C'mon. You've entered info for 29 rounds, and only entered cites for 13? That's only 44.8%. Open Source is NOT a replacement for good disclosure practices.
Tournament
Round
Report
GSU
2
Opponent: Kansas KS | Judge:
Aff- Detention 1NC- Drones DA T Court Ptix Security Congress CP Strippers 2NR - Court Ptix
GSU
8
Opponent: Georgetown ErMc | Judge: Dan Bagwell
Aff - Targeted Killing 1NC - T-restrict Executive CP Politics Security K State Secrets DA 2NR - Executive CP State Secrets DA
GSU
6
Opponent: MSU | Judge: Bruce Najor
1AC - Consult Congress 1NC - T- restrict Politics PMC Shift DA Security K Executive CP NFU PIC w Deterrence DA
GSU
Doubles
Opponent: Georgetown EM | Judge: Hardy, Hall, Brovero
1AC- Targeted Killing 1NC - SS DA CR DA T XO Armed Conflict CP WOT DA on Case 2NR - SS DA and Case
Gsu
4
Opponent: Liberty Bobbitt-Murray | Judge: Foley
1NC - T - Sig Strikes T-Restriction Executive CP Shutdown Politics Security K Prez Powers DA 2NC - T Restriction Executive CP case 1NR - Shutdown Politics 2NR - Politics Case
Harvard
2
Opponent: Wake MQ | Judge: Susko
1NC - Court CP Armed Conflict CP Yellen Politics T - Signature Strikes Case (Yemen strikes good) Block - Court CP Armed Conflict CP Yellen Politics and case 2NR - Court Cp and politics
Harvard
2
Opponent: Wake MQ | Judge: Susko
1NC - Court CP Armed Conflict CP Yellen Politics T - Signature Strikes Case (Yemen strikes good) Block - Court CP Armed Conflict CP Yellen Politics and case 2NR - Court Cp and politics
Harvard
4
Opponent: Georgetown ErMC | Judge: Repko
1NC - Armed Conflict CP Special Ops PIC Yellen Politics T - SS State Secrets DA
Tournament: GSU | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Georgetown EM | Judge: Hardy, Hall, Brovero 1NC 1NC A. Interpretation – Statutory restrictions must directly prohibit activities currently under the president’s war powers authority – this excludes regulation or oversight Statutory restrictions prohibit actions Lamont 5 (Michael, Legal Analyst @ Occupational health, "Legal: Staying on the right side of the law," http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/01/04/2005/29005/legal-staying-on-the-right-side-of-the-law.htm#.UgFe_o3qnoI) It will be obvious what 'conduct' and 'redundancy' dismissals are. A statutory restriction means that the employee is prevented by law from doing the job - for example, a driver who loses his driving licence. 'Some other substantial reason' means "Parliament can't be expected to think of everything". Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108_11379 Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority AND were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.
B. Vote Neg –
Limits – Regulation and oversight of authority allows a litany of new affs in each area – justifies indirect effects of statutory policies and affs that don’t alter presidential authority – undermines prep and clash 2. Ground – Restriction ground is the locus of neg prep – their interpretation jacks all core disads – politics, presidential powers, and any area based disad because an aff doesn’t have to prevent the president from doing anything
But read on to the second graf of the piece and you'll see that the AND of a shutdown, in other words, they're falling, not rising. Obama fights the plan – strongly supports war powers Rana 11 (Aziz – Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099, lexis) Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of Barack Obama AND war powers and to promote the centrality of state secrecy to national security. Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis) a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by AND Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187 Capital key Dumain 9/18/13 (Emma, Roll Call, "Will House Democrats Balk at Sequester-Level CR?," http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/will-house-democrats-balk-at-sequester-level-cr/)
What would be helpful for the duration of the political battle over the CR between now and the end of the month, however, is if Obama more frequently took to the “bully pulpit” to blast Republicans and bolster Democrats, the aide said.¶ “The more the better,” he said. Shutdown makes us vulnerable to a cyber-attack Sideman 11 (Alysia, Federal Computer Week Contributor, “Agencies must determine computer security teams in face of potential federal shutdown” Federal Computer Week, http://fcw.com/Articles/2011/02/23/Agencies-must-determine-computer-security-teams-in-face-of-shutdown.aspx?Page=1)
With the WikiLeaks hacks and other threats to cybersecurity present, guarding against cyberattacks has AND be vulnerable in the face of an attack, reports Federal Computer Week.
Nuclear war. Lawson 9 (Sean, Assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict Escalation, May 13th 2009, http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477)
Introduction At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over AND hacker mercenaries. How will deterrence play out in this kind of scenario?
1NC Text: The Executive Branch of the United States should issue an executive order that states that targeted killing should not be used as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
Self-restraint solves and is more effective than the plan Posner and Vermeule 10 (Eric A. Posner is the Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law @ the University of Chicago School of Law and Editor of the Journal of Legal Studies, Adrian Vermeule is a legal scholar, Oxford University Press, “The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic”, Google Books) A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic AND political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules ¶or policies. policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why? 1NC Congressional action undermines the state secrete privilege – ends court deference and spills over Windsor 12 (Lindsay – J.D. candidate and Master of Security Studies candidate at Georgetown University, “IS THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN THE CONSTITUTION? THE BASIS OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN INHERENT EXECUTIVE POWERS and WHY COURT-IMPLEMENTED SAFEGUARDS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENT”, 2012, 43 Geo. J. Int'l L. 897, lexis) In contrast to the acknowledged roles of both Congress and the President in foreign affairs AND procedures to satisfy the Court that national security matters are at stake. n16 State Secrets Privilege key to military technology and innovation Donohue 10 (Laura – Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Shadow of State Secrets”, 2010, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77, lexis) In contrast, docket searches demonstrate that, from January 2001 to January 2009, AND state to protect the company from financial penalties associated with bad behavior. n33 Great power war Baru 9 – Sanjaya Baru is a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 - 168 Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.2 In the modern AND sustain economic growth and military power, the classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma. 1NC Text: The United States Federal Government should restrict executive authority to use targeted killing as a first resort outside of armed conflict. Restricting targeting killing outside of zones of active hostilities means the US can’t strike in Pakistan or Yemen. JCSL 13 Journal of Con?ict and Security Law, Vol. 18 No. 1, p. 1-2, “Deterrence Revisited?” Oxford University Press Journals The other mentioned issue is that of drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), not in AND the result of technological advancements that have led to new types of weapons. Aggressive targeted killing policy’s key to stability in Yemen Alan W. Dowd 13, writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters, Vol. 42.4/43.1 At the beginning of President Hadi’s May offensive he, therefore, had a fractured AND , but they could also melt away in the face of military setbacks. Adding to his problems, President Hadi had only recently taken office after a long AND Yemeni officers indicated that they respected the fighting ability of their enemies.16 Shortly before the ground offensive, drones were widely reported in the US and international AND government, although it no longer ruled any urban centers in the south. Al Qaeda will attack Saudi Arabian oil assets. That collapses the global economy. Gartenstein-Ross, 5/23/2011 (Daveed – author of Bin Laden’s Legacy, lecturer for the Naval Postgraduate School, trains members of the U.S. military preparing for deployments to the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, director of the Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization, above-average bowler, Osama’s Oil Obsession, Foreign Policy, p. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/23/osamas_oil_obsession) The killing of Osama bin Laden has provided the U.S. public with AND well-placed throughout the Persian Gulf to attack oil facilities and officials." Nuclear war Harris and Burrows, 9 – *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)
Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and AND within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world. The CP solves norms – armed conflict requirement is based on host-state consent and proportionality. Lewis and Crawford 13 Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Emily, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, “DRONES AND DISTINCTION: HOW IHL ENCOURAGED THE RISE OF DRONES” p. 1163-1165 , http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF But the misconceptions concerning drones are not limited to the practical effects of U. AND ever-expanding entitlement for itself to target individuals across the globe.”168
Norms No Modeling U.S. can’t effectively signal Zenko 13 (Micah, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, "The Signal and the Noise," Foreign Policy, 2-2-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the_signal_and_the_noise)
Later, Gen. Austin observed of cutting forces from the Middle East: " AND pronouncements seriously, and instead assume they are made to appease domestic audiences. No reverse modeling - norms can’t solve Saunders 13 (Paul, executive director of The Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005, “We Won't Always Drone Alone,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177)
A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will AND China or Russia uses armed UAVs to attack groups they define as terrorists? Prolif Inevitable – Can’t Reverse Drones are locked in - plan can’t solve McDonald 13 (Jack, lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, completed his PhD thesis on targeted killings, has worked with The Centre for Defence Studies, “Losing perspective on proliferation,” http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2013/01/losing-perspective-on-proliferation/)
The control of UAV technology is, however, a problem. In short, AND little more thought from critics of military UAVs might produce a better critique.
The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command ( AND be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.
Will Be Slow Drone prolif is slow and the impact is small Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf?)
Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within AND undertake the significant¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term.
They can’t solve signature strikes – means there will still be a norm for out of battlefield drone use Zenko evidence says we need direct cooperation to solve norms. Zenko 13 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, “U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf?) The United States should ?? promote Track 1.5 or Track 2 discussions on AND engage emerging drone makers on how to strengthen norms against selling weaponscapable systems.
1NC SCS If China Can’t use drone strikes they will use other means – still ensures escalation No SCS conflict Chaibi 3/4 -- 3rd year visiting student from Princeton University in the Department of Engineering Science (Abraham, 2013, "The outlook for continuing stability in the South China Sea," http://politicsinspires.org/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/)
East Asia’s rapid economic and military development has captured global attention, but pundits are AND , Taiwan would most likely be the focus of its aggressionvii. SCS tensions inevitable but no escalation Meidan 12 -- analyst at Eurasia Group; research includes China's energy and environmental policies, policymaking, Chinese elite politics, and diplomacy; MA in political sciences and East Asian studies from the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (Michal, 8/7, "Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea," http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2GsDDT62R)
These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them AND in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates.
What ultimately drives this is a -- is a conflicting set of interests between rampant AND the national mistakes in the public discourse both about Japan and with Japan.
1NC Turkey No reverse causal modeling evidence- Stein just says Turkey uses drones like the U.S. – no argument that Turkey would stop if the U.S. set a precedent. Turkey soft power fails Idiz 9-3 Semih Idiz contributing writer for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse. A journalist who has been covering diplomacy and foreign policy issues for major Turkish newspapers for 30 years, published in The Financial Times, The Times of London, Mediterranean Quarterly and Foreign Policy magazine.¶ “Turkey’s Middle East Policy Lies in Shambles” http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/turkish-middle-east-policy-shambles.html
Erdogan’s angry rhetoric, which is also aiming now at regional powers that supported the AND and appears set to continue to do so for some time to come. Iran prolif isn’t a threat – they don’t want the bomb and if they get it they won’t use it Pinker, 11 Steven, professor of psychology at Harvard University, The Better Angels of our Nature Why Violence Has Declined, ISBN: 067002295, for online access email alexanderdpappas@gmail.com and I will forward you the full book If current pundits are to be believed, then as you are reading these words AND were repeatedly proven wrong, could lead to adventures with even greater costs. Deterrence theory true in terms of Iran – U.S. and Israel keep them in check Kreps 12 (Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Cornell University, "What Will Iran Do If It Gets a Nuclear Bomb?", Feb 22, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/what-will-iran-do-if-it-gets-a-nuclear-bomb/253430/)
Having a nuclear weapon would give Iran a bigger bark. Armed with the bomb AND , while only temporarily or incompletely complying with their end of the bargain. On the other hand, it seems doubtful that having the bomb would give Iran AND hurt Iran quite badly should be enough to keep Iran's bite in check.
Terror 1NC Winning War on Terror now – Al Qaeda is on the run Ackerman 13 (Spencer, Wired senior reporter, Spencer, "Spy Chiefs Point to a Much, Much Weaker Al-Qaida," Wired, 3-13-13, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/spy-terrorism/, accessed 9-18-13)
Don’t ever expect the heads of the U.S.’ 16-agency AND to keep doing what it’s doing, lest the threat re-emerge. Geographic limits undermine the effectiveness of US counter-terror ops Corn 13 (Geoffrey, South Texas College of Law Presidential Research Professor of Law, former JAG officer and chief of the law of war branch of the international law division of the US Army, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, "The law of armed conflict, the use of military force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force," Congressional Documents and Publications, 6-16-13, lexis) In my opinion, there is no need to amend the AUMF to define the AND when and where theyhe will be subject to lawful attack. Geographic restrictions doom counter-terror - create safe havens Blank 10 (Laurie, Emory University School of Law International Humanitarian Law Clinic director, "Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat," Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, 9-16-10, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677965)
It is therefore premature and dangerous to repeal or significantly restrict the AUMF at this AND to the United States, the law should not be repealed or replaced. Your author concedes that geographic limits to TK creates terrorist safe havens Daskal 13 (Jennifer, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University, "THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE," 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, lexis)
As a policy matter, the territorially restricted approach also creates safe havens for the AND information for a criminal prosecution (as was done in Warsame's case). n77
1NC Terror No impact to terror Mueller and Stewart 12 John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center AND . 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan It seems increasingly likely that the official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks of AND far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.
No nuclear terror – operation, cohesion and coordination Mueller and Stewart 12 John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center AND . 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able AND eventually have committed some serious, if small-scale, damage.16 Even if there is an attack – it would be small scale and disorganized Mueller and Stewart 12 John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center AND . 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan Calculating the Costs of the Counterterrorism Delusion Delusion is a quality that is difficult to AND they would not change the fatality risk for the American population very much.
1NC US/Russia War No nuclear strike Graham 7 (Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html) An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “ AND while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.
No escalation – disagreements remain limited Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties) Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States AND of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia. 1NC Russian Miscalc No risk of accidental/unauthorized war. Dr. Leonid Ryabikhin, General (Ret.) Viktor Koltunov and Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, June 2009. Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute; Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic Stability of Rosatom; and Senior Research Scientist, Centre for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. “De-alerting: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Discussion paper presented at the seminar on “Re-framing De Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context,” www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf.
Analysis of the above arguments shows, that they do not have solid grounds. Today Russian and U.S. ICBMs are not targeted at any state. High alert status of the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces has not been an obstacle for building a strategic partnership. The issue of the possibility of an “accidental” nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorization by the national leadership. Besides that it should be mentioned that even the Soviet Union and the United States had taken important bilateral steps toward decreasing the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. Direct emergency telephone “red line” has been established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963. In 1971 the USSR and USA signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Nuclear War Threat. This Agreement established the actions of each side in case of even a hypothetical accidental missile launch and it contains the requirements for the owner of the launched missile to deactivate and eliminate the missile. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have developed proper measures to observe the agreed requirements.
Moar Defense -- No risk of Russia war Ball 5 (Desmond, Professor – Strategic Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University, “The Probabilities of ‘On the Beach’ Assessing Armageddon Scenarios in the 21st Century, May, http://www.manningclark.org.au/papers/se05_ball.html)
The prospects of a nuclear war between the US and Russia must now be deemed AND buried targets (such as underground command and control centres and leadership bunkers). -- Common ties, Russian leadership, and defense spending checks Aron 6 (Leon, Director of Russian Studies – American Enterprise Institute, “The United States and Russia”, 6-29, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24606/pub_detail.asp)
Yet the probability of a frontal confrontation and a new Cold War remains very remote AND -eleventh of what the U.S. spent ($522 billion). -- Deterrence checks Turner 2 (Admiral Stansfield, Former Director – Central Intelligence Agency, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter / Spring, 26 Fletcher F. World Aff. 115, Lexis)
There are, of course, other centrals question to be considered: Would Russian AND the United States must consider Russian deterrence as very close to its own. -- Won’t go nuclear Manning 00 (Robert A., Senior Fellow and Director of Asian Studies – Council on Foreign Relations, “Abbott and Costello Nuclear Policy”, Washington Times, 3-10, Lexis)
We don't want to go any lower because we need these weapons for nuclear deterrence AND targeting plans on prospective Russian targets, though no one will say so.
2NC Counterplan
“Armed Conflict” Solves Terror The armed conflict framework authorizes targeted killings outside of zones of hostilities in a manner that’s consistent with international law – it’s key to deny safe havens. Wittes 13 Benjamin, Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, 2/27, “Drones and the War on Terror: When Can the U.S. Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?” p. 3-6, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Testimony/2013/02/2720drones20wittes/Feb202720Drones20Wittes20Testimony.pdf First, the administration contends that the United States is in a state of armed AND reaching these actors and denying them sanctuary from which to attack this country.
Armed conflict requirement is key to solve terror. Groves 13 Steven, Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, 4/10, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad While U.S. drone strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in AND does not somehow extinguish the right of the United States to defend itself.
“Armed Conflict” Solves Norms CP Solves norms – host states consent and US justifications are perceived as valid. Lewis and Crawford 13 Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Emily, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, “DRONES AND DISTINCTION: HOW IHL ENCOURAGED THE RISE OF DRONES” p. 1166, , http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF Lastly, the legal justi?cation advanced by the United States for its drone use does AND it likely to “haunt” the United States in the future.169
Behind the scenes, though, it is not data protection and surveillance that produces the most complications for the transatlantic intelligence relationship, but rather America's use of armed drones to kill terrorist suspects away from the battlefield. Incidents such as the recent killing of at least 17 people in Pakistan are therefore only likely to heighten European unease. In public, European governments have displayed a curiously passive approach to American drone strikes AND , however, Europe’s muted stance on drone strikes looks likely to change. Why? For one thing, many European countries are now trying to acquire armed AND and discussions are also likely to start at a pan-European level. But as Europeans begin to articulate their policy on the use of drones, a AND an expanded drone strike campaign. European countries have generally rejected this claim. However, the changes to American policy that President Obama announced in May could open AND associated force could lawfully be killed with a drone strike at any time. European countries might be more willing to accept an approach based on this kind of “self-defense” idea. However, there remain some big stumbling blocks. First, a good deal about Obama’s new standards is still unclear. How does he define a “zone of hostilities,” where the new rules will not apply? And what is his understanding of an “imminent” threat? European countries are likely to interpret these key terms in a much narrower way than the United States. Second, Obama’s new approach only applies as a policy choice. His more expansive legal claims remain in the background so that he is free to return to them if he wishes. But if the United States is serious about working toward international standards on drone strikes, as Obama and his officials have sometimes suggested, then Europe is the obvious place to start. And there are a number of steps the administration could take to make an agreement with European countries more likely.
Turns Iran/North Korea Econ collapse spurs isolationism – sparks rogue prolif by Iran and NK and conflict between Russia, China, Indo–Pak Freidberg 8 (Aaron, Professor of Politics and International Relations – Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, Wall Street Journal, 10–21, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html?mod=googlenews_wsj) With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to AND disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership. Turns Russia Econ collapse turns Russian war Nyquist 5 (J.R., Author and Geopolitical Columnist – Financial Sense Online, "The Political Consequences of a Financial Crash," 2–4, http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2005/0204.html) Should the United States experience a severe economic contraction during the second term of President Bush, the American people will likely support politicians who advocate further restrictions and controls on our market economy – guaranteeing its strangulation and the steady pauperization of the country. In Congress today, Sen. Edward Kennedy supports nearly all the economic dogmas listed above. It is easy to see, therefore, that the coming economic contraction, due in part to a policy of massive credit expansion, will have serious political consequences for the Republican Party (to the benefit of the Democrats). Furthermore, an economic contraction will encourage the formation of anti–capitalist majorities and a turning away from the free market system. The danger here is not merely economic. The political left openly favors the collapse of America's strategic position abroad. The withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East, the Far East and Europe would catastrophically impact an international system that presently allows 6 billion people to live on the earth's surface in relative peace. Should anti–capitalist dogmas overwhelm the global market and trading system that evolved under American leadership, the planet's economy would contract and untold millions would die of starvation. Nationalistic totalitarianism, fueled by a politics of blame, would once again bring war to Asia and Europe. But this time the war would be waged with mass destruction weapons and the United States would be blamed because it is the center of global capitalism. Furthermore, if the anti–capitalist party gains power in Washington, we can expect to see policies of appeasement and unilateral disarmament enacted. American appeasement and disarmament, in this context, would be an admission of guilt before the court of world opinion. Russia and China, above all, would exploit this admission to justify aggressive wars, invasions and mass destruction attacks. A future financial crash, therefore, must be prevented at all costs. But we cannot do this. As one observer recently lamented, "We drank the poison and now we must die." Turns China Growth prevents miscalculation and war with China Glaser 5/2/12 (“China is Reacting to Our Weak Economy” Bonnie S. Glaser (senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.) 5/2/2012 http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are–we–headed–for–a–cold–war–with–china/china–is–reacting–to–our–weak–economy) To maintain peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region and secure American interests AND the United States needs to restore financial solvency and growth through bipartisan action. Econ growth prevents war with China – sticky power ensures interdependence not war Mead 04 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, “America's STICKY Power,” Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr, Proquest) China's rise to global prominence will offer a key test case for sticky power. AND inevitable" U.S.–Chinese conflict is less likely to occur. Econ collapse turns China war Mead 9 (Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy – Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger”, The New Republic, 2–4, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9–2887–4d81–8542–92e83915f5f8andp=2) The greatest danger both to U.S.–China relations and to American power AND the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight. Turns Terrorism Turns terrorism Schaub 4 (Drew, Professor of Political Science – Penn State University, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(2), April) Despite the caveats, our analysis suggests important policy implications for the war against terrorism AND economic development deserves much more attention from policy makers than it currently enjoys. Growth solves terrorism Gries, Kriegery, Meierrieksz 09 (Causal Linkages Between Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth; Thomas Gries , Tim Kriegery, Daniel Meierrieksz; February 17, 2009;http://groups.uni–paderborn.de/fiwi/RePEc/Working20Paper20neutral/WP2020–202009–02.pdf) Possible E¤ects of Economic Performance on Terrorism Economic theory argues that terrorists are AND , in times of stronger economic performance individuals simply have more to lose. AQAP Impact – Oil Spikes A terrorist attack on Saudi Arabia undermines the resiliency of the oil market – that causes a global economic collapse. Daly, 2/23/2006 (John C. K. - United Press International correspondent and former adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute, Saudi Oil Facilities: Al-Qaeda's Next Target?, Terrorism Monitor Vol. 4 Issue 4, p. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnewstt_news=685andtx_ttnewsbackPid=181andno_cache=1) Saudi Arabia and its oil have long been in bin Laden's thoughts; in 1996 AND world's oil-addicted economies to their knees, America's along with them." Econ Collapse = War Decline cause miscalculation and conflict – prefer statistically significant evidence Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215) Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict AND not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. Economic collapse causes extinction Bearden 00 (T.E., Director of Association of Distinguished American Scientists, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly,” Space Energy Access Systems, http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm) History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic AND , and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
Thus far, in Congress and in the executive branch, we see mostly uncritical AND Starbucks, running these things in theater and being incredibly, incredibly successful.”
No Modeling
Restrictions won’t be modeled- precedent already set Jacobson 13 (Mark R., senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. From 2009 to 2011, he served with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, “Column: Key Assumptions About Drones Are Based on Misconceptions,” http://www.vnews.com/opinion/4393278-95/drones-drone-armed-civilian
Armed drones are neither as simple as model airplanes nor as complex as high- AND United States must prepare for being the prey, not just the predator. US drone model is irrelevant Wittes and Singh 12 (Benjamin, a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution where he co-directs the Harvard Law School-Brookings Project on Security and Law, specializes in the legal issues surrounding international security and the war on terrorism, member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and the Law, Ritika, a research assistant on law and national security issues at the Brookings Institution. She graduated with majors in International Affairs and Government from Skidmore College, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,” 1-11-12, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity)
Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the AND United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.
Prolif Inevitable – Tech/Econ Benefits US tech sales and economic benefits make prolif inevitable
CRG 12 (The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal, a registered non-profit organization in the province of Quebec, Canada, “Mapping Drone Proliferation: UAVs in 76 Countries,” September 18, http://www.globalresearch.ca/mapping-drone-proliferation-uavs-in-76-countries)
The report goes on: “Currently, there are over 50 countries developing more AND U.S. companies can remain competitive in the global UAV market.” US tech sales make prolif inevitable
Unintended consequences of drone warfare include retaliation from, and the radicalization of, the AND
in essence, a further expansion of the military-industrial complex.
2NC SCS SCS tensions inevitable but no escalation Meidan 12 -- analyst at Eurasia Group; research includes China's energy and environmental policies, policymaking, Chinese elite politics, and diplomacy; MA in political sciences and East Asian studies from the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (Michal, 8/7, "Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea," http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2GsDDT62R)
These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them AND in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates. No SCS conflict Economist 12 (9/22, "Could Asia really go to war over these?" http://www.economist.com/node/21563316)
Optimists point out that the latest scuffle is mainly a piece of political theatre— AND retaliation when China blocked the sale of rare earths essential to Japanese industry. No SCS escalation Storey 12 -- Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, specializes in Asian security issues, with a focus on Southeast Asia (Ian, Interviewed by Ann Jung, 7/16/12, "ASEAN and the South China Sea: Deepening Divisions," http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=262)
The worst-case scenario for the United States, and indeed all stakeholders in AND say at this point in time. But it could be very messy. -- South China Seas are stable – China lacks capability and interdependence checks Rosenberg 9 (David, Professor of Political Science – Middlebury College and Research Fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies – Australian National University, “Dire Straits: Competing Security Priorities in the South China Sea”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 3-20, http://japanfocus.org/-David-Rosenberg/1773)
From the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Malacca, security concerns are growing around AND a Chinese meltdown, as many regional monetary authorities are quick to note. South China Sea is no longer a concern Bitzinger and Desker 08 Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Senior Fellow with the Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Richard and Barry, Why east asian war is unlikely Survival, Volume 50, Issue 6 December 2008 , pages 105 – 128)
Nowhere, perhaps, is this new 'play-nice' strategy and good-neighbour approach more tangible than in China's recent handling of the Spratly Islands dispute. From its supposed flashpoint status during the 1990s, the Spratlys have calmed down considerably, and today the status of the islands is 'no longer discussed as a major security concern'.20 To its credit, China has made a concerted effort not to let the South China Sea issue become a major domestic political football (unlike the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan), nor has it seized or occupied additional islands in the Spratlys since 1995. In particular, in 2002 Beijing and ASEAN agreed to a joint Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which affirmed the intention of the signatories to peacefully resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes, to exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea and to avoid actions that would 'complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability', including refraining from further construction on the presently uninhabited islands. In addition, in March 2005 Beijing also signed bilateral agreements with the Philippines and Vietnam for the joint exploration for oil in areas of overlapping sovereignty claims. (At the same time, estimates of likely oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea have been revised downward considerably, so there may be much less to fight over than originally believed.) This is not to say that the Spratly Islands dispute has been settled once and for all (fishing rights, for example, will continue to be important). It does stand a much better chance of being resolved peacefully, however, and without adding to tensions or hostility between China and Southeast Asia. Existing agreements solve Chinese aggression PDI 08 (3/13, "SPRATLYS DEAL NOTHING TO WORRY ABOUT FVR", L/N)
FORMER PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS Yesterday allayed fears over the governments joint oil exploration deal with AND the non-violent resolution of lingering border questions on the Spratly islands. China’s avoiding Spratlys conflict and any dispute won’t esclate Teves 08 (Catherine J., 10/5, News.Balita, “Chinese aggression over Spratlys far-fetched: expert observer,” http://news.balita.ph/2008/10/05/chinese-aggression-over-spratlys-far-fetched-expert-observer/)
A Beijing-based Filipino journalist believes Chinese aggression over internationally disputed Spratly Islands is AND said China’s armed forces still lags behind US military power. (PNA) -- No escalation Bush and O’Hanlon 7 (Richard and Michael, Senior Fellows – Brookings Institution, “U.S. Grapples With China’s Rise, Taiwan”, The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 5-3, Lexis)
But most of the issues and frictions that accompany China's rise can be managed AND Sea or small islets in the South China Sea) is highly unlikely. -- Many factors check South China Sea war -- Geography -- ASEAN -- Shipping Lanes -- Political Costs Joyner 98 (Chris, Professor of International Relations – Georgetown University, New England Law Review, Spring, Lexis)
Nevertheless, several factors suggest the unlikelihood of large-scale military conflict over the AND Asian states, including other claimants to the Spratlys, underscores that reluctance.
Plan can’t restore Turkish influence in the ME -Calls for Syrian intervention -support of the weakened Muslim brotherhood Tattersall 9-18 Nick, writer for Reuters, “Analysis: Turkey's 'worthy solitude' sidelines Erdogan in Middle East”
ISTANBUL (Reuters) - Clinging to calls for military action in Syria and wedded AND is that this could have quite a detrimental impact on the Turkish economy."
Turkey can’t use its soft power – also means they can’t solve Grunstein 11 Judah, “Turkey and the Arab Spring”, World Politics Review's editor-in-chief. His coverage of French politics, foreign policy and national security has appeared in World Politics Review, the American Prospect online, French Politics, the Small Wars Journal and Foreign Policy online http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/8764/turkey-and-the-arab-spring
Moreover, and supporting Cook's argument, as much as I've often admired Turkey's AND mean that the high-point of Ankara's regional influence is behind it.
terror
No Nuclear Terror
Strategy has shifted- will be small scale terrorism Finn ‘10 (Risk of small-scale attacks by al-Qaeda and its allies is rising, officials say By Peter Finn Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, September 22, 2010; 10:50 PM
Al-Qaeda and its allies are likely to attempt small-scale, less AND a commercial airliner approaching Detroit and the failed car bombing in Times Square.
Won’t Use Nukes
Won’t use nukes- they are rational Kapur ‘8 S. Paul, associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32
Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two AND rorist groups must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
A2: Missing Nukes
No missing nukes – they would have been used already Associated Press 12 – Vladimir Isachenkov, reporter for the Associated Press, January 9, 2012, "How Threat of Loose Soviet Nukes Was Avoided," http://www.military.com/news/article/how-threat-of-loose-soviet-nukes-was-avoided.html There have been gnawing fears that a few Soviet nukes still might have gone missing AND the fact that the nuclear weapons have been maintained in a secure way."
1NR Russia Deterrence checks Turner 2 (Admiral Stansfield, Former Director – Central Intelligence Agency, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter / Spring, 26 Fletcher F. World Aff. 115, Lexis)
There are, of course, other centrals question to be considered: Would Russian AND the United States must consider Russian deterrence as very close to its own. Early warning systems solve Bailey 98 (Kathleen, Snr Fellow @ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, August, NIPP, http://www.nipp.org/5.php)
The United States and Russia have satellite- and ground-based systems to detect AND the leadership stepped up readiness in event that it was actually an attack.
It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and AND rapidly exchange information, conduct research and promote individual awareness of the threat.
Conditionality – 2NC
What is conditionality? Can one really be conditional? Who are we? What are we doing here?
Impact – 2NC Insert impact calc and some jokes if I have time
Impact – Heg – Turns Terror Collapse of hegemony increases terrorism Brooks and Wohlforth 2 Stephen Brooks, Assistant Professor, William Wohlforth, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs, July / August 2002
Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if AND but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.
There are good reasons for mutual apprehension; they cannot be papered over with better AND the ships and aircraft our military needs, Americans may buy themselves peace. 2ac- Iran Perception of American strength prevents iran nuke war Talent and Hall ‘10, March (Jim - distinguished fellow in government relations at the Heritage Foundation, and Heath, Sowing the Wind, p. http://www.freedomsolutions.org/2010/03/sowing-the-wind-the-decay-of-american-power-and-its-consequences/) There is a reason that regimes like Iran and North Korea go to the time AND of American power without having to develop their own deterrent capability.42
Link Wall – 2NC – Congress Courts will get involved – the only method of enforcing legislation Tien 10 (Lee – Senior Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation, “THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FIS) AND FISA REFORM: Article: Litigating the State Secrets Privilege”, 2010, 42 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 675, lexis) It is difficult to imagine how courts could proceed more carefully than the Ninth Circuit AND even when they are working together to protect individual rights against Executive abuse. Statutory guidelines alter the state secrets doctrine Blazey 10 (Elizabeth – J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011, “Controlling Government Secrecy: A Judicial Solution to the Internal and External Conflicts Surrounding the State Secrets Privilege”, 2010, 58 Buffalo L. Rev. 1187, lexis) First, this Comment explores internal conflict using legal and historical traditions as a framework AND disclosure for other types of secrets under statutory guidelines set by Congress. n20 Statutory limits enable court oversight of executive programs – undermines state secrets Frost 7 (Amanda – Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, “THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND SEPARATION OF POWERS”, 2007, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1931, lexis) The executive's assertion of the privilege thus undermines Congress's authority to assign federal jurisdiction and AND well be to permit courts to determine the legality of such executive conduct.
Link – Drones Drones are protected as state secrets – plan requires circumventing the doctrine Rosen 11 (Richard D. – Professor of Law and Director, Center for Military Law and Policy, Texas Tech University School of Law, “PART III: ARTICLE: DRONES AND THE U.S. COURTS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5280, lexis) V. State Secrets: The Death Knell of Drone Cases Assuming a complaint survives AND to the means, methods, and circumstances under which drones are employed. U – 2NC Trends prove – the state secret privilege is stronger Rudenstine 13 (David – Sheldon H. Solow Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, “The Irony of a Faustian Bargain: A Reconsideration of the Supreme Court's 1953 United States v. Reynolds Decision”, Cardozo Law Review, 2013, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1283, lexis) Introduction Sixty years ago, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Reynolds. AND re-examine the Reynolds decision, the basis of the modern privilege. CONTINUED TO FOOTNOTE n8. The expansion of the state secrets privilege over the last three and a AND Justice to review all claims of executive privilege. See infra note 409. Spillover – 2NC State secret rulings spill over – multiple opinions prove Donohue 10 (Laura – Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Shadow of State Secrets”, 2010, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77, lexis) The telecommunications cases related to the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program stand apart from the general AND fore the major battles between the branches that mark invocations of the privilege. Precedent dictates use of state secret doctrine Ziegler 8 (Margaret, “No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain: The Government's Increased Use of the State Secrets Privilege to Conceal Wrongdoing”, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2008, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 691, lexis) With respect to the second and third approaches to state secrets identified in the opinion AND sufficiently to asses the state secrets privilege in light of the facts." n42
SSP K2 Military – 2NC State secrets are key to hegemony – military and industrial tech Donohue 10 (Laura – Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Shadow of State Secrets”, 2010, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77, lexis) I. Government Contractors and State Secrets The increasingly intricate relationship between national defense, AND of a broader framework through which the government tries to limit its vulnerability. Impact – Deterrence – 2NC Secrecy is key to the US nuclear deterrent Green 97 (Tracey – Associate with McNair Law Firm, J.D. – University of South Carolina, “Providing for the Common Defense versus Promoting the General Welfare: the Conflicts Between National Security and National Environmental Policy”, South Carolina Environmental Law Journal, Fall, 6 S.C Envtl. L.J. 137, lexis) The deployment of nuclear weapons, however, is a DoD action for which secrecy AND weapons, they cannot release any information regarding the storage of these weapons. Escalates to global nuclear war Caves 10 (John P. Jr., Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction – National Defense University, “Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”, Strategic Forum, No. 252, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/SF20252_John20Caves.pdf) Perceptions of a compromised U.S. nuclear deterrent as described above would have profound policy implications, particu¬larly if they emerge at a time when a nuclear-armed great power is pursuing a more aggressive strategy toward U.S. allies and partners in its region in a bid to enhance its regional and global clout. ? A dangerous period of vulnerability would open for the United States and those nations that depend on U.S. protection while the United States attempted to rectify the problems with its nuclear forces. As it would take more than a decade for the United States to produce new nuclear weapons, ensuing events could preclude a return to anything like the status quo ante. ? The assertive, nuclear-armed great power, and other major adversaries, could be willing to challenge U.S. interests more directly in the expectation that the United States would be less prepared to threaten or deliver a military response that could lead to direct conflict. They will want to keep the United States from reclaiming its earlier power position. ? Allies and partners who have relied upon explicit or implicit assurances of U.S. nuclear protection as a foundation of their security could lose faith in those assur¬ances. They could compensate by accom¬modating U.S. rivals, especially in the short term, or acquiring their own nuclear deter¬rents, which in most cases could be accom¬plished only over the mid- to long term. A more nuclear world would likely ensue over a period of years. ? Important U.S. interests could be com¬promised or abandoned, or a major war could occur as adversaries and/or the United States miscalculate new boundaries of deterrence and provocation. At worst, war could lead to state-on-state employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on a scale far more catastrophic than what nuclear-armed terror¬ists alone could inflict.
9/23/13
NDT Rnd 3 1nc vs Northwestern OS
Tournament: NDT | Round: 3 | Opponent: Northwestern OS | Judge: Smelko, Wunderlich, Glineicki 1NC A. Interpretation – Restrictions are prohibitions --- the aff is distinct Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown and Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/68642920Appellant20Randall20Kincheloe27s.pdf 3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the AND or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as AND merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license. Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108_11379 Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority AND were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions. President’s war powers authority is to authority to act Lobel 8 (Jules – Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War”, 2008, Ohio State Law Journal, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 391, lexis) Separation of powers doctrine generally operates on what has been termed a horizontal axis to AND to check and limit presidential initiative both before and after the Executive acts. Authority is power delegated to an agent by a principle Kelly 3 Judge for the State of Michigan, JOSEPH ELEZOVIC, Plaintiff, and LULA ELEZOVIC, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and DANIEL P. BENNETT, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants., No. 236749, COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN, 259 Mich. App. 187; 673 N.W.2d 776; 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 2649; 93 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 244; 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1557, lexis Applying agency principles, a principal is responsible for the acts of its agents done AND be delegated in carrying out the principal's business." Id. at 1348. B. Violation – Ex-post review only determines whether particular targeted killings exceeded authority the government already had---that doesn’t affect the legality of targeted killings at all Vladeck 13 (Steve Vladeck, professor of law and the associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, 2/5/13, “What’s Really Wrong With the Targeted Killing White Paper,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/whats-really-wrong-with-the-targeted-killing-white-paper/) Many of us wondered, at the time, just where this came from– AND which the perfect is the enemy of the good, this is it. Vote neg--- Neg ground---only prohibitions on particular authorities guarantee links to every core argument like flexibility and deference Precision---only our interpretation defines “restrictions on authority”---that’s key to adequate preparation and policy analysis Limits---there are an infinite number of small hoops they could require the president to jump through---overstretches our research burden
1NC Judicial ex-post review of targeted killing would collapse military effectiveness and command structure---causes second-guessing of every crucial battlefield decision Delery 12 (Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, 12/14/12, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, NASSER AL-AULAQI, as personal representative of the estate of ANWAR AL-AULAQI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LEON E. PANETTA, et al., in their individual capacities, Defendants, No. 1:12-cv-01192 (RMC), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MTD-AAA.pdf) First, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly held that where claims directly AND on military effectiveness. This too warrants barring this new species of litigation. Targeted killing’s vital to counterterrorism---disrupts leadership and makes carrying out attacks impossible Anderson 13 (Kenneth, Professor of International Law at American University, June 2013, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, Vol. 135, No. 6, http://www.volokh.com/2013/05/22/the-case-for-drones/) Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end AND acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness. Extinction Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf) The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option. 1NC The executive branch should publish its standards and procedures for target selection in targeted killing and establish ex ante transparency of targeted killing standards and procedures. The executive branch should limit self-defense targeted killings to those that are not guided by specific reference to the following as justification for the use of force: the armed attacks preceding it, how the object of the use of force is responsible for the attacks, and/or how the state in which the group is being targeted is responsible for the operations of that group. Executive order establishing transparency of targeting decisions resolves drone legitimacy and resentment Daskal 13 (Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165) 4. Procedural Requirements Currently, officials in the executive branch carry out all such AND and would promote better accounting of the civilian costs of targeting operations. n198 Solves the second advantage Martin 11 (Craig Martin, Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law, “GOING MEDIEVAL: TARGETED KILLING, SELF-DEFENSE AND THE JUS AD BELLUM REGIME”, SSRN) Without going through the analysis for each of these scenarios in detail, we can AND , is a violation of the prohibition on the use of armed force.¶ Such a conclusion is troubling enough. But even more important in the long run is the potential harm this continued practice could cause to the jus ad bellum regime, and to the relationship between the jus ad bellum and IHL regimes, to which we turn next.
1NC Obama’s capital means likely passage of patent reform – it will slay abusive patent troll litigation Kravets 3/20 (David, WIRED senior staff writer, "History Will Remember Obama as the Great Slayer of Patent Trolls," http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2014/03/obama-legacy-patent-trolls/) But Obama will leave another gift to posterity, one not so obvious, one AND back to the House for final approval before landing on the president’s desk. Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis) a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by AND Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187 Capital key Hattern 3/5 (Julian, The Hill, "Congress gets out club for patent 'trolls'," http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/199954-lawmakers-look-to-push-patent-troll-bill#ixzz2wzlCnU5g) In December, the House overwhelmingly passed the Innovation Act, which would reform much AND side, where we had stronger vote totals than we were necessarily expecting.” Key to innovation – lynchpin of US economy Goodlatte 3/12 (Robert, House Judiciary Committee chair, "Bipartisan Road Map for Protecting and Encouraging American Innovation," Roll Call www.rollcall.com/news/bipartisan_road_map_for_protecting_and_encouraging_american_innovation-231413-1.html?pg=2) Throughout our nation’s history, great ideas have powered our economic prosperity and security, AND patent litigation and keeping U.S. patent laws up to date. Impact is global nuclear war Harris and Burrows 9 (Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf) Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is AND within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
1NC Text – The United States Congress should pass legislation that creates a statutory cause of action for damages for those unlawfully injured by targeted killing operations, their heirs, or their next friends. The President should sign the bill and issue a signing statement declaring that the legislation is unconstitutional, refusing to carry it out. Congress should confer a cause of action of interested parties to bring suit against the President for refusing to enforce this legislation. Competes – “Increase” is a legal mandate HEFC 4 (Higher Education Funding Council, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtchar/1 67/167we98.htm# n43)
9.1 The Draft Bill creates an obligation on the principal regulator to do AND . Indeed, the obligation could be considered to be ever-increasing. Statutory restrictions prohibit actions Lamont 5 (Michael, Legal Analyst @ Occupational health, "Legal: Staying on the right side of the law," http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/01/04/2005/29005/legal-staying-on-the-right-side-of-the-law.htm#.UgFe_o3qnoI) It will be obvious what 'conduct' and 'redundancy' dismissals are. A statutory restriction means that the employee is prevented by law from doing the job - for example, a driver who loses his driving licence. 'Some other substantial reason' means "Parliament can't be expected to think of everything". Signing statement nullifies the legal effect of the plan. Only Congressional redress can overturn it and set a precedent that averts a total collapse of separation of powers Wolverton 10 (Dr. Joe, J.D. and Editorial Assistant – New American, “Signing Statements and Executive Orders: Obama's Tyrannical Tack”, New American, 2-15, http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/constitution/ 2946-signing-statements-and-executive-orders-president-obamas-tyrannical-tack) As was further reported by The New American, President Obama has decided to sidestep AND path of despotism by decree so well trod by many of his forerunners. That’s key to U.S. leadership Ikenberry 1 (G. John, Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice – Georgetown University, “Getting Hegemony Right”, The National Interest, Spring, Lexis) When other major states consider whether to work with the United States or resist it AND , to return to the corporate metaphor, to invest in ongoing partnerships. US leadership prevents great powers wars. Khalilzad, 2/8/2011 (Zalmay – former United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations, The Economy and National Security, National Review, p. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?page=329) We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. AND the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.
Norms No Modeling U.S. can’t effectively signal Zenko 13 (Micah, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, "The Signal and the Noise," Foreign Policy, 2-2-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the_signal_and_the_noise)
Later, Gen. Austin observed of cutting forces from the Middle East: " AND pronouncements seriously, and instead assume they are made to appease domestic audiences. No reverse modeling - norms can’t solve Saunders 13 (Paul, executive director of The Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005, “We Won't Always Drone Alone,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177)
A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will AND China or Russia uses armed UAVs to attack groups they define as terrorists? 1NC No Drone Wars Drone wars don’t happen Lewis and Crawford 13 Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Emily, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, “DRONES AND DISTINCTION: HOW IHL ENCOURAGED THE RISE OF DRONES” p. 1163, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF Before discussing the legal merits of the norms that the United States is shaping through AND to the United States, regardless of how it pursues its drone policy.
1NC Drone Prolif Acquisition takes forever Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf?)
Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within AND undertake the significant¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term.
The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command ( AND be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions. Preventative War Defense Too late Rivkin 4 David B. Rivkin Jr. (non-staff member@the Heritage Foundation, writes on federal and international law); Lee A. Casey (Attorney and renowned political commentator on I-Law and foreign policy); Mark W. DeLaquil (JD from Harvard); “Preemption and Law in the Twenty-First Century”; 2004; 5 Chi. J. Int'l L. 467-498 (2004-2005) In the years since the UN Charter was adopted, states have frequently invoked the right to use armed force to defend their interests, particularly the right to use anticipatory or preemptive force.4' Indeed, as Professor Michael Glennon (who argues that the Charter was designed to forbid preemptive or anticipatory self-defense) has noted: States can no longer be said to regard the Charter's rules concerning anticipatory self-defense--or concerning the use of force in general, for that matter-as binding. The question-the sole question, in the consent-based international legal system-is whether states have in fact agreed to be bound by the Charter's use-of-force rules. If states had truly intended to make those rules obligatory, they would have made the cost of violation greater than the perceived benefits. They have not. The Charter's use-of-force rules have been widely and regularly disregarded. Since 1945, two-thirds of the members of the United Nations-126 states out of 189-have fought 291 interstate conflicts in which over 22 million people have been killed. 42 The 1956 "Suez Crisis," where France, Britain, and Israel launched military AND around the Suez Canal posed no threat to the British or French territories.
Been around for centuries Rivkin 4 David B. Rivkin Jr. (non-staff member@the Heritage Foundation, writes on federal and international law); Lee A. Casey (Attorney and renowned political commentator on I-Law and foreign policy); Mark W. DeLaquil (JD from Harvard); “Preemption and Law in the Twenty-First Century”; 2004; 5 Chi. J. Int'l L. 467-498 (2004-2005) Although the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense has existed for centuries, international law AND leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. '' 6 In fact, by the mid-nineteenth century, the actual practice of states AND French territory-was rooted in their right to anticipate future attacks. 9
Drones not key---their card Ariel Colonomos 13, Director of Research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, Ph.D. in political science from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, “The Gamble of War: Is it Possible to Justify Preventive War?” p 72-75, google books John Yoo holds that the American interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq fulfilled the criteria of AND movements, required the adoption of an anticipatory mode of use of force.
Preventive war has been our policy since 1941 Trachtenberg 7 Marc Trachtenberg (Prof of PoliSci @ UCLA); “Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy”; 17 April 2007; Security Studies 16, no. 1 (January–March 2007): 1–31 This article examines the claim that the Bush strategy of dealing with developing threats “ AND
American policy in 1941 was strongly in?uenced by this kind of thinking.
Pounds conflation—blurs the imminence standard that defines self-defense Rivkin 4 David B. Rivkin Jr. (non-staff member@the Heritage Foundation, writes on federal and international law); Lee A. Casey (Attorney and renowned political commentator on I-Law and foreign policy); Mark W. DeLaquil (JD from Harvard); “Preemption and Law in the Twenty-First Century”; 2004; 5 Chi. J. Int'l L. 467-498 (2004-2005) However, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is probably the most important modern example, AND missiles would be launched at the United States once they were in place.
Pounds US modeling—response to the Cuban Missile Crisis relied on preventive self-defense justifications Trachtenberg 7 Marc Trachtenberg (Prof of PoliSci @ UCLA); “Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy”; 17 April 2007; Security Studies 16, no. 1 (January–March 2007): 1–31 What about the international law argument—the claim that the U.S. government at that time “did not invoke any notion of ‘anticipatory self-defense”’? The fact is that the government did defend its policy in those terms. The AND anticipatory self-defense,” it is hard to imagine what would be.
3/28/14
NDT Rnd 3 1nr Terror DA
Tournament: NDT | Round: 3 | Opponent: Northwestern OS | Judge: Smelko, Wunderlich, Glineicki No North Korean conflict – ignore alarmism Bandow 3/26 -- senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author and editor of several books (Doug, 2013, "North Korea Is Not America’s Problem," http://spectator.org/archives/2013/03/20/north-korea-is-not-americas-pr/print)
The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is impoverished and decrepit. Its AND noises of a dying regime that clearly recognizes the writing on the wall.” Impact – 2NC Impact outweighs – one nuclear terror attack is the mechanism that draws in all nuclear powers – triggers extinction – that’s Hellman Causes extinction – draws in Russia through miscalc Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor and Francis) War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16 Impact turns the case – crises expand power Young 13 (Laura Young, Ph.D., Purdue University Associate Fellow, June 2013, Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Volume 43, Issue 2) During periods of crisis, the time available to make decisions is limited. Because AND regardless of the institutional make-up of government or his persuasive abilities. Specifically, 1NC Delery says AQAP - AQAP attacks on oil sparks global price volatility Harder, 5/2/2011 (Amy, Al-Qaeda Retaliation Would Drive Spike in Oil Prices, National Journal, p. http://www.nationaljournal.com/al-qaida-retaliation-would-drive-spike-in-oil-prices-20110502) Global oil prices could rise and become even more volatile if al-Qaida terrorists AND Institution’s energy-security initiative and is a senior fellow in foreign policy. Oil volatility sparks great power war --- forces U.S. intervention and goes nuclear. King, September 2008 (Neil, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, p. 14-17) Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question AND risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.
A2: No Nuke Terror – 2NC Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, “Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment”, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html) I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and AND technologies, and materials across the world. • Making a crude nuclear bomb Nuclear terrorism is feasible---high risk of theft and attacks escalate Dvorkin 12 (Vladimir Z. Dvorkin, Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what_can_destroy_strategic_stability.html) Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences AND a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them. Nuclear terrorism is extremely probable – nuclear scientist coop and unsecure sites Jaspal 12 (Zafar Nawaz Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan 12, citing: The Fissile Material Working Group, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111) The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles AND the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states. Nuclear terrorism is likely - al Qaeda is opportunistic and has WMD ambitions Hoffman 13 (February 19, Bruce, Director of the Center for Security Studies and Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown, “Interview with Bruce Hoffman on today’s Global Terrorism Threat” interview by Bilal Y. Saab, Arms Control and Regional Security for the Middle East, http://www.middleeast-armscontrol.com/2013/02/19/interview-with-bruce-hoffman-on-todays-global-terrorism-threat/) 1- Many scholars, analysts, and government officials have viewed the Al Qaeda AND US, the West, and regional governments react will determine the outcome. Link – Review – 2NC Plan fetters field commanders b/c it deters them from using force --- they have to always think twice before a strike --- quick action is crucial in the context of CT so weighing the risks of judicial review means we don’t act until it’s too late. Ex-post review would involve rulings on fundamental questions of overall TK legality like the scope of armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and the executive’s interpretation of imminence Hafetz 13 (Jonathan Hafetz 13, Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, 3/8/13, “Reviewing Drones,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-hafetz/reviewing-drones_b_2815671.html) The better course is to ensure meaningful review after the fact. To this end AND If a drone strike satisfies these requirements, the suit should be dismissed. Effective pre-emption is key to win the entire war on terror---prevents bio and nuclear terrorism Yoo 12 (John Yoo, Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, School of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, 2011/12, “Assassination or Targeted Killings After 9/11,” New York Law School Law Review, http://www.nylslawreview.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Yoo-56-1.pdf) Imminence is not a purely temporal concept. The concept traces its origins to the AND that must be considered in determining when to use force against the enemy. The prospect of external involvement causes battlefield risk aversion---TK decisions are made in split-seconds---any delay has massive negative effects on missions Maher 10 (Larry Maher 10, Quartermaster General, Veterans of Foreign Wars, et al, 9/30/10, BRIEF OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS AND DISMISSAL, Nasser al-Aulaqi, Plaintiff, vs. Barack H. Obama, et al., Defendants, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/VFW_Brief_PACER.pdf ) War is the province of chance. “If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war—the means by which war has to be fought—it will look more than ever like a gamble . . . in the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.” Clausewitz, 86-87. Within this field of human endeavor, the most successful armies are those led by decisive commanders who visualize the operational environment and make rapid, sound decisions. Combat leadership involves the motivation of others to risk their lives, and only the most decisive and confident leaders can inspire this kind of self-sacrifice.¶ Leadership is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. Confident, competent, and informed leadership intensifies the effectiveness of all other elements of combat power by formulating sound operational ideas and assuring discipline and motivation in the force . . . Leadership in today’s operational environment is often the difference between success and failure.¶ Dept. of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, at ¶¶ 4-6 - 4-8 (2008), available at http://www.army.mil/fm3-0/fm3-0.pdf.¶ Battle command is a subset of combat leadership—it is how wartime leaders operationalize their intent and transmit their guidance to subordinate units. Battle command is the art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing forces to impose the commander’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Battle command applies leadership to translate decisions into actions—by synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in time, space, and purpose—to accomplish missions. Battle command is guided by professional judgment gained from experience, knowledge, education, intelligence, and intuition. It is driven by commanders.¶ Id. at ¶ 5-9. Battlefield decisionmaking involves the visualization of the battlefield and all its components, the deliberate assessment of operational risk, and the selection of a course of action which accepts certain risks in order to achieve tactical, operational or strategic success. Id. at ¶5-10; see also Gen. Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Battle Command: A Commander’s Perspective, Military Review, May-June 1996, at 120-121. “Given the inherently uncertain nature of war, the object of planning is not to eliminate or minimize uncertainty but to foster decisive and effective action in the midst of such uncertainty.” Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, at ¶ 4-4 (2008), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3- 07.pdf.¶ In bringing this case, Plaintiff asks this Court to substitute itself as the battlefield commander, and to second-guess the strategic, operational and tactical decisions made by this nation’s military chain of command in the campaign against Al Qaeda. Judicial decisionmaking is incompatible with military decisionmaking. Rather than produce rapid, confident, decisive actions, judicial resolution of this matter would produce deliberate and measured decisions which are the product of adversarial process, and which would reflect judicial considerations, not strategic or tactical ones.¶ Also, judicial involvement may induce risk aversion among commanders, who would worry about how their actions might be judged in courtrooms far removed from the battlefield, and thus hedge their battlefield decisions in order to protect themselves and their units from future judicial scrutiny. This is particularly true of Plaintiff’s prayer for relief, which calls upon the Court to enjoin the Government from using lethal force “except in circumstances in which they present concrete, specific, and imminent threats to life or physical safety, and there are no means other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed to neutralize the threats.” Such decisions about the use of force can often be made by soldiers in a split-second, on the basis of intuition and training. The specter of judicial involvement will affect the way soldiers and leaders approach these decisions, potentially complicating and slowing their decisions by injecting judicial considerations which have no place on the battlefield. review of TKs compromises unity of command---that’s fundamental to warfighting and successful operations---the plan injects devastating legal uncertainty into battlefield decisionmaking Maher 10 (Larry Maher 10, Quartermaster General, Veterans of Foreign Wars, et al, 9/30/10, BRIEF OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS AND DISMISSAL, Nasser al-Aulaqi, Plaintiff, vs. Barack H. Obama, et al., Defendants, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/VFW_Brief_PACER.pdf ) A. Adjudication Of This Case Would Compromise The Military Principle Of “Unity Of Command,” And Undermine The Chain Of Command “Unity of command,” and its corollary, “unity of effort,” are fundamental principles of warfare which are central to the effectiveness of Western militaries. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War 200-210 (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans., Princeton University Press 1976) (1832) (hereinafter “Clausewitz”). There “is no higher and simpler law of strategy” than to apply this principle in order to concentrate a nation’s military power its adversaries’ “center of gravity.” Id. at 204. This principle was first embraced by the American military during the 19th Century, and has subsequently shaped the organizational structure of American warfighting through two world wars and countless other conflicts. See James F. Schnabel, History of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, Vol. 1 at 80-87 (1996); Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army at 422-423 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). Unity of command requires the integration of all combat functions into a single organizational element, with command authority vested in a single individual. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-0, Joint Operations at Appx. A, p. A-2 (2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. The U.S. military implements “unity of command” through its chain of command—a hierarchical organizational structure which transmits command authority from the President through the Secretary of Defense, through subordinate military officers, down to the lowest ranking soldier, sailor, airman or Marine on the frontlines of America’s armed conflicts. This chain of command serves important organizational purposes, by vesting command authority in individual officers who are responsible for specific missions, and are empowered to command their personnel to achieve those missions. The chain of command also supports important normative and legal policy purposes, such as the doctrine of “command responsibility,” which renders battlefield commanders responsible for all their units do or fail to do, whether they knew about such conduct, or should have known about it. See Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1946); see also Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare at ¶ 501 (1956) (stating U.S. Army doctrine on “command responsibility”). “Everything in war is very simple,” Clausewitz noted, “but the simplest thing is difficult.” Clausewitz at 119. The dangers of war, the fatigue of close combat, and the uncertainty which lurks within the fog of war, all combine to create a kind of “friction” which impedes the progress of armies. Id. A more contemporary author and veteran describes this fog: For the common soldier, at least, war has the feel, the spiritual texture, of a great ghostly fog, thick and permanent. There is no clarity. Everything swirls. The old rules are no longer binding, the old truths no longer true. Right spills over into wrong. Order blends into chaos, love into hate, ugliness into beauty, law into anarchy, civility into savagery. The vapor sucks you in. You can’t tell where you are, or why you’re there, and the only certainty is overwhelming ambiguity . . . . You lose your sense of the definite, hence your sense of truth itself. Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried 88 (1990). The military chain of command is designed to counteract this fog and friction of war, by providing clarity of orders and purpose to individual soldiers and their units. Similarly, this organizational structure exists to impose some order on the behavior and actions of soldiers and units, aligning their conduct with national goals, framing their actions in the context of strategic and operational campaigns, and focusing their efforts on the missions which support these broader endeavors. It is this structure which differentiates the armed forces of a nation from an armed group of thugs, and which ensures that national armed forces conduct themselves in accordance with the laws of armed conflict. Cf. Annex to the Convention, Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364. Our nation’s military personnel depend on their chain of command to provide them with certainty, clarity and authority in the heat of battle. Into this ordered system, Plaintiff wishes to inject the uncertainty of the American adversarial litigation process, by seeking, inter alia, that this Court declare there is no armed conflict in Yemen, and that orders issued by the President in response to that conflict should be enjoined. Not only would this force the court to go far beyond the “limited institutional competence of the judiciary” by involving it in sensitive matters of national security, cf. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 576 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted), but this also would undermine the chain of command by literally interposing this Court between the President and his subordinate officers, thereby contravening the core doctrinal principle of “unity of command,” which has served American military forces in good stead since the Civil War. In asking the Court to hear this case, and to entertain the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief against the President and his cabinet, the Plaintiff is asking the court to overturn the political judgment of the President and Congress that the nation is at war; that this war is an armed conflict against Al Qaeda; and that it is appropriate to use a blend of military, intelligence and diplomatic force to wage this war. All three branches of Government have decided that “we are at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates.” Remarks of the President on National Security, May 21, 2009; see also Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006). Political leaders from both political parties, over the course of two presidencies and five elected Congresses, have agreed upon, authorized, and appropriated funds for this war against Al Qaeda. It is a fundamental axiom among American strategists that, “as a nation, the United States wages war employing all instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States at I-1 (2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf. Plaintiff would seek to overturn the considered judgment of this nation’s political leaders in choosing the national strategy for this war, including the Attorney General of the United States, who has written that, in this war against Al Qaeda, “we must use every weapon at our disposal . . . including direct military action, military justice, intelligence, diplomacy, and civilian law enforcement.” See Letter from Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Sen. Mitch McConnell, February 3, 2010 (emphasis added). The relief requested by plaintiff is both extraordinary and inappropriate, and completely inconsistent with the strategic imperative for “unified action which ensures unity of effort focused on national objectives and leading to the conclusion of operations on terms favorable to the United States.” See Joint Pub. 1 at I-1. decks unit cohesion---undermines authority of orders and makes units turn against themselves in litigation Maher 10 (Larry Maher 10, Quartermaster General, Veterans of Foreign Wars, et al, 9/30/10, BRIEF OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS AND DISMISSAL, Nasser al-Aulaqi, Plaintiff, vs. Barack H. Obama, et al., Defendants, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/VFW_Brief_PACER.pdf ) B. Adjudication Also Would Adversely Affect Unit Cohesion Throughout military history, from the Spartan warriors at Thermopylae to today’s American infantrymen in Afghanistan, soldiers have been motivated by comradeship and unit cohesion to sacrifice, persevere, and fight. See generally Richard Holmes, Acts of War (1986) (describing role of unit cohesion in mitigating fear and combat stress in World Wars I and II); James MacPherson, For Cause and Comrades (1997) (chronicling the motivations of American soldiers during the Civil War); Nancy Sherman, The Untold War (2010) (describing the emotional landscape of soldiering in Iraq and Afghanistan) Although war brings many emotions to the surface, unit cohesion matters more than any other motivating factor in the heat of battle. “Unit cohesion exists in a unit when the primary day-to-day goals of the individual soldier, of the small group with which he identifies, and of unit leaders, are congruent--with each giving his primary loyalty to the group so that it trains and fights as a unit with all members willing to risk death and achieve a common objective.” William Darryl Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, (1985), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/cohesion/. Studies of wars throughout the 20th Century have shown unit cohesion to be the critical ingredient for the success or failure of small units. See Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” Public Opinion Quarterly 12 (Summer 1948) 280-315 (finding that unit cohesion translated into higher battlefield effectiveness, survivability and hardiness); Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s Military 144-46 (1970) (finding that close bonds between soldiers played a key role in determining unit effectiveness and survival in the Vietnam War); Samuel Rolbant, The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army 200-210 (1970) (finding that Israeli soldiers had “a very strong sense of mutual affection and attraction among unit members,” and that this cohesion contributed significantly to their exemplary combat performance); William Darryl Henderson, Why the Vietcong Fought: A Study of Motivation and Control in a Modern Army in Combat 107-118 (1979) (finding that a combination of “very strong cohesion” and simple logistics enabled the North Vietnamese Army to persevere against overwhelming firepower); Leonard Wong, “Combat Motivation in Today’s Soldiers,” 32 Armed Forces and Soc. No. 4, 659- 663 (2006) (concluding that, in Iraq and Afghanistan, American soldiers are primarily motivated by unit cohesion and comradeship, among other factors); Army Field Manual 6-22.5, Combat and Operational Stress Control Manual for Leaders and Soldiers, at ¶ 2-3 (2009) (“Unit cohesion and morale is the best predictor of combat resiliency within a unit or organization. Units with high cohesion tend to experience a lower rate of combat stress casualties than units with low cohesion and morale.). “I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade.” S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire 42 (1947). In this lawsuit, Plaintiff asks this Court to declare that the U.S. Government is not engaged in an armed conflict in Yemen, and that U.S. personnel may not therefore use lethal force against individuals in Yemen absent “circumstances in which they present concrete, specific, and imminent threats to life or physical safety, and there are no means other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed to neutralize the threats.” Further, plaintiff seeks disclosure of the allegedly classified criteria used to designate U.S. citizens for targeting. And, in this suit’s most extraordinary request, Plaintiff asks this Court to enjoin the President, his advisers, and his generals, from conducting certain parts of the nation’s war against Al Qaeda. As described above, judicial action of the sort requested by Plaintiff would have a deleterious effect on the chain of command. Judicial action also would, necessarily, affect unit cohesion by undermining both the vertical bonds among leaders and followers, and the horizontal bonds among comrades. These bonds depend on the clarity of orders and authorities which are the sine qua non of the military organizational structure. A judicial order on the lawfulness of the armed conflict in Yemen, or the appropriateness of U.S. military actions there, would cast doubt upon the orders of the President and his subordinate military officers, and introduce uncertainty into the military structure. Further, should this suit be allowed to proceed, it may eventually result in litigation relating to actions taken by military forces in Yemen. Such litigation may require units and soldiers to participate in the production of documents, interrogation of witnesses, and presentation of evidence at trial in an adversarial proceeding. Such litigation would rip apart the military units it touched, by pitting comrades against each other as potential witnesses, and creating the risk that every uttered or written word could eventually be used in a future courtroom, making every battlefield act susceptible to secondguessing and criticism. At its core, unit cohesion reflects a core trust among comrades so powerful that it would motivate a soldier to sacrifice his or her life for another, such that “combat soldiers describe the bond, hesitantly or openly, as love.” See Army Field Manual 22- 51, Leaders’ Manual for Combat Stress Control, at ¶ 3-7 (1994). Judicial intervention in this matter would erode that bond for the units touched by this process, undermining their effectiveness and our national security.
TK Good TK is key to solve terrorism – Anderson evidence indicates that its key to solve w/o counterinsurgency – we can strike Yemen and Mali leadership which disrupts the group – the fact that its unpred means they don’t plan attacks
Drone-based decapitation strategy key Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida's leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm's way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida's senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida's central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan's Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden's letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military's footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan. Link – TK Good – General Targeted killing solves terrorism – degrades terrorist capabilities more than it increases recruitment or retal Fisher 7 (Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711, lexis)
So does targeted killing provide a net advantage or disadvantage in dealing with terrorism? AND terrorist recruitment, retaliation, and cooperation the tactic's use may have spurred. Targeted killing key to effective counter-terrorism Anderson 9 (Kenneth, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Member of its Task Force on National Security and the Law, "Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law," http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/1120counterterrorism20anderson/0511_counterterrorism_anderson.pdf) Obama was right as a candidate and is correct as president to insist on the AND to neutralize a terrorist without unduly ¶ jeopardizing either civilians or American forces.
2NC No Model No modeling – our evidence cites social science between states – prefer it because it addresses the psychology of how other countries perceive us. That’s Zenko – also 1AC author. Precedent locked in Jacobson 13 (Mark R., senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. From 2009 to 2011, he served with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, “Column: Key Assumptions About Drones Are Based on Misconceptions,” http://www.vnews.com/opinion/4393278-95/drones-drone-armed-civilian Armed drones are neither as simple as model airplanes nor as complex as high- AND United States must prepare for being the prey, not just the predator. US drone model is irrelevant Wittes and Singh 12 (Benjamin, a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution where he co-directs the Harvard Law School-Brookings Project on Security and Law, specializes in the legal issues surrounding international security and the war on terrorism, member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and the Law, Ritika, a research assistant on law and national security issues at the Brookings Institution. She graduated with majors in International Affairs and Government from Skidmore College, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,” 1-11-12, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity)
Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the AND United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.
No Model – A2 Russia/China China and Russia will inevitably use, no global support for norm creation, and Israel means targeted killing will continue Fisher 7 (Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711, lexis)
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that the worldwide spread and acceptance of AND , or both, a targeted killing norm will achieve even greater prominence. cite Israel to continue counter-terror policies – US policy isn’t key
Alston 11 (Philip, Professor of Law, New York University, "The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders," 2 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 283, lexis)
Thus when the United States argues that targeted killings are legitimate when used in response AND of military and special forces outside the country's borders against external threats." n618
1NC Precedent Answers Zero chance that U.S. self-restraint causes any other country to give up their plans for drones Max Boot 11, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/9/11, “We Cannot Afford to Stop Drone Strikes,” Commentary Magazine, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/10/09/drone-arms-race/ The New York Times engages in some scare-mongering today about a drone ams race. Scott Shane notes correctly other nations such as China are building their own drones and in the future U.S. forces could be attacked by them–our forces will not have a monopoly on their use forever. Fair enough, but he goes further, suggesting our current use of drones to target terrorists will backfire: If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them. “The problem is that we’re creating an international norm” — asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect of planning attacks, argues Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the University of Pittsburgh and author of Missile Contagion, who has called for tougher export controls on American drone technology. “The copycatting is what I worry about most.” This is a familiar trope of liberal critics who are always claiming we should forego AND and cut down our own arsenal–to encourage similar restraint from Iran. The argument falls apart rather quickly because it is founded on a false premise: AND is unilateral disarmament–which is what the New York Times implicitly suggests. Imagine if we did refrain from drone strikes against al-Qaeda–what would AND . What’s the difference between sending a hit team and sending a drone? While a decision on our part to stop drone strikes would be unlikely to alter AND the vain hope it will encourage disarmament on the part of dictatorial states. 2NC No Precedent US drone policy doesn’t set a precedent – other countries don’t act based on our use Boot 12 (Max, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies @ Council on Foreign Relations, "The Incoherence of a Drone-Strike Advocate," http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-incoherence-of-a-drone-strike-advocate/265256/)
Naureen Shah of Columbia Law School, a guest on the show, had raised AND So I wouldn't worry too much about the so called precedent it sets..." Other countries won’t model US legal standards or oversight
That said, the United States has well-established rules for the use of AND that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace. The US isn’t key to drone use or proliferation – tech advances and necessities mean that their development is inevitable
Anderson 11 (Kenneth, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University; and Hoover Institution visiting fellow, member of Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law; nonresident senior fellow, Brookings Institution, "What Kind of Drones Arms Race is Coming?," http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/)
By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there AND states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating. US restrictions won’t deter global drone use and self-interests drive other countries desires to use
Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries AND ). In such circumstances, the role of norms is much more limited.
2NC No Drone Wars No large-scale drone war - susceptibility to air defenses ensures they'll be limited to only permissive environments
Lewis 12 (Michael, Associate Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University, "SYMPOSIUM: THE 2009 AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS: Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield," Spring, 47 Tex. Int'l L.J. 293, lexis)
Like any weapons system drones have significant limitations in what they can achieve. Drones AND could severely degrade drone operations if it did not defeat them entirely. n25 These twin vulnerabilities to manned aircraft and signal disruption could be mitigated with massive expenditures AND for drone use will most often be found in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations. No global drone war - diplomatic and political costs are too high
Singh 12 (Joseph, researcher at the Center for a New American Security, "Betting Against a Drone Arms Race," nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2fBGQibv1)
Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake AND the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement. Drone proliferation won't escalate - deterrence theory checks
Singh 12 (Joseph, researcher at the Center for a New American Security, "Betting Against a Drone Arms Race," nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2fBGQibv1)
Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic AND of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.¶
2NC Drone Prolif States won’t have the capability to do strikes even if they have the initial tech – other investments are needed. That’s Zenko US tech sales and economic benefits make prolif inevitable CRG 12 (The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal, a registered non-profit organization in the province of Quebec, Canada, “Mapping Drone Proliferation: UAVs in 76 Countries,” September 18, http://www.globalresearch.ca/mapping-drone-proliferation-uavs-in-76-countries) The report goes on: “Currently, there are over 50 countries developing more AND U.S. companies can remain competitive in the global UAV market.”
Drones are locked in - plan can’t solve
McDonald 13 (Jack, lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, completed his PhD thesis on targeted killings, has worked with The Centre for Defence Studies, “Losing perspective on proliferation,” http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2013/01/losing-perspective-on-proliferation/)
The control of UAV technology is, however, a problem. In short, AND little more thought from critics of military UAVs might produce a better critique. It’s impossible to control drone use
Controlling the spread of drone technology will prove impossible; that horse left the barn AND (also called Burma) to kill a wanted drug trafficker hiding there.
Preemption
Preventive War Been around for centuries Rivkin 4 David B. Rivkin Jr. (non-staff member@the Heritage Foundation, writes on federal and international law); Lee A. Casey (Attorney and renowned political commentator on I-Law and foreign policy); Mark W. DeLaquil (JD from Harvard); “Preemption and Law in the Twenty-First Century”; 2004; 5 Chi. J. Int'l L. 467-498 (2004-2005) Although the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense has existed for centuries, international law AND leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. '' 6 In fact, by the mid-nineteenth century, the actual practice of states AND French territory-was rooted in their right to anticipate future attacks. 9 This is about bush doctrine – if that didn’t trigger it, idk why the plan would Jonathan Kirshner 3, Associate Professor of Government and director of the Program on International Political Economy at Cornell, PhD in Politics from Princeton, January 2003, “PREVENT DEFENSE: WHY THE BUSH DOCTRINE WILL HURT U.S. INTERESTS,” http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/17143/ichaptersection_singledocument/f431ada5-2db5-4843-82fd-73e78a3c21a5/en/OP27_Ch1.pdf Paradoxically, although one of the great concerns motivating the new security strategy is the AND militarized disputes in the future will involve states that have some nuclear capability.
Drones not key---their card Ariel Colonomos 13, Director of Research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, Ph.D. in political science from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, “The Gamble of War: Is it Possible to Justify Preventive War?” p 72-75, google books John Yoo holds that the American interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq fulfilled the criteria of AND movements, required the adoption of an anticipatory mode of use of force.
Preventive war has been our policy since 1941 Trachtenberg 7 Marc Trachtenberg (Prof of PoliSci @ UCLA); “Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy”; 17 April 2007; Security Studies 16, no. 1 (January–March 2007): 1–31 This article examines the claim that the Bush strategy of dealing with developing threats “ AND
American policy in 1941 was strongly in?uenced by this kind of thinking.
Pounds conflation—blurs the imminence standard that defines self-defense Rivkin 4 David B. Rivkin Jr. (non-staff member@the Heritage Foundation, writes on federal and international law); Lee A. Casey (Attorney and renowned political commentator on I-Law and foreign policy); Mark W. DeLaquil (JD from Harvard); “Preemption and Law in the Twenty-First Century”; 2004; 5 Chi. J. Int'l L. 467-498 (2004-2005) However, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is probably the most important modern example, AND missiles would be launched at the United States once they were in place.
Pounds US modeling—response to the Cuban Missile Crisis relied on preventive self-defense justifications Trachtenberg 7 Marc Trachtenberg (Prof of PoliSci @ UCLA); “Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy”; 17 April 2007; Security Studies 16, no. 1 (January–March 2007): 1–31 What about the international law argument—the claim that the U.S. government at that time “did not invoke any notion of ‘anticipatory self-defense”’? The fact is that the government did defend its policy in those terms. The AND anticipatory self-defense,” it is hard to imagine what would be.
2NC Prolif – No War We’ve got empirics – their author exaggerate Farley 11, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, (Robert, "Over the Horizon: Iran and the Nuclear Paradox," 11-16, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10679/over-the-horizon-iran-and-the-nuclear-paradox) States sometimes have excellent reasons for developing nuclear weapons. Countries that believe themselves likely AND , exaggerated alarmism will substitute for a realistic appraisal of the policy landscape. Statistics Asal and Beardsley, 2007 (Victor – assistant professor of political science at SUNY Albany, and Kyle – assistant professor of political science at Emory, Proliferation and international crisis behavior, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 2, p. 149-151) As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant AND significant, which strengthens the case for the explanations provided in this study. History outweighs Sechser, 2009 (Todd S. - assistant professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia, Controversies in Globalization, Peter M. Haas, John A. Hird, and Beth McBratney, eds., p. 174) The spread of nuclear weapons undoubtedly entails extraordinary risks. Nuclear weapons are the most AND the nuclear future, we must first acknowledge the lessons of the past. Their evidence is biased warmongering – err neg Gavin, Winter 20092010 / (Francis - Tom Slick professor of international affairs at the University Texas at Austin, Same as it ever was, International Security, p. lexis) Nuclear alarmists exaggerate and oversimplify contemporary nuclear threats while underplaying those of the past. AND expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available materials." 118 Even if proliferators go to war, there is no escalation Sechser, 2009 (Todd S. - assistant professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia, Controversies in Globalization, Peter M. Haas, John A. Hird, and Beth McBratney, eds., p. 167-168) The Intensity of Military Conflict What about conflicts which, despite the shadow of nuclear AND limited, escalatory options were rejected, and eventually the challenger backed down.
2NC Prolif – Inevitable -- Prolif inevitable – A) Tech and materials are widespread Ellis 3 (Jason D., Senior Research Professor – Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, “The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security”, Washington Quarterly, Spring, p. 119-120)
The Bush administration’s national security strategy starts with the reality of a post-proliferated AND context, traditional supply-side constraints have and will continue to erode. B) Conventional superiority Gerson and Boyars 7 (Michael Gerson, Member – CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies, MA in International Relations – University of Chicago, and Jacob, Intern – CNA’s Center for Strategic Studies, MA in Security Studies – Georgetown University, “The Mix of New Subjects” and “Deterrent Against US Power”, 9-18, http://www.cna.org/documents/D0017171.A2.pdf)
The mix of new subjects of U.S. deterrence, such as emerging AND nuclear weapons as the only possible deterrent against U.S. power. C) Other incentives Martel 94 (William and William Pendley, Associate Professors, Air War College, “Nuclear Coexistence: Rethinking US Policy to Promote Stability in an Era of Proliferation,” Air War College Studies in National Security #1, April, p. 26)
Summary. The prospect is that the already strong incentives for nuclear proliferation will increase AND and modernization—states may well feel powerful incentives to possess nuclear weapons.
Allies
Allied Co-Op – 2NC There’s cooperation now – EU has laws to help with intel and actively seek to foster cooperation with the US – declaration on counter-terror proves – That’s Archick. Self-interest overwhelms legal disputes Kristin Archick, Congressional Research Service Specialist in European Affairs, 9/4/13, U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent AND have been working together to curb terrorist financing and to strengthen transport security. Even if they leave intel is still fine. Barton Gellman and Greg Miller, 8-29-2013, “Top secret ‘black budget’ reveals US spy agencies’ spending,” LA Daily News, http://www.dailynews.com/government-and-politics/20130829/top-secret-black-budget-reveals-us-spy-agencies-spending “The United States has made a considerable investment in the Intelligence Community since the AND rivals or exceeds the levels reached at the height of the Cold War. Allies will inevitably come around on US drone doctrine questions---they know they’re the future of war and won’t want to be left out Ulrike Esther Franke 13, Ph.D. Candidate, International Relations, University of Oxford, April 2013, “Just the new hot thing? The diffusion of UAV technology worldwide and its popularity among democratic states,” http://files.isanet.org/ConferenceArchive/4269932e782d47248d5269ad381ca6c7.pdf As shown in the first part of this paper, democracies seem to be particularly AND an obvious and important avenue of infusion of US military … technology”.61 U.S.-EU anti-terror coop’s locked in, inevitable, and resilient Sally McNamara 11, Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, 3/8/11, “The EU–U.S. Counterterrorism Relationship: An Agenda for Cooperation,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/03/the-eu-us-counterterrorism-relationship-an-agenda-for-cooperation America needs allies to win the war on terrorism. The EU equally accepts that AND powers—and it has not been afraid to flex its legislative muscle.
Impact D The worst case scenario happened – no extinction Dove 12 Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/
The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with AND biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.
2NC Bioterror They don’t have the capability Ouagrham-Gormley 2012 Sonia Ben, Assistant Professor in the Biodefense Program at George Mason University, “Barriers to Bioweapons,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 80–114 Knowledge Acquisition and Diffusion in Past Weapons Programs Studies of knowledge transfer, including in AND were doing things and unconsciously corrected the problem only after several weeks. 26 Nor the organizational structure Ouagrham-Gormley 2012 Sonia Ben, Assistant Professor in the Biodefense Program at George Mason University, “Barriers to Bioweapons,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 80–114 socioeconomic conditions in which knowledge is used Stability in the work environment and continuity of AND scientiªc work caused by shortages in funding had the same delaying effect. 29 Bioterror is extremely unlikely – no weapons programs – and current biodefense solves Orent 09 – Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Michigan, leading freelance science writer, and author of Plague: The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease (Wendy, 7/17. “America’s bioterror bugaboo.” Los Angeles Times. Lexis.)
After the anthrax letter attacks of October 2001, the Bush administration pledged $57 AND War College report, by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Even if terrorists have bioweapons, there’s no way they can disperse them Smithson 05 (Amy E., PhD, project director for biological weapons at the Henry L. Stimson Center. “Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”. http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB2001121259
Terrorists cannot count on just filling the delivery system with agent, pointing the device AND undergo mechanical stresses that can kill 95 percent or more of the microorganisms. -- No pandemic or extinction – history proves Easterbrook 3 (Gregg, Senior Fellow – New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1andtopic=andtopic_set=)
3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up AND out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future. -- Tech hurdles prevent bioterror Mueller 6 (John, Chair of National Security Studies – Mershon Center and Professor of Political Science – Ohio State University, Overblown, p. 24)
Not only has the science about chemical and biological weapons been quite sophisticated for more AND and poisons still presents seri¬ous technological hurdles that greatly inhibit their effective use. -- No acquisition Burton and Stewart 8 (Fred and Scott, Stratfor Intelligence, “Busting the Anthrax Myth”, 7-30, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/busting_anthrax_myth)
Operating in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border, al Qaeda cannot easily AND or at least bring into question — the intense concern about such programs. A2: Bioterror O/W Nuke War Nuclear war outweighs – bioweapons leave survivors and land intact Klotz 09 Lynn, former Harvard University faculty member and biotechnology executive, Senior Science Fellow AND Making Us All Less Secure, October 2009, P 129-130
However, if we simply consider the lethality and morbidity or contagiousness of the agents AND following a nuclear exchange, “the living would envy the dead.”11
No bioweapons prolif – tacit knowledge gap and organization failure – assumes new tech advances Ouagrham-Gormley 2012 Sonia Ben, Assistant Professor in the Biodefense Program at George Mason University, “Barriers to Bioweapons,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 80–114 Conclusion The U.S. and Soviet bioweapons programs offer valuable insights for assessing AND knowledge can delay progress in a suspected program and possibly cause its failure.
What happens to Obama if this goes down: If the Obama administration loses AND necessary — that would be a huge political blow to Obama’s political standing.
GOP-led Senate undercuts Obama’s climate agenda
Harder 13 (Amy, Environmental Correspondent @ National Journal, "Care About Energy and Environment Policy? Watch These Eight Races," http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CM3Nm1CJ-4wJ:www.nationaljournal.com/energy/care-about-energy-and-environment-policy-watch-these-eight-races-20131231+26cd=2726hl=en26ct=clnk26gl=us) For environmentalists, the 2014 midterm elections are about settling for the lesser of two evils. Several conservative Democrats up for reelection in red states are facing tough competition, and if enough of these members lose, the Senate could flip to Republican control. That would be the worst outcome for environmentalists, who need a Democrat-controlled Senate to defend against efforts to undo President Obama’s climate-change agenda and other tough environmental policies.
Obama’s climate agenda spurs global action – solves warming
Martinson 14 (Erica, Regulatory reporter @ Politico, "Obama’s agenda: EPA leading the charge on climate change," http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=3BE87317-0921-4B01-A3B5-C39AEF6CDDC3) President Barack Obama’s environmental regulators will spend the rest of this year writing climate rules AND and the single largest source of U.S. greenhouse gas pollution.
Extinction
Flournoy 12 (Don, Citing Feng Hsu, PhD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard AND 2012, Springer Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-11) In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA AND simply too high for us to take any chances" (Hsu 2010 ).
Text: The United States Congress should rescind all funding for targeted killing operations that are not agreed upon specified areas with the Pakistani Defense Committee of the Cabinet henceforth in the next comprehensive appropriation legislation passed by Congress.
The counterplan is an appropriations restriction
Raven-Hansen 98 (Peter – Directed the The George Washington University Law School War Powers Project which wrote this report, Glen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, "The War Powers Resolution: Origins, History, Criticism and Reform: Chapter 9: Legislative Reform", 1998, 2 J. Nat’l Security L. 157, lexis) Sec. 8. Appropriations for the use of armed forces abroad.—No funds AND States or appropriated for one agency and made available to another by transfer.
Only the CP preserves authority
Taylor 96 (Ellen, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online) The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency AND is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.
Solves the case
Fisher 97 (Louis – Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, "Presidential Independence and the Power of the Purse", 1997, 3 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. 26 Pol’y 107, lexis) Through its prerogative to authorize programs and appropriate funds, Congress can define and limit AND the executive branch, but they can control the internal procedures of Congress.
CP avoids politics
Eggspuehler 8 (Chad M. – J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, "The S-Words Mightier than the Pen: Signing Statements as Express Advocacy of Unlawful Action", 2008, 43 Gonz. L. Rev. 461, lexis) The pragmatist’s argument for presidential review acknowledges the countervailing efficiency and political interests preventing the AND part of the bill’s veto than for its own speculative constitutional legitimacy. n95
Solvency – 2NC
It’s best method of checking the executive – boosts solvency
Devins 97 (Neal – Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary, "PANEL IV: THE BUDGET: In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act", 1997, 47 Case W. Res. 1605, lexis) The power of the purse lies with Congress. The Constitution prohibits money "drawn AND makes the ultimate decision whether and to what extent executive sentiments should prevail.
A2: Perm – Do CP
Funding cuts are distinct – they don’t legally change the presidents war powers
Lipez 10 (Kermit V. – Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, "Accessing Justice in Hard Times: Lessons from the Field, Looking to the Future: ARTICLE: REFLECTIONS OF AN ACCESS TO JUSTICE CHAIRS", 2010, 62 Me. L. Rev. 585, lexis) I did not become the Chair of JAG through a democratic process. Instead, AND in the conference and its aftermath, which included the establishment of JAG.
It’s distinct – CRS reports prove
Elsea 13 (Jennifer K., "Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations", CRS Report for Congress, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41989.pdf) This report begins by discussing constitutional provisions allocating war powers between Congress and the President AND such limitations appear to be within Congress’s authority to allocate resources for military operations
The CP maintains authority – contextual ev proves
Martinez 12 (Nicolas – J.D. Candidate 2013, Stanford Law School, "Pinching the President’s Prosecutorial Prerogative: Can Congress Use Its Purse Power to Block Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s Transfer to the United States?", 2013, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 1469, lexis) The Constitution bestows on Congress exclusive powers to appropriate funds and to tax and spend AND funds for the activities within the independent constitutional authority of other branches. n78
Authority is distinct from the exercise of power
Silverstein 5 (Gordon, "Book Review: CONSTITUTIONAL CONTORTION? MAKING UNFETTERED WAR POWERS COMPATIBLE WITH LIMITED GOVERNMENT: THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11.", 2005, 22 Const. Commentary 349, lexis) There is a distinct difference between legal authority to cut funds (which Congress unquestionably AND to the battle, but their ability to use those weapons effectively. n8
It is the allocation of decision rights – the counterplan changes funding, not the right to decide
The CP only prevents the execution of authority – it doesn’t restrict it
Turner 12 (Robert – University of Virginia School of Law, "Presidential Powers and Foreign Affairs: The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still Controversial: The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud That Contributed Directly to the 9/11 Attacks", 2012, 45 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 109, lexis) There is a popular belief in Congress and among some scholars that Congress can achieve its goals by attaching "conditions" to appropriations bills mandating how the president must act. And in settings where the president is simply executing authority delegated by Congress, that is often the case. But this power is limited—like all grants of constitutional power—to exercises of power that do not otherwise conflict with the Constitution itself. n94 Solvency – Signal – 2NC
The CP will be perceived internationally as a credible commitment
Nzelibe and Yoo 6 (Jide – Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School, and John – Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law , "THE MOST DANGEROUS BRANCH? MAYORS, GOVERNORS, PRESIDENTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW: A SYMPOSIUM ON EXECUTIVE POWER: ESSAY: Rational War and Constitutional Design", 2006, 115 Yale L.J. 2512, lexis) Congress’s participation was part of a series of signals sent by the United States to AND emphasis on declarations of war or statutory authorizations for the use of force.
The CP sends a strong and clear signal
Ford 97 (Christopher – Assistant Counsel to the Intelligence Oversight Board at the White House in 1996 and is presently Counsel for Special Investigations at the Governmental Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate, "CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA: SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE: WATCHING THE WATCHDOG: SECURITY OVERSIGHT LAW IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA", 1997, 3 Mich. J. Race 26 L. 59, lexis) In U.S. practice, the power of the purse - a power AND .S. forces from their involvement in those countries’ civil wars. n385
Solvency – Targeted Killing
The CP solves drone policy – congressional funding changes are effective
Safranski 13 (Mark, "The White Paper and its Critics", 2013, http://zenpundit.com/?p=19154) More importantly, there are better, simpler remedies to a "slippery slope" AND operations or cease funding them. Quite pointedly, they have done neither.
CP Avoids Politics – 2NC
There’s a link differential between the plan and counterplan
Heder 10 (Adam – J.D., magna cum laude, J. Reuben Clark Law School, "THE POWER TO END WAR: THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER", 2010, 41 St. Mary’s L. J. 445, lexis) As noted, Congress also could exercise its constitutional power to dissolve the armed forces under the rationale that the power to raise an army includes the subordinate power of dissolving an army. n32 However, given the dominant political role of both the United States and its armed forces throughout the world, this exercise would be even more impractical and politically unpopular than cutting off funds.
Avoids politics – Presidents will avoid fighting broad appropriation legislation
Tiefer 6 (Charles – Professor, University of Baltimore Law School, "Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?", 2006, 42 Stan. J Int’l L. 291, lexis) V. After Enactment: Presidential Undermining A. Presidential Undermining 1. Why the AND war, elicited a storm of adverse reaction when their secrets came out. Defense
Drones not key—-their card
Ariel Colonomos 13, Director of Research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, Ph.D. in political science from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, "The Gamble of War: Is it Possible to Justify Preventive War?" p 72-75, google books John Yoo holds that the American interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq fulfilled the criteria of AND movements, required the adoption of an anticipatory mode of use of force.
The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command ( AND be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.
U.S. can’t effectively signal
Zenko 13 (Micah, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, "The Signal and the Noise," Foreign Policy, 2-2-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the_signal_and_the_noise)
Later, Gen. Austin observed of cutting forces from the Middle East: " AND pronouncements seriously, and instead assume they are made to appease domestic audiences.
A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will AND China or Russia uses armed UAVs to attack groups they define as terrorists?
1NC No Drone Wars
Drone wars don’t happen
Lewis 26 Crawford 13 ~Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Emily, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, "DRONES AND DISTINCTION: HOW IHL ENCOURAGED THE RISE OF DRONES" p. 1163, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF~~ Before discussing the legal merits of the norms that the United States is shaping through AND to the United States, regardless of how it pursues its drone policy.
1NC Drone Prolif
Acquisition takes forever
Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, "Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies," January, Council Special Report No. 65, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf?)
Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within AND undertake the significant¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term. Armenia
No escalation to Armenia
Glashatov 7 (Oleg, "Zero Hour Approaches for Yerevan; Azerbaijan Prepares to Fight for Nagorno-Karabakh: Will There Be War?", What the Papers Say Part A (Russia), 7-5, Lexis)
Speaking at Johns Hopkins University, US Council on Foreign Relations analyst Wayne Merry noted AND effort to see that this conflict is resolved by diplomatic or other means. Israel
No strike
Elhusseini 13 (Fadi, Palestinian Diplomat and Journalist, 3/12/2013, "Will Israel attack Iran?", jordantimes.com/will-israel-attack-iran)
That red line is fast approaching, but is Israel going to really attack Iran AND eventual American intervention and an inevitable confrontation with the world’s biggest military might.
* Won’t escalate
Rogan 8/18/12 (Thomas, MSc in Middle East politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies. Israel could attack Iran without causing a major war in the region http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/18/israeli-attack-iran) While it is likely Israel will attack Iran in the near future, it is not in either party’s interest to allow retaliation to escalate Over the last few days, Israeli newspapers have been consumed by reports that the prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has decided to launch an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities some time this autumn. Although Netanyahu has an obvious interest in increasing pressure on Iran, it would be an error to regard these reports as simple rhetorical sensationalism. In my opinion, whether this year or next, Israel is likely to use its airforce to attack Iran. While it is impossible to know for sure whether Netanyahu will act, it is possible to consider the likely repercussions that would follow an Israeli attack. While it is likely that Iran would retaliate against Israel and possibly the US in response to any attack, it is unlikely that Iran will instigate a major war. Albeit for different reasons, Iran, Israel and the US all understand that a war would not serve their interests. First, the Israeli policy angle. If Netanyahu decides to order an attack on Iran, his focus will be on maximising the success of that action and minimising any negative consequences that might follow. In terms of Iranian retaliation, Israel would expect Iran’s core non-state allies Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah to launch rocket attacks into Israeli territory. However, present success with advanced defence systems has helped increase Israeli confidence in their AND shown Israel that Iran continues to regard covert action as a powerful weapon. The key for Israel is that, while these Iranian capabilities are seen as credible AND Assad alongside Iran (an outcome that might follow major retaliatory Israeli action). If Netanyahu does decide to take action, Israeli objectives would be clearly limited. The intent would be to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability while minimising escalation towards war. Israel has no interest in a major conflict that would risk serious damage to the Israeli state. Though holding opposite objectives, Iran’s attitude concerning a major war is similar to Israel’s. While Iran regards nuclear capability as prospectively guaranteeing the survival of its Islamic revolution, clerical leaders also understand that initiating a major war would make American intervention likely. Such intervention would pose an existential threat to the theocratic project that underpins the Islamic Republic. Thus, in the event of an Israeli attack, Iran’s response would be finely calibrated towards achieving three objectives: • First, punishing Israel for its attack. • Second, deterring further Israeli strikes and so creating space for a reconstituted Iranian nuclear programme. • Finally, weakening US/international support for Israel so as to increase Israeli isolation and vulnerability. Hezbollah, Hamas and other non-state allies would play a major role in effecting Iranian retaliation. Iran may also attempt to launch a number of its new Sajjil-2 medium-range missiles against Israel. Again, however, using these missiles would risk major retaliation if many Israeli citizens were killed. As a preference, Iran would probably perceive that utilising Hamas and Hezbollah would allow retaliation without forcing Netanyahu into a massive counter-response. Crucially, I believe Iran regards that balancing its response would enable it to buy time for a reconstituted, hardened nuclear programme. In contrast to the relatively open current structure, sites would be deeper underground and far less vulnerable to a future attack. The nuclear ambition would not be lost, simply delayed. As a final objective for retaliation, Iran would wish to weaken Israel’s relationship with the US and the international community. This desire might encourage Iran to take action against US navy assets in the Gulf and/or attempt to mine the Strait of Hormuz, so as to cause a price spike in global oil markets and increased international discomfort. However, beyond their rhetoric, the Iranian leadership understand that they cannot win a military contest against the US, nor hold the strait for longer than a few days. For Iran then, as with Israel, regional war is far from desirable. Finally, consider the US. It is now clear that Obama and Netanyahu disagree on Iran. In my opinion, Netanyahu does not believe Obama will ever be willing to take pre-emptive military action against Iran’s nuclear programme. Conversely, Obama believes Netanyahu’s diplomatic expectations are too hasty and excessively restrictive. The policy distance between these two leaders appears increasingly irreconcilable. If Netanyahu decides to AND is that the US government has no interest in a war with Iran. If Netanyahu decides to take military action, he will do so in a strategic environment in which Israel, Iran and the US have no preference for a major war. Each state views the prospect of a war as counter to their particular long-term ambitions. Because of this, while serious, Iranian retaliation would be unlikely to produce an escalatory dynamic leading to war. The leadership of each of these states will restrain their respective actions in the pursuit of differing long-term objectives but common short-term ones.
Asia War
No US-China conflict
Allison 26 Blackwill 13 — *director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government AND Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert D., 2013, "Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations," http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/) Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore, one of Asia’s most prominent public intellectuals, a member of the Fondation Chirac’s honour committee
Competition between the United States and China is inevitable, but conflict is not. AND long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight.
By a number of yardsticks, relations in the Taiwan Strait today are the best AND sea-rescue operations in the waters off Taiwan’s Kinmen and China’s Xiamen.
The prime minister said peace in Afghanistan was in the interest of Pakistan and the AND Gul. Bilateral relations and mutual interests were also discussed in these meetings.
Either
A) Military means drones strikes inevitable Toronto Star June 11 2013 ("Pakistani PM lashes out against U.S. drone strikes" lexis)
In office for less than a week, Pakistan’s new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif AND Pakistani Taliban, breaking its chain of command and coherency as an organization.
Admittedly, this final compromise option would be painful for both Islamabad and Washington. Pakistani leaders would finally have to come clean to their people about authorizing drone strikes. That would eliminate even the thin veneer of deniability that past leaders have maintained to protect themselves from political fallout. It would also place Sharif’s party firmly on the blacklists of the Pakistani Taliban and other targeted groups, which to date have enjoyed slightly more ambiguous relationships.
Or B) Plan means Pakistani ground troops are used – undermines political stability
Moreover, things have to be viewed in much broader perspective in a complicated situation AND and cry over the army being used to kill Pakistan’s "own people". A2 Pakistan: 1NC
Pakistan once again sought US intervention in settling the Kashmir dispute on Monday, complaining AND by his Special Assistant Syed Tariq Fatemi and Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry.
WASHINGTON, March 28 (APP) : The International Monetary Fund on Friday said AND violence but also noted that economic developments have been slightly better than expected.
Impact D
Shocks cause cooperation – not escalation- also takes out Afghan impact
Collins and Wohlforth 4 (Kathleen, Professor of Political Science – Notre Dame and William, Professor of Government – Dartmouth, "Defying ’Great Game’ Expectations", Strategic Asia 2003-4: Fragility and Crisis, p. 312-313)
Conclusion The popular great game lens for analyzing Central Asia fails to capture the declared AND 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia.
Central Asia faces numerous threats to its stability, including Islamic extremism, a population AND further challenge our efforts to integrate the region and encourage reform and development. I-P
We must be clear that nuclear weapons are here to maintain peace and stability between AND it prevented the likelihood of an all out nuclear war in South Asia. Russia
No nuclear strike
Graham 7 (Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs" The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html) An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that " AND while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.
The U.S. will need to keep a close eye on the tribal AND will remain of vital strategic interest for Washington for many years to come. Though the drone issue will continue to be a source of tension in the relationship, it is doubtful that it alone would derail ties. The extent to which the United States will continue to rely on drone strikes ultimately depends on Islamabad’s willingness to develop more decisive and comprehensive counterterrorism policies that include targeting groups like the Haqqani Network.
Intelligence agencies norms of conduct exacerbate executive secrecy – makes groupthink unavoidable
Schulhofer 10 (Stephen J., Robert B. McKay Professor of Law, New York University "Secrecy and Democracy: Who Controls Information in the National Security State?, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 217, http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/217)
The impetus to over-classify, even when acting from legitimate motives, is AND is the first place to turn for a means to counteract these distortions. 2NC Obama Solves Groupthink
Obama solves groupthink – he’s that good
Kennedy, 12 ~ Copyright (c) 2012 Gould School of Law Southern California AND Arts and Sciences; B.A. Government 2009, Harvard University.~ A. Anti-Groupthink Decision-Making Practices The Obama team adopted several decision AND doubts and to rethink the entire issue before making a definitive choice. n246
1NC Allied Co-Op
Allied terror coop is high now, despite frictions
Kristin Archick, European affairs specialist @ CRS, 9-4-2013, "U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism," Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf-http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf As part of the EU’s efforts to combat terrorism since September 11, 2001, AND security and protection to citizens of all nations while also upholding individual rights."
NATO Answers
NATO fails and EU solves the impacts better Hockenos ’9 (03/09/2009 RETHINKING US-EUROPE RELATIONS Is the EU Better for Obama than NATO? By Paul Hockenos Paul Hockenos is editor of Internationale Politik-Global Edition. His most recent book is "Joschka Fischer andthe Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History o fPostwar Germany".
The new American administration would be well served to rethink the United States’ relationship to AND , enabling it to launch its first mission in Macedonia in March 2003.
The United States federal judiciary should restrict the president’s targeted killing authority by requiring that targeted killing operations be taken under agreed upon specified areas with the Pakistani Defense Committee of the Cabinet
Judicial restrictions solve and the executive complies
Bradley and Morrison 13 (Curtis and Trevor, Prof of Law @ Duke + Prof of Law @ Columbia, "PRESIDENTIAL POWER, HISTORICAL PRACTICE, AND ¶ LEGAL CONSTRAINT," http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=545126context=faculty_scholarship) Insisting on a sharp distinction between the law governing presidential authority that is subject to AND retain the status of law beyond the ¶ extent of judicial enforcement.123
Avoids Politics
Stimson 9 ~09/25/09, Cully Stimson is a senior legal fellow at the Heritage Foundation and an instructor at the Naval Justice School former American career appointee at the Pentagon. Stimson was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs., "Punting National Security To The Judiciary", http://blog.heritage.org/2009/09/25/punting-national-security-to-the-judiciary/~~ So what is really going on here? To those of us who have either AND the administration close Gitmo without taking the heat for actually releasing detainees themselves.
Kravets 3/20 (David, WIRED senior staff writer, "History Will Remember Obama as the Great Slayer of Patent Trolls," http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2014/03/obama-legacy-patent-trolls/) But Obama will leave another gift to posterity, one not so obvious, one AND back to the House for final approval before landing on the president’s desk.
Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off
O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, "The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege", 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis) a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by AND Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187
Key to innovation – lynchpin of US tech development and leadership
Goodlatte 3/12 (Robert, House Judiciary Committee chair, "Bipartisan Road Map for Protecting and Encouraging American Innovation," Roll Call www.rollcall.com/news/bipartisan_road_map_for_protecting_and_encouraging_american_innovation-231413-1.html?pg=2) Throughout our nation’s history, great ideas have powered our economic prosperity and security, AND patent litigation and keeping U.S. patent laws up to date.
US competitiveness solves hegemony and great power war
Baru 9 – Sanjaya Baru is a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 - 168 Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.2 In the modern AND sustain economic growth and military power, the classic ’guns versus butter’ dilemma.
Patent reform likely to pass now – continued push is key to getting over the finish line
The Senate Judiciary Committee plans to move forward on patent system reform as soon as AND think this could get done if we keep our nose to the grindstone."
Momentum and Obama’s push
Tellier 3/23 (Stephen, "Push for Patent Troll Crackdown Gathers Steam Ahead of St. Paul Forum," http://kstp.com/news/stories/S3370892.shtml) They’re called "patent trolls." They buy up patents, and then threaten companies AND patent reform bill, and there are several bills pending in the Senate.
Top of the agenda and close to passing
McKeown and Bullard 3/18 (Scott and Christopher, Associates @ Oblon Spivak McClelland Maier 26 Neustadt LLP, "Medical technology patents at the PTAB," http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8020b7d4-87ef-49af-97fb-3b0faa35149c) With Congress on the verge of passing still more legislation directed at alleviating the dreaded AND (IPR) in particular has become the favorite anti-troll measure.
Bipartisan support building
US Official News 3/15 ("Portman, Udall Lead Bipartisan Effort to Confront Abusive Patent Trolls, Support Main Street Businesses," lexis) U.S. Senators Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Mark Udall AND ready to offer our support for commonsense improvements to our nation’s patent system."
A2 Reform Ineffective
Patent trolls crush growth and reform is key to solve —— the alternative is backlog and crushed start-ups
On June 4, the Obama Administration issued five executive actions and seven legislative recommendations AND has high returns, so, frankly, it makes good business sense.
Sufficient to solve even if all trolling doesn’t end
Mullin 13 (Joe, "Finally, a bill to end patent trolling; Bipartisan bill has most of what reformers want—and a real chance of passing," Ars Technica, 10-23-12, arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/its-finally-here-a-bill-to-end-patent-trolling/)
This bill wouldn’t end patent trolling, but it could greatly increase the risks and AND who want to fight back and speak out—currently a daunting proposition.
It solves all of the components of the patent problem
Daniel Nazer at the Electronic Frontier Foundation does an excellent job summing up Goodlatte’s reform AND the trolls gumming up one of the most innovative parts of our economy. AT: Ukraine Aid Pounder
No controversy now and final vote on Tuesday—-means our link comes first
ABC 3/28 "House to Vote Next Week on Aid to Ukraine" abcnews.go.com/Politics/ wireStory/congress-backs-bill-cash-strapped-ukraine-23094729 Aid to cash-strapped Ukraine and sanctions on Russia remain on track in the U.S. Congress, but it will take a few days longer before the legislation gets to President Barack Obama. House leaders decided to vote Tuesday on the package, putting off an expected Friday vote. Congressional aides said the decision by the International Monetary Fund on Thursday to release billions of dollars to Ukraine lessened the urgency to act. The delay ensures that House members will have a chance to go on record with a roll-call vote in backing the Senate version of the bill.
Dems backed off IMF reform to avoid a fight—-it’s not a loss because there was never a vote
Michael Tomasky 3-26, Daily Beast special correspondent, editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, 3/26/14, "The GOP Just Screwed Ukraine Out of Billions to Hurt Obama," http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/26/the-gop-just-screwed-ukraine-out-of-billions-to-hurt-obama.html But those points don’t matter on the right, of course. Over there, AND an aid deal with the IMF stuff included wasn’t going to make it. And so, it emerged this week that the Obama administration and Senate Democrats apparently backed off their demand for the Ukraine aid bill on Capitol Hill to include the reforms. On Monday, John Kerry visited Congress and threw in the towel. Better to have whatever we can get now than fight over this and delay matters. Or worse, lose altogether, because there was no chance that the House would ever have passed the IMF-laden version. A2: Econ Thumper
Once this year’s harsh weather has faded, the U.S. economy could AND our discontent, things should be looking a lot better," Naroff said. A2: Sequester
Restrictions are prohibitions on action —- the aff is a reporting requirement
Jean Schiedler-Brown 12,Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown 26 Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/68642920Appellant20Randall20Kincheloe27s.pdf 3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. Black’s Law Dictionary, ’fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the AND or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as AND merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.
Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions
William Conner 78,former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108_11379 Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority AND were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.
B. Vote Neg –
1. Limits – Regulation and oversight of authority allows a litany of new affs in each area
2. Ground – Restriction ground is the locus of neg prep – their interpretation jacks all core because an aff doesn’t have to prevent the president from doing anything
3/30/14
Round 2 GSU vs Kansas
Tournament: GSU | Round: 2 | Opponent: Kansas KS | Judge: 1NC A. Interpretation – Judicial restrictions must directly prohibit activities currently under the president’s war powers authority – this excludes regulation or oversight Judicial restriction means to reduce the scope of Newman 8 (Pauline, Judge @ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 545 F.3d 943; 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479; 88 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1385; 2008-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50,621, IN RE BERNARD L. BILSKI and RAND A. WARSAW, lexis) Id. at 315 (quoting U.S. Const., art. I AND 103 drafting §101 precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable. B. Vote Neg –
Limits – Oversight of authority allows a litany of new affs in each area – justifies indirect effects of judicial review and affs that don’t alter presidential authority – undermines prep and clash 2. Ground – Restriction ground is the locus of neg prep – their interpretation jacks all core disads – judicial deference, court politics, presidential powers, and any area based disad because an aff doesn’t have to prevent the president from doing anything 1NC Plan causes a compensatory shift to drone strikes – that’s worse RT, 13 (5/3, “US targeted drone killings used as alternative to Guantanamo Bay - Bush lawyer.” http://rt.com/usa/obama-using-drones-avoid-gitmo-747/)
A lawyer who was influential in the United States’ adoption of unmanned aircraft has spoken AND not abiding by the rule of law or are indifferent to civilian casualties.” Increased drone use sets a precedent that causes South China Sea conflict Roberts 13 (Kristen, News Editor at National Journal, “When the Whole World Has Drones”, 3/22/13, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321)
And that’s a NATO ally seeking the capability to conduct missions that would run afoul AND lead somebody to be subject for an engagement by the United States government.” Extinction Wittner 11 (Lawrence S., Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace and Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by AND —destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
1NC The aff doesn’t provide real reform – continued crisis discourse allows a re-expansion of executive authority Scheuerman 12 -- Professor of Political Science and West European Studies at Indiana University (William E., Summer 2012, "Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy," Law and Social Inquiry 37(3), EBSCO)
IV. REFORMISM'S LIMITS Bruce Ackerman, one of our country's most observant analysts of AND both from existing US-style presidentialism and parliamentarism, constrained or otherwise. Causes global destruction Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25) No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary AND on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. The alternative is to reject dominant security discourse – no one policy solves every problem – good theory now drives better policies later Bruce 96 (Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9) This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of AND resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should substantially enact statutory restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States to use indefinite detention without criminal trial. Solves the case better Rooney, 6 – J.D. Candidate, Drake University Law School; B.A., Evangel University (Heather L., Spring. “NOTE: PARLAYING PRISONER PROTECTIONS: A LOOK AT THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THAT SHOULD BE GOVERNING OUR TREATMENT OF GUANTANAMO DETAINEES.” 54 Drake L. Rev. 679. Lexis.)
The Supreme Court decisions pertaining to detainees provide a very general framework of rights that AND of detainees that will build confidence and cooperation both at home and abroad.
1NC The court will strike down aggregate limits now – it’ll be close Chemerinsky, 8-12 (Erwin, American lawyer and law professor. He is a prominent scholar in United States constitutional law and federal civil procedure. He is the current and founding dean of the University of California, Irvine School of Law, “Symposium: The distinction between contribution limits and expenditure limits,” http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposium-the-distinction-between-contribution-limits-and-expenditure-limits/) For almost forty years, since Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, campaign finance AND Thomas in rejecting this distinction and they well might signal this in McCutcheon. Capital key to strike down aggregate limits --- Citizens United proves Gora 8-15 (Joel, professor of law at Brooklyn Law School, “Symposium: McCutcheon v. FEC and the fork in the road,” http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/symposium-mccutcheon-v-fec-and-the-fork-in-the-road/#more-168568) The future of Buckley? Will the McCutcheon case disturb that Buckley equilibrium and call AND “super PACs,” as exaggerated as their electoral impact seemed to be. The plan forces a trade off --- massively spends court capital McGinnis and Rappaport ’02 (John O., Prof of Law @ Cardozo Law, and Michael B., Prof of Law @ University of San Diego Law, “Our Supermajoritarian Constitution,” 80 Tex. L. Rev. 703) Significantly, the Supreme Court has not declared these substitutions unconstitutional. In fact, AND judicial decisions concerning foreign affairs would jeopardize the political capital of the Court). McCutcheon win strengthens political parties relative to Super PACs Boschma ’13 (Janie, “Capital Eye Opener, Feb. 27: Lobbyists Worry About SCOTUS Case, Club for Growth Ranks Congress,” http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/02/capital-eye-opener-feb-27-1.html) LOBBYISTS WORRY ABOUT SCOTUS CASE: As we wrote earlier this week, the Supreme AND can go to candidates and $74,600 to PACs and parties. That checks Republican extremism Weisbrot ’12 (David, Professor of Legal Policy at the United States Studies Centre and Professor of Law and Governance at Macquarie University, “SuperPACs and bags of cash fail to halt Obama's ground game,” http://uselectionwatch12.com/news-room/SuperPACs-and-bags-of-cash-fail-to-halt-Obamas-ground-game) Obviously, the most worrying aspect of the SuperPAC phenomenon is the disproportionately large voice AND to be defeated in an otherwise very winnable Senate seat for the Republicans. That jacks US/Russian relations – domestic politics key Sokov 13 (Nicholas – Senior Fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), “US-Russian Relations: Beyond the Reset”, 1/29, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/us-russian-relations-beyond-the-reset_459.html) Looking into the future, most observers of US-Russian relations tend to concentrate AND -the-flag” tactic of consolidating the public around the government. Russia relations solve global nuclear war Allison 11 (Graham, Director – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6) That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S AND Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions. 1NC Detainment court rulings cause stripping Reinhardt 6 (Stephen – Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, “THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY”, 2006, 86 B.U.L. Rev. 1309, lexis) Archibald Cox - who knew a thing or two about the necessity of government actors AND during periods of military conflict, questions judges should not shirk from resolving. Stripping sends a signal that undermines global democracy Gerhardt 5 (Michael J. Gerhardt, William and Mary School of Law Professor, Lewis and Clark Review, "THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO COURT-STRIPPING," 9 Lewis and Clark L. Rev. 347, lexis) Beyond the constitutional defects with the Act, n40 it may not be good policy AND by Article III courts throughout our history in vindicating the rule of law. Democracy’s on the brink --- consolidation solves global WMD conflict Halperin 11 (Morton H., Senior Advisor – Open Society Institute and Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress, “Unconventional Wisdom – Democracy is Still Worth Fighting For”, Foreign Policy, January / February, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional_wisdom?page=0,11) As the United States struggles to wind down two wars and recover from a humbling AND Nor should we doubt that America would be more secure if they succeed. 1NC Cred 1NC A2 Legitimacy Advantage
The aff results in shipping enemy combatants overseas – makes us look worse Umansky, 5 – senior editor at ProPublica (Eric, 6/17. “Closing Guantanamo prison may not be the best option.” http://onlineathens.com/stories/061805/opi_20050618001.shtml)
Closing the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay has suddenly become a hot AND at Guantanamo Bay, no reporters have been allowed to visit these jails. Single policy changes don’t spill over MacDonald and Parent, 11 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami (Paul K. and Joseph M., Spring. “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44.)
Second, pessimists overstate the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can damage a AND up resources and signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance. Signals are irrelevant – capability outweighs credibility Chapman, 13 – columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune (Steve, 9/5. “War in Syria: The Endless Quest for Credibility,” http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/05/war-in-syria-the-endless-quest-for-credi)
The United States boasts the most powerful military on Earth. We have 1. AND dangerous. But there are graveyards full of people who made that bet. AT Multilat Multilat fails Naim 13 -- Senior Associate of International Economics Program @ Carnegie Endowment for Peace (Moises, 2/15/2013, "The G20 is a Sad Sign of Our Uncooperative World," http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/15/g20-is-sad-sign-of-our-uncooperative-world/fgvs)
The changing landscape of global politics also plays a role. As the number and AND seeking to advance the global agendas on trade liberalisation and curbing global warming. US won’t exert effective diplomacy Walt 3/4 -- American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago (Stephen, 2013, "Is this any way to run U.S. foreign policy?" walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/04/is_this_any_way_to_run_us_foreign_policy)
Watching the musical chairs taking place in the first months of Obama's second term reminds AND . The results, I am sorry to say, speak for themselves.
THE WEEKLY STANDARD has reviewed translations of 34 messages and interviews delivered by top al AND Guantanamo do not fare much better when any amount of scrutiny is applied. Can’t solve – prosecution fails Walen, 11 – Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law (Alec, 6/22. “A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to Preventive Detention for Suspected Terrorists.” Maryland Law Review, Volume 70, Issue 4. http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3466andcontext=mlr)
A more legitimate concern is that it may be particularly difficult to bring a successful AND .S. persons until October 2001 and December 2004, respectively.” 77
1NC Terrorism Turns We’re walking the right line on executive flexibility now – detention’s key to solve terror – multiple internal links Tomatz and Graham, 13 – Colonel, B.A., University of Houston AND , 69 A.F. L. Rev. 1. Lexis.)
President Obama signed the NDAA "despite having serious reservations with certain provisions that regulate AND about known and hidden dangers, and preventing terrorists from continuing the fight. Perception of weakness increases terrorism – history votes neg D'Souza 7 (Dinesh, fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, “How the left led us into 9/11,” LA Times, 1/18, lexis)
Clinton's policies also helped to provoke 9/11. After the Cold War, AND . In that case, 9/11 will be only the beginning. The aff prevents effective intel-sharing by allies – they’ll fear sensitive info will get out McCarthy, 4 (Andrew, former federal prosecutor, National Review Online, ‘Abu Ghraib and Enemy Combatants”, 5/11, http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy200405110832.asp)
First, as long as we are in active hostilities, searching judicial proceedings to AND necessarily resulting in more widespread loss of life than would otherwise have happened.
The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with AND biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists. Zero impact – no acquisition. Leitenberg 6 (Milton, Senior research scholar at the University of Maryland, Trained as a Scientist and Moved into the Field of Arms Control in 1966, First American Recruited to Work at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Affiliated with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Center for International Studies Peace Program at Cornell University, Senior Fellow at CISSM, http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0217-27.htm) So what substantiates the alarm and the massive federal spending on bioterrorism? There are AND produced simply with easily available materials." We are creating our worst nightmare.
1NC Pakistan Pakistan – 1NC Pakistan modeling fails – no clarity and destructive decisions Khan 11 (Amjad Mahmood, Senior Litigation Associate – Latham and Watkins LLP, Postgraduate Research Fellow – Harvard Law School, JD – Harvard Law School, “Misuse and Abuse of Legal Argument by Analogy in Transjudicial Communication: the Case of Zaheeruddin v. State,” Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business, 10(4), http://muslimwriters.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/khan_10-4-2.pdf) This article explores the risks and limits of transjudicial communication. In particular, I AND S. Supreme Court authorities to bolster and legitimize its deeply flawed decision. Military dominance prevents a strong judiciary Kalhan 13 (Anil – Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, “"Gray Zone" Constitutionalism and the Dilemma of Judicial Independence in Pakistan”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, January, 46 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1, lexis) *9 However, scholarship on constitutionalism and the judiciary in Pakistan has AND seize direct control in 1999 and further extend the reach of its power.
1NC Indo-Pak War They're moving towards a resolution Gidvani 12 -- 2008 graduate of The University of Iowa College of Law and currently practices law in Las Vegas, Nevada (ND, 2/22, "The Peaceful Resolution of Kashmir: A United Nations Led Effort for Successful International Mediation and a Permanent Resolution to the India-Pakistan Conflict," TRANSNATIONAL LAW and CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, Vol. 18:721, http://www.muntr.org/v4/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/The_Peaceful.pdf)
However, the removal of President Musharraf from power in a landslide election on September AND reasonably indicates that a successful resolution can be reached sooner rather than later. -- No India/Pakistan war – A) Deterrence Giorgio et al 10 (Maia Juel, Tina Søndergaard Madsen, Jakob Wigersma, Mark Westh, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Assessment of Deterrence and Stability in the Indian – Pakistan Conflict,” Global Studies, Autumn, http://dspace.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/6041/1/Project20GS-BA2c20Autumn202010.pdf) To what extent has nuclear deterrence enhanced stability in the India-Pakistan conflict? AND deterrence has thus been successful in creating stability on a higher structural level. B) Economics Tellis 2 (Ashley, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis, Winter, p. 19)
In any event, the saving grace that mutes the potential for exacerbated competition between AND the viewpoint both of the two South Asian competitors and the United States. AT Causes XTC No extinction – impact is local Dyer 2 (Gwynne, Ph.D. in War Studies – University of London and Board of Governors – Canada’s Royal Military College, “Nuclear War a Possibility Over Kashmir”, Hamilton Spectator, 5-24, Lexis)
For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is AND of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and they are mostly still here. No Scenario for Terror
Terror internal link is E/D Riedel ’11 (Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow at Brookings (9-26-2011, senior fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution and an adjunct professor at the School for Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. The Daily Star, September 26, 2011)
At least twice jihadists have tried to provoke war between India and Pakistan. The first time was in December 2001 with the attack on the Indian Parliament; then on Nov. 26, 2008, with the attack on Mumbai. Two Indian prime ministers were too smart to take the bait.
Moar Indo Pak D No Indo-Pak War Wright ‘13 (Thomas Wright is a fellow at the Brookings Institution in the Managing Global Order project. Previously, he was executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a lecturer at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, and senior researcher for the Princeton Project on National Security, "Don’t Expect Worsening of India, Pakistan Ties," http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2013/01/16/dont-expect-worsening-of-india-pakistan-ties/, January 16, 2013)
There’s no end for now to the hostile rhetoric between India and Pakistan. But AND noted, have been limited to specific areas of the Line of Control.
Islamabad has been trying to send signals over the last few months indicating that it AND comprehensive shift. That remains, however, purely speculative at this stage.
At the end of last week, foreign secretaries Nirupama Rao of India and Salman AND issues both countries have gone to war over several times in the past.
Solvency 1NC Solvency No viable alternative to detention Kempton, 13 – professor of political science and vice president for academic affairs at Franciscan University of Steubenville, Ohio (Daniel R, 6/4. “KEMPTON: A drone war over semantics.” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/4/a-drone-war-over-semantics/)
Finally — and most importantly — the president has failed to develop a realistic alternative AND suspending the use of the term hasn’t brought an end to the reality. Evidentiary standards mean trials and habeas hearings will always go against the detainees—means they can’t solve Ajuha and Tutt 12 Fall, 2012, Jasmeet K. Ahuja and Andrew Tutt “Evidentiary Rules Governing Guantanamo Habeas Petitions: Their Effects and Consequences”, 31 Yale L. and Pol'y Rev. 185 Beginning in 2001, the United States began transporting hundreds of persons captured overseas in AND when other facts in the record point strongly in the opposite direction. n21 The executive will move detainees around without providing real due process McNeal, 8 – Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law (Gregory, 8/8. “ARTICLE: BEYOND GUANTANAMO, OBSTACLES AND OPTIONS.” 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 29. Lexis)
3. Executive Forum-Discretion--Any reform which allows for adjudication of guilt AND proposed reform is incomplete without thoroughly addressing the factors that the Executive balances. Can’t solve – the DOD will just shift detainment overseas Merritt, 2005 (Jeralyn, Criminal Defense Lawyer, J.D. 1973, “Rendition Comes Out of the Closet”, TalkLeft, March 11th, http://talkleft.com/new_archives/009994.html)
A Feb. 5 memorandum from Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld calls for broader AND persuading other countries to bear some of the burden of detaining terrorism suspects.
9/21/13
Round 6 GSU vs MSU
Tournament: GSU | Round: 6 | Opponent: MSU | Judge: Bruce Najor 1NC A. Interpretation – Statutory restrictions must directly prohibit activities currently under the president’s war powers authority – this excludes regulation or oversight Statutory restrictions prohibit actions Lamont 5 (Michael, Legal Analyst @ Occupational health, "Legal: Staying on the right side of the law," http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/01/04/2005/29005/legal-staying-on-the-right-side-of-the-law.htm#.UgFe_o3qnoI) It will be obvious what 'conduct' and 'redundancy' dismissals are. A statutory restriction means that the employee is prevented by law from doing the job - for example, a driver who loses his driving licence. 'Some other substantial reason' means "Parliament can't be expected to think of everything". Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108_11379 Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority AND were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.
B. Vote Neg –
Limits – Regulation and oversight of authority allows a litany of new affs in each area – justifies indirect effects of statutory policies, undermines prep and clash 2. Ground – Restriction ground is the locus of neg prep – their interpretation jacks all core disads because an aff doesn’t have to prevent the president from doing anything
But read on to the second graf of the piece and you'll see that the AND of a shutdown, in other words, they're falling, not rising. Obama fights the plan – strongly supports war powers Rana 11 (Aziz – Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099, lexis) Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of Barack Obama AND war powers and to promote the centrality of state secrecy to national security. Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis) a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by AND Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187 Capital key Dumain 9/18/13 (Emma, Roll Call, "Will House Democrats Balk at Sequester-Level CR?," http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/will-house-democrats-balk-at-sequester-level-cr/)
What would be helpful for the duration of the political battle over the CR between now and the end of the month, however, is if Obama more frequently took to the “bully pulpit” to blast Republicans and bolster Democrats, the aide said.¶ “The more the better,” he said. Shutdown wrecks the economy Wu 8/27/13 (Yi, “Government Shutdown 2013: Still a Terrible Idea,” PolicyMic, http://www.policymic.com/articles/60837/government-shutdown-2013-still-a-terrible-idea)
Around a third of House Republicans, many Tea Party-backed, sent a AND to demand cancellation of the entire health care reform enacted a year before. Global nuclear war Harris and Burrows 9 (Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf)
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is AND within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world. 1NC Private military contractor use is decreasing Schwartz 10 (Moshe – Specialist in Defense Acquisition, CRS Report, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress”, 6/22, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145576.pdf) According to DOD, from September 2007 to June 2009, the number of armed AND as the overall number of contractors and troops in Iraq has also decreased. Plan causes a Shift to PMC’s Michaels 4 (Jon – Law Clerk to the Honorable Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Law Clerk designate, the Honorable David H. Souter, U.S. Supreme Court; J.D., Yale Law School, “ARTICLE: BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATIZING WAR”, 2004, 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1001, lexis) *1008 Military privatization of combat duties, on the other hand, AND of powers, and to the legitimacy of collective security may prove irreparable. That kills readiness and causes WMD terrorism Singer 2 (P.W. – Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2002 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2002/1/01us20military20singer/20020128.pdf) INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND MONI TORING DIFFICULTIES. Problems of incomplete information and monitoring generally accompany AND another local general with w hom the firmís executives had a better working relationship Extinction Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand – Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33(7), July) A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by AND for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
1NC The aff doesn’t provide real reform – continued crisis discourse allows a re-expansion of executive authority Scheuerman 12 -- Professor of Political Science and West European Studies at Indiana University (William E., Summer 2012, "Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy," Law and Social Inquiry 37(3), EBSCO)
IV. REFORMISM'S LIMITS Bruce Ackerman, one of our country's most observant analysts of AND both from existing US-style presidentialism and parliamentarism, constrained or otherwise. Causes global destruction Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25) No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary AND on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. The alternative is to reject dominant security discourse – no one policy solves every problem – good theory now drives better policies later Bruce 96 (Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9) This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of AND resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why? 1NC Text: The Executive Branch of the United States should seek Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force. The Executive Branch will comply with the result of Congressional authorization. Self-restraint solves and is more effective than the plan Posner and Vermeule 10 (Eric A. Posner is the Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law @ the University of Chicago School of Law and Editor of the Journal of Legal Studies, Adrian Vermeule is a legal scholar, Oxford University Press, “The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic”, Google Books) A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic AND political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules ¶or policies. 1NC The United States federal government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of non-nuclear military force. Presidential flexibility on nuclear weapons key to deterrence Chilcoat 99 (Richard, President – National Defense University, “Strategic Forces and Deterrence: New Realities, New Roles?” Strategic Assuessment, National Defense University, http://se1.isn.ch:80/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISNandfileid=A28BAB6C-38EA-B58D-A4F2-10FE0E95174Aandlng=en) The United States has consistently eschewed an unequivocal policy of “no first use” AND capable of a credible and proportional response, with nuclear weapons if necessary. Nuclear Deterrence prevents CBW Joseph 00 (Robert, Director – Center for Counterproliferation Research, senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy, professor – Missouri State University, and formerly Special Envoy for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Congressional Testimony – Senate Foreign Relations Nonproliferation Policy, 3-21) Therefore, it is essential that the United States acquire the capabilities to deny an AND weapons, and President Reagan held the vision of eliminating these weapons altogether. Extinction Sandberg et al 8—Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. PhD in computation neuroscience, Stockholm—AND—Jason G. Matheny—PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins. special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh—AND—Milan M. ?irkovi?—senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. Assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad. (Anders, How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?, 9 September 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction) The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. AND may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.
Interventionism 1NC Informal checks are sufficient to address groupthink Kennedy 12 Copyright (c) 2012 Gould School of Law Southern California Interdisciplinary AND Arts and Sciences; B.A. Government 2009, Harvard University.
Neither the president nor the decision-making group members implement "hybrid" checks AND the threat to ""go public' by leaking embarrassing information or publicly resigning." Groupthink Inevitable – secrecy means the executive retains control Posner 12 (Eric, Kirkland and Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School, REFLECTIONS ON THE LAW OF SEPTEMBER 11: A TEN-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE: DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, Winter, 2012 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 35 Harv. J.L. and Pub. Pol'y 213)
Recall that Professor Holmes says that the argument that the executive can act more swiftly AND of secrecy prevail. That brings us to the Office of Legal Counsel. Intelligence agencies norms of conduct exacerbate executive secrecy – makes groupthink unavoidable Schulhofer 10 (Stephen J., Robert B. McKay Professor of Law, New York University “Secrecy and Democracy: Who Controls Information in the National Security State?, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 217, http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/217)
The impetus to over-classify, even when acting from legitimate motives, is AND is the first place to turn for a means to counteract these distortions.
Case - Resolve DA Plan kills resolve Newton 12 (Michael – Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School, “Presidential Powers and Foreign Affairs: The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still Controversial: Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution”, 2012, 45 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 173, lexis) B. US Enemies' Ability to Manipulate American Political Will The corollary to this modern AND asymmetric enemy can in theory erode our political will even before it solidifies. Causes global instability – turns the case Chapin and Hanson, 12/7/2009 (Bernard - interviewer and Victor Davis - Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Change, weakness, disaster, p. http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/) BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies AND tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.
1NC Korean War No north korea war Bandow 12/6 -- Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution with the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan (Doug, 2012, "Ignore North Korea's Temper Tantrums," http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/ignore-north-koreas-temper-tantrums-7813?page=show)
North Korea announced that it plans another rocket launch this month. The South Korean AND regime’s great power, the latest effort could reinforce Pyongyang’s image of irrelevance. No escalation Kang 10 (David, Professor of International Relations and Business and Director of the Korean Studies Institute –University of Southern California, “Korea’s New Cold War,” 12-31, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/koreas-new-cold-war-4653) However, despite dueling artillery barrages and the sinking of a warship, pledges of AND the North Korean leadership plans to expand the fighting into a general war.
Warfighting
1NC WPR reform fails – President will circumvent – Congress and Courts won’t hold him accountable Newton 12 (Michael – Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School, “Presidential Powers and Foreign Affairs: The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still Controversial: Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution”, 2012, 45 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 173, lexis) A. President as Litigator-in-Chief First, debates over the applicability AND a clear-eyed national discussion of the merits of such overseas action.
power projection irrelevant Fettweis 11 Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan
It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship AND global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.
A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to AND about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it. No spillover MacDonald and Parent, 11 (Paul K., Assistant Professor of Political Science – Williams College, and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science – University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, 35(4), p. 7-44)
Second, pessimists overstate the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can damage a AND up resources and signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance. Studies prove Fettweis, 10 (Christopher J., Professor of Political Science at Tulane, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy”, Survival, Vol. 52 no. 2, April–May 2010, p. 59–82, Ebsco)
The credibility imperative is a clear example, one that continues to have a particularly AND military action, no matter how small the issue or large the odds. Credibility is not important – their logic is stuck in the Cold War Fettweis, 10 (Christopher J., Professor of Political Science at Tulane, Dangerous Times- The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 187-8)
Skeptics may warn that the consequences to national credibility of reneging on commitments would be AND the evidence and refuse to believe that its reputation is worth paying for. AT Multilat Multilat fails Naim 13 -- Senior Associate of International Economics Program @ Carnegie Endowment for Peace (Moises, 2/15/2013, "The G20 is a Sad Sign of Our Uncooperative World," http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/15/g20-is-sad-sign-of-our-uncooperative-world/fgvs)
The changing landscape of global politics also plays a role. As the number and AND seeking to advance the global agendas on trade liberalisation and curbing global warming. US won’t exert effective diplomacy Walt 3/4 -- American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, previously taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago (Stephen, 2013, "Is this any way to run U.S. foreign policy?" walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/04/is_this_any_way_to_run_us_foreign_policy)
Watching the musical chairs taking place in the first months of Obama's second term reminds AND . The results, I am sorry to say, speak for themselves.
SOP Framing They have no terminal impacts to this advantage – be skeptical of escalation claims – we’ll read defense to their laundry lists 1NC Indo-Pak War No indo pak war Giorgio et al 10 (Maia Juel, Tina Søndergaard Madsen, Jakob Wigersma, Mark Westh, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: An Assessment of Deterrence and Stability in the Indian – Pakistan Conflict,” Global Studies, Autumn, http://dspace.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/6041/1/Project20GS-BA2c20Autumn202010.pdf) To what extent has nuclear deterrence enhanced stability in the India-Pakistan conflict? AND deterrence has thus been successful in creating stability on a higher structural level.
No Russia Georgia War No Georgia war- central asia doesn’t escalate Collins and Wohlforth 4 (Kathleen, Professor of Political Science – Notre Dame and William, Professor of Government – Dartmouth, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expectations”, Strategic Asia 2003-4: Fragility and Crisis, p. 312-313)
Conclusion The popular great game lens for analyzing Central Asia fails to capture the declared AND 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia. No China/Taiwan No military invasion to regain Taiwan - -they'll use other methods Fischer 11/27 -- clean energy entrepreneur and is the founder and CEO of Lumicity Ltd (Tristan, 2012, " Why China could invade Taiwan – and get away with it," http://www.historyfuturenow.com/wp/why-china-could-invade-taiwan-and-get-away-with-it/)
The People’s Republic of China has been very patient with Taiwan. It knows that AND market access making the business classes increasingly open to reunification with mainland China.
Separation of Powers – 1NC SoP useless – pres powers too big Posner and Vermeule, 10 - *professor of law at the University of Chicago AND professor of law at Harvard (Eric and Adrian, The Executive Unbound, p. 17-18)
We begin with the constitutional framework, and with the official constitutional theory of liberal AND the courts, exerts implicit but effective control over executive and administrative behavior. Plan can’t solve separation of powers – too many alt causes – A. Drones Noonan 13 (Raymond, “Law School prof addresses drone legality”, 2/22, http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2013/02/22/law-school-prof-addresses-drone-legality/) Hathaway, who directs the Center for Global Legal Challenges at Yale Law School, AND threaten to very much upset traditional powers over use of military force.” B. NSA Surveillance Brito 13 (Jenny, “NSA Scandal: How Leaks Advance Liberty and Resist Tyranny”, 7/18, http://reason.com/archives/2013/06/18/nsa-scandal-how-leaks-advance-liberty-an) If the secret surveillance itself is any indication, then the separation of powers is AND institutions, on what can we rely to keep government power in check? C. Detention Siegel 12 (Ashley – J.D., Boston University School of Law, “SOME HOLDS BARRED: EXTENDING EXECUTIVE DETENTION HABEAS LAW BEYOND GUANTANAMO BAY”, 2012, 92 B.U.L. Rev. 1405, lexis) The Supreme Court created a vastly different landscape for alien detainees' rights and habeas petitions AND law by reinventing categories of prisoners or locating them in offshore facilities. n208 No impact to SOP- Presidents bypass formal constitutional barriers all the time, Zasloff, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law, 2004 (Jonathan, “Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California's Separation of Powers” 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1079, Copyright (c) 2004 The Regents of the University of California) Presidents break legislative impasses by "solving" pressing problems with unilateral decrees that often AND concern. And thus, it should not be cause for judicial concern.
9/22/13
Round 8 GSU vs Georgetown
Tournament: GSU | Round: 8 | Opponent: Georgetown ErMc | Judge: Dan Bagwell 1NC A. Interpretation – Statutory restrictions must directly prohibit activities currently under the president’s war powers authority – this excludes regulation or oversight Statutory restrictions prohibit actions Lamont 5 (Michael, Legal Analyst @ Occupational health, and#34;Legal: Staying on the right side of the law,and#34; http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/01/04/2005/29005/legal-staying-on-the-right-side-of-the-law.htm#.UgFe_o3qnoI) It will be obvious what and#39;conductand#39; and and#39;redundancyand#39; dismissals are. A statutory restriction means that the employee is prevented by law from doing the job - for example, a driver who loses his driving licence. and#39;Some other substantial reasonand#39; means and#34;Parliament canand#39;t be expected to think of everythingand#34;. Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108_11379 Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority AND were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.
B. Vote Neg –
Limits – Regulation and oversight of authority allows a litany of new affs in each area – justifies indirect effects of statutory policies and affs that don’t alter presidential authority – undermines prep and clash 2. Ground – Restriction ground is the locus of neg prep – their interpretation jacks all core disads – politics, presidential powers, and any area based disad because an aff doesn’t have to prevent the president from doing anything
But read on to the second graf of the piece and youand#39;ll see that the AND of a shutdown, in other words, theyand#39;re falling, not rising. Obama fights the plan – strongly supports war powers Rana 11 (Aziz – Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099, lexis) Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of Barack Obama AND war powers and to promote the centrality of state secrecy to national security. Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis) a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by AND Shane observes, non-judicial resolution and#34;becomes vastly more difficult.and#34; n187 Capital key Dumain 9/18/13 (Emma, Roll Call, and#34;Will House Democrats Balk at Sequester-Level CR?,and#34; http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/will-house-democrats-balk-at-sequester-level-cr/)
What would be helpful for the duration of the political battle over the CR between now and the end of the month, however, is if Obama more frequently took to the “bully pulpit” to blast Republicans and bolster Democrats, the aide said.¶ “The more the better,” he said. Shutdown wrecks the economy Wu 8/27/13 (Yi, “Government Shutdown 2013: Still a Terrible Idea,” PolicyMic, http://www.policymic.com/articles/60837/government-shutdown-2013-still-a-terrible-idea)
Around a third of House Republicans, many Tea Party-backed, sent a AND to demand cancellation of the entire health care reform enacted a year before. Global nuclear war Harris and Burrows 9 (Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_00
