# 1NC

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#### A. Interpretation – Statutory restrictions must directly prohibit activities currently under the president’s war powers authority – this excludes regulation or oversight

#### Statutory restrictions prohibit actions

Lamont 5 (Michael, Legal Analyst @ Occupational health, "Legal: Staying on the right side of the law," http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/01/04/2005/29005/legal-staying-on-the-right-side-of-the-law.htm#.UgFe\_o3qnoI)

It will be obvious what 'conduct' and 'redundancy' dismissals are. A statutory restriction means that the employee is prevented by law from doing the job - for example, a driver who loses his driving licence. 'Some other substantial reason' means "Parliament can't be expected to think of everything".

#### Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### Authority is the exercise of power over others

OED 13 (http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/13349)

authority, n.

I. Power to enforce obedience.

a. Power or right to enforce obedience; moral or legal supremacy; the right to command, or give an ultimate decision.

b. in authority: in a position of power; in possession of power over others.

#### B. Vote Neg –

#### 1. Limits – Regulation and oversight of authority allows a litany of new affs in each area – justifies indirect effects of statutory policies and affs that don’t alter presidential authority – undermines prep and clash

#### 2. Ground – Restriction ground is the locus of neg prep – their interpretation jacks all core disads –because an aff doesn’t have to prevent the president from doing anything

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#### A. Interpretation – targeted killing is distinct from signature strikes – precise definitions are key

Uebersax 12 (John, psychologist, writer and former RAND Corporation military analyst, "The Four Kinds of Drone Strikes," http://satyagraha.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/the-four-kinds-of-drone-strikes/)

We must begin with clear terms, and that is the purpose of the present article. Drone strikes, that is, the launching of explosive missiles from a remotely operated aerial vehicle, come in four varieties: targeted killings, signature strikes, overt combat operations, and covert combat operations. We shall consider each in turn.¶ Targeted killing. This occurs when a drone strike is used to kill a terrorist whose identity is known, and whose name has been placed on a hit list, due to being deemed a ‘direct and immediate threat’ to US security. The government would like people to think this means these strikes target a terrorist literally with his or her hand on a detonator. But, in actuality, the only real criterion is that the government believes the target is sufficiently closely affiliated with terrorist organizations (e.g., a propagandist or financier) to justify assassination. This is likely the rarest form of drone strike. However it receives the most publicity, because the government likes to crow when it kills a high-ranking terrorist.¶ Signature strikes. In signature strikes, the target is a person whose name is not known, but whose actions fit the profile (or ‘signature’) of a high-ranking terrorist. There is some ambiguity concerning the meaning of this term. Some use it in the sense just stated — i.e., a strike against an anonymous terrorist leader. Others use it more broadly to include killing of any non-identified militants, whether high-ranking or not. However from the moral standpoint it makes a major difference whether an anonymous targeted victim is a high-level leader, or simply an anonymous combatant. For this reason it is advantageous to restrict the term “signature strike” to the targeting of anonymous high-level leaders, and to assign strikes against anonymous non-leaders to the two further categories below.¶ Overt combat operation. This category includes drone strikes conducted as part of regular military operations. These strikes are presumably run by uniformed military personnel according to codes of military conduct, and are, logically and legally, not much different from ordinary air or artillery strikes. As a part of routine warfare, such strikes are subject to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Three items of the Geneva Conventions are of special interest here: (1) strikes should occur only in the context of a legally declared war; (2) they should be conducted by lawful combatants (which, many experts believe, excludes use of non-uniformed, civilian contractor operators); and (3) standard provisions concerning the need to report casualties, especially civilian casualties, are in effect.¶ Covert combat operation. Finally, there are covert combat operations. These, like the former category, are launched against usual military targets – e.g., any hostile militant, not just high-ranking ones. But why should these strikes be covert? The obvious answer is: to mask something shady. Covert combat strikes can evade all those irritating constraints on military tactics imposed by the Geneva Conventions, International Law, public opinion, and basic human decency.¶ The specific terms used above to distinguish these four kinds of strikes are admittedly arbitrary, and perhaps some other nomenclature would be more advantageous. But we need some fixed set of terms to refer to these fundamentally different kinds of strikes. Without such terms, the US government will continue to have its way by relying on public confusion and terminological sophistry. For example, if there is only a single generic term, the government may issue a claim such as “drone strikes comply with international law.” This is perhaps technically true for, say, overt military drone strikes, but it is not true for signature strikes. With more precise terms, it would be more difficult for the government to mislead the public.

#### B. Vote neg –

#### A. Precision – our interpretation is exclusive and has an intent to define – accurate reading of the resolution is a pre-requisite to fairness and education – they make the resolution meaningless

#### B. Limits – expanding the term to include unknown terrorist identities makes the term limitless, destroying in depth education

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#### Judicial review of war powers erodes the State Secrets Privilege

Kadidal 7 (Shayana – Center for Constitutional Rights, New York City; J.D., Yale 1994, “DOES CONGRESS HAVE THE POWER TO LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S CONDUCT OF DETENTIONS, INTERROGATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR?”, 2007, 11 N.Y. City L. Rev. 23, lexis)

As to the AUMF, this meta-defense runs as follows: In both our case and the ACLU's similar case, the government claims that it could explain how the program fits into what Congress authorized in the AUMF--namely, the "use [of] all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist [\*58] attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001" n127 and those who harbored them--but to do so it would have to explain to the court how the Program works, particularly who it was targeting and what kinds of communications it was intercepting. The sensitivity of that information about how the Program works in practice means that it cannot do that, even ex parte in camera. Thus, the government argues, the State Secrets Privilege forecloses the ability to litigate these questions. n128 As to the FISA-is-unconstitutional defense, the meta-defense argues that for the government to explain to the court how the Program fits into the core of the President's inherent power to defend the nation--that (limited) core aspect of the war power that is so fundamentally executive as to be immune to regulation from Congress--would require disclosing state secrets to the court. Since FISA might be unconstitutional to the extent that it restricts such a hypothetical core, unregulable part of the executive war power, the court cannot rely on FISA in enjoining the President from carrying out such surveillance:

#### State Secrets Privilege key to the military superiority

Donohue 10 (Laura – Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Shadow of State Secrets”, 2010, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77, lexis)

In contrast, docket searches demonstrate that, from January 2001 to January 2009, the privilege played a significant role in the executive branch's national security litigation strategy. In one case, the Administration asserted the state secrets privilege some 245 times. n31 More to the point, the government has invoked the state secrets privilege in more than 100 cases, which is more than five times the number of cases previously considered. And it is not just the executive branch that benefitted from the privilege: in scores of additional cases, private industry claimed that the state secrets doctrine applied, with the expectation that the federal government would later intervene to prevent certain documents from being subject to discovery or to stop the suit from moving forward. Beyond these, there are hundreds of cases on which the shadow of the privilege fell. This Article thus focuses on cases working their way through the courts between 2001 and 2009. It begins with disputes related to government contractors, where the threatened and actual invocation of the privilege appears in a broad range of grievances. Breach of contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, fraud, and employment termination cases prove remarkable in their frequency, length, and range of technologies involved. Wrongful death, personal injury, and negligence [\*88] cases extend beyond product liability to include infrastructure and services, as well as an emerging area perhaps best understood as the conduct of war. These corporate cases are distinguished by the tendency of companies to claim that state secrets are at stake early in the dispute and the subsequent role of the United States, if it chooses to become involved and to invoke the privilege, as an intervenor. Close inspection suggests a conservative executive branch that is more likely to step forward when breach of contract, trade secrets, or patent disputes present themselves, and unlikely - once it invokes the privilege - to back down. Where the executive initially decides not to intervene and invoke the privilege, the rapid expansion of the use of contractors appears to be giving birth to a new form of "graymail": should the government initially refuse to support the corporation's state secrets claim, companies deeply embedded in the state may threaten to air legally or politically damaging information. n32 Even when no overt threat is made, the government may worry that certain information will emerge during the course of the trial that would politically compromise the agency or individuals involved. In other cases, the government may be dependent upon a corporation for a key aspect of national defense, thus creating an incentive for the state to protect the company from financial penalties associated with bad behavior. n33

#### Nuclear war

Kagan 7 (Robert, Senior Associate – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership”, Policy Review, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10)

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying —  its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore  to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.

#### Drone oversight requires circumventing the doctrine – allows lawsuits and releases military secrets

Rosen 11 (Richard D. – Professor of Law and Director, Center for Military Law and Policy, Texas Tech University School of Law, “PART III: ARTICLE: DRONES AND THE U.S. COURTS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5280, lexis)

V. State Secrets: The Death Knell of Drone Cases Assuming a complaint survives the jurisdictional, justiciability, immunity, and other hurdles to lawsuits challenging U.S. drone policy, the state secrets doctrine is likely to bring the suit to a quick end. n93 Under the doctrine, the United States may prevent the disclosure of information in judicial proceedings if there is a reasonable danger of revealing military or state secrets. n94 Once the privilege is properly invoked and a court is satisfied that release would pose a reasonable danger to secrets of state, "even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege." n95 Not only will the state secrets doctrine thwart plaintiffs from acquiring or introducing evidence vital to their case, n96 it could result in dismissal of the cases themselves. Under the doctrine, the courts will dismiss a case either because the very subject of the case involves state secrets, n97 or a case cannot proceed without the privileged evidence or presents an unnecessary risk of revealing [\*5293] protected secrets. n98 Employing drones as a weapons platform against terrorists and insurgents in an ongoing armed conflict implicates both the nation's military tactics and strategy as well as its delicate relations with friendly nations. n99 As such, lawsuits challenging the policy cannot be tried without access to and the possible disclosure of highly classified information relating to the means, methods, and circumstances under which drones are employed.

#### Lawsuits release vital drone methods and intelligence –turns case

Murphy and Radsan 9 (Richard – AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, and Afsheen – Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, “ARTICLE: DUE PROCESS AND TARGETED KILLING OF TERRORISTS”, November, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 405, lexis)

In defense of this anomaly, there are obvious policy reasons for not allowing Bivens-style claims against American officials for targeted killings wherever they occur in the world. Among them, we do not want federal courts damaging national security through excessive, misdirected second-guessing of executive judgments; nor do we want [\*442] the litigation process to reveal information that national security requires to be kept secret. In Arar v. Ashcroft, a divided panel of the Second Circuit cited these "special factors" to disallow a plaintiff from bringing a Bivens claim against officials he alleged subjected him to extraordinary rendition. n209 But as the dissenting judge in Arar noted, these special factors lose much of their force once one acknowledges that a Bivens-style action needs to overcome formidable hurdles of fact and law. n210 As to practical hurdles, most people left alive by a Predator strike or other targeted killing would not turn to American courts for relief. Some would not sue because they are, in fact, the enemy - Osama bin Laden is not going to hire an American lawyer. n211 Others would not sue because doing so is beyond their means - a villager from the mountains of Afghanistan is not likely to hire an American lawyer either. As to legal hurdles, Boumediene itself poses a high one to lawsuits by non-U.S. citizens for overseas attacks. Here we may seem to contradict our earlier insistence that Boumediene presupposes some form of constitutional protection worldwide for everyone. n212 Yet Boumediene shows that the requirement of judicial process depends on a pragmatic analysis. n213 As part of its balancing, Boumediene made clear that courts should favor the interests of American citizens and of others with strong connections to the United States. n214 Although the Boumediene petitioners lacked the preference in favor of citizens, they persuaded a slim majority of the Court to extend constitutional habeas to non-resident aliens detained at Guantanamo. This result, however, took place under exceptional circumstances: among them, Guantanamo is de facto United States territory; n215 the executive had held detainees [\*443] there for years and claimed authority to do so indefinitely; and the Supreme Court doubted the fairness and accuracy of the CSRTs. n216 Absent such circumstances, Boumediene leaves courts to follow their habit of deferring to the executive on national security. For targeted killing, that may mean cutting off non-citizens from American courts. The state-secrets privilege poses another barrier to Bivens-style actions. This privilege allows the government to block the disclosure of information in court that would damage national security. n217 It could prevent a case from proceeding in any number of ways. For instance, the government could block plaintiffs from accessing or using information needed to determine whether a Predator attack had a sound basis through human or technical sources of intelligence. n218 By this trump card, the government could prevent litigation from seriously compromising intelligence sources and methods. n219 In addition, the doctrine of qualified immunity requires dismissal of actions against officials if a court determines they reasonably believed they were acting within the scope of their legal authority. n220 Defendants would satisfy this requirement so long as they reasonably [\*444] claimed they had authority under the laws of war (assuming their applicability). These standards are hazy, and a court applying them would tend to defer to the executive on matters of military judgment. n221 In view of so many practical and legal hurdles, some courts and commentators might be inclined to categorically reject all Bivens-style challenges to targeted killings. In essence, they might view lawsuits related to targeted killing as a political question left to the executive. n222 This view parallels Justice Thomas's that courts should not second-guess executive judgments as to who is an enemy combatant. n223 Contrary to Justice Thomas's view, the potency of the government's threshold defenses means that targeted-killing cases that make it to the merits would likely involve the most egregious conduct - for example, killing an unarmed Jose Padilla at O'Hare Airport on a shoot-to-kill order. For these egregious cases, a judicial check on executive authority is most necessary. In terms of a Mathews balancing, the question becomes whether the benefits of Bivens actions on targeted killings of terrorists outweigh the harms. The potential harm is to the CIA's sources and methods on the Predator program. Lawsuits might harm national security by forcing the disclosure of sensitive information. The states-secrets privilege should block this result, however. Lawsuits might also harm national security by causing executive officials to become risk-averse about actions needed to counter terrorist activities. Qualified immunity, however, should ensure that liability exists only where an official lacks any justification for his action. On the benefit side, allowing lawsuits to proceed would, in truly exceptional cases, serve the private interest of the plaintiff in seeking compensation and, perhaps more to the point given the incommensurability of death and money, would provide accountability. Still more important, all people have an interest in casting light on the government's use of the power to kill in a world-wide war in which combatants and targets are not easily identified.

#### Unmanned vehicle tech leadership is key to naval power

Landay et al. 4 (William E. Landay III – RDML (Rear Admiral), USN, Concurring with the following: Michael A. LeFever, RDML, USN Raymond A. Spicer, RDML, USN Roseanne M. Levitre, RDML, USN Steven J. Toma szeski, RADM, USN, Oceanographer of the Navy, Approved by Joseph A. Walsh and Roger M. Smith of US Navy, “The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan”, 11/9, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/uuvmp.pdf)

The Vision for UUVs and the Objective of the UUV Master Plan Today our naval forces enjoy maritime superiority around the world and find themselves at a strategic inflection point during which future capabilities must be pondered with creativity and innovation . Change must be embraced and made an ally in order to take advantage of emerging technologies, concepts, and doctrine; thereby preserving the nation’s global leadership. Sea Power 21 has additionally specified unmanned vehicles as force multipliers and risk reduction agents for the Navy of the future. Transformation applies to what we buy as well as how we buy and operate it–all while competing with other shifting national investment priorities. The growing use of unmanned systems– air, surface, ground, and underwater is continually demonstrating new possibilities. While admittedly futuristic in vision , one can conceive of scenarios where UUVs sense, track, identify, target, and destroy an enemy–all autonomously and tie in with the full net-centric battlespace. UUV systems will provide a key undersea component f o r FORCEnet, contributing to an integrated picture of the battlespace. Even though today’s planners, operators, and technologists cannot accurately forecast the key applications for U UVs in the year 2050, this plan provides a roadmap to move toward that vision. Pursuit of this plan’s updated recommendations beginning in the year 2004, will place increasingly large numbers of UUVs in the hands of warfighters. Thus, xvii UUV Master Plan UUVs can begin addressing near-term needs while im proving understanding of mid- to far-term possibilities. Even the most futuristic applications can evolve in a confident, cost-effective manner. This confidence is based on several factor s: the Sea Power 21 Sub-Pillar capabilities identified he readdress a broad ran g e of user needs; critical technologies are identified that will enable tomorrow’s more complex applications; and key principles and best practices are recommended that p r o v ide for a logical, flexible, and affordable development effort.

#### Strong navy is key to prevent great power war – turns SCS and econ

Eaglen 11 (Mackenzie, Heritage Foundation Research Fellow for National Security Studies, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, May, 16, 2011, “Thinking about a Day without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/thinking-about-a-day-without-sea-power-implications-for-us-defense-policy)

Under a scenario of dramatically reduced naval power, the United States would cease to be active in any international alliances. While it is reasonable to assume that land and air forces would be similarly reduced in this scenario, the lack of credible maritime capability to move their bulk and establish forward bases would render these forces irrelevant, even if the Army and Air Force were retained at today’s levels. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, 90 percent of material arrives by sea, although material bound for Afghanistan must then make a laborious journey by land into theater. China’s claims on the South China Sea, previously disputed by virtually all nations in the region and routinely contested by U.S. and partner naval forces, are accepted as a fait accompli, effectively turning the region into a “Chinese lake.” China establishes expansive oil and gas exploration with new deepwater drilling technology and secures its local sea lanes from intervention. Korea, unified in 2017 after the implosion of the North, signs a mutual defense treaty with China and solidifies their relationship. Japan is increasingly isolated and in 2020–2025 executes long-rumored plans to create an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.[11] By 2025, Japan has 25 mobile nuclear-armed missiles ostensibly targeting China, toward which Japan’s historical animus remains strong. China’s entente with Russia leaves the Eurasian landmass dominated by Russia looking west and China looking east and south. Each cedes a sphere of dominance to the other and remains largely unconcerned with the events in the other’s sphere. Worldwide, trade in foodstuffs collapses. Expanding populations in the Middle East increase pressure on their governments, which are already stressed as the breakdown in world trade disproportionately affects food importers. Piracy increases worldwide, driving food transportation costs even higher. In the Arctic, Russia aggressively asserts its dominance and effectively shoulders out other nations with legitimate claims to seabed resources. No naval power exists to counter Russia’s claims. India, recognizing that its previous role as a balancer to China has lost relevance with the retrenchment of the Americans, agrees to supplement Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to protect the flow of oil to Southeast Asia. In exchange, China agrees to exercise increased influence on its client state Pakistan. The great typhoon of 2023 strikes Bangladesh, killing 23,000 people initially, and 200,000 more die in the subsequent weeks and months as the international community provides little humanitarian relief. Cholera and malaria are epidemic. Iran dominates the Persian Gulf and is a nuclear power. Its navy aggressively patrols the Gulf while the Revolutionary Guard Navy harasses shipping and oil infrastructure to force Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries into Tehran’s orbit. Russia supplies Iran with a steady flow of military technology and nuclear industry expertise. Lacking a regional threat, the Iranians happily control the flow of oil from the Gulf and benefit economically from the “protection” provided to other GCC nations. In Egypt, the decade-long experiment in participatory democracy ends with the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in a violent seizure of power. The United States is identified closely with the previous coalition government, and riots break out at the U.S. embassy. Americans in Egypt are left to their own devices because the U.S. has no forces in the Mediterranean capable of performing a noncombatant evacuation when the government closes major airports. Led by Iran, a coalition of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq attacks Israel. Over 300,000 die in six months of fighting that includes a limited nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. Israel is defeated, and the State of Palestine is declared in its place. Massive “refugee” camps are created to house the internally displaced Israelis, but a humanitarian nightmare ensues from the inability of conquering forces to support them. The NATO alliance is shattered. The security of European nations depends increasingly on the lack of external threats and the nuclear capability of France, Britain, and Germany, which overcame its reticence to military capability in light of America’s retrenchment. Europe depends for its energy security on Russia and Iran, which control the main supply lines and sources of oil and gas to Europe. Major European nations stand down their militaries and instead make limited contributions to a new EU military constabulary force. No European nation maintains the ability to conduct significant out-of-area operations, and Europe as a whole maintains little airlift capacity.

### 1NC

#### Yellen will likely be confirmed as the next Fed chair – votes in support are there, but conservatives will put up a fight

Europost 10/18 ("Janet Yellen rises to FED head challenge," 2013, http://www.europost.bg/article?id=8754)

For the first time in its cen­tu­ry-old his­to­ry, the US Fed­er­al Reserve (Fed) is wide­ly expect­ed to have a female Chair­per­son. Jan­et Yel­len (67), cur­rent­ly serv­ing as dep­u­ty of Ben Ber­nan­ke, has been nom­i­nat­ed by Pres­i­dent Barack Obama for the sec­ond most pow­er­ful gov­ern­ment posi­tion in the US. Because of the Fed's excep­tion­al inde­pend­ence and pow­er to pull the strings of not only the US, but the glob­al econ­o­my, its Chair­per­son holds an enor­mous amount of influ­ence.¶ Anoth­er sig­nif­i­cant devel­op­ment is the fact that for the first time in near­ly 30 years the Dem­o­crats will have their hands on this cru­cial finan­cial insti­tu­tion. The last Dem­o­crat at the helm of the US cen­tral bank was Paul Volc­ker, who Pres­i­dent Ronald Rea­gan replaced with Alan Green­span in 1987.¶ "Jan­et is excep­tion­al­ly well qual­i­fied for this role," Obama said at a White House cer­e­mo­ny on 9 Octo­ber, with Yell­en stand­ing by his side. "She doesn't have a crys­tal ball, but what she does have is a keen under­stand­ing of how mar­kets and the econ­o­my work, not just in the­o­ry but also in the real world. And she calls it like she sees it."¶ "She had sound­ed the alarm bell ear­ly about the hous­ing mar­ket bub­ble and excess­es in the finan­cial mar­kets before the reces­sion. She calls it like she sees it," Obama add­ed.¶ Yell­en, who spoke aft­er Obama, said she would pro­mote max­i­mum employ­ment, sta­ble pri­ces, and a sound finan­cial sys­tem.¶ "While we have made progress, we have fur­ther to go. The man­date of the Fed­er­al Reserve is to serve all the Amer­i­can peo­ple, and too many Amer­i­cans still can't find a job and wor­ry how they'll pay their bills and pro­vide for their fam­i­lies," Yell­en said.¶ "Jan­et is excep­tion­al­ly well qual­i­fied for the posi­tion, with stel­lar aca­dem­ic cre­den­tials and a strong record as a lead­er and a pol­i­cy­mak­er," Ben Ber­nan­ke said in a state­ment.¶ With her white hair and sweet smile, Yell­en inspires con­fi­dence. She was born and raised in Brook­lyn, where she attend­ed Fort Hamil­ton High School in Bay Ridge. She grad­u­at­ed from Brown Uni­ver­si­ty with a degree in eco­nom­ics in 1967, and received a Ph.D. in eco­nom­ics from Yale Uni­ver­si­ty in 1971.¶ Yell­en was an assist­ant pro­fes­sor at Har­vard from 1971-76 and an econ­o­mist with the Fed­er­al Reserve Board of Gov­ern­ors from 1977-78. There she met her future hus­band George Akerl­of, a Nobel prize-win­ning econ­o­mist. The two of them have worked togeth­er on numer­ous eco­nom­ic the­ses. She is now a Pro­fes­sor Emer­i­tus at the Haas School of Busi­ness, at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Cal­i­for­nia, Berke­ley.¶ Yell­en served as chair of Pres­i­dent Bill Clin­ton's Coun­cil of Eco­nom­ic Advis­ers 1997-1999, and was appoint­ed as a mem­ber of the Fed­er­al Reserve Sys­tem's Board of Gov­ern­ors from 1994 to 1997. She has taught at Har­vard Uni­ver­si­ty and at the Lon­don School of Eco­nom­ics. From June 14, 2004, until 2010, Yell­en was the Pres­i­dent and Chief Exec­u­tive Offi­cer of the Fed­er­al Reserve Bank of San Fran­cis­co. Fol­low­ing her appoint­ment to the Fed­er­al Reserve in 2004, she spoke pub­lic­ly, and in meet­ings of the Fed's mon­e­tary pol­i­cy com­mit­tee, on her con­cern about the poten­tial con­se­quen­ces of the boom in hous­ing pri­ces.¶ Yell­en is con­sid­ered by many on Wall Street to be a "dove" (more con­cerned with unem­ploy­ment than with infla­tion). Many con­serv­a­tives are hawks on infla­tion, argu­ing that keep­ing pri­ces low should be the Fed's chief con­cern. Yell­en will like­ly face oppo­si­tion from some Repub­li­cans in the Sen­ate, but she is expect­ed to be con­firmed as the next Fed chair.¶ A con­serv­a­tive group has launched a cam­paign to stop Jan­et L. Yell­en from becom­ing the next head of the Fed­er­al Reserve, Amer­i­can media report­ed. The con­cerns are that her con­fir­ma­tion would lead to an expan­sion of easy mon­ey pol­i­cies that would cause pri­ces to soar.¶ Still, she is expect­ed to gain enough sup­port to secure the 60 votes need­ed to over­come any pro­ce­dur­al hur­dles in the 100-seat Sen­ate. Dem­o­crats con­trol the cham­ber 54-46.

#### Obama fights the plan – strongly supports war powers

Rana 11 (Aziz – Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099, lexis)

Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of Barack Obama as President appeared to herald a new approach to security concerns and even the possibility of a fundamental break from Bush-era policies. These hopes were immediately stoked by Obama's decision before taking office to close the Guantanamo Bay prison. n4 Over two years later, however, not only does Guantanamo remain open, but through a recent executive order Obama has formalized a system of indefinite detention for those held there and also has stated that new military commission trials will begin for Guantanamo detainees. n5 More important, in ways small and large, the new administration remains committed to core elements of the previous constitutional vision of national security. Just as their predecessors, Obama officials continue to defend expansive executive detention and war powers and to promote the centrality of state secrecy to national security.

#### Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off

O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis)

a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by first-hand accounts of information battles and by the conclusions of experts who study them. Participants in such battles report that short-term political calculations consistently trump the constitutional interests at stake. One veteran of the first Bush White House, for example, has explained that rational-choice theory predicts what he in fact experienced: The rewards for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the office of the presidency would be largely abstract, since they would consist primarily of fidelity to a certain theory of the Constitution... . The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing purposes, [and] the unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies. n182 Louis Fisher, one of the leading defenders of the political branches' competence and authority to interpret the Constitution independently of the courts, n183 acknowledges that politics and "practical considerations" typically override the legal and constitutional principles implicated in information disputes. n184 In his view, although debate about congressional access and executive privilege "usually proceeds in terms of constitutional doctrine, it is the messy political realities of the moment that usually decide the issue." n185 Indeed, Professor Peter Shane, who has extensively studied such conflicts, concludes that their successful resolution in fact depends upon the parties focusing only on short-term political [\*1123] considerations. n186 When the participants "get institutional," Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187

#### Capital key

Collier 9/30 (Sustainable Wealth Management, "Perspectives: Four Challenges Facing the Markets This Fall,"2013, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:mVzW9cxQi5YJ:www.collierswm.com/blog/perspectives-four-challenges-facing-markets-fall+&cd=15&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)

Current Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke, will step down from his position in January and his replacement will be named soon. Rumors about President Obama’s nomination are flying and we can expect a contentious confirmation process by the Senate, filled with horse-trading and negotiations. The new Fed chairman will have the responsibility of managing the tapering process and ending the Fed’s unprecedented quantitative easing programs while keeping the economy on track.[iii]

#### Key to free trade

Rasmus 13 (Jack Rasmus, “On Janet Yellen as Federal Reserve Chair,”

http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/10/10/on-janet-yellen-as-federal-reserve-chair/

On October 9, 2013, President Obama appointed Janet Yellen, current vice-chair of the Federal Reserve, as the new Fed chair, to replace Ben Bernanke expected to retire at year’s end. Obama’s appointment, subject to Senate confirmation that is likely, comes after a general consensus in recent weeks that Yellen would be Obama’s choice. That followed prior weeks of heated public debate and maneuvering involving Yellen, as favorite of liberals in and out of Congress, and Larry Summers, favorite of Obama administration staffers and in-siders. Summers withdrew his candidacy several weeks ago, however, under pressure from conservative elements, who viewed his role as former Obama adviser, as too liberal on fiscal spending in Obama’s administration, and liberal elements, who viewed his role as former Clinton administration Secretary of the Treasury as too accommodating to bankers and financial deregulation. It has been interesting to watch how liberals, within and without the Obama administration in recent weeks organized aggressively on behalf of Yellen. Yellen was the ‘Fed Dove’, willing to continue Ben Bernanke’s generous free money policies of QE and near zero interest rates. In contrast, Summers was the monetary ‘hawk’ that would likely accelerate a withdrawal from QE faster. Of course, both profiles were mostly spin. Noted liberal economists, like Paul Krugman of the New York Times, fell completely into the Yellen camp, praising her policies and more liberal credentials. Even progressives of the moderate persuasion fell for the ‘Yellen as Fed Dove’ fiction. But a closer inspection would have revealed that neither Summers nor Yellen would have departed much, if at all, from current chair Bernanke’s policies. Those policies, in the form of QE (quantitative easing) and ‘zero bound interest rates’, since 2009 have had little if any impact or effect on the real economy—and therefore on housing recovery, jobs, or middle class incomes. In the course of four years of both QE and zero rates, the Federal Reserve has pumped more than $13 trillion in liquidity (money) into the US and global banking system (and shadow banking system) to bail out the banks. In terms of QE alone, this occurred in at least three versions—QE1, QE2, and now currently QE3—which together will have provided by year end 2013 (along with QE 2.5—called ‘operation twist’), nearly $4 trillion of liquidity injections to bankers as well as individual wealthy investors seeking to dump their collapse subprime mortgage bonds on the Federal Reserve. QE and the $13 trillion resulted in record booms in the stock and bond markets in the US and globally. Much of that likely flowed out of the US economy into the global, serving to stimulate real growth in emerging markets and even more in generating financial asset speculative bubbles around the world since 2009. There is in fact a very high correlation between the announcement, introduction, and conclusion of QE programs and stock-bond, derivative, and other financial asset booms and declines since 2009. Conversely, there is virtually no such connection between housing, jobs, and other real sectors of the US economy. Bernanke Fed monetary policies have thus boosted financial capital gains and in turn the incomes of the wealthiest in the US and globally, as real disposable income for US households has consistently declined for four consecutive years. As recent data on income distribution from studies of economists at the University of California have shown this past summer: The wealthiest US 1% households have accrued for themselves no less than 95% of all the income gains in the US since 2009. Yellen has been perhaps the strongest supporter of out-going Fed Chair, Ben Bernanke’s policies of QE and zero bound rates, which have directly resulted in this lopsided income inequality. So why were liberals so impressed with her as the preferred choice for next Fed chair? It certainly wasn’t for her policies. Or was it? Perhaps they still labor under the false notion that, in the world of 21st century global finance capitalism, that low interest rates create jobs? But that academic economics fiction no longer has evidence in reality. It belongs in the same trash bin with other fictions, like more business tax cuts create jobs. Or that more free trade agreements , like the pending Transpacific Partnership, pushed by the Obama administration and liberals, will create jobs. Here again, the empirical track record shows that neither have, or will, create jobs. But liberals nonetheless adhere to these false notions, believing in the various forms of ‘trickle down’ economics. Yellen as Fed Chair will do no more for jobs and real middle class-working class incomes than Obama’s appointment of General Electric’s CEO, Jeff Immelt, did for jobs since 2010 by getting the Obama administration to pass new free trade agreements with Panama, Columbia and Korea, or more tax cuts for multinational manufacturers like GE, Microsoft, or big pharma have done for jobs. But Yellen was given the ‘dove’ tag and therefore the liberal endorsement. Yellen as Fed Chair will continue policies no different in content than has Ben Bernanke. Yellen will continue to pump QE into bankers and investors, stocks and bond markets, global speculators and offshore investors, as had Bernanke. If she really were liberal, she’d take the $1 trillion given them in just the past year of QE3 liquidity injections and use it to fund a government direct job creation program. That would create 20 million $50k a year jobs, and jump start the economic recovery overnight.

#### Impact is extinction AND turns China and Terror advantages

**Pazner 8** (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

## Accountability

### No Modeling

#### U.S. can’t effectively signal

Zenko 13 (Micah, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, "The Signal and the Noise," Foreign Policy, 2-2-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the\_signal\_and\_the\_noise)

Later, Gen. Austin observed of cutting forces from the Middle East: "Once you reduce the presence in the region, you could very well signal the wrong things to our adversaries." Sen. Kelly Ayotte echoed his observation, claiming that President Obama's plan to withdraw 34,000 thousand U.S. troops from Afghanistan within one year "leaves us dangerously low on military personnel...it's going to send a clear signal that America's commitment to Afghanistan is going wobbly." Similarly, during a separate House Armed Services Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ominously warned of the possibility of sequestration: "Perhaps most important, the world is watching. Our friends and allies are watching, potential foes -- all over the world." These routine and unchallenged assertions highlight what is perhaps the most widely agreed-upon conventional wisdom in U.S. foreign and national security policymaking: the inherent power of signaling. This psychological capability rests on two core assumptions: All relevant international audiences can or will accurately interpret the signals conveyed, and upon correctly comprehending this signal, these audiences will act as intended by U.S. policymakers. Many policymakers and pundits fundamentally believe that the Pentagon is an omni-directional radar that uniformly transmits signals via presidential declarations, defense spending levels, visits with defense ministers, or troop deployments to receptive antennas. A bit of digging, however, exposes cracks in the premises underlying signaling theories. There is a half-century of social science research demonstrating the cultural and cognitive biases that make communication difficult between two humans. Why would this be any different between two states, or between a state and non-state actor? Unlike foreign policy signaling in the context of disputes or escalating crises -- of which there is an extensive body of research into types and effectiveness -- policymakers' claims about signaling are merely made in a peacetime vacuum. These signals are never articulated with a precision that could be tested or falsified, and thus policymakers cannot be judged misleading or wrong. Paired with the faith in signaling is the assumption that policymakers can read the minds of potential or actual friends and adversaries. During the cycle of congressional hearings this spring, you can rest assured that elected representatives and expert witnesses will claim to know what the Iranian supreme leader thinks, how "the Taliban" perceives White House pronouncements about Afghanistan, or how allies in East Asia will react to sequestration. This self-assuredness is referred to as the illusion of transparency by psychologists, or how "people overestimate others' ability to know them, and...also overestimate their ability to know others." Policymakers also conceive of signaling as a one-way transmission: something that the United States does and others absorb. You rarely read or hear critical thinking from U.S. policymakers about how to interpret the signals from others states. Moreover, since U.S. officials correctly downplay the attention-seeking actions of adversaries -- such as Iran's near-weekly pronouncement of inventing a new drone or missile -- wouldn't it be safer to assume that the majority of U.S. signals are similarly dismissed? During my encounters with foreign officials, few take U.S. government pronouncements seriously, and instead assume they are made to appease domestic audiences.

#### No reverse modeling - norms can’t solve

Saunders 13 **(**Paul, executive director of The Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005, “We Won't Always Drone Alone,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177>)

A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will use drones, whether armed or unarmed, and what lessons they will draw from Washington’s approach. Thus far, the principal lesson may well be that drones can be extremely effective in killing your opponents, wherever they are, without risking your own troops and without sending soldiers or law enforcement personnel across another country’s borders. It seems less likely that others will adopt U.S.-style legal standards and oversight procedures, or that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace.¶ Based on their actions, it is almost as if Obama administration officials believe that the United States and its allies will have a long-term monopoly on drones. How else can one explain their exuberant confidence in launching drone attacks? However, the administration’s dramatic expansion in drone strikes—and their apparent effectiveness—will only further shorten Washington’s reign as the drone capital of the world by increasing the incentives to others eager to develop, refine or buy the technology.¶ Have Obama administration officials given any thought to what the world might look like when armed drones are more widespread and when Americans or U.S. allies and partners could become targets? To an outsider, there is little evidence of this kind of thinking in the administration’s use of drones.¶ This is a serious problem. According to an unclassified July 2012 report by the Government Accountability Office, at least 76 countries already have acquired unmanned aerial vehicles, known as UAVs or drones; the report also states that “countries of concern” are attempting to acquire advanced UAVs from foreign suppliers as well as seeking illegal access to U.S. technology. And a 2012 special report by the United Kingdom’s Guardian newspaper indicated that China has 10 or more models, though not all are armed. Other sources identify additional varieties in China. At least 50 countries are trying to build 900 different types of drones, the GAO writes.¶ More generally, the administration’s expanding use of drones is a powerful endorsement of not only the technology, but of the practice of targeted killing as an instrument of foreign and security policy. Having provided this powerful impetus, the United States should not be surprised if others—with differing legal standards and more creative efforts at self-justification—seize upon it once they have the necessary capabilities. According to the GAO, this is already happening—in government-speak, “while only a limited number of countries have fielded lethal or weaponized UAVs, this threat is anticipated to grow.” From this perspective, it is ironic that a president so critical of his predecessor’s unilateralism would practice it himself—particularly in a manner that other governments will find much easier to emulate than the Bush administration’s larger-scale use of force. How does the Obama administration plan to respond if and when China or Russia uses armed UAVs to attack groups they define as terrorists?

### 1NC No Drone Wars

#### No drone wars

Joseph Singh 12, researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 8/13/12, “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2eSvaZnfQ

In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology.

Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team.

Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones.

What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use.

Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best.

Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations.

Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### States won’t attack each other

Lewis & Crawford 13 [Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Emily, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, “DRONES AND DISTINCTION: HOW IHL ENCOURAGED THE RISE OF DRONES” p. 1163, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF]

Before discussing the legal merits of the norms that the United States is shaping through its present conduct of drone warfare, it is ﬁrst necessary to dispel a pervasive misconception about drones that Alston and many other commentators have promulgated. That misconception is that the current manner in which the United States is using drones broadly justiﬁes any use of drones by other countries against the United States and that drones represent a serious threat to the United States.159 This misconception has spread so easily because the reciprocity theme is intuitively appealing and, to a point, legally correct. It is true that whatever legal basis the United States offers for utilizing drones in Yemen, Pakistan, or Somalia must also be available to any other nation wishing to use drones as well. However, that does not mean that drones will be appearing over New York City anytime soon, in large part because drones are very vulnerable to air defense systems and signal interruption and because they are particularly unsuited to use by terror groups.160 Even the most advanced drones that the United States possesses are relatively slow and vulnerable to ﬁghters or surface-to-air missiles, meaning that, as conventional weapons, drones would have limited utility in a traditional state-on-state armed conﬂict.161 Perhaps more importantly, the physical realities associated with using drones makes them of limited usefulness to terrorists. Drones that are capable of carrying any signiﬁcant payload need hard surfaced runways and signiﬁcant maintenance support. Any drone returning to such facilities would be closely followed by U.S. forces, meaning that any drone used by terrorists would be a single strike proposition, and quite an expensive one at that. Therefore, from a practical standpoint, car bombs, suicide bombs, and attacks on airliners remain by far the most credible threat to the United States, regardless of how it pursues its drone policy.

### 1NC Drone Prolif

#### Acquisition takes forever

Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out¶ distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests.¶ However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most¶ likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial¶ base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited¶ firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the¶ intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and crossborder¶ adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks¶ by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia¶ into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into¶ Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingencies¶ do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support.¶ Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat¶ to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term.

### Circumvention

#### Obama can circumvent

Lohmann 13 **(**Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>)

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

### Asia D

#### No East China sea conflict

Rudd 3/14 -- Former Prime Minister and Former Foreign Minister, Member, Australian Parliament, interview with Jonathan Tepperman (Kevin, 2013, "The Situation in North Korea and the Future of U.S.-China Relations," http://www.cfr.org/australasia-and-the-pacific/situation-north-korea-future-us-china-relations/p30230)

What ultimately drives this is a -- is a conflicting set of interests between rampant nationalisms on the one hand and, on the other hand, a pragmatic recognition by governments both in Beijing and Tokyo that conflict, for both of them, would be absolutely disastrous and would retard economic growth and stability in the wider region and would further (retard China's ?) -- primacy of China's own economic development objectives. Now, if they're the two competing poles in this debate, both in Tokyo and Beijing, rational foreign policy actors would conclude that rational self-interest and rational economic self-interest would ultimately (prevail ?). As you know, history cautions us against reaching those conclusions. And I think if you've seen the drift in the numbers, both in terms of Sino-Japanese trade numbers and Sino-Japanese investment numbers over the last six to nine months, the impact in real numbers is palpable and measurable in terms of the state of the China-Japan relationship. I think my friends in Beijing, when I have spoken with them, including the military, I think it's fair to say, are working very actively behind the scenes to find face-saving mechanisms by which this can be managed to the point of stability for the period ahead and then put into some longer-term process with the Japanese. However, when I was last in Beijing, which was prior to the -- (audio interference) -- lock-on incident, the -- it was very much a question within the Chinese minds about how one would do that without actually losing face on the national mistakes in the public discourse both about Japan and with Japan.

### 1NC SCS

#### South China Sea stable now

Chaibi 3/4 -- 3rd year visiting student from Princeton University in the Department of Engineering Science (Abraham, 2013, "The outlook for continuing stability in the South China Sea," http://politicsinspires.org/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/)

East Asia’s rapid economic and military development has captured global attention, but pundits are quick to point to the South China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan as potential obstacles to the region’s continued growth. Analysis of news coverage demonstrates that regional economies and tensions have been growing in tandem. The South China Sea has historically been of particular interest because of the number of conflicting claims on the islands and sea-lanes it encompasses. China, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, among others, have often engaged in bilateral disagreements with resulting spikes in diplomatic tension and even military confrontation. Of note, these conflicts have never escalated to a full-scale regional war. Direct extrapolation suggests that previous restraint in military interactions implies the nations involved do not consider the potential benefits sufficient to justify an upset to the balance of power. However, contemporary changes in economic and security conditions complicate the issue. While current tensions appear unlikely to lead to a full-scale military conflict, the diversion of national resources needed to maintain the status quo is substantial. Institutional changes to increase transparency; clarify US treaties with ASEAN nations; and increase states’ internal enforcement of international agreements, although initially costly, would allow the neighbouring states to redirect these resources to long-term growth. Historically, China has been involved in a majority of the military conflicts in the South China Sea. A 1947 Chinese map delineates China’s controversial claim to approximately 80% of the sea. China aggressively used its navy to conclude a dispute with Vietnam in the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then in 1988 during the Johnson South Reef Skirmish for the Spratly Islands. Conflict was narrowly averted in 1995 when the Philippines chose not to shell fort-like Chinese military structures on Mischief Reef (China maintained they were only intended as shelter for fisherman); however, the Philippines continues to assert that this is an example of “creeping occupation”. This form of venting tensions, while far short of total war, is extremely costly over the long run; the combination of of resources, energy, and lives expended to establish a claim to the islands creates a significant and avoidable opportunity cost. These skirmishes are not merely an imprint of the 20th century but continue today as witnessed by the Chinese establishment of the Sansha garrison-city in 2012 and the Sino-Philippines stand-off in the Scarborough Shoal. What then is the evidence suggesting a continued reluctance to engage in full-scale military confrontation? Although in the past conflict has often arisen between economically interdependent nations (viz. the previous peak of global trade in 1914), the China-ASEAN relationship is one of fundamental interdependence of production, visible in the prevalence of international supply chaining in manufacturing processes, rather than solely trade and labour movement[i]. The burgeoning economic interdependence and growth of neighbouring states contributes a major incentive to prevent a conflagration. $5.3 trillion of trade, of which approximately 20% is US, transits the South China Sea annually and any interruption would not only severely restrict regional trade revenues, but would also very likely guarantee US military intervention[ii]. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is becoming increasingly interconnected and 2015 will mark a key turning point with the opening of internal ASEAN borders for free movement of labor. The ASEAN bloc has also concluded a number of reconciliation agreements with China. Regarding security, both the 2002 Code of Conduct and the 2011 Guidelines to the Code of Conduct are intended to help coordinate diplomacy and maintain peace in South China Sea disputes. Economically China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and at its opening in 2010 the ASEAN-China free trade area (ACFTA) became the largest in the world by population. These arrangements come at a time when growing estimates of the value of the natural resources contained in the South China Sea are generating pressures associated with ensuring energy security. Economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, however, is not the sole factor at play. In areas with considerable interstate tension sub-state actors have often contributed to the deterioration of international relations, most prominently with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand tipping Europe into World War I. Recent developments in state-level Chinese political and military discourse reflect a strong interest in cooperation. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 2011 discussions with Filipino President Corazon Aquino firmly expressed the hope that “the countries concerned may put aside disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas”[iii]. Additionally in 2011 the Chinese State Council Information Office released a white paper with a similar emphasis on joint development. Yet China is also reported to have developed internal fractures in its South China Sea policy, with a number of different ministries controlling paramilitary units that are not under express government oversight[iv]. For example, the Bureau of Fisheries Administration (BFA) now directs a relatively well-equipped law enforcement fleet that is tasked with patrolling Chinese-owned fishing areas. Such interest groups repeatedly instigate minor disputes with their ASEAN counterparts and the US navy that exacerbate state-level discussions and risk eventually drawing unintended consequences (characteristically, in 2004 two BFA vessels obstructed a US Navy surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea). The region has also seen a rise in high-tech militarization, with rapid development in areas ranging from aircraft carriers and submarines to cyber-espionage; this is likely to further increase due to the 2011 US “pivot to Asia” and military surge. The pivot is considered to be a sign that the US intends to continue playing a leadership role in East Asia, a strategy at odds with China’s vision[v]. An associated complication is the imprecise definition of US commitments to its ally nations in the event of disputes in contested territories, especially vis-à-vis the Philippines and Vietnam, and the possibility that alliances will be used to escalate a small battle into a regional affair. The US is making efforts to address these complications; for the first time since RIMPACS’s creation in 1971, China has been invited to participate in a US-led naval exercise. Positive near-term repercussions of growing US involvement have also been postulated; analysts suggest that one of the root causes behind Chinese interest in cooperation is the fear that aggression in the South China Sea will drive other parties to strengthen their ties with the US[vi]. The relative wealth of economic and diplomatic compromises on all sides presents a compelling argument that under current conditions, disputes in the South China Sea will continue to be restrained to small-scale skirmishes that do not threaten overall stability. This is not to say that the increase in regional tension is insignificant, but rather that the involved parties all have a strong interest in maintaining mutual growth and have demonstrated their willingness to make strategic sacrifices to maintain the status quo. Furthermore as China is the common link in the majority of the disputes, it is probable that it will be at the heart of any conflict — and China has frequently shown restraint in this regard (though not so, for example, in Tibet). In terms of China’s priorities, policy analysts tend to agree that if China were to begin a large-scale military campaign, Taiwan would most likely be the focus of its aggression[vii].

## Terrorism

### AQIM Not A Threat

#### AQIM isn’t a threat – can’t project power and won’t lash out

Christina Hellmich 13, reader in IR and ME Studies @ Reading, 1-22-2013, “Mali/Algeria: threat of AQIM to Europe has been overstated,” African Arguments, http://africanarguments.org/2013/01/22/malialgeria-threat-of-aqim-to-europe-has-been-overstated-by-christina-hellmich/

The intervention of French military forces in Mali and the apparent reprisals in the form of the hostage crisis at the In Amenas gas processing plant in Algeria have brought the threat of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to international attention. The drama of the hostage crisis has shot the hitherto unknown group ‘Signatories in Blood’ and its leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, variably referred to as an Islamist with ties to bin Ladin and/or a senior al-Qaeda leader, to notoriety overnight and has prompted Western leaders to focus on the possibility of a growing threat of Islamist terrorism on Europe’s southern border. Such tragic events are bound to provoke a strong reaction, yet, upon closer examination, it seems that the idea of a threat to mainland Europe is overstated. Even at a glance, the nature of the attack – hostage-taking for financial gain – is not the kind we have come to associate with al-Qaeda over the years. Rather than reflecting the “signature” suicide attack with mass casualties, the event fits more appropriately into the series of other hostage-takings that have taken place in Algeria in recent years but which have not been on so grand a scale and hence have not gained the same attention as events at In Amenas. It is not only the events which are different: the particular branch of al-Qaeda to which they have been ascribed, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly known as the GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat – Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) stands out for its focus on a local agenda. Although it has allegedly claimed that it supports Osama bin Ladin, the group, which was found to be responsible for car bombings that took place in Algiers in 2007, as well as a number of other local incidents, appears to be more concerned with the goal of overthrowing the Algerian government and the institution of an Islamic state in its place than with bin Ladin’s vision of the reestablishment of the caliphate and global jihad against the West. While it can be argued that the above is not entirely out of touch with al-Qaeda’s stated aims, it is nonetheless a return to the “near enemy” – the forces of occupation and secularisation – that have preoccupied Islamists for almost a century. While the AQIM’s claim to be acting in the name of “al-Qaeda central” feels very much like a convenient piece of flag-waving, current al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared in 2006 that America and France were the enemies, indicating a pragmatic approach by which senior al-Qaeda leaders aim to flatter their local affiliates, enabling one side to continue to maintain the impression of its global reach while the other benefits from association with the infamous name. The true extent of any link or co-operative strategy, however, remains open to question. If there is little evidence to suggest genuine cooperation between AQIM and the senior leadership of al-Qaeda, the connection between al-Qaeda and Belmokhtar and his Signatories in Blood is even more tenuous. Sometimes referred to as “Marlboro man” for his cigarette-smuggling exploits, Belmokhtar has a wide-ranging and impressive criminal career which includes drug trafficking, diamond smuggling and the kidnapping of dozens of Westerners, such as diplomats, aid workers and tourists, for ransoms of up to $3 million each. Yet Belmokhtar’s success and growing influence were to be his downfall as far as his membership of AQIM was concerned. While his actions at In Amenas supposedly link Belmokhtar to al-Qaeda in the eyes of the West, he in fact made the news on various jihadist forums for falling out with AQIM for his “fractious behavior”, and either resigned or was formally dismissed from its ranks in late 2012. Such splintering is far from exceptional; indeed, it exemplifies the present state of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), operating in Yemen, and the recently formed Ansar al-Sharia are a case in point: despite their different names and agendas, the two groups are frequently referred to as one and the same and are conceived of as somehow representing a joint force. This bias amongst commentators towards presenting a united al-Qaeda in various regions of the world is conducive only to resurrecting the popular, yet deeply flawed theory that al-Qaeda operates on a global basis as a cohesive group, with all that this implies for the threat it poses to global security. Today more than ever before, al-Qaeda and its local affiliates are highly fragmented and in disagreement as to their priorities of ideology and strategy. Indeed, the lines of fragmentation only begin here: beyond the increasing internal debate, al-Qaeda and its local affiliates find themselves in direct contest with other, often more established Islamist groups with radically different worldviews and agendas, many of which now enjoy greater popularity because they are not so ready to spill the blood of their fellow Muslims. Whilst the existence of groups such as The Signatories in Blood and the dramatic, violent nature of incidents such as mass hostage-takings and car-bombings heightens fears in the West of a resurgence of the al-Qaeda that caused so much death and destruction on 9/11, the truth is that most of today’s al-Qaeda franchises have a much more limited vision. Thus, when David Cameron announces that Britain must pursue the terrorists with an iron resolve, he unwittingly reinforces a notion of a unified Islamist threat that does not exist in that form in reality. It is a convenient narrative which benefits both the propaganda machine of Islamists and the calls of those in the West who support military action, yet the true picture of those who claim to act in the name of al-Qaeda – both in Africa and elsewhere – is far more nuanced, and much less of a threat to Europe, than we are commonly led to believe.

### 1NC Terror

#### No impact to terror

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

It seems increasingly likely that the official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been substantially deluded—massively disproportionate to the threat that al-Qaida has ever actually presented either as an international menace or as an inspiration or model to homegrown amateurs. Applying the extensive datasets on terrorism that have been generated over the last decades, we conclude that the chances of an American perishing at the hands of a terrorist at present rates is one in 3.5 million per year—well within the range of what risk analysts hold to be “acceptable risk.”40 Yet, despite the importance of responsibly communicating risk and despite the costs of irresponsible fearmongering, just about the only official who has ever openly put the threat presented by terrorism in some sort of context is New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who in 2007 pointed out that people should “get a life” and that they have a greater chance of being hit by lightning than of being a victim of terrorism—an observation that may be a bit off the mark but is roughly accurate.41 (It might be noted that, despite this unorthodox outburst, Bloomberg still managed to be re-elected two years later.) Indeed, much of the reaction to the September 11 attacks calls to mind Hans Christian Andersen’s fable of delusion, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” in which con artists convince the emperor’s court that they can weave stuffs of the most beautiful colors and elaborate patterns from the delicate silk and purest gold thread they are given. These stuffs, they further convincingly explain, have the property of remaining invisible to anyone who is unusually stupid or unfit for office. The emperor finds this quite appealing because not only will he have splendid new clothes, but he will be able to discover which of his officials are unfit for their posts—or in today’s terms, have lost their effectiveness. His courtiers, then, have great professional incentive to proclaim the stuffs on the loom to be absolutely magnificent even while mentally justifying this conclusion with the equivalent of “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Unlike the emperor’s new clothes, terrorism does of course exist. Much of the reaction to the threat, however, has a distinctly delusionary quality. In Carle’s view, for example, the CIA has been “spinning in self-referential circles” in which “our premises were flawed, our facts used to fit our premises, our premises determined, and our fears justified our operational actions, in a self-contained process that arrived at a conclusion dramatically at odds with the facts.” The process “projected evil actions where there was, more often, muddled indirect and unavoidable complicity, or not much at all.” These “delusional ratiocinations,” he further observes, “were all sincerely, ardently held to have constituted a rigorous, rational process to identify terrorist threats” in which “the avalanche of reporting confirms its validity by its quantity,” in which there is a tendency to “reject incongruous or contradictory facts as erroneous, because they do not conform to accepted reality,” and in which potential dissenters are not-so-subtly reminded of career dangers: “Say what you want at meetings. It’s your decision. But you are doing yourself no favors.”42 Consider in this context the alarming and profoundly imaginary estimates of U.S. intelligence agencies in the year after the September 11 attacks that the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000.43 Terrorist cells, they told reporters, were “embedded in most U.S. cities with sizable Islamic communities,” usually in the “run-down sections,” and were “up and active” because electronic intercepts had found some of them to be “talking to each other.”44 Another account relayed the view of “experts” that Osama bin Laden was ready to unleash an “11,000 strong terrorist army” operating in more than sixty countries “controlled by a Mr. Big who is based in Europe,” but that intelligence had “no idea where thousands of these men are.”45 Similarly, FBI Director Robert Mueller assured the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 11, 2003, that, although his agency had yet to identify even one al-Qaida cell in the United States, “I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing,” a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text. Moreover, he claimed that such unidentified entities presented “the greatest threat,” had “developed a support infrastructure” in the country, and had achieved both the “ability” and the “intent” to inflict “signi ficant casualties in the US with little warning.”46 Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.

#### No nuclear terror – operation, cohesion and coordination

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In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12 The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14 In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15 Although the efforts of would-be terrorists have often seemed pathetic, even comical or absurd, the comedy remains a dark one. Left to their own devices, at least a few of these often inept and almost always self-deluded individuals could eventually have committed some serious, if small-scale, damage.16

#### Even if there is an attack – it would be small scale and disorganized

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Calculating the Costs of the Counterterrorism Delusion Delusion is a quality that is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, there may be a way to get a sense of its dimensions—or at least of its cost consequences. We have argued that terrorism is a limited problem with limited consequences and that the reaction to it has been excessive, and even delusional. Some degree of effort to deal with the terrorism hazard is, however, certainly appropriate—and is decidedly not delusional. The issue then is a quantitative one: At what point does a reaction to a threat that is real become excessive or even delusional? At present rates, as noted earlier, an American’s chance of being killed by terrorism is one in 3.5 million in a given year. This calculation is based on history (but one that includes the September 11 attacks in the count), and things could, of course, become worse in the future. The analysis here, however, suggests that terrorists are not really all that capable, that terrorism tends to be a counterproductive exercise, and that September 11 is increasingly standing out as an aberration, not a harbinger. Moreover, it has essentially become officially accepted that the likelihood of a large-scale organized attack such as September 11 has declined and that the terrorist attacks to fear most are ones that are small scale and disorganized.66 Attacks such as these can inflict painful losses, of course, but they are quite limited in their effect and, even if they do occur, they would not change the fatality risk for the American population very much.

### 1NC Bioterror

#### No bioterror impact

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It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than the actual threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact. As far as continued research is concerned, there is a risk-reward equation to consider. The threat of a terrorist attack using biological weapons is very low. And while it is impossible to predict viral outbreaks, it is important to be able to recognize a new strain of virus that could result in an epidemic or even a pandemic, enabling countries to respond more effectively. All of this hinges on the level of preparedness of developed nations and their ability to rapidly exchange information, conduct research and promote individual awareness of the threat.

#### OCHS has no quals – he’s from Free from terror .net

#### He thinks that you need a FULL BODY CAVITY SEARCH EVERY DAY to solve

**Ochs, 02** -- You put quals here, right? (Richard, "BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY", Free from Terror.net, June 9th 2002, June 1st 2010, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html, KONTOPOULOS)

Unless guards do body crevice searches of lab employees every day, smuggling out a few grams will be a piece of cake. Basically, THERE CAN BE NO SECURITY. Humanity is at great risk as we speak. All biological weapons must be destroyed immediately. All genetic engineering of new diseases must be halted. All bioweapons labs must be dismantled. Fort Detrick and Dugway labs must be decommissioned and torn down. Those who continue this research are potential war criminals of the highest order. Secret bioweapons research must be outlawed.

#### -- Tech hurdles prevent bioterror

Mueller 6 (John, Chair of National Security Studies – Mershon Center and Professor of Political Science – Ohio State University, Overblown, p. 24)

Not only has the science about chemical and biological weapons been quite sophisticated for more than a century, but that science has become massively more developed over that period. Moreover, govern­ments (not just small terrorist groups) have spent a great deal of money over decades in an effort to make the weapons more effective. Yet, although there have been great improvements in the lethality, effective­ness, and deployment of conventional and nuclear weapons during that time, the difficulties of controlling and dispersing chemical and biological substances seem to have persisted. Perhaps dedicated terrorists will, in time, figure it out. However, the experience in the 1990s of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo suggests there are great difficulties. The group had some 300 scientists in its employ and an estimated budget of $1 billion, and it reportedly tried at least nine times over five years to set off biological weapons by spray­ing pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops, hoping fancifully to ignite an apocalyptic war**. These efforts failed to create a single fatality**; in fact, nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place. It was at that point that the group abandoned its biological efforts in frustration and instead turned to the infamous sarin chemical attack.29 As two analysts stress, there have been so few biological (and chem­ical) terrorist attacks because they would require overcoming several **major technological hurdles**. Among them: gaining access to specialized ingredients, acquiring equipment and know-how to produce and dis­perse the agents, and creating an organization that can resist infiltration or early detection by law enforcement." In the meantime, the science with respect to detecting and ably responding to such attacks is likely to grow. Although acknowledging that things could change in the future, the Gilmore Commission has concluded, "As easy as some argue that it may be for terrorists to culture anthrax spores or brew up a concoction of deadly nerve gas, the effective dissemination or dispersal of these viruses and poisons still presents seri­ous technological hurdles that greatly inhibit their effective use.

#### -- No acquisition

Burton and Stewart 8 (Fred and Scott, Stratfor Intelligence, “Busting the Anthrax Myth”, 7-30,

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/busting\_anthrax\_myth)

Operating in the badlands along the Pakistani-Afghan border, al Qaeda cannot easily build large modern factories capable of producing large quantities of agents or toxins. Such fixed facilities are expensive and consume a lot of resources. Even if al Qaeda had the spare capacity to invest in such facilities, the fixed nature of them means that they could be compromised and quickly destroyed by the United States. If al Qaeda could somehow create and hide a fixed biological weapons facility in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas or North-West Frontier Province, it would still face the daunting task of transporting large quantities of biological agents from the Pakistani badlands to targets in the United States or Europe. Al Qaeda operatives certainly can create and transport small quantities of these compounds, but not enough to wreak the kind of massive damage it desires. Al Qaeda’s lead chemical and biological weapons expert, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, also known as Abu Khabab al-Masri, was reportedly killed on July 28, 2008, by a U.S. missile strike on his home in Pakistan. Al-Sayid, who had a $5 million dollar bounty on his head, was initially reported to have been one of those killed in the January 2006 strike in [Damadola](http://www.stratfor.com/bin_laden_tape_and_strike_damadola). If he was indeed killed, his death should be another significant blow to the group’s biological warfare efforts. Of course, we must recognize that the jihadist threat goes just beyond the al Qaeda core. As we have been writing for several years now, al Qaeda has undergone a metamorphosis from a smaller core group of professional operatives into an operational model that encourages independent grassroots jihadists to conduct attacks. The core al Qaeda group, through men like al-Sayid, has published manuals in hard copy and on the Internet that provide instructions on how to manufacture rudimentary biological weapons. It is our belief that independent jihadist cells and lone-wolf jihadists will almost certainly attempt to brew up some of the recipes from the al Qaeda cookbook. There also exists a very real threat that a jihadist sympathizer could obtain a small quantity of deadly biological organisms by infiltrating a research facility. This means that we likely will see some limited attempts at employing biological weapons. That does not mean, however, that such attacks will be large-scale or create mass casualties. The Bottom Line While there has been much consternation and alarm-raising over the potential for widespread proliferation of biological weapons and the possible use of such weapons on a massive scale, there are significant constraints on such designs. The current dearth of substantial biological weapons programs and arsenals by governments worldwide, and the even smaller number of cases in which systems were actually used, seems to belie — or at least bring into question — the intense concern about such programs.

### 1NC No Econ War

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425)]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

#### No escalation

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

### A2: Program Collapse

#### Drone program sustainable

Robert Chesney 12, professor at the University of Texas School of Law, nonresident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, distinguished scholar at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 8/29/12, “Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138623>

This multi-year pattern of cross-branch and cross-party consensus gives the impression that the legal architecture of detention has stabilized at last. But the settlement phenomenon is not limited to detention policy. The same thing has happened, albeit to a lesser extent, in other areas.

The military commission prosecution system provides a good example. When the Obama administration came into office, it seemed quite possible, indeed likely, that it would shut down the commissions system. Indeed, the new president promptly ordered all commission proceedings suspended pending a policy review.48 In the end, however, the administration worked with the then Democratic-controlled Congress to pursue a mend-it-don’t-end-it approach culminating in passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2009, which addressed a number of key objections to the statutory framework Congress and the Bush administration had crafted in 2006. In his National Archives address in spring 2009, moreover, President Obama also made clear that he would make use of this system in appropriate cases.49 He has duly done so, notwithstanding his administration’s doomed attempt to prosecute the so-called “9/11 defendants” (especially Khalid Sheikh Mohamed) in civilian courts. Difficult questions continue to surround the commissions system as to particular issues—such as the propriety of charging “material support” offenses for pre-2006 conduct50—but the system as a whole is far more stable today than at any point in the past decade.51

There have been strong elements of cross-party continuity between the Bush and Obama administration on an array of other counterterrorism policy questions, including the propriety of using rendition in at least some circumstances and, perhaps most notably, the legality of using lethal force not just in contexts of overt combat deployments but also in areas physically remote from the “hot battlefield.” Indeed, the Obama administration quickly outstripped the Bush administration in terms of the quantity and location of its airstrikes outside of Afghanistan,52 and it also greatly surpassed the Bush administration in its efforts to marshal public defenses of the legality of these actions.53 What’s more, the Obama administration also succeeded in fending off a lawsuit challenging the legality of the drone strike program (in the specific context of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen and member of AQAP known to be on a list of approved targets for the use of deadly force in Yemen who was in fact killed in a drone strike some months later).54

The point of all this is not to claim that legal disputes surrounding these counterterrorism policies have effectively ended. Far from it; a steady drumbeat of criticism persists, especially in relation to the use of lethal force via drones. But by the end of the first post-9/11 decade, this criticism no longer seemed likely to spill over in the form of disruptive judicial rulings, newly-restrictive legislation, or significant spikes in diplomatic or domestic political pressure, as had repeatedly occurred in earlier years. Years of law-conscious policy refinement—and quite possibly some degree of public fatigue or inurement when it comes to legal criticisms—had made possible an extended period of cross-branch and cross-party consensus, and this in turn left the impression that the underlying legal architecture had reached a stage of stability that was good enough for the time being.

#### Yes public support

**Curry 2013** [Tom, National Affairs Writer, June 5, “Poll finds overwhelming support for drone strikes,” NBC News, http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/06/05/18780381-poll-finds-overwhelming-support-for-drone-strikes?lite]

Some members of Congress have misgivings about the use of drone strikes against suspected terrorists, but Americans surveyed in the new NBC News/Wall Street Journal overwhelmingly support drones as a weapon.

Tribesmen stand on the rubble of a building destroyed by a U.S. drone air strike, that targeted suspected al Qaeda militants in Azan of the southeastern Yemeni province of Shabwa in this file photo taken on Feb. 3, 2013.

The survey found that 66 percent of respondents favored the use of unmanned aircraft, or drones, to kill suspected members of Al Qaeda and other terrorists. Sixteen percent opposed the drone strikes, while 15 percent said they did not know enough to voice an opinion. The poll result was in line with other survey data on drone use. A NBC News/Wall Street Journal survey in February found a nearly identical level of support for drone use against overseas terrorists.

The survey found that two thirds of respondents favor the use of unmanned aircraft, or drones, to kill suspected members of al Qaeda and other terrorists.

The poll result was in line with other survey data on drone use. A Gallup survey in March found almost the identical level of support as in the NBC/WSJ poll for drone use against overseas terrorists.

#### Zenko concludes neg – no kickout

**Zenko and Welch 2012** [Micah and Emma, Douglas Dillon Fellow; Research associate with the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, MAY 29, 2012 “Where the Drones Are,” ForeignPolicy.com, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/29/where\_the\_drones\_are?page=full]

The countries that are willing to host U.S. drone operations have shifted as their political sensitivities have evolved. While the United States lost access to both Iraq and Pakistan in 2011, other host nations are more tolerant, albeit more evasive. For instance, a remote CIA airstrip in the Persian Gulf was reportedly completed in September, although the country remains publicly unidentified.

Given the politically sensitive nature of stationing U.S. government personnel or private contractors to support drone operations in another country's sovereign territory, it is impossible to identify and verify the complete architecture of air bases from which U.S. strike and spy drones fly. Many journalists and researchers have previously written about American drone bases, from which this piece benefitted tremendously. The 12 bases that appear below, scattered across three continents, are but a representative sample of drone bases around the world compiled through publicly available information. There are assuredly others, perhaps at Masirah Island Air Base in Oman or Socotra Island Air Field off the coast of Yemen. We welcome updates and corrections.

EUROPE

Location: Incirlik, Turkey

Coordinates: 37, 35.26

Last November, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced that four U.S. Predator drones would be deployed to Incirlik, a massive air base primarily used by U.S. and Turkish forces that serves as a staging point for regional air operations. (In general, four aircraft are required to provide around-the-clock surveillance over a particular area of interest -- one airborne while the others take off, land, refuel, or undergo maintenance.) The four Predators are launched and recovered by 15 U.S. airmen from 414th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, while the Nevada-based contractor Battlespace Flight Services flies the drones. Real-time intelligence from the Predators is transmitted via satellite link to the combined intelligence fusion cell in Ankara. The cell, opened in November 2007 to process surveillance imagery from U.S. manned and unmanned systems flying over Iraq, is staffed by Turkish and U.S. military personnel working side by side to provide targeting information on suspected members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, for strikes by Turkish F-16s in Turkey or Northern Iraq. According to reports, on Dec. 28, a Predator provided video imagery of a caravan of suspected PKK militants near the Turkish border. After Turkish officers directed the drone to fly elsewhere, Turkish aircraft attacked the caravan with four sorties, reportedly killing 34 civilians.

SOUTHWEST ASIA

Location: Jalalabad Airfield, Afghanistan

Coordinates: 34.40, 70.50

Both the U.S. Air Force and the CIA use Jalalabad Airfield as a launching pad for their fleets of Predator and Reaper drones. In August 2009, the New York Times reported, "Officials said the CIA now conducted most of its Predator missile and bomb strikes on targets in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region from the Jalalabad base, with drones landing or taking off almost hourly." In late 2011, when the Pakistani government kicked the remaining U.S. drones and their support personnel out of Shamsi air base, they were reportedly relocated to Jalalabad.

Location: Khost Airfield, Afghanistan

Coordinates: 33.33, 69.95

Located adjacent to the western border of Pakistan, Khost -- also known as Forward Operating Base Chapman -- is under the operational command of the CIA. Khost houses CIA officers, operatives, and analysts who collect, assess, and interpret intelligence information as well as select suspected militants as targets. Because of its location in one of the most violent regions of Afghanistan, Khost also serves as a recruitment center for informants. It is perhaps best known as the site of a suicide bombing that claimed the lives of seven Americans on Dec. 30, 2009 -- the deadliest day for the CIA since the 1983 bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. After the attack, the CIA retaliated swiftly with 11 attacks that killed nearly 100 suspected militants, marking one of the most intense periods of the drone program thus far.

Location: Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan

Coordinates: 31.50, 65.85

Kandahar Airfield is one of the largest bases in Afghanistan. Run by the U.S. military, it serves as a major base for both surveillance and strike drone operations in Afghanistan, as well as intermittently into Pakistan to pursue suspected militants. The U.S. Air Force also shares some of the surveillance footage with Islamabad. It is also home to the RQ-170 Sentinel -- nicknamed the "Beast of Kandahar" -- an advanced surveillance drone that reportedly was used to monitor the Abbottabad compound where al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was ultimately killed.

Location: Shindand Airfield, Afghanistan

Coordinates: 33.39, 62.26

On Nov. 29, 2011, a CIA-controlled RQ-170 Sentinel drone flying out of the Shindad base crashed 140 miles inside Iran. (The United States began flying drones over Iran from Iraq as early as April 2004.) Although Iranian officials claimed to have downed the drone through electronic warfare, U.S. officials countered that the drone had suffered from a technical malfunction. Before the incident, the Sentinel had reportedly flown undetected over Iran for three years, making hundreds of sorties over dozens of suspected nuclear weapons sites up to 600 miles into the country. U.S. officials claim that Sentinel surveillance flights over Iran have continued despite the well-publicized crash.

Location: Al-Udeid Air Base, Qatar

Coordinates: 25.12, 51.32

Al-Udeid features the longest and most advanced runways in the Middle East, serves as a major transshipment site for American troops and resources headed to Afghanistan, and also hosts the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC), which relocated from Saudi Arabia in 2003. The airbase serves as a drone operations command and control center throughout the Middle East, including Iraq and Afghanistan, for the U.S. Air Force, which through CAOC manages day-to-day joint air operations. Lawyers are stationed at Al-Udeid 24 hours a day to approve drone strikes carried about by the U.S. military.

Location: Zamboanga, Philippines

Coordinates: 6.92, 122.06

The Philippine government reportedly allows the United States to fly unmanned surveillance drones to monitor militants from the al Qaeda-linked group Abu Sayyaf on the island Mindanao. The most active site is in Zamboanga, one of the locations where the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines is based. U.S. drones are said to have provided the location of prominent Abu Sayyaf militants that were subsequently killed in an air strike carried out by the Philippines Air Force in February 2012.

Location: Al-Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates

Coordinates: 24.25, 54.55

In January 2002, the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) was deployed to Al-Dharfa to support operations in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism. At the time, there were only 300 American servicemembers on the base. According to a diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, by September 2007 there were 1,300 Air Force personnel at Al-Dhafra. The 380th AEW also brought manned U-2 spy planes and the unmanned RQ-4 Global Hawk to the base. In 2005, an anonymous Air Force official stated, "There is a major Global Hawk operating base being built in the UAE." According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, in June 2010 there were four Global Hawks at Al-Dhafra; by June 2011, there were six (five Air Force and one Navy). More recently, the United States has begun deploying F-22s, its advanced stealth fighter. According to Matthew Aid's book Intel Wars, Global Hawks operating out of Al-Dhafra "fly daily [signals intelligence] and imagery collection missions along Iran's borders with Iraq and Afghanistan and along Iran's Persian Gulf coastline."

Location: Al-Anad Air Base, Yemen

Coordinates: 13.18, 44.76

In the heart of the Lahij province in southern Yemen, the U.S. military works directly with Yemeni forces to monitor, target, and kill suspected militants affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the local franchise of the global jihadist group. The close cooperation between the United States and Yemen was brought to light in a confidential cable published by WikiLeaks, which quoted then President Ali Abdullah Saleh, "We'll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours." U.S. drones often provide surveillance information to Yemeni forces to carry out assaults, as well as to launch airstrikes. According to the Long War Journal, the United States has conducted 21 airstrikes in the first five months of 2012, more than double the number in all of 2011.

AFRICA

Location: Arba Minch, Ethiopia

Coordinates: 6.04, 37.59

In January 2007, the U.S. Air Force carried out at least two attacks with AC-130 gunships against suspected Islamic militants in Somalia from a base in Ethiopia. After reports emerged with details of the attacks, the Ethiopian government expelled the U.S. military from that base. In October 2011, after four years of negotiations, the U.S. military was permitted to reestablish a presence in Ethiopia, with Reaper drones being flown out of the Arba Minch airfield for surveillance missions over Somalia.

Location: Camp Lemonier, Djibouti

Coordinates: 11.54, 43.15

Six days after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush signed a Memorandum of Notification that authorized the CIA to kill a "high-value target list" of 24 al-Qaeda leaders. Included on this list was Abu Ali al-Harithi, mastermind of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. On Nov. 3, 2002, a Predator drone killed Harithi and six others in Yemen, marking the first targeted killing outside of a battlefield. The drone reportedly originated and was controlled from Camp Lemonier. The CIA has also flown drones launched from Djibouti over Somalia, targeting militants affiliated with al Qaeda. Camp Lemonier has been the home of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa since 2003, and reportedly houses 3,500 U.S. personnel from various military and civilian agencies.

Location: Mahe, Seychelles

Coordinates: -4.6700823, 55.5146885

In 2011, the U.S. military reopened a base on the island nation of Seychelles -- an archipelago roughly twice the size of Washington, D.C. -- for a small fleet of armed MQ-9 Reaper drones. Although the Seychelles had previously served as a base for surveillance drones to track pirates in the Indian Ocean, classified U.S. government cables released by WikiLeaks revealed that drones have also carried out strike missions against al Qaeda affiliates in Somalia. According to another cable, Seychelles President James Michel requested -- twice -- that the inaugural launch of U.S. drones be documented with a photo-op or celebration. U.S. drone operations from the Seychelles have continued, as demonstrated by a MQ-9 Reaper crashing into the Indian Ocean after skidding off the runway in December 2011.

### Africa Specific

#### Specifically – won’t get kicked out of Africa

**Bennett, 2013** [Dashiell Bennett, reporter for the Atlantic Wire, Jan 28, 2013 “U.S. Drone Base Would Make Africa the New Home of the War on Terror,” The Atlantic Wire, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2013/01/us-drone-base-africa-command/61497/]

The New York Times reports today that the Pentagon is planning to install drone base in Niger, a move that almost certainly guarantees a long-term U.S. presence in North Africa. The official purpose of the base would be as a launching pad for unarmed surveillance flights to support French forces in Mali. However, it doesn't take much imagination to find other uses for such an outpost or the planes that are based there.

The United States currently has only has one permanent installation in Africa, another drone base in Djiboti. That outpost grows larger every year and is the main staging point for most of the armed drone attacks on Yemen. While that base allows Americans to easily reach Somalia, Sudan, and most of the Arabian peninsula, and their European bases allow them to reach the Sahara, having a permanent base in the heart of the region would allow them to make more flights, more often, and respond immediately to threats and developing situations. The Times's Eric Schmitt reports that officials "have not ruled out conducting missile strikes at some point" based out of the new base.

It would also send a clear signal that the U.S. now considers North Africa to be a theater in the never-ending, non-declared war on terror (with lowercase letters). Now that Afghanistan and Iraq are officially "over," the focus appears to be moving West, to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, to the ethnic and religious violence in Nigeria, to the scattered militias in Libya, and toward terrorist attackers like those who hit the Algeria gas facility this month. This just continues the pattern of the Sahara region drawing more and more of America's military resources and attention. And history shows that once the Pentagon establishes a presence in an foreign country, it becomes almost impossible to get them to leave.

It also proves that drones will continue to be the preferred first line of defense overseas. The Times also reports that Americans have already signed a "status of forces" agreement with Niger, the likely location of the new base. There are still several steps of approval to go through, but the wheels are in motion, and it won't be long before the drones will be in the sky.

### Link Turn

#### The plan kills drones -

#### A) Intel

Rasdan and Murphy 11 (Afsheen and Richard, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law + AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, "ARTICLE: MEASURE TWICE, SHOOT ONCE: HIGHER CARE FOR CIA-TARGETED KILLING," lexis)

Determining an appropriate scope of review still leaves open who should conduct that review of CIA drone strikes. The Israelis rely on a mix of executive and judicial actors. In the United States, federal judges have great independence because of lifetime tenure and protections of their salaries. They are obvious candidates. But using federal courts to review CIA targeted killing raises a host of problems. Few judges are military and intelligence experts, and the transparency of civilian courts goes against the secrecy necessary for some military and intelligence operations. As a compromise, one might try a national security court to keep intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. n179 But, putting aside academic debates, Congress does not seem interested in a new court. Another problem with regular courts is the "standing" requirement of a plaintiff who is ready and able to bring suit. The targets of attacks, even if they survive, are unlikely to travel from Afghanistan or Pakistan to file suit, and it is not clear who else could be a proper plaintiff. n180

#### B) Operational flexibility

Murphy and Rasdan 9 (Richard and Afsheen, AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University + Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, "DUE PROCESS AND TARGETED KILLING OF TERRORISTS," 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 405, lexis)

Yet - in favor of executive autonomy - we live in an imperfect world where judicial obstacles to killing could hinder national security. It would be silly, for instance, to require the military to use the full procedures of the law enforcement model to decide what to bomb in the midst of a war. Likewise, given the conflict with al Qaeda, it may be silly to judicialize the process for killing its committed members. Moreover, not only does judicialization threaten national security, it might not deliver countervailing benefits because courts lack the competence to improve military and national security decisions. n192¶ n192. Cf. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 583 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("With respect to certain decisions relating to national security and foreign affairs, the courts simply lack the relevant information and expertise to second-guess determinations made by the President.").

#### Probs a 2nc card – if not I’ll tag on the fly

Johnson 13 (Jeh, Former Pentagon General Counsel, "Jeh Johnson Speech on “A ‘Drone Court’: Some Pros and Cons”," http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/jeh-johnson-speech-on-a-drone-court-some-pros-and-cons/)

Judges are accustomed to making legal determinations based on a defined, settled set of facts – a picture that has already been painted; not a moving target, which is what we are literally talking about here. These are not one-time-only judgments and we want military and national security officials to continually assess and reassess these two questions up until the last minute before an operation. If these types of continual reassessments must be submitted to a member of the Article III branch of government for evaluation, I believe we compromise our government’s ability to conduct these operations effectively. The costs will outweigh the benefits. In that event, I believe we will also discourage the type of continual reevaluation I’m referring to.

#### D) Allied Cooperation

Rona 13 (Gabor, international legal director at Human Rights First, "The pro-rule of law argument against a 'drone court'," http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/285041-the-pro-rule-of-law-argument-against-a-drone-court)

Outside an active armed conflict, the legal standards are different: a suspect can be targeted for death only if he poses an “imminent threat” to human life that cannot be thwarted by non-lethal means. Here a “drone court” would be especially useless. We wouldn’t want the military to have to jump through judicial hoops to thwart a truly imminent attack. If the threat is imminent, there is, by definition, no time to seek judicial review, and if there is time, the threat is, by definition, not imminent.¶ ¶ But a “drone court” would be worse than ineffective: it would harm national security. Throughout the “war on terror,” policies that offend international law, including the broad scope of the government's claimed authority to kill, have inhibited allies from sharing essential intelligence with the United States and damaged the country’s reputation as a beacon on human rights. A secret court would only reinforce the perception that the United States concocts its own secret rules while insisting that other countries follow the international public ones.

#### The link turns outweigh the advantage

Bork and Rivkin 5 (Robert H., Senior Fellow – Hudson Institute, Former Solicitor General – United States, and Judge – U.S. Court of Appeals, and David B. Jr., Washington Lawyer and Former Member – United States Justice Department, “A War the Courts Shouldn't Manage”, Washington Post, 1-21, Lexis)

As speculation mounts about President Bush's nominees to the federal judiciary, and particularly to the Supreme Court, one factor that should be of paramount importance is too often overlooked. Curbing or reversing the Supreme Court's usurpation of so many domestic issues is crucial. But perhaps even more important is avoiding judicial micromanagement of America's war against radical Islamic terrorists. Already there are disturbing signs of judicial overreaching that is constitutionally illegitimate and, in practical terms, potentially debilitating. The vast majority of war opponents and attorneys for captured terrorists are pressing for a full-fledged criminal law model never before applied to enemy combatants. Realizing that Congress and the president will not adopt their position, these litigants are resorting to the federal courts. Real abuses that inevitably occur in war, as well as in peacetime prisons, are being punished by our military, but that does not assuage critics who have an agenda other than justice. They allege that the abuses stem from the administration's legal analysis and that the analysis is contrary to the Constitution and to international norms. That is wrong on both counts. A pair of confusing Supreme Court decisions handed down June 28 plowed the ground for astounding lower-court activism. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, involving a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of a U.S. citizen held by the military as an enemy combatant fighting in Afghanistan, was a qualified victory for the government. The court approved the use of military tribunals but held that Yaser Esam Hamdi must have an opportunity to contest his status as an enemy combatant. It left unclear how that opportunity could be exercised, and it is difficult to see how it could be without calling witnesses from the combat zone, a procedure that would divert American soldiers from waging war. Rasul v. Bush, on the other hand, was a disaster for the war effort. Aliens held at Guantanamo Bay, not a part of the United States or within the jurisdiction of any federal court, were held to have a right to a habeas petition. The result would seem to be that captured alien combatants held by the U.S. military anywhere in the world can henceforth litigate their status in federal courts. Some lower federal courts have not resisted the temptation to insert themselves further into the conduct of the war. In doing so, they have interfered with the war effort while fostering the false impression that the executive branch is trampling on constitutional liberties. The district court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2004) is a prime example. The judge applied the Geneva Conventions in contradiction of the legal framework laid down in Hamdi, misread the conventions and severely encroached upon the president's war powers. In Omar Abu Ali v. Ashcroft (2004), another district court outdid the Supreme Court by finding that it had, at least potentially, authority to determine the legality of a foreign government's detention of an accused dual-nationality terrorist because of an allegation that the United States had prompted the detention. Nearly 70 years ago, the court held in a famous decision (Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. v. United States) that the executive branch's extensive prerogatives in foreign affairs are grounded in its unique expertise, information and unitary nature. Courts have neither the constitutional authority nor the expertise and information to override the president's determinations on issues such as whether we are in armed conflict or what kind of anti-terrorist cooperation we should engage in with foreign governments. For obvious reasons, the executive cannot share all the relevant information with judges. Nor has the judiciary the necessary unitary nature, unless every case is decided by the Supreme Court. Thus, in addition to fighting legal battles in court, the administration would be well-advised to make a far stronger public case for its detention policies, which are designed not only to prevent enemy combatants from returning to fight against us but also to obtain intelligence that might save the lives of American soldiers and civilians as well as shorten the war. Although current detention and interrogation procedures can surely be improved, and additional safeguards against abuses should be adopted, these ought to be matters for the political branches. Freezing policies through constitutional rulings should be a last resort. The executive and Congress, as circumstances change and experience accumulates, can debate and resolve in a flexible manner the policy imperatives of individual liberty and America's reputation overseas, on one hand, vs. the demands of collective safety. But in doing so they must avoid trampling on the president's constitutional prerogatives. Congress should not lay down detailed prescriptions on what interrogation techniques are appropriate. And it should resist the temptation to grandstand; passing exhortations against torture is not the way to proceed. Sensitivity to these matters and the crucial but limited role of the judiciary should be taken into account in the choice of nominees to the courts and in the confirmation process. Too much is riding on the outcome of this war -- ultimately, perhaps, the survival of Western societies -- to choose judges who are unaware of the complexities of what is at stake.

### Shocks Don’t Kill Econ – 1NC

#### Oil shocks don’t kill the economy

Rasmussen and Roitman 12

[Tobias Rasmussen, Senior Economist, Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF, and Agustin Roitman, Economist, IMF, Oil shocks around the world: Are they really that bad?, 2/20/12, http://www.resilience.org/stories/2012-02-20/oil-shocks-around-world-are-they-really-bad]

Given that periods of high oil prices have generally coincided with good times for the world economy, especially in recent years, it is important to disentangle the impact of oil price increases on economic activity during episodes of markedly high oil prices. Following Hamilton (2003), we identify 12 episodes since 1970 in which oil prices have reached three-year highs. The median increase in oil prices in these years was 27%. We study the behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates during these episodes by comparing the median annual change in a particular variable during oil shock years to the median annual change over the entire sample period. This tells us of any unusual observed changes (Figure 2). We find no evidence of a widespread contemporaneous negative effect on economic output across oil-importing countries, but rather value and volume increases in both imports and exports. It is only in **the year after the shock** that we find a negative impact on output for a small majority of countries.To analyse multiple countries and control for global conditions, we adapt the basic autoregressive model of Hamilton (2003, 2005). Our main interest is in the effect of an oil price shock on the economy of a typical oil-importing country. Taking into account the fact that higher oil prices are generally positively associated with good global conditions, we find that the effect becomes larger and more significant as the ratio of oil imports to GDP increases (Figure 3). To trace out the full impact of an oil shock, we calculate impulse responses for a 25% increase in oil prices (Figure 4). The results indicate that the typical oil importer can expect a cumulative GDP loss of about 0.3% over the first two years, with little subsequent impact. For countries with oil imports of more than 4% of GDP (ie at or above the average for middle- and low-income oil importers), however, the loss increases to about 0.8% – and this loss increases further for those with oil imports above 5% of GDP. In contrast to the oil importers, oil exporters show little impact on GDP in the first two years but then a substantial increase consistent with the positive income effect, with real GDP 0.6% higher three years after the initial shock. To put these numbers in perspective, it is useful to think of an economy where oil accounts for 4% of total expenditure and where aggregate spending is determined entirely by demand. If the quantity of oil consumption remains unchanged, then a 25% increase in the price of oil will cause spending on other items to decrease and, hence, real GDP to contract by 1% of the total. From this reference point, one would expect the possibility of substituting away from oil to reduce the overall impact on GDP. At the same time, there could also be factors working in the opposite direction, via, for example, confidence effects, market frictions, or changes in monetary policy. With our estimates of the GDP loss at only about half the level implied by the direct price effect on the import bill, the results presented here suggest the size of any such magnifying effects, if present, is not substantial across countries. Are oil price increases really that bad? Conventional wisdom has it that oil shocks are bad for oil-importing countries. This is grounded in the experience of slumps in many advanced economies during the 1970s. It is also consistent with the large body of research on the impact of higher oil prices on the US economy, although the magnitude and channels of the effect are still being debated. Our recent research indicates that oil prices tend to be surprisingly closely associated with good times for the global economy. Indeed, we find that the US has been somewhat of an outlier in the way that it has been negatively affected by oil price increases. Across the world, **oil** **price shock episodes have generally not been associated with a contemporaneous decline in output** but, rather, with increases in both imports and exports. There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output, particularly for OECD economies, but the magnitude has typically been small. Controlling for global economic conditions, and thus abstracting from our finding that oil price increases generally appear to be demand-driven, makes the impact of higher oil prices stand out more clearly. For a given level of world GDP, we do find that oil prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports. The effect is still not particularly large, however, with our estimates suggesting that a 25% increase in oil prices will typically cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of less than half of 1%, spread over 2 to 3 years. These findings suggest that the higher import demand in oil-exporting countries resulting from oil price increases has an important contemporaneous offsetting effect on economic activity in the rest of the world, and that the adverse consequences are mostly relatively mild and occur with a lag.

### No Oil Shocks – 1NC

#### Oil prices will stabilize– no shocks

Lazzaro 12

[Joseph, U.S. Editor, served as Managing Editor of New York-based financial news web sites WallStreetEurope.com/WallStreetItalia.com, 1999-2004, and as Economics/Markets Editor for AOL’s DailyFinance.com, 2008-2011., Oil Prices: Will Crude Fall Substantially In 2013?, 10/20/12, <http://www.ibtimes.com/oil-prices-will-crude-fall-substantially-2013-850159>]

So now you know two major reasons (geopolitical risk, oil as alternative investment) why oil prices are so high today. Given the above, is there any good news on the horizon for businesses and consumers who use oil? Indeed there is. Natural gas, and in particular unconventional natural gas stemming from new hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” technology, has become a comparatively cheap, abundant source of energy in the United States, and major, new supply additions are also possible in Europe, Russia, and the Middle East. In North America, natural gas closed Friday at $3.58 per million Btus (MMBtu) – which means it sold for the oil equivalent of $20.74 per barrel. In other words, natural gas costs about one-fourth of oil, for the same amount of energy delivered. To be sure, those huge increases in natural gas’s supply are contingent on fracking technology deployed safely. In some areas, fracking has led to environmental damage and it is not appropriate for all, potential drilling areas, but if those approved fracking sites continue to produce at current rates in the United States, natural gas will continue to displace oil in factories, home heating, and displace coal (and other fuels) in electric power generation. Natural gas is also making in-roads in transportation, in the fleet vehicle market (buses, garbage trucks, short-haul delivery trucks), or where vehicles return to the same site to re-fuel. (The long-haul, 18-wheeler truck and civilian car/SUV markets will have to await the build-out of the U.S. natural gas filling station network.) In other words, natural gas will decrease U.S. oil consumption, and in the process take some pressure off global oil demand. Second, as the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicated in its latest global oil outlook, just as it has with natural gas, fracking and other, new drilling technologies applied to shale and tight formations in North America is increasing oil production. The IEA confirms what President Barack Obama has stated on the campaign trail: oil production in the U.S. has increased 13.1 percent since 2008 to 5.658 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2011, according to the U.S. Energy Information Agency, with the IEA calling the new oil drilling techniques, “a game-changer in the making.” In other words, new drilling techniques will continue to increase U.S. oil production, and will play a role in increasing international oil production, boosting global oil production by 9.3 million bpd to 102 million bpd by 2017, the IEA said. Meanwhile, global oil demand is expected to rise to 95.7 million bpd by 2017. The net result? The world’s spare capacity or “safety cushion” for oil is expected to roughly double - to 5-7 million bpd in 2017 - a safety cushion size the world has not seen since before 2003. On Supply, Demand, And Spare Capacity Hence, there’s good news on the horizon for businesses and consumers who use oil. Comparatively cheap, abundant natural gas is displacing oil in the United States for several energy uses, decreasing oil demand, and new drilling technology is increasing oil’s supply from areas previously thought to be unfeasible for oil production. Each trend is likely to continue as the decade progresses. If each trend does continue, the result will be a slow, gradual lowering of oil prices over the next five years, the IEA said.

### A2: Groupthink

#### Informal checks are sufficient to address groupthink

Kennedy 12 [ Copyright (c) 2012 Gould School of Law Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal Spring, 2012 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 21 S. Cal. Interdis. L.J. 633 LENGTH: 23138 words NOTE: THE HIJACKING OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: GROUPTHINK AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD NAME: Brandon Kennedy\* BIO: \* Class of 2012, University of Southern California Gould School of Law; M.A. Regional Studies: Middle East 2009, Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences; B.A. Government 2009, Harvard University.]

Neither the president nor the decision-making group members implement "hybrid" checks; the checks do, however, originate in the executive branch and directly affect the president and the group members. Hybrid checks relate to the bureaucratic machine and typically address the structural faults within the executive branch that can affect the core decision-making group. Although the president and his or her advisers constitute the insiders of the decision-making group, they ultimately belong [\*676] to a larger organization - the executive branch - and thereby become part of the bureaucratic machine. 1. Inter-Agency Process The "inter-agency process" check involves getting approval for, or opinions about, a proposed decision from **other agencies**. n252 The inter-agency process is particularly common for national security and foreign policy decisions. n253 "Occasionally, it will operate at a higher level in principals' committees involving Cabinet-level or sub-Cabinet people and their deputies," thus directly checking the decision-making group members. n254 2. Intra-Agency Process Another similar check is the "intra-agency process," in which the circulation of proposed decisions **within the agency** empowers dissidents and harnesses a diversity of thinking. n255 If nothing else, the process catches errors, or at least increases the odds of avoiding them, given the number of people who must review or approve a document or decision within the agency. n256 3. Agency or Lawyer Culture The culture of a particular agency - the institutional self-awareness of its professionalism - provides another check. n257 "Lawyer culture" - which places high **value on competency** and adherence to rules and laws - resides at the core of agency culture; n258 its "nay-saying" objectivity "is especially important in the small inner circle of presidential decision making to counter the tendency towards groupthink and a vulnerability to sycophancy." n259 [\*677] 4. Public Humiliation A final check in this category is the "public humiliation" check. n260 This check only comes into play when the previous three have failed, and involves the threat to ""go public' by leaking embarrassing information or publicly resigning."

### A2: Flex

#### Plan constrains the president – causes nuclear war and turns the case

**Yoo 12**

[John, Law Professor at University of California, Berkeley and Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (OLC), during the George W. Bush administration, Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (OLC), during the George W. Bush administration, War Powers Belong to the President, 2/1/12, <http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war_powers_belong_to_the_president>]

Congress’ track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’ isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security may come from inaction and isolationism. Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president, Republican or Democrat, George W. Bush or Obama, has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it. Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue for a radical remaking of the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain—where the framers got the idea of the declare-war power—fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand. Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive. Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay or modify war plans. Before 1945, for example, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, it has been Congress that has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offensive-minded military. Congress’ check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation. The framers expected Congress’ power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war. Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’ funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But **it could** also **seriously threaten American national security.** In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional **consent cannot be obtained in time to act**. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy. The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, **now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.**

# 2NC

## Accountability

### Drone Prolif Inevitable

#### New technology makes drone proliferation by state and non-state actors inevitable

Wood 12 (David, American Drones Ignite New Arms Race From Gaza To Iran To China, Huffington Post, 27 November 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/27/american-drones\_n\_2199193.html)

Obama administration officials have said they are weighing various options to codify the use of armed U.S. drones, because the increased use of drones has been driven more by perceived necessity than by deliberative policy. But that effort is complicated by the wildfire spread of drone technology: how could the U.S. restrict its use of armed drones if others do not?¶ Already, the Pentagon is worried that China not only is engaged in an "alarming" effort to develop and field high-tech drones, but it intends to sell drone technology abroad, according to the Pentagon report.¶ Indeed, the momentum of the drone wars seems irresistible. "The increasing worldwide focus on unmanned systems highlights how U.S. military success has changed global strategic thinking and spurred a race for unmanned aircraft," the Pentagon study reported.¶ Modern drones were first perfected by Israel, but the U.S. Air Force took the first steps in 2001 to mount sophisticated drones with precision weapons. Today the U.S. fields some 8,000 drones and plans to invest $36.9 billion to boost its fleet by 35 percent over the next eight years.¶ Current research on next-generation drones seems certain to exacerbate the drone arms race. The U.S. and other countries are developing "nano" drones, tiny weapons designed to attack in swarms. Both the U.S. and China are working to incorporate "stealth" technology into micro drones. The Pentagon is fielding a new weapon called the Switchblade, a 5.5-pound precision-attack drone that can be carried and fired by one person -- a capability sure to be envied by terrorists.¶ "This is a robotics revolution, but it's not just an American revolution -- everyone's involved, from Hezbollah to paparazzi," Singer, the Brookings Institution expert, told The Huffington Post. "This is a revolution in which billions and trillions of dollars will be made. To stop it you'd have to first stop science, and then business, and then war."

#### Low cost makes drone prolif inevitable - US policy not key

Lewis 12 (Michael, Associate Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University, "SYMPOSIUM: THE 2009 AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS: Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield," Spring, 47 Tex. Int'l L.J. 293, lexis)

The driving force behind the western militaries' development of drone technology was to minimize the number of human lives placed at risk to collect intelligence and to deliver small amounts of ordnance with some degree of precision. However, it is the relatively low cost of drones compared to that of modern combat aircraft that will drive the proliferation of drones over the next decade. More basic drones cost less than 1/20th as much as the latest combat aircraft and even the more advanced drones that feature jet propulsion and employ some stealth technology are less than 1/10th the cost. n13 With defense budgets around the world under increasing pressure, drones will be seen as an attractive alternative to manned aircraft for certain types of missions.

### No Drone Wars

#### No large-scale drone war - susceptibility to air defenses ensures they'll be limited to only permissive environments

Lewis 12 (Michael, Associate Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University, "SYMPOSIUM: THE 2009 AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS: Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield," Spring, 47 Tex. Int'l L.J. 293, lexis)

Like any weapons system drones have significant limitations in what they can achieve. Drones are extremely vulnerable to any type of sophisticated air defense system. They are slow. Even the jet-powered Avenger recently purchased by the Air Force only has a top speed of around 460 miles per hour, n20 meaning that it cannot escape from any manned fighter aircraft, not even the outmoded 1970s-era fighters that are still used by a number of nations. n21 Not only are drones unable to escape manned fighter aircraft, they also cannot hope to successfully fight them. Their air-to-air weapons systems are not as sophisticated as those of manned fighter aircraft, n22 and in the dynamic environment of an air-to-air engagement, the drone operator could not hope to match the situational awareness n23 of the pilot of manned fighter aircraft. As a result, the outcome of any air-to-air engagement between drones and manned fighters is a foregone conclusion. Further, drones are not only vulnerable to manned fighter aircraft, they are also vulnerable to jamming. Remotely piloted aircraft are dependent upon a continuous signal from their operators to keep them flying, and this signal is vulnerable to disruption and jamming. n24 If drones were [\*299] perceived to be a serious threat to an advanced military, a serious investment in signal jamming or disruption technology could severely degrade drone operations if it did not defeat them entirely. n25

These twin vulnerabilities to manned aircraft and signal disruption could be mitigated with massive expenditures on drone development and signal delivery and encryption technology, n26 but these vulnerabilities could never be completely eliminated. Meanwhile, one of the principal advantages that drones provide - their low cost compared with manned aircraft n27 - would be swallowed up by any attempt to make these aircraft survivable against a sophisticated air defense system. As a result, drones will be limited, for the foreseeable future, n28 to use in "permissive" environments in which air defense systems are primitive n29 or non-existent. While it is possible to find (or create) such a permissive environment in an inter-state conflict, n30 permissive environments that will allow for drone use will most often be found in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations.

#### No global drone war - diplomatic and political costs are too high

Singh 12 (Joseph, researcher at the Center for a New American Security, "Betting Against a Drone Arms Race," nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/#ixzz2fBGQibv1)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones.¶ As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings.¶ Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use.¶ In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.”¶ Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey.¶ Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory.¶ States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement.

### US Not Key/No Modeling – 1nc

#### US drone policy doesn’t set a precedent – other countries don’t act based on our use

Boot 12 (Max, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies @ Council on Foreign Relations, "The Incoherence of a Drone-Strike Advocate," http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-incoherence-of-a-drone-strike-advocate/265256/)

Naureen Shah of Columbia Law School, a guest on the show, had raised the possibility that America is setting a dangerous precedent with drone strikes. If other people start doing what America does--fire drones into nations that house somebody they want dead--couldn't this come back to haunt us? And haunt the whole world? Shouldn't the U.S. be helping to establish a global norm against this sort of thing? Host Warren Olney asked Boot to respond.¶ Boot started out with this observation:¶ I think the precedent setting argument is overblown, because I don't think other countries act based necessarily on what we do and in fact we've seen lots of Americans be killed by acts of terrorism over the last several decades, none of them by drones but they've certainly been killed with car bombs and other means.¶ That's true--no deaths by terrorist drone strike so far. But I think a fairly undeniable premise of the question was that the arsenal of terrorists and other nations may change as time passes. So answering it by reference to their current arsenal isn't very illuminating. In 1945, if I had raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might one day have nuclear weapons, it wouldn't have made sense for you to dismiss that possibility by noting that none of the Soviet bombs dropped during World War II were nuclear, right?¶ As if he was reading my mind, Boot immediately went on to address the prospect of drone technology spreading. Here's what he said:¶ You know, drones are a pretty high tech instrument to employ and they're going to be outside the reach of most terrorist groups and even most countries. But whether we use them or not, the technology is propagating out there. We're seeing Hezbollah operate Iranian supplied drones over Israel, for example, and our giving up our use of drones is not going to prevent Iran or others from using drones on their own. So I wouldn't worry too much about the so called precedent it sets..."

#### Other countries won’t model US legal standards or oversight

Saunders 13 (Paul J., executive director of the Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest, 3/4, “We Won’t Always Drone Alone,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177?page=1>)

That said, the United States has well-established rules for the use of lethal force in war and in law enforcement operations. There are extensive rules governing surveillance, too. From this perspective, drones represent a new way of doing things that the executive branch has done for some time and do not pose a radical challenge to existing policies and procedures—except, perhaps, for strains imposed by the sheer number of strikes. Ultimately, however, America has had the drone debate before in various guises and will eventually find a way forward that satisfies legal and oversight concerns.¶ A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will use drones, whether armed or unarmed, and what lessons they will draw from Washington’s approach. Thus far, the principal lesson may well be that drones can be extremely effective in killing your opponents, wherever they are, without risking your own troops and without sending soldiers or law enforcement personnel across another country’s borders. It seems less likely that others will adopt U.S.-style legal standards and oversight procedures, or that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace.

#### No modeling – state interests trump

Metz 13 (Steven, defense analyst and the author of "Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy." His weekly WPR column, Strategic Horizons, appears every Wednesday 27 Feb 2013 World Politics Review “Strategic Horizons: The Strategy Behind U.S. Drone Strikes” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12747/strategic-horizons-the-strategy-behind-u-s-drone-strikes>)

Both of these arguments are shaky. There is little or no evidence that nations facing a serious enemy base their response on U.S. actions. States do what they feel they have to do. The implication that if the United States did not use drones against insurgents other nations would not simply defies common sense. On the second point, there is no doubt that drone strikes create anger. Unfortunately, this does tend to be directed at the United States rather than at the extremists who elected to use human shields in the first place. But again there is no evidence that a significant number of potential terrorists or terrorist supporters were motivated exclusively or primarily by American drone strikes.

### No China Drone Attacks

#### China won't use its drones offensively - international pressure checks and past experience proves

Erickson 13 (Andrew, Assoc Prof @ Naval War College + Research Assoc @ Harvard, "China has drones. Now how will it use them?," http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html)

Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, § Marked 19:29 § according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.¶ What about using drones outside of Chinese-claimed areas? That China did not, in fact, launch a drone strike on the Myanmar drug criminal underscores its caution. According to Liu Yuejin, the director of the anti-drug bureau in China's Ministry of Public Security, Beijing considered using a drone carrying a 20-kilogram TNT payload to bomb Kham's mountain redoubt in northeast Myanmar. Kham had already evaded capture three times, so a drone strike may have seemed to be the best option. The authorities apparently had at least two plans for capturing Kham. The method they ultimately chose was to send Chinese police forces to lead a transnational investigation that ended in April 2012 with Kham's capture near the Myanmar-Laos border. The ultimate decision to refrain from the strike may reflect both a fear of political reproach and a lack of confidence in untested drones, systems, and operators.¶ The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorisation is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorisation, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries' sovereignty - something Beijing regularly decries when others do it.

### A2 Russia/China Models

#### China and Russia will inevitably use, no global support for norm creation, and Israel means targeted killing will continue

Fisher 7 (Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711, lexis)

The above discussion is not meant to suggest that the worldwide spread and acceptance of a targeted killing norm is preordained, rather only that it seems likely, at present, that the norm will achieve greater prominence. That prognosis could change, however, if a powerful State or group of States or collection of committed non-State actors with State support, or some combination thereof, acting as a norm entrepreneur, actively works to thwart the development of a norm permitting targeted killing for counter-terrorism purposes. n179 Several Arab and Middle Eastern States, the European Union, Russia, and others have made statements criticizing targeted killing after high-profile targeted killings have been carried out. n180 Yet none of them, it seems, has yet attempted to assume the position of norm entrepreneur and to engage in a sustained effort to end use of the tactic. Moreover, there is evidence that Russia and China, perhaps revealing their true preferences, have themselves employed targeted killing - Russia in its ongoing conflict with Chechen rebels and China in its hostilities with members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement in Xinjiang province. n181 Currently, it does not appear that a norm entrepreneur with the status or relevance of the United States or Israel has emerged to challenge the targeted killing norm, something that would seem to be necessary if its present trajectory is to be altered.¶ A norm permitting the use of targeted killing for counter-terrorism purposes may be viewed as having already achieved a certain degree of prominence because of the status and visibility of the two States that are known to have adopted it: the United States and Israel. Furthermore, given the positioning of the United States and [\*742] Israel in the international system and the absence of a significant norm entrepreneur pushing in the opposite direction, it seems likely that, whether by emulation, restrained norm entrepreneurship, or both, a targeted killing norm will achieve even greater prominence.

### 2NC Asia War – Regional Coop

#### Multilateral structures check escalation

Desker 8 (Barry, Dean – S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, “Why War is Unlikely in Asia: Facing the Challenge from China”, 6-4, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/asias-strategic-challenges-in-search-of-a-common-agenda/conference-papers/fifth-session-conflict-in-asia/why-war-in-asia-remains-unlikely-barry-desker/)

War in Asia is thinkable but it is unlikely.  The Asia-Pacific region can, paradoxically, be regarded as a zone both of relative insecurity and of relative strategic stability.  On the one hand, the region contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of resulting in a major war.  The region is replete with border issues, the site of acts of terrorism (the Bali bombings, Manila superferry bombing, Kashmir, etc.), and it is an area of overlapping maritime claims (the Spratly Islands, Diaoyutai islands, etc).  Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance, sitting astride key sea lines of communication (SLOCS) and important chokepoints. Nevertheless, the Asia-Pacific region is more stable than one might believe.  Separatism remains a challenge but the break-up of states is unlikely.  Terrorism is a nuisance but its impact is contained.  The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearization of the peninsula.  Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict (especially after the KMT victories in Taiwan).  The region also possesses significant multilateral structures such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the nascent Six Party Talks forum and, in particular, ASEAN, and institutions such as the EAs, ASEAN + 3, ARF which ASEAN has conceived.

#### No East Asian war --- informal processes secure and maintain East Asian peace

Weissmann ‘9 --- senior fellow at the Swedish School of Advanced Asia Pacific Studies (Mikael Weissmann, “Understanding the East Asian Peace: Some Findings on the Role of Informal Processes,” Nordic Asia Research Community, November 2, 2009, http://barha.asiaportal.info/blogs/in-focus/2009/november/understanding-east-asian-peace-some-findings-role-informal-processes-mi)

The findings concerning China’s role in keeping peace in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and on the Korean Peninsula confirm the underlying hypothesis that various informal processes and related mechanisms can help explain the relative peace. Virtually all of the identified processes and related mechanisms have been informal rather than formal. It should be noted that it is not necessarily the same types of processes that have been of importance in each and every case. In different ways these informal processes have demonstrated that the relative lack of formalised security structures and/or mechanisms have not prevented the region from moving towards a stable peace. **Informal processes have been sufficient both to prevent tension and disputes from escalating into war and for moving East Asia towards a stable peace.**

### 2NC Asia War – Economics

#### Economics prevent competition

Eskildsen 9 (Robert, Assistant Professor of Japanese History – Smith College “Whither East Asia? Reflections on Japan’s Colonial Experience in Taiwan”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 3-22, http://japanfocus.org/-Robert-Eskildsen/2058)

The Meiji Restoration gave Japan the flexibility to pursue changes in the diplomatic status quo in East Asia, but the changes carried with them enormous risks. Domestically, Japan implemented radical institutional changes in order to conform more closely to Western norms, but doing so alienated important constituencies—farmers and samurai—and ultimately provoked armed rebellion. In foreign relations, Japan set out to learn the norms of Western diplomacy and use them to clarify a number of border relationships: with Russia in the north, Korea in the west, and China in the south—through a complex intermediate zone that included the Ryukyu archipelago and Taiwan. The process of redefining Japan’s borders in the west and south proved particularly troublesome and embroiled Japan in a sustained challenge to China’s diplomatic supremacy in East Asia that involved gunboat diplomacy, diplomatic coercion and armed conflict. Although it involved no clash with Chinese forces, the Taiwan Expedition was the earliest of these armed conflicts.Fast forward to the present, and we see that some of the issues that clouded the future of East Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century have contemporary analogues, although the geopolitical context has changed dramatically in the last 150 years. The biggest difference in the geopolitical context, of course, is that all the states in the region, with the possible exception of North Korea, are committed to operating within the international system and they have developed a measure of economic interdependence. These factors will mitigate the possibility of armed conflict in the future. On the other hand, nationalism, the legacies of Japanese imperialism, World War II and the Cold War, and China’s growing economic stature already exacerbate diplomatic conflicts, and they undoubtedly will continue to do so for many years to come. Against this geopolitical backdrop, three contemporary strategic conflicts stand out as particularly troublesome.

a longer-term peace. Understanding is also important to be able to overcome the range of historical issues.

## Terrorism

### AT Diversionary Theory

#### No empirical support for diversionary theory

Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2, April 2010, Pp. 413–425, Chetan]

According to the diversionary theory of war, the cause of some militarized conflicts is not a clash of salient interests between countries, but rather problematic domestic circumstances. Under conditions such as economic adversity or political unrest, the country’s leader may attempt to generate a foreign policy crisis in order both to divert domestic discontent and bolster their political fortunes through a rally around the flag effect (Russett 1990). Yet, despite the wide-ranging popularity of this idea and some evidence of U.S. diversionary behavior (e.g., DeRouen 1995, 2000; Fordham 1998a, 1998b; Hess and Orphanides 1995; James and Hristolouas 1994; James and Oneal 1991; Ostrom and Job 1986), after **five decades** of research broader empirical support for the theory remains elusive (e.g., Gelpi 1997; Gowa; 1998; Leeds and Davis 1997; Levy 1998; Lian and Oneal 1993; Meernik and Waterman 1996). This has prompted one scholar to conclude that ‘‘seldom has so much common sense in theory found so little support in practice’’ (James 1987, 22), a view reflected in the more recent research (e.g., Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004; Meernick 2004; Moore and Lanoue 2003; Oneal and Tir 2006). I argue that this puzzling lack of support could be addressed by considering the possibility that the embattled leader may anticipate achieving their diversionary aims specifically through the initiation of territorial conflict2—a phenomenon I call territorial diversion.

#### Diversionary thesis false—its too difficult to distract the public from the economy—empirically forces leaders to decrease militarized disputes.

William D. Baker, May 2004. Professor of American Studies, American Government, Comparative Politics at the Arkansas School for Mathematics, Sciences, and the Arts. “The Dog That Won't Wag: Presidential Uses of Force and the Diversionary Theory of War,” Strategic Insights, 3.5, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/may/bakerMay04.asp>.

The diversionary theory of war, the widely held belief that presidents will be predisposed toward uses of force in militarized interstate disputes as a means of boosting their own public approval ratings, diverting public attention from domestic political or economic troubles, or to influence impending elections, assumes, of course, that the rally effect is in fact real, or at least that presidents believe that it is. However, key elements of the diversionary theory of war have been brought into question as a result of this research. Despite popular presumptions to the contrary, presidents are in fact not more likely to become involved in crises when their popularity is low, and actually are **more likely to enjoy higher** than average public **approval levels prior to becoming involved in militarized disputes**. The economic data presented also suggest that presidents are not more inclined to seek out foreign military diversions when the consumer confidence in the health of the economy is low, but that in fact consumer confidence and expectations tend to be higher than average prior to a dispute. Similarly, the proximity of elections does not appear to be a factor in the onset of militarized interstate disputes either.

### 2NC No Econ War

#### No more wars from economic collapse – we’re in a state of turboparalysis

Lind 12 -- co-founder of the New America Foundation, policy director of the Economic Growth Program, graduate of the University of Texas and Yale, taught at Harvard and Johns Hopkins, been an editor or staff writer for The New Yorker, Harper’s, The New Republic and The National Interest (Michael, 12/15, "The age of turboparalysis," <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8789631/the-age-of-turboparalysis/>)

More than half a decade has passed since the recession that triggered the financial panic and the Great Recession, but the condition of the world continues to be summed up by what I’ve called ‘turboparalysis’ — a prolonged condition of furious motion without movement in any particular direction, a situation in which the engine roars and the wheels spin but the vehicle refuses to move.¶ The greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression might have been expected to produce revolutions in politics and the world of ideas alike. Outside of the Arab world, however, revolutions are hard to find. Mass unemployment and austerity policies have caused riots in Greece and Spain, but most developed nations are remarkably sedate. Scandal and sputtering economic growth appear unlikely to prevent another peaceful transition of power within the Communist party of China. And in the US, the re-election of President Obama and the strengthening of his Democratic party in the US Senate reflect long-term demographic changes in an increasingly non-white and secular American electorate, not the endorsement of a bold agenda for the future by the Democrats. They don’t have one.¶ In the realm of ideas, turboparalysis is even more striking. On both sides of the Atlantic, political and economic debate proceed as though the bursting of the global bubble economy did not discredit any school of thought. Right, left and centre, the players are the same and so are their familiar moves. Public debate is dominated by the same three groups — market fundamentalists, centrist neoliberals, and mildly reformist social democrats — who have been debating one another since the 1980s. Someone who went to sleep like Rip Van Winkle in the 1980s when Reagan and Thatcher were in power and awoke today would find nothing new in the way of economic theories or political doctrines.¶ By now one might have expected the emergence of innovative and taboo-breaking schools of thought seeking to account for and respond to the global crisis. But to date there is no insurgent political and intellectual left, nor a new right, for that matter. In the US, the militant Tea Party right, many of whose candidates went down to defeat in this year’s elections, represents the last gasp of the Goldwater-Reagan coalition, not something fresh. The American centre-left under Obama is intellectually exhausted and politically feeble, reduced to rebranding as ‘progressive’ policies like the individual mandate system (‘Obamacare’) and tax cuts for the middle class which originated on the moderate right a generation ago. In Britain, the manifestos of various ‘colour revolutions’ — Blue Labour, Red Tory and so on — have the feel of PR brochures promoting rival cliques of ambitious apparatchiks rather than the epochal thinking the times require.¶ Why has a global calamity produced so little political change and, at the same time, so little rethinking? Part of the answer, I think, has to do with the collapse of the two-way transmission belt that linked the public to the political elite. Institutions such as mass political parties, trade unions, and local civic associations, which once connected elected leaders to constituents, have withered away in more individualistic and anonymous societies. One result is a perpetual crisis of legitimacy on the part of political elites, who owe their electoral successes increasingly to rich donors and skilful advertising consultants. New political movements are hard to found. At the same time, anachronistic movements can continue to raise funds or entertain audiences, even if, like America’s conservative movement, they lose election after election.¶ But there is a deeper, structural reason for the persistence of turboparalysis. And that has to do with the power and wealth that incumbent elites accumulated during the decades of the global bubble economy.¶ In essence, the bubble economy was a dysfunctional marriage of export-driven economies like China, Japan and Germany and debt-addicted nations like the US and many of Germany’s European neighbours. As international trade imbalances built up, from the 1980s to the 2000s, so did the wealth and power of elites who profited from the system, from Chinese Communist princelings with a stake in overbuilt export industries to the financiers of Wall Street and the City of London.¶ A global economic system that relied on excessive borrowing by consumers, particularly in the US, was bound to grind to a halt when fearful consumers switched from borrowing to saving. But the crash was only the first stage of the adjustment. The second stage is rebalancing. Countries like China and Germany must rely more on domestic consumption; countries like the US and UK must rely less on private consumer debt and shift resources from finance and housing to productive, traded industries.¶ But these reform agendas, from the downsizing of the overbuilt industrial sectors of mercantilist Asian nations to the pruning of finance in the Anglo-American world, threaten the very interests that profited from the preceding bubble and now glare defensively at a changing world, like Fafnir crouched upon his hoard. In the US, the wealth of the bubble-swollen financial sector has been transmuted into political power via campaign contributions. While Mitt Romney, the candidate of Wall Street, lost his bid for the presidency, the American financial industry overall has been successful in blocking reforms like the nationalising of failed banks (rather than government bailouts with few conditions) and the restructuring of private household mortgage debt. These reforms, along with a dose of moderate inflation and much more aggressive fiscal policies like massive investment in infrastructure, would have helped the economy recover more rapidly. But they would have imposed significant costs on economic elites who have wielded their power to thwart them.¶ For their part, the masses seldom unite against the classes in democracies because they are divided among themselves. When nations realise that they will be collectively poorer in the future than they had expected, the usual result is not solidarity but rather civil war, by means of ballots and sometimes bullets. Confronted by a crisis like the Great Recession, each section of society uses its political influence to try to maintain its share of the national wealth, while forcing the cost of economic adjustment to others. The rich try to shift adjustment costs to the middle class, who in turn try to pay for their own subsidies and entitlements by cutting the programmes of the poor.History is sobering, in this regard. The Great Recession, which continues despite a technical ‘recovery’, can be viewed as the third great economic collapse of the industrial era, following the ‘Long Depression’ of the 1870s-1890s and the Great Depression of the 1930s. The earlier two episodes of global economic crisis witnessed setbacks for liberalism, democracy and free trade and the flourishing of illiberal nationalism, racism, imperialism and beggar-thy-neighbour economics. While slow growth combined with national rivalries have not yet engendered anything like the autarkic economics of the earlier two crises, it would be premature to predict the survival of present levels of financial and economic integration in a world that wobbles between feeble recoveries and renewed recessions.¶ Nowhere is there greater potential for conflict than in the relationship between the two poles of the now-collapsed bubble economy — the US, which specialised in exporting debt to China, and China, which specialised in exporting manufactured goods to the US. Since the Great Recession began, American attitudes toward China have grown strikingly more negative. The much-discussed ‘pivot’ in American strategy away from fighting jihadists in the Middle East and Central Asia towards unnamed great power rivals in East Asia is manifestly a shift toward greater military containment of China.¶ And in the recently concluded US elections, both candidates competed in promising to protect American producers from unfair Chinese competition. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which China is excluded, combines military and trade concerns in a single set of America-centred Asian alliances. Gone is the Clinton-era vision of China as a liberalising and democratising partner of the US in a world of great-power harmony.¶ The last global depression was brought to an end by the second world war. This time a ‘hot’ war is extremely unlikely and a cold war merely possible. Nevertheless, geopolitics may do what domestic politics has failed so far to do and free the world’s leading countries from ongoing turboparalysis.

### Jarvis

#### No escalation

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

### General no kickout

#### No basing kickout – obama building a constellation of anonymous bases with minimal footprint – means no pressured rollback

**Turse, 2011, [**Nick, award-winning journalist, historian, essayist, and the associate editor of the Nation Institute’s Tomdispatch.com, October 16th, 2011, “America’s Secret Empire of Drone Bases,” http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/mike-friends-blog/americas-secret-empire-drone-bases]

They increasingly dot the planet. There’s a facility outside Las Vegas where “pilots” work in climate-controlled trailers, another at a dusty camp in Africa formerly used by the French Foreign Legion, a third at a big air base in Afghanistan where Air Force personnel sit in front of multiple computer screens, and a fourth at an air base in the United Arab Emirates that almost no one talks about.

And that leaves at least 56 more such facilities to mention in an expanding American empire of unmanned drone bases being set up worldwide. Despite frequent news reports on the drone assassination campaign launched in support of America’s ever-widening undeclared wars and a spate of stories on drone bases in Africa and the Middle East, most of these facilities have remained unnoted, uncounted, and remarkably anonymous -- until now.

Run by the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and their proxies, these bases -- some little more than desolate airstrips, others sophisticated command and control centers filled with computer screens and high-tech electronic equipment -- are the backbone of a new American robotic way of war. They are also the latest development in a long-evolving saga of American power projection abroad -- in this case, remote-controlled strikes anywhere on the planet with a minimal foreign “footprint” and little accountability.

Using military documents, press accounts, and other open source information, an in-depth analysis by TomDispatch has identified at least 60 bases integral to U.S. military and CIA drone operations. There may, however, be more, since a cloak of secrecy about drone warfare leaves the full size and scope of these bases distinctly in the shadows.

A Galaxy of Bases

Over the last decade, the American use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has expanded exponentially, as has media coverage of their use. On September 21st, the Wall Street Journal reported that the military has deployed missile-armed MQ-9 Reaper drones on the “island nation of Seychelles to intensify attacks on al Qaeda affiliates, particularly in Somalia.” A day earlier, a Washington Post piece also mentioned the same base on the tiny Indian Ocean archipelago, as well as one in the African nation of Djibouti, another under construction in Ethiopia, and a secret CIA airstrip being built for drones in an unnamed Middle Eastern country. (Some suspect it's Saudi Arabia.)

Post journalists Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock reported that the “Obama administration is assembling a constellation of secret drone bases for counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula as part of a newly aggressive campaign to attack al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia and Yemen.” Within days, the Post also reported that a drone from the new CIA base in that unidentified Middle Eastern country had carried out the assassination of radical al-Qaeda preacher and American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen.

With the killing of al-Awlaki, the Obama Administration has expanded its armed drone campaign to no fewer than six countries, though the CIA, which killed al-Awlaki, refuses to officially acknowledge its drone assassination program. The Air Force is less coy about its drone operations, yet there are many aspects of those, too, that remain in the shadows. Air Force spokesman Lieutenant Colonel John Haynes recently told TomDispatch that, “for operational security reasons, we do not discuss worldwide operating locations of Remotely Piloted Aircraft, to include numbers of locations around the world.”

Still, those 60 military and CIA bases worldwide, directly connected to the drone program, tell us much about America’s war-making future. From command and control and piloting to maintenance and arming, these facilities perform key functions that allow drone campaigns to continue expanding, as they have for more than a decade. Other bases are already under construction or in the planning stages. When presented with our list of Air Force sites within America’s galaxy of drone bases, Lieutenant Colonel Haynes responded, “I have nothing further to add to what I’ve already said.”

Even in the face of government secrecy, however, much can be discovered. Here, then, for the record is a TomDispatch accounting of America’s drone bases in the United States and around the world.

#### Zenko concludes neg – hosts nations will always be available overwhelms status quo backlash

**Zenko and Welch 2012** [Micah and Emma, Douglas Dillon Fellow; Research associate with the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, MAY 29, 2012 “Where the Drones Are,” ForeignPolicy.com, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/29/where\_the\_drones\_are?page=full]

The countries that are willing to host U.S. drone operations have shifted as their political sensitivities have evolved. While the United States lost access to both Iraq and Pakistan in 2011, other host nations are more tolerant, albeit more evasive. For instance, a remote CIA airstrip in the Persian Gulf was reportedly completed in September, although the country remains publicly unidentified.

Given the politically sensitive nature of stationing U.S. government personnel or private contractors to support drone operations in another country's sovereign territory, it is impossible to identify and verify the complete architecture of air bases from which U.S. strike and spy drones fly. Many journalists and researchers have previously written about American drone bases, from which this piece benefitted tremendously. The 12 bases that appear below, scattered across three continents, are but a representative sample of drone bases around the world compiled through publicly available information. There are assuredly others, perhaps at Masirah Island Air Base in Oman or Socotra Island Air Field off the coast of Yemen. We welcome updates and corrections.

EUROPE

Location: Incirlik, Turkey

Coordinates: 37, 35.26

Last November, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced that four U.S. Predator drones would be deployed to Incirlik, a massive air base primarily used by U.S. and Turkish forces that serves as a staging point for regional air operations. (In general, four aircraft are required to provide around-the-clock surveillance over a particular area of interest -- one airborne while the others take off, land, refuel, or undergo maintenance.) The four Predators are launched and recovered by 15 U.S. airmen from 414th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, while the Nevada-based contractor Battlespace Flight Services flies the drones. Real-time intelligence from the Predators is transmitted via satellite link to the combined intelligence fusion cell in Ankara. The cell, opened in November 2007 to process surveillance imagery from U.S. manned and unmanned systems flying over Iraq, is staffed by Turkish and U.S. military personnel working side by side to provide targeting information on suspected members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, for strikes by Turkish F-16s in Turkey or Northern Iraq. According to reports, on Dec. 28, a Predator provided video imagery of a caravan of suspected PKK militants near the Turkish border. After Turkish officers directed the drone to fly elsewhere, Turkish aircraft attacked the caravan with four sorties, reportedly killing 34 civilians.

SOUTHWEST ASIA

Location: Jalalabad Airfield, Afghanistan

Coordinates: 34.40, 70.50

Both the U.S. Air Force and the CIA use Jalalabad Airfield as a launching pad for their fleets of Predator and Reaper drones. In August 2009, the New York Times reported, "Officials said the CIA now conducted most of its Predator missile and bomb strikes on targets in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region from the Jalalabad base, with drones landing or taking off almost hourly." In late 2011, when the Pakistani government kicked the remaining U.S. drones and their support personnel out of Shamsi air base, they were reportedly relocated to Jalalabad.

Location: Khost Airfield, Afghanistan

Coordinates: 33.33, 69.95

Located adjacent to the western border of Pakistan, Khost -- also known as Forward Operating Base Chapman -- is under the operational command of the CIA. Khost houses CIA officers, operatives, and analysts who collect, assess, and interpret intelligence information as well as select suspected militants as targets. Because of its location in one of the most violent regions of Afghanistan, Khost also serves as a recruitment center for informants. It is perhaps best known as the site of a suicide bombing that claimed the lives of seven Americans on Dec. 30, 2009 -- the deadliest day for the CIA since the 1983 bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. After the attack, the CIA retaliated swiftly with 11 attacks that killed nearly 100 suspected militants, marking one of the most intense periods of the drone program thus far.

Location: Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan

Coordinates: 31.50, 65.85

Kandahar Airfield is one of the largest bases in Afghanistan. Run by the U.S. military, it serves as a major base for both surveillance and strike drone operations in Afghanistan, as well as intermittently into Pakistan to pursue suspected militants. The U.S. Air Force also shares some of the surveillance footage with Islamabad. It is also home to the RQ-170 Sentinel -- nicknamed the "Beast of Kandahar" -- an advanced surveillance drone that reportedly was used to monitor the Abbottabad compound where al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was ultimately killed.

Location: Shindand Airfield, Afghanistan

Coordinates: 33.39, 62.26

On Nov. 29, 2011, a CIA-controlled RQ-170 Sentinel drone flying out of the Shindad base crashed 140 miles inside Iran. (The United States began flying drones over Iran from Iraq as early as April 2004.) Although Iranian officials claimed to have downed the drone through electronic warfare, U.S. officials countered that the drone had suffered from a technical malfunction. Before the incident, the Sentinel had reportedly flown undetected over Iran for three years, making hundreds of sorties over dozens of suspected nuclear weapons sites up to 600 miles into the country. U.S. officials claim that Sentinel surveillance flights over Iran have continued despite the well-publicized crash.

Location: Al-Udeid Air Base, Qatar

Coordinates: 25.12, 51.32

Al-Udeid features the longest and most advanced runways in the Middle East, serves as a major transshipment site for American troops and resources headed to Afghanistan, and also hosts the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC), which relocated from Saudi Arabia in 2003. The airbase serves as a drone operations command and control center throughout the Middle East, including Iraq and Afghanistan, for the U.S. Air Force, which through CAOC manages day-to-day joint air operations. Lawyers are stationed at Al-Udeid 24 hours a day to approve drone strikes carried about by the U.S. military.

Location: Zamboanga, Philippines

Coordinates: 6.92, 122.06

The Philippine government reportedly allows the United States to fly unmanned surveillance drones to monitor militants from the al Qaeda-linked group Abu Sayyaf on the island Mindanao. The most active site is in Zamboanga, one of the locations where the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines is based. U.S. drones are said to have provided the location of prominent Abu Sayyaf militants that were subsequently killed in an air strike carried out by the Philippines Air Force in February 2012.

Location: Al-Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates

Coordinates: 24.25, 54.55

In January 2002, the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) was deployed to Al-Dharfa to support operations in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism. At the time, there were only 300 American servicemembers on the base. According to a diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, by September 2007 there were 1,300 Air Force personnel at Al-Dhafra. The 380th AEW also brought manned U-2 spy planes and the unmanned RQ-4 Global Hawk to the base. In 2005, an anonymous Air Force official stated, "There is a major Global Hawk operating base being built in the UAE." According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, in June 2010 there were four Global Hawks at Al-Dhafra; by June 2011, there were six (five Air Force and one Navy). More recently, the United States has begun deploying F-22s, its advanced stealth fighter. According to Matthew Aid's book Intel Wars, Global Hawks operating out of Al-Dhafra "fly daily [signals intelligence] and imagery collection missions along Iran's borders with Iraq and Afghanistan and along Iran's Persian Gulf coastline."

Location: Al-Anad Air Base, Yemen

Coordinates: 13.18, 44.76

In the heart of the Lahij province in southern Yemen, the U.S. military works directly with Yemeni forces to monitor, target, and kill suspected militants affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the local franchise of the global jihadist group. The close cooperation between the United States and Yemen was brought to light in a confidential cable published by WikiLeaks, which quoted then President Ali Abdullah Saleh, "We'll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours." U.S. drones often provide surveillance information to Yemeni forces to carry out assaults, as well as to launch airstrikes. According to the Long War Journal, the United States has conducted 21 airstrikes in the first five months of 2012, more than double the number in all of 2011.

AFRICA

Location: Arba Minch, Ethiopia

Coordinates: 6.04, 37.59

In January 2007, the U.S. Air Force carried out at least two attacks with AC-130 gunships against suspected Islamic militants in Somalia from a base in Ethiopia. After reports emerged with details of the attacks, the Ethiopian government expelled the U.S. military from that base. In October 2011, after four years of negotiations, the U.S. military was permitted to reestablish a presence in Ethiopia, with Reaper drones being flown out of the Arba Minch airfield for surveillance missions over Somalia.

Location: Camp Lemonier, Djibouti

Coordinates: 11.54, 43.15

Six days after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush signed a Memorandum of Notification that authorized the CIA to kill a "high-value target list" of 24 al-Qaeda leaders. Included on this list was Abu Ali al-Harithi, mastermind of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. On Nov. 3, 2002, a Predator drone killed Harithi and six others in Yemen, marking the first targeted killing outside of a battlefield. The drone reportedly originated and was controlled from Camp Lemonier. The CIA has also flown drones launched from Djibouti over Somalia, targeting militants affiliated with al Qaeda. Camp Lemonier has been the home of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa since 2003, and reportedly houses 3,500 U.S. personnel from various military and civilian agencies.

Location: Mahe, Seychelles

Coordinates: -4.6700823, 55.5146885

In 2011, the U.S. military reopened a base on the island nation of Seychelles -- an archipelago roughly twice the size of Washington, D.C. -- for a small fleet of armed MQ-9 Reaper drones. Although the Seychelles had previously served as a base for surveillance drones to track pirates in the Indian Ocean, classified U.S. government cables released by WikiLeaks revealed that drones have also carried out strike missions against al Qaeda affiliates in Somalia. According to another cable, Seychelles President James Michel requested -- twice -- that the inaugural launch of U.S. drones be documented with a photo-op or celebration. U.S. drone operations from the Seychelles have continued, as demonstrated by a MQ-9 Reaper crashing into the Indian Ocean after skidding off the runway in December 2011.

### No Africa Kickout

#### Ev just says that it may expand – not conclusive

Tinti, WPR, 13

(Peter, freelance journalist and analyst based in Bamako, Mali, and Dakar, Senegal, 1-2-13, “U.S. Debates Framework for Counterterror Operations in Africa,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12593/u-s-debates-framework-for-counterterror-operations-in-africa, accessed 8-23-13, CMM)

Some of these core assumptions, however, are being reconsidered amid the revelation that the group responsible for the recent attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi may have ties to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), one of the Islamist groups now in control of northern Mali. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), an AQIM offshoot also operating in northern Mali, is similarly thought to have ties with Boko Haram, a radical Islamist sect terrorizing communities in northern Nigeria.¶ Amid reports that foreign fighters are pouring into northern Mali, U.S. defense officials are concerned that the large, ungoverned area could become a jihadi safe haven and potential launching pad for terrorist attacks abroad. Though AQIM is widely considered to be the best-funded al-Qaida franchise, it is unclear to what extent, if any, it takes orders from or collaborates with al-Qaida’s “headquarters” in Pakistan. AQIM is a legacy of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s and was born out of a movement formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching in Combat. It was not until 2007 that it formally pledged its allegiance to al-Qaida and rebranded itself as AQIM.¶ In order to pursue terrorist groups in Africa under the 2001 authorization, defense officials need to establish links between these groups and al-Qaida proper, a process that often resembles a strained connecting of disparate dots. A new authorization would remove this burden by redefining the powers and responsibilities of the military in ways that would make it easier, in theory, to pursue African extremist groups deemed threatening to U.S. security.¶ Ironically, the debate over congressional approval is perhaps most acute among those who agree that terrorist groups in Africa pose a direct threat to the United States. Proponents argue that such authority would make the use of force against terror cells in Africa more defensible, transparent and acceptable to allies. For detractors, however, new legislation is fraught with political risk and tantamount to asking Congress for permission to start a new, indefinite war.¶ Meanwhile, the CIA has for years carried out a lengthy, far-reaching counterterror campaign outside of the purview of the 2001 authorization. These efforts, usually in the form of drone strikes and small missions by U.S. special operations forces, are overseen by the president, who can authorize CIA action without congressional approval. Administration officials are openly entertaining the possibility of expanding these types of operations to West Africa.¶ These debates, while important, are to a large extent a matter of keeping policy frameworks apace with practice. Under the Obama administration, U.S. military operations in Africa have rapidly expanded in scope, depth and breadth, creating a skeletal infrastructure that enables a panoply of near-constant training exercises with partner governments -- as well as clandestine activities.¶ Though Camp Lemmonier in Djibouti is technically the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa, in reality, there are hundreds of military outposts and locations dotting the continent, with several thousand uniformed U.S. military and civilian Department of Defense personnel, as well as an unknown number of defense contractors, working across the continent at any one time. U.S. special operations forces regularly work within civil-affairs and humanitarian assignments that provide cover for covert counterterrorism activities. And as Craig Whitlock of the Washington Post reported, the U.S. has been operating surveillance flights, usually through private contractors, out of Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Burkina Faso and Mauritania for years, using nondescript turboprop planes equipped with high-tech sensors to monitor the movements of various militant groups. Meanwhile, Africom is slated to be the inaugural combatant command for the Pentagon’s recently developed Regionally Aligned Brigade approach, with counterterrorism training missions with African partner militaries high on the agenda.¶ All of this suggests that regardless of what legal frameworks the Obama administration decides to pursue, whether they involve congressional authorization for expanded authority to allow military operations in Africa or a more low-profile increase in covert actions, the U.S. is already working to put in place the infrastructure for a broad expansion of U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa. Important questions remain, however, as to what impact prioritizing counterterrorism objectives over other stated goals, such as democracy promotion and economic development, might have on relations between the U.S. and its African counterparts.

### ---Terrorism- AQIM

**AQIM not a threat** – too weak, can’t carry out attacks, squo counterterror solves.

**PN ‘12.** [Peace Newspaper, accredited internationally by the United Nations, IMF/World Bank, and nationally by the Ministry of Communication, internally citing numerous security experts, “Al-Qaeda seeks help from Maghreb affiliate” -- <http://www.peacenewspaper.net/?p=1584>]

Al-Qaeda’s central command sees AQIM as capable of sustaining the global terror group. Analysts say it’s a poor bet. It is a desperate time for the once-dreaded al-Qaeda. Funds are depleted, long-time figurehead Osama Bin Laden is dead and counter-terror operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan keep operatives on the run or in hiding. The embattled terror group is now counting on al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other organisations for restored credibility and rescue. When Ayman al-Zawahiri needed to overcome a shortfall of funds after the death of Bin Laden, he looked to the Sahara. “After Osama Bin Laden was killed, it became likely that the future of al-Qaeda would involve Maghreb countries,” university professor Ely al-Sheikh Ould Bah said. Arms and drug trafficking, along with abductions for ransoms, have produced a revenue stream for al-Qaeda’s North African branch. But all is not as it appears, security experts caution. The high-profile kidnappings of westerners in the Sahel-Saharan region in recent months do not necessarily indicate “an increase in the organisation’s capacity to strike”, a UN Security Council report noted in February. The abductions “might just imply a need to raise money and get international attention, or be the result of internal power struggles”. Security analyst Hamadi Ould Dah agrees that al-Qaeda “had no other option but to resort to its Arab Maghreb branch”. “However, this group seems to be unable to provide any support for the main al-Qaeda organisation because of the internal problems facing it, and also because of crippling security crackdowns by Sahel countries,” he tells Magharebia. Given significant attrition among its ranks, as well as its poor media skills, the Maghreb branch appears unlikely to live up to Zawahiri’s expectations. The Madrid-based Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH) recently confirmed that al-Qaeda’s Maghreb offshoot faces problems of its own. “Internal fractures within AQIM lead us to question the real cohesion of the organisation,” § Marked 19:25 § Madrid-based Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH) observed in a February report. “Its activities in the Sahel region seem to better reflect the action of different cells with varied driving forces rather than a co-ordinated action with a clear identity and rationale,” the IECAH said. And as al-Qaeda gets more connected with criminal activities “and disconnects with the ideological discourse as justification of its actions, its tactics are subject to increasing criticism and rejection by religious leaders in the Maghreb and Sahel”, the report added. Al-Qaeda has long prepared its branch in the Islamic Maghreb to assume the mantle when it collapses. To celebrate the 5th anniversary of the September 11th, 2001 attacks, the terror group posted a video in which al-Zawahiri announced that Algeria’s “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat” (GSPC) had become part of al-Qaeda. GSPC emir Abdelmalek Droukdel was eager to mount a serious media campaign. The only problem: no one knew how to do it. Abu Yasser Sayyaf, GSPC’s webmaster, had to issue an online plea for help uploading content and using different programmes, “which shows how far behind GSPC was technologically”, terrorism analyst and academic Manuel Torres Soriano explained in a January analysis, “The Road to Media Jihad: The Propaganda Actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”. Sayyaf’s excuse for the second-rate video and audio was the group’s isolated location in the mountains of Algeria. Things changed in 2007. The GSPC’s adoption of the name “al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) coincided with a media outreach initiative modelled after the parent group to which AQIM had become allied. More media production was compulsory for GSPC if it were to merge with al-Qaeda as an official branch. The newest members of the global terror organisation quickly recognised the merit of visual and audio messages, Torres Soriano says. More media production was compulsory for GSPC if it were to merge with Al-Qaeda as an official branch. For example, in 2007 — the year of the name change — AQIM released six videos, almost double the number of all videos it produced during the previous eight years. Al-Qaeda had been trying for years to solidify its support in the North Africa desert, but the GSPC was still a long way from performing like an affiliate of a global terror group. “Although the GSPC started its activities at the information era par excellence, its method was more that of a traditional gang than that of a group ‘apprenticed’ by Osama Bin Laden,” Torres Soriano points out. After AQIM’s merger with al-Qaeda, however, “it turned into a group with its own media strategy”. “Ayman al-Zawahiri urged AQIM to develop its own propaganda machine,” journalist Mohamed Ould Sid al-Moktar tells Magharebia. Now that AQIM has met the challenge, Bin Laden’s successor and his top aides believe it to be a group upon which al-Qaeda can depend, al-Moktar adds. They forget that the Maghreb branch is under siege from Sahel security services. “Al-Qaeda’s dependence on AQIM is similar to a weak entity leaning on another weak entity; something that will take both of them down,” al-Moktar says. Abdel-Rahim Al-Manar Slimi of Mohammed V University in Rabat noted that “al-Qaeda’s branches are prospering in areas where the state is absent or is failing; a situation which didn’t exist in North Africa until the fall of Kadhafi’s regime, and Libya’s entry into a transitional status”. Meanwhile, AQIM is trying to expand relations with terrorist movements in Africa, especially Boko Haram. Al-Qaeda’s Maghreb branch may also try to exploit the recent clashes between Touareg rebels and Malian army. Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz recently suggested in an interview with Le Monde that al-Qaeda was involved in the northern Mali conflict. A spokesperson for the Touareg rebels countered that the National Movement for the Liberation of Azaouad (MNLA) “neither has interests nor shares any policies with that terrorist organisation”. Instead of turning to AQIM, Ayman Al-Zawahiri could have chosen to depend on al-Qaeda branches, in the Arabian Peninsula or Iraq, Boko Haram or Shabab al-Mujahideen. But these branches are not based in the Sahara. Analysts believe that “al-Qaeda Central” sees the desert as a place where its leaders can escape, and where rampant criminal activity keeps the money flowing. Mohamed Ould Zain of the Sahara Media network points out, however, that both al-Qaeda and its offshoot AQIM face difficult times in the wake of the Arab Spring. “There is growing recognition that peaceful struggle and democracy are the most effective way to make progress, not violence and killing,” Ould Zain says.

### No Oil Shocks – 2NC

#### No unforeseen events – prices will be stable

Dourian 13

[Kate, Platts, Oil market well balanced, expected to be stable for rest of year: gulf source, 3/11/13, http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/Oil/8218146]

Saudi Arabia produced 9.15 million b/d in February and supplied 9.16 million b/d to markets as output fell by 100,000 b/d over January, but the OPEC kingpin is likely to raise production in the coming months as demand picks up, a Gulf source said Monday. "I think the market is balanced. It's a little bit on the tight side because of refining maintenance in Asia and many other areas," the source said. "We expected the stock build in the second quarter and a little bit in the third quarter." The source, who declined to be identified, said that oil prices were also expected to hold steady, assuming there is no unforeseen geopolitical development that would impact markets. "**I don't see any major change this year that will impact either prices or the supply and demand picture**," the source said, adding: "I think it's going to be stable unless there is something that we don't know about like geopolitics." "Generally the market is expected to be stable," the source said adding that oil prices might move by $2-$3/barrel "up or down" or in a worst-case scenario by $5/b.

#### Prices stable now

Eqbali 13

[Aresu, Platts, Iran oil minister says crude prices to remain stable at current levels: report, 3/8/13, http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/Oil/6240738]

Iranian Oil Minister Rostam Ghasemi said crude oil prices will remain stable at current levels, oil ministry news service Shana said Friday. "Global oil prices will remain stable at the current levels," Ghasemi was quoted as saying. "I think global oil prices are reasonable and will remain at this level," he added. According to Shana, he described current crude prices in the international market as "favorable." As for any new gas deal with Turkey as previously speculated by some media, he said: "The Islamic republic has had no new gas agreement with Turkey and previous deals and contracts are still valid." Iran sells around 28 million cubic meters of gas to Turkey on a daily basis.

### No Oil Shocks – A2: Africa

#### This isn’t relevant – no demand and prices are falling

Payne and Farge 13

[Julia and Emma, Reuters, 2/26/13, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/02/26/oil-africa-exports-idUKL5N0B7I6H20130226>]

African crude exports to the United States could slip to a trickle this year as the world's top oil consumer enjoys a shale oil boom, allowing China, often now the buyer of last resort, to become ever more choosy. The dire prospects for West African and Algerian exports to the U.S. is also stoking competition among producers, which must sell to a reduced pool of Asian and European clients. And the growing glut of sweet oil in the Atlantic Basin has already started creating price havoc from last year and this will likely heat up in 2013. Angola has lost the U.S as its top buyer, which last year accounted for just 11 percent of exports, behind China and India "There will be a greater competition to make up for a fall in sales to its (Angola's) once largest market and ... oil prices may fall as a consequence," Sandra Julio, President and CEO of Angolan state oil firm Sonangol's trading branch, said in a company document. Analysts estimate that some 900,000 bpd of Nigerian and Algerian crude oil, accounting for more than 1 percent of global supply, is soon to be displaced in the U.S. market by shale oil. Top U.S. refiners Valero and Phillips 66 said they have stopped importing light, sweet oil to the U.S. Gulf coast as new shale oil production combined with better pipeline flows has yielded cheaper domestic alternatives. "The Seaway ramp-up and the other pipeline start-ups make it possible that WAF (West African) flows to the U.S. will fall to zero by end-2013," Citi analysts said, referring to the pipeline linking the U.S. mid-continent to Gulf Coast refiners. Nigeria currently exports about 700,000 bpd, or one third, of its crude to the United States out of a total of 2 million-2.2 million bpd. At its peak, Nigeria used to export around 1.6 million to the U.S. Nigeria's standard crude Qua Iboe traditionally sells at a premium of $1-$3 per barrel to benchmark Brent and Algeria's Saharan Blend at between flat to a premium of $2 per barrel. Both grades have traded regularly below traditional levels in the past 12 months. A 10-cent drop in prices for Nigeria's oil means a yearly loss of around $70 million. Nigeria has already sold cargoes for around 40 cents less than the official selling price this year, according to estimates by the pan-African Ecobank. Nearly half of Algeria's exports of around 650,000 bpd used to go to the Americas, mostly to the U.S. Gulf coast but now the total trans-Atlantic volume fluctuates at around a third of exports and are nearly all absorbed into Quebec, Canada. That means close to 200,000 bpd of Algeria's light sweet Saharan Blend crude oil exports will also be seeking new customers soon. Valero is set to buy more U.S. light sweet crude for its 265,000 bpd Canadian refinery in Saint-Romuald, Quebec starting at the end of the year. Producers of the light, sweet crudes have been able to divert some cargoes eastwards and West African exports to Asia rose to a record high last year. But a flattening in Chinese demand and a preference for diesel-rich heavier grades at new refineries will cap demand. "Asian refiners do not like light grades. They like sweet medium grades," a Chinese trader said, adding Libyan crude and some relatively cheap Australian light grades suit Asia better.

### No Oil Shocks – A2: Prices Are Global

#### 1. This means the aff can’t solve \_\_\_\_\_

#### 2. Shale oil is sufficient to moderate price swings

Perry 12

[Dr. Mark J. Perry is a professor of economics and finance in the School of Management at the Flint campus of the University of Michigan., One Reason Why Oil Prices Will Remain Stable: U.S. Production Reached a 14-Year High in February, 5/24/12, http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2012/05/why-oil-prices-will-remain-stable.html]

The invisible hand steadying global energy markets is the growing influence of modern technologies. So a case can be made for a relatively stable crude-price window—$80 to $120 a barrel for the next several years. The growing influence of modern technologies is evident everywhere. Net daily U.S. imports of petroleum have dropped by 50% to eight million barrels over the last five years. Imports are likely to shrink further in the coming decade due to an upsurge in domestic oil and gas supplies (see chart above). Fracking and horizontal wells have given the U.S. an unmistakable geopolitical advantage while moderating the market swings. Both presidential candidates have a chance to accelerate U.S. energy independence. Ambiguity, policy vacillation and an overreach on uneconomical options (ethanol, wind) act as suppressants. But technology and market forces trump politics. The march is on." MP: The chart above shows monthly U.S. oil production starting in January 1998, and going through February 2012, when production reached 6,144,000 barrels per day. That was the highest monthly output of domestic crude oil in almost 14 years, going back to August 1998. New energy and geophysical technologies like 3D-seismic imaging, fracking and horizontal drilling have opened up huge reserves of previously unrecoverable oil and gas in the United States, and that's the main reason that crude oil production is close to a 14-year high. And it's one reason that "oil prices will keep falling," or will at least remain relatively stable. § Marked 19:25 § Related from CBS News: North Dakota could double its oil production by 2015 to more than 1 million barrels daily, putting it on par with Texas "if everything goes our way," according to the state's top oil regulator Lynn Helms. Billionaire Oklahoma oilman Harold Hamm said that Helms' prediction was probably accurate, if not a little low. "We've been saying for two years that North Dakota could be at 1.2 million barrels a day by 2015," said Hamm, CEO of Continental Resources Inc.

# 1NR

### U – Will Pass

#### Obama pushing AND Yellen will likely win confirmation

Peterson and McGrane 10/24 (Kristina and Victoria, Wall St Journal, "Fed Pick Yellen Plans Meetings With Senators," http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/10/24/fed-pick-yellen-plans-meetings-with-senators/)

The Obama administration has started reaching out to members of the Senate Banking Committee to set up meetings with Janet Yellen, the president’s pick to be the first chairwoman of the Federal Reserve, the White House and Senate aides said Thursday.¶ At least one meeting will happen next week: Sen. Richard Shelby (R., Ala.) is scheduled to sit down with Ms. Yellen next week, according to his office. Sen. Joe Manchin (D., W. Va.), a member of the panel, is slated to meet with Ms. Yellen on Nov. 6, his office said.¶ Sen. Jon Tester (D., Mont.) will also meet with Ms. Yellen during the first week of November, while Sens. Dean Heller (R., Nev.) and Sen. Sherrod Brown (D., Ohio) have upcoming meetings scheduled. Among those still working to set up appointments are Sens. Bob Corker (R., Tenn.) and Heidi Heitkamp (D., N.D.), according to their offices. Fed officials are working with Hill staffers to arrange the meetings, aides said.¶ President Barack Obama announced Oct. 9 he would nominate Ms. Yellen, the Fed’s vice chairwoman, to succeed Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, whose term ends Jan. 31. The nomination is subject to Senate confirmation and goes first to the banking committee for a hearing and vote.¶ Ms. Yellen’s confirmation hearing has not been scheduled. The White House has not sent the committee all nomination paperwork, aides said. Meetings between nominees and senators traditionally happen before the hearing, offering senators a chance to meet the nominee and ask questions in a private setting.¶ Democrats are confident Ms. Yellen, the Fed’s vice chairwoman, will win Senate confirmation, though it’s unknown how rocky Republicans might make the process. She is likely to win approval by the 22-member banking committee, where Democrats hold a two-seat majority. It appears likely all 12 Democrats on the panel will vote for her. It remains unclear how many – if any – Republicans will vote for her.¶ Sen. Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.), a member of the Banking Committee, said he expected Ms. Yellen would be confirmed.¶ “I don’t know how many Republican votes she’ll get, but I find it hard to believe that for the first time in history that Republicans would filibuster a Fed nominee,” Mr. Schumer said in an interview Thursday. The New York Democrat expects to meet with Ms. Yellen soon.

#### Will be confirmed - even GOP admits

Siddiqui 10/25 (Sabrina, Huff Post, "Rand Paul Threatens To Hold Up Janet Yellen Nomination To Fed: Report," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/25/rand-paul-janet-yellen\_n\_4163766.html)

President Barack Obama formally nominated Yellen on Oct. 9. Though a confirmation hearing has not been set, the Fed vice chairwoman is scheduled to meet with members of the Senate Banking Committee in the coming weeks. At least one Republican who voted against her nomination to join the Fed board in 2010, Tennessee Sen. Bob Corker, predicted Yellen will be confirmed.¶ Yellen would become the first woman to lead the agency when outgoing Chairman Ben Bernanke's term expires on Jan. 31.

#### Will be confirmed

Reuters 10/23 ("Yellen's Senate hearing for Fed chair unlikely before mid-November," http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/23/us-usa-fed-yellen-idUSBRE99M1EN20131023)

President Barack Obama nominated Yellen, the Fed's current vice chair, on October 9 to replace Ben Bernanke when his term expires at the end of January, subject to Senate confirmation.¶ Her hearing before the banking panel is the next step in that process, but Senate staff are still waiting to receive the paperwork from the White House before scheduling a start date, the aide said.¶ The hearing is expected to be somewhat confrontational, with Republicans critical of the Fed's ultra-easy monetary policy using the opportunity to voice concerns that it risks financial instability and future inflation.¶ But Obama's Democrats control the Senate, including 12 seats on the 20-member banking panel. As a result, Yellen is expected to win confirmation fairly easily, and to take the helm of the U.S. central bank when Bernanke steps down on January 31.

#### Yellen will be confirmed - little threat of filibuster

DiGiorgio 10/15/13 (James, Financial Analyst @ Uncommon Wisdom, "A Yellen-Led Fed: Good News for Glass Ceilings and Gold," http://www.uncommonwisdomdaily.com/a-yellen-led-fed-good-news-for-glass-ceilings-and-gold-17277)

Wall Street and congressional Democrats got their wish this past Thursday when President Obama nominated Janet Yellen as Federal Reserve chairwoman. Yet another glass ceiling shattered!¶ I expect the Senate to confirm Yellen swiftly.¶ Writing in this space a few weeks ago, I wondered whether Republicans might try to block Yellen’s nomination. My answer then:¶ "Maybe — but it wouldn’t help their already-serious problem with women voters."¶ Now, however, thanks to damage from the government shutdown and debt-ceiling battles, I believe the Senate will want to avoid the appearance of dissent and acrimony.¶ Senator Ted Cruz and perhaps a couple of other Tea-Party senators may call Yellen a threat to the U.S. economy and oppose her, but cooler heads will ignore their squeals and prevent a filibuster.

#### Yellen confirmation likely - but some GOP support is key

Hunter and Hopkins 10/14 (Kathleen and Cheyenne, Columnists @ SF Gate, "Yellen Choice Draws Questions on Record Not Confirmation Chances”, 2013, http://www.sfgate.com/business/bloomberg/article/Yellen-Choice-Draws-Questions-on-Record-Not-4893681.php)

U.S. Senate Republicans are raising questions about Federal Reserve Chairman nominee Janet Yellen’s views on monetary policy, even as they predict she probably will be confirmed.¶ Several Republicans on the Senate Banking Committee, which will consider Yellen’s nomination before a floor vote to confirm her is scheduled, said today that their concerns about the Federal Reserve’s bond-buying program -- known as quantitative easing -- could cause them to vote against confirming Yellen.¶ “I still have the same concerns,” said Idaho Senator Mike Crapo, the top Republican on the banking panel, who opposed Yellen’s nomination to the Federal Reserve Board in 2010. “We are now moving toward further Fed management of some sort with regard to whether it’s winding down the quantitative easing or not, but I’m going to let the process move forward and evaluate it carefully before I make a decision.”¶ President Barack Obama today nominated Yellen, the Fed’s current vice chairman, to lead the central bank, replacing Ben S. Bernanke.¶ Even if they end up opposing her, Republicans on the panel couldn’t unilaterally block Yellen because Democrats have a two- seat edge on the committee. On the Senate floor, Democrats would need the support of six Republicans to advance Yellen’s nomination.

#### Will be confirmed by December

Reuters 10/9 ("Instant View - Yellen to be nominated for Fed chair," http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/09/uk-usa-economy-instant-idUKBRE99717920131009)

ROBBERT VAN BATENBURG, DIRECTOR OF MARKET STRATEGY, NEWEDGE USA LLC, NEW YORK:¶ "The timing is a little surprising, but the nomination is not with the disappearance of Larry Summers as the leading candidate. The bond market likes to see continuity with this Fed, which has been favourable to it. I think it could be two to three months to the nominee through the process. So we should see her confirmed in December. Under normal circumstances, this news would be dollar bearish and stocks and commodities bullish. Now we have all the cross-currents especially from Washington. It's not clear how markets will react. The markets are much more concerned about the 'drop dead date' on the debt ceiling."¶ GUY LEBAS, CHIEF FIXED INCOME STRATEGIST, JANNEY MONTGOMERY SCOTT, PHILADELPHIA:¶ "A Yellen nomination as Fed chairman will provide to the short to medium part of the yield curve. We could see the three to five year part of the curve to rally a bit. She is perceived as dovish. She is also a great economist with a great deal of experience. It might be a slow nomination process, but we have a Senate that should be friendly to her nomination."

#### Confirmation by early December

Reuters 10/9/13 ("Instant View - Yellen to be nominated for Fed chair," http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/09/uk-usa-economy-instant-idUKBRE99717920131009)

MICHAEL S. HANSON, SENIOR ECONOMIST, BOFA MERRILL LYNCH GLOBAL RESEARCH, NEW YORK:¶ "Not surprised. With all the fiscal issues currently before the Senate, confirmation may not be complete until later November or early December. Means continuity in Fed policy going forward. Market will discover over time that she isn't the perma-dove that some have suggested, but easy policy will remain in place for some time - as the Bernanke Fed has already indicated."¶ JOHN BRYNJOLFSSON, CIO OF ARMORED WOLF, ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA:¶ "With betting odds stacked 85 percent in her favour, hardly a surprise. Her reputation is one of emphasizing the dual mandate, and within the dual mandate, fostering full employment, so is more dovish than Bernanke.

### U – Will Pass/Vote Next Month

#### Confirmation likely, vote next month, will be a fight

Mui 10/25/13 (Ylan, Wash Post, "Rand Paul threatens to block Fed confirmation of Janet Yellen," http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/rand-paul-threatens-to-block-fed-confirmation/2013/10/25/e5863956-3daf-11e3-a94f-b58017bfee6c\_story.html)

Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) threatened this week to block President Obama’s pick to lead the Federal Reserve, creating yet another speed bump in what has already been an unusually contentious nomination.¶ In a video posted online Thursday, Paul called for a halt on confirming Janet L. Yellen, the central bank’s vice chairman, for the top job unless lawmakers also vote on his bill to increase transparency at the Fed. The measure was originally introduced by his father, former representative Ron Paul (R-Tex.), in the aftermath of the financial crisis.¶ “I say no vote on a new Fed chairman without a vote on my Audit the Fed bill!” reads the text on a video made for Campaign for Liberty, the political organization founded by his father. The video was also sent by e-mail to the group’s 750,000 supporters.¶ On Friday, Paul issued a statement saying that “the American people deserve transparency from the Federal Reserve and the federal government as a whole.”¶ Although Paul’s action is unlikely to derail Yellen’s confirmation, it marks the first salvo in what is shaping up to be a broader fight over the central bank’s efforts to prop up the recovery and stabilize the financial system.¶ “This will provide a real opportunity for the Senate to debate monetary policy and the role of the Fed,” a senior GOP Senate aide said.¶ The nomination process has been rocky from the beginning. Obama had hoped to name his onetime close adviser Lawrence H. Summers to the post but faced a backlash from Democrats, prompting Summers to withdraw from consideration. This month, he selected Yellen for the job.¶ She has begun scheduling meetings with members of the Senate banking committee and a hearing is expected to be held next month, a Democratic committee aide said.

### Obama Pushing

#### Obama pushing for quick confirmation now

Philadelphia News 10/27/13 ("Janet Yellen Nominated to Succeed Federal Reserve Head Bernanke," http://thephilanews.com/janet-yellen-nominated-to-succeed-federal-reserve-head-bernanke-42525.htm)

President Obama, standing with Janet Yellen, vice chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and outgoing Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, announces October 9 that Yellen is his choice to succeed Bernanke as head of the nation’s powerful central bank.¶ Obama praised Bernanke, who plans to leave the post in January, as “a stabilizing force not just for our country, but for the entire world.”¶ The president said Yellen is “held in high esteem by colleagues across the country and around the world who look to the United States … and the Fed for leadership.”¶ Yellin’s nomination needs to be confirmed by the U.S. Senate, an action Obama urged it to take without delay. If confirmed, Yellen would be the first woman to serve as head of the Federal Reserve System in that body’s 100-year history.

### Internals – 2nc Capital Key

#### Capital key to securing Fed chair confirmation

Irwin 8/30/13 (Neil, Washington Post columnist and the economics editor of Wonkblog, "How the Fed chair race became a public circus, and why it matters," http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/30/how-the-fed-chair-race-became-a-public-circus-and-why-it-matters/)

And the final factor is this reality: The Federal Reserve has, since the crisis, become more important player in the economy and financial system than it was before. Even apart from the 2008 crisis-era bailouts and interventions, since then it has expanded its balance sheet almost five-fold and been the one government entity in Washington trying to do something about high unemployment. Its power to oversee financial institutions was greatly expanded by Dodd-Frank legislation. Bernanke started in the Fed chairmanship aiming to make it a more anonymous, technocratic role, in contrast to Alan "The Maestro" Greenspan; three years later, he was appearing on "60 Minutes" and was Time Person of the Year. Everyone cares more about who the next Fed chair is because they should care more about who the next Fed chair is.¶ Add it all up, and, as Fratto puts it, "the current transition is a perfect hot mess."¶ The question is, does it matter? It increasingly appears that President Obama will nominate Summers sometime in the next few weeks, and that he will be confirmed, though with no small amount of grumbling by many liberal and some conservative senators in the process. What will that mean?¶ First, there's the cost for the White House. If it were to select a "boring" candidate for the job, like Yellen, Don Kohn, or Roger Ferguson, there might be the usual bumps and bruises in the confirmation process, but there would never really be a doubt that the Senate would come up with the votes.¶ Summers is decidedly un-boring. The opposition to him within the Democratic caucus, especially among women, means that president and his aides will have to spend more time massaging and persuading those senators reluctant to be a "yes" vote on someone much of the Democratic base just doesn't like very much. At best, this will be a distraction at a time that a high stakes fiscal stand-off over funding the government is re-emerging; at worst, it will require horse-trading that could cost political capital they might prefer to save to push another tough vote.¶ For the Fed, the equation is a little different. Based on conversations with many Fed-folks at a conference in Jackson Hole last weekend, I can assert with confidence that people at the central bank are none-too-thrilled with the loud public debate over who their next chairman will be. And it surely will damage the ability of the next chairman, whether it's Summers or someone else, to maintain an image of the aloof, politically neutral, wise, man-behind-the-curtain Fed chair that has been part of the job's image for generations.¶ At the same time, go back to the reasons listed above about why this has become such a spectacle. Part of it is the White House's strategy and part of it is Summers's personality. But other parts, the new media environment and the more prominent role of the Fed, aren't going away.¶ In other words, we may be entering an era where the Fed chairman job is as much a lightning rod as any other major appointment. In that case, the strange Summers vs. Yellen debate of the summer of 2013 is less an aberration, and more a harbinger of what is to come.

#### Capital key to Fed chair confirmation

Gregory 8/23/13 (Michael, Senior Economist @ BMO Capital Markets, "Fed Head Games," http://www.bmonesbittburns.com/economics/focus/20130823/feature.pdf)

A frequent question asked these days is: Who will be the next Fed chairman and how ¶ will this impact monetary policy? The media deem Larry Summers and Janet Yellen ¶ the front runners. Interestingly, the Obama Administration does not appear to be ¶ completely comfortable with either candidate, as evidenced by the fact that a third ¶ name was officially entered into contention (Donald Kohn). Furthermore, the ¶ Washington Post reported this week that the Summers and Yellen entourages were ¶ actively lobbying to win over the Administration’s hearts and minds. ¶ The choice of Kohn, Summers, Yellen or a possible yet-to-be-named dark horse candidate ¶ is complicated by the fact that the Administration not only wants the best overall person ¶ for the job but also a nominee that would move relatively smoothly through the Senate ¶ confirmation process. Fresh in memory is the April 2010 ill-fated nomination of Nobel ¶ laureate Peter Diamond for a Fed governorship that ended 14 months later with the ¶ candidate himself withdrawing owing to the degree of Republican opposition in the ¶ Democrat-controlled Senate. And, we are entering a politically charged season, with ¶ passage of a spending bill required by September’s end to avoid a government shutdown ¶ and a debt ceiling lift required sometime during October-November to avoid a debt ¶ default. Obama’s nomination will likely get lassoed in the political horse trading that is ¶ about to transpire. As such, who ends up getting the nod is difficult to call.

#### OBAMA thinks capital is key to Yellen’s confirmation

Schwartz and Lowrey 9/19/13 (Nelson and Annie, NYT, "Hurdles Are Still High for a New Fed Front-Runner," http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/business/economy/hurdles-still-high-for-a-new-front-runner.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0&pagewanted=print)

As the favorite to succeed Ben S. Bernanke to lead the Federal Reserve, Janet L. Yellen faces no shortage of hurdles.¶ The first would be to win confirmation from the Senate — an obstacle that doomed the previous front-runner for the job, Lawrence H. Summers.¶ While Ms. Yellen faces much less potential opposition than Mr. Summers did, the White House is not taking Senate approval for granted. Even as the administration informed legislators on Capitol Hill on Thursday that Ms. Yellen probably would be President Obama’s nominee, one official said the point of the calls was not so much to gauge support but to tell Democratic senators they should defend Ms. Yellen if she comes under attack before a formal nomination.¶ The second, even bigger, challenge would be to manage the central bank’s retreat from its unprecedented efforts to stimulate the economy, even as the nation’s job market remains frustratingly weak more than four years after the Great Recession.¶ With the collapse of Mr. Summers’s candidacy, White House officials began calling Senate Democrats about the Fed choice; a senior Congressional aide said the only name they mentioned was Ms. Yellen’s. Since she has become the focus of public discussion, the president’s staff is worried that she could become a target for criticism, just as Mr. Summers was, before the White House actually nominates her and can defend her.¶ Jeff Merkley, an Oregon Democrat who serves on the Senate Banking Committee, said in an interview Thursday that the White House had accelerated the vetting process for Ms. Yellen.¶ “Certainly my impression is the White House is taking a very serious and fast-track examination of her as a potential nominee,” Mr. Merkley said.¶ While Ms. Yellen enjoys strong support from Senate Democrats — a third of the caucus took the unusual step of signing a letter urging the president to nominate her, even before the White House indicated it was leaning toward Mr. Summers — Senate Republicans will be more difficult to persuade.

#### Capital key to securing Fed chair confirmation

Rushton 9/14/13 (Katherine, The Telegraph of London, "Obama's big Fed dilemma," http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10309423/Obamas-big-Fed-dilemma.html)

As with many senior appointments in the US government, the president nominates a candidate to be Federal Reserve chairman and puts that name to a senate vote.¶ President Barack Obama is expected to name his choice this autumn, preparing the Fed for the departure of its current chairman, Ben Bernanke, in January. However, there is no fixed date for the nomination.¶ “The only deadline is when Mr Bernanke leaves. There is no atomic bomb,” says Prof Susan Rose-Ackerman, professor of law and political science at Yale.¶ The senate will debate the suitability of the candidate before voting. Senators do not have a formal debate on alternative candidates unless the nominee is rejected.¶ The president will have taken plenty of soundings about Larry Summers and Janet Yellen before he makes his formal nomination, and will have a clear idea of the level of support he can expect.¶ The odds of him being overruled by the senate are “pretty small”, says Prof Rose-Ackerman – even in these politically volatile times – but his choice of candidate will define how much of a fight the president has to have and how much energy he has to expend getting his choice.¶ “It is more of a question of how much hassle does he have to go through? How much political capital does he have to use?” she said.

### Impact – Key to Global Econ

#### Yellen confirmation key to the global economy

Reuters 10/9/13 ("Instant View - Yellen to be nominated for Fed chair," http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/09/uk-usa-economy-instant-idUKBRE99717920131009)

BONNIE BAHA, HEAD OF GLOBAL DEVELOPED CREDIT AT DOUBLELINE CAPITAL LP, LOS ANGELES:¶ "I think it's fair to say that the anxiety level in the markets has elevated materially over the last several trading sessions. The announcement of the Yellen nomination is far from random and should have a calming effect on global capital markets. The escalating rhetoric between Obama and Congress has the potential to spiral out of control quickly given the looming debt ceiling deadline. With at least one major uncertainty removed the hope must be that this announcement buys some time for all parties involved with respect to the ongoing budget debate."¶ ROBERTO PERLI, CORNERSTONE MACRO, WASHINGTON:¶ "I think markets will receive the news well (aside from the fiscal debacle). It resolves an important uncertainty as to the direction of the Fed, and points overall to a market-friendly Fed, in the sense that premature removal of policy accommodation becomes now less likely. In terms of communication style I see Yellen as more likely to be upfront about her own views than Bernanke is, to be less of a consensus seeker at all costs, to defer less to the FOMC consensus, and to produce clearer communication as a result."¶ MICHAEL S. HANSON, SENIOR ECONOMIST, BOFA MERRILL LYNCH GLOBAL RESEARCH, NEW YORK:¶ "Not surprised. With all the fiscal issues currently before the Senate, confirmation may not be complete until later November or early December. Means continuity in Fed policy going forward. Market will discover over time that she isn't the perma-dove that some have suggested, but easy policy will remain in place for some time - as the Bernanke Fed has already indicated."¶ JOHN BRYNJOLFSSON, CIO OF ARMORED WOLF, ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA:¶ "With betting odds stacked 85 percent in her favour, hardly a surprise. Her reputation is one of emphasizing the dual mandate, and within the dual mandate, fostering full employment, so is more dovish than Bernanke.¶ "While hawks fear that this dovishness risks inflating bubbles, paradoxically Yellen's reputation for more than cordial collaboration may mean the Fed fully airs hawks' concerns before voting on policy, and suggests (Bernanke's) grand plan of making the Fed a more process-based institution than a personality-based institution, may be the result."¶ ANNETTE BEACHER, HEAD OF ASIA-PACIFIC RESEARCH, TD SECURITIES, SINGAPORE:¶ "The markets are loving it is what I can say. The U.S. dollar has weakened appropriately. Our base case is that if Yellen is now in the race - although this needs to be approved by the Senate - it delays the potential for tapering.¶ "If Yellen is confirmed, it's more likely that tapering won't be until March at the earliest. From a financial markets perspective everyone is comfortable with the Yellen nomination. She's certainly well-known, she's certainly well-known to be dovish so this is extremely good for risk assets, it should be good for equities, it should be good for emerging markets. It's a risk-positive piece of news for the otherwise ongoing U.S. government deadlock."¶ CRAIG JAMES, CHIEF ECONOMIST, COMMONWEALTH SECURITIES, SYDNEY:¶ "The view is that Janet Yellen would basically follow similar policies as Ben Bernanke, which means that she's going to taper or wind back stimulus only slowly over time. That suggests that the U.S. dollar is going to remain relatively low. We've seen reaction in financial markets today where both the euro and Aussie dollar have spiked somewhat higher.¶ "It's still a case that it's more speculative rather than anything else, but if the confirmation does go through as widely perceived then it's going to be a case of business as usual for the Federal Reserve. It's just a case of handing the baton from the chairman to the vice chairman, so that's comforting for the global economy, comforting for financial markets, that you've got continuity at one of the most important organisations in the world."¶ BRAD DELONG, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY:¶ "I do not think any chair nominee ever has been better prepared to take the job than Janet Yellen is right now. And I think it is good that she is so prepared. If Obama does nominate her in the Senate does confirm her, she will face challenges of the same order of magnitude that Paul Volker and Marriner Eccles faced. It is news that does make me sleep easier."¶

#### Yellen confirmation key to the global economy – ensures FOMC/Fed policy continuity

Rushton 9/14/13 (Katherine, The Telegraph of London, "Obama's big Fed dilemma," http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/10309423/Obamas-big-Fed-dilemma.html)

Whoever wins the chairmanship will have their hands on the levers of the biggest economy in the world. The decisions the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) takes – setting interest rates and deciding if and when to wind back quantitative easing – have mighty ramifications for the rest of the global economy.¶ Yellen’s expected ascension to the seat of power was thrown into turmoil in July, when it was reported that President Barack Obama had privately signalled his support for Summers.¶ This was a surprise to both sides of the political divide. Summers, who served as US Treasury Secretary under Bill Clinton between 1999 and 2001, is blamed by many economists as one of the key architects of the financial crisis.¶ Although Wall Street enjoyed his fervour for deregulation, it is now argued that Summers laid the foundation for a series of policy mistakes, including doing away with the 1933 Glass Steagall Act which separated commercial and investment banking. He also strenuously resisted calls for a regulatory crackdown on the derivatives market which could arguably have helped prevent the banking crisis.¶ “The policies he promoted as Treasury Secretary and in his subsequent writings led to the economic disaster that we now face,” says Dean Baker, an economist at Washington’s Centre for Economic Policy and Research.¶ Summers’ reputed arrogance and stubbornness also left him with a long list of enemies, both in Washington and the wider corporate world.¶ Bradley Frank, one of the architects of the Dodd Frank Act which was designed to clean up the banking crisis – effectively reinstituting many of the regulations Summers helped to abolish – declined to comment on the prospect of Summers’ return to the seat of power. “I have too many personal relationships,” he said.¶ There is little doubt that Summers is a talented economist with a fearsome intellect, but when weighing how well suited he is to become Fed chairman, Obama will have to consider whether those strengths are enough to outweigh Summers’ weaknesses and the noses it will put out of joint.¶ For many Fed watchers, this issue drives to the heart of the decision facing Obama. The risk Summers poses has less to do with his position on economic policy and more to do with the instability his appointment could trigger at the central bank at a crucial time.¶ Michael Gapen, chief economist at Barclays Capital, who previously worked at the Fed, says: “The Fed is an institution that has historically acted with a lot of unanimity and consensus. They think that policy is best conducted when it comes from a clear, unified voice.”¶ Policy decisions come down to a vote, where each of the 12-members of the FOMC theoretically have equal power. But it is understood for those around the table that they should take a more unified stand behind the chairman than they may actually feel.¶ Gapen will not say who out of Summers and Yellen he supports in terms of ability, but he strongly favours the latter when it comes to preserving stability at a crucial time.¶ “We are in uncharted territory in terms of monetary policy. Whoever the new chair is will need to maintain the consensus-oriented nature of the board to maintain policy effectiveness,” he says.¶ “Yellen represents the most logical choice in terms of policy continuity. We know her views. She has been in the Federal Reserve system since 1977 and is a career central banker. She has many statements on the public record, so we know where she stands on issues of monetary policy. Summers represents someone we don’t know.¶ “There will be a lot of change under a new Fed chairman, and there will be even more change under Summers because Yellen would be very unlikely to stay – and the departure of [both] Bernanke and Yellen would represent a lot of institutional knowledge walking out of the door.”¶ Yellen has an impressive record of forecasting economic trends correctly – even in the last few, tumultuous years – and was one of the first to warn that the US housing market would collapse long before its 2008 unravelling.

### A2: Hutchinson

**Their evidence goes the wrong way --- it says confirmation fights don’t derail the rest of the agenda not that political capital isn’t key to get confirmations. Prefer our Yellin-specific evidence.**

**Their evidence doesn’t assume the partisan nature of Congress and recent trends.**

**Wilson**, 12/26/20**12** (Reid, Congress has outsized influence over Obama’s Cabinet, Government Executive, p. <http://www.govexec.com/management/2012/12/congress-has-outsized-influence-over-obamas-cabinet/60345/>)

There has long been a general consensus on Capitol Hill that, barring a nominee's significant legal, ethical or moral pothole, a president should be able to run his administration with the personnel he chooses. But as he builds a team for his second term, President Obama has allowed Congress to influence his choices. While Supreme Court nominees now must undergo all but guaranteed political fights, Cabinet nominees have rarely had to sweat out a close Senate vote. And almost none have had to overcome a filibuster; even arch-conservative Republican John Ashcroft, picked to become George W. Bush's attorney general, avoided a filibuster and won confirmation with just 55 votes. In American history, before Obama took office, only seven Cabinet appointees have been rejected, and another thirteen have been withdrawn before the Senate turned them away. But the pace is picking up; seven of those unlucky 20 nominees have occurred under Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama. Clinton tried four times to pick an attorney general after his first choice, Zoe Baird, withdrew just five days after she was nominated; his second and third picks demurred even before they were officially nominated. Anthony Lake, Hershel Gober, Linda Chavez, Bernie Kerik, Bill Richardson and Tom Daschle all pulled the plug on their own nominations. The increasing frequency of a president's personnel picks who can't win confirmation could be a symptom of an increasingly partisan Senate, where 60 votes are required to overcome more common filibusters, said Sarah Binder, a senior fellow of governance studies at the Brookings Institution and The George Washington University. "The pattern of challenging would-be nominees is consistent with Republicans' willingness to exploit their procedural rights across the president's agenda," Binder said. "When the parties aren't so polarized, it's easier to find a nominee acceptable to your own party and to some centrist members of the opposition. When the parties polarize, it's not so easy to find acceptable nominees, particularly if senators are willing to flex their parliamentary muscles."

### 2NC Key to Trade

#### Yellen will push trade policies

Appelbaum 13 (Binyamin Appelbaum, The New York Times 10-10-13, “For Yellen, a focus on reducing unemployment,” <http://www.ndtv.com/article/people/for-yellen-a-focus-on-reducing-unemployment-430256>)

Thirty years later, Yellen and the debate about the Fed's abilities have both moved from the theoretical world of academia to the Fed itself. As the central bank's vice chairwoman since 2010, she has pressed for stronger measures to reduce unemployment, battling the doubts of other Fed officials about the value of continuing to expand the Fed's enormous stimulus campaign. Yellen, 67, now finds herself as President Barack Obama's nominee to succeed the Fed chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, at the end of January, largely because many Democrats view Yellen as the best person to press that stimulus campaign and to strengthen financial regulation. Senate Democrats prevented the nomination of Obama's first choice, Lawrence H. Summers. For Yellen, who was drawn to study economics as a path into public service and aspired as a college student to work at the Fed, the top job at the central bank would be a logical if - until only recently - unexpected culmination. Her confirmation also would reinforce the Fed's evolution from an institution run by market-wise bureaucrats focused on controlling inflation to an institution run by academics committed to a broader mission of steady growth and minimal unemployment. Yellen's intellectual roots and leadership style both suggest that she would push somewhat more forcefully than Bernanke to extend the Fed's stimulus campaign, according to a review of her career and interviews with more than two dozen colleagues and acquaintances. She has expressed greater concern about the economic consequences of unemployment, a stronger conviction in the Fed's ability to stimulate job growth and a greater willingness to tolerate a little more inflation in order to reduce unemployment more quickly. Until recently, her emphasis on unemployment would likely have disqualified her for the job, and it has already inspired opposition from some Senate Republicans and investors concerned that she would not be sufficiently vigilant in guarding against inflation. Yellen is also a more assertive leader than Bernanke and appears less averse to conflict. While both encourage open debate and seek to make decisions by consensus, Yellen has been a more vocal and persistent advocate for her own views. Bernanke has allowed Fed officials to air their views freely, while Yellen has expressed concern that the cacophony undermines the Fed's effectiveness by sowing confusion about the direction of policy. "I think she is fundamentally committed to continuity, that we still have a problem and we still need monetary policy to be doing a fair amount," said Christina D. Romer, a former chairwoman of Obama's Council of Economic Advisers and a close friend of Yellen's. "There's a toughness there, and I think there's a toughness to her that there isn't in Bernanke." Yet it is easy to overstate the changes Yellen likely would bring. She would be the first Democrat to lead the Fed in nearly three decades, but a liberal central banker is something different from - and more conservative than - a liberal politician. She was instrumental in the Fed's decision last year to declare a target of 2 percent annual inflation, and has shown a very limited willingness to tolerate higher inflation. On regulatory issues, too, Yellen's views are closer to those of the Obama administration than to those of the left-leaning Democrats most fervently seeking her nomination. She believes markets are imperfect and require significant regulation. But she favored the emergence in the 1990s of financial giants like Citigroup and has not supported calls for their breakup. And Yellen may find her own instincts constrained by the increasingly restive minority of Fed officials who want to start pulling back from the stimulus campaign. Richard W. Fisher, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas - who will become a voting member of the Fed's policy-making committee next year as part of a regular rotation - is among those officials. Of Yellen, he said last week, "She's wrong on policy, but she's a darn good, decent, wonderful person." Yellen, like many economists of her generation, was drawn to the field by an interest in the Great Depression. Economics allowed her to combine a love for the rigor of mathematics with a desire to work on issues affecting people's lives. Born in New York City in 1946, she was raised in a middle-class neighborhood. Her mother, a teacher with an interest in finance, stayed home to raise Janet and her brother, John. Her father, a family doctor, saw patients in a home office he closed Wednesday afternoons so the family could spend time together. Some of Yellen's classmates at Fort Hamilton High School, from which she graduated in 1963, remember a smart and devoted student who seemed a little removed from their teenage world of music, parties and political ferment. "She was a good friend and a good companion," said Charles Saydah, who was in many of Yellen's classes and hung out with the same group of friends, which he described as "the kids who were interested in folk songs." But "from where I was sitting," Saydah added, "it was clear that this was a way station to better things" for her. Each year, the editor of the student newspaper interviewed the class valedictorian. Yellen was both, so she interviewed herself. She talked about her love of travel, her rock collection - "I've been collecting rocks since I was 8 and have over 200 different specimens" - and her plans for college. "I've decided to major in math or anthropology or economics or ..." she wrote. After enrolling at Brown University, it did not take long to narrow the list. "She took her first economics course and came home and gave me the one-hour lecture on why economics was the greatest thing going," Susan Grosart, a childhood friend, said, recalling the Christmas vacation of their freshman year. "It was pretty obvious from then on that that was her passion." Yellen decided to pursue a doctorate at Yale University after hearing a speech by James Tobin, the economist whom she still regards as her intellectual hero. Tobin was a staunch defender of the view that government policy could lift an economy from recession. She also admired the way he mixed academic work with public service. "He encouraged his students to do work that was about something," Yellen told the Yale Daily News after Tobin's death in 2002. "Work that would not only meet a high intellectual standard, but would improve the well-being of mankind." Yellen and Akerlof spent much of the 1980s trying to understand unemployment - at the office, at the dinner table and on vacation in Hawaii, where they rarely entered the water, preferring to read economics books on the beach. The couple met in 1977 in a cafeteria at the Fed, where both had taken research positions. Yellen had not secured tenure after six years as a junior professor at Harvard University; Akerlof had been denied a full professorship at Berkeley. "We liked each other immediately and decided to get married," Akerlof wrote in a personal history after winning the Nobel Prize in 2001. "Not only did our personalities mesh perfectly, but we have also always been in all but perfect agreement about macroeconomics. Our lone disagreement is that she is a bit more supportive of free trade than I."

### U – Top of Agenda/A2 Thumpers

#### Yellen confirmation at the top of the agenda now AND confirmation increasingly likely

Schnayer 10/25/13 (Joshua, Contributor @ American Spectator, "Preparations Underway for Yellen’s Coronation at Fed," http://spectator.org/blog/2013/10/25/preparations-underway-for-yell)

Washington, D.C. is preparing for Janet Yellen’s nomination proceedings for Federal Reserve chair, and it appears increasingly likely that she will be confirmed. The only known obstacle standing in the way of her assumption of that most high office is Rand Paul, who announced his plans to put the banker’s nomination on hold.¶ Yellen was officially nominated by President Obama on October 9 after a long period of front-runner status following Larry Summers’ exit from contention. Yellen has had an extensive relationship with the Federal Reserve system: She’s served as the head of the San Francisco branch president, and currently serves as vice chair of the Federal Open Market Committee board of governors. She’s famous for emphasizing the labor and employment aspects of the Federal Reserve’s mandates. Known as an inflation “dove,” it is widely speculated that Yellen will gladly continue the Fed’s policy of low interest rates even after reaching stated target unemployment levels.¶ The Federal Reserve Board of Governors seemed to have been anticipating Yellen, and it is likely that a transition from Bernanke to Yellen will be smooth, given that Yellen will likely continue or accelerate quantitative easing policies such as have characterized the last few years of Bernanke’s second term.¶ Yellen will soon begin meeting with members of Congress, most notably the Senate Banking Committee, where certain members have doubled as cheerleaders for her nomination, and will likely continue to wave pom-poms as she undergoes the hearing process. Recent filibusterer Ted Cruz, meanwhile, has vowed to keep an “open mind” on Yellen, suggesting that he won’t stand in the way of the nomination. Rand Paul, another filibusterer and someone who has a strong aversion to the current state of the Federal Reserve, will almost certainly put up resistance, but it’s not clear whether he will be able to singlehandedly stall or block the nomination.

#### Yellen confirmation is at the top of the Senate agenda now

Lesniewski 10/25/13 (Niels, Roll Call, "Rand Paul May Lack Leverage Over Fed Nominee Yellen (Video)," http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/rand-paul-lacks-leverage-over-fed-nominee-janet-yellen-video/)

Sen. Rand Paul is getting a lot of attention this morning for his threat to hold up the nomination of Janet L. Yellen to head the Federal Reserve, but he may have very little leverage to stop her confirmation.¶ The Kentucky Republican is seeking a vote on his Federal Reserve transparency legislation as part of considering the Yellen nomination. The announcement came in a YouTube video posted Thursday by the Campaign for Liberty, a nonprofit affiliated with Paul’s father, former Rep. Ron Paul, R-Texas.¶ Legislation to require an audit of the Federal Reserve has had bipartisan support in the past when pushed by both Pauls, but it has faced no shortage of opposition and roadblocks.¶ “Sen. Rand Paul will be demanding a vote on audit the Fed in the Senate when they consider the new Fed nominee,” John Tate, the chairman of Campaign for Liberty, said in the video.¶ However, Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., could decide to ignore Paul’s request by moving to limit debate on Yellen’s nomination by filing cloture. If Reid gets 60 votes, there’s no need to make a deal with Paul or anyone else. Yellen appears to already have enough support to overcome a filibuster, unless Republicans and some sympathetic Democrats decide to back his quest for a vote on the audit bill.¶ “Right now, the Senate is preparing to debate and confirm the new Obama nominee to chair the Federal Reserve,” Paul said. “I say vote no on a new Fed chairman without a vote on my audit the Fed bill. This will be the fight of our lives.”

#### Top of the Senate agenda

Reis and Volz 10/24/13 (Patrick and Dustin, National Journal, "Obamacare Hearing Made Easy, Thinking Robots and Why You're a Republican (or Democrat)—THE EDGE," http://www.nationaljournal.com/the-edge/obamacare-hearing-made-easy-thinking-robots-and-why-you-re-a-republican-or-democrat-the-edge-20131024)

TODAY IN ONE PARAGRAPH: Contractors responsible for designing HealthCare.gov painted a picture today of a rushed rollout in their testimony to Congress. The contractors blamed the administration for the site's problems, but they also blamed each other, swapping accusations over which parts of the website were to blame for its struggles. Elsewhere, Janet Yellen is preparing her push to be confirmed as head of the Fed, and she plans to begin meeting with senators next week. And overseas, key U.S. allies remain incensed over revelations of spying on foreign leaders.

### A2: Winners Win – 2NC

#### Winners win makes no sense – Obama doesn’t push the plan – he fights it – that’s our link

#### Winners don’t win

Eberly 13 - assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland

Todd, “The presidential power trap,” Baltimore Sun, 1/21/13, Lexis

Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap. Presidents in recent years from have been unable to prevent their political capital eroding. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform — that at the time received popular approval.¶ However, short-term legislative strategies may win policy success for a president but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital over time, as the difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved the political capital problem or avoided the power trap. It is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.

#### Obama thinks that pol cap is finite – he’ll back off controversial issues even if he’s winning

Kuttner 9 (Robert – , co-editor of The American Prospect and a senior fellow at Demos, author of "Obama's Challenge: America's Economic Crisis and the Power of a Transformative Presidency, 4/28/9, “Obama Has Amassed Enormous Political Capital, But He Doesn't Know What to Do with It,” <http://www.alternet.org/economy/138641/obama_has_amassed_enormous_political_capital,_but_he_doesn%27t_know_what_to_do_with_it/?page=entire>)

We got a small taste of what a more radical break might feel like when Obama briefly signaled with the release of Bush's torture memos that he might be open to further investigation of the Bush's torture policy, but then backtracked and quickly asked the Democratic leadership to shut the idea down. Evidently, Obama's political self wrestled with his constitutional conscience, and won. Civil libertarians felt a huge letdown, but protest was surprisingly muted.

Thus the most important obstacle for seizing the moment to achieve enduring change: Barack Obama's conception of what it means to promote national unity. Obama repeatedly declared during the campaign that he would govern as a consensus builder. He wasn't lying. However, there are two ways of achieving consensus. One is to split the difference with your political enemies and the forces obstructing reform. The other is to use presidential leadership to transform the political center and alter the political dynamics. In his first hundred days, Obama has done a little of both, but he defaults to the politics of accommodation.

#### Winners lose – any major win is the quickest way to kill future proposals. The GOP will backlash

**The Economist**, 2/16/**2011** (What’s the equilibrium here?, p. lexis)

The Obama administration's theory of policymaking amid divided government is a frustrating one. What most people want from the president is to lead. And leading, in this case, means giving a speech, getting behind some unpopular ideas, trying to change public opinion... But the White House has come to the conclusion that that type of leadership doesn't work. It believes that the **quickest way to kill a controversial proposal** in a polarized political system is to have the president endorse it. Once a high-profile proposal is associated with the White House, Republicans (correctly) view its passage as a **threat to their political fortunes**. That's why the Obama administration didn't endorse a payroll tax holiday until after the election, when it emerged as part of the tax deal. Endorsing it before the election would've "**poisoned the well**," one administration official told me after. Republicans would have had to attack it, and that would have made it impossible for them to endorse it later. The Obama administration may have a point here. Consider one item that the president has repeatedly, openly pushedinvestment in America's long-neglected intercity rail system. Republican governors are cancelling rail plans as fast as they can. Florida Governor Rick Scott just scrapped a Florida plan, despite the fact that the federal government was going to cover most of the capital costs, while private companies were offering to cover the rest in exchange for the right to operate the line. On the other hand, Mr Obama responded to Republican budget proposals that avoided addressing entitlements by...releasing a budget that avoided addressing entitlements. And lo and behold, Republican congressional leaders are now scrambling to include entitlement reforms in new budget plans. Maybe the president has this whole reverse psychology thing figured out. But I doubt this is a stable equilibrium. The GOP's reflexive **anti-Obama streak** is motivated, one presumes, by a desire to win elections. One supposes that they feel they must **deny him legislative victories** in order to be successful at the ballot box. So for a while, presidential abdication of leadership may create political space for something like honest legislative negotiations over policy. But a grand bargain that takes place under Mr Obama's watch is a **political victory** for Mr Obama, whether or not he led the charge. And the GOP is **unlikely to let the president have such a win**.

#### Controversial wins bleed momentum not build it.

**Politico**, 1/20/**2010** (Obama's first year: What went wrong, p. http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=4DF829C9-18FE-70B2-A8381A971FA3FFC9)

Obama believed that early success would be self-reinforcing, building a powerful momentum for bold government action. This belief was the essence of the White House’s theory of the “big bang” — that success in passing a big stimulus package would lead to success in passing health care, which in turn would clear the way for major cap-and-trade environmental legislation and “re-regulation” of the financial services sector — all in the first year. This proved to be a radical misreading of the dynamics of power. The massive cost of the stimulus package and industry bailouts — combined with the inconvenient fact that unemployment went up after their passage — meant that Obama spent the year bleeding momentum rather than steadily increasing public confidence in his larger governing vision. That vision was further obscured for many Americans by the smoke from the bitter and seemingly endless legislative battle on Capitol Hill over health care.

#### Wins don’t spill over – empirically proven

**Hertzberg**, 2/7/**2011** (Hendrik – senior editor and political essayist at the New Yorker, The New Yorker, p. http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/02/07/110207taco\_talk\_hertzberg?printable=true)

Strong words. But now they are not even whispered. The climate bill, like hundreds of others less consequential, met its fate on the legislative terminal ward that is the United States Senate, where bleeding is still the treatment of choice. The bill died of complete organ failure, you might say. The contributing causes included the economic crisis, which made it easy to stoke fear; the power, money, and regional clout of sectors that benefit from the greenhouse-gas-producing status quo, especially the coal and oil industries; the Republican congressional leadership’s determination to forgo compromise in favor of a disciplined drive to block anything that might resemble a victory for Obama; the rise of the Tea Party right and the baleful influence of talk radio and Fox News; and, as always, the filibuster. But Obama and the White House cannot escape blame. They botched delicate negotiations in the Senate, were neglectful at key moments, and expended little of the courage, imagination, and resources they brought to health-care reform. Perhaps they calculated that winning health care would strengthen them for climate change, like Popeye after a helping of spinach. But the political effect, at least in its immediate manifestations, was more like Kryptonite.

#### Winners win not true for Obama – must be large, popular and on economic issue

**Kuttner 11** (Robert, co-founder and co-editor of The American Prospect, as well as a distinguished senior fellow of the think tank Demos, 5/16, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack\_obamas\_theory\_of\_power)

Obama won more legislative trophies during his first two years than Clinton did, but in many respects, they were poisoned chalices. Health reform proved broadly unpopular because of political missteps—a net negative for Democrats in the 2010 midterm. The stimulus, though valuable, was too small to be a major political plus. Obama hailed it as a great victory rather than pledging to come back for more until recovery was assured. He prematurely abandoned the fight for jobs as his administration’s central theme, though the recession still wracked the nation. And because of the administration’s alliance with Wall Street, Obama suffered both the appearance and reality of being too close to the bankers, despite a partial success on financial reform. Obama’s mortgage-rescue program was the worst of both worlds—it failed to deliver enough relief to make an economic difference yet still signaled politically disabling sympathy for both “deadbeat” homeowners and for bankers. (See this month’s special report on page A1.)

#### Wins only build long-term capital – link outweighs

Purdum 10, Columnist for Vanity Fair, (Todd, “Obama Is Suffering Because of His Achievements, Not Despite Them,” 12-20 [www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html](http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html))

With this weekend’s decisive Senate repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for gay service members, can anyone seriously doubt Barack Obama’s patient willingness to play the long game? Or his remarkable success in doing so? In less than two years in office—often against the odds and the smart money’s predictions at any given moment—Obama has managed to achieve a landmark overhaul of the nation’s health insurance system; the most sweeping change in the financial regulatory system since the Great Depression; the stabilization of the domestic auto industry; and the repeal of a once well-intended policy that even the military itself had come to see as unnecessary and unfair. So why isn’t his political standing higher? Precisely because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved. Obama has pushed through large and complicated new government initiatives at a time of record-low public trust in government (and in institutions of any sort, for that matter), and he has suffered not because he hasn’t “done” anything but because he’s done so much—way, way too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics. With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated, filling the airwaves and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another. Is it any wonder the guy is bleeding a bit? For his part, Obama resists the pugilistic impulse. To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident, and he has been the first to acknowledge that he has not always done all he could to explain them, sensibly and simply, to the American public. But Obama is nowhere near so politically maladroit as his frustrated liberal supporters—or implacable right-wing opponents—like to claim. He proved as much, if nothing else, with his embrace of the one policy choice he surely loathed: his agreement to extend the Bush-era income tax cuts for wealthy people who don’t need and don’t deserve them. That broke one of the president’s signature campaign promises and enraged the Democratic base and many members of his own party in Congress. But it was a cool-eyed reflection of political reality: The midterm election results guaranteed that negotiations would only get tougher next month, and a delay in resolving the issue would have forced tax increases for virtually everyone on January 1—creating nothing but uncertainty for taxpayers and accountants alike. Obama saw no point in trying to score political debating points in an argument he knew he had no chance of winning. Moreover, as The Washington Post’s conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer bitterly noted, Obama’s agreement to the tax deal amounted to a second economic stimulus measure—one that he could never otherwise have persuaded Congressional Republicans to support. Krauthammer denounced it as the “swindle of the year,” and suggested that only Democrats could possibly be self-defeating enough to reject it. In the end, of course, they did not. Obama knows better than most people that politics is the art of the possible (it’s no accident that he became the first black president after less than a single term in the Senate), and an endless cycle of two steps forward, one step back. So he just keeps putting one foot in front of the other, confident that he can get where he wants to go, eventually. The short-term results are often messy and confusing. Just months ago, gay rights advocates were distraught because Obama wasn’t pressing harder to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Now he is apparently paying a price for his victory because some Republican Senators who’d promised to support ratification of the START arms-reduction treaty—identified by Obama as a signal priority for this lame-duck session of Congress—are balking because Obama pressed ahead with repealing DADT against their wishes. There is a price for everything in politics, and Obama knows that, too.

### Political Capital Key – 2NC

#### Prefer issue specific evidence – 1NC \_\_\_\_ indicates that Obama’s use of political capital will help \_\_\_\_\_ becomes successful and is a critical factor

#### Presidential leadership shapes the agenda

Kuttner 11 (Robert, Senior Fellow – Demos and Co-editor – American Prospect, “Barack Obama's Theory of Power,” The American Prospect, 5-16, <http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack_obamas_theory_of_power>)

As the political scientist Richard Neustadt observed in his classic work, Presidential Power, a book that had great influence on President John F. Kennedy, the essence of a president’s power is “the power to persuade.” Because our divided constitutional system does not allow the president to lead by commanding, presidents amass power by making strategic choices about when to use the latent authority of the presidency to move public and elite opinion and then use that added prestige as clout to move Congress. In one of Neustadt’s classic case studies, Harry Truman, a president widely considered a lame duck, nonetheless persuaded the broad public and a Republican Congress in 1947-1948 that the Marshall Plan was a worthy idea. As Neustadt and Burns both observed, though an American chief executive is weak by constitutional design, a president possesses several points of leverage. He can play an effective outside game, motivating and shaping public sentiment, making clear the differences between his values and those of his opposition, and using popular support to box in his opponents and move them in his direction. He can complement the outside bully pulpit with a nimble inside game, uniting his legislative party, bestowing or withholding benefits on opposition legislators, forcing them to take awkward votes, and using the veto. He can also enlist the support of interest groups to pressure Congress, and use media to validate his framing of choices. Done well, all of this signals leadership that often moves the public agenda.

### War Powers – Link – 2NC

#### Congressional criticism of war powers saps capital

Kriner 10 (Douglas L. Kriner, assistant professor of political science at Boston University, “After the

Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec

1, 2010, page 68-69)

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives . Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### Plan is a perceived loss for Obama that saps his capital

Loomis, 7 --- Department of Government at Georgetown

(3/2/2007, Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy,” pg 35-36, <http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php>)

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, ¶ In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. ¶ Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. ¶ The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.¶ This brief review of the literature suggests how legitimacy norms enhance presidential influence in ways that structural powers cannot explain. Correspondingly, increased executive power improves the prospects for policy success. As a variety of cases indicate—from Woodrow Wilson’s failure to generate domestic support for the League of Nations to public pressure that is changing the current course of U.S. involvement in Iraq—the effective execution of foreign policy depends on public support. Public support turns on perceptions of policy legitimacy. As a result, policymakers—starting with the president—pay close attention to the receptivity that U.S. policy has with the domestic public. In this way, normative influences infiltrate policy-making processes and affect the character of policy decisions.

### Drone Stuff

#### Obama fights the plan and sparks controversial battles in Congress – targeted killing is heavily criticized

Radsan and Murphy 12 (Afsheen John – Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2002 to 2004, and Richard – AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, “The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA Targeted Killing”, 2012, 5 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 439, lexis)

This scenario emphasizes a simple point: President Obama, a Harvard Law School graduate, a former teacher of constitutional law at the University of Chicago and a Nobel Peace Laureate, must believe that he has the authority to order the CIA to fire missiles from drones to kill suspected terrorists. Not everyone agrees with him, though. For almost a decade now, the United States has been firing missiles from unmanned drones to kill people identified as leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban. This "targeted killing" has engendered controversy in policymaking and legal circles, spilling into law review articles, op-ed pieces, congressional hearings, and television programs. n2 On one level, this [\*441] controversy is curious. A state has considerable authority in war to kill enemy combatants - whether by gun, bomb, or cruise missile - so long as those attacks obey basic, often vague, rules (e.g., avoidance of "disproportionate" collateral damage). So what is so different about targeted killing by drone? Some of the concerns about a CIA drone campaign relate to the personalized nature of targeted killing. All attacks in an armed conflict must, as a matter of basic law and common sense, be targeted. To attack something, whether by shooting a gun at a person or dropping a bomb on a building, is to target it. "Targeted killing," however, refers to a premeditated attack on a specific person. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for instance, ordered Admiral Yamamoto killed not because he was any Japanese sailor, but because he was the author of "tora, tora, tora" on Pearl Harbor. President Obama, more recently, ordered Osama bin Laden killed not because the Saudi was any member of al Qaeda, but because he was the author of 9/11 who continued to command the terrorist organization. Targeted killing is psychologically disturbing because it is individualized. It is easier for a U.S. operator to kill a faceless soldier in a uniform than someone whom the operator has been tracking with photographs, videos, voice samples, and biographical information in an intelligence file. There is also concern that drones will attack improperly identified targets or cause excessive collateral damage. Targets who hide among peaceful civilians heighten these dangers. Of course, drone strikes should be far more precise than bombs dropped from a piloted aircraft. The lower [\*442] "costs" of drone strikes, however, encourage governments to resort to deadly force more quickly - a trend that may accelerate as drone technology rapidly improves and perhaps becomes fully automated through advances in artificial intelligence. Paradoxically, improved precision could lead to an increase in deadly mistakes. Another concern relates to granting an intelligence agency trigger authority. Entrusting drones to the CIA, an intelligence agency with a checkered history as to the use of force whose activities are largely conducted in secret, heightens concerns in some quarters that strikes may sometimes kill the wrong people for the wrong reasons. If applied sloppily or maliciously, targeted killing by drones could amount to nothing more than advanced death squads. For these and related reasons, the use of killer drones merits serious thought and criticism. Along these lines, many opponents of the reported CIA program have decried it as illegal. Without questioning their sincerity, one can acknowledge the soundness of their tactics. "Law talk" offers them a strong weapon. How could anyone, without shame or worse, support an illegal killing campaign? Illegality is for gangsters, drug dealers, and other outlaws - not the Oval Office.

### A2: Executive wants it

#### Disagreements over authority trigger constitutional showdowns – even if the executive wants the plan – it’s about who decides, not the decision itself

**Posner and Vermeule, 10** - \*professor of law at the University of Chicago AND \*\*professor of law at Harvard (Eric and Adrian, The Executive Unbound, p. 75-77)

Showdowns occur when the location of constitutional authority for making an important policy decision is ambiguous, and multiple political agents (branches, parties, sections, governments) have a strong interest in establishing that the authority lies with them. Although agents often have an interest in negotiating a settlement, asymmetric information about the interests and bargaining power of opposing parties will sometimes prevent such a settlement from being achieved. That is when a showdown occurs. Ultimately, however, someone must yield; this yielding to or acquiescence in the claimed authority of another agent helps clarify constitutional lines of authority, so that next time the issue arises, a constitutional impasse can be avoided. From a normative standpoint, constitutional showdowns thus have an important benefit, but they are certainly not costless. As long as the showdown lasts, the government may be paralyzed, unable to make important policy decisions, at least with respect to the issue under dispute. We begin by examining a simplified version of our problem, one involving just two agents—Congress and the executive. We assume for now that each agent is a unitary actor with a specific set of interests and capacities. We also assume that each agent has a slightly different utility function, reflecting their distinct constituencies. If we take the median voter as a baseline, we might assume that Congress is a bit to the left (or right) of the median voter, while the president is a bit to the right (or left). We will assume that the two agents are at an equal distance from the median, and that the preferences of the population are symmetrically distributed, so that the median voter will be indifferent between whether the president or Congress makes a particular decision, assuming that they have equal information.39 But we also will assume that the president has better information about some types of problems, and Congress has better information about other types of problems, so that, from the median voter’s standpoint, it is best for the president to make decisions about the first type of problem and for Congress to make decisions about the second type ofproblem.40 Suppose, for example, that the nation is at war and the government must decide whether to terminate it soon or allow it to continue. Congress and the president may agree about what to do, of course. But if they disagree, their disagreement may arise from one or both of two sources. First, Congress and the president have different information. For example, the executive may have better information about the foreign policy ramifications of a premature withdrawal, while Congress has better information about home-front morale. These different sources of information lead the executive to believe that the war should continue, while Congress believes the war should be ended soon. Second, Congress and the president have different preferences because of electoral pressures of their different constituents. Suppose, for example, that the president depends heavily on the continued support of arms suppliers, while crucial members of Congress come from districts dominated by war protestors. Thus, although the median voter might want the war to continue for a moderate time, the president prefers an indefinite extension, while Congress prefers an immediate termination. So far, we have explained why the president and Congress might disagree about when to terminate the war, but mere policy disagreement does not result in a showdown. Showdowns arise only when there is a disagreement about authority. If Congress believes that the president has the sole authority to terminate the war, then his view will prevail. Congress may try to pressure him or influence him by offering support for other programs desired by the president, or by trying to rile up the public, but these activities are part of normal politics, and do not provoke a constitutional showdown. Similarly, if the president believes that Congress has the sole authority to terminate the war, then Congress’s view will prevail. This outcome is shown in cell 3 in table 2.1. Similarly, no showdown occurs when the two branches agree both about authority and policy—for example, that the president decides, and Congress agrees with his decision (cell 1). The first column represents the domain of normal politics. Showdowns can arise only when Congress and the president disagree about who decides. Here, there are two further possibilities. First, Congress and the president disagree about who decides but agree about the correct policy outcome (cell 2). In these situations, which arise with some frequency, the two branches are often tempted to paper over their differences because an immediate policy choice is not at stake. But sometimes a showdown will occur. We will discuss this special case later. Second, Congress and the president disagree about the policy outcome and about authority (cell 4). In this case, showdowns are likely, because a policy decision must be made, and if the parties cannot agree about what it should be, then they cannot avoid resolving the question of authority. We focus on this case for now.