# 1NC

### 1NC

#### A. Interpretation – Statutory restrictions must directly prohibit activities currently under the president’s war powers authority – this excludes regulation or oversight

#### Statutory restrictions prohibit actions

Lamont 5 (Michael, Legal Analyst @ Occupational health, "Legal: Staying on the right side of the law," http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/01/04/2005/29005/legal-staying-on-the-right-side-of-the-law.htm#.UgFe\_o3qnoI)

It will be obvious what 'conduct' and 'redundancy' dismissals are. A statutory restriction means that the employee is prevented by law from doing the job - for example, a driver who loses his driving licence. 'Some other substantial reason' means "Parliament can't be expected to think of everything".

#### Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

#### B. Vote Neg –

#### 1. Limits – Regulation and oversight of authority allows a litany of new affs in each area – justifies indirect effects of statutory policies and affs that don’t alter presidential authority – undermines prep and clash

#### 2. Ground – Restriction ground is the locus of neg prep – their interpretation jacks all core disads – politics, presidential powers, and any area based disad because an aff doesn’t have to prevent the president from doing anything

### 1NC

#### Shutdown will be avoided now

Yglesias 9/18/13 (Matthew, business/economics correspondent @ Slate, "The Odds of a Government Shutdown Are Falling, Not Rising," http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/09/18/government\_shutdown\_odds\_falling\_not\_rising.html)

But read on to the second graf of the piece and you'll see that the odds are not rising at all. What's happening is that John Boehner is preparing to pass an appropriations bill that also defunds Obamacare that he knows perfectly well stands no chance of passing, and he's hoping that doing this will placate the right wing of the his caucus for when he surrenders.¶ Here they explain:¶ House leaders are hoping the vote on the defunding measure will placate conservatives once the Democratically controlled Senate rejects it. The House, they are betting, would then pass a stopgap spending measure unencumbered by such policy baggage and shift the argument to the debt ceiling, which must be raised by mid-October if the government is to avoid an economically debilitating default.¶ The key thing to remember here is that the House, as a discretionary decision, operates by the "Hastert Rule" in which only bills that are supported by a majority of GOP members can be brought to the floor for a vote. There is no Hastert-compliant appropriations bill that can pass the Senate. But there very likely is majority support in the House for the kind of "clean" funding bill that can also pass the Senate. All that has to happen is for John Boehner to violate the Hastert Rule. And the Hastert Rule isn't actually a rule, it's something Boehner has put aside many times. But it's also a rule he can't flagrantly ignore, lest his caucus get too grumpy and depose him. The operating theory here is that if Boehner has the whole House GOP indulge the maximalist faction by all passing a defuding bill, that creates enough room to move to later violate the Hastert Rule and pass a continuing resolution.¶ If anything is happening to the odds of a shutdown, in other words, they're falling, not rising.

#### Obama fights the plan – strongly supports war powers

Rana 11 (Aziz – Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099, lexis)

Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of Barack Obama as President appeared to herald a new approach to security concerns and even the possibility of a fundamental break from Bush-era policies. These hopes were immediately stoked by Obama's decision before taking office to close the Guantanamo Bay prison. n4 Over two years later, however, not only does Guantanamo remain open, but through a recent executive order Obama has formalized a system of indefinite detention for those held there and also has stated that new military commission trials will begin for Guantanamo detainees. n5 More important, in ways small and large, the new administration remains committed to core elements of the previous constitutional vision of national security. Just as their predecessors, Obama officials continue to defend expansive executive detention and war powers and to promote the centrality of state secrecy to national security.

#### Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off

O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis)

a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by first-hand accounts of information battles and by the conclusions of experts who study them. Participants in such battles report that short-term political calculations consistently trump the constitutional interests at stake. One veteran of the first Bush White House, for example, has explained that rational-choice theory predicts what he in fact experienced: The rewards for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the office of the presidency would be largely abstract, since they would consist primarily of fidelity to a certain theory of the Constitution... . The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing purposes, [and] the unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies. n182 Louis Fisher, one of the leading defenders of the political branches' competence and authority to interpret the Constitution independently of the courts, n183 acknowledges that politics and "practical considerations" typically override the legal and constitutional principles implicated in information disputes. n184 In his view, although debate about congressional access and executive privilege "usually proceeds in terms of constitutional doctrine, it is the messy political realities of the moment that usually decide the issue." n185 Indeed, Professor Peter Shane, who has extensively studied such conflicts, concludes that their successful resolution in fact depends upon the parties focusing only on short-term political [\*1123] considerations. n186 When the participants "get institutional," Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187

#### Capital key

Dumain 9/18/13 (Emma, Roll Call, "Will House Democrats Balk at Sequester-Level CR?," http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/will-house-democrats-balk-at-sequester-level-cr/)

What would be helpful for the duration of the political battle over the CR between now and the end of the month, however, is if Obama more frequently took to the “bully pulpit” to blast Republicans and bolster Democrats, the aide said.¶ “The more the better,” he said.

#### Shutdown makes us vulnerable to a cyber-attack

Sideman 11 (Alysia, Federal Computer Week Contributor, “Agencies must determine computer security teams in face of potential federal shutdown” Federal Computer Week, http://fcw.com/Articles/2011/02/23/Agencies-must-determine-computer-security-teams-in-face-of-shutdown.aspx?Page=1)

With the WikiLeaks hacks and other threats to cybersecurity present, guarding against cyberattacks has become a significant part of governing -- especially because most government agencies have moved to online systems.¶ As a potential government shutdown comes closer, agencies must face new questions about defining “essential” computer personnel. Cyber threats weren’t as significant during the 1995 furlough as they are today, reports NextGov. The publication adds that agencies need to buck up and be organized. ¶ In late January, government officials, NATO and the European Union banded together in Brussels to formulate a plan to battle cyber bandits, according to Defense Systems.¶ Leaders there agreed that existing cybersecurity measures were incomplete and decided to fast-track a new plan for cyber incident response.¶ Meanwhile, observers are wondering whether the U.S. government has a plan to deal with cyberattacks in the case of a shutdown.¶ The lists of essential computer security personnel drawn up 15 years ago are irrelevant today, computer specialists told NextGov.¶ In 1995, the only agencies concerned about cybersecurity were entities such as the FBI and CIA. Today, before any potential government shutdown happens, a plan of essential IT personnel should be determined, the specialists add.¶ Agencies should be figuring out which systems will need daily surveillance and strategic defense, as well as evaluating the job descriptions of the people operating in those systems, former federal executives told NextGov.¶ Hord Tipton, a former Interior Department CIO, agrees. “If they haven’t done it, there’s going to be a mad scramble, and there’s going to be a hole in the system,” he told the site. ¶ All government departments are supposed to have contingency plans on deck that spell out essential systems and the employees associated with them, according to federal rules.¶ Meanwhile, some experts say determining which IT workers are essential depends more on the length of the shutdown.¶ Jeffrey Wheatman, a security and privacy analyst with the Gartner research group, tells NextGov that a shutdown lasting a couple of weeks “would require incident response personnel, network administrators and staff who monitor firewall logs for potential intrusions.”¶ If a shutdown lasted a month or longer, more employees would need to report, he said, adding: “New threats could emerge during that time frame, which demands people with strategy-oriented job functions to devise new lines of defense.”¶ Employees who are deemed “essential” are critical to national security.¶ Cyber warfare or holes in cybersecurity can threaten a nation’s infrastructure. In particular, the electric grid, the nation’s military assets, financial sector and telecommunications networks can be vulnerable in the face of an attack, reports Federal Computer Week.

#### Nuclear war.

**Lawson 9** (Sean, Assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, *Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict Escalation*, May 13th 2009, http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477)

Introduction At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, “The Problem with Cyber War,” that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United States. He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalation–i.e. the possibility that offensive use of cyber attacks could escalate to the use of physical force. As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call “**cross-domain responses**” to cyberattacks. Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner Based on the premise that completely blinding a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is iminent, Ranum has argued that “The best thing that you could possibly do if you want to start **World War III** is launch a cyber attack. [...] When people talk about cyber war like it’s a practical thing, what they’re really doing is messing with the OK button for starting World War III. We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k up.” [2] He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past: Taking away an adversary’s ability to make rational decisions could backfire. [3] For example, Gregory Witol cautions that “attacking the decision makerÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s ability to perform rational calculations may cause more problems than it hopes to resolveÃ¢â‚¬Â¦ Removing the capacity for rational action may result in completely unforeseen consequences, including longer and bloodier battles than may otherwise have been.” [4] Ã¯Â»Â¿Cross-Domain Response So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded. But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern. It’s not just worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary. What is also cause for concern is that current U.S. policy indicates that “kinetic attacks” (i.e. physical use of force) are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks. Most worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a **nuclear response** is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a “domain of warfare” equivalent to air, land, sea, and space. The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary. But thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define “cyber attacks” (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war. But what happens if the U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains? It retaliates. But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked. Rather, responses are typically “cross-domain responses”–i.e. a massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the attacker. Even more likely given a U.S. military “way of warfare” that emphasizes multidimensional, “joint” operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously. The possibility of “kinetic action” in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]: Of course, the possibility that a cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in “cross-domain response.” And while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. **defense policy documents**. From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004): “The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical ‘weapons’. They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.” [6] The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying, “Coupled with the declaratory policy on nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating impacts) may be possible. It also sets a relevant scale–a cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness.” [7] Asked by the New York Times to comment on this, U.S. defense officials would not deny that nuclear retaliation remains an option for response to a massive cyberattack: “Pentagon and military officials confirmed that the United States reserved the option to respond in any way it chooses to punish an adversary responsible for a catastrophic cyberattack. While the options could include the use of nuclear weapons, officials said, such an extreme counterattack was hardly the most likely response.” [8] The rationale for this policy: “Thus, the United States never declared that it would be bound to respond to a Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional invasion with only American and NATO conventional forces. The fear of escalating to a nuclear conflict was viewed as a pillar of stability and is credited with helping deter the larger Soviet-led conventional force throughout the cold war. Introducing the possibility of a nuclear response to a catastrophic cyberattack would be expected to serve the same purpose.” [9] Non-unique, Dangerous, and In-credible? There are a couple of interesting things to note in response. First is the development of a new acronym, WMD/E (weapons of mass destruction or effect). Again, this acronym indicates a weakening of the requirement of physical impacts. In this new definition, mass effects that are not necessarily physical, nor necessarily destructive, but possibly only disruptive economically or even psychologically (think “shock and awe”) are seen as equivalent to WMD. This new emphasis on effects, disruption, and psychology reflects both contemporary, but also long-held beliefs within the U.S. defense community. It reflects current thinking in U.S. military theory, in which it is said that U.S. forces should be able to “mass fires” and “mass effects” without having to physically “mass forces.” There is a sliding scale in which the physical (often referred to as the “kinetic”) gradually retreats–i.e. massed forces are most physical; massed fire is less physical (for the U.S. anyway); and massed effects are the least physical, having as the ultimate goal Sun Tzu’s “pinnacle of excellence,” winning without fighting. But the emphasis on disruption and psychology in WMD/E has also been a key component of much of 20th century military thought in the West. Industrial theories of warfare in the early 20th century posited that industrial societies were increasingly interdependent and reliant upon mass production, transportation, and consumption of material goods. Both industrial societies and the material links that held them together, as well as industrial people and their own internal linkages (i.e. nerves), were seen as increasingly fragile and prone to disruption via attack with the latest industrial weapons: airplanes and tanks. Once interdependent and fragile industrial societies were hopelessly disrupted via attack by the very weapons they themselves created, the nerves of modern, industrial men and women would be shattered, leading to moral and mental defeat and a loss of will to fight. Current thinking about the possible dangers of cyber attack upon the U.S. are based on the same basic premises: technologically dependent and therefore fragile societies populated by masses of people sensitive to any disruption in expected standards of living are easy targets. Ultimately, however, a number of researchers have pointed out the pseudo-psychological, pseudo-sociological, and a-historical (not to mention non-unique) nature of these assumptions. [10] Others have pointed out that these assumptions did not turn out to be true during WWII strategic bombing campaigns, that modern, industrial societies and populations were far more resilient than military theorists had assumed. [11] Finally, even some military theorists have questioned the assumptions behind cyber war, especially when assumptions about our own technology dependence-induced societal fragility (dubious on their own) are applied to other societies, especially non-Western societies (even more dubious). [12] Finally, where deterrence is concerned, it is important to remember that a deterrent has to be credible to be effective. True, the U.S. retained nuclear weapons as a deterrent during the Cold War. But, from the 1950s through the 1980s, there was increasing doubt among U.S. planners regarding the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence via the threat of “massive retaliation.” As early as the 1950s it was becoming clear that the U.S. would be reluctant at best to actually follow through on its threat of massive retaliation. Unfortunately, most money during that period had gone into building up the nuclear arsenal; conventional weapons had been marginalized. Thus, the U.S. had built a force it was likely never to use. So, the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s saw the development of concepts like “flexible response” and more emphasis on building up conventional forces. This was the big story of the 1980s and the “Reagan build-up” (not “Star Wars”). Realizing that, after a decade of distraction in Vietnam, it was back in a position vis-a-viz the Soviets in Europe in which it would have to rely on nuclear weapons to offset its own weakness in conventional forces, a position that could lead only to blackmail or holocaust, the U.S. moved to create stronger conventional forces. [13] Thus, the question where cyber war is concerned: If it was in-credible that the U.S. would actually follow through with massive retaliation after a Soviet attack on the U.S. or Western Europe, is it really credible to say that the U.S. would respond with nuclear weapons to a cyber attack, no matter how disruptive or destructive? Beyond credibility, deterrence makes many other assumptions that are problematic in the cyber war context. It assumes an adversary capable of being deterred. Can most of those who would perpetrate a cyber attack be deterred? Will al-Qa’ida be deterred? How about a band of nationalistic or even just thrill-seeker, bandwagon hackers for hire? Second, it assumes clear lines of **command and control**. Sure, some hacker groups might be funded and assisted to a great degree by states. But ultimately, even cyber war theorists will admit that it is doubtful that states have complete control over their armies of hacker mercenaries. How will deterrence play out in this kind of scenario?

### 1NC

#### Text: The Executive Branch of the United States should issue an executive order that states that targeted killing should not be used as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.

#### Self-restraint solves and is more effective than the plan

Posner and Vermeule 10 (Eric A. Posner is the Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law @ the University of Chicago School of Law and Editor of the Journal of Legal Studies, Adrian Vermeule is a legal scholar, Oxford University Press, “The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic”, Google Books)

A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they ¶ involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in ¶ particular, those that involve self-binding.**74** Can a president bind himself to respect ¶particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is “yes, at least to the same ¶ extent that a legislature can.” Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds ¶ even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated**,** thereby establishing a new ¶ legal status quo.75 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to ¶ create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical ¶ sense**,** presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term ¶ project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own ¶future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules ¶or policies.

policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### 1NC

#### Congressional action undermines the state secrete privilege – ends court deference and spills over

Windsor 12 (Lindsay – J.D. candidate and Master of Security Studies candidate at Georgetown University, “IS THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN THE CONSTITUTION? THE BASIS OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN INHERENT EXECUTIVE POWERS & WHY COURT-IMPLEMENTED SAFEGUARDS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENT”, 2012, 43 Geo. J. Int'l L. 897, lexis)

In contrast to the acknowledged roles of both Congress and the President in foreign affairs matters, the Constitution does not grant the judiciary branch any authority over foreign affairs, and the courts have traditionally been "hesitant to intrude" upon matters of foreign policy and national security. n153 The Supreme Court "has recognized the generally accepted view that foreign policy [is] the province and responsibility of the Executive." n154 Hence, "courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs." n155 This hesitation and reluctance stem from the limited institutional competence of the judiciary in foreign affairs. As the Court wrote in Boumediene v. Bush, "Unlike the President and some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people." n156 Echoing the "sole organ" [\*920] scheme of Curtiss-Wright, the Court later wrote that in foreign affairs matters, "The Judiciary is not suited to [make] determinations that would . . . undermine the Government's ability to speak with one voice in this area." n157 A court should, therefore, give great deference to the Executive's invocation of the state secrets privilege because it inherently involves matters of national security. Nonetheless, deciding cases or controversies before the Court is within its field of expertise. n158 Such cases include separation of powers controversies between federal branches and enforcing checks on executive power. n159 Though a court could not amend the substance of the state secrets privilege, it could amend the procedure for its invocation in one of two ways: pursuant to congressional authorization or by interpreting its own rules of procedure. First, if Congress enacts specific legislation under its Article I powers requiring the President to follow certain procedures in invoking the privilege, then a court could enforce that procedure in a case before it. Second, the Court could reinterpret the procedural requirements for the privilege. The Reynolds Court specifically wrote a court should not always "insist[] upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers." n160 But in national security cases implicating core civil liberties, the Court could find that plaintiffs' necessity routinely requires different procedures to satisfy the Court that national security matters are at stake. n16

#### State Secrets Privilege key to military technology and innovation

Donohue 10 (Laura – Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Shadow of State Secrets”, 2010, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77, lexis)

In contrast, docket searches demonstrate that, from January 2001 to January 2009, the privilege played a significant role in the executive branch's national security litigation strategy. In one case, the Administration asserted the state secrets privilege some 245 times. n31 More to the point, the government has invoked the state secrets privilege in more than 100 cases, which is more than five times the number of cases previously considered. And it is not just the executive branch that benefitted from the privilege: in scores of additional cases, private industry claimed that the state secrets doctrine applied, with the expectation that the federal government would later intervene to prevent certain documents from being subject to discovery or to stop the suit from moving forward. Beyond these, there are hundreds of cases on which the shadow of the privilege fell. This Article thus focuses on cases working their way through the courts between 2001 and 2009. It begins with disputes related to government contractors, where the threatened and actual invocation of the privilege appears in a broad range of grievances. Breach of contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, fraud, and employment termination cases prove remarkable in their frequency, length, and range of technologies involved. Wrongful death, personal injury, and negligence [\*88] cases extend beyond product liability to include infrastructure and services, as well as an emerging area perhaps best understood as the conduct of war. These corporate cases are distinguished by the tendency of companies to claim that state secrets are at stake early in the dispute and the subsequent role of the United States, if it chooses to become involved and to invoke the privilege, as an intervenor. Close inspection suggests a conservative executive branch that is more likely to step forward when breach of contract, trade secrets, or patent disputes present themselves, and unlikely - once it invokes the privilege - to back down. Where the executive initially decides not to intervene and invoke the privilege, the rapid expansion of the use of contractors appears to be giving birth to a new form of "graymail": should the government initially refuse to support the corporation's state secrets claim, companies deeply embedded in the state may threaten to air legally or politically damaging information. n32 Even when no overt threat is made, the government may worry that certain information will emerge during the course of the trial that would politically compromise the agency or individuals involved. In other cases, the government may be dependent upon a corporation for a key aspect of national defense, thus creating an incentive for the state to protect the company from financial penalties associated with bad behavior. n33

#### Great power war

Baru 9 – Sanjaya Baru is a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 - 168

Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.2 In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. 'Victory (in war)', Kennedy claimed, 'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base'.3 Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, 'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and military power, the classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma.

### 1NC

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should restrict executive authority to use targeted killing as a first resort outside of armed conflict.

#### Restricting targeting killing outside of zones of active hostilities means the US can’t strike in Pakistan or Yemen.

JCSL 13 [Journal of Conﬂict & Security Law, Vol. 18 No. 1, p. 1-2, “Deterrence Revisited?” Oxford University Press Journals]

The other mentioned issue is that of drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), not in the case of information gathering but when used for targeted killings. In reading the legal justifications, one comes to the conclusion that there remains much ambiguity regarding the applicable rules of international law. With regard to using drones outside a zone of armed conflict, with regard to Al Qai’da and its associates, the opinion within the Obama Administration appears to be that this is permitted under the President’s Authorization for Use of Military Force against al-Qa’ida—the 2001 authorization adopted after the 9/11 attack. The Department of Justice White Paper 1 argues that case. It is focused primarily on the targeted killing of a US citizen abroad who is regarded as an Al Qa’ida operative. The position taken is that the USA is in a non-international armed conflict with al-Qa’ida. ‘Any U.S. operation would be part of this non-international armed conflict, even if it were to take place away from the zone of active hostilities.’ Stretching this argument, it is put forth that the USA is allowed to defend itself whenever it concludes that individuals are part of al-Qa’ida, or associated with it, by targeting these individuals wherever they are found. This appears to be the current legal reasoning for the broad use of targeted killings by drones in places like Yemen or Pakistan. As in the case of cyber warfare, the criteria in making these decisions are secret. And, similar to the cyber weapons issue, this development is the result of technological advancements that have led to new types of weapons.

#### Aggressive targeted killing policy’s key to stability in Yemen

Alan W. Dowd 13, writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters, Vol. 42.4/43.1

At the beginning of President Hadi’s May offensive he, therefore, had a fractured army and a dysfunctional air force. Army leaders from competing factions were often disinclined to support one another in any way including facilitating the movement of needed supplies. Conversely, the air force labor strike had been a major setback to the efficiency of the organization, which was only beginning to operate as normal in May 2012. Even before the mutiny, the Yemen Air Force had only limited capabilities to conduct ongoing combat operations, and it did not have much experience providing close air support to advancing troops. Hadi attempted to make up for the deficiencies of his attacking force by obtaining aid from Saudi Arabia to hire a number of tribal militia fighters to support the regular military. These types of fighters have been effective in previous examples of Yemeni combat, but they could also melt away in the face of military setbacks.

Adding to his problems, President Hadi had only recently taken office after a long and painful set of international and domestic negotiations to end the 33-year rule of President Saleh. If the Yemeni military was allowed to be defeated in the confrontation with AQAP, that outcome could have led to the collapse of the Yemeni reform government and the emergence of anarchy throughout the country. Under these circumstances, Hadi needed every military edge that he could obtain, and drones would have been a valuable asset to aid his forces as they moved into combat. As planning for the campaign moved forward, it was clear that AQAP was not going to be driven from its southern strongholds easily. The fighting against AQAP forces was expected to be intense, and Yemeni officers indicated that they respected the fighting ability of their enemies.16

Shortly before the ground offensive, drones were widely reported in the US and international media as helping to enable the Yemeni government victory which eventually resulted from this campaign.17 Such support would have included providing intelligence to combatant forces and eliminating key leaders and groups of individuals prior to and then during the battles for southern towns and cities. In one particularly important incident, Fahd al Qusa, who may have been functioning as an AQAP field commander, was killed by a missile when he stepped out of his vehicle to consult with another AQAP leader in southern Shabwa province.18 It is also likely that drones were used against AQAP fighters preparing to ambush or attack government forces in the offensive.19 Consequently, drone warfare appears to have played a significant role in winning the campaign, which ended when the last AQAP-controlled towns were recaptured in June, revealing a shocking story of the abuse of the population while it was under occupation.20 Later, on October 11, 2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted that drones played a “vital role” in government victories over AQAP in Yemen, although he did not offer specifics.21 AQAP, for its part, remained a serious threat and conducted a number of deadly actions against the government, although it no longer ruled any urban centers in the south.

#### Al Qaeda will attack Saudi Arabian oil assets. That collapses the global economy.

**Gartenstein-Ross**, 5/23/**2011** (Daveed – author of Bin Laden’s Legacy, lecturer for the Naval Postgraduate School, trains members of the U.S. military preparing for deployments to the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, director of the Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization, above-average bowler, Osama’s Oil Obsession, Foreign Policy, p. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/23/osamas\_oil\_obsession)

The killing of Osama bin Laden has provided the U.S. public with a stark reminder of the risks posed by America's dependence on foreign sources of oil. On May 20, the Department of Homeland Security issued a new bulletin outlining al Qaeda's interest in targeting oil and natural gas infrastructure based on evidence unearthed after the Navy SEAL raid that killed the terrorist chief. "In 2010, there was continuing interest by members of al Qaeda in targeting oil tankers and commercial infrastructure at sea," said a DHS spokesman in a statement referencing the bulletin. He added that there was no information suggesting an imminent threat, but the department "wanted to make our partners aware of the alleged interest." Bin Laden long believed that undermining the U.S. economy was central to his war against the United States -- an outlook that has **permeated al Qaeda's ranks and will outlive him**. Al Qaeda views attacking the oil supply as a smart strategy for good reason: America's reliance on oil for its transportation needs makes it a commodity that, if disrupted or made unaffordable, will **cause the U.S. economy to collapse**. The United States holds only 3 percent of conventional global oil reserves, yet uses 25 percent of the world's daily production. It imports more than 66 percent of its oil, amounting to a daily purchase of 12 million barrels of imported oil. A **significant rise** in the price of oil due to a terrorist attack would deal al Qaeda's main enemy **a severe economic blow**. The threat that keeps counterterrorism officials up at night is a massive strike on Saudi oil installations, taking advantage of the limited number of production hubs to knock a significant amount of oil off the world market. The kingdom relies on its Abqaiq facility to **process two-thirds of its crude oil**, and on two primary terminals (Ras Tanura and Ras al-Ju'aymah) to export its oil to the world. The economic impact of a successful attack on one of these targets would be tremendous: Gal Luft and Anne Korin of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security estimate that, if a terrorist cell hijacked a plane and crashed it into either the Abqaiq or Ras Tanura facilities in a 9/11-style attack, it could "take up to 50% of Saudi oil off the market for at least six months and with it **most of the world's spare capacity**, **sending oil prices through the ceiling**." Former CIA case officer Robert Baer agrees, writing his 2004 book Sleeping with the Devil, "A single jumbo jet with a suicide bomber at the controls, hijacked during takeoff from Dubai and crashed into the heart of Ras Tanura, would be enough to **bring the world's oil-addicted economies to their knees, America's along with them**." The prospect of a terrorist strike is so worrying because of the **critical role** that Saudi oil production plays in the world economy. Saudi Arabia produces almost 10 million barrels of oil per day, and is the only country able to maintain excess daily production capacity of around 1.5 million barrels per day (a "swing reserve") to **keep world prices stable**. Al Qaeda has certainly tried to attack the kingdom's key oil targets. The threat of terrorist attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure first became a reality in September 2005, when a 48-hour shootout with Islamic militants at a villa in the Saudi seaport of al-Dammam ended with Saudi police introducing light artillery. When police entered the compound in the aftermath of the battle, they found not only what Newsweek described as "enough weapons for a couple of platoons of guerilla fighters," but also forged documents that would have given the terrorists access to the country's key oil and gas facilities. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz confirmed to the newspaper Okaz that the cell had planned to attack energy facilities, noting that "there isn't a place that they could reach that they didn't think about."**[He continues…]** Attacks on the oil supply can raise oil prices even when they don't succeed, something shown by the fact that prices immediately jumped by $2.37 a barrel following the 2006 attack on Abqaiq. As Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA's bin Laden unit, notes, "Al Qaeda and its allies are well-placed throughout the Persian Gulf to attack oil facilities and officials."

#### Nuclear war

Harris and Burrows, 9 – \*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, \*\*member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

#### The CP solves norms – armed conflict requirement is based on host-state consent and proportionality.

Lewis & Crawford 13 [Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Emily, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, “DRONES AND DISTINCTION: HOW IHL ENCOURAGED THE RISE OF DRONES” p. 1163-1165

, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF]

But the misconceptions concerning drones are not limited to the practical effects of U.S. drone policy. Legally, the United States’ position is not one of “ever-expanding entitlement for itself to target individuals across the globe.”162 The “entitlement” to use drones, just like the entitlement to engage in any other action on the sovereign territory of another state, is largely based upon the consent of the nation in which drones are being used. It is clear that Yemen consented to the strikes undertaken on its territory.163 This is supported by the WikiLeaks release of cables indicating Yemeni government consent for the actions taken there.164Likewise, there is evidence that the Pakistani government has privately consented to most of the strikes that the United States had conducted on its territory.165To the extent that the norm being shaped by U.S. behavior is limited to cases of consent, it is hard to see how the United States will one day be disadvantaged by that norm.¶ Outside of situations in which the host state consents to the strike, the United States has only asserted an “entitlement” to target al Qaeda in situations where the host state has proven itself to be unable or unwilling to incapacitate or expel al Qaeda from its territory.166 It has long been established that states not involved in armed conﬂicts have a responsibility not to aid either belligerent.167 The United States’ position that the law of armed conﬂict allows it to conduct proportional strikes against al Qaeda targets within states that have proven themselves to be unable or unwilling to incapacitate or expel those targets cannot be fairly characterized as creating an “ever-expanding entitlement for itself to target individuals across the globe.”168

## Norms

### No Modeling

#### U.S. can’t effectively signal

Zenko 13 (Micah, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, "The Signal and the Noise," Foreign Policy, 2-2-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the\_signal\_and\_the\_noise)

Later, Gen. Austin observed of cutting forces from the Middle East: "Once you reduce the presence in the region, you could very well signal the wrong things to our adversaries." Sen. Kelly Ayotte echoed his observation, claiming that President Obama's plan to withdraw 34,000 thousand U.S. troops from Afghanistan within one year "leaves us dangerously low on military personnel...it's going to send a clear signal that America's commitment to Afghanistan is going wobbly." Similarly, during a separate House Armed Services Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ominously warned of the possibility of sequestration: "Perhaps most important, the world is watching. Our friends and allies are watching, potential foes -- all over the world." These routine and unchallenged assertions highlight what is perhaps the most widely agreed-upon conventional wisdom in U.S. foreign and national security policymaking: the inherent power of signaling. This psychological capability rests on two core assumptions: All relevant international audiences can or will accurately interpret the signals conveyed, and upon correctly comprehending this signal, these audiences will act as intended by U.S. policymakers. Many policymakers and pundits fundamentally believe that the Pentagon is an omni-directional radar that uniformly transmits signals via presidential declarations, defense spending levels, visits with defense ministers, or troop deployments to receptive antennas. A bit of digging, however, exposes cracks in the premises underlying signaling theories. There is a half-century of social science research demonstrating the cultural and cognitive biases that make communication difficult between two humans. Why would this be any different between two states, or between a state and non-state actor? Unlike foreign policy signaling in the context of disputes or escalating crises -- of which there is an extensive body of research into types and effectiveness -- policymakers' claims about signaling are merely made in a peacetime vacuum. These signals are never articulated with a precision that could be tested or falsified, and thus policymakers cannot be judged misleading or wrong. Paired with the faith in signaling is the assumption that policymakers can read the minds of potential or actual friends and adversaries. During the cycle of congressional hearings this spring, you can rest assured that elected representatives and expert witnesses will claim to know what the Iranian supreme leader thinks, how "the Taliban" perceives White House pronouncements about Afghanistan, or how allies in East Asia will react to sequestration. This self-assuredness is referred to as the illusion of transparency by psychologists, or how "people overestimate others' ability to know them, and...also overestimate their ability to know others." Policymakers also conceive of signaling as a one-way transmission: something that the United States does and others absorb. You rarely read or hear critical thinking from U.S. policymakers about how to interpret the signals from others states. Moreover, since U.S. officials correctly downplay the attention-seeking actions of adversaries -- such as Iran's near-weekly pronouncement of inventing a new drone or missile -- wouldn't it be safer to assume that the majority of U.S. signals are similarly dismissed? During my encounters with foreign officials, few take U.S. government pronouncements seriously, and instead assume they are made to appease domestic audiences.

#### No reverse modeling - norms can’t solve

Saunders 13 **(**Paul, executive director of The Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005, “We Won't Always Drone Alone,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177>)

A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will use drones, whether armed or unarmed, and what lessons they will draw from Washington’s approach. Thus far, the principal lesson may well be that drones can be extremely effective in killing your opponents, wherever they are, without risking your own troops and without sending soldiers or law enforcement personnel across another country’s borders. It seems less likely that others will adopt U.S.-style legal standards and oversight procedures, or that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace.¶ Based on their actions, it is almost as if Obama administration officials believe that the United States and its allies will have a long-term monopoly on drones. How else can one explain their exuberant confidence in launching drone attacks? However, the administration’s dramatic expansion in drone strikes—and their apparent effectiveness—will only further shorten Washington’s reign as the drone capital of the world by increasing the incentives to others eager to develop, refine or buy the technology.¶ Have Obama administration officials given any thought to what the world might look like when armed drones are more widespread and when Americans or U.S. allies and partners could become targets? To an outsider, there is little evidence of this kind of thinking in the administration’s use of drones.¶ This is a serious problem. According to an unclassified July 2012 report by the Government Accountability Office, at least 76 countries already have acquired unmanned aerial vehicles, known as UAVs or drones; the report also states that “countries of concern” are attempting to acquire advanced UAVs from foreign suppliers as well as seeking illegal access to U.S. technology. And a 2012 special report by the United Kingdom’s Guardian newspaper indicated that China has 10 or more models, though not all are armed. Other sources identify additional varieties in China. At least 50 countries are trying to build 900 different types of drones, the GAO writes.¶ More generally, the administration’s expanding use of drones is a powerful endorsement of not only the technology, but of the practice of targeted killing as an instrument of foreign and security policy. Having provided this powerful impetus, the United States should not be surprised if others—with differing legal standards and more creative efforts at self-justification—seize upon it once they have the necessary capabilities. According to the GAO, this is already happening—in government-speak, “while only a limited number of countries have fielded lethal or weaponized UAVs, this threat is anticipated to grow.” From this perspective, it is ironic that a president so critical of his predecessor’s unilateralism would practice it himself—particularly in a manner that other governments will find much easier to emulate than the Bush administration’s larger-scale use of force. How does the Obama administration plan to respond if and when China or Russia uses armed UAVs to attack groups they define as terrorists?

### Prolif Inevitable – Can’t Reverse

#### Drones are locked in - plan can’t solve

**McDonald 13 (**Jack, lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, completed his PhD thesis on targeted killings, has worked with The Centre for Defence Studies, “Losing perspective on proliferation,” <http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2013/01/losing-perspective-on-proliferation/>)

The control of UAV technology is, however, a problem. In short, it isn’t that amenable to control in any meaningful sense of the word. If one wishes to “control” the proliferation of technology automating human behaviour and actions, then there would need to be some form of global bar on research in that area.\* I imagine that MIT and Google might have a problem this idea. Similarly, if someone wants to control the design and building of small unmanned aircraft, well, too late, that horse bolted a long time ago. Of course, you could lock up every amateur geek enthusiast, but that would be a bit pointless. The point is, the technology to build UAVs is embedded into our society to a far greater degree than nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons and small arms are. UAVs are effectively an extension of the industrial revolution (mechanisation, automation, replacement of human action by machine). I’m writing this on a laptop that was probably made by a large number of robots. UAVs need to be put into perspective – despite their dangers they can’t make human life as we know it extinct and they likely can’t be controlled by treaty. A little less rhetoric and a little more thought from critics of military UAVs might produce a better critique.

### Circumvention

#### Obama can circumvent

Lohmann 13 **(**Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>)

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

### Will Be Slow

#### Drone prolif is slow and the impact is small

Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out¶ distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests.¶ However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most¶ likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial¶ base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited¶ firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the¶ intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and crossborder¶ adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks¶ by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia¶ into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into¶ Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingencies¶ do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support.¶ Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat¶ to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term.

#### They can’t solve signature strikes – means there will still be a norm for out of battlefield drone use

#### Zenko evidence says we need direct cooperation to solve norms.

Zenko 13 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, “U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

The United States should ■■ promote Track 1.5 or Track 2 discussions on armed drones, similar to dialogues with other countries on the principles and limits of weapons systems such as nuclear weapons or cyberwarfare; ■■ create an international association of drone manufacturers that includes broad participation with emerging drone powers that could be modeled on similar organizations like the Nuclear Suppliers Group; explicitly state which legal principles apply—and do not apply—to drone strikes and the procedural safeguards to ensure compliance to build broader international consensus; ■■ begin discussions with emerging drone powers for a code of conduct to develop common principles for how armed drones should be used outside a state’s territory, which would address issues such as sovereignty, proportionality, distinction, and appropriate legal framework; and ■■ host discussions in partnership with Israel to engage emerging drone makers on how to strengthen norms against selling weaponscapable systems.

### 1NC SCS

#### If China Can’t use drone strikes they will use other means – still ensures escalation

#### No SCS conflict

Chaibi 3/4 -- 3rd year visiting student from Princeton University in the Department of Engineering Science (Abraham, 2013, "The outlook for continuing stability in the South China Sea," http://politicsinspires.org/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/)

East Asia’s rapid economic and military development has captured global attention, but pundits are quick to point to the South China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan as potential obstacles to the region’s continued growth. Analysis of news coverage demonstrates that regional economies and tensions have been growing in tandem. The South China Sea has historically been of particular interest because of the number of conflicting claims on the islands and sea-lanes it encompasses. China, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, among others, have often engaged in bilateral disagreements with resulting spikes in diplomatic tension and even military confrontation. Of note, these conflicts have never escalated to a full-scale regional war. Direct extrapolation suggests that previous restraint in military interactions implies the nations involved do not consider the potential benefits sufficient to justify an upset to the balance of power. However, contemporary changes in economic and security conditions complicate the issue. While current tensions appear unlikely to lead to a full-scale military conflict, the diversion of national resources needed to maintain the status quo is substantial. Institutional changes to increase transparency; clarify US treaties with ASEAN nations; and increase states’ internal enforcement of international agreements, although initially costly, would allow the neighbouring states to redirect these resources to long-term growth. Historically, China has been involved in a majority of the military conflicts in the South China Sea. A 1947 Chinese map delineates China’s controversial claim to approximately 80% of the sea. China aggressively used its navy to conclude a dispute with Vietnam in the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then in 1988 during the Johnson South Reef Skirmish for the Spratly Islands. Conflict was narrowly averted in 1995 when the Philippines chose not to shell fort-like Chinese military structures on Mischief Reef (China maintained they were only intended as shelter for fisherman); however, the Philippines continues to assert that this is an example of “creeping occupation”. This form of venting tensions, while far short of total war, is extremely costly over the long run; the combination of of resources, energy, and lives expended to establish a claim to the islands creates a significant and avoidable opportunity cost. These skirmishes are not merely an imprint of the 20th century but continue today as witnessed by the Chinese establishment of the Sansha garrison-city in 2012 and the Sino-Philippines stand-off in the Scarborough Shoal. What then is the evidence suggesting a continued reluctance to engage in full-scale military confrontation? Although in the past conflict has often arisen between economically interdependent nations (viz. the previous peak of global trade in 1914), the China-ASEAN relationship is one of fundamental interdependence of production, visible in the prevalence of international supply chaining in manufacturing processes, rather than solely trade and labour movement[i]. The burgeoning economic interdependence and growth of neighbouring states contributes a major incentive to prevent a conflagration. $5.3 trillion of trade, of which approximately 20% is US, transits the South China Sea annually and any interruption would not only severely restrict regional trade revenues, but would also very likely guarantee US military intervention[ii]. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is becoming increasingly interconnected and 2015 will mark a key turning point with the opening of internal ASEAN borders for free movement of labor. The ASEAN bloc has also concluded a number of reconciliation agreements with China. Regarding security, both the 2002 Code of Conduct and the 2011 Guidelines to the Code of Conduct are intended to help coordinate diplomacy and maintain peace in South China Sea disputes. Economically China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and at its opening in 2010 the ASEAN-China free trade area (ACFTA) became the largest in the world by population. These arrangements come at a time when growing estimates of the value of the natural resources contained in the South China Sea are generating pressures associated with ensuring energy security. Economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, however, is not the sole factor at play. In areas with considerable interstate tension sub-state actors have often contributed to the deterioration of international relations, most prominently with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand tipping Europe into World War I. Recent developments in state-level Chinese political and military discourse reflect a strong interest in cooperation. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 2011 discussions with Filipino President Corazon Aquino firmly expressed the hope that “the countries concerned may put aside disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas”[iii]. Additionally in 2011 the Chinese State Council Information Office released a white paper with a similar emphasis on joint development. Yet China is also reported to have developed internal fractures in its South China Sea policy, with a number of different ministries controlling paramilitary units that are not under express government oversight[iv]. For example, the Bureau of Fisheries Administration (BFA) now directs a relatively well-equipped law enforcement fleet that is tasked with patrolling Chinese-owned fishing areas. Such interest groups repeatedly instigate minor disputes with their ASEAN counterparts and the US navy that exacerbate state-level discussions and risk eventually drawing unintended consequences (characteristically, in 2004 two BFA vessels obstructed a US Navy surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea). The region has also seen a rise in high-tech militarization, with rapid development in areas ranging from aircraft carriers and submarines to cyber-espionage; this is likely to further increase due to the 2011 US “pivot to Asia” and military surge. The pivot is considered to be a sign that the US intends to continue playing a leadership role in East Asia, a strategy at odds with China’s vision[v]. An associated complication is the imprecise definition of US commitments to its ally nations in the event of disputes in contested territories, especially vis-à-vis the Philippines and Vietnam, and the possibility that alliances will be used to escalate a small battle into a regional affair. The US is making efforts to address these complications; for the first time since RIMPACS’s creation in 1971, China has been invited to participate in a US-led naval exercise. Positive near-term repercussions of growing US involvement have also been postulated; analysts suggest that one of the root causes behind Chinese interest in cooperation is the fear that aggression in the South China Sea will drive other parties to strengthen their ties with the US[vi]. The relative wealth of economic and diplomatic compromises on all sides presents a compelling argument that under current conditions, disputes in the South China Sea will continue to be restrained to small-scale skirmishes that do not threaten overall stability. This is not to say that the increase in regional tension is insignificant, but rather that the involved parties all have a strong interest in maintaining mutual growth and have demonstrated their willingness to make strategic sacrifices to maintain the status quo. Furthermore as China is the common link in the majority of the disputes, it is probable that it will be at the heart of any conflict — and China has frequently shown restraint in this regard (though not so, for example, in Tibet). In terms of China’s priorities, policy analysts tend to agree that if China were to begin a large-scale military campaign, Taiwan would most likely be the focus of its aggression[vii].

#### SCS tensions inevitable but no escalation

Meidan 12 -- analyst at Eurasia Group; research includes China's energy and environmental policies, policymaking, Chinese elite politics, and diplomacy; MA in political sciences and East Asian studies from the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (Michal, 8/7, "Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea," http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2GsDDT62R)

These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them. Vietnam and the Philippines, concerned with the shifting balance of powers in the region, are pushing their maritime claims more aggressively and increasing their efforts to internationalise the question by involving both ASEAN and Washington. Attempts to come up with a common position in ASEAN have failed miserably but as the US re-engages Asia, it is drawn into the troubled waters of the South China Sea. Political dynamics in China – with a once in a decade leadership transition coming up, combined with electoral politics in the US and domestic constraints for both Manila and Hanoi – all augur that the South China Sea will remain turbulent. No government can afford to appear weak in the eyes of domestic hawks or of increasingly nationalistic public opinions. The risk of a miscalculation resulting in prolonged standoffs or skirmishes is therefore higher now than ever before. But there are a number of reasons to believe that even these skirmishes are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict. First, despite the strong current of assertive forces within China, cooler heads are ultimately likely to prevail. While a conciliatory stance toward other claimants is unlikely before the leadership transition, China’s top brass will be equally reluctant to significantly escalate the situation, since this will send southeast Asian governments running to Washington. Hanoi and Manila also recognize that despite their need for assertiveness to appease domestic political constituencies, a direct confrontation with China is overly risky. Second, military pundits in China also realize that the cost of conflict is too high, since it will strengthen Washington’s presence in the region and disrupt trade flows. And even China’s oil company CNOOC, whose portfolio of assets relies heavily on the South China Sea, is diversifying its interests in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates.

#### No East China sea conflict

Rudd 3/14 -- Former Prime Minister and Former Foreign Minister, Member, Australian Parliament, interview with Jonathan Tepperman (Kevin, 2013, "The Situation in North Korea and the Future of U.S.-China Relations," http://www.cfr.org/australasia-and-the-pacific/situation-north-korea-future-us-china-relations/p30230)

What ultimately drives this is a -- is a conflicting set of interests between rampant nationalisms on the one hand and, on the other hand, a pragmatic recognition by governments both in Beijing and Tokyo that conflict, for both of them, would be absolutely disastrous and would retard economic growth and stability in the wider region and would further (retard China's ?) -- primacy of China's own economic development objectives. Now, if they're the two competing poles in this debate, both in Tokyo and Beijing, rational foreign policy actors would conclude that rational self-interest and rational economic self-interest would ultimately (prevail ?). As you know, history cautions us against reaching those conclusions. And I think if you've seen the drift in the numbers, both in terms of Sino-Japanese trade numbers and Sino-Japanese investment numbers over the last six to nine months, the impact in real numbers is palpable and measurable in terms of the state of the China-Japan relationship. I think my friends in Beijing, when I have spoken with them, including the military, I think it's fair to say, are working very actively behind the scenes to find face-saving mechanisms by which this can be managed to the point of stability for the period ahead and then put into some longer-term process with the Japanese. However, when I was last in Beijing, which was prior to the -- (audio interference) -- lock-on incident, the -- it was very much a question within the Chinese minds about how one would do that without actually losing face on the national mistakes in the public discourse both about Japan and with Japan.

### 1NC Turkey

#### No reverse causal modeling evidence- Stein just says Turkey uses drones like the U.S. – no argument that Turkey would stop if the U.S. set a precedent.

#### Turkey soft power fails

**Idiz 9-3**

[Semih Idiz contributing writer for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse. A journalist who has been covering diplomacy and foreign policy issues for major Turkish newspapers for 30 years, published in The Financial Times, The Times of London, Mediterranean Quarterly and Foreign Policy magazine.¶ “Turkey’s Middle East Policy Lies in Shambles” http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/turkish-middle-east-policy-shambles.html]

Erdogan’s angry rhetoric, which is also aiming now at regional powers that supported the coup in Egypt, may be going down well with his followers, but his general line of argumentation is proving to be seriously out of touch with the course of developments in the Middle East. He is also coming under fire for allegedly increasing threats to Turkey with his fiery remarks.¶ Many Turks were made wary after the twin [car bombings in May](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/turkey-bombing-syria-reyhanli.html) in the town of Reyhanli, near the Syrian border, said by Turkish authorities to have been carried out by pro-Assad elements, and which left 53 people dead. Public concerns about further retaliatory attacks such as these increased after the Syria-related kidnapping of two [Turkish Airlines (THY) pilots](http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/08/turkey-pilots-abducted-beirut-quiet-bargaining.html) in Lebanon, and the [rocket attack](http://www.aawsat.net/2013/09/article55315632) against the Turkish Consul General’s convoy in Mosul, Northern Iraq, on Monday [Sept. 2].¶ Although that attack occurred outside Syria and the perpetrators are still unknown, it has nevertheless resulted in more questions being asked as to why Turkey is being dragged into situations in the Middle East it has never had to face before. Meanwhile, Erdogan has come out openly saying any US-led operation against Syria must aim at toppling Bashar al-Assad and his regime.¶ His remarks stand in stark contrast, however, to Washington’s declaration that any operation designed to punish the Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons will not aim at regime change. Unlike Erdogan, it appears that the West is now looking for a gradual and controlled change in leadership in Syria because of concerns about who might take over if the Assad regime were to be toppled in a disorderly manner.¶ [Answering questions from reporters](http://www.cnnturk.com/2013/turkiye/08/30/erdogan.sinirli.operasyon.bizi.tatmin.etmez/721548.0/) on Aug. 30, during the Victory Day reception in Ankara, Erdogan indicated in clear terms that a limited operation against Syria would not satisfy his government. “It must be like the one in Kosovo. It must not be an in-and-out intervention over one or two days, but aim at making the regime give up,” he said, referring to the 78-day NATO operation in 1999 that forced the Serbian military out of Kosovo. ¶ Remarks such as these clearly anger Turkey’s powerful northern neighbor, Russia, and eastern neighbor, Iran, with whom Ankara has to still maintain delicate diplomatic ties for a host of political and economic reasons. Both Moscow and Tehran continue to support the Assad regime and have expressed strong opposition to any US-led strike against Syria.¶ Meanwhile, Erdogan continues to hit at the military regime in Egypt, and that he has started to criticize regional Arab countries that are backing this regime is hardly likely to be going down well among government circles in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or Jordan. These countries have vowed political and economic support for Cairo.¶ The result is that Turkey today is almost isolated in the Arab League, where it has observer status, which is making it much harder for Ankara to play a key role in the Middle East. Apart form this, though, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s gross miscalculations in relation to the Arab Spring, and Erdogan’s angry rhetoric, which has turned most of the regions powers against him, have also left Turkey facing new threats it has not had to cope with in the past.¶ Ankara’s Middle East policy has traditionally been marked by excessive caution, given the unpredictability of the region, which is made up of a dangerous brew of Arab nationalism, radical Islam, violent sectarianism and gross social injustice fed by a serious lack of democracy.¶ Turkey under Erdogan may have started with a vision of “zero problems” with the Arab countries of the region, for which the “Turkish model” was supposed to provide an inspiration while they tried to develop democratically and economically. But with the “zero problems” approach turning into a bad joke at this stage, Ankara has ended up instead facing a whole range of risks, ranging from the threat of being flooded by refugees to chemical attacks on its Eastern border.¶ Meanwhile, public fears are mounting that the country could face terrorism, not just from al-Qaeda-related groups, but also from vengeful radical Shiite groups that are angry over Ankara’s overt support for Sunni groups, whether they be in Iraq, Syria or elsewhere.¶ It is also clear that Turkey’s once good ties with regional powers like Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia will require some fence mending, since the administration in those countries are unlikely to be very happy as Erdogan attempts to rouse the streets in the Middle East with “[Four-Finger Rabaa al-Adawiya salutes](http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/2013/08/21/Four-finger-salute-Egypt-rivals-use-Rabaa-symbol-to-turn-Facebook-yellow.html).”¶ The rulers of these countries have always been mistrustful of any attempt at rousing the masses. The bottom line is that while Erdogan may continue to have admirers in the streets of the Middle East, he has lost the admiration of most of the region’s leaders that he ultimately has to deal with. The result is that Erdogan has left Ankara’s traditional Middle East policy — that was always based on maintaining stability in a turbulent environment — in shambles.¶ He has also left Turkey facing new risks with his angry, albeit often hollow, rhetoric that is seen to be out of touch with the realities that have governed the region, and appears set to continue to do so for some time to come.

#### Iran prolif isn’t a threat – they don’t want the bomb and if they get it they won’t use it

Pinker, 11 [Steven, professor of psychology at Harvard University, *The Better Angels of our Nature Why Violence Has Declined*, ISBN: 067002295, for online access email alexanderdpappas@gmail.com and I will forward you the full book]

If current pundits are to be believed, then as you are reading these words the New Peace will already have been shattered by a major war, perhaps a nuclear war, with Iran. At the time of this writing, tensions have been rising over the country’s nuclear energy program. Iran is currently enriching enough uranium to fashion a nuclear arsenal, and it has defied international demands that it allow inspections and comply with other provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has taunted Western leaders, supported terrorist groups, accused the United States of orchestrating the 9/11 attacks, denied the Holocaust, called for Israel to be “wiped off the map,” and prayed for the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam, the Muslim savior who would usher in an age of peace and justice. In some interpretations of Shi’a Islam, this messiah will show up after a worldwide eruption of war and chaos. All this is, to say the least, disconcerting, and many writers have concluded that Ahmadinejad is another Hitler who will soon develop nuclear weapons and use them on Israel or furnish them to Hezbollah to do so. Even in less dire scenarios, he could blackmail the Middle East into acceding to Iranian hegemony. The prospect might leave Israel or the United States no choice but to bomb its nuclear facilities preemptively, even if it invited years of war and terrorism in response. A 2009 editorial in the *Washington Times* spelled it out: “War with Iran is now inevitable. The only question is: Will it happen sooner or later?”279 This chilling scenario of a nuclear attack by Iranian fanatics is certainly possible. But is it *inevitable*, or even highly likely? One can be just as contemptuous of Ahmadinejad, and just as cynical about his motives, while imagining less dire alternatives for the world ahead. John Mueller, Thomas Schelling, and many other foreign affairs analysts have imagined them for us and have concluded that **the Iranian nuclear program is not the end of the world**.280 Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Ahmadinejad has repeatedly declared that Iran’s nuclear program is intended only for energy and medical research. In 2005 Supreme Leader Khameini (**who wields more power than Ahmadinejad**) issued a fatwa declaring that **nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam**.281 If the government went ahead and developed the weapons anyway, it would not be the first time in history that national leaders have lied through their teeth. But having painted themselves into this corner, the prospect of forfeiting all credibility in the eyes of the world (including major powers on whom they depend, like Russia, China, Turkey, and Brazil) might at least give them pause. Ahmadinejad’s musings about the return of the Twelfth Imam do not necessarily mean that he plans to hasten it along with a nuclear holocaust. Two of the deadlines by which writers confidently predicted that he would set off the apocalypse (2007 and 2009) have already come and gone.282 And for what it’s worth, here is how he explained his beliefs in a 2009 television interview with NBC correspondent Ann Curry: *Curry:* You’ve said that you believe that his arrival, the apocalypse, would happen in your own lifetime. What do you believe that you should do to hasten his arrival? *Ahmadinejad:* I have never said such a thing.... I was talking about peace.... What is being said about an apocalyptic war and—global war, things of that nature. This is what the Zionists are claiming. Imam . . . will come with logic, with culture, with science. He will come so that there is no more war. No more enmity, hatred. No more conflict. He will call on everyone to enter a brotherly love. Of course, he will return with Jesus Christ. The two will come back together. And working together, they would fill this world with love. The stories that have been disseminated around the world about extensive war, apocalyptic wars, so on and so forth, these are false. 283 As a Jewish atheist, I can’t say I find these remarks completely reassuring. But with one obvious change they are not appreciably different from those held by devout Christians; indeed, they are milder, as many Christians do believe in an apocalyptic war and have fantasized about it in bestselling novels. As for the speech containing the phrase that was translated as “wiping Israel off the map,” the *New York Times* writer Ethan Bronner consulted Persian translators and analysts of Iranian government rhetoric on the meaning of the phrase in context, and they were unanimous that Ahmadinejad was daydreaming about regime change in the long run, not genocide in the days ahead.284 The perils of translating foreign bombast bring to mind Khrushchev’s boast “We will bury you,” which turned out to mean “outlive” rather than “entomb.” There is a parsimonious alternative explanation of Iran’s behavior. In 2002 George W. Bush identified Iraq, North Korea, and Iran as the “axis of evil” and proceeded to invade Iraq and depose its leadership. North Korea’s leaders saw the writing on the wall and promptly developed a nuclear capability, which (as they no doubt anticipated) has put an end to any musings about the United States invading them too. Shortly afterward Iran put its nuclear program into high gear, aiming to create enough ambiguity as to whether it possesses nuclear weapons, or could assemble them quickly, to squelch any thought of an invasion in the mind of the Great Satan. If Iran does become a confirmed or suspected nuclear power, the history of the nuclear age suggests that the most likely outcome would be nothing. As we have seen, nuclear weapons have turned out to be useless for anything but deterrence against annihilation, which is why the nuclear powers have repeatedly been defied by their nonnuclear adversaries. The most recent episode of proliferation bears this out. In 2004 it was commonly predicted that if North Korea acquired a nuclear capability, then by the end of the decade it would share it with terrorists and set off a nuclear arms race with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.285 In fact, North Korea did acquire a nuclear capability, the end of the decade has come and gone, and nothing has happened. It’s also unlikely that any nation would furnish nuclear ammunition to the loose cannons of a terrorist band, thereby giving up control over how they would be used while being on the hook for the consequences.286 In the case of Iran, before it decided to bomb Israel (or license Hezbollah to do so in an incriminating coincidence), with no conceivable benefit to itself, its leaders would have to anticipate a nuclear reprisal by Israeli commanders, who could match them hothead for hothead, together with an invasion by a coalition of powers enraged by the violation of the nuclear taboo. Though the regime is detestable and in many ways irrational, one wonders whether its principals are so indifferent to continuing their hold on power as to choose to annihilate themselves in pursuit of perfect justice in a radioactive Palestine or the arrival of the Twelfth Imam, with or without Jesus at his side. As Thomas Schelling asked in his 2005 Nobel Prize lecture, “What else can Iran accomplish, except possibly the destruction of its own system, with a few nuclear warheads? Nuclear weapons should be too precious to give away or to sell, too precious to waste killing people when they could, held in reserve, make the United States, or Russia, or any other nation, hesitant to consider military action.”287 Though it may seem dangerous to consider alternatives to the worst-case scenario, the dangers go both ways. In the fall of 2002 George W. Bush warned the nation, “America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof —the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” The “clear evidence” led to a war that has cost more than a hundred thousand lives and almost a trillion dollars and has left the world no safer. A cocksure certainty that Iran will use nuclear weapons, in defiance of sixty-five years of history in which authoritative predictions of inevitable catastrophes were repeatedly proven wrong, could lead to adventures with even greater costs.

#### **Deterrence theory true in terms of Iran – U.S. and Israel keep them in check**

Kreps 12 (Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Cornell University, "What Will Iran Do If It Gets a Nuclear Bomb?", Feb 22, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/what-will-iran-do-if-it-gets-a-nuclear-bomb/253430/)

Having a nuclear weapon would give Iran a bigger bark. Armed with the bomb, Iran could make threats that might win it economic aid and political concessions. Influence, as Schelling noted, comes from "the power to hurt," and nuclear weapons provide the ultimate power to hurt. Having such "latent violence" in the form of nuclear weapons can translate into considerable bargaining influence. The North Korea model is instructive here. The Kim Jong-il regime used its nuclear program as a bargaining chip, promising to dismantle its Yongbyon reactor in exchange for political concessions and economic aid. Often they gained concessions, however, while only temporarily or incompletely complying with their end of the bargain.

On the other hand, it seems doubtful that having the bomb would give Iran a bigger bite. Rather, there's every reason to believe that deterrence theory should hold. How much influence Iran's weapons can confer, again drawing on Schelling, "will indeed depend on how much the adversary can hurt in return." Iran's primary rivals are Israel and the United States, each with arsenals that are far more lethal than what Iran could assemble even over the next decade. That each has enough weapons to hurt Iran quite badly should be enough to keep Iran's bite in check.

## Terror

### 1NC

#### Winning War on Terror now – Al Qaeda is on the run

Ackerman 13 (Spencer, Wired senior reporter, Spencer, "Spy Chiefs Point to a Much, Much Weaker Al-Qaida," Wired, 3-13-13, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/spy-terrorism/, accessed 9-18-13)

Don’t ever expect the heads of the U.S.’ 16-agency spy apparatus to say it outright. But the testimony they provided Tuesday morning to a Senate panel described al-Qaida, the scourge of the U.S. for 12 years, as a threat that’s on the verge of becoming a spent force, if they’re not already. James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, and his colleagues at the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Counterterrorism Center and State Department, never made that contention outright to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Tuesday. But in their annual public briefing on the threats America faces, they focused on their budgets and on cyber attacks more than they did terrorism. Not only was that itself a big change in the annual exercise, what they said about the threat from al-Qaida was mostly cheerful news. Al-Qaida’s core in Pakistan is so degraded that it is “probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale attacks in the West,” Clapper testified. (.pdf) Its regional affiliates, in Iraq, Somalia and northern Africa, are focused on local attacks. Despite all the online propaganda seeking to radicalize American Muslim, homegrown jihadis will attempt “fewer than ten domestic plots per year.” Last year, the plots hit the single digits; no one died from them. Matt Olsen, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, testified that those attempts are and are likely to remain “unsophisticated.” Those al-Qaida manages to inspire may be “wayward knuckleheads,” Olsen said, but they’ll remain a challenge for the spy apparatus to monitor and disrupt. The exception is al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen affiliate of the organization, which remains the one most inclined to attack the U.S. at home. FBI director Robert Mueller said the threat to U.S. airliners from that affiliate is “undiminished.” Attacking outside Yemen remains a priority for the organization. But Clapper said they’ll have to balance that agenda with both their aspirations in Yemen and the degree to which “they have individuals who can manage, train, and deploy operatives for U.S. operations.” To be clear, not a single spy chief said that al-Qaida is no longer a big deal. Not a single spy chief said that al-Qaida no longer threatens the United States. And not a single spy chief so much as hinted that it’s time for U.S. officials to consider the global war on terrorism finished. Ever since the Benghazi attack of September, those officials and their spy chiefs have stopped predicting that al-Qaida is on the verge of defeat. If anything, Clapper warned that the budget crunch he’s under might make it harder to spot and prevent the next al-Qaida attack. Yet the picture they presented of al-Qaida is no longer one of a determined global movement growing in strength; seeking the world’s deadliest weapons; and capable of pulling off complex, mass-casualty assaults. Benghazi, and the January attack on an Algerian oil field, look like models for the terrorist threats of the future: ones that occur far from U.S. soil, launched by unaffiliated groups that are primarily focused on a local agenda, yet sufficiently inspired by al-Qaida’s rhetoric or sympathetic to its worldview that unsecured western targets of opportunity are in its cross-hairs. Left unsaid and un-debated at the hearing: whether that diminished threat means it’s time to roll back the U.S. global wartime apparatus; or whether it’s only diminished because of an aggressive wartime apparatus that **needs to keep doing what it’s doing, lest the threat re-emerge**.

#### Geographic limits undermine the effectiveness of US counter-terror ops

Corn 13 (Geoffrey, South Texas College of Law Presidential Research Professor of Law, former JAG officer and chief of the law of war branch of the international law division of the US Army, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, "The law of armed conflict, the use of military force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force," Congressional Documents and Publications, 6-16-13, lexis)

In my opinion, there is no need to amend the AUMF to define the geographic scope of military operations it authorizes. On the contrary, I believe doing so would fundamentally undermine the efficacy of U.S. counter-terror military operations by overtly signaling to the enemy exactly where to pursue safe-haven and de facto immunity from the reach of U.S. power. This concern is similar to that associated with explicitly defining co-belligerents subject to the AUMF, although I believe it is substantially more significant. It is an operational and tactical axiom that insurgent and non-state threats rarely seek the proverbial "toe to toe" confrontation with clearly superior military forces. Al Qaeda is no different. Indeed, their attempts to engage in such tactics in the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom proved disastrous, and ostensibly caused the dispersion of operational capabilities that then necessitated the co-belligerent assessment. Imposing an arbitrary geographic limitation of the scope of military operations against this threat would therefore be inconsistent with the strategic objective of preventing future terrorist attacks against the United States. I believe much of the momentum for asserting some arbitrary geographic limitation on the scope of operations conducted to disrupt or disable al Qaeda belligerent capabilities is the result of the commonly used term "hot battlefield." This notion of a "hot" battlefield is, in my opinion, an operational and legal fiction. Nothing in the law of armed conflict or military doctrine defines the meaning of "battlefield." Contrary to the erroneous assertions that the use of combat power is restricted to defined geographic locations such as Afghanistan (and previously Iraq), the geographic scope of armed conflict must be dictated by a totality assessment of a variety of factors, ultimately driven by the strategic end state the nation seeks to achieve. The nature and dynamics of the threat -including key vulnerabilities - is a vital factor in this analysis. These threat dynamics properly influence the assessment of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, which in turn drive the formulation of national strategy, which includes determining when, where, and how to leverage national power (including military power) to achieve desired operational effects. Thus, threat dynamics, and not some geographic "box", have historically driven and must continue to drive the scope of armed hostilities. The logic of this premise is validated by (in my opinion) the inability to identify an armed conflict in modern history where the scope of operations was legally restricted by a conception of a "hot" battlefield. Instead, threat dynamics coupled with policy, diplomatic considerations and, in certain armed conflicts the international law of neutrality, dictate such scope. Ultimately, battlefields become "hot" when persons, places, or things assessed as lawful military objectives pursuant to the law of armed conflict are subjected to attack. I do not, however, intend to suggest that it is proper to view the entire globe as a battlefield in the military component of our struggle against al Qaeda, or that threat dynamics are the only considerations in assessing the scope of military operations. Instead, complex considerations of policy and diplomacy have and must continue to influence this assessment. However, suggesting that the proper scope of combat operations is dictated by a legal conception of "hot" battlefield is operationally irrational and legally unsound. Accordingly, placing policy limits on the scope of combat operations conducted pursuant to the legal authority provided by the AUMF is both logical and appropriate, and in my view has been a cornerstone of U.S. use of force policy since the enactment of the AUMF. In contrast, interpreting the law of armed conflict to place legal limits on the scope of such operations to "hot" battlefields, or imposing such a legal limitation in the terms of the AUMF, creates a perverse incentive for the belligerent enemy by allowing [them]~~him~~ to dictate when and where [they]~~he~~ will be subject to lawful attack.

#### Geographic restrictions doom counter-terror - create safe havens

Blank 10 (Laurie, Emory University School of Law International Humanitarian Law Clinic director, "Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat," Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 1, 9-16-10, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1677965)

The ramifications of including areas within the zone of combat, such as the accompanying authority to use lethal force as a first resort, raise a variety of policy considerations. The two primary considerations weigh directly against each other and perhaps, as a result, lend credence to the need for a middle ground in defining the zone of combat. First, some argue that creating geographic limits to the battlefield has the problematic effect of granting terrorists a safe haven. For example, a member of al Qaeda can be a legitimate target as a result of continuous participation in hostilities, thus losing any immunity from attack he might have had by dint of being a civilian.105 If the zone of combat is limited geographically to certain areas, then this member of al Qaeda can avoid being targeted—and thus regain civilian immunity, in essence—simply by crossing an international border even while remaining active in a terrorist organization engaged in a conflict with the U.S.106 Geographic limits designed to curtail the use of governmental military force thus effectively grant terrorists a safe haven and extend the conflict by enabling them to regroup and continue their attacks.

#### Geographic restrictions doom counter-terror- safe havens

Majidyar 13 (Ahmad, American Enterprise Institute senior research associate, “We Need Military Authorization Until Al-Qaida Is No Longer a Threat,” June 17th, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-the-authorization-for-use-of-military-force-be-repealed/we-need-military-authorization-until-al-qaida-is-no-longer-a-threat)

It is therefore premature and dangerous to repeal or significantly restrict the AUMF at this point, since it would undercut the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism efforts to deal with al-Qaida-related emerging threats worldwide. Suggestions to incorporate temporal and geographical limitations into the AUMF are also ill-advised. Confining the law to a specific number of countries or terrorist groups would give the enemy more freedom of action and allow it to create new fronts and sanctuaries in areas immune from U.S. counterterrorism operations. In his counterterrorism policy speech three weeks ago, President Obama promised to continue a "series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America." In the absence of the AUMF, such actions would become untenable and devoid of a legal basis. At present, the AUMF provides the administration with adequate authorities to pursue the war. Until al-Qaida and associated forces are degraded to a level where they pose no substantial national security threat to the United States, the law should not be repealed or replaced.

#### Your author concedes that geographic limits to TK creates terrorist safe havens

Daskal 13 (Jennifer, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University, "THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE," 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, lexis)

As a policy matter, the territorially restricted approach also creates safe havens for the non-state enemy, allowing it to cross state lines to regroup, plan, and coordinate externally directed plots free from the threat of attack. n75 To the extent that the threat can be appropriately addressed [\*1190] through foreign cooperation and law enforcement means, that might not be particularly troubling. But what if the foreign government is unable or unwilling to respond to the threat, and capture by the belligerent state is infeasible? Alternatively, what if the foreign government is supportive of the belligerent state's efforts to arrest and prosecute the enemy, but information about the target, at least initially, comes primarily from intelligence reporting that cannot be introduced in open court without revealing a critical source or jeopardizing a key relationship with a foreign power? n76 Under the territorially restricted view, even short-term law-of-war detention is prohibited, and even if carried out for the express purpose of gathering information for a criminal prosecution (as was done in Warsame's case). n77

### 1NC Terror

#### No impact to terror

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

It seems increasingly likely that the official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been substantially deluded—massively disproportionate to the threat that al-Qaida has ever actually presented either as an international menace or as an inspiration or model to homegrown amateurs. Applying the extensive datasets on terrorism that have been generated over the last decades, we conclude that the chances of an American perishing at the hands of a terrorist at present rates is one in 3.5 million per year—well within the range of what risk analysts hold to be “acceptable risk.”40 Yet, despite the importance of responsibly communicating risk and despite the costs of irresponsible fearmongering, just about the only official who has ever openly put the threat presented by terrorism in some sort of context is New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who in 2007 pointed out that people should “get a life” and that they have a greater chance of being hit by lightning than of being a victim of terrorism—an observation that may be a bit off the mark but is roughly accurate.41 (It might be noted that, despite this unorthodox outburst, Bloomberg still managed to be re-elected two years later.) Indeed, much of the reaction to the September 11 attacks calls to mind Hans Christian Andersen’s fable of delusion, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” in which con artists convince the emperor’s court that they can weave stuffs of the most beautiful colors and elaborate patterns from the delicate silk and purest gold thread they are given. These stuffs, they further convincingly explain, have the property of remaining invisible to anyone who is unusually stupid or unfit for office. The emperor finds this quite appealing because not only will he have splendid new clothes, but he will be able to discover which of his officials are unfit for their posts—or in today’s terms, have lost their effectiveness. His courtiers, then, have great professional incentive to proclaim the stuffs on the loom to be absolutely magnificent even while mentally justifying this conclusion with the equivalent of “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Unlike the emperor’s new clothes, terrorism does of course exist. Much of the reaction to the threat, however, has a distinctly delusionary quality. In Carle’s view, for example, the CIA has been “spinning in self-referential circles” in which “our premises were flawed, our facts used to fit our premises, our premises determined, and our fears justified our operational actions, in a self-contained process that arrived at a conclusion dramatically at odds with the facts.” The process “projected evil actions where there was, more often, muddled indirect and unavoidable complicity, or not much at all.” These “delusional ratiocinations,” he further observes, “were all sincerely, ardently held to have constituted a rigorous, rational process to identify terrorist threats” in which “the avalanche of reporting confirms its validity by its quantity,” in which there is a tendency to “reject incongruous or contradictory facts as erroneous, because they do not conform to accepted reality,” and in which potential dissenters are not-so-subtly reminded of career dangers: “Say what you want at meetings. It’s your decision. But you are doing yourself no favors.”42 Consider in this context the alarming and profoundly imaginary estimates of U.S. intelligence agencies in the year after the September 11 attacks that the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000.43 Terrorist cells, they told reporters, were “embedded in most U.S. cities with sizable Islamic communities,” usually in the “run-down sections,” and were “up and active” because electronic intercepts had found some of them to be “talking to each other.”44 Another account relayed the view of “experts” that Osama bin Laden was ready to unleash an “11,000 strong terrorist army” operating in more than sixty countries “controlled by a Mr. Big who is based in Europe,” but that intelligence had “no idea where thousands of these men are.”45 Similarly, FBI Director Robert Mueller assured the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 11, 2003, that, although his agency had yet to identify even one al-Qaida cell in the United States, “I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing,” a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text. Moreover, he claimed that such unidentified entities presented “the greatest threat,” had “developed a support infrastructure” in the country, and had achieved both the “ability” and the “intent” to inflict “signi ficant casualties in the US with little warning.”46 Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.

#### No nuclear terror – operation, cohesion and coordination

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12 The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14 In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15 Although the efforts of would-be terrorists have often seemed pathetic, even comical or absurd, the comedy remains a dark one. Left to their own devices, at least a few of these often inept and almost always self-deluded individuals could eventually have committed some serious, if small-scale, damage.16

#### Even if there is an attack – it would be small scale and disorganized

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

Calculating the Costs of the Counterterrorism Delusion Delusion is a quality that is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, there may be a way to get a sense of its dimensions—or at least of its cost consequences. We have argued that terrorism is a limited problem with limited consequences and that the reaction to it has been excessive, and even delusional. Some degree of effort to deal with the terrorism hazard is, however, certainly appropriate—and is decidedly not delusional. The issue then is a quantitative one: At what point does a reaction to a threat that is real become excessive or even delusional? At present rates, as noted earlier, an American’s chance of being killed by terrorism is one in 3.5 million in a given year. This calculation is based on history (but one that includes the September 11 attacks in the count), and things could, of course, become worse in the future. The analysis here, however, suggests that terrorists are not really all that capable, that terrorism tends to be a counterproductive exercise, and that September 11 is increasingly standing out as an aberration, not a harbinger. Moreover, it has essentially become officially accepted that the likelihood of a large-scale organized attack such as September 11 has declined and that the terrorist attacks to fear most are ones that are small scale and disorganized.66 Attacks such as these can inflict painful losses, of course, but they are quite limited in their effect and, even if they do occur, they would not change the fatality risk for the American population very much.

### 1NC US/Russia War

#### No nuclear strike

Graham 7 (Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, **than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War**. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and **the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability**. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

#### No escalation – disagreements remain limited

Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely **remain limited and compartmentalized**. Russia and the West **do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over**. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

### 1NC Russian Miscalc

#### No risk of accidental/unauthorized war.

#### Dr. Leonid Ryabikhin, General (Ret.) Viktor Koltunov and Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, June 2009. Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute; Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic Stability of Rosatom; and Senior Research Scientist, Centre for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. “De-alerting: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Discussion paper presented at the seminar on “Re-framing De Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context,” [www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf](http://www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf).

#### Analysis of the above arguments shows, that they do not have solid grounds. Today Russian and U.S. ICBMs are not targeted at any state. High alert status of the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces has not been an obstacle for building a strategic partnership. The issue of the possibility of an “accidental” nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorization by the national leadership. Besides that it should be mentioned that even the Soviet Union and the United States had taken important bilateral steps toward decreasing the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. Direct emergency telephone “red line” has been established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963. In 1971 the USSR and USA signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Nuclear War Threat. This Agreement established the actions of each side in case of even a hypothetical accidental missile launch and it contains the requirements for the owner of the launched missile to deactivate and eliminate the missile. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have developed proper measures to observe the agreed requirements.

### Moar Defense

#### -- No risk of Russia war

Ball 5 (Desmond, Professor – Strategic Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University, “The Probabilities of ‘On the Beach’ Assessing Armageddon Scenarios in the 21st Century, May, <http://www.manningclark.org.au/papers/se05_ball.html>)

The prospects of a nuclear war between the US and Russia must now be deemed **fairly remote**. There are now no geostrategic issues that warrant nuclear competition and **no inclination** in either Washington or Moscow to provoke such issues. US and Russian strategic forces have been taken off day-to-day alert and their ICBMs 'de-targeted', greatly reducing the possibilities of war by accident, inadvertence or miscalculation. On the other hand, while the US-Russia strategic competition is in abeyance, there are several aspects of current US nuclear weapons policy which are profoundly disturbing. In December 2001 President George W. Bush officially announced that the US was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, one of the mainstays of strategic nuclear arms control during the Cold War, with effect from June 2002, and was proceeding to develop and deploy an extensive range of both theatre missile defence (TMD) and national missile defence (NMD) systems. The first anti-missile missile in the NMD system, designed initially to defend against limited missile attacks from China and North Korea, was installed at Fort Greely in Alaska in July 2004. The initial system, consisting of 16 interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg Air Force in California, is expected to be operational by the end of 2005. The Bush Administration is also considering withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and resuming nuclear testing. (The last US nuclear test was on 23 September 1992). In particular, some key Administration officials believe that testing is necessary to develop a 'new generation' of nuclear weapons, including low-yield, 'bunker-busting', earth-penetrating weapons specifically designed to destroy very hard and deeply buried targets (such as underground command and control centres and leadership bunkers).

#### -- Common ties, Russian leadership, and defense spending checks

Aron 6 (Leon, Director of Russian Studies – American Enterprise Institute, “The United States and Russia”, 6-29,

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24606/pub\_detail.asp)

Yet the probability of a frontal confrontation and a new Cold War remains **very remote** for at least three reasons. First, despite the erosion, the countries geopolitical assets are still very weighty, as the bedrock issues of anti-terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and energy will continue to force them to seek common ground and at least limited partnership.[17] Second, the restorationist foreign policy notwithstanding, the three basic elements of the 1992-1993 national consensus on the foreign policy and defense doctrine remain largely the same. Russia is to stay a nuclear superpower and the regional superpower, but it seems to have settled for the role of one of the world’s great states, rather than a global superpower engaged in a worldwide competition with the United States. While these desiderata will continue to cause occasional sparring with the United States, they are no longer dedicated to the attainment of goals inimical to the vital interests of the United States and are not likely to ignite a relentless antagonistic struggle to the bitter end**.** Lastly, despite the muscular rhetoric emanating of late from the Kremlin, unlike the Soviet Union twenty years ago and China today, Russia is not a revisionist power. It does not seek radically to reshape the geopolitical balance of forces in its favor. Moscow may rail at the score, but it is unlikely to endeavor to change the rules of the game. For that, one needs a different ideology and, as a result, a different set of priorities. Yet even in today’s Russia flush with petrodollars, the share of GDP devoted to defense (around 3 percent) is not only at least ten times smaller than in the Soviet Union, but also below the 1992-1997 average in a Russia that inherited an empty treasury from the Soviet Union and that was, like every revolutionary government, unable to collect taxes. Calculated in purchasing power parity, Russia’s defense expenditures in 2005 ($47.77 billion) were less than one-eleventh of what the U.S. spent ($522 billion).

#### -- Deterrence checks

Turner 2 (Admiral Stansfield, Former Director – Central Intelligence Agency, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter / Spring, 26 Fletcher F. World Aff. 115, Lexis)

There are, of course, other centrals question to be considered: Would Russian psychology differ from American and would Russian society be willing to accept large numbers of nuclear detonations on their soil in order to perpetrate a nuclear war against the United States? These are difficult questions to answer. The more pertinent concern, however, is that this is an issue of life or death. No head of state could contemplate plunging the world into nuclear conflict without considering both the mortal threat to his or her citizens, and also the likelihood of his or her own death, underground shelters notwithstanding. The presumption that heads of state prefer to live than to die gives us one benchmark. Another is the Cuban missile crisis, in which both Leonid Khruschev and President Kennedy quite visibly backed away from the prospect of very limited nuclear war. Finally, Russia’s economy, being about the size of Belgium’s, is so small that its leaders would be well aware that recovery, even from a small nuclear attack, would be a very lengthy process. In terms of nuclear detonation threats, the United States must consider Russian deterrence as very close to its own.

#### -- Won’t go nuclear

Manning 00 (Robert A., Senior Fellow and Director of Asian Studies – Council on Foreign Relations, “Abbott and Costello Nuclear Policy”, Washington Times, 3-10, Lexis)

We don't want to go any lower because we need these weapons for nuclear deterrence, according to State Department spokesman James Rubin. But how many nukes do we need for deterrence to be credible? China, which President Clinton has talked of as a "strategic partner," has a grand total of 20 - count them - strategic warheads that could hit the United States. Nuclear wannabes like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would have only a handful if they did manage to succeed in joining the nuclear club. Russia, which has 6,000 strategic warheads, is no longer an adversary. During the Cold War, it was not hard to envision a conventional war in Europe escalating into nuclear conflict. But today it is difficult to spin a plausible scenario in which the United States and Russia escalate hostilities into a nuclear exchange. Russia has no Warsaw Pact, and not much of a conventional force to speak of. Yet U.S. nuclear planners still base their targeting plans on prospective Russian targets, though no one will say so.

# 2NC

## Counterplan

### “Armed Conflict” Solves Terror

#### The armed conflict framework authorizes targeted killings outside of zones of hostilities in a manner that’s consistent with international law – it’s key to deny safe havens.

Wittes 13 [Benjamin, Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, 2/27, “Drones and the War on Terror: When Can the U.S. Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?” p. 3-6, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Testimony/2013/02/27%20drones%20wittes/Feb%2027%20Drones%20Wittes%20Testimony.pdf]

First, the administration contends that the United States is in a state of armed conflict with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. President Obama himself made the point in a major address as early as May 2009 that warfare lay at the heart of the relationship between the United States and certain foreign terrorist organizations, saying, “Now let me be clear: we are indeed at war with Al Qaeda and its affiliates.”2 ¶ The administration has since consistently maintained that the United States’ use of force in the current conflict is authorized by Congress—specifically by the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)3—and consistent with international law.4¶ The nature of this conflict, it bears emphasis, involves actual war—not war as a metaphor for policy seriousness, but armed conflict in the strict legal sense. This is the government’s position—including the Congress’s position—even though the enemy is not a state. In the parlance of international law, the United States considers itself as fighting a “non-international armed conflict”—that is, an armed conflict against something other than another sovereign state. Since many U.S. actions using lethal force would constitute murder or other crimes during peacetime, this is actually a pivotal point. ¶ Another important aspect of the government’s view of the conflict is that the war is not limited to Al Qaeda itself, but also includes its “affiliates,” at least when those affiliates qualify as “associated forces.” This is an intentional framing of the activity and identity of these groups so as to treat them within the framework of co-belligerency for purposes of international law. And while many commentators have asserted that the armed conflict is limited legally to particular theaters of conflict or hot battlefields, the administration has consistently rejected this notion as well. Attorney General Eric Holder addressed this point in a major address last March at Northwestern University:¶ Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts have limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan. We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting operations from country to country. Over the last three years alone, Al Qaeda and its associates have directed several attacks—fortunately, unsuccessful—against us from countries other than Afghanistan. Our government has both a responsibility and a right to protect this nation and its people from such threats.5¶ The notions that an armed conflict exists, that it is not limited to Afghanistan but extends at least to those places from which the enemy strikes, and that it includes Al Qaeda’s co-belligerent forces are all contested by advocacy groups, international organizations, and prominent figures in the legal academy. Importantly, as Holder noted, however, they have not been contested either by the Congress or by the courts. The AUMF did not specify a legal geography of the conflict and thereby create zones of impunity to which this country’s military enemies might flee and from which they might then attack—and Congress has never sought to impose geographic limits on the conflict after the fact either. In fact, Congress in 2012 specifically reaffirmed—as least as regards detention authority—that the AUMF was still a vital document and reached members and supporters of enemy groups, including associated forces. It did so, once again, without reference to geography.6 What’s more, the courts, in Guantánamo detention cases, have recognized both that the armed conflict extends beyond the hot battlefield of Afghanistan7 and that the executive branch’s authority to use force extends beyond core Al Qaeda and Taliban forces and includes “associated forces.”8 In other words, there is no dispute among the branches of government that the United States is in a state of armed conflict with Al Qaeda and its cobelligerents, wherever they may be.¶ Second, in this armed conflict—as, indeed, in any armed conflict—the United States is lawfully entitled to target the enemy with lethal force. The existence of an ongoing armed conflict means that, legally speaking, the administration can strike, assuming the target is a lawful one, whenever it wants. As a matter of international law and domestic AUMF authority, it does not have to do a separate legal analysis of whether force can be used against each individual member of enemy forces or whether each individual member poses an imminent threat; a single conflict is, after all, already under way. Nor is there some general legal obligation to seek to capture a lawful target before attacking using lethal force where the target is not hors de combat. Similarly, there is no obligation to give warning or to offer surrender before launching an attack, though surrender must be accepted once completed. While the administration has made it clear that, as a policy matter, it does prefer to capture whenever possible—to reap the intelligence harvest of interrogations, to avoid unnecessary death, and to bring suspects to justice in the criminal justice system—this is generally not a legal requirement but a set of prudential, humanitarian, and tactical considerations.¶ Again, this point should engender no particular controversy—though it nonetheless does. The ability to target the enemy in an armed conflict with lethal force is a simple, and lawful, operational necessity in a world in which enemy organizations in countries and locations impossible to reach by law enforcement continue to threaten the United States. The fact of armed conflict—and the consequent availability of targeting—does not mean automatic recourse to hostilities, of course. There are many places in the world where the United States can and does pursue terrorists through law enforcement, interdiction of terrorist financing, and other non-hostilities-based tools of counterterrorism. But there are other places in the world that are weakly governed, ungoverned, or simply hostile to the United States, where terrorist groups responsible for September 11 have fled, or in which associated terrorist groups or cells have arisen and joined the conflict against the United States. The armed conflict framework, and the inherently-tied authority to target the enemy with lethal force, is essential to reaching these actors and denying them sanctuary from which to attack this country.

#### Armed conflict requirement is key to solve terror.

Groves 13 [Steven, Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, 4/10, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad]

While U.S. drone strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan have garnered little attention by comparison, human rights activists and international legal academics have criticized strikes on the territory of countries outside that “hot” battlefield for several years. However, the ongoing armed conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda is not confined to the territory where the September 11 plot was hatched. Nor is the U.S. right to defend itself against imminent threats posed by al-Qaeda restricted to only Afghanistan. While al-Qaeda and its associated forces have metastasized to different parts of the world, they have maintained their intent to strike the United States and kill its citizens wherever they may be. The United States must continue to deter and eliminate that threat with drone strikes and any other means at its disposal.¶ Congressional Authorization. As an initial matter, it should be noted that U.S. armed forces possess the domestic authority to use force against al-Qaeda wherever its operatives may be located and found to pose a threat to U.S. national security. Days after the September 11 attacks, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force.[28] The AUMF’s stated purpose is “to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States” by any person, organization, or nation that the President determines to have “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the September 11 attacks. To achieve that end, the President may “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons.”¶ Congress attached no temporal or geographic limitations to its authorization. Nothing in the AUMF limits U.S. forces from pursuing al-Qaeda outside the borders of Afghanistan or requires U.S. forces to cease hostilities upon achieving a particular military objective. As long as a person, organization, or nation is found to have planned, authorized, committed, or aided the September 11 attacks, the President may use all force he deems necessary and appropriate against that person, organization, or nation to prevent any future act of terrorism against the United States.¶ Neither the U.N. Charter nor Security Council Resolution 1368 places geographic limitations on the right of self-defense. When elements of al-Qaeda and the Taliban plan and launch attacks against the United States or Afghan forces from Pakistan, Yemen, or elsewhere, the United States has the right to target those elements on Pakistani and Yemeni soil. The fact that al-Qaeda and its associated forces currently operate from bases in Yemen, Somalia, and the Sahel does not somehow extinguish the right of the United States to defend itself.

### “Armed Conflict” Solves Norms

#### CP Solves norms – host states consent and US justifications are perceived as valid.

Lewis & Crawford 13 [Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Emily, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, “DRONES AND DISTINCTION: HOW IHL ENCOURAGED THE RISE OF DRONES” p. 1166,

, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF]

Lastly, the legal justiﬁcation advanced by the United States for its drone use does not seek an “ever-expanding entitlement” to use drones around the world, nor is it likely to result in the use of drones against the United States. While states must always be wary of conducting themselves in a manner that serves their short-term security interests while creating a damaging long-term precedent, it does not appear that the United States’ legal justiﬁcation does that. Because the justiﬁcation is largely based upon the consent of the state in which force is employed, there are minimal sovereignty concerns related to drone use. Those concerns do arise when a state is unable or unwilling to prevent non-state actors within its borders from engaging in an armed conﬂict with another state. These concerns should be addressed by showing proper deference to the targeted state in arriving at an “unable or unwilling” determination. As long as proper deference is shown to the target state, an emerging legal norm allowing for selfdefense targeting of non-state actors on the territory of a third state if that “host” state is either unable or unwilling to detain or expel the non-state actors does not threaten the stability and cohesion of the international order, nor is it likely to “haunt” the United States in the future.169

### EU

#### Specifically the EU – they’re key

Dworkin 7/17/13

Anthony Dworkin is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, CNN, July 17, 2013, "Actually, drones worry Europe more than spying", http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/17/actually-drones-worry-europe-more-than-spying/

Behind the scenes, though, it is not data protection and surveillance that produces the most complications for the transatlantic intelligence relationship, but rather America's use of armed drones to kill terrorist suspects away from the battlefield. Incidents such as the recent killing of at least 17 people in Pakistan are therefore only likely to heighten European unease.

In public, European governments have displayed a curiously passive approach to American drone strikes, even as their number has escalated under Barack Obama’s presidency. Many Europeans believe that the majority of these strikes are unlawful, but their governments have maintained an uneasy silence on the issue. This is partly because of the uncomfortable fact that information provided by European intelligence services may have been used to identify some targets. It is also because of a reluctance to accuse a close ally of having violated international law. And it is partly because European countries have not worked out exactly what they think about the use of drones and how far they agree within the European Union on the question. Now, however, Europe’s muted stance on drone strikes looks likely to change.

Why? For one thing, many European countries are now trying to acquire armed drones themselves, and this gives them an incentive to spell out clearer rules for their use. More importantly, perhaps, Europeans have noticed that drones are proliferating rapidly, and that countries like China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are soon likely to possess them. There is a clear European interest in trying to establish some restrictive standards on drone use before it is too late. For all these reasons, many European countries are now conducting internal reviews of their policy on drones, and discussions are also likely to start at a pan-European level.

But as Europeans begin to articulate their policy on the use of drones, a bigger question looms. Can Europe and the United States come together to agree on when drone strikes are permissible? Until now, that would have seemed impossible. Since the September 11 attacks, the United States has based its counterterrorism operations on the claim that it is engaged in a worldwide armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated forces — an idea that President Obama inherited from President George W. Bush and has been kept as the basis for an expanded drone strike campaign. European countries have generally rejected this claim.

However, the changes to American policy that President Obama announced in May could open the way to at least the possibility of a dialogue. Obama suggested that he anticipated a time in the not-too-distant future when the armed conflict against al Qaeda might come to an end. More substantially, he made clear that his administration was in the process of switching its policy so that, outside zones of hostilities, it would only use drone strikes against individuals who posed a continuing and imminent threat to the U.S. That is a more restrictive standard than the claim that any member of al Qaeda or an associated force could lawfully be killed with a drone strike at any time.

European countries might be more willing to accept an approach based on this kind of “self-defense” idea. However, there remain some big stumbling blocks.

First, a good deal about Obama’s new standards is still unclear. How does he define a “zone of hostilities,” where the new rules will not apply? And what is his understanding of an “imminent” threat? European countries are likely to interpret these key terms in a much narrower way than the United States.

Second, Obama’s new approach only applies as a policy choice. His more expansive legal claims remain in the background so that he is free to return to them if he wishes.

But if the United States is serious about working toward international standards on drone strikes, as Obama and his officials have sometimes suggested, then Europe is the obvious place to start. And there are a number of steps the administration could take to make an agreement with European countries more likely.

### Turns Iran/North Korea

#### Econ collapse spurs isolationism – sparks rogue prolif by Iran and NK and conflict between Russia, China, Indo–Pak

Freidberg 8 (Aaron, Professor of Politics and International Relations – Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, Wall Street Journal, 10–21, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj)

With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish? If so, what would that mean? One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction –– foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially–induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal –– attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion –– might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale–force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar–denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign–policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that **rogue states may** choose to **become** ever more **reckless with** their **nuclear toys**, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.

### Turns Russia

#### Econ collapse turns Russian war

Nyquist 5 (J.R., Author and Geopolitical Columnist – Financial Sense Online, "The Political Consequences of a Financial Crash," 2–4, http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2005/0204.html)  
Should the United States experience a severe economic contraction during the second term of President Bush, the American people will likely support politicians who advocate further restrictions and controls on our market economy – guaranteeing its strangulation and the steady pauperization of the country. In Congress today, Sen. Edward Kennedy supports nearly all the economic dogmas listed above. It is easy to see, therefore, that the coming economic contraction, due in part to a policy of massive credit expansion, will have serious political consequences for the Republican Party (to the benefit of the Democrats). Furthermore, an economic contraction will encourage the formation of anti–capitalist majorities and a turning away from the free market system. The danger here is not merely economic. The political left openly favors the collapse of America's strategic position abroad. The withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East, the Far East and Europe would catastrophically impact an international system that presently allows 6 billion people to live on the earth's surface in relative peace. Should anti–capitalist dogmas overwhelm the global market and trading system that evolved under American leadership, the planet's economy would contract and untold millions would die of starvation. Nationalistic totalitarianism, fueled by a politics of blame, would once again bring war to Asia and Europe. But this time the war would be waged with mass destruction weapons and the United States would be blamed because it is the center of global capitalism. Furthermore, if the anti–capitalist party gains power in Washington, we can expect to see policies of appeasement and unilateral disarmament enacted. American appeasement and disarmament, in this context, would be an admission of guilt before the court of world opinion. Russia and China, above all, would exploit this admission to justify aggressive wars, invasions and mass destruction attacks. A future financial crash, therefore, must be prevented at all costs. But we cannot do this. As one observer recently lamented, "We drank the poison and now we must die."

### Turns China

#### Growth prevents miscalculation and war with China

Glaser 5/2/12 (“China is Reacting to Our Weak Economy” Bonnie S. Glaser (senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.) 5/2/2012 http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are–we–headed–for–a–cold–war–with–china/china–is–reacting–to–our–weak–economy)

To maintain peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region and secure American interests, the United States must sustain its leadership and bolster regional confidence in its staying power. The key to those goals is reinvigorating the U.S. economy. Historically, the Chinese have taken advantage of perceived American weakness and shifts in the global balance of power. In 1974 China seized the Paracel Islands from Saigon just after the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Treaty, which signaled the U.S. withdrawal from the region. When the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met one of Deng Xiaoping’s “three obstacles” requirements for better ties and withdrew from Can Ranh Bay, Vietnam, in 1988, China snatched seven of the Spratly Islands from Hanoi. Two decades later, as the United States–Philippines base agreement was terminated, China grabbed Mischief Reef from Manila. Beijing must not be allowed to conclude that an economic downturn means our ability to guarantee regional stability has weakened. The Chinese assertive behaviors against its neighbors in recent years in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea were in part a consequence of China’s assessment that the global financial crisis signaled the beginning of U.S. decline and a shift in the balance of power in China’s favor. The Obama administration’s “rebalancing” or “pivot” to Asia will help prevent Chinese miscalculation and increase the confidence of U.S. partners in U.S. reliability as the ballast for peace and stability in the region. But failure to follow through with actions and resources would spark uncertainty and lead smaller countries to accommodate Chinese interests in the region. Most important, the United States must revive its economy. China will inevitably overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world in the coming decade or two. The United States must not let Beijing conclude that a relative decline in U.S. power means a weakened United States unable to guarantee regional peace and stability. The Chinese see the United States as mired in financial disorder, with an alarming budget deficit, high unemployment and slow economic growth — which, they predict, will lead to America's demise as the sole global superpower. To avoid Chinese miscalculation and greater United States–China strategic competition, the United States needs to restore financial solvency and growth through bipartisan action.

#### Econ growth prevents war with China – sticky power ensures interdependence not war

Mead 04 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations, “America's STICKY Power,” Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr, Proquest)

China's rise to global prominence will offer a key test case for sticky power. As China develops economically, it should gain wealth that could support a military rivaling that of the United States; China is also gaining political influence in the world. Some analysts in both China and the United States believe that the laws of history mean that Chinese power will someday clash with the reigning U.S. power. Sticky power offers a way out. China benefits from participating in the U.S. economic system and integrating itself into the global economy. Between 1970 and 2003, China's gross domestic product grew from an estimated $106 billion to more than $1.3 trillion. By 2003, an estimated $450 billion of foreign money had flowed into the Chinese economy. Moreover, China is becoming increasingly dependent on both imports and exports to keep its economy (and its military machine) going. Hostilities between the United States and China would cripple China's industry, and cut off supplies of oil and other key commodities. Sticky power works both ways, though. If China cannot afford war with the United States, the United States will have an increasingly hard time breaking off commercial relations with China. In an era of weapons of mass destruction, this mutual dependence is probably good for both sides. Sticky power did not prevent World War I, but economic interdependence runs deeper now; as a result, the "inevitable" U.S.–Chinese conflict is less likely to occur.

#### Econ collapse turns China war

Mead 9 (Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy – Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger”, The New Republic, 2–4, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9–2887–4d81–8542–92e83915f5f8&p=2)

The greatest danger both to U.S.–China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst–case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest––and a bitter climate of anti–foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of **Weimar Germany**, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever–greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops. India's future is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60–year–old democratic system has resisted many shocks, a deep economic recession in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could undermine political order, long–term growth, and India's attitude toward the United States and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse; religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the list of economic events that changed history, even if the recessions in the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis––and work very hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. **For billions** of people **in nuclear–armed countries** to emerge from this crisis believing either that the United States was indifferent to their well–being or that it had profited from their distress could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq––however late, however undeserved, however limited––had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals. None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time, financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe, the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage––or at least allow and sustain––the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting–edge technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a vast social project of modernization––and to maintain political stability in the face of accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin world is often drawn to anti–capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society––whether during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post–cold war leaders who so signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only half–heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half–hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front–runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes––as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads––but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300–year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. **Bad economic times** can **breed wars**. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward **Moscow**, **Karachi**, **Beijing**, or **New Delhi** to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, **we may** still **have to fight**.

### Turns Terrorism

#### Turns terrorism

Schaub 4 (Drew, Professor of Political Science – Penn State University, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(2), April)

Despite the caveats, our analysis suggests important policy implications for the war against terrorism. National governments should realize that economic globalization is not the cause of, but a possible partial solution to, transnational terrorism. Although opening up one’s border facilitates the movement of terrorists and their activities, our results show that the effect of such facilitation appears weak. It does not precipitate a significant rise in transnational terrorist attacks within countries. This is an important lesson for policy makers who are designing antiterrorism policies. More important, economic openness, to the extent that it promotes economic development, may actually help to reduce indirectly the number of transnational terrorist incidents inside a country. Closing borders to foreign goods and capital may produce undesirable effects. Economic closure and autarky can generate more incentives to engage in transnational terrorist activities by hindering economic development. Antiterrorism policy measures should be designed with caution. They should not be designed to slow down economic globalization. Promoting economic development and reducing poverty should be important components of the global war against terrorism. Such effects are structural and system–wide. It is in the best interest of the United States not only to develop by itself but also to help other countries to grow quickly. The effect of economic development on the number of transnational terrorist incidents is large. The role of economic development deserves much more attention from policy makers than it currently enjoys.

#### Growth solves terrorism

Gries, Kriegery, Meierrieksz 09 (Causal Linkages Between Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth; Thomas Gries , Tim Kriegery, Daniel Meierrieksz; February 17, 2009;http://groups.uni–paderborn.de/fiwi/RePEc/Working%20Paper%20neutral/WP20%20–%202009–02.pdf)

Possible E¤ects of Economic Performance on Terrorism Economic theory argues that terrorists are rational individuals which choose their levels of violent activity according to the costs and benefits arising from their actions (cf., e.g., Sandler and Enders, 2004). Because of terrorists’ presumed rationality, the opportunity costs of terror also matter. Intuitively, low opportunity costs of violence –that is, few prospects of economic activity –lead to elevated terrorist activity, whereas high opportunity costs result in the opposite (cf., e.g., Freytag et al., 2008). Times of economic success mean, inter alia, more individual economic opportunities and economic participation. Higher levels of overall growth should coincide with higher opportunity costs of terror and thus less violence. Conversely, in periods of economic downturn should be accompanied by fewer economic opportunities and participation and thus by more economic dissatisfaction. In times of economic crisis, dissidents are more likely to resort to violence as the opportunity costs of terror are low, while the potential long–run payo¤s from violence –a redistribution of scarce economic resources which is to be enforced by means of terrorism are comparatively high (cf. Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004). To some extent, empirical evidence suggests that economic performance and terrorism are linked along the lines discussed before. The findings of Collier and Hoe­ er (1998) indicate that higher levels of economic development coincide with lower likelihoods of civil war, providing initial evidence that economic success and con‡ict are diametrically opposed. Considering economic development and terrorism, several studies …nd that higher levels of development are obstacles to the production of transnational terrorism (cf., e.g., Santos Bravo and Mendes Dias, 2006; Lai, 2007; Freytag et al., 2008). Blomberg and Hess (2008) also …and that higher incomes are a strong deterrence to the genesis of domestic terrorism. Furthermore, there is evidence connecting solid short–run economic conditions with less political violence (cf. Muller andWeede, 1990; Freytag et al., 2008).6 In general, the evidence indicates that terrorism and economic conditions are linked. Here, economic success seems to impede the genesis of terrorism, presumably due to higher opportunity costs of conflict. In other words, in times of stronger economic performance individuals simply have more to lose.

### AQAP Impact – Oil Spikes

#### A terrorist attack on Saudi Arabia undermines the resiliency of the oil market – that causes a global economic collapse.

**Daly**, 2/23/**2006** (John C. K. - United Press International correspondent and former adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute, Saudi Oil Facilities: Al-Qaeda's Next Target?, Terrorism Monitor Vol. 4 Issue 4, p. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx\_ttnews[tt\_news]=685&tx\_ttnews[backPid]=181&no\_cache=1)

Saudi Arabia and its oil have long been in bin Laden's thoughts; in 1996, he said, "The ordinary Saudi knows that his country is the largest oil producer in the world, yet at the same time he is suffering from taxes and bad services…Our country has become a colony of America…Saudis know their real enemy is America" (UPI Intelligence Watch, March 21, 2005).   Neighboring Iraq demonstrates the crippling effects of an insurgency on oil installations. Since June 2003, there have been 298 recorded attacks against Iraqi oil facilities (Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch.htm). As of December 2005, Iraqi production was averaging around 1.9 million barrels per day as compared with its January 2003 2.58 million barrels per day production rate (U.S. Energy Information Administration, December 2005). Moreover, the costs of infrastructure attacks are becoming staggering, with the Iraqi oil ministry announcing on February 19 that insurgent attacks had cost the oil industry $6.25 billion in lost revenue during 2005.   Aside from Saudi crude oil production capacity being the world's largest, at **10.5-11 million barrels** per day, Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates, controls the world's only **significant excess production capacity**, an extra 2.5-3 million barrels per day. This makes the kingdom the world's only guarantor of liquidity in the oil market. The Saudi economy is heavily dependent on energy, with oil export revenues bringing in around 90-95 percent of total Saudi export earnings, and generating around 40 percent of the country's gross domestic product.   The country's hydrocarbon infrastructure, with its massive production fields, ports and 10,000 miles of pipelines, presents a number of opportunities for potential attackers, whose success would have implications far beyond the kingdom, **driving the world into recession** or depression as energy costs soar.   Over half of Saudi Arabia's oil reserves are contained in just eight massive fields, including the huge 130-mile long, 20-mile wide Ghawar field, covering 2,600 square miles. Ghawar alone accounts for nearly half of Saudi Arabia's total oil production capacity. Aramco's skein of pipelines depends on 30 pumping stations, powered by six generators, which would shut down the flow if destroyed. Port facilities are concentrated on a 20-mile stretch of Persian Gulf shoreline from Juaymah to al-Khobar.   Saudi Arabia's offshore Safaniya oilfield is the largest of its kind in the world, with estimated reserves of 35 billion barrels. Continuing the trend toward gigantism, the Abqaiq refinery 25 miles inland from the Gulf of Bahrain processes about two-thirds of Saudi Arabia's crude oil. On the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura facility is the world's largest offshore oil loading facility, accounting for a tenth of the world's daily oil supply. A second loading facility is at Ras al-Juaymah, while Yanbu terminal is located on the Red Sea, supplied from Abqaiq via the 750-mile East-West pipeline.   Terrorist attacks could be easily launched against onshore facilities and tankers. Over 60 percent of the world's oil is shipped on 3,500 tankers through a small number of "chokepoints" including the Strait of Hormuz, which alone transits 13 million barrels of oil per day.   Al-Qaeda has already carried out maritime attacks on both warships and tankers. On October 6, 2002, the 299,364 DWT-ton French Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) tanker Limburg, carrying a cargo of 397,000 barrels of crude from Iran to Malaysia, was rammed by an explosives-laden boat off the port of Ash Shihr at Mukalla, 353 miles east of Aden. A crewman was killed and the double-hulled tanker was breached. The impact on the Yemeni economy was immediate, as maritime insurers tripled their rates.   Al-Qaeda issued a statement following the attack warning that it "was not an incidental strike at a passing tanker but...on the international oil-carrying line in the full sense of the word," prompting the U.S. Navy's Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain to issue a warning stating that "Shipmasters should exercise extreme caution when transiting...strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, or Bab el-Mandeb, or...traditional high-threat areas such as along the Horn of Africa."   Al-Qaeda's cadre of maritime specialists recently received a boost when on February 3, 23 prisoners escaped from a jail in Sanaa. Five days later, Interpol issued a global security alert, a Red Notice, to its 184 member states, as law enforcement officials believe that at least 13 of the fugitives have links to al-Qaeda. Among those who broke out of the prison was Jamal al-Badawi, who was serving a 10-year sentence for his part in the October 12, 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS Cole in Aden harbor during a refueling stop; 17 sailors died and 39 more were injured in the attack.   The most worrisome scenario revolves around al-Qaeda crashing a hijacked commercial passenger jet into an oil installation. To consider just one scenario, a jetliner crashing into the Ras Tanura facility could remove 10 percent of the world's energy imports in one shot.   Former CIA agent Robert Baer has considered the implications of terrorist attacks on Saudi oil facilities, writing, "At the least, a moderate-to-severe attack on Abqaiq would slow average production there from 6.8 million barrels a day to roughly a million barrels for the first two months post-attack, a loss equivalent to approximately one-third of America's current daily consumption of crude oil. Even as long as seven months after an attack, Abqaiq output would still be about 40 percent of pre-attack output, as much as four million barrels below normal—roughly equal to what all of the OPEC partners collectively took out of production during the devastating 1973 embargo" (see Robert Baer's Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold our Soul for Saudi Crude). An al-Qaeda assault on Abqaiq would have the added propaganda effect of killing Americans. Abqaiq is an oil-company town; in 2005, nearly half of its approximately 2,000 inhabitants were U.S. citizens.   In the last few years, the Saudis have moved to tighten security around their oil installations. Unlike in Iraq, where insurgent attacks are focused mainly on the country's hydrocarbon infrastructure, thus far al-Qaeda attacks in Saudi Arabia have focused on "soft targets," namely the 3,000 foreign oil workers employed in the kingdom.   On December 16, 2004, bin Laden released an audiotape making an explicit connection between U.S. forces in Iraq and the region's oil reserves; in the audiotape, he praised the terrorists who attacked the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah. Bin Laden said, "Targeting America in Iraq in terms of economy and losses in life is a golden and unique opportunity. Do not waste it only to regret it later. One of the most important reasons that led our enemies to control our land is the theft of our oil. Do everything you can to stop the biggest plundering operation in history—the plundering of the resources of the present and future generations in collusion with the agents and the aliens...Be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf, for this is their fate" (BBC, December 16, 2004). Three days later, the "al-Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula" posted a message on its website urging its members "to strike all foreign targets and the hideouts of the tyrants to rid the peninsula of the infidels and their supporters. We call on all the mujahideen to target the sources of oil which do not serve the Islamic nation but serve the enemies of the nation" (Agence France Press, December 19, 2004).   Judging by al-Qaeda's pronouncements, an attack on Saudi Arabian oil facilities seems to be only a matter of time. In terms of the global impact of such a strike, Robert Baer provides an extreme but not altogether improbable scenario: "Such an attack would be more economically damaging than a dirty nuclear bomb set off in midtown Manhattan or across from the White House in Lafayette Square…[and] would be enough to bring the world's oil-addicted economies to their knees, America's along with them."

### Econ Collapse = War

#### Decline cause miscalculation and conflict – prefer statistically significant evidence

**Royal 10** (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases**,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularlyduring periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate externalmilitary conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in theuse of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### Economic collapse causes extinction

**Bearden 00** (T.E., Director of Association of Distinguished American Scientists, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly,” Space Energy Access Systems, http://www.seaspower.com/EnergyCrisis-Bearden.htm)

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released.  As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China — whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States — attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary.  The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

## Norms

### A2 We Change Calculations

#### They don’t change calculations of drones- states perceive benefits so they will continue using

Barry 12 (Tom, the Director of the TransBorder Project at the Center for International Policy, “Drone Proliferation: Other Chapters and Other Challenges,” 1-17-12, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/17/tom-barry/drone-proliferation-other-chapters-other-challenges>)

Thus far, in Congress and in the executive branch, we see mostly uncritical advocacy for increased drone deployment—on vivid display at the annual drone fairs sponsored jointly by the House Unmanned Systems Caucus and the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International.[5]¶ It is widely accepted—in Congress, in the media, and by the public—that drone warfare has been an unqualified success. This perceived success—unsullied by the type of concerns raised by Cortright such as drone blowback—is key in driving drone proliferation around the world and at home. Representative Candice Miller, the Michigan Republican who chairs the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the House Homeland Security Committee, is a self-declared “huge supporter” of UAVs and advocates deploying the “fantastic technology” that the U.S. military uses “in theater” at home.¶ “The UAVs are coming,” declared Miller in a recent oversight hearing, “and now you see our military sitting in a cubicle sometimes in Nevada, drinking a Starbucks, running these things in theater and being incredibly, incredibly successful.”

### No Modeling

#### Restrictions won’t be modeled- precedent already set

Jacobson 13 **(**Mark R., senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. From 2009 to 2011, he served with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, “Column: Key Assumptions About Drones Are Based on Misconceptions,” <http://www.vnews.com/opinion/4393278-95/drones-drone-armed-civilian>]

Armed drones are neither as simple as model airplanes nor as complex as high-performance fighter jets. Of course, a remote-controlled helicopter that you can build in your garage is certainly not as capable as the $26.8 million MQ-9 Reaper, the primary U.S. hunter-killer drone. But drones are much less expensive than fighter aircraft, and in an age of increasing austerity, it is tempting for nations to consider replacing jets with drones. More than 50 countries operate surveillance drones, and armed drones will quickly become standard in military arsenals. The challenge is to consider what international rules, if any, should govern the use of armed drones. The United States is setting the precedent; our approach may define the global rules of engagement. Of course, we cannot expect other nations to adopt the oversight and restrictions we have. What doors are we opening for other nations’ use of drones? What happens when terrorist groups acquire them? The United States must prepare for being the prey, not just the predator.

#### US drone model is irrelevant

Wittes and Singh 12 (Benjamin, a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution where he co-directs the Harvard Law School-Brookings Project on Security and Law, specializes in the legal issues surrounding international security and the war on terrorism, member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and the Law, Ritika, a research assistant on law and national security issues at the Brookings Institution. She graduated with majors in International Affairs and Government from Skidmore College, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,” 1-11-12, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity>)

Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.

### Prolif Inevitable – Tech/Econ Benefits

#### US tech sales and economic benefits make prolif inevitable

CRG 12 (The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal, a registered non-profit organization in the province of Quebec, Canada, “Mapping Drone Proliferation: UAVs in 76 Countries,” September 18, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/mapping-drone-proliferation-uavs-in-76-countries>)

The report goes on: “Currently, there are over 50 countries developing more than 900 different UAV systems. This growth is attributed to countries seeing the success of the United States with UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan and deciding to invest resources into UAV development to compete economically and militarily in this emerging area.”¶ While the report fails to highlight the danger of growing drone proliferation to global peace and security it does emphasize the danger of drone proliferation to “US interests”. The report states that “the use of UAVs by foreign parties to gather information on U.S. military activities has already taken place” and “the significant growth in the number of countries that have acquired UAVs, including key countries of concern, has increased the threat to the United States.”¶ Despite this, the report states “the U.S. government has determined that selected transfers of UAV technology support its national security interests”, thus highlighting the contradiction at the heart of current arms control measures. ‘Private sector representatives’ told the reports authors that “UAVs are one of the most important growth sectors in the defense industry and provide significant opportunities for economic benefits if U.S. companies can remain competitive in the global UAV market.”

#### US tech sales make prolif inevitable

Abdurazak and Advani 13 **(**Faeza, MSc in International Relations from Nanyang Technological University and is a research assistant at the Middle East Institute, and Rohan, Middle East Institute, “Drones Further Worsen Image of the U.S. in the Middle East, Say Panellists,” <http://www.mei.nus.edu.sg/blog/drones-further-worsen-image-of-the-u-s-in-the-middle-east-say-panellists>]

Unintended consequences of drone warfare include retaliation from, and the radicalization of, the local populace, as well as operational and strategic confusion – all of which reinforces the self-fulfilling prophecy of the “War on Terror.” Support for the policy and the proliferation of drones is also rapidly increasing, as the industry – expected to be valued at $82 billion by 2025 – continues to provide jobs in an economically fragile environment. As the drone lobby gains power, we may see economic factors being prioritized over strategic goals; in essence, a further expansion of the military-industrial complex.

### 2NC SCS

#### SCS tensions inevitable but no escalation

Meidan 12 -- analyst at Eurasia Group; research includes China's energy and environmental policies, policymaking, Chinese elite politics, and diplomacy; MA in political sciences and East Asian studies from the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (Michal, 8/7, "Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea," http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2GsDDT62R)

These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them. Vietnam and the Philippines, concerned with the shifting balance of powers in the region, are pushing their maritime claims more aggressively and increasing their efforts to internationalise the question by involving both ASEAN and Washington. Attempts to come up with a common position in ASEAN have failed miserably but as the US re-engages Asia, it is drawn into the troubled waters of the South China Sea. Political dynamics in China – with a once in a decade leadership transition coming up, combined with electoral politics in the US and domestic constraints for both Manila and Hanoi – all augur that the South China Sea will remain turbulent. No government can afford to appear weak in the eyes of domestic hawks or of increasingly nationalistic public opinions. The risk of a miscalculation resulting in prolonged standoffs or skirmishes is therefore higher now than ever before. But there are a number of reasons to believe that even these skirmishes are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict. First, despite the strong current of assertive forces within China, cooler heads are ultimately likely to prevail. While a conciliatory stance toward other claimants is unlikely before the leadership transition, China’s top brass will be equally reluctant to significantly escalate the situation, since this will send southeast Asian governments running to Washington. Hanoi and Manila also recognize that despite their need for assertiveness to appease domestic political constituencies, a direct confrontation with China is overly risky. Second, military pundits in China also realize that the cost of conflict is too high, since it will strengthen Washington’s presence in the region and disrupt trade flows. And even China’s oil company CNOOC, whose portfolio of assets relies heavily on the South China Sea, is diversifying its interests in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates.

#### No SCS conflict

Economist 12 (9/22, "Could Asia really go to war over these?" http://www.economist.com/node/21563316)

Optimists point out that the latest scuffle is mainly a piece of political theatre—the product of elections in Japan and a leadership transition in China. The Senkakus row has boiled over now because the Japanese government is buying some of the islands from a private Japanese owner. The aim was to keep them out of the mischievous hands of Tokyo’s China-bashing governor, who wanted to buy them himself. China, though, was affronted. It strengthened its own claim and repeatedly sent patrol boats to encroach on Japanese waters. That bolstered the leadership’s image, just before Xi Jinping takes over. More generally, argue the optimists, Asia is too busy making money to have time for making war. China is now Japan’s biggest trading partner. Chinese tourists flock to Tokyo to snap up bags and designer dresses on display in the shop windows on Omotesando. China is not interested in territorial expansion. Anyway, the Chinese government has enough problems at home: why would it look for trouble abroad? Asia does indeed have reasons to keep relations good, and this latest squabble will probably die down, just as others have in the past. But each time an island row flares up, attitudes harden and trust erodes. Two years ago, when Japan arrested the skipper of a Chinese fishing boat for ramming a vessel just off the islands, it detected retaliation when China blocked the sale of rare earths essential to Japanese industry.

#### No SCS escalation

Storey 12 -- Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, specializes in Asian security issues, with a focus on Southeast Asia (Ian, Interviewed by Ann Jung, 7/16/12, "ASEAN and the South China Sea: Deepening Divisions," http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=262)

The worst-case scenario for the United States, and indeed all stakeholders in the South China Sea, is a serious confrontation in which military force is employed. But frankly I think the chances of that happening are not very high. The best-case scenario is for China and ASEAN to agree on a credible and effective CoC that ameliorates tensions, leads to the implementation of confidence-building measures, and thereby creates an environment conducive to a peaceful resolution. I don’t think the chances of that outcome are very high either. So I think what we will see for the foreseeable future is a continuation of the status quo in the South China Sea: tensions will continue to ebb and flow, the claimants will protest each other’s moves, and ASEAN and China will keep the DoC/CoC process going if only to show that they are doing something. How long the status quo can continue is another matter. I think it has a limited shelf life, though what the post–status quo will look like is impossible to say at this point in time. But it could be very messy.

#### -- South China Seas are stable – China lacks capability and interdependence checks

Rosenberg 9 (David, Professor of Political Science – Middlebury College and Research Fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies – Australian National University, “Dire Straits: Competing Security Priorities in the South China Sea”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 3-20, http://japanfocus.org/-David-Rosenberg/1773)

From the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Malacca, security concerns are growing around the South China Sea. While the Bush Administration sees a resurgent Chinese military threat across the Taiwan Strait and a terrorist threat in the Strait of Malacca, many countries between the Straits are more concerned about security for their maritime resources from the threats of competitors, traffickers, poachers, and pirates. Security Concerns in the South China Sea Several recent statements and appointments highlight the current Bush administration view of China's threat to Taiwan. Porter Goss, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, warned that improved Chinese capabilities not only threaten Taiwan but also U.S. forces in the (western Pacific) region. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld worried that the Chinese navy was building some amphibious landing ships for possible use across the Taiwan Strait. The appointment of combative neoconservative John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations sends a clear and ominous signal: formerly a paid consultant to the Taiwanese government, Bolton has advocated Taiwan's independence and its full U.N. membership. Then, in February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and their Japanese counterparts announced a significant alteration in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance by identifying security in the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective." Has there been any big shift in the balance of power around the Taiwan Strait that warrants this U.S. response? The Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years. This year it's up by 12 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing. China is modernizing its defenses -- adding anti-ship missiles to aircraft, acquiring AWACS-airborne early warning and control systems, guided missile destroyers and frigates. However, its power projection capabilities are limited. It lacks any long-range amphibious capability or support infrastructure to supply forces over long distances for a protracted period. It also lacks heavy cargo-carrying aircraft, comprehensive air defenses, seaworthy ships, and aircraft carriers. Given the current state of Chinese equipment and training, the Chinese have no capability to pursue an expansionist maritime policy in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. [1] By contrast, the U.S. has overwhelming military superiority and an expansive network of military bases across the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. Pacific Fleet is the world's largest naval command, including approximately 190 ships, about 1,400 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft and 35 shore installations. Over 300,000 Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, and Intelligence military personnel are integrated under the unified command of PACOM, the U.S. Pacific Command. What are China's strategic goals between the Straits? China's Defense White Paper of 2002 emphasizes the importance of pursuing peaceful external relations initiatives through multilateral, cooperative approaches to promote domestic development. The most recent Defense White Paper, published in December of 2004, reiterates this priority. More important than statements of good intentions, however, China has taken significant steps to implement this goal. It was evident in the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, negotiated in November 2002. That led to the agreement signed in November 2004 to implement an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010. Following the 10th Summit Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in Vientiane, Laos in November 2004, Beijing held its own summit with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus One) and then joined Japan and the Republic of Korea in discussions with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus Three, or APT). Beijing had earlier in November hosted the first Security Policy Conference of the ASEAN Regional Forum. It featured an anti-piracy drill and a workshop on countering terrorism. Regional Economic and Financial Agreements Regional economic agreements were the main achievements of these meetings. However, the ASEAN Plus Three sessions identified other areas for cooperation, including deeper cooperation in investment and finance, expanded security dialogue and cooperation, expanded cultural exchanges, and periodic progress reviews. Perhaps the most dramatic developments have occurred in regional financial cooperation. Finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries have launched an Asian Bond Markets Initiative and the regional central bankers group set up two Asian Bond Funds in early 2005. These are key steps in addressing one of the major weaknesses in the region's development as indicated by the currency and financial crisis that struck large parts of the region in 1997: the heavy reliance by firms on short-term bank loans for financing. As Jennifer Amyx notes, many countries in East Asia maintain high savings rates but, because of the absence of stable long-term debt markets, the savings deposited into local banks tended to be funneled out to international financial centers and then back into the region as short-term foreign currency loans. This situation creates a problem referred to as a "double mismatch" -- that is, a mismatch between debt maturities (short-term borrowing for long-term investments) and the denomination of this debt (in foreign rather than local currencies). [2] The ASEAN+3 finance ministers had earlier set up a network of bilateral currency swaps to permit a country beset by a speculative attack to draw on reserves of other nations. The program -- the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) -- went into effect at the end of 2003. Japan, with the largest reserves in the region, led negotiations over swap arrangements and will play the role of arbitrator for currency loans. China, another potential lender with substantial reserves in excess of potential needs, also lent its support to the CMI. Widespread participation by ASEAN Plus Three members in these initiatives encourages smooth financial liberalization processes and thereby bolsters regional stability. It also reinforces the efforts of various working groups to improve transparency and information dissemination and to strengthen settlement systems and regulatory reforms. China's shift to a more proactive position on regional financial cooperation has greatly facilitated these recent financial developments. As a result, interdependence between the Chinese economy and other economies in the region has deepened significantly in recent years. Today, trade by ASEAN member nations with China far exceeds trade conducted within the ASEAN grouping, while China is predicted to soon overtake the United States as Japan's top trading partner. Levels of investment in China by countries in the region are also extremely high. The worst case scenario is not Chinese domination but a Chinese meltdown, as many regional monetary authorities are quick to note.

#### South China Sea is no longer a concern

Bitzinger and Desker 08 Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Senior Fellow with the Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

(Richard and Barry, Why east asian war is unlikely [Survival](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713659919), Volume [50](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713659919%7Etab=issueslist%7Ebranches=50#v50), Issue [6](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=g906414492) December 2008 , pages 105 – 128)

#### Nowhere, perhaps, is this new 'play-nice' strategy and good-neighbour approach more tangible than in China's recent handling of the Spratly Islands dispute. From its supposed flashpoint status during the 1990s, the Spratlys have calmed down considerably, and today the status of the islands is 'no longer discussed as a major security concern'.[20](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a906256449&fulltext=713240928#EN0020) To its credit, China has made a concerted effort not to let the South China Sea issue become a major domestic political football (unlike the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan), nor has it seized or occupied additional islands in the Spratlys since 1995. In particular, in 2002 Beijing and ASEAN agreed to a joint Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which affirmed the intention of the signatories to peacefully resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes, to exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea and to avoid actions that would 'complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability', including refraining from further construction on the presently uninhabited islands. In addition, in March 2005 Beijing also signed bilateral agreements with the Philippines and Vietnam for the joint exploration for oil in areas of overlapping sovereignty claims. (At the same time, estimates of likely oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea have been revised downward considerably, so there may be much less to fight over than originally believed.) This is not to say that the Spratly Islands dispute has been settled once and for all (fishing rights, for example, will continue to be important). It does stand a much better chance of being resolved peacefully, however, and without adding to tensions or hostility between China and Southeast Asia.

#### Existing agreements solve Chinese aggression

PDI 08 (3/13, "SPRATLYS DEAL NOTHING TO WORRY ABOUT FVR", L/N)

FORMER PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS Yesterday allayed fears over the governments joint oil exploration deal with China inthe Spratlys, saying bilateral and multilateral agreements have long been in place to ensure the peaceful resolution of border disputes. We should not panic... Because there is so much goodwill already built up among the claimants especially between China, who is the big power in this area, and the other claimants, Ramos said in an interview. After addressing an international forum on the Asean Charter, Ramos told reporters yesterday that the controversial Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) should not be a cause for concern since military superpower China would honor previous agreements made to ensure the non-violent resolution of lingering border questions on the Spratly islands.

#### China’s avoiding Spratlys conflict and any dispute won’t esclate

Teves 08 (Catherine J., 10/5, News.Balita, “Chinese aggression over Spratlys far-fetched: expert observer,” http://news.balita.ph/2008/10/05/chinese-aggression-over-spratlys-far-fetched-expert-observer/)

A Beijing-based Filipino journalist believes Chinese aggression over internationally disputed Spratly Islands is unlikely. ”China doesn’t want these Spratlys to be the bone of contention in Asia,” said ABC News Beijing Bureau chief producer Chito Sta. Romana at Kapihan sa Sulo forum, noting the Chinese prefer to maintain good relations with neighboring countries which are also their trading partners. He said China will likely handle the Spratly issue by continuing to use its ‘soft power’ approach consisting of investing in and aiding its neighbors instead. ”The Chinese want to avoid conflict as much as possible –- they’d rather negotiate and exert influence,” he said. Sta. Romana expressed this view as concern on possible Chinese aggression over the Spratlys re-emerged amidst Congress’ discussions on the baseline bill that’ll define the country’s territorial limits. Government is aiming to include several of the islands as part of Philippine territory. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, China and the Philippines are pushing for respective claims over the Spratlys, a group of islands in South China Sea. Studies indicating possible presence of oil and natural gas reserves in the area further heightened these countries’ claims. China, Asia’s former ‘Sleeping Dragon,’ has financial resources for investments and aid to other countries as Sta. Romana pointed out the economy there is growing, placing it fourth worldwide. He cited trade liberalization, tempered State control and the Chinese’s determination to achieve progress as the major factors that drive their country’s economy. ”That country’s already an economic super power, having the biggest foreign reserves amounting to some US$ 1.8 trillion,” he said. If China continues such growth, he said its economy by the mid-21st century will surpass that of the United States. Sta. Romana however noted China dislikes the super power tag. ”China doesn’t want to be a super power and that means it doesn’t want to have troops worldwide,” he said. Despite economic progress, Sta. Romana said China’s armed forces still lags behind US military power. (PNA)

#### -- No escalation

Bush and O’Hanlon 7 (Richard and Michael, Senior Fellows – Brookings Institution, “U.S. Grapples With China’s Rise, Taiwan”, The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 5-3, Lexis)

But most of the issues and frictions that accompany China's rise can be managed. The good news is that China and the United States, not to mention other key regional players like Japan, now have politicians and bureaucracies that are relatively good at preventing serious problems from becoming grounds for war. China will want to flex its military muscle more in the future, but it also wants economic prosperity for the political stability that comes with it. In addition, the United States and its regional partners know how to maintain open dialogue with Beijing while also sustaining vigorous defense alliances. China has enough reason to worry about nuclear weapons and global instability that it will not be totally oblivious to our concerns about proliferating countries such as Iran and North Korea. Conflict with the littoral nations of Japan, the Philippines or Vietnam over disputed seabed resources (like oil in the East China Sea or small islets in the South China Sea) is highly unlikely.

#### -- Many factors check South China Sea war

-- Geography -- ASEAN

-- Shipping Lanes -- Political Costs

Joyner 98 (Chris, Professor of International Relations – Georgetown University, New England Law Review, Spring, Lexis)

Nevertheless, several factors suggest the unlikelihood of large-scale military conflict over the Spratlys in the foreseeable future. For one, there is the geography: These islands are scattered over an immense area, nearly 200,000 square kilometers. Considerable room is available for naval patrols to maneuver and miss contact with one another. Relatedly, the Spratlys are more than 300 kilometers (185 miles) from [\*837] the Philippine and Vietnamese coasts, and more than 1000 kilometers (600 miles) from mainland China. This distance presents serious difficulties for any claimant government to patrol more than a small area of the Spratly archipelago at any one time, especially given these states’ relatively weak capabilities for projecting armed forces. No claimant state possesses sufficient logistical support capabilities to ensure effective occupation and maintain extended control over these islands, which underscores the importance of relative naval size. Even so, these conditions presumably should permit greater opportunities for confidence building measures to be considered as alternative strategies. 50 The Cold Wars passing has also fostered a sense of rapprochement throughout Asia, which makes the political costs of a large-scale military conflict in Spratlys less acceptable to the PRC or Taiwan. 51 The dynamic economic expansion of ASEAN counties, increasingly close links with the international community, and strategically significant shipping lanes through the South China Sea -- all converge to dissuade overt attempts by any state, including the PRC, to strive for regional military domination. That the economies of both the PRC and Taiwan have become increasingly interdependent with those of Southeast Asian states, including other claimants to the Spratlys, underscores that reluctance.

#### Plan can’t restore Turkish influence in the ME

-Calls for Syrian intervention

-support of the weakened Muslim brotherhood

**Tattersall 9-18**

[Nick, writer for Reuters, “Analysis: Turkey's 'worthy solitude' sidelines Erdogan in Middle East”]

ISTANBUL (Reuters) - Clinging to calls for military action in Syria and wedded to his backing for Egypt's ousted Islamist president, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan cuts an increasingly lonely figure in a region whose future he still hopes to help shape.¶ Finding himself in what one adviser calls "worthy solitude", Erdogan risks alienating some important Gulf investors in Turkey as well as weakening his diplomatic clout with international powers and Egypt's new military-backed rulers.¶ Long feted by the West as a model democrat in the Muslim world, his influence had seemed to be rising when he backed the pro-democracy uprisings of the Arab Spring, particularly when fellow Islamists initially won power in Egypt and elsewhere in north Africa.¶ But his strident calls for intervention to help force Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power have left him appearing sidelined after Washington and Moscow struck a deal this week averting U.S. strikes, at least for now.¶ His outspoken support for the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt's deposed president Mohamed Mursi has left Turkey without full diplomatic relations with the Arab world's most populous nation, and set it at odds with the Gulf Arab states whose investment has helped Turkey to prosper over the past decade.¶ Turkey already may be suffering economic damage, with exports to the Middle East down sharply and Abu Dhabi delaying a major investment project in the country. Beyond this, Ankara's reduced ability to influence its neighbors makes it a less useful ally for Washington and other Western states seeking reliable partners in the turbulent Middle East.¶ Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy said Turkish leaders had taken a risk by backing various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, a pan-Arab Islamist movement with saw the success of Erdogan's AK Party as a political model.¶ "While Turkey's foreign policy deserves credit for supporting democratic movements and the ouster of dictatorships ... they banked all their money with one political party," said Cagaptay.¶ "They hoped the Brotherhood would come to a prominent position in Libya, they hoped the Brotherhood would become Turkey's ally in Egypt, they wanted to make a Brotherhood member the leader of the Syrian opposition," he said. "All of these failed."¶ The implosion of the Brotherhood in Egypt after the army removed Mursi in July riled Erdogan. This was not just because it reopened a debate on whether democracy and political Islam can co-exist - one he hoped had been laid to rest by the AK Party's three successive election victories.¶ It also galled him because he saw parallels to his own experience in Turkey, where the secular military pressured an Islamist government from power in 1997 while he was mayor of Istanbul. The precursor to the AK Party, which he later founded and now dominates Turkish politics, was closed.¶ "There is a very strong sense of identification with the Brotherhood which tends to shape Turkish policy," said Sinan Ulgen, chairman of the Istanbul Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, EDAM.¶ The AK Party and the Egyptian Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party are both linked to political Islam, he noted. "These are both parties - in Turkey successfully, in Egypt much less so - that have tried to navigate the difficulty of dealing with the political influence of the military."¶ Erdogan has called Mursi's removal an "unacceptable coup", accusing Western nations of double standards by failing to do likewise while criticizing a police crackdown on weeks of anti-government demonstrations in Turkey over the summer.¶ Ankara recalled its ambassador from Cairo in August after a violent crackdown on Mursi's supporters. He returned this month but Egypt has said its envoy will not return to Ankara until Turkey stops its "interference".¶ "WORTHY SOLITUDE"¶ Erdogan takes criticism of his foreign policy on the chin. "We believe in a world not where the strong are right, but where the right are strong," he said in a speech on Wednesday.¶ "We don't have any intention to interfere in any other country's domestic affairs. But we have shown a very clear and principled stance ... against initiatives that have turned people we consider brothers into a state of oppression."¶ Foreign policy is unlikely to top the agenda when Turkish voters go to local, parliamentary and presidential elections over the next two years. However, the public is skeptical, with a majority opposing deeper involvement in the Syrian crisis.¶ When the Turkish leader visited the White House four months ago, he was determined to push President Barack Obama for more assertive action - in short, a military intervention which would weaken Assad to the point of forcing him from power.¶ Any strikes should not just be a "24 hour hit-and-run", Erdogan said late last month, citing the 11-week NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 during the Kosovo war as a possible template.¶ But NATO member Turkey was left looking like a bit player after Russia and the United States agreed a plan under which Assad will escape the immediate threat of U.S. air strikes by placing his chemical weapons under international control.¶ "With regard to Syria, they are out in the cold. Their calls for a comprehensive intervention have been sidelined," said Faruk Logoglu, former Turkish ambassador to Washington and vice chairman of the main opposition Republican People's Party.¶ "To put it bluntly, Mr. Erdogan pursues a Sunni-dominated foreign policy ... They were banking on the prevalence of the Muslim Brotherhood whether in Iraq, Egypt or Syria. It is a bankrupt policy," he said.¶ Erdogan's government strongly denies any sectarian agenda in Syria or the wider region. His aides point to his cultivation of good relations with Assad for years before the conflict.¶ Syria's Sunni Muslims and its Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shi'ism to which Assad belongs, are not fixed blocs and Turkey does not see the crisis in sectarian terms, they argue.¶ "The claim that Turkey is alone in the Middle East is not correct, but if this is a criticism then you have to say: this is a worthy solitude," Ibrahim Kalin, one of Erdogan's top foreign policy advisers, said on his Twitter account last month.¶ "There come moments in history when you are alone on the side of truth in an atmosphere where the world is silent to coups and massacres. You cannot give up on your values and principles just because your allies and other countries don't take your side," he said in a subsequent newspaper interview.¶ But as with Egypt, critics see a personal agenda in Syria. "The personal animosity is very palpable between the Turkish leadership and Assad. The Turkish leadership initially believed they had a good relationship, believed they could influence him, and ended up being extremely frustrated," said Ulgen.¶ "Where I would criticize Turkish policy on Syria is the gap between its very heavy rhetoric, assertive, ambitious rhetoric ... and its total inability to really shape the evolution of the crisis."¶ REALPOLITIK¶ Erdogan's opposition to Assad should give him common cause with the Sunni-ruled Gulf Arab states. A year ago, a Pew survey of Arab public opinion found Erdogan to be the most popular leader, beating King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia who has special status as guardian of the holy city of Mecca.¶ But Erdogan's support for Mursi has created friction with Gulf states, which see Egypt as a strategic ally against any threat from non-Arab Iran and which celebrated the president's departure with palpable relief.¶ The U.S.-allied United Arab Emirates has never trusted the Brotherhood, which it has accused of plotting to undermine governments in the region and has banned.¶ There are signs of a trade impact from Turkey's strained relations with an increasingly important export market and a growing source of portfolio investment in its capital markets.¶ Turkish exports to the Middle East fell by almost a third in July to $3.1 billion from a year earlier, Turkey's statistics agency said.¶ Abu Dhabi's state-owned oil explorer and power supplier TAQA announced last month that it was delaying a $12 billion project to build several power plants in Turkey, a decision some saw as politically motivated.¶ "A growing sense of Turkey's isolation in the region ... risks the erosion of benefits from the enormous strides made over the past decade in terms of the development of trade and investment flows," said Timothy Ash, an economist at Standard Bank in London.¶ "Considering Turkey's already strained relations with Iran, Syria, Iraq and Israel, the fear now is that this could have quite a detrimental impact on the Turkish economy."

**Turkey can’t use its soft power – also means they can’t solve**

**Grunstein 11**

Judah, “Turkey and the Arab Spring”, World Politics Review's editor-in-chief. His coverage of French politics, foreign policy and national security has appeared in World Politics Review, the American Prospect online, French Politics, the Small Wars Journal and Foreign Policy online

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/8764/turkey-and-the-arab-spring

Moreover, and supporting Cook's argument, as much as I've often admired Turkey's regional approach, I've previously noted that there remains a wide gap between the rhetoric used by Ankara -- and outside observers -- to describe Turkey's regional pull and the reality of it. This was on prominent display following the Turkey- and Brazil-mediated nuclear fuel swap agreement with Iran, and is also characteristic of most of Turkey's "successes" in the region and beyond. The fact is, Ankara is pretty good at getting people to the table, as its many past and present mediation efforts -- Israel and Syria, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Iran deal -- attest. But the difference between mediation and influence lies in the ability to get everyone, including interested third parties, to sign on the dotted line. And that's where Turkey bumps up against the limits of its diplomatic weight. Ankara has delivered some concrete results in resolving tensions with its own neighbors: Syria, Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran and Armenia, as well as a more distant Russia. But on a regional basis, it has not yet managed to convert the soft power that comes with increased trust and connectivity into the hard power of getting others to adopt its preferred line. In part that is because it just doesn't have the muscle necessary both to twist people's arms and to guarantee the resulting compromises. In part it is because the rise in its regional influence remains a work in progress. For Turkey, the Arab Spring comes 10 years too soon. But it is also worth noting the regional realities: Ankara is operating in a very challenging neighborhood. If Turkey has failed in the Middle East, and during the Arab Spring, who exactly has succeeded? As for the Turkish Model that emphasizes connectivity and autonomy over containment and alignment, Ankara's current challenges do not necessarily invalidate it, but they do demonstrate two vulnerabilities. First, connectivity is only as stable as the surrounding network. In almost all circumstances, the redundancy it offers serves to minimize the destabilizing impact of local perturbations. However, connectivity shifts from being a dampening effect to being a magnifying effect when the entire network experiences generalized perturbations. That's what's happening in the Middle East right now, and the threat -- or challenge -- it poses to Turkey is a clear illustration of connectivity's double-edged sword. Second, the diplomatic value of connectivity is inversely proportional to the surrounding network's reach. Turkey's refusal to exclusively align with either side of the region's many divides -- Saudi-Iranian, Sunni-Shiite, Western-Arab -- was more valuable in the context of a region where trust and communication were low, but where the cost of conflict was high. In that kind of environment, being the only party that has relationships with all sides can be more easily converted into influence. But Turkey's status as the only the only game in town when it comes to bridging divides and resolving conflicts is no longer guaranteed. Egypt's emerging reorientation, including tentative contacts with Iran and an increasing willingness to buck U.S. policy, suggests that, in a best-case scenario for the Arab Spring, Turkey might find that it is no longer the only regional actor pursuing a policy of connectivity and nonalignment. That will be good news for the region, but it could very mean that **the high-point of Ankara's regional influence is behind it**.

## terror

### No Nuclear Terror

**Strategy has shifted- will be small scale terrorism**

**Finn ‘10** (Risk of small-scale attacks by al-Qaeda and its allies is rising, officials say By Peter Finn Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, September 22, 2010; 10:50 PM

Al-Qaeda and its allies **are likely to attempt small-scale, less sophisticated terrorist attacks** in the United States, senior Obama administration officials said Wednesday, noting that it's extremely difficult to detect such threats in advance. "Unlike large-scale, coordinated, catastrophic attacks, executing **smaller-scale attacks requires less planning and fewer pre-operational steps,"** said Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, testifying before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. "Accordingly, there are fewer opportunities to detect such an attack before it occurs." Terrorism experts have puzzled over al-Qaeda's apparent unwillingness after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to use car bombs, improvised explosives and small arms to conduct assaults in the United States. The group appeared fixated on orchestrating another dramatic mass-casualty event, such as the simultaneous downing of several commercial airliners. Indeed, attacks inspired by al-Qaeda in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 involved multiple, coordinated bombings targeting mass-transit systems. But the risk of a single-target bombing or an attack by a lone gunman has increased, officials say, with the rise of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the tribal areas of Pakistan, in Yemen and in Somalia, and with the emergence of radicalized Americans inspired by the ideology of violent jihad. "The impact of the attempted attacks during the past year suggests al-Qaeda, and its affiliates and allies, **will attempt to conduct smaller-scale attacks** targeting the homeland but with greater frequency," said Michael Leiter, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, pointing to plots against the subway system in New York, the attempt to down a commercial airliner approaching Detroit and the failed car bombing in Times Square.

### Won’t Use Nukes

**Won’t use nukes- they are rational**

**Kapur ‘8** [S. Paul, associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32]

Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S. Government 2002). However, **it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices**. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer 1999: 4-5), **extensive empirical evidence indicates** that **terrorist groups** in fact **behave rationally**, adopting strategies designed **to achieve particular ends** (Crenshaw 1995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? **For** certain types of terrorist **objectives, nuclear weapons could be too destructive**. Large-scale **devastation could negatively influence audiences** important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist orga- nization were struggling with another group for control of their common home- land, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory**. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counter- productive** for the terrorists in this scenario. It is thus not obvious that all terrorist groups would use nuclear weapons. Some groups would probably not. The propensity for nuclear acquisition and use by ter- rorist groups must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

### A2: Missing Nukes

**No missing nukes – they would have been used already**

**Associated Press 12 –** Vladimir Isachenkov, reporter for the Associated Press, January 9, 2012, "How Threat of Loose Soviet Nukes Was Avoided," http://www.military.com/news/article/how-threat-of-loose-soviet-nukes-was-avoided.html

There have been gnawing fears that a few Soviet nukes still might have gone missing, but experts with inside knowledge say that if it were true, the world would already know. "If somebody or a terrorist group got hold of a nuclear weapon, they would probably use it as quickly as possible," said Steven Pifer, who served as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, held other senior State Department posts and is now director of the Brookings Institute's Arms Control Initiative. "So the fact that you haven't seen a nuclear detonation ... reflects the fact that the nuclear weapons have been maintained in a secure way."

# 1NR

### Russia

#### Deterrence checks

Turner 2 (Admiral Stansfield, Former Director – Central Intelligence Agency, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter / Spring, 26 Fletcher F. World Aff. 115, Lexis)

There are, of course, other centrals question to be considered: Would Russian psychology differ from American and would Russian society be willing to accept large numbers of nuclear detonations on their soil in order to perpetrate a nuclear war against the United States? These are difficult questions to answer. The more pertinent concern, however, is that this is an issue of life or death. No head of state could contemplate plunging the world into nuclear conflict without considering both the mortal threat to his or her citizens, and also the likelihood of his or her own death, underground shelters notwithstanding. The presumption that heads of state prefer to live than to die gives us one benchmark. Another is the Cuban missile crisis, in which both Leonid Khruschev and President Kennedy quite visibly backed away from the prospect of very limited nuclear war. Finally, Russia’s economy, being about the size of Belgium’s, is so small that its leaders would be well aware that recovery, even from a small nuclear attack, would be a very lengthy process. In terms of nuclear detonation threats, the United States must consider Russian deterrence as very close to its own.

#### Early warning systems solve

Bailey 98 (Kathleen, Snr Fellow @ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, August, NIPP, http://www.nipp.org/5.php)

The United States and Russia have satellite- and ground-based systems to detect and track the launch of ballistic missiles toward their territories, as well as some capabilities to warn of approaching aircraft. Additionally, both nations have communications established that enable them to raise questions and seek clarification should there be unexplained activity that appears threatening. Critics who favor de-alerting cite an incident in January 1995 as evidence that early warning in Russia is inadequate and could lead to hasty Russian nuclear use. The incident involved a Russian alert response to a research rocket fired from Norway. But, while some people viewed President Yeltsin's order for an alert as excessively dangerous, others noted that it was actually an example of the system working as it should: a missile firing was observed and the leadership stepped up readiness in event that it was actually an attack.

### Case

#### No bioterror impact

Keller 3/7 -- Analyst at Stratfor, Post-Doctoral Fellow at University of Colorado at Boulder (Rebecca, 2013, "Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential," http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

It is important to remember that the risk of biological attack is very low and that, partly because viruses can mutate easily, the potential for natural outbreaks is unpredictable. The key is having the right tools in case of an outbreak, epidemic or pandemic, and these include a plan for containment, open channels of communication, scientific research and knowledge sharing. In most cases involving a potential pathogen, the news can appear far worse than the actual threat. Infectious Disease Propagation Since the beginning of February there have been occurrences of H5N1 (bird flu) in Cambodia, H1N1 (swine flu) in India and a new, or novel, coronavirus (a member of the same virus family as SARS) in the United Kingdom. In the past week, a man from Nepal traveled through several countries and eventually ended up in the United States, where it was discovered he had a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a report stating that antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals are on the rise. In addition, the United States is experiencing a worse-than-normal flu season, bringing more attention to the influenza virus and other infectious diseases. The potential for a disease to spread is measured by its effective reproduction number, or R-value, a numerical score that indicates whether a disease will propagate or die out. When the disease first occurs and no preventive measures are in place, the reproductive potential of the disease is referred to as R0, the basic reproduction rate. The numerical value is the number of cases a single case can cause on average during its infectious period. An R0 above 1 means the disease will likely spread (many influenza viruses have an R0 between 2 and 3, while measles had an R0 value of between 12 and 18), while an R-value of less than 1 indicates a disease will likely die out. Factors contributing to the spread of the disease include the length of time people are contagious, how mobile they are when they are contagious, how the disease spreads (through the air or bodily fluids) and how susceptible the population is. The initial R0, which assumes no inherent immunity, can be decreased through control measures that bring the value either near or below 1, stopping the further spread of the disease. Both the coronavirus family and the influenza virus are RNA viruses, meaning they replicate using only RNA (which can be thought of as a single-stranded version of DNA, the more commonly known double helix containing genetic makeup). The rapid RNA replication used by many viruses is very susceptible to mutations, which are simply errors in the replication process. Some mutations can alter the behavior of a virus, including the severity of infection and how the virus is transmitted. The combination of two different strains of a virus, through a process known as antigenic shift, can result in what is essentially a new virus. Influenza, because it infects multiple species, is the hallmark example of this kind of evolution. Mutations can make the virus unfamiliar to the body's immune system. The lack of established immunity within a population enables a disease to spread more rapidly because the population is less equipped to battle the disease. The trajectory of a mutated virus (or any other infectious disease) can reach three basic levels of magnitude. An outbreak is a small, localized occurrence of a pathogen. An epidemic indicates a more widespread infection that is still regional, while a pandemic indicates that the disease has spread to a global level. Virologists are able to track mutations by deciphering the genetic sequence of new infections. It is this technology that helped scientists to determine last year that a smattering of respiratory infections discovered in the Middle East was actually a novel coronavirus. And it is possible that through a series of mutations a virus like H5N1 could change in such a way to become easily transmitted between humans. Lessons Learned There have been several influenza pandemics throughout history. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is often cited as a worst-case scenario, since it infected between 20 and 40 percent of the world's population, killing roughly 2 percent of those infected. In more recent history, smaller incidents, including an epidemic of the SARS virus in 2003 and what was technically defined as a pandemic of the swine flu (H1N1) in 2009, caused fear of another pandemic like the 1918 occurrence. The spread of these two diseases was contained before reaching catastrophic levels, although the economic impact from fear of the diseases reached beyond the infected areas. Previous pandemics have underscored the importance of preparation, which is essential to effective disease management. The World Health Organization lays out a set of guidelines for pandemic prevention and containment. The general principles of preparedness include stockpiling vaccines, which is done by both the United States and the European Union (although the possibility exists that the vaccines may not be effective against a new virus). In the event of an outbreak, the guidelines call for developed nations to share vaccines with developing nations. Containment strategies beyond vaccines include quarantine of exposed individuals, limited travel and additional screenings at places where the virus could easily spread, such as airports. Further measures include the closing of businesses, schools and borders. Individual measures can also be taken to guard against infection. These involve general hygienic measures -- avoiding mass gatherings, thoroughly washing hands and even wearing masks in specific, high-risk situations. However, airborne viruses such as influenza are still the most difficult to contain because of the method of transmission. Diseases like noroviruses, HIV or cholera are more serious but have to be transmitted by blood, other bodily fluids or fecal matter. The threat of a rapid pandemic is thereby slowed because it is easier to identify potential contaminates and either avoid or sterilize them. Research is another important aspect of overall preparedness. Knowledge gained from studying the viruses and the ready availability of information can be instrumental in tracking diseases. For example, the genomic sequence of the novel coronavirus was made available, helping scientists and doctors in different countries to readily identify the infection in limited cases and implement quarantine procedures as necessary. There have been only 13 documented cases of the novel coronavirus, so much is unknown regarding the disease. Recent cases in the United Kingdom indicate possible human-to-human transmission. Further sharing of information relating to the novel coronavirus can aid in both treatment and containment. Ongoing research into viruses can also help make future vaccines more efficient against possible mutations, though this type of research is not without controversy. A case in point is research on the H5N1 virus. H5N1 first appeared in humans in 1997. Of the more than 600 cases that have appeared since then, more than half have resulted in death. However, the virus is not easily transmitted because it must cross from bird to human. Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 is very rare, with only a few suspected incidents in the known history of the disease. While there is an H5N1 vaccine, it is possible that a new variation of the vaccine would be needed were the virus to mutate into a form that was transmittable between humans. Vaccines can take months or even years to develop, but preliminary research on the virus, before an outbreak, can help speed up development. In December 2011, two separate research labs, one in the United States and one in the Netherlands, sought to publish their research on the H5N1 virus. Over the course of their research, these labs had created mutations in the virus that allowed for airborne transmission between ferrets. These mutations also caused other changes, including a decrease in the virus's lethality and robustness (the ability to survive outside the carrier). Publication of the research was delayed due to concerns that the results could increase the risk of accidental release of the virus by encouraging further research, or that the information could be used by terrorist organizations to conduct a biological attack. Eventually, publication of papers by both labs was allowed. However, the scientific community imposed a voluntary moratorium in order to allow the community and regulatory bodies to determine the best practices moving forward. This voluntary ban was lifted for much of the world on Jan. 24, 2013. On Feb. 21, the National Institutes of Health in the United States issued proposed guidelines for federally funded labs working with H5N1. Once standards are set, decisions will likely be made on a case-by-case basis to allow research to continue. Fear of a pandemic resulting from research on H5N1 continues even after the moratorium was lifted. Opponents of the research cite the possibility that the virus will be accidentally released or intentionally used as a bioweapon, since information in scientific publications would be considered readily available. The Risk-Reward Equation The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact. As far as continued research is concerned, there is a risk-reward equation to consider. The threat of a terrorist attack using biological weapons is very low. And while it is impossible to predict viral outbreaks, it is important to be able to recognize a new strain of virus that could result in an epidemic or even a pandemic, enabling countries to respond more effectively. All of this hinges on the level of preparedness of developed nations and their ability to rapidly exchange information, conduct research and promote individual awareness of the threat.

### Conditionality – 2NC

#### What is conditionality? Can one really be conditional? Who are we? What are we doing here?

### Impact – 2NC

[Insert impact calc and some jokes if I have time]

### Impact – Heg – Turns Terror

#### Collapse of hegemony increases terrorism

Brooks and Wohlforth 2 [Stephen Brooks, Assistant Professor, William Wohlforth, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs, July / August 2002]

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually **be the worst of all worlds for the U**nited **S**tates. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The **threats would remain, but** the possibility of **effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced**.

### Impact – Heg – Turns Russia

#### Multipolarity exacerbates current tensions with Russia – causing nuke war

**Arbatov 07** corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs.

(Alexei, [© "Russia in Global Affairs". № 2, July - September 2007](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/), Is a New Cold War Imminent? 08-08)

However, the low probability of a new Cold War and the collapse of American unipolarity (as a political doctrine, if not in reality) cannot be a cause for complacency. Multipolarity, existing objectively at various levels and interdependently, holds many difficulties and threats. For example, if the Russia-NATO confrontation persists, it can do much damage to both parties and international security. Or, alternatively, if Kosovo secedes from Serbia, this may provoke similar processes in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, and involve Russia in armed conflicts with Georgia and Moldova, two countries that are supported by NATO. Another flash point involves Ukraine. In the event of Kiev’s sudden admission into the North Atlantic Alliance (recently sanctioned by the U.S. Congress), such a move may divide Ukraine and provoke mass disorders there, thus making it difficult for Russia and the West to refrain from interfering. Meanwhile, U.S. plans to build a missile defense system in Central and Eastern Europe may cause Russia to withdraw from the INF Treaty and resume programs for producing intermediate-range missiles. Washington may respond by deploying similar missiles in Europe, which would dramatically increase the vulnerability of Russia’s strategic forces and their control and warning systems. This could make the stage for nuclear confrontation even tenser.

### 2ac- China/Taiwan

#### Heg key to solve China-Taiwan war

#### Blumenthal 12

[Dan Blumenthal is a resident fellow in Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “A strong military keeps the threat of war small”, 5/2/12, <http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/a-strong-military-keeps-the-threat-of-war-small/>]

There are good reasons for mutual apprehension; they cannot be papered over with better communications or "confidence building measures." China's dictators are neither wrong in their belief that the ultimate U.S. aim is democracy in China, nor misguided in their belief that Washington will do whatever it takes to make sure China does not dominate Asia. Washington is right to believe that China has greater ambitions now that it is more powerful. China wants more control, if not hegemony, over the Asia Pacific. There should be no surprise that China is a strategic rival: great power competition is the natural state of international politics. Why anyone thought China would be different is a mystery. Though the two sides have clashing interests, neither side wants strategic competition to descend into conflict. Managing the competition calls for sophisticated statecraft. The two sides should acknowledge their divergent objectives, while continuing to focus on their mutual interests — deep economic reform in both countries But, in the end, it will be old-fashioned deterrence by the U.S. that will keep the peace between these great powers. This is easier said than done. A war-weary United States is reluctant to provide resources for its stated strategy of checking Chinese power. Historically, Washington's habit is to cut its military after long wars. It is incumbent upon America to go against this penny-wise, pound-foolish practice. America's leaders must make the case that paying now for a greater military presence in Asia will deter a far more costly possible conflict with China. By paying for the ships and aircraft our military needs, Americans may buy themselves peace.

### 2ac- Iran

#### Perception of American strength prevents iran nuke war

**Talent and Hall ‘10,**

March (Jim - distinguished fellow in government relations at the Heritage Foundation, and Heath, Sowing the Wind, p. http://www.freedomsolutions.org/2010/03/sowing-the-wind-the-decay-of-american-power-and-its-consequences/)

There is a reason that regimes like Iran and North Korea go to the time and expense, and assume the risks of developing nuclear weapons programs; nuclear capability empowers them to achieve their ends, and thereby poses challenges to the United States, for several reasons. First, there is a danger that rogue regimes with nuclear material may assist terrorists in developing weapons of mass destruction.[36] Even the possibility that such regimes may do so gives them leverage internationally. Second, these regimes have ambitions in their regions and around the world.[37] Some of their leaders are fanatical enough to actually consider a first strike using nuclear weapons; for example, high-ranking officials of the Iranian government have openly discussed using a nuclear weapon against Israel.[38] Whether a first strike occurs or not, the possession of nuclear capability frees aggressive regimes to pursue their other goals violently with less fear of retaliation. For example, North Korea’s nuclear capability means that it could attack South Korea conventionally with a measure of impunity; even if the attack failed, the United States and its allies would be less likely to remove the North Korean regime in retaliation. In other words, nuclear capability lessens the penalties which could be exacted on North Korea if it engages in aggression, which makes the aggression more likely. The same logic applies to Iran, which is why the other nations in the Middle East are so concerned about Iran’s nuclear program. A nuclear attack by Iran is possible, but the real danger of Iranian nuclear capability is that it would make conventional aggression in the region more likely.[39] Finally, the more nations that get nuclear weapons, the greater the pressure on other nations to acquire them as a deterrent, and this is particularly true when a government acquiring the capability is seen as unstable or aggressive. North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons has tended, for obvious reasons, to make the South Koreans and Japanese uncomfortable about having no deterrent themselves. The possibility of uncontrolled proliferation—what experts call a “nuclear cascade”[40]—is tremendously dangerous; it increases the possibility that terrorists can get nuclear material from a national program, and it raises the prospect of a multilateral nuclear confrontation between nations.[41] Many of the smaller nuclear nations do not have well-established first strike doctrine or launch protocols; the chance of a nuclear exchange, accidental or intentional, increases geometrically when a confrontation is multilateral. The antidote to proliferation is American leadership and power. The reality and perception of American strength not only deters aggressive regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; it reassures other countries that they can exist safely under the umbrella of American power without having to develop their own deterrent capability.[42]

### Link Wall – 2NC – Congress

#### Courts will get involved – the only method of enforcing legislation

Tien 10 (Lee – Senior Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation, “THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FIS) AND FISA REFORM: Article: Litigating the State Secrets Privilege”, 2010, 42 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 675, lexis)

It is difficult to imagine how courts could proceed more carefully than the Ninth Circuit and the district courts in Al-Haramain did. Congress clearly intended FISA and the section 1806(f) procedures to operate as a mechanism by which courts could manage litigation over the legality of warrantless surveillance. Thus, the first lesson here is probably for Congress: any legislative preemption or reform of the state secrets privilege must anticipate the various procedural hurdles that a highly resistant Executive will use to delay or frustrate litigation. Perhaps more importantly, Congress cannot itself enforce individual rights, statutory or constitutional; it needs litigants to bring cases, and it needs courts to hear them. Yet the Government's position on "need to know" essentially asserts that litigation authorized by Congress precisely in [\*698] order to check unlawful government surveillance is not a "governmental function." Al-Haramain thus presents a vision of sweeping Executive power that ignores Congress and the courts even when they are working together to protect individual rights against Executive abuse.

#### Statutory guidelines alter the state secrets doctrine

Blazey 10 (Elizabeth – J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011, “Controlling Government Secrecy: A Judicial Solution to the Internal and External Conflicts Surrounding the State Secrets Privilege”, 2010, 58 Buffalo L. Rev. 1187, lexis)

First, this Comment explores internal conflict using legal and historical traditions as a framework to determine which branch or branches of the government have the legitimate power and competency to define and control the state secrets privilege. The current democratic majority in Congress views the privilege as a common law rule of evidence, malleable to legislation. n15 To prove its point, both houses have introduced legislation to define and control the privilege, with the goal of removing decision-making power from the hands of the executive by requiring judicial oversight and review in all cases. n16 The Obama administration opposes these bills; indeed, it has aligned itself with past administrations by arguing that the privilege falls under the foundational powers given [\*1191] exclusively to the executive through Article II of the Constitution. n17 The judiciary recognizes a qualified constitutional privilege for the executive subject to judicial review under certain circumstances. n18 The circumstances for such review depend on the type of information at issue. For instance, the courts accord great deference to the executive for military and foreign relations secrets, n19 while the courts treat disclosure for other types of secrets under statutory guidelines set by Congress. n20

#### Statutory limits enable court oversight of executive programs – undermines state secrets

Frost 7 (Amanda – Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, “THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND SEPARATION OF POWERS”, 2007, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1931, lexis)

The executive's assertion of the privilege thus undermines Congress's authority to assign federal jurisdiction and simultaneously to enlist the courts as its partner in executive oversight. When a litigant claims that the executive has violated a statute or engaged in unconstitutional conduct - as is alleged in the challenges to both the warrantless wiretapping and extraordinary rendition programs - courts serve as a check on the potential abuse of executive authority. They do so because Congress gave the federal judiciary the authority to hear cases in which executive power is challenged by enacting 28 U.S.C. §1331, which grants courts broad federal question [\*1955] jurisdiction, and by enacting specific statutory limits on executive power in the area of national security, such as in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. If the judiciary agrees with the executive branch that it must dismiss these cases to protect state secrets, it is abdicating its congressionally assigned task to restrain executive power. For this reason, the executive's assertion of the state secrets privilege in the cases outlined in Part I cannot be equated with the use of the privilege in either Reynolds or Totten. In the latter two cases, the plaintiffs were seeking damages for negligence and breach of contract, respectively; they made no claims that the executive had overstepped its constitutional authority. Although the Totten bar was recently affirmed in Tenet v. Doe, in which the plaintiffs did allege that their constitutional rights were violated by the government's failure to adhere to the terms of their contract, Tenet did not involve any ongoing executive branch program or practice and the dispute was limited to the parties before the Court. The executive's assertion of the privilege in all of these cases was not part of a broad pattern under which it raised the privilege to bar any case of this type from being heard in court. Certainly, Reynolds, Totten, and Tenet all involved legal claims that Congress had granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear and decide. But the judicial role in these cases was to determine whether an individual deserved a remedy, and not to act as Congress's deputy in curbing ongoing abuse of executive power. In its post-9/11 assertions of the state secrets privilege, the executive branch acknowledges that it is seeking to eliminate judicial oversight of some executive programs, but contends that the legality of executive action is better addressed by the "political branches" and not the courts. n111 That argument overlooks the primary role that Congress - one of the "political branches" - plays in granting federal courts jurisdiction in the first instance. Indeed, for the reasons described above, the "political branch" solution to the problem might well be to permit courts to determine the legality of such executive conduct.

### Link – Drones

#### Drones are protected as state secrets – plan requires circumventing the doctrine

Rosen 11 (Richard D. – Professor of Law and Director, Center for Military Law and Policy, Texas Tech University School of Law, “PART III: ARTICLE: DRONES AND THE U.S. COURTS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5280, lexis)

V. State Secrets: The Death Knell of Drone Cases Assuming a complaint survives the jurisdictional, justiciability, immunity, and other hurdles to lawsuits challenging U.S. drone policy, the state secrets doctrine is likely to bring the suit to a quick end. n93 Under the doctrine, the United States may prevent the disclosure of information in judicial proceedings if there is a reasonable danger of revealing military or state secrets. n94 Once the privilege is properly invoked and a court is satisfied that release would pose a reasonable danger to secrets of state, "even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege." n95 Not only will the state secrets doctrine thwart plaintiffs from acquiring or introducing evidence vital to their case, n96 it could result in dismissal of the cases themselves. Under the doctrine, the courts will dismiss a case either because the very subject of the case involves state secrets, n97 or a case cannot proceed without the privileged evidence or presents an unnecessary risk of revealing [\*5293] protected secrets. n98 Employing drones as a weapons platform against terrorists and insurgents in an ongoing armed conflict implicates both the nation's military tactics and strategy as well as its delicate relations with friendly nations. n99 As such, lawsuits challenging the policy cannot be tried without access to and the possible disclosure of highly classified information relating to the means, methods, and circumstances under which drones are employed.

### U – 2NC

#### Trends prove – the state secret privilege is stronger

Rudenstine 13 (David – Sheldon H. Solow Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, “The Irony of a Faustian Bargain: A Reconsideration of the Supreme Court's 1953 United States v. Reynolds Decision”, Cardozo Law Review, 2013, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 1283, lexis)

Introduction Sixty years ago, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Reynolds. n1 That decision attracted very little public attention at the time, n2 remains largely unexamined today, n3 and is critically important in understanding the scope of the contemporary state secrets privilege. n4 [\*1286] The Reynolds decision announced new guidelines that courts to this day n5 must follow when they decide whether to sustain an executive n6 branch claim that certain information is confidential because it is protected by the state secrets privilege. n7 That privilege, which has been vastly expanded in recent decades and has a determinative impact on a large number of cases, n8 is highly controversial and has been the subject of substantial analysis by judges, n9 news commentators n10 and legal [\*1287] scholars. n11 Nonetheless, with few exceptions, n12 scholars and commentators have not returned to re-examine the Reynolds decision, the basis of the modern privilege.

[CONTINUED TO FOOTNOTE]

n8. The expansion of the state secrets privilege over the last three and a half decades has been so sweeping and intricate that a thorough description and analysis would require a separate Article. The best that can be done in footnotes is to point to mountain peaks. Thus, the so-called "Mosaic theory," which emphasizes that trivial information that may seem to be of no particular national security significance may in fact be significant when assessment, in the context of other information by an informed person, prompts the protection of seemingly harmless information. See, e.g., United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972). The "unacceptable risk" doctrine holds that a complaint will be dismissed before a responsive pleading is filed because of a state secrets privilege when a judge decides that litigation of the claim will present a "risk" that a state secret may be accidently and unintentionally disclosed and that a judge decides that the "risk" is "unacceptable." See, e.g., Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1079, 1083; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305-06. The state secrets privilege now applies when a party merely seeks from the executive a statement that information already in the public domain is true. A court may sustain the executive's objection that acknowledging, confirming, or denying, the validity of such information constitutes a state secret. See, e.g., Bareford, 973 F.2d 1138; Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The privilege may result in the dismissal of an action if the unavailability of the evidence due to the privilege hampers a defendant in establishing a valid defense. Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d 544. See generally infra Part VI.D. Perhaps in recognition of the expansion and potential abuse of the state secrets privilege, the Obama administration has adopted a policy which grants authority to the Department of Justice to review all claims of executive privilege. See infra note 409.

### Spillover – 2NC

#### State secret rulings spill over – multiple opinions prove

Donohue 10 (Laura – Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Shadow of State Secrets”, 2010, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77, lexis)

The telecommunications cases related to the NSA's warrantless wiretapping program stand apart from the general third-party cases. Here the government has acted variously as plaintiff, intervenor, and defendant. Although none of the forty-six cases dismissed under the MDL turned on the invocation of state secrets, the privilege played a key role throughout. The executive's decision to invoke state secrets in this set of cases rested on a closely held executive branch jurisprudence - suggesting that this body of opinions may be relevant to understanding operation of the privilege. This set of suits also reveals a parallel effect: when invoked in one case, courts may treat similarly positioned cases as though the state secrets privilege has been asserted, even in the absence of a formal invocation thereof. The telecommunication suits also bring to the fore the major battles between the branches that mark invocations of the privilege.

#### **Precedent dictates use of state secret doctrine**

Ziegler 8 (Margaret, “No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain: The Government's Increased Use of the State Secrets Privilege to Conceal Wrongdoing”, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2008, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 691, lexis)

With respect to the second and third approaches to state secrets identified in the opinion, Judge Walker said it would be premature to conclude that state secrets privilege would bar evidence that would keep Hepting from establishing his prima facie case or preclude AT&T's defense. n41 The court said its decision to allow the case to proceed followed precedent in other state secret cases where the courts allowed them to "proceed to discovery sufficiently to asses the state secrets privilege in light of the facts." n42

### SSP K2 Military – 2NC

#### State secrets are key to hegemony – military and industrial tech

Donohue 10 (Laura – Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Shadow of State Secrets”, 2010, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77, lexis)

I. Government Contractors and State Secrets The increasingly intricate relationship between national defense, private industry, and technology provides the framework for scores of [\*92] lawsuits that have arisen during the War on Terror. Somewhat surprisingly, very little attention has been paid to this litigation. Yet such suits are hardly new. In the early twentieth century, the judiciary confronted issues arising from government contractors' construction of weapons and military vessels. Thus, in addition to the more traditional area of libel, n40 cases like In re Grove, Pollen v. United States, and Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co. alleged patent infringements and resulted in the invocation of the state secrets privilege. n41 As technology advanced and the threat of the Cold War loomed, the government sought new and more varied relationships with private companies, driving national security deeper into the public domain. In 1950, National Security Council Report 68 became the blueprint for U.S. strategy, calling for "a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world." n42 The United States would need to draw on its industrial strength for success. In his famous farewell address in January 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower explained: A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment ... . This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence - economic, political, even spiritual - is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society ... . Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military [\*93] machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. n43 Many trends mark the evolution of the relationship between government and private corporations. Two are of particular importance to state secrets considerations. First is the increasing formalization of secrecy protections to control information. n44 Thus, in 1954, the Commerce Department established the Office of Strategic Information to work with companies to limit the dissemination of information. n45 Simultaneously, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a regulation advising defense contractors to avoid publishing information of "possible use" to enemy states. n46 By 1960, these arrangements had become formalized in a new system of classification specifically targeted at industry. n47 Executive Order 10,865 provided for the classification of bidding on, negotiating, awarding, performing, or terminating contracts with federal agencies, as well as for allowing private actors to have access to classified information. n48 Subsequent orders extended and defined the relationship between the executive and private companies. n49 The end of the Cold War neither weakened public-private relations nor diminished efforts to protect national security information [\*94] held by third parties. To the contrary, in 1993, the executive formally established a robust National Industry Security Program to safeguard classified information released to contractors, licensees, and grantees of the federal government. n50 While these devices centered on public-private contractual relations, new legislation extended the executive's ability to control noncontractual entities to private actors that held information central to national security. Following World War II, the Invention Secrecy Act became the first peacetime measure to restrict private actors' inventions in the name of national security. n51 Between 1963 and 1979, the annual number of secrecy orders placed on inventions derived from government contracts hovered between 4100 and 5100. n52 During the following decade, the total number of secrecy orders increased significantly. n53 Since that time, the number of annual secrecy orders has hovered around 5000 per year. n54 Beyond secrecy orders, the Atomic Energy Act tethered nuclear technologies to the national interest, classifying such discoveries from birth. n55 Both benign and nefarious explanations for the increase in secrets and secrecy orders abound. The numbers could be equally tied to the growth of the bureaucratic state and the government's growing dependence on technology rather than attributing the increase to information control. But, in the context of this Article, such [\*95] arguments are less important than the fact of the expansion, as these and other executive orders and statutory devices became intimately linked to state secrets assertions: when such devices are implicated in suits, the state secrets privilege often attends. n56 The privilege has thus become part of a broader framework through which the government tries to limit its vulnerability.

### Impact – Deterrence – 2NC

#### Secrecy is key to the US nuclear deterrent

Green 97 (Tracey – Associate with McNair Law Firm, J.D. – University of South Carolina, “Providing for the Common Defense versus Promoting the General Welfare: the Conflicts Between National Security and National Environmental Policy”, South Carolina Environmental Law Journal, Fall, 6 S.C Envtl. L.J. 137, lexis)

The deployment of nuclear weapons, however, is a DoD action for which secrecy is crucial and, thus, is classified by Executive Order. n59 According to the American policy of deterrence through mutually assured destruction (MAD), nuclear weapons are essential to an effective deterrent. n60 If DoD disclosed the location of these weapons, disclosure would reduce or destroy the deterrent. An adversary could destroy all nuclear weapons with an initial strike, leaving the country exposed to nuclear terror. n61 Additionally, terrorists would know where to strike to obtain material for nuclear blackmail. In short, secrecy regarding nuclear weapons has enormous implications for national security. While the armed services must consider the environmental effects of maintaining nuclear weapons, they cannot release any information regarding the storage of these weapons.

#### Escalates to global nuclear war

**Caves 10** (John P. Jr., Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction – National Defense University, “Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”, Strategic Forum, No. 252, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/SF%20252\_John%20Caves.pdf)

Perceptions of a compromised U.S. nuclear deterrent as described above would have profound policy implications, particu­larly if they emerge at a time when a nuclear-armed great power is pursuing a more aggressive strategy toward U.S. allies and partners in its region in a bid to enhance its regional and global clout.

■ A dangerous period of vulnerability would open for the United States and those nations that depend on U.S. protection while the United States attempted to rectify the problems with its nuclear forces. As it would take more than a decade for the United States to produce new nuclear weapons, ensuing events could preclude a return to anything like the status quo ante.

■ The assertive, nuclear-armed great power, and other major adversaries, could be willing to challenge U.S. interests more directly in the expectation that the United States would be less prepared to threaten or deliver a military response that could lead to direct conflict. They will want to keep the United States from reclaiming its earlier power position.

■ Allies and partners who have relied upon explicit or implicit assurances of U.S. nuclear protection as a foundation of their security could lose faith in those assur­ances. They could compensate by accom­modating U.S. rivals, especially in the short term, or acquiring their own nuclear deter­rents, which in most cases could be accom­plished only over the mid- to long term. A more nuclear world would likely ensue over a period of years.

■ Important U.S. interests could be com­promised or abandoned, or a major war could occur as adversaries and/or the United States miscalculate new boundaries of deterrence and provocation. At worst, war could lead to state-on-state employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on a scale far more catastrophic than what nuclear-armed terror­ists alone could inflict.