### 1NC

#### A. Interpretation – Statutory restrictions must directly prohibit activities currently under the president’s war powers authority – this excludes regulation or oversight

#### Statutory restrictions prohibit actions

Lamont 5 (Michael, Legal Analyst @ Occupational health, "Legal: Staying on the right side of the law," http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/01/04/2005/29005/legal-staying-on-the-right-side-of-the-law.htm#.UgFe\_o3qnoI)

It will be obvious what 'conduct' and 'redundancy' dismissals are. A statutory restriction means that the employee is prevented by law from doing the job - for example, a driver who loses his driving licence. 'Some other substantial reason' means "Parliament can't be expected to think of everything".

#### Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### B. Vote Neg –

#### 1. Limits – Regulation and oversight of authority allows a litany of new affs in each area – justifies indirect effects of statutory policies and affs that don’t alter presidential authority – undermines prep and clash

#### 2. Ground – Restriction ground is the locus of neg prep – their interpretation jacks all core disads – politics, presidential powers, and any area based disad because an aff doesn’t have to prevent the president from doing anything

### 1NC

#### Shutdown will be avoided now

Yglesias 9/18/13 (Matthew, business/economics correspondent @ Slate, "The Odds of a Government Shutdown Are Falling, Not Rising," http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/09/18/government\_shutdown\_odds\_falling\_not\_rising.html)

But read on to the second graf of the piece and you'll see that the odds are not rising at all. What's happening is that John Boehner is preparing to pass an appropriations bill that also defunds Obamacare that he knows perfectly well stands no chance of passing, and he's hoping that doing this will placate the right wing of the his caucus for when he surrenders.¶ Here they explain:¶ House leaders are hoping the vote on the defunding measure will placate conservatives once the Democratically controlled Senate rejects it. The House, they are betting, would then pass a stopgap spending measure unencumbered by such policy baggage and shift the argument to the debt ceiling, which must be raised by mid-October if the government is to avoid an economically debilitating default.¶ The key thing to remember here is that the House, as a discretionary decision, operates by the "Hastert Rule" in which only bills that are supported by a majority of GOP members can be brought to the floor for a vote. There is no Hastert-compliant appropriations bill that can pass the Senate. But there very likely is majority support in the House for the kind of "clean" funding bill that can also pass the Senate. All that has to happen is for John Boehner to violate the Hastert Rule. And the Hastert Rule isn't actually a rule, it's something Boehner has put aside many times. But it's also a rule he can't flagrantly ignore, lest his caucus get too grumpy and depose him. The operating theory here is that if Boehner has the whole House GOP indulge the maximalist faction by all passing a defuding bill, that creates enough room to move to later violate the Hastert Rule and pass a continuing resolution.¶ If anything is happening to the odds of a shutdown, in other words, they're falling, not rising.

#### Obama fights the plan – strongly supports war powers

Rana 11 (Aziz – Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099, lexis)

Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of Barack Obama as President appeared to herald a new approach to security concerns and even the possibility of a fundamental break from Bush-era policies. These hopes were immediately stoked by Obama's decision before taking office to close the Guantanamo Bay prison. n4 Over two years later, however, not only does Guantanamo remain open, but through a recent executive order Obama has formalized a system of indefinite detention for those held there and also has stated that new military commission trials will begin for Guantanamo detainees. n5 More important, in ways small and large, the new administration remains committed to core elements of the previous constitutional vision of national security. Just as their predecessors, Obama officials continue to defend expansive executive detention and war powers and to promote the centrality of state secrecy to national security.

#### Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off

O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis)

a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by first-hand accounts of information battles and by the conclusions of experts who study them. Participants in such battles report that short-term political calculations consistently trump the constitutional interests at stake. One veteran of the first Bush White House, for example, has explained that rational-choice theory predicts what he in fact experienced: The rewards for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the office of the presidency would be largely abstract, since they would consist primarily of fidelity to a certain theory of the Constitution... . The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing purposes, [and] the unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies. n182 Louis Fisher, one of the leading defenders of the political branches' competence and authority to interpret the Constitution independently of the courts, n183 acknowledges that politics and "practical considerations" typically override the legal and constitutional principles implicated in information disputes. n184 In his view, although debate about congressional access and executive privilege "usually proceeds in terms of constitutional doctrine, it is the messy political realities of the moment that usually decide the issue." n185 Indeed, Professor Peter Shane, who has extensively studied such conflicts, concludes that their successful resolution in fact depends upon the parties focusing only on short-term political [\*1123] considerations. n186 When the participants "get institutional," Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187

#### Capital key

Dumain 9/18/13 (Emma, Roll Call, "Will House Democrats Balk at Sequester-Level CR?," http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/will-house-democrats-balk-at-sequester-level-cr/)

What would be helpful for the duration of the political battle over the CR between now and the end of the month, however, is if Obama more frequently took to the “bully pulpit” to blast Republicans and bolster Democrats, the aide said.¶ “The more the better,” he said.

#### Shutdown wrecks the economy

Wu 8/27/13 (Yi, “Government Shutdown 2013: Still a Terrible Idea,” PolicyMic, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/60837/government-shutdown-2013-still-a-terrible-idea>)

Around a third of House Republicans, many Tea Party-backed, sent a letter last week calling on Speaker John Boehner to reject any spending bills that include implementation of the Affordable Care Act, otherwise known as Obamacare. Some Senate Republicans echo their House colleagues in pondering this extreme tactic, which is nothing other than a threat of government shutdown as neither congressional Democrats nor President Obama would ever agree on a budget that abolishes the new health care law. Unleashing this threat would amount to holding a large number of of the federal government's functions, including processing Social Security checks and running the Centers for Disease Control, hostage in order to score partisan points. It would be an irresponsible move inflicting enormous damage to the U.S. economy while providing no benefit whatsoever for the country, and Boehner is rightly disinclined to pursue it. Government shutdowns are deleterious to the economy. Two years ago in February 2011, a similar government shutdown was looming due to a budget impasse, and a research firm estimated that quater's GDP growth would be reduced by 0.2 percentage points if the shutdown lasted a week. After the budget is restored from the hypothetical shutdown, growth would only be "partially recouped," and a longer shutdown would result in deeper slowdowns. Further, the uncertainties resulting from a shutdown would also discourage business. A shutdown was avoided last-minute that year, unlike in 1995 during the Clinton administration where it actually took place for four weeks and resulted in a 0.5 percentage-point dent in GDP growth. Billions of dollars were cut from the budget, but neither Boehner nor the Republicans at the time were reckless enough to demand cancellation of the entire health care reform enacted a year before.

#### Global nuclear war

Harris & Burrows 9 (Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for** greater **conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any **economically-induced drawdown** of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, **acquire additional weapons**, and consider pursuing their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and **broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on **preemption** rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in **interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 1NC

#### The aff doesn’t provide real reform – continued crisis discourse allows a re-expansion of executive authority

Scheuerman 12 -- Professor of Political Science and West European Studies at Indiana University (William E., Summer 2012, "Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy," Law & Social Inquiry 37(3), EBSCO)

IV. REFORMISM'S LIMITS Bruce Ackerman, one of our country's most observant analysts of its clunky constitutional machinery, is similarly impatient with the "comforting notion that our heroic ancestors" created an ideal constitutional and political system (2010, 10). He even agrees that the US model increasingly seems to overlap with Schmitt's dreary vision of executive-centered plebiscitarianism motored by endless crises and emergencies (2010, 82). In sharp contrast to Posner and Vermeule, however, he not only worries deeply about this trend, but he also discards the unrealistic possibility that it might be successfully countered without recourse to legal and constitutional devices. Although Madison's original tripartite separation of powers is ill-adjusted to the realities of the modern administrative state, we need to reinvigorate both liberal legalism and checks and balances. Unless we can succeed in doing so, US citizens are likely to experience a "quantum leap in the presidency's destructive capacities" in the new century (2010, 119). Despite its alarmist tenor, for which he has been—in my view—unfairly criticized,'' Ackerman's position is grounded in a blunt acknowledgment of the comparative disadvantages of the US constitutional system. More clearly than any of the other authors discussed in this article, he breaks cleanly with the intellectual and constitutional provincialism that continues to plague so much legal and political science research on the United States. In part because as "late developers" they learned from institutional mistakes in the United States and elsewhere, more recently designed liberal democracies often do a better job than our Model T version at guaranteeing both policy effectiveness and the rule of law (2010, 120-22). Following the path-breaking work of his colleague Juan Linz, Ackerman offers a critical assessment of our presidential version of liberal democracy, where an independently elected executive regularly finds itself facing off against a potentially obstructionist Congress, which very well may seek to bury "one major presidential initiative after another" (2010, 5; see also Linz 1994). In the context of either real or imagined crises, executives facing strict temporal restraints (i.e., an upcoming election), while claiming to be the people's best protector against so-called special interests, will typically face widespread calls for swift (as well as legally dubious) action. "Crisis talk," in part endogenously generated by a flawed political system prone to gridlock rather than effective policy making, "prepares the ground for a grudging acceptance of presidential unilateralism" (2010, 6). Executives everywhere have much to gain from crisis scenarios. Yet incentives for declaring and perpetuating emergencies may be especially pronounced in our presidential system. The combination of temporal rigidity (i.e., fixed elections and terms of office) and "dual democratic legitimacy" (with both Congress and the president claiming to speak for "we the people") poses severe challenges to law-based government (Linz 1994). Criticizing US scholarship for remaining imprisoned in the anachronistic binary contrast of "US presidentialism vs. Westminster parliamentarism," Ackerman recommends that we pay closer attention to recent innovations achieved by what he describes as "constrained parliamentarism," basically a modified parliamentary system that circumvents the worst design mistakes of both Westminster parliamentarism and US presidentialism. As he has argued previously in a lengthy Harvard Law Review article, constrained parliamentarism—as found, for example, in recent democracies like Germany and Spain—locates law making in a Westminster-style popular assembly. But in contrast to the UK model, "legislative output is constrained by a higher lawmaking process" (2000, 666). The German Eederal Republic, for example, rests on a written constitution (e.g., the Basic Law) and has a powerful constitutional court. In Ackerman's view, constrained parliamentarism lacks many of the institutional components driving the growth of executive-dominated emergency govemment. Not surprisingly, he posits, it suffers to a reduced degree from many of the institutional pathologies plaguing US-style presidentialism. Ackerman argues that, in contrast, US-style presidential models have regularly collapsed elsewhere (e.g., in Latin and South American countries, where US-style presidentialism has been widely imitated [Linz and Valenzuela 1994]), devolving on occasion into unabated authoritarianism (2000, 646). Ackerman now seems genuinely concerned that a similar fate might soon befall its original version. Even if his most recent book repeats some earlier worries, he has now identified additional perils that he thinks deserve immediate attention. Not surprisingly, perhaps, his anxiety level has noticeably increased. Even Schmitt's unattractive vision of presidential authoritarianism appears "a little old-fashioned," given some ominous recent trends (2010, 82). To an extent unfathomable in Schmitt's day, the executive can exploit quasi-scientific polling data in order to gauge the public pulse. Presidents now employ a small but growing army of media gurus and consultants who allow them to craft their messages in astonishingly well-skilled—and potentially manipulative—ways. Especially during crisis moments, an overheated political environment can quickly play into the hands of a "White House propaganda machine generating a stream of sound bites" (2010, 33). Pundits and opinion makers already tend to blur the crucial divide between polling "numbers" and actual votes, with polls in both elite and popular consciousness tending not only to supplement but increasingly displace election results.'^ The decline of the print media and serious joumalism—about which Ackerman is understandably distressed—means that even the most fantastic views are taken seriously. Thus far, the Internet has failed to pick up the slack; it tends to polarize public opinion. Meanwhile, our primary system favors candidates who successfully appeal to an energized partisan base, meaning that those best able to exploit public opinion polling and the mass media, but out of sync with the median voter, generally gain the party nomination. Linz earlier pointed out that presidentialism favors political outsiders; Ackerman worries that in our emerging presidential model, the outsiders will tend to be extremists. Polling and media-savvy, charismatic, and relatively extreme figures will colonize the White House. In addition, the president's control over the massive administrative apparatus provides the executive with a daunting array of institutional weapons, while the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and Office of Counsel to the President offer hyperpoliticized sites from which distinctly executive-centered legal and constitutional views now are rapidly disseminated. Ackerman raises some tough questions for those who deem the OLC and related executive organs fundamentally sound institutions that somehow went haywire under David Addington and John Yoo. In his view, their excesses represent a logical result of basic structural trends currently transforming both the executive and political system as whole. OLC's partisan and sometimes quasi-authoritarian legal pronouncements are now being eagerly studied by law students and cited by federal courts (2010, 93). Notwithstanding an admirable tradition of executive deference to the Supreme Court, presidents are better positioned than ever to claim higher political legitimacy and neutralize political rivals. Backed by eager partisan followers, adept at the media game, and well armed with clever legal arguments constructed by some of the best lawyers in the country, prospective presidents may conceivably stop deferring to the Court (2010, 89). Ackerman's most unsettling amendment to his previous views is probably his discussion of the increasingly politicized character of the military—an administrative realm, by the way, ignored by other writers here, despite its huge role in modern US politics. Here again, the basic enigma is that the traditional eighteenth-century tripartite separation of powers meshes poorly with twenty-first-century trends: powerful military leaders can now regularly play different branches of govemment against one another in ways that undermine meaningful civilian oversight. Top officers possess far-reaching opportunities "to become an independent political force—allowing them to tip the balance of political support in one direction, then another," as the competing branches struggle for power (2010, 49). For Ackerman, the emergence of nationally prominent and media-savvy figures such as Colin Powell and David Petraeus, who at crucial junctures have communicated controversial policy positions to a broader public,'^ suggests that this long-standing structural flaw has recently gotten worse. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1996, for example, transformed the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from a mediator for the competing services into the military's principal—and hugely influential—spokesperson within the National Security Council (2010, 50). Not only does the military constitute a hugely significant segment of the administrative machinery, but it is now embodied—both in govemment and the public eye—in a single leader whose views carry tremendous weight. The fact that opinion surveys show that the officer corps is increasingly conservative in its partisan orientation, Ackerman notes, only adds to the dangers. Americans need not fear an imminent military putsch, along the lines that destroyed other presidential regimes elsewhere. Nonetheless, we would do well not to be "lulled into a false sense of security" (2010, 87). Having painted a foreboding portrait of institutional trends, Ackerman points to paths we might take to ward off the worst. In light of the obvious seriousness of the illness he has diagnosed, however, his antidotes tend to disappoint: he proposes that we treat cancer with some useful but limited home remedies. Like Shane, Ackerman wants to improve popular deliberation by reforming the mass media and institutionalizing "Deliberation Day" (2010, 125-40). Yet how such otherwise potentially appealing initiatives might counteract the symbiotic relationship between presidentialism and crisis government remains ambiguous. A modernized electoral college, for example, might simply engender executives better positioned to claim to stand in for "we the people" than their historical predecessors. Given Ackerman's own worries about plebiscitarianism, this reform might compound rather than alleviate our problems. More innovatively, Ackerman endorses the idea of a quasi-judicial check within the executive branch, a "Supreme Executive Tribunal" given the task of expeditiously determining the legality of proposed executive action, whose members would be appointed to staggered terms and subject to Senate confirmation. Forced to gain a seal of approval from jurists relatively insulated from sitting presidents, the executive tribunal would act more quickly than an ordinary court and thereby help put a "brake on the presidential dynamic before it can gather steam" (2010,143). Before the president could take the first political move and potentially alter the playing field, he or she might first have to clear the move with a body of legal experts, a requirement that presumably over time would work to undergird the executive branch's commitment to legality. The proposed tribunal could allow the president and Congress to resolve many of their standoffs more expeditiously than is typical today (2010, 146). Congressional representatives, for example, might rely on the tribunal to challenge executive signing statements. Existing exemptions for a significant number of major executive-level actors (e.g., the president's National Security Advisor) from Senate confirmation also need to be abandoned, while the military should promulgate a new Canon of Military Ethics, aimed at clarifying what civilian control means in contemporary real-life settings, in order to counteract its ongoing politicization. Goldwater-Nichols could be revised so as better to guarantee the subordination of military leaders to the Secretary of Defense (2010, 153-65). Ackerman also repeats his previous calls for creating an explicit legal framework for executive emergency action: Congress could temporarily grant the president broad discretionary emergency powers while maintaining effective authority to revoke them if the executive proved unable to gain ever more substantial support from the legislature (2010, 165-70; see also Ackerman 2006). Each of these suggestions demands more careful scrutiny than possible here. Nonetheless, even if many of them seem potentially useful, room for skepticism remains. Why, for example, would the proposed executive tribunal not become yet another site for potentially explosive standoffs between presidents and Congress? Might not highlevel political conflicts end up simply taking the forms of destructive (and misleadingly legalistic) duels? To the extent that one of the tribunal's goals is to decelerate executive decision making, its creation would perhaps leave our already sluggish and slow-moving political system even less able than at the present to deal with fast-paced challenges. Faced with time constraints and the need to gain popular support, executives might then feel even more pressed than at present to circumvent legality. As Ackerman knows, even as it presently operates, the Senate confirmation process is a mess. His proposal to extend its scope might simply end up reproducing at least some familiar problems. Last but not least, given the perils he so alarmingly describes, his proposed military reforms seem unsatisfying. Why not instead simply cut our bloated military apparatus and abandon US imperial pretensions? The obvious Achilles heel is that none of the proposals really deals head-on with what Ackerman himself conceives as the fundamental root of executive-centered government: an independently elected president strictly separated from legislative bodies with which he periodically clashes in potentially destructive ways. Despite Ackerman's ambition, his proposals do not provide structural reform: he concludes that US-based reformers should "take the independently elected presidency as a fixture" (2010, 124). Thus, presidential government is here to stay; reformers can also forget about significantly altering our flawed system of presidential primaries, activist government, and powerful military that intervenes frequently abroad (2010, 124). Given contemporary political developments, one can certainly appreciate why Ackerman is skeptical that the US system might finally be ripe for a productive institutional overhaul. Nonetheless, this just makes an already rather bleak book look even bleaker. His book's title. The Decline and Fall of the Arnerican Republic, is out of step with the somewhat upbeat reformist proposals detailed in its final chapters. Regretfully, the title better captures his core message. Only Ackerman's ultimately disturbing book both adeptly rejects the tendency among recent students of executive power to revert to constitutional nostalgia while forthrightly identifying the very real dangers posed by recent institutional trends. In an age of permanent or at least seemingly endless emergencies, where the very attempt to cleanly distinguish dire crises from "normal" political and social challenges becomes exceedingly difficult, the executive threatens to become an even more predominant— and potentially lawless—institutional player Unfortunately, US-style presidential democracy may be particularly vulnerable to this trend. Ackerman proves more successful than the other authors discussed here because he is best attuned to a rich body of comparative constitutional and political science scholarship that has raised legitimate doubts about the alleged virtues of US-style liberal democracy. Not surprisingly, some of his own reform ideas—for example, his proposed system of emergency law making—draw heavily on foreign examples, including Canada and new democracies such as South Africa. He convincingly argues that we might at least ameliorate the widespread tendency among presidents to manipulate crises for narrow partisan reasons, for example, by relying on the clever idea of a supermajoritarian escalator, which would require every legislative renewal of executive emergency authority to rest on ever more numerous supermajorities (2006). Ackerman is right to suggest that the United States needs to look abroad in order to improve our rather deficient system of emergency rule (Scheuerman 2006, 2008). Our system is broken; it is time to see what can be learned from others. Ackerman's latest book's overly cautious reformism thus seems especially peculiar in light of his own powerful and indeed enthusiastic defense of constrained parliamentarism, which he quite plausibly describes as potentially offering a superior approach to emergency government. The key point is not that we can be absolutely sure that the "grass is greener" in new democracies such as postwar Germany or post-Franco Spain; existing empirical evidence offers, frankly, a mixed picture. Contemporary Germany, for example, has certainly experienced its own fair share of emergency executive excesses (Frankenberg 2010). Scholars have criticized not only the empirical thesis that presidentialism and a strict separation of powers can help explain the substantial growth of executive discretion (Carolan 2009; Gross and Ni Aolain 2006), but also more farreaching assertions about their alleged structural disadvantages (Cheibub 2006). Still others argue that parliamentary regimes even of the "old type" (i.e., the UK Westminster model) have done relatively well in maintaining the rule of law during serious crises (Ewing and Gearty 2000; Bellamy 2007, 249-53). Unfortunately, we still lack wellconceived empirical studies comparing constrained parliamentarism with US-style presidentialism. Too much existing scholarship focuses on single countries, or relies on "foreign" cases but only in a highly selective and anecdotal fashion. Until we have more properly designed comparative studies, however, it seems inaccurate to assume a priori that core institutional features of US presidential democracy are well equipped to tackle the many challenges at hand. As I have tried to argue here, a great deal of initial evidence suggests that this simply is not the case. Admittedly, every variety of liberal democracy confronts structural tendencies favoring the augmentation of executive power: many of the social and economic roots (e.g., social acceleration) of executive-centered crisis govemment represent more-or-less universal phenomena, likely to rattle even well-designed constitutional systems. One can also easily imagine that in decades to come, extreme "natural" catastrophes— increasingly misnamed, because of their links to human-based climate change— justifying declarations of martial law or states of emergency will proliferate, providing novel possibilities for executives to expand their authority.^° So it would be naive to expect any easy constitutional or political-institutional fix. However, this sobering reality should not lead us to abandon creative institutional thinking. On the contrary, it arguably requires of us that we try to come up with new institutional models, distinct both from existing US-style presidentialism and parliamentarism, constrained or otherwise.

#### Causes global destruction

**Der Derian 98** (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori  argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0%3Dwww.ciaonet.org%3A80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### The alternative is to reject dominant security discourse – no one policy solves every problem – good theory now drives better policies later

Bruce 96 (Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### 1NC

#### Text: The Executive Branch of the United States should not utilize targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.

#### Self-restraint solves and is more effective than the plan

Posner and Vermeule 10 (Eric A. Posner is the Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law @ the University of Chicago School of Law and Editor of the Journal of Legal Studies, Adrian Vermeule is a legal scholar, Oxford University Press, “The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic”, Google Books)

A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they ¶ involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in ¶ particular, those that involve self-binding.**74** Can a president bind himself to respect ¶particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is “yes, at least to the same ¶ extent that a legislature can.” Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds ¶ even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated**,** thereby establishing a new ¶ legal status quo.75 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to ¶ create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical ¶ sense**,** presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term ¶ project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own ¶future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules ¶or policies.

policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### 1NC

#### Congressional action undermines the state secrete privilege – ends court deference and spills over

Windsor 12 (Lindsay – J.D. candidate and Master of Security Studies candidate at Georgetown University, “IS THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN THE CONSTITUTION? THE BASIS OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN INHERENT EXECUTIVE POWERS & WHY COURT-IMPLEMENTED SAFEGUARDS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENT”, 2012, 43 Geo. J. Int'l L. 897, lexis)

In contrast to the acknowledged roles of both Congress and the President in foreign affairs matters, the Constitution does not grant the judiciary branch any authority over foreign affairs, and the courts have traditionally been "hesitant to intrude" upon matters of foreign policy and national security. n153 The Supreme Court "has recognized the generally accepted view that foreign policy [is] the province and responsibility of the Executive." n154 Hence, "courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs." n155 This hesitation and reluctance stem from the limited institutional competence of the judiciary in foreign affairs. As the Court wrote in Boumediene v. Bush, "Unlike the President and some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people." n156 Echoing the "sole organ" [\*920] scheme of Curtiss-Wright, the Court later wrote that in foreign affairs matters, "The Judiciary is not suited to [make] determinations that would . . . undermine the Government's ability to speak with one voice in this area." n157 A court should, therefore, give great deference to the Executive's invocation of the state secrets privilege because it inherently involves matters of national security. Nonetheless, deciding cases or controversies before the Court is within its field of expertise. n158 Such cases include separation of powers controversies between federal branches and enforcing checks on executive power. n159 Though a court could not amend the substance of the state secrets privilege, it could amend the procedure for its invocation in one of two ways: pursuant to congressional authorization or by interpreting its own rules of procedure. First, if Congress enacts specific legislation under its Article I powers requiring the President to follow certain procedures in invoking the privilege, then a court could enforce that procedure in a case before it. Second, the Court could reinterpret the procedural requirements for the privilege. The Reynolds Court specifically wrote a court should not always "insist[] upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers." n160 But in national security cases implicating core civil liberties, the Court could find that plaintiffs' necessity routinely requires different procedures to satisfy the Court that national security matters are at stake. n16

#### State Secrets Privilege key to military technology and innovation

Donohue 10 (Laura – Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Shadow of State Secrets”, 2010, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77, lexis)

In contrast, docket searches demonstrate that, from January 2001 to January 2009, the privilege played a significant role in the executive branch's national security litigation strategy. In one case, the Administration asserted the state secrets privilege some 245 times. n31 More to the point, the government has invoked the state secrets privilege in more than 100 cases, which is more than five times the number of cases previously considered. And it is not just the executive branch that benefitted from the privilege: in scores of additional cases, private industry claimed that the state secrets doctrine applied, with the expectation that the federal government would later intervene to prevent certain documents from being subject to discovery or to stop the suit from moving forward. Beyond these, there are hundreds of cases on which the shadow of the privilege fell. This Article thus focuses on cases working their way through the courts between 2001 and 2009. It begins with disputes related to government contractors, where the threatened and actual invocation of the privilege appears in a broad range of grievances. Breach of contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, fraud, and employment termination cases prove remarkable in their frequency, length, and range of technologies involved. Wrongful death, personal injury, and negligence [\*88] cases extend beyond product liability to include infrastructure and services, as well as an emerging area perhaps best understood as the conduct of war. These corporate cases are distinguished by the tendency of companies to claim that state secrets are at stake early in the dispute and the subsequent role of the United States, if it chooses to become involved and to invoke the privilege, as an intervenor. Close inspection suggests a conservative executive branch that is more likely to step forward when breach of contract, trade secrets, or patent disputes present themselves, and unlikely - once it invokes the privilege - to back down. Where the executive initially decides not to intervene and invoke the privilege, the rapid expansion of the use of contractors appears to be giving birth to a new form of "graymail": should the government initially refuse to support the corporation's state secrets claim, companies deeply embedded in the state may threaten to air legally or politically damaging information. n32 Even when no overt threat is made, the government may worry that certain information will emerge during the course of the trial that would politically compromise the agency or individuals involved. In other cases, the government may be dependent upon a corporation for a key aspect of national defense, thus creating an incentive for the state to protect the company from financial penalties associated with bad behavior. n33

#### Great power war

Baru 9 – Sanjaya Baru is a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 - 168

Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.2 In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. 'Victory (in war)', Kennedy claimed, 'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base'.3 Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, 'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and military power, the classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma.

## Norms

### No Modeling

#### No drone modeling

Zenko 13 (Micah, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, "The Signal and the Noise," Foreign Policy, 2-2-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the\_signal\_and\_the\_noise)

Later, Gen. Austin observed of cutting forces from the Middle East: "Once you reduce the presence in the region, you could very well signal the wrong things to our adversaries." Sen. Kelly Ayotte echoed his observation, claiming that President Obama's plan to withdraw 34,000 thousand U.S. troops from Afghanistan within one year "leaves us dangerously low on military personnel...it's going to send a clear signal that America's commitment to Afghanistan is going wobbly." Similarly, during a separate House Armed Services Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ominously warned of the possibility of sequestration: "Perhaps most important, the world is watching. Our friends and allies are watching, potential foes -- all over the world." These routine and unchallenged assertions highlight what is perhaps the most widely agreed-upon conventional wisdom in U.S. foreign and national security policymaking: the inherent power of signaling. This psychological capability rests on two core assumptions: All relevant international audiences can or will accurately interpret the signals conveyed, and upon correctly comprehending this signal, these audiences will act as intended by U.S. policymakers. Many policymakers and pundits fundamentally believe that the Pentagon is an omni-directional radar that uniformly transmits signals via presidential declarations, defense spending levels, visits with defense ministers, or troop deployments to receptive antennas. A bit of digging, however, exposes cracks in the premises underlying signaling theories. There is a half-century of social science research demonstrating the cultural and cognitive biases that make communication difficult between two humans. Why would this be any different between two states, or between a state and non-state actor? Unlike foreign policy signaling in the context of disputes or escalating crises -- of which there is an extensive body of research into types and effectiveness -- policymakers' claims about signaling are merely made in a peacetime vacuum. These signals are never articulated with a precision that could be tested or falsified, and thus policymakers cannot be judged misleading or wrong. Paired with the faith in signaling is the assumption that policymakers can read the minds of potential or actual friends and adversaries. During the cycle of congressional hearings this spring, you can rest assured that elected representatives and expert witnesses will claim to know what the Iranian supreme leader thinks, how "the Taliban" perceives White House pronouncements about Afghanistan, or how allies in East Asia will react to sequestration. This self-assuredness is referred to as the illusion of transparency by psychologists, or how "people overestimate others' ability to know them, and...also overestimate their ability to know others." Policymakers also conceive of signaling as a one-way transmission: something that the United States does and others absorb. You rarely read or hear critical thinking from U.S. policymakers about how to interpret the signals from others states. Moreover, since U.S. officials correctly downplay the attention-seeking actions of adversaries -- such as Iran's near-weekly pronouncement of inventing a new drone or missile -- wouldn't it be safer to assume that the majority of U.S. signals are similarly dismissed? During my encounters with foreign officials, few take U.S. government pronouncements seriously, and instead assume they are made to appease domestic audiences.

#### No reverse modeling - norms can’t solve

Saunders 13 **(**Paul, executive director of The Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005, “We Won't Always Drone Alone,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177>)

A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will use drones, whether armed or unarmed, and what lessons they will draw from Washington’s approach. Thus far, the principal lesson may well be that drones can be extremely effective in killing your opponents, wherever they are, without risking your own troops and without sending soldiers or law enforcement personnel across another country’s borders. It seems less likely that others will adopt U.S.-style legal standards and oversight procedures, or that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace.¶ Based on their actions, it is almost as if Obama administration officials believe that the United States and its allies will have a long-term monopoly on drones. How else can one explain their exuberant confidence in launching drone attacks? However, the administration’s dramatic expansion in drone strikes—and their apparent effectiveness—will only further shorten Washington’s reign as the drone capital of the world by increasing the incentives to others eager to develop, refine or buy the technology.¶ Have Obama administration officials given any thought to what the world might look like when armed drones are more widespread and when Americans or U.S. allies and partners could become targets? To an outsider, there is little evidence of this kind of thinking in the administration’s use of drones.¶ This is a serious problem. According to an unclassified July 2012 report by the Government Accountability Office, at least 76 countries already have acquired unmanned aerial vehicles, known as UAVs or drones; the report also states that “countries of concern” are attempting to acquire advanced UAVs from foreign suppliers as well as seeking illegal access to U.S. technology. And a 2012 special report by the United Kingdom’s Guardian newspaper indicated that China has 10 or more models, though not all are armed. Other sources identify additional varieties in China. At least 50 countries are trying to build 900 different types of drones, the GAO writes.¶ More generally, the administration’s expanding use of drones is a powerful endorsement of not only the technology, but of the practice of targeted killing as an instrument of foreign and security policy. Having provided this powerful impetus, the United States should not be surprised if others—with differing legal standards and more creative efforts at self-justification—seize upon it once they have the necessary capabilities. According to the GAO, this is already happening—in government-speak, “while only a limited number of countries have fielded lethal or weaponized UAVs, this threat is anticipated to grow.” From this perspective, it is ironic that a president so critical of his predecessor’s unilateralism would practice it himself—particularly in a manner that other governments will find much easier to emulate than the Bush administration’s larger-scale use of force. How does the Obama administration plan to respond if and when China or Russia uses armed UAVs to attack groups they define as terrorists?

### Prolif Inevitable – Can’t Reverse

#### Drones are locked in - plan can’t solve

**McDonald 13 (**Jack, lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, completed his PhD thesis on targeted killings, has worked with The Centre for Defence Studies, “Losing perspective on proliferation,” <http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2013/01/losing-perspective-on-proliferation/>)

The control of UAV technology is, however, a problem. In short, it isn’t that amenable to control in any meaningful sense of the word. If one wishes to “control” the proliferation of technology automating human behaviour and actions, then there would need to be some form of global bar on research in that area.\* I imagine that MIT and Google might have a problem this idea. Similarly, if someone wants to control the design and building of small unmanned aircraft, well, too late, that horse bolted a long time ago. Of course, you could lock up every amateur geek enthusiast, but that would be a bit pointless. The point is, the technology to build UAVs is embedded into our society to a far greater degree than nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons and small arms are. UAVs are effectively an extension of the industrial revolution (mechanisation, automation, replacement of human action by machine). I’m writing this on a laptop that was probably made by a large number of robots. UAVs need to be put into perspective – despite their dangers they can’t make human life as we know it extinct and they likely can’t be controlled by treaty. A little less rhetoric and a little more thought from critics of military UAVs might produce a better critique.

### Circumvention

#### Obama can circumvent the plan- covert loopholes are inevitable

Lohmann 13 **(**Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>)

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

### Will Be Slow

#### Drone prolif is slow and the impact is small

Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out¶ distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests.¶ However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most¶ likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial¶ base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited¶ firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the¶ intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and crossborder¶ adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks¶ by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia¶ into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into¶ Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingencies¶ do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support.¶ Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat¶ to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term.

### No Caucuses Escalation

**No escalation – allies won’t be drawn in and Russia will be diplomatic**

**Glashatov 7** (Oleg, “Zero Hour Approaches for Yerevan; Azerbaijan Prepares to Fight for Nagorno-Karabakh: Will There Be War?”, What the Papers Say Part A (Russia), 7-5, Lexis)

Speaking at Johns Hopkins University, US Council on Foreign Relations analyst Wayne Merry noted that Azerbaijan cannot win, even though military options for resolving the conflict are being discussed openly in Azerbaijan. In his view, Nagorno-Karabakh is an impregnable fortress, further strengthened by Armenian forces, and even the American military would have difficulty attacking that fortress. According to the analyst, this is also the prevalent view in the Pentagon. But Azerbaijan takes an entirely different view of the situation. Zakhir Orudzh, a member of the Azeri parliament's defense and security committee, says: "Armenia can only be superior to us in the capacities it gains from bilateral military agreements with Russia and participation in the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. For all other parameters and resources, Azerbaijan is superior to Armenia, in military terms. And don't let anyone try to intimidate Azerbaijan with the idea that conflict escalation could have serious consequences for our country. Everyone should realize that if Azerbaijan and Armenia were left to face each other alone, with no external support, we could rapidly prove that we are in the right." Armed **hostilities could resume** in several ways; in almost every scenario, they would be started either **by Azerbaijan** or by dubious international structures that specialize in promoting the West's interests in this region (such as the International Crisis Group). The most immediately relevant scenario could involve the United States attacking Iran, and Azerbaijan taking advantage of the chaos to make an attempt at sorting out the Nagorno-Karabakh problem once and for all. **However, Azerbaijan could** **hardly expect** substantial **military support** in these circumstances, **from either the United States** (**it would be too busy elsewhere)** **or Turkey** (**which might confine its participation** in the conflict **to sending volunteers**). All of the above leads to the following conclusion: **Azerbaijan is unlikely to succeed with a blitzkrieg** in the immediate future. In this situation (as in most modern conflicts), the time factor would be decisive. Moreover, if hostilities do break out, Russia's military obligations would come into effect: Armenia is an ally within the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. **Consequently, Moscow is likely to make every effort to see that this conflict is resolved by diplomatic** or other **means**.

#### No Incentive for Draw-In – neither U.S. nor Russia have vital interests in the region

**Empirically denied**

**Arminfo 7** (News Agency, “Arkadiy Gukasyan: Pat Situation Maybe Created In The Karabakh Negotiating Process Because Inefficiency Of Its Format”, 7-3, Lexis)

Pat situation maybe created in the Karabakh negotiating process because inefficiency of its format, the NKR President Arkadiy Gukasyan said in the Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) state University when making a report "Nagornyy Karabakh: prospects of settlement". He also added that at present the OSCE Minsk Group because of contradiction of official Baku cannot make the format of the negotiating process in line with configuration of the conflict defined by it. "The pat situation maybe created in the negotiating process because of inefficiency of its format as the Azerbaijani party is trying to persuade the world community that only Azerbaijan and Armenia are the parties to the conflict blaming the latter for the territorial pretensions. We see the way out from the created situation in returning Nagornyy Karabakh to the negotiating table, and the OSCE MG co-chairs' efforts should be directed to this goal reaching", - the NKR president said. He also added that in fact today the parties are trying to treat a decease not knowing its diagnosis. "Today **the conflict is** **20 years old**, but **they are still disputing about the participants** in the conflict and its parties: **Azerbaijan-Armenia**, Azerbaijan-Karabakh or Azerbaijan-Armenia-Karabakh. I think **this is an** absolutely **absurd situation**. I have got a formula: until Azerbaijan strives to speak only with Armenia without Nagornyy Karabakh, Azerbaijan does not strive to settle the conflict and is just propagandizing", - Arkadiy Gukasyan concluded.

#### Also the only escalation warrant is Russia – defense will be on the other advantage

### 1NC SCS

#### If China Can’t use drone strikes they will use other means – still ensures escalation

#### No SCS conflict

Chaibi 3/4 -- 3rd year visiting student from Princeton University in the Department of Engineering Science (Abraham, 2013, "The outlook for continuing stability in the South China Sea," http://politicsinspires.org/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/)

East Asia’s rapid economic and military development has captured global attention, but pundits are quick to point to the South China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan as potential obstacles to the region’s continued growth. Analysis of news coverage demonstrates that regional economies and tensions have been growing in tandem. The South China Sea has historically been of particular interest because of the number of conflicting claims on the islands and sea-lanes it encompasses. China, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, among others, have often engaged in bilateral disagreements with resulting spikes in diplomatic tension and even military confrontation. Of note, these conflicts have never escalated to a full-scale regional war. Direct extrapolation suggests that previous restraint in military interactions implies the nations involved do not consider the potential benefits sufficient to justify an upset to the balance of power. However, contemporary changes in economic and security conditions complicate the issue. While current tensions appear unlikely to lead to a full-scale military conflict, the diversion of national resources needed to maintain the status quo is substantial. Institutional changes to increase transparency; clarify US treaties with ASEAN nations; and increase states’ internal enforcement of international agreements, although initially costly, would allow the neighbouring states to redirect these resources to long-term growth. Historically, China has been involved in a majority of the military conflicts in the South China Sea. A 1947 Chinese map delineates China’s controversial claim to approximately 80% of the sea. China aggressively used its navy to conclude a dispute with Vietnam in the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then in 1988 during the Johnson South Reef Skirmish for the Spratly Islands. Conflict was narrowly averted in 1995 when the Philippines chose not to shell fort-like Chinese military structures on Mischief Reef (China maintained they were only intended as shelter for fisherman); however, the Philippines continues to assert that this is an example of “creeping occupation”. This form of venting tensions, while far short of total war, is extremely costly over the long run; the combination of of resources, energy, and lives expended to establish a claim to the islands creates a significant and avoidable opportunity cost. These skirmishes are not merely an imprint of the 20th century but continue today as witnessed by the Chinese establishment of the Sansha garrison-city in 2012 and the Sino-Philippines stand-off in the Scarborough Shoal. What then is the evidence suggesting a continued reluctance to engage in full-scale military confrontation? Although in the past conflict has often arisen between economically interdependent nations (viz. the previous peak of global trade in 1914), the China-ASEAN relationship is one of fundamental interdependence of production, visible in the prevalence of international supply chaining in manufacturing processes, rather than solely trade and labour movement[i]. The burgeoning economic interdependence and growth of neighbouring states contributes a major incentive to prevent a conflagration. $5.3 trillion of trade, of which approximately 20% is US, transits the South China Sea annually and any interruption would not only severely restrict regional trade revenues, but would also very likely guarantee US military intervention[ii]. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is becoming increasingly interconnected and 2015 will mark a key turning point with the opening of internal ASEAN borders for free movement of labor. The ASEAN bloc has also concluded a number of reconciliation agreements with China. Regarding security, both the 2002 Code of Conduct and the 2011 Guidelines to the Code of Conduct are intended to help coordinate diplomacy and maintain peace in South China Sea disputes. Economically China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and at its opening in 2010 the ASEAN-China free trade area (ACFTA) became the largest in the world by population. These arrangements come at a time when growing estimates of the value of the natural resources contained in the South China Sea are generating pressures associated with ensuring energy security. Economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, however, is not the sole factor at play. In areas with considerable interstate tension sub-state actors have often contributed to the deterioration of international relations, most prominently with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand tipping Europe into World War I. Recent developments in state-level Chinese political and military discourse reflect a strong interest in cooperation. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 2011 discussions with Filipino President Corazon Aquino firmly expressed the hope that “the countries concerned may put aside disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas”[iii]. Additionally in 2011 the Chinese State Council Information Office released a white paper with a similar emphasis on joint development. Yet China is also reported to have developed internal fractures in its South China Sea policy, with a number of different ministries controlling paramilitary units that are not under express government oversight[iv]. For example, the Bureau of Fisheries Administration (BFA) now directs a relatively well-equipped law enforcement fleet that is tasked with patrolling Chinese-owned fishing areas. Such interest groups repeatedly instigate minor disputes with their ASEAN counterparts and the US navy that exacerbate state-level discussions and risk eventually drawing unintended consequences (characteristically, in 2004 two BFA vessels obstructed a US Navy surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea). The region has also seen a rise in high-tech militarization, with rapid development in areas ranging from aircraft carriers and submarines to cyber-espionage; this is likely to further increase due to the 2011 US “pivot to Asia” and military surge. The pivot is considered to be a sign that the US intends to continue playing a leadership role in East Asia, a strategy at odds with China’s vision[v]. An associated complication is the imprecise definition of US commitments to its ally nations in the event of disputes in contested territories, especially vis-à-vis the Philippines and Vietnam, and the possibility that alliances will be used to escalate a small battle into a regional affair. The US is making efforts to address these complications; for the first time since RIMPACS’s creation in 1971, China has been invited to participate in a US-led naval exercise. Positive near-term repercussions of growing US involvement have also been postulated; analysts suggest that one of the root causes behind Chinese interest in cooperation is the fear that aggression in the South China Sea will drive other parties to strengthen their ties with the US[vi]. The relative wealth of economic and diplomatic compromises on all sides presents a compelling argument that under current conditions, disputes in the South China Sea will continue to be restrained to small-scale skirmishes that do not threaten overall stability. This is not to say that the increase in regional tension is insignificant, but rather that the involved parties all have a strong interest in maintaining mutual growth and have demonstrated their willingness to make strategic sacrifices to maintain the status quo. Furthermore as China is the common link in the majority of the disputes, it is probable that it will be at the heart of any conflict — and China has frequently shown restraint in this regard (though not so, for example, in Tibet). In terms of China’s priorities, policy analysts tend to agree that if China were to begin a large-scale military campaign, Taiwan would most likely be the focus of its aggression[vii].

#### SCS tensions inevitable but no escalation

Meidan 12 -- analyst at Eurasia Group; research includes China's energy and environmental policies, policymaking, Chinese elite politics, and diplomacy; MA in political sciences and East Asian studies from the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (Michal, 8/7, "Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea," http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2GsDDT62R)

These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them. Vietnam and the Philippines, concerned with the shifting balance of powers in the region, are pushing their maritime claims more aggressively and increasing their efforts to internationalise the question by involving both ASEAN and Washington. Attempts to come up with a common position in ASEAN have failed miserably but as the US re-engages Asia, it is drawn into the troubled waters of the South China Sea. Political dynamics in China – with a once in a decade leadership transition coming up, combined with electoral politics in the US and domestic constraints for both Manila and Hanoi – all augur that the South China Sea will remain turbulent. No government can afford to appear weak in the eyes of domestic hawks or of increasingly nationalistic public opinions. The risk of a miscalculation resulting in prolonged standoffs or skirmishes is therefore higher now than ever before. But there are a number of reasons to believe that even these skirmishes are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict. First, despite the strong current of assertive forces within China, cooler heads are ultimately likely to prevail. While a conciliatory stance toward other claimants is unlikely before the leadership transition, China’s top brass will be equally reluctant to significantly escalate the situation, since this will send southeast Asian governments running to Washington. Hanoi and Manila also recognize that despite their need for assertiveness to appease domestic political constituencies, a direct confrontation with China is overly risky. Second, military pundits in China also realize that the cost of conflict is too high, since it will strengthen Washington’s presence in the region and disrupt trade flows. And even China’s oil company CNOOC, whose portfolio of assets relies heavily on the South China Sea, is diversifying its interests in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates.

**No US-China conflict**

Allison & Blackwill 3/5 -- \*director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND \*\*Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert D., 2013, "Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations," http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/)

Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore, one of Asia's most prominent public intellectuals, a member of the Fondation Chirac's honour committee

Competition between the United States and China is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world. There will be a struggle for influence. I think it will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States, need U.S. markets, U.S. technology, need to have students going to the United States to study the ways and means of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. If you quarrel with the United States and become bitter enemies, all that information and those technological capabilities will be cut off. The struggle between the two countries will be maintained at the level that allows them to still tap the United States. Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the United States and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market. Sino-American relations are both cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive. A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires cooperation from and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict between China and the United States is low. Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades. They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but to be able, if necessary, to pressure Taiwan by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone -- at least not for the next 15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight.

## Terror

### 1NC

#### Winning War on Terror now – Al Qaeda is on the run

Ackerman 13 (Spencer, Wired senior reporter, Spencer, "Spy Chiefs Point to a Much, Much Weaker Al-Qaida," Wired, 3-13-13, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/spy-terrorism/, accessed 9-18-13)

Don’t ever expect the heads of the U.S.’ 16-agency spy apparatus to say it outright. But the testimony they provided Tuesday morning to a Senate panel described al-Qaida, the scourge of the U.S. for 12 years, as a threat that’s on the verge of becoming a spent force, if they’re not already. James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, and his colleagues at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Counterterrorism Center and State Department, never made that contention outright to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Tuesday. But in their annual public briefing on the threats America faces, they focused on their budgets and on cyber attacks more than they did terrorism. Not only was that itself a big change in the annual exercise, what they said about the threat from al-Qaida was mostly cheerful news. Al-Qaida’s core in Pakistan is so degraded that it is “probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale attacks in the West,” Clapper testified. (.pdf) Its regional affiliates, in Iraq, Somalia and northern Africa, are focused on local attacks. Despite all the online propaganda seeking to radicalize American Muslim, homegrown jihadis will attempt “fewer than ten domestic plots per year.” Last year, the plots hit the single digits; no one died from them. Matt Olsen, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, testified that those attempts are and are likely to remain “unsophisticated.” Those al-Qaida manages to inspire may be “wayward knuckleheads,” Olsen said, but they’ll remain a challenge for the spy apparatus to monitor and disrupt. The exception is al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen affiliate of the organization, which remains the one most inclined to attack the U.S. at home. FBI director Robert Mueller said the threat to U.S. airliners from that affiliate is “undiminished.” Attacking outside Yemen remains a priority for the organization. But Clapper said they’ll have to balance that agenda with both their aspirations in Yemen and the degree to which “they have individuals who can manage, train, and deploy operatives for U.S. operations.” To be clear, not a single spy chief said that al-Qaida is no longer a big deal. Not a single spy chief said that al-Qaida no longer threatens the United States. And not a single spy chief so much as hinted that it’s time for U.S. officials to consider the global war on terrorism finished. Ever since the Benghazi attack of September, those officials and their spy chiefs have stopped predicting that al-Qaida is on the verge of defeat. If anything, Clapper warned that the budget crunch he’s under might make it harder to spot and prevent the next al-Qaida attack. Yet the picture they presented of al-Qaida is no longer one of a determined global movement growing in strength; seeking the world’s deadliest weapons; and capable of pulling off complex, mass-casualty assaults. Benghazi, and the January attack on an Algerian oil field, look like models for the terrorist threats of the future: ones that occur far from U.S. soil, launched by unaffiliated groups that are primarily focused on a local agenda, yet sufficiently inspired by al-Qaida’s rhetoric or sympathetic to its worldview that unsecured western targets of opportunity are in its cross-hairs. Left unsaid and un-debated at the hearing: whether that diminished threat means it’s time to roll back the U.S. global wartime apparatus; or whether it’s only diminished because of an aggressive wartime apparatus that **needs to keep doing what it’s doing, lest the threat re-emerge**.

#### Geographic limits undermine the effectiveness of US counter-terror ops

Corn 13 (Geoffrey, South Texas College of Law Presidential Research Professor of Law, former JAG officer and chief of the law of war branch of the international law division of the US Army, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, "The law of armed conflict, the use of military force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force," Congressional Documents and Publications, 6-16-13, lexis)

In my opinion, there is no need to amend the AUMF to define the geographic scope of military operations it authorizes. On the contrary, I believe doing so would fundamentally undermine the efficacy of U.S. counter-terror military operations by overtly signaling to the enemy exactly where to pursue safe-haven and de facto immunity from the reach of U.S. power. This concern is similar to that associated with explicitly defining co-belligerents subject to the AUMF, although I believe it is substantially more significant. It is an operational and tactical axiom that insurgent and non-state threats rarely seek the proverbial "toe to toe" confrontation with clearly superior military forces. Al Qaeda is no different. Indeed, their attempts to engage in such tactics in the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom proved disastrous, and ostensibly caused the dispersion of operational capabilities that then necessitated the co-belligerent assessment. Imposing an arbitrary geographic limitation of the scope of military operations against this threat would therefore be inconsistent with the strategic objective of preventing future terrorist attacks against the United States. I believe much of the momentum for asserting some arbitrary geographic limitation on the scope of operations conducted to disrupt or disable al Qaeda belligerent capabilities is the result of the commonly used term "hot battlefield." This notion of a "hot" battlefield is, in my opinion, an operational and legal fiction. Nothing in the law of armed conflict or military doctrine defines the meaning of "battlefield." Contrary to the erroneous assertions that the use of combat power is restricted to defined geographic locations such as Afghanistan (and previously Iraq), the geographic scope of armed conflict must be dictated by a totality assessment of a variety of factors, ultimately driven by the strategic end state the nation seeks to achieve. The nature and dynamics of the threat -including key vulnerabilities - is a vital factor in this analysis. These threat dynamics properly influence the assessment of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, which in turn drive the formulation of national strategy, which includes determining when, where, and how to leverage national power (including military power) to achieve desired operational effects. Thus, threat dynamics, and not some geographic "box", have historically driven and must continue to drive the scope of armed hostilities. The logic of this premise is validated by (in my opinion) the inability to identify an armed conflict in modern history where the scope of operations was legally restricted by a conception of a "hot" battlefield. Instead, threat dynamics coupled with policy, diplomatic considerations and, in certain armed conflicts the international law of neutrality, dictate such scope. Ultimately, battlefields become "hot" when persons, places, or things assessed as lawful military objectives pursuant to the law of armed conflict are subjected to attack. I do not, however, intend to suggest that it is proper to view the entire globe as a battlefield in the military component of our struggle against al Qaeda, or that threat dynamics are the only considerations in assessing the scope of military operations. Instead, complex considerations of policy and diplomacy have and must continue to influence this assessment. However, suggesting that the proper scope of combat operations is dictated by a legal conception of "hot" battlefield is operationally irrational and legally unsound. Accordingly, placing policy limits on the scope of combat operations conducted pursuant to the legal authority provided by the AUMF is both logical and appropriate, and in my view has been a cornerstone of U.S. use of force policy since the enactment of the AUMF. In contrast, interpreting the law of armed conflict to place legal limits on the scope of such operations to "hot" battlefields, or imposing such a legal limitation in the terms of the AUMF, creates a perverse incentive for the belligerent enemy by allowing [them]~~him~~ to dictate when and where [they]~~he~~ will be subject to lawful attack.

#### Geographic restrictions doom counter-terror - create safe havens

Blank 10 (Laurie, Emory University School of Law International Humanitarian Law Clinic director, "Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat," Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, 9-16-10, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1677965)

The ramifications of including areas within the zone of combat, such as the accompanying authority to use lethal force as a first resort, raise a variety of policy considerations. The two primary considerations weigh directly against each other and perhaps, as a result, lend credence to the need for a middle ground in defining the zone of combat. First, some argue that creating geographic limits to the battlefield has the problematic effect of granting terrorists a safe haven. For example, a member of al Qaeda can be a legitimate target as a result of continuous participation in hostilities, thus losing any immunity from attack he might have had by dint of being a civilian.105 If the zone of combat is limited geographically to certain areas, then this member of al Qaeda can avoid being targeted—and thus regain civilian immunity, in essence—simply by crossing an international border even while remaining active in a terrorist organization engaged in a conflict with the U.S.106 Geographic limits designed to curtail the use of governmental military force thus effectively grant terrorists a safe haven and extend the conflict by enabling them to regroup and continue their attacks.

#### Geographic restrictions doom counter-terror- safe havens

Majidyar 13 (Ahmad, American Enterprise Institute senior research associate, “We Need Military Authorization Until Al-Qaida Is No Longer a Threat,” June 17th, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-the-authorization-for-use-of-military-force-be-repealed/we-need-military-authorization-until-al-qaida-is-no-longer-a-threat)

It is therefore premature and dangerous to repeal or significantly restrict the AUMF at this point, since it would undercut the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism efforts to deal with al-Qaida-related emerging threats worldwide. Suggestions to incorporate temporal and geographical limitations into the AUMF are also ill-advised. Confining the law to a specific number of countries or terrorist groups would give the enemy more freedom of action and allow it to create new fronts and sanctuaries in areas immune from U.S. counterterrorism operations. In his counterterrorism policy speech three weeks ago, President Obama promised to continue a "series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America." In the absence of the AUMF, such actions would become untenable and devoid of a legal basis. At present, the AUMF provides the administration with adequate authorities to pursue the war. Until al-Qaida and associated forces are degraded to a level where they pose no substantial national security threat to the United States, the law should not be repealed or replaced.

#### Your author concedes that geographic limits to TK creates terrorist safe havens

Daskal 13 (Jennifer, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University, "THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE," 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, lexis)

As a policy matter, the territorially restricted approach also creates safe havens for the non-state enemy, allowing it to cross state lines to regroup, plan, and coordinate externally directed plots free from the threat of attack. n75 To the extent that the threat can be appropriately addressed [\*1190] through foreign cooperation and law enforcement means, that might not be particularly troubling. But what if the foreign government is unable or unwilling to respond to the threat, and capture by the belligerent state is infeasible? Alternatively, what if the foreign government is supportive of the belligerent state's efforts to arrest and prosecute the enemy, but information about the target, at least initially, comes primarily from intelligence reporting that cannot be introduced in open court without revealing a critical source or jeopardizing a key relationship with a foreign power? n76 Under the territorially restricted view, even short-term law-of-war detention is prohibited, and even if carried out for the express purpose of gathering information for a criminal prosecution (as was done in Warsame's case). n77

### 1NC Terror

#### No impact to terror

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

It seems increasingly likely that the official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been substantially deluded—massively disproportionate to the threat that al-Qaida has ever actually presented either as an international menace or as an inspiration or model to homegrown amateurs. Applying the extensive datasets on terrorism that have been generated over the last decades, we conclude that the chances of an American perishing at the hands of a terrorist at present rates is one in 3.5 million per year—well within the range of what risk analysts hold to be “acceptable risk.”40 Yet, despite the importance of responsibly communicating risk and despite the costs of irresponsible fearmongering, just about the only official who has ever openly put the threat presented by terrorism in some sort of context is New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who in 2007 pointed out that people should “get a life” and that they have a greater chance of being hit by lightning than of being a victim of terrorism—an observation that may be a bit off the mark but is roughly accurate.41 (It might be noted that, despite this unorthodox outburst, Bloomberg still managed to be re-elected two years later.) Indeed, much of the reaction to the September 11 attacks calls to mind Hans Christian Andersen’s fable of delusion, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” in which con artists convince the emperor’s court that they can weave stuffs of the most beautiful colors and elaborate patterns from the delicate silk and purest gold thread they are given. These stuffs, they further convincingly explain, have the property of remaining invisible to anyone who is unusually stupid or unfit for office. The emperor finds this quite appealing because not only will he have splendid new clothes, but he will be able to discover which of his officials are unfit for their posts—or in today’s terms, have lost their effectiveness. His courtiers, then, have great professional incentive to proclaim the stuffs on the loom to be absolutely magnificent even while mentally justifying this conclusion with the equivalent of “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Unlike the emperor’s new clothes, terrorism does of course exist. Much of the reaction to the threat, however, has a distinctly delusionary quality. In Carle’s view, for example, the CIA has been “spinning in self-referential circles” in which “our premises were flawed, our facts used to fit our premises, our premises determined, and our fears justified our operational actions, in a self-contained process that arrived at a conclusion dramatically at odds with the facts.” The process “projected evil actions where there was, more often, muddled indirect and unavoidable complicity, or not much at all.” These “delusional ratiocinations,” he further observes, “were all sincerely, ardently held to have constituted a rigorous, rational process to identify terrorist threats” in which “the avalanche of reporting confirms its validity by its quantity,” in which there is a tendency to “reject incongruous or contradictory facts as erroneous, because they do not conform to accepted reality,” and in which potential dissenters are not-so-subtly reminded of career dangers: “Say what you want at meetings. It’s your decision. But you are doing yourself no favors.”42 Consider in this context the alarming and profoundly imaginary estimates of U.S. intelligence agencies in the year after the September 11 attacks that the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000.43 Terrorist cells, they told reporters, were “embedded in most U.S. cities with sizable Islamic communities,” usually in the “run-down sections,” and were “up and active” because electronic intercepts had found some of them to be “talking to each other.”44 Another account relayed the view of “experts” that Osama bin Laden was ready to unleash an “11,000 strong terrorist army” operating in more than sixty countries “controlled by a Mr. Big who is based in Europe,” but that intelligence had “no idea where thousands of these men are.”45 Similarly, FBI Director Robert Mueller assured the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 11, 2003, that, although his agency had yet to identify even one al-Qaida cell in the United States, “I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing,” a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text. Moreover, he claimed that such unidentified entities presented “the greatest threat,” had “developed a support infrastructure” in the country, and had achieved both the “ability” and the “intent” to inflict “signi ficant casualties in the US with little warning.”46 Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.

#### No nuclear terror – operation, cohesion and coordination

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12 The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14 In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15 Although the efforts of would-be terrorists have often seemed pathetic, even comical or absurd, the comedy remains a dark one. Left to their own devices, at least a few of these often inept and almost always self-deluded individuals could eventually have committed some serious, if small-scale, damage.16

#### Even if there is an attack – it would be small scale and disorganized

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

Calculating the Costs of the Counterterrorism Delusion Delusion is a quality that is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, there may be a way to get a sense of its dimensions—or at least of its cost consequences. We have argued that terrorism is a limited problem with limited consequences and that the reaction to it has been excessive, and even delusional. Some degree of effort to deal with the terrorism hazard is, however, certainly appropriate—and is decidedly not delusional. The issue then is a quantitative one: At what point does a reaction to a threat that is real become excessive or even delusional? At present rates, as noted earlier, an American’s chance of being killed by terrorism is one in 3.5 million in a given year. This calculation is based on history (but one that includes the September 11 attacks in the count), and things could, of course, become worse in the future. The analysis here, however, suggests that terrorists are not really all that capable, that terrorism tends to be a counterproductive exercise, and that September 11 is increasingly standing out as an aberration, not a harbinger. Moreover, it has essentially become officially accepted that the likelihood of a large-scale organized attack such as September 11 has declined and that the terrorist attacks to fear most are ones that are small scale and disorganized.66 Attacks such as these can inflict painful losses, of course, but they are quite limited in their effect and, even if they do occur, they would not change the fatality risk for the American population very much.

### 1NC US/Russia War

#### No escalation – disagreements remain limited

Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely **remain limited and compartmentalized**. Russia and the West **do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over**. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

#### No nuclear strike

Graham 7 (Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, **than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War**. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and **the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability**. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

### 1NC Russian Miscalc

#### No risk of accidental/unauthorized war.

#### Dr. Leonid Ryabikhin, General (Ret.) Viktor Koltunov and Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, June 2009. Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute; Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic Stability of Rosatom; and Senior Research Scientist, Centre for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. “De-alerting: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Discussion paper presented at the seminar on “Re-framing De Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context,” [www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf](http://www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf).

#### Analysis of the above arguments shows, that they do not have solid grounds. Today Russian and U.S. ICBMs are not targeted at any state. High alert status of the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces has not been an obstacle for building a strategic partnership. The issue of the possibility of an “accidental” nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorization by the national leadership. Besides that it should be mentioned that even the Soviet Union and the United States had taken important bilateral steps toward decreasing the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. Direct emergency telephone “red line” has been established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963. In 1971 the USSR and USA signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Nuclear War Threat. This Agreement established the actions of each side in case of even a hypothetical accidental missile launch and it contains the requirements for the owner of the launched missile to deactivate and eliminate the missile. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have developed proper measures to observe the agreed requirements.