# 1NC

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#### A. Interpretation – targeted killing is distinct from all drone strikes

Uebersax 12 (John, psychologist, writer and former RAND Corporation military analyst, "The Four Kinds of Drone Strikes," http://satyagraha.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/the-four-kinds-of-drone-strikes/)

We must begin with clear terms, and that is the purpose of the present article. Drone strikes, that is, the launching of explosive missiles from a remotely operated aerial vehicle, come in four varieties: targeted killings, signature strikes, overt combat operations, and covert combat operations. We shall consider each in turn.¶ Targeted killing. This occurs when a drone strike is used to kill a terrorist whose identity is known, and whose name has been placed on a hit list, due to being deemed a ‘direct and immediate threat’ to US security. The government would like people to think this means these strikes target a terrorist literally with his or her hand on a detonator. But, in actuality, the only real criterion is that the government believes the target is sufficiently closely affiliated with terrorist organizations (e.g., a propagandist or financier) to justify assassination. This is likely the rarest form of drone strike. However it receives the most publicity, because the government likes to crow when it kills a high-ranking terrorist.¶ Signature strikes. In signature strikes, the target is a person whose name is not known, but whose actions fit the profile (or ‘signature’) of a high-ranking terrorist. There is some ambiguity concerning the meaning of this term. Some use it in the sense just stated — i.e., a strike against an anonymous terrorist leader. Others use it more broadly to include killing of any non-identified militants, whether high-ranking or not. However from the moral standpoint it makes a major difference whether an anonymous targeted victim is a high-level leader, or simply an anonymous combatant. For this reason it is advantageous to restrict the term “signature strike” to the targeting of anonymous high-level leaders, and to assign strikes against anonymous non-leaders to the two further categories below.¶ Overt combat operation. This category includes drone strikes conducted as part of regular military operations. These strikes are presumably run by uniformed military personnel according to codes of military conduct, and are, logically and legally, not much different from ordinary air or artillery strikes. As a part of routine warfare, such strikes are subject to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Three items of the Geneva Conventions are of special interest here: (1) strikes should occur only in the context of a legally declared war; (2) they should be conducted by lawful combatants (which, many experts believe, excludes use of non-uniformed, civilian contractor operators); and (3) standard provisions concerning the need to report casualties, especially civilian casualties, are in effect.¶ Covert combat operation. Finally, there are covert combat operations. These, like the former category, are launched against usual military targets – e.g., any hostile militant, not just high-ranking ones. But why should these strikes be covert? The obvious answer is: to mask something shady. Covert combat strikes can evade all those irritating constraints on military tactics imposed by the Geneva Conventions, International Law, public opinion, and basic human decency.¶ The specific terms used above to distinguish these four kinds of strikes are admittedly arbitrary, and perhaps some other nomenclature would be more advantageous. But we need some fixed set of terms to refer to these fundamentally different kinds of strikes. Without such terms, the US government will continue to have its way by relying on public confusion and terminological sophistry. For example, if there is only a single generic term, the government may issue a claim such as “drone strikes comply with international law.” This is perhaps technically true for, say, overt military drone strikes, but it is not true for signature strikes. With more precise terms, it would be more difficult for the government to mislead the public.

#### B. Vote neg –

#### A. Precision – our interpretation is exclusive and has an intent to define –they make the resolution meaningless

#### B. Limits – expanding the term to include unknown terrorist identities makes the term limitless, destroying education

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#### Yellen will likely be confirmed as the next Fed chair

Europost 10/18/13 ("Janet Yellen rises to FED head challenge," http://www.europost.bg/article?id=8754)

For the first time in its cen­tu­ry-old his­to­ry, the US Fed­er­al Reserve (Fed) is wide­ly expect­ed to have a female Chair­per­son. Jan­et Yel­len (67), cur­rent­ly serv­ing as dep­u­ty of Ben Ber­nan­ke, has been nom­i­nat­ed by Pres­i­dent Barack Obama for the sec­ond most pow­er­ful gov­ern­ment posi­tion in the US. Because of the Fed's excep­tion­al inde­pend­ence and pow­er to pull the strings of not only the US, but the glob­al econ­o­my, its Chair­per­son holds an enor­mous amount of influ­ence.¶ Anoth­er sig­nif­i­cant devel­op­ment is the fact that for the first time in near­ly 30 years the Dem­o­crats will have their hands on this cru­cial finan­cial insti­tu­tion. The last Dem­o­crat at the helm of the US cen­tral bank was Paul Volc­ker, who Pres­i­dent Ronald Rea­gan replaced with Alan Green­span in 1987.¶ "Jan­et is excep­tion­al­ly well qual­i­fied for this role," Obama said at a White House cer­e­mo­ny on 9 Octo­ber, with Yell­en stand­ing by his side. "She doesn't have a crys­tal ball, but what she does have is a keen under­stand­ing of how mar­kets and the econ­o­my work, not just in the­o­ry but also in the real world. And she calls it like she sees it."¶ "She had sound­ed the alarm bell ear­ly about the hous­ing mar­ket bub­ble and excess­es in the finan­cial mar­kets before the reces­sion. She calls it like she sees it," Obama add­ed.¶ Yell­en, who spoke aft­er Obama, said she would pro­mote max­i­mum employ­ment, sta­ble pri­ces, and a sound finan­cial sys­tem.¶ "While we have made progress, we have fur­ther to go. The man­date of the Fed­er­al Reserve is to serve all the Amer­i­can peo­ple, and too many Amer­i­cans still can't find a job and wor­ry how they'll pay their bills and pro­vide for their fam­i­lies," Yell­en said.¶ "Jan­et is excep­tion­al­ly well qual­i­fied for the posi­tion, with stel­lar aca­dem­ic cre­den­tials and a strong record as a lead­er and a pol­i­cy­mak­er," Ben Ber­nan­ke said in a state­ment.¶ With her white hair and sweet smile, Yell­en inspires con­fi­dence. She was born and raised in Brook­lyn, where she attend­ed Fort Hamil­ton High School in Bay Ridge. She grad­u­at­ed from Brown Uni­ver­si­ty with a degree in eco­nom­ics in 1967, and received a Ph.D. in eco­nom­ics from Yale Uni­ver­si­ty in 1971.¶ Yell­en was an assist­ant pro­fes­sor at Har­vard from 1971-76 and an econ­o­mist with the Fed­er­al Reserve Board of Gov­ern­ors from 1977-78. There she met her future hus­band George Akerl­of, a Nobel prize-win­ning econ­o­mist. The two of them have worked togeth­er on numer­ous eco­nom­ic the­ses. She is now a Pro­fes­sor Emer­i­tus at the Haas School of Busi­ness, at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Cal­i­for­nia, Berke­ley.¶ Yell­en served as chair of Pres­i­dent Bill Clin­ton's Coun­cil of Eco­nom­ic Advis­ers 1997-1999, and was appoint­ed as a mem­ber of the Fed­er­al Reserve Sys­tem's Board of Gov­ern­ors from 1994 to 1997. She has taught at Har­vard Uni­ver­si­ty and at the Lon­don School of Eco­nom­ics. From June 14, 2004, until 2010, Yell­en was the Pres­i­dent and Chief Exec­u­tive Offi­cer of the Fed­er­al Reserve Bank of San Fran­cis­co. Fol­low­ing her appoint­ment to the Fed­er­al Reserve in 2004, she spoke pub­lic­ly, and in meet­ings of the Fed's mon­e­tary pol­i­cy com­mit­tee, on her con­cern about the poten­tial con­se­quen­ces of the boom in hous­ing pri­ces.¶ Yell­en is con­sid­ered by many on Wall Street to be a "dove" (more con­cerned with unem­ploy­ment than with infla­tion). Many con­serv­a­tives are hawks on infla­tion, argu­ing that keep­ing pri­ces low should be the Fed's chief con­cern. Yell­en will like­ly face oppo­si­tion from some Repub­li­cans in the Sen­ate, but she is expect­ed to be con­firmed as the next Fed chair.¶ A con­serv­a­tive group has launched a cam­paign to stop Jan­et L. Yell­en from becom­ing the next head of the Fed­er­al Reserve, Amer­i­can media report­ed. The con­cerns are that her con­fir­ma­tion would lead to an expan­sion of easy mon­ey pol­i­cies that would cause pri­ces to soar.¶ Still, she is expect­ed to gain enough sup­port to secure the 60 votes need­ed to over­come any pro­ce­dur­al hur­dles in the 100-seat Sen­ate. Dem­o­crats con­trol the cham­ber 54-46.

#### Obama fights the plan – strongly supports war powers

Rana 11 (Aziz – Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099, lexis)

Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of Barack Obama as President appeared to herald a new approach to security concerns and even the possibility of a fundamental break from Bush-era policies. These hopes were immediately stoked by Obama's decision before taking office to close the Guantanamo Bay prison. n4 Over two years later, however, not only does Guantanamo remain open, but through a recent executive order Obama has formalized a system of indefinite detention for those held there and also has stated that new military commission trials will begin for Guantanamo detainees. n5 More important, in ways small and large, the new administration remains committed to core elements of the previous constitutional vision of national security. Just as their predecessors, Obama officials continue to defend expansive executive detention and war powers and to promote the centrality of state secrecy to national security.

#### Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off

O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis)

a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by first-hand accounts of information battles and by the conclusions of experts who study them. Participants in such battles report that short-term political calculations consistently trump the constitutional interests at stake. One veteran of the first Bush White House, for example, has explained that rational-choice theory predicts what he in fact experienced: The rewards for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the office of the presidency would be largely abstract, since they would consist primarily of fidelity to a certain theory of the Constitution... . The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing purposes, [and] the unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies. n182 Louis Fisher, one of the leading defenders of the political branches' competence and authority to interpret the Constitution independently of the courts, n183 acknowledges that politics and "practical considerations" typically override the legal and constitutional principles implicated in information disputes. n184 In his view, although debate about congressional access and executive privilege "usually proceeds in terms of constitutional doctrine, it is the messy political realities of the moment that usually decide the issue." n185 Indeed, Professor Peter Shane, who has extensively studied such conflicts, concludes that their successful resolution in fact depends upon the parties focusing only on short-term political [\*1123] considerations. n186 When the participants "get institutional," Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187

#### Capital key to securing the new Fed chair

Collier 9/30/13 (Sustainable Wealth Management, "Perspectives: Four Challenges Facing the Markets This Fall," http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:mVzW9cxQi5YJ:www.collierswm.com/blog/perspectives-four-challenges-facing-markets-fall+&cd=15&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)

Current Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke, will step down from his position in January and his replacement will be named soon. Rumors about President Obama’s nomination are flying and we can expect a contentious confirmation process by the Senate, filled with horse-trading and negotiations. The new Fed chairman will have the responsibility of managing the tapering process and ending the Fed’s unprecedented quantitative easing programs while keeping the economy on track.[iii]

#### Yellen confirmation is key to the global economy – she’s key to managing multiple threats to growth

Crutsinger and Wiseman 10/9/13 (Martin and Paul, AP Economics Writers, "As Fed chair, Yellen would face tough challenges," http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20131009-as-fed-chair-yellen-would-face-tough-challenges.ece?nclick\_check=1)

Yellen would also take over the Fed at a critical time for China, the world's No. 2 economy after the United States, and other developing nations.¶ The International Monetary Fund, citing slower growth in China, India and Brazil, downgraded its forecast this week for global economic growth to 2.9 percent this year and 3.6 percent in 2014. Both are 0.2 percentage point weaker than the IMF's previous forecast in July.¶ Investors have been pulling money out of developing markets, partly to take advantage of rising interest rates in the United States. The Fed might be called upon to help calm worldwide financial volatility.¶ "The role of the Fed chair is so critical," said Greg McBride, senior financial analyst at Bankrate.com. "We're not just talking about the U.S. economy. We're talking about the global economy."¶ Yellen will also have to establish herself as chair at a time when the Fed is experiencing unusual turnover. When Bernanke leaves Jan. 31, but there could be up to four vacancies that Obama would need to fill on the seven-member Fed board.¶ One board member, Elizabeth Duke, left in August. Another, Sarah Bloom Raskin, has been nominated by Obama to become deputy Treasury secretary. The term of a third, Jerome Powell, will be up Jan. 31, though he can remain on the board until a successor is confirmed by the Senate.¶ And Sandra Pianalto, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, has announced that she will leave early next year.¶ Most analysts say they're confident Yellen can handle the many challenges.¶ "By temperament, by mannerism and by extensive experience, I think she is better prepared for that job than almost anybody on the face of the earth," says Alan Blinder, a Princeton University economist and former Fed vice chairman who served with Yellen at the Fed in the 1990s.

#### Global nuclear war

Harris & Burrows 9 (Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for** greater **conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any **economically-induced drawdown** of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, **acquire additional weapons**, and consider pursuing their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and **broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on **preemption** rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in **interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

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#### The plan kills the state secrets doctrine

Windsor 12 (Lindsay – J.D. candidate and Master of Security Studies candidate at Georgetown University, “IS THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN THE CONSTITUTION? THE BASIS OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE IN INHERENT EXECUTIVE POWERS & WHY COURT-IMPLEMENTED SAFEGUARDS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENT”, 2012, 43 Geo. J. Int'l L. 897, lexis)

In contrast to the acknowledged roles of both Congress and the President in foreign affairs matters, the Constitution does not grant the judiciary branch any authority over foreign affairs, and the courts have traditionally been "hesitant to intrude" upon matters of foreign policy and national security. n153 The Supreme Court "has recognized the generally accepted view that foreign policy [is] the province and responsibility of the Executive." n154 Hence, "courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs." n155 This hesitation and reluctance stem from the limited institutional competence of the judiciary in foreign affairs. As the Court wrote in Boumediene v. Bush, "Unlike the President and some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people." n156 Echoing the "sole organ" [\*920] scheme of Curtiss-Wright, the Court later wrote that in foreign affairs matters, "The Judiciary is not suited to [make] determinations that would . . . undermine the Government's ability to speak with one voice in this area." n157 A court should, therefore, give great deference to the Executive's invocation of the state secrets privilege because it inherently involves matters of national security. Nonetheless, deciding cases or controversies before the Court is within its field of expertise. n158 Such cases include separation of powers controversies between federal branches and enforcing checks on executive power. n159 Though a court could not amend the substance of the state secrets privilege, it could amend the procedure for its invocation in one of two ways: pursuant to congressional authorization or by interpreting its own rules of procedure. First, if Congress enacts specific legislation under its Article I powers requiring the President to follow certain procedures in invoking the privilege, then a court could enforce that procedure in a case before it. Second, the Court could reinterpret the procedural requirements for the privilege. The Reynolds Court specifically wrote a court should not always "insist[] upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers." n160 But in national security cases implicating core civil liberties, the Court could find that plaintiffs' necessity routinely requires different procedures to satisfy the Court that national security matters are at stake. n16

#### Key to protect our technological superiority

Donohue 10 (Laura – Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “The Shadow of State Secrets”, 2010, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 77, lexis)

In contrast, docket searches demonstrate that, from January 2001 to January 2009, the privilege played a significant role in the executive branch's national security litigation strategy. In one case, the Administration asserted the state secrets privilege some 245 times. n31 More to the point, the government has invoked the state secrets privilege in more than 100 cases, which is more than five times the number of cases previously considered. And it is not just the executive branch that benefitted from the privilege: in scores of additional cases, private industry claimed that the state secrets doctrine applied, with the expectation that the federal government would later intervene to prevent certain documents from being subject to discovery or to stop the suit from moving forward. Beyond these, there are hundreds of cases on which the shadow of the privilege fell. This Article thus focuses on cases working their way through the courts between 2001 and 2009. It begins with disputes related to government contractors, where the threatened and actual invocation of the privilege appears in a broad range of grievances. Breach of contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, fraud, and employment termination cases prove remarkable in their frequency, length, and range of technologies involved. Wrongful death, personal injury, and negligence [\*88] cases extend beyond product liability to include infrastructure and services, as well as an emerging area perhaps best understood as the conduct of war. These corporate cases are distinguished by the tendency of companies to claim that state secrets are at stake early in the dispute and the subsequent role of the United States, if it chooses to become involved and to invoke the privilege, as an intervenor. Close inspection suggests a conservative executive branch that is more likely to step forward when breach of contract, trade secrets, or patent disputes present themselves, and unlikely - once it invokes the privilege - to back down. Where the executive initially decides not to intervene and invoke the privilege, the rapid expansion of the use of contractors appears to be giving birth to a new form of "graymail": should the government initially refuse to support the corporation's state secrets claim, companies deeply embedded in the state may threaten to air legally or politically damaging information. n32 Even when no overt threat is made, the government may worry that certain information will emerge during the course of the trial that would politically compromise the agency or individuals involved. In other cases, the government may be dependent upon a corporation for a key aspect of national defense, thus creating an incentive for the state to protect the company from financial penalties associated with bad behavior. n33

#### Great power war

Baru 9 – Sanjaya Baru is a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 - 168

Hence, economic policies and performance do have strategic consequences.2 In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. 'Victory (in war)', Kennedy claimed, 'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base'.3 Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, 'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and military power, the classic 'guns versus butter' dilemma.

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#### The United States Federal Government should restrict executive authority for targeted killing as a first resort outside transnational armed conflict.

#### Strict geographic restrictions create safe havens – the transnational armed conflict model retains operational flexibility without escalating to a global battlefield.

Lewis 12 [Michael W., Associate Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, 6/2, 47 Texas International Law Journal 293, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1917461]

The existence of an armed conflict between, for example, al Qaeda and the United States, or between Hezbollah and Israel, should be based upon the degree of violence exchanged between those two parties, not on the level of violence that exists between al Qaeda and the nation of Afghanistan where it resides, or between Hezbollah and Lebanon where it is based. Yet it is this latter test which is being proposed by the ACLU and commentators supporting strict geographical limitations on the scope of IHL.¶ Such an application of the Tadic factors to determine whether IHL applies in a given geographical area to transnational armed conflicts confers a tremendous strategic advantage upon the very same organizations that IHL otherwise strongly disfavors. By limiting IHL to territory on which the threshold of violence for an armed conflict is currently occurring, IHL would effectively create sanctuaries for terrorist organizations in any state not currently involved in a domestic insurgency in which law enforcement is known to be ineffective. Nations such as Yemen,91 Somalia, Sudan and the FATA-area of Pakistan in which law enforcement actions against organizations like al Qaeda are either ineffective or intentionally not pursued, would become safe havens if IHL were not applied there. Al Qaeda members fulfilling a continuous combat function could effectively reacquire their civilian immunity by crossing an international boundary rather than being required to disavow al Qaeda, IHL’s preferred result.¶ This limitation on IHL’s scope in transnational armed conflicts would effectively cede the initiative 92 in a conflict between a state actor that abides by IHL and a non-state terrorist organization, which IHL disfavors in every other way because of its conduct during an armed conflict, to the terrorist organization. Members of the disfavored terrorist organization would be able to remain in these safe areas beyond the reach of law enforcement and immune from any attack that employed the tools of armed conflict, while they continued training, recruiting and planning their next attack. They alone would be allowed to decide the next battlefield’s location, whether it is New York, London, Madrid, Washington, DC, Mumbai, Detroit or Bali, and when the next confrontation would take place. IHL should not be read to privilege such a group that it actively disfavors in so many other ways. Employing neutrality law to determine IHL’s scope and the boundaries of the battlefield in transnational armed conflicts is the best way of avoiding such an anomalous interpretation of IHL.93¶ Significantly, neutrality law (or something very much like it) has already been employed in a transnational armed conflict. After the attacks of September 11, Afghanistan was put to much the same choice as Uruguay was in 1939. Become an ally of the United States in the conflict with al Qaeda and allow the use of force against al Qaeda on Afghan territory. Maintain neutrality in the conflict between the U.S. and al Qaeda by prohibiting U.S. action against al Qaeda in Afghanistan while ensuring that al Qaeda leaves Afghanistan and does not use Afghan territory as a sanctuary. Or become an enemy of the United States by refusing to uphold its duties as a neutral nation by allowing al Qaeda to use Afghan territory as a sanctuary. Afghanistan chose the third option and the United States and its NATO allies used force against both Afghan and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan with broad international support.¶ Conclusion¶ The Air Missile Manual makes it clear that drones are legitimate weapons platforms whose use is effectively governed by current IHL applicable to aerial bombardment. Like other forms of aircraft they may be lawfully used to target enemy forces, whether specifically identifiable individuals or armed formations, if they comply with IHL’s requirements of proportionality, necessity and distinction.¶ Because drones are only able to operate effectively in permissive environments, the most significant legal challenges facing their development and employment have been based upon where they may be employed. Attempts to apply the strict geographical restrictions that govern the scope of IHL in internal non-international armed conflicts to all non-international armed conflicts, including transnational armed conflicts, threaten to significantly limit the usefulness of drones.¶ When IHL’s core principles are considered, it becomes clear that the application of strict geographical limitations on IHL’s scope in the context of transnational armed conflicts cannot be defended. The determination of whether the Tadic threshold for an armed conflict is met on the territory of a non-party to the conflict should have no bearing on whether IHL may be applied to the parties to the conflict. In other words, the fact that there is no local violence occurring in Yemen or Somalia should not be used to provide a sanctuary for non-state actors that are involved in an armed conflict with another state.¶ The answer for how the boundaries of the battlefield and the scope of IHL’s application can be properly determined is found in neutrality law. This is historically how geographical limitations have been imposed upon IHL’s scope in international armed conflicts. It was applied in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, with at least tacit international approval, to the situation involving the United States, al Qaeda and Afghanistan. Its application is checked by the consent of the sovereign states involved, making an escalating spiral of violence less, rather than more, likely. And perhaps most importantly, neutrality law’s application to transnational armed conflicts does not lead to the anomalous results that are produced when strict geographical limitations are applied to transnational armed conflicts in which IHL is read to favor its otherwise most disfavored groups.

#### US deploys drones under the armed conflict model now – it retains the capacity to execute targeted killings against non-imminent threats outside of active hostilities

Lewis 13 [Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University, 5/24, Opinio Juris, “Guest Post: Obama Got it Right on Drones”, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/24/guest-post-obama-got-it-right-on-drones/]

This leads to a final point that continues to be the source of debate on OJ. Is there an armed conflict and does IHL apply outside of “hot” battlefields? Obama’s speech confirmed the US position that it is involved in an armed conflict with “al Qaeda and associated forces”. Reacting to the SASC hearings last week Gary Brown of the ICRC pointed out that the campaign outside of “hot” battlefields is not being conducted like any other “war” we have fought. Taking every strike to the NCA-level for approval is not the way warfare is conducted, which points to this conflict being something less than warfare.¶ While it may be something less than warfare, it is also clearly something more than law enforcement. And unfortunately there is a binary choice between human rights law and IHL. Even with the “human rights law continues in the background even during armed conflict” position that many human rights lawyers take, there are situations in which only one model can be operative. Status-based targeting defines IHL and is antithetical to human right law. May status-based targeting continue against members of AQAP, etc. who are not engaged in immediately threatening behavior at the time a drone finds them? In answering this question affirmatively the US is taking the position that it is involved in a more restricted form of warfare rather than a more robust form of law enforcement.

#### Limiting targeted killing to active hostilities creates safe havens in Pakistan and Yemen

Lewis 11 [Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University, 5/15, Opinio Juris, “The Boundaries of the Battlefield”, http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/15/the-boundaries-of-the-battlefield/]

NOTE: IHL = International Humanitarian Law

In analyzing the bin Laden operation Kevin expressed his belief that there is currently a NIAC between the US and “original” al Qaeda, a group to which bin Laden clearly belonged. Although there is not sufficient violence taking place within Pakistan to say that there is currently a NIAC occurring on Pakistani territory, that fact did not prohibit the use of armed force in Pakistan when a participant in the NIAC between the US and al Qaeda could be found there. Likewise, if bin Laden were in Yemen, the same outcome would have been reached, the tools of armed conflict could be employed against bin Laden in Yemen (under certain circumstances) because he was a participant in the NIAC with the US.¶ The normative reason for this conclusion is that any other reading of IHL with respect to the boundaries of the battlefield would essentially turn IHL on its head. One of IHL’s principal goals is to spare the civilian population and members of the military that are hors de combat from the ravages of warfare. To this end it insists on proportionality and military necessity for all attacks, it requires the acceptance of surrender, it ties the availability of the combatants’ privilege to organizational respect for IHL, and it removes civilian immunity from those participating in an armed conflict either temporarily for such time as they directly participate in hostilities (DPH) or more permanently for those who continuously perform a combat function (CCF). Members of al Qaeda are targetable when they are engaged in attacks (DPH), and leadership (like bin Laden) that is consistently engaged in the planning and direction of operations is targetable at all times (CCF). IHL rewards organizations that enforce the laws of war by allowing members of those orgainzations the combatants’ privilege. IHL discourages terrorist organizations like al Qaeda that target civilians and blend in with the civilian population (thereby placing them at greater risk) by denying them the combatants’ privilege and removing civilian immunity from its members.¶ However, if IHL is read to prohibit the use of the tools of armed conflict outside of certain geographically defined areas it would be conferring a tremendous strategic advantage upon these same terrorist organizations that it disfavors. By limiting the use of the tools of armed conflict to territory on which the threshold of violence for a NIAC is currently occurring, IHL would effectively create sanctuaries for terrorist organizations in any state in which law enforcement is known to be ineffective (like Yemen, Somalia, Sudan and the FATA area of Pakistan). This reading of IHL would thereby cede the initiative in the NIAC between a state actor that abides by IHL and a non-state terrorist organization (which IHL disfavors in every other way because of its conduct during an armed conflict) to the terrorist organization. The disfavored terrorist organization would get to decide when, where and how the war is to be fought because they would be immune from targeting based purely on geography. That cannot be how IHL should be read when considering the boundaries of the battlefield.

#### That prevents us from beating AQAP

Alan W. Dowd 13, writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters, Vol. 42.4/43.1

At the beginning of President Hadi’s May offensive he, therefore, had a fractured army and a dysfunctional air force. Army leaders from competing factions were often disinclined to support one another in any way including facilitating the movement of needed supplies. Conversely, the air force labor strike had been a major setback to the efficiency of the organization, which was only beginning to operate as normal in May 2012. Even before the mutiny, the Yemen Air Force had only limited capabilities to conduct ongoing combat operations, and it did not have much experience providing close air support to advancing troops. Hadi attempted to make up for the deficiencies of his attacking force by obtaining aid from Saudi Arabia to hire a number of tribal militia fighters to support the regular military. These types of fighters have been effective in previous examples of Yemeni combat, but they could also melt away in the face of military setbacks.

Adding to his problems, President Hadi had only recently taken office after a long and painful set of international and domestic negotiations to end the 33-year rule of President Saleh. If the Yemeni military was allowed to be defeated in the confrontation with AQAP, that outcome could have led to the collapse of the Yemeni reform government and the emergence of anarchy throughout the country. Under these circumstances, Hadi needed every military edge that he could obtain, and drones would have been a valuable asset to aid his forces as they moved into combat. As planning for the campaign moved forward, it was clear that AQAP was not going to be driven from its southern strongholds easily. The fighting against AQAP forces was expected to be intense, and Yemeni officers indicated that they respected the fighting ability of their enemies.16

Shortly before the ground offensive, drones were widely reported in the US and international media as helping to enable the Yemeni government victory which eventually resulted from this campaign.17 Such support would have included providing intelligence to combatant forces and eliminating key leaders and groups of individuals prior to and then during the battles for southern towns and cities. In one particularly important incident, Fahd al Qusa, who may have been functioning as an AQAP field commander, was killed by a missile when he stepped out of his vehicle to consult with another AQAP leader in southern Shabwa province.18 It is also likely that drones were used against AQAP fighters preparing to ambush or attack government forces in the offensive.19 Consequently, drone warfare appears to have played a significant role in winning the campaign, which ended when the last AQAP-controlled towns were recaptured in June, revealing a shocking story of the abuse of the population while it was under occupation.20 Later, on October 11, 2012, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted that drones played a “vital role” in government victories over AQAP in Yemen, although he did not offer specifics.21 AQAP, for its part, remained a serious threat and conducted a number of deadly actions against the government, although it no longer ruled any urban centers in the south.

#### The impact is oil shocks

**Harder**, 5/2/**2011** (Amy, Al-Qaeda Retaliation Would Drive Spike in Oil Prices, National Journal, p. http://www.nationaljournal.com/al-qaida-retaliation-would-drive-spike-in-oil-prices-20110502)

Global oil prices could rise and become even more volatile if al-Qaida terrorists in the Middle East try to avenge Osama bin Laden’s death. Many energy security experts caution that it’s too soon to make a judgment either way on what long-term effect bin Laden’s death will have on oil prices. Indeed, global oil prices are high largely because of the political revolutions occurring in countries such as Libya that are not directly connected to recent terrorism. Nonetheless, bin Laden's death has intensified the focus on the connection between Middle East geopolitics and oil prices. “The political trends in the Middle East and North Africa major oil exporting region is going to be the heavier influence on oil prices,” said Christine Parthemore, an energy-security fellow at the Center for New American Security. “But Yemen now sticks out as the real country to watch because it has both,” added Parthemore, referring to the fact that al-Qaida’s most active branch, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, is based in Yemen, and that the country is experiencing political upheaval. To boot, Yemen sits at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden. About 10 percent of the world’s seaborne oil passes through that gulf, including oil from Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest producer and exporter. Parthemore said terrorists regularly try to attack petroleum infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, and noted that  bin Laden’s death could trigger more efforts. “I’m particularly concerned about reprisal attacks focusing on petroleum infrastructure there [Saudi Arabia] -- probably more so than is being represented in the media now,” she said. Other experts said if terrorism occurs in Saudi Arabia or Yemen, oil prices could skyrocket. “If the al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula were able to stir things up a bit and do something in or near the border of Saudi Arabia … I think you would see a very sharp move upward in petroleum prices,” said Charles Ebinger, who directs the Brookings Institution’s energy-security initiative and is a senior fellow in foreign policy.

#### Great power war

**King**, September **2008** (Neil, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, p. 14-17)

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United **S**tates. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.

### 1NC

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should restrict executive authority for drone strikes as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.

#### Competes – Targeted killing includes drones and special force raids – only the plan restricts special forces

Alston 11 (Phillip – John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, “ARTICLE: The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders”, 2011, 2 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 283, lexis)

The two principal targeted killing techniques are kill-or-capture raids and air strikes from unmanned aerial vehicles commonly known as drones. The individuals targeted are alleged terrorists or others deemed dangerous, and their inclusion on what are known as kill/capture lists is based on undisclosed intelligence applied against secret criteria. In Afghanistan alone it appears that there are at least six different kill/capture lists, with a total of thousands of names on them. While the CIA has been actively engaged in kill/capture missions since its arrival in Afghanistan in the days immediately after 9/11, it sometimes operates in conjunction with DOD Special Operations Forces under the command of JSOC, a body that also leads a determinedly twilight existence. Because the targeting operations and the kill/capture lists on which they are based are secret, the CIA will neither confirm nor deny their existence. [\*286] The CIA's drone-based killing programs have so far killed well in excess of 2,000 persons in Pakistan, and it has been involved in such drone programs in at least four other countries. This number is likely to expand significantly in the years ahead as a result of a combination of factors, including the perceived effectiveness of drone killings, the relatively low costs involved, shrinking overall defense budgets, a diminishing appetite for traditional warfare, the very low risk to United States personnel, the rapidly growing sophistication of tracking, targeting, and delivery technologies, and major investments aimed at further accelerating technological breakthroughs. Seen against this background, the targeted killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 was not a dramatic departure from the United States' established practice, but rather just another example of its increasingly frequent use of extraterritorial targeted killings as an integral part of its overall national security strategy. As the CIA Director observed at the time, the Special Forces that carried out the bin Laden raid--the United States Navy SEALS--"conduct these kinds of operations two and three times a night in Afghanistan." n5

#### Solves – 1AC evidence lists drone strikes as being the reason for their impacts – counterplan sufficiently resolves that

#### Special Operations Forces conduct operations globally

Alston 11 (Phillip – John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, “ARTICLE: The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders”, 2011, 2 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 283, lexis)

B. Kill/Capture Operations These operations might be thought of as the military equivalent of search and seizure exercises. The principal difference, of course, is that lethality appears to be a prominent ingredient in the military version, and there is no reason to believe that killings are strictly confined to situations involving self-defense, although in the absence of detailed data no ironclad conclusions can be drawn in this regard. Kill/capture operations are based [\*334] on target lists drawn up after more or less systematic analysis of intelligence. The technical term reflected in the U.S. Air Force's Targeting manual is a "joint integrated prioritized collection list," n158 but in the broader military context the terms used more commonly are "joint prioritized effects list," "joint effects list," or more colloquially "kill list." n159 In Afghanistan, these operations have generally taken the form of "night raids," which refers to kill/capture operations undertaken under the cover of darkness and involving the invasion of private homes or compounds. They have become especially controversial after a number of high-profile cases involving alleged, and sometimes acknowledged, mistakes in terms of the individuals killed. These Afghanistan operations are part of a broader program carried out by United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) around the world, 85 percent of whose activities occur within the Central Command's region, which includes primarily Afghanistan and Iraq. n160

#### Oversight devastates the effectiveness of special operations

Serafino 11 (Marissa – Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Office of US Senator Jeanne Shaheen, “U.S. Military: Invest in Special Ops, Not in Drones “, 2011, http://www.policymic.com/articles/1412/u-s-military-invest-in-special-ops-not-in-drones/9235)

As intelligence and defense departments enter a new era with reduced spending, special operations forces provide some stability to the security of the U.S. Special ops forces are a key component of the war in Afghanistan and have a high rate of military success, so even in an economic recession, people remain the greatest asset to the military. These forces operate a network of secret prisons across the world and engage in: counter-terrorist activities; assassinations; long-range reconnaissance; intelligence analysis; foreign troop training; and weapons of mass destruction counter-proliferation operations. Critics have continually cried foul about the secrecy of counterterrorism operations and have raised concerns with the influence of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Critics also contend that with a global presence in roughly 60% of the world's nations, counterterrorism strike forces are evidence of a rising clandestine pentagon power elite waging secret wars across the world. The real question here is whether you trust our defense experts to authorize missions they deem necessary, such as the killing of bin Laden. While the lack of transparency of SOCOM is cause for debate, ultimately, secrecy is crucial to protecting the interests of the United States and its citizens. Covert missions were officially established during the Cold War under President Truman, who saw a need for secrecy even then. In order to continue U.S. hegemony today, special ops forces must be expanded. They protect U.S. interests while drawing the least amount of attention. Their job is to be inconspicuous. The United States needs discretion, especially in a fragile and nuclear world. While oversight is important for any special operation, broad oversight, such as congressional oversight, will endanger officers and counter the success of missions. Special operations forces have been an invaluable weapon of the past and will be an asset in the future for counterterrorism. America is smart to invest in them. Cuts to the defense budget should be in outdated technology and weaponry. The technological and strategic race for the security of our state depends on special operations, research, and innovations in order to move us forward.

#### Special ops key to solve prolif - causes nuclear war

Thomas and Dougherty 13 (Jim – Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Chris – Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments, “Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces”, 5/10, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2013/05/beyond-the-ramparts-the-future-of-u-s-special-operations-forces/)

Emerging Strategic Context Predicting exactly which threats will confront the United States, or precisely where SOF will deploy over the next ten to twenty years, is an impossible task. It is feasible, however, to project forward some of the key trends that will shape planning requirements and the impact they will have on SOF. While the future security environment will present the U.S. Joint Force, including SOF, with a panoply of challenges, there are four in particular that will have arguably the most significant long-term implications for SOF: defeating Islamist VENs; countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD); confronting anti-access and area-denial networks (A2/ AD); and waging influence campaigns and proxy wars. The United States will confront these challenges against a backdrop of persistent global economic weakness and its own 􀂿scal predicament. Islamist VENs pose challenges in the present that will likely persist well into the future. Although surgical strikes have inflicted a heavy toll on the leadership of al Qaeda since 9/11, violent extremism has metastasized and new nodes have spawned in an ever-adapting terrorist network. Consistent with the founding vision of al Qaeda as a 􀂳base􀂴 from which violent Islamist extremists would develop a global terrorism network, al Qaeda franchises and ideologically associated groups have sprung up throughout the Muslim world, exploiting weak states and endemic instability. This metastasis of extremist franchises is pushing the locus of CT efforts beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Conducting CT outside of theaters of war will require U.S. SOF to place greater emphasis on finding and fixing enemy forces, while partner forces􀂲be they foreign security forces, intelligence services, or law enforcement agencies – conduct the finishes. More proactive global CT and FID operations will also require pushing smaller SOF units forward for long-duration operations in remote, austere areas. Moreover, it will necessitate a lighter footprint, and the shift away from theaters of armed con􀃀ict with a large U.S. presence will limit SOF’s ability to rely on General Purpose Forces (GPF) units for logistics and sustainment 􀂳enablers.􀂴 WMD do not represent new threats to U.S. security interests, but as nascent nuclear powers grow their arsenals and aspirants like Iran continue to pursue nuclear capabilities, the threat of nuclear proliferation, as well as the potential for the actual use of nuclear weapons, will increase. Upheaval in failing or outlaw states like Libya and Syria, which possess chemical weapons and a range of missiles, highlights the possibility that in future instances of state collapse or civil war, such weapons could be used by failing regimes in an act of desperation, fall into the hands of rebel forces, or be seized by parties hostile to the United States or its interests. SOF can contribute across the spectrum of counter-WMD efforts, from stopping the acquisition of WMD by hostile states or terrorist groups to preventing their use. The global CT network SOF have built over the last decade could be repurposed over the ne􀁛t decade to become a global counter-WMD network, applying the same logic that it takes a network to defeat a network. Increasing the reach and density of a global counter-WMD network will require expanding security cooperation activities focused on counter-proliferation. Finally, SOF may offer the most viable strategic option for deposing WMD-armed regimes through UW campaigns should the need arise. The spread of advanced military technologies, such as precision-guided munitions, is enabling a number of countries to construct A2/AD networks that could erode the United States’ ability to project military power into key regions. Nations such as China and Iran are actively seeking to acquire and held A2/AD capabilities, including precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles, attack submarines, fast-attack craft, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, computer-network attack capabilities, advanced 􀂿ghter aircraft, and integrated air defenses, that may challenge the U.S. military’s ability to project power. The cumulative effect of spreading A2/ AD systems is that the land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains will be far less permissive for U.S. military operations. In the face of growing A2/AD threats, the value of low-signature forces capable of operating independently and far forward in denied areas is likely to increase substantially. SOF may oer the most viable ground-force option in future A2/AD environments, either executing direct action against key targets or working by, with, and through partner forces to conduct peripheral campaigns (i.e., operations designed to impose costs and conducted beyond the territory or reach of the enemy). Prior to hostilities, SOF could carry out preparation of the environment (PE) and special reconnaissance (SR) missions. At the outset of hostilities, SOF might serve as an early-entry force to blind or disrupt enemy command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C􀀗ISR) networks, thereby enabling higher-signature conventional forces to penetrate A2/AD networks. Inserting or e􀁛tracting SOF from denied environments, and supporting them once there, will challenge SOF aviation and undersea capabilities. Accordingly, SOF will need stealthy means of Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces xiii insertion from the air and sea. SOF may also need to conduct foreign external defense (FED) missions in states to build their capacity to repel foreign military aggression. This could entail helping key partners to create their own versions of A2/AD networks. The proliferation of WMD and A2/AD capabilities will erode the conventional power-projection capability of not only the United States, but of other countries as well. In the future, states may therefore avoid direct confrontations and be more inclined to use unconventional methods and measures short of war to gain influence and achieve their foreign policy goals. States may also turn to third-party proxies to maintain plausible deniability for their actions. States could engage in influence campaigns and proxy competitions to achieve objectives such as: imposing costs on ma􀁍or competitors, foreclosing opportunities for other countries or non-state actors to gain a foothold in a region, “peeling away” allies or partners from competitors, diverting the attention and resources of competitors (misdirection), conducting cross-border operations against a ma􀁍or power with less risk of confrontation, or controlling (or denying) critical resources and trade routes. SOF will be critical to success in persistent influence campaigns and proxy competitions. They will need e􀁛quisite, local-area e􀁛pertise and language skills, along with deep, longstanding relationships with key local actors built over time by embedding and living with foreign partner forces. Though SOF already operate in smaller units than GPF, the breadth, speci􀂿city, and need to minimize the visibility of these operations will place an emphasis on even smaller SOF teams and single operators working in close collaboration with other government agencies. These four security challenges􀂲coming to the fore during a time of 􀂿scal austerity in the United States and global economic uncertainty􀂲are likely to dominate the national security agenda for decades to come. These challenges are not mutually e􀁛clusive and, in almost every case, the challenges are intertwined with opportunities for SOF to impose costs on U.S. adversaries. Given their global nature, and recognizing the interrelationship between the various challenges and opportunities, SOF are uniquely suited to address them asymmetrically.

## Norms

### No Modeling

#### U.S. can’t effectively signal

Zenko 13 (Micah, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action Douglas Dillon fellow, "The Signal and the Noise," Foreign Policy, 2-2-13, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/20/the\_signal\_and\_the\_noise)

Later, Gen. Austin observed of cutting forces from the Middle East: "Once you reduce the presence in the region, you could very well signal the wrong things to our adversaries." Sen. Kelly Ayotte echoed his observation, claiming that President Obama's plan to withdraw 34,000 thousand U.S. troops from Afghanistan within one year "leaves us dangerously low on military personnel...it's going to send a clear signal that America's commitment to Afghanistan is going wobbly." Similarly, during a separate House Armed Services Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ominously warned of the possibility of sequestration: "Perhaps most important, the world is watching. Our friends and allies are watching, potential foes -- all over the world." These routine and unchallenged assertions highlight what is perhaps the most widely agreed-upon conventional wisdom in U.S. foreign and national security policymaking: the inherent power of signaling. This psychological capability rests on two core assumptions: All relevant international audiences can or will accurately interpret the signals conveyed, and upon correctly comprehending this signal, these audiences will act as intended by U.S. policymakers. Many policymakers and pundits fundamentally believe that the Pentagon is an omni-directional radar that uniformly transmits signals via presidential declarations, defense spending levels, visits with defense ministers, or troop deployments to receptive antennas. A bit of digging, however, exposes cracks in the premises underlying signaling theories. There is a half-century of social science research demonstrating the cultural and cognitive biases that make communication difficult between two humans. Why would this be any different between two states, or between a state and non-state actor? Unlike foreign policy signaling in the context of disputes or escalating crises -- of which there is an extensive body of research into types and effectiveness -- policymakers' claims about signaling are merely made in a peacetime vacuum. These signals are never articulated with a precision that could be tested or falsified, and thus policymakers cannot be judged misleading or wrong. Paired with the faith in signaling is the assumption that policymakers can read the minds of potential or actual friends and adversaries. During the cycle of congressional hearings this spring, you can rest assured that elected representatives and expert witnesses will claim to know what the Iranian supreme leader thinks, how "the Taliban" perceives White House pronouncements about Afghanistan, or how allies in East Asia will react to sequestration. This self-assuredness is referred to as the illusion of transparency by psychologists, or how "people overestimate others' ability to know them, and...also overestimate their ability to know others." Policymakers also conceive of signaling as a one-way transmission: something that the United States does and others absorb. You rarely read or hear critical thinking from U.S. policymakers about how to interpret the signals from others states. Moreover, since U.S. officials correctly downplay the attention-seeking actions of adversaries -- such as Iran's near-weekly pronouncement of inventing a new drone or missile -- wouldn't it be safer to assume that the majority of U.S. signals are similarly dismissed? During my encounters with foreign officials, few take U.S. government pronouncements seriously, and instead assume they are made to appease domestic audiences.

#### No reverse modeling - norms can’t solve

Saunders 13 **(**Paul, executive director of The Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005, “We Won't Always Drone Alone,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177>)

A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will use drones, whether armed or unarmed, and what lessons they will draw from Washington’s approach. Thus far, the principal lesson may well be that drones can be extremely effective in killing your opponents, wherever they are, without risking your own troops and without sending soldiers or law enforcement personnel across another country’s borders. It seems less likely that others will adopt U.S.-style legal standards and oversight procedures, or that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace.¶ Based on their actions, it is almost as if Obama administration officials believe that the United States and its allies will have a long-term monopoly on drones. How else can one explain their exuberant confidence in launching drone attacks? However, the administration’s dramatic expansion in drone strikes—and their apparent effectiveness—will only further shorten Washington’s reign as the drone capital of the world by increasing the incentives to others eager to develop, refine or buy the technology.¶ Have Obama administration officials given any thought to what the world might look like when armed drones are more widespread and when Americans or U.S. allies and partners could become targets? To an outsider, there is little evidence of this kind of thinking in the administration’s use of drones.¶ This is a serious problem. According to an unclassified July 2012 report by the Government Accountability Office, at least 76 countries already have acquired unmanned aerial vehicles, known as UAVs or drones; the report also states that “countries of concern” are attempting to acquire advanced UAVs from foreign suppliers as well as seeking illegal access to U.S. technology. And a 2012 special report by the United Kingdom’s Guardian newspaper indicated that China has 10 or more models, though not all are armed. Other sources identify additional varieties in China. At least 50 countries are trying to build 900 different types of drones, the GAO writes.¶ More generally, the administration’s expanding use of drones is a powerful endorsement of not only the technology, but of the practice of targeted killing as an instrument of foreign and security policy. Having provided this powerful impetus, the United States should not be surprised if others—with differing legal standards and more creative efforts at self-justification—seize upon it once they have the necessary capabilities. According to the GAO, this is already happening—in government-speak, “while only a limited number of countries have fielded lethal or weaponized UAVs, this threat is anticipated to grow.” From this perspective, it is ironic that a president so critical of his predecessor’s unilateralism would practice it himself—particularly in a manner that other governments will find much easier to emulate than the Bush administration’s larger-scale use of force. How does the Obama administration plan to respond if and when China or Russia uses armed UAVs to attack groups they define as terrorists?

### 1NC No Drone Wars

#### Drone wars don’t happen

Lewis & Crawford 13 [Michael W., Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Emily, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Sydney, “DRONES AND DISTINCTION: HOW IHL ENCOURAGED THE RISE OF DRONES” p. 1163, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/law-journals/gjil/recent/upload/zsx00313001127.PDF]

Before discussing the legal merits of the norms that the United States is shaping through its present conduct of drone warfare, it is ﬁrst necessary to dispel a pervasive misconception about drones that Alston and many other commentators have promulgated. That misconception is that the current manner in which the United States is using drones broadly justiﬁes any use of drones by other countries against the United States and that drones represent a serious threat to the United States.159 This misconception has spread so easily because the reciprocity theme is intuitively appealing and, to a point, legally correct. It is true that whatever legal basis the United States offers for utilizing drones in Yemen, Pakistan, or Somalia must also be available to any other nation wishing to use drones as well. However, that does not mean that drones will be appearing over New York City anytime soon, in large part because drones are very vulnerable to air defense systems and signal interruption and because they are particularly unsuited to use by terror groups.160 Even the most advanced drones that the United States possesses are relatively slow and vulnerable to ﬁghters or surface-to-air missiles, meaning that, as conventional weapons, drones would have limited utility in a traditional state-on-state armed conﬂict.161 Perhaps more importantly, the physical realities associated with using drones makes them of limited usefulness to terrorists. Drones that are capable of carrying any signiﬁcant payload need hard surfaced runways and signiﬁcant maintenance support. Any drone returning to such facilities would be closely followed by U.S. forces, meaning that any drone used by terrorists would be a single strike proposition, and quite an expensive one at that. Therefore, from a practical standpoint, car bombs, suicide bombs, and attacks on airliners remain by far the most credible threat to the United States, regardless of how it pursues its drone policy.

### 1NC Drone Prolif

#### Acquisition takes forever

Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out¶ distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests.¶ However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most¶ likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial¶ base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited¶ firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the¶ intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and crossborder¶ adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks¶ by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia¶ into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into¶ Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingencies¶ do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support.¶ Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat¶ to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term.

### Circumvention

#### Obama can circumvent

Lohmann 13 **(**Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>)

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

### No Caucuses Escalation

#### No escalation – allies won’t be drawn in and Russia will be diplomatic

Glashatov 7 (Oleg, “Zero Hour Approaches for Yerevan; Azerbaijan Prepares to Fight for Nagorno-Karabakh: Will There Be War?”, What the Papers Say Part A (Russia), 7-5, Lexis)

Speaking at Johns Hopkins University, US Council on Foreign Relations analyst Wayne Merry noted that Azerbaijan cannot win, even though military options for resolving the conflict are being discussed openly in Azerbaijan. In his view, Nagorno-Karabakh is an impregnable fortress, further strengthened by Armenian forces, and even the American military would have difficulty attacking that fortress. According to the analyst, this is also the prevalent view in the Pentagon. But Azerbaijan takes an entirely different view of the situation. Zakhir Orudzh, a member of the Azeri parliament's defense and security committee, says: "Armenia can only be superior to us in the capacities it gains from bilateral military agreements with Russia and participation in the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. For all other parameters and resources, Azerbaijan is superior to Armenia, in military terms. And don't let anyone try to intimidate Azerbaijan with the idea that conflict escalation could have serious consequences for our country. Everyone should realize that if Azerbaijan and Armenia were left to face each other alone, with no external support, we could rapidly prove that we are in the right." Armed **hostilities could resume** in several ways; in almost every scenario, they would be started either **by Azerbaijan** or by dubious international structures that specialize in promoting the West's interests in this region (such as the International Crisis Group). The most immediately relevant scenario could involve the United States attacking Iran, and Azerbaijan taking advantage of the chaos to make an attempt at sorting out the Nagorno-Karabakh problem once and for all. **However, Azerbaijan could** **hardly expect** substantial **military support** in these circumstances, **from either the United States** (**it would be too busy elsewhere)** **or Turkey** (**which might confine its participation** in the conflict **to sending volunteers**). All of the above leads to the following conclusion: **Azerbaijan is unlikely to succeed with a blitzkrieg** in the immediate future. In this situation (as in most modern conflicts), the time factor would be decisive. Moreover, if hostilities do break out, Russia's military obligations would come into effect: Armenia is an ally within the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. **Consequently, Moscow is likely to make every effort to see that this conflict is resolved by diplomatic** or other **means**.

#### No Incentive for Draw-In – neither U.S. nor Russia have vital interests in the region

**Empirically denied**

Arminfo 7 (News Agency, “Arkadiy Gukasyan: Pat Situation Maybe Created In The Karabakh Negotiating Process Because Inefficiency Of Its Format”, 7-3, Lexis)

Pat situation maybe created in the Karabakh negotiating process because inefficiency of its format, the NKR President Arkadiy Gukasyan said in the Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) state University when making a report "Nagornyy Karabakh: prospects of settlement". He also added that at present the OSCE Minsk Group because of contradiction of official Baku cannot make the format of the negotiating process in line with configuration of the conflict defined by it. "The pat situation maybe created in the negotiating process because of inefficiency of its format as the Azerbaijani party is trying to persuade the world community that only Azerbaijan and Armenia are the parties to the conflict blaming the latter for the territorial pretensions. We see the way out from the created situation in returning Nagornyy Karabakh to the negotiating table, and the OSCE MG co-chairs' efforts should be directed to this goal reaching", - the NKR president said. He also added that in fact today the parties are trying to treat a decease not knowing its diagnosis. "Today **the conflict is** **20 years old**, but **they are still disputing about the participants** in the conflict and its parties: **Azerbaijan-Armenia**, Azerbaijan-Karabakh or Azerbaijan-Armenia-Karabakh. I think **this is an** absolutely **absurd situation**. I have got a formula: until Azerbaijan strives to speak only with Armenia without Nagornyy Karabakh, Azerbaijan does not strive to settle the conflict and is just propagandizing", - Arkadiy Gukasyan concluded.

#### Also the only escalation warrant is Russia – defense will be on the other advantage

### 1NC SCS

#### If China Can’t use drone strikes they will use other means – still ensures escalation

#### No SCS conflict

Chaibi 3/4 -- 3rd year visiting student from Princeton University in the Department of Engineering Science (Abraham, 2013, "The outlook for continuing stability in the South China Sea," http://politicsinspires.org/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/)

East Asia’s rapid economic and military development has captured global attention, but pundits are quick to point to the South China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan as potential obstacles to the region’s continued growth. Analysis of news coverage demonstrates that regional economies and tensions have been growing in tandem. The South China Sea has historically been of particular interest because of the number of conflicting claims on the islands and sea-lanes it encompasses. China, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, among others, have often engaged in bilateral disagreements with resulting spikes in diplomatic tension and even military confrontation. Of note, these conflicts have never escalated to a full-scale regional war. Direct extrapolation suggests that previous restraint in military interactions implies the nations involved do not consider the potential benefits sufficient to justify an upset to the balance of power. However, contemporary changes in economic and security conditions complicate the issue. While current tensions appear unlikely to lead to a full-scale military conflict, the diversion of national resources needed to maintain the status quo is substantial. Institutional changes to increase transparency; clarify US treaties with ASEAN nations; and increase states’ internal enforcement of international agreements, although initially costly, would allow the neighbouring states to redirect these resources to long-term growth. Historically, China has been involved in a majority of the military conflicts in the South China Sea. A 1947 Chinese map delineates China’s controversial claim to approximately 80% of the sea. China aggressively used its navy to conclude a dispute with Vietnam in the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then in 1988 during the Johnson South Reef Skirmish for the Spratly Islands. Conflict was narrowly averted in 1995 when the Philippines chose not to shell fort-like Chinese military structures on Mischief Reef (China maintained they were only intended as shelter for fisherman); however, the Philippines continues to assert that this is an example of “creeping occupation”. This form of venting tensions, while far short of total war, is extremely costly over the long run; the combination of of resources, energy, and lives expended to establish a claim to the islands creates a significant and avoidable opportunity cost. These skirmishes are not merely an imprint of the 20th century but continue today as witnessed by the Chinese establishment of the Sansha garrison-city in 2012 and the Sino-Philippines stand-off in the Scarborough Shoal. What then is the evidence suggesting a continued reluctance to engage in full-scale military confrontation? Although in the past conflict has often arisen between economically interdependent nations (viz. the previous peak of global trade in 1914), the China-ASEAN relationship is one of fundamental interdependence of production, visible in the prevalence of international supply chaining in manufacturing processes, rather than solely trade and labour movement[i]. The burgeoning economic interdependence and growth of neighbouring states contributes a major incentive to prevent a conflagration. $5.3 trillion of trade, of which approximately 20% is US, transits the South China Sea annually and any interruption would not only severely restrict regional trade revenues, but would also very likely guarantee US military intervention[ii]. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is becoming increasingly interconnected and 2015 will mark a key turning point with the opening of internal ASEAN borders for free movement of labor. The ASEAN bloc has also concluded a number of reconciliation agreements with China. Regarding security, both the 2002 Code of Conduct and the 2011 Guidelines to the Code of Conduct are intended to help coordinate diplomacy and maintain peace in South China Sea disputes. Economically China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and at its opening in 2010 the ASEAN-China free trade area (ACFTA) became the largest in the world by population. These arrangements come at a time when growing estimates of the value of the natural resources contained in the South China Sea are generating pressures associated with ensuring energy security. Economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, however, is not the sole factor at play. In areas with considerable interstate tension sub-state actors have often contributed to the deterioration of international relations, most prominently with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand tipping Europe into World War I. Recent developments in state-level Chinese political and military discourse reflect a strong interest in cooperation. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 2011 discussions with Filipino President Corazon Aquino firmly expressed the hope that “the countries concerned may put aside disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas”[iii]. Additionally in 2011 the Chinese State Council Information Office released a white paper with a similar emphasis on joint development. Yet China is also reported to have developed internal fractures in its South China Sea policy, with a number of different ministries controlling paramilitary units that are not under express government oversight[iv]. For example, the Bureau of Fisheries Administration (BFA) now directs a relatively well-equipped law enforcement fleet that is tasked with patrolling Chinese-owned fishing areas. Such interest groups repeatedly instigate minor disputes with their ASEAN counterparts and the US navy that exacerbate state-level discussions and risk eventually drawing unintended consequences (characteristically, in 2004 two BFA vessels obstructed a US Navy surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea). The region has also seen a rise in high-tech militarization, with rapid development in areas ranging from aircraft carriers and submarines to cyber-espionage; this is likely to further increase due to the 2011 US “pivot to Asia” and military surge. The pivot is considered to be a sign that the US intends to continue playing a leadership role in East Asia, a strategy at odds with China’s vision[v]. An associated complication is the imprecise definition of US commitments to its ally nations in the event of disputes in contested territories, especially vis-à-vis the Philippines and Vietnam, and the possibility that alliances will be used to escalate a small battle into a regional affair. The US is making efforts to address these complications; for the first time since RIMPACS’s creation in 1971, China has been invited to participate in a US-led naval exercise. Positive near-term repercussions of growing US involvement have also been postulated; analysts suggest that one of the root causes behind Chinese interest in cooperation is the fear that aggression in the South China Sea will drive other parties to strengthen their ties with the US[vi]. The relative wealth of economic and diplomatic compromises on all sides presents a compelling argument that under current conditions, disputes in the South China Sea will continue to be restrained to small-scale skirmishes that do not threaten overall stability. This is not to say that the increase in regional tension is insignificant, but rather that the involved parties all have a strong interest in maintaining mutual growth and have demonstrated their willingness to make strategic sacrifices to maintain the status quo. Furthermore as China is the common link in the majority of the disputes, it is probable that it will be at the heart of any conflict — and China has frequently shown restraint in this regard (though not so, for example, in Tibet). In terms of China’s priorities, policy analysts tend to agree that if China were to begin a large-scale military campaign, Taiwan would most likely be the focus of its aggression[vii].

#### SCS tensions inevitable but no escalation

Meidan 12 -- analyst at Eurasia Group; research includes China's energy and environmental policies, policymaking, Chinese elite politics, and diplomacy; MA in political sciences and East Asian studies from the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (Michal, 8/7, "Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea," http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2GsDDT62R)

These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them. Vietnam and the Philippines, concerned with the shifting balance of powers in the region, are pushing their maritime claims more aggressively and increasing their efforts to internationalise the question by involving both ASEAN and Washington. Attempts to come up with a common position in ASEAN have failed miserably but as the US re-engages Asia, it is drawn into the troubled waters of the South China Sea. Political dynamics in China – with a once in a decade leadership transition coming up, combined with electoral politics in the US and domestic constraints for both Manila and Hanoi – all augur that the South China Sea will remain turbulent. No government can afford to appear weak in the eyes of domestic hawks or of increasingly nationalistic public opinions. The risk of a miscalculation resulting in prolonged standoffs or skirmishes is therefore higher now than ever before. But there are a number of reasons to believe that even these skirmishes are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict. First, despite the strong current of assertive forces within China, cooler heads are ultimately likely to prevail. While a conciliatory stance toward other claimants is unlikely before the leadership transition, China’s top brass will be equally reluctant to significantly escalate the situation, since this will send southeast Asian governments running to Washington. Hanoi and Manila also recognize that despite their need for assertiveness to appease domestic political constituencies, a direct confrontation with China is overly risky. Second, military pundits in China also realize that the cost of conflict is too high, since it will strengthen Washington’s presence in the region and disrupt trade flows. And even China’s oil company CNOOC, whose portfolio of assets relies heavily on the South China Sea, is diversifying its interests in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates.

**No US-China conflict**

Allison & Blackwill 3/5 -- \*director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND \*\*Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert D., 2013, "Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations," http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/)

Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore, one of Asia's most prominent public intellectuals, a member of the Fondation Chirac's honour committee

Competition between the United States and China is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world. There will be a struggle for influence. I think it will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States, need U.S. markets, U.S. technology, need to have students going to the United States to study the ways and means of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. If you quarrel with the United States and become bitter enemies, all that information and those technological capabilities will be cut off. The struggle between the two countries will be maintained at the level that allows them to still tap the United States. Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the United States and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market. Sino-American relations are both cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive. A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires cooperation from and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict between China and the United States is low. Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades. They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but to be able, if necessary, to pressure Taiwan by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone -- at least not for the next 15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight.

## Terror

### 1NC Terror

#### No impact to terror

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

It seems increasingly likely that the official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been substantially deluded—massively disproportionate to the threat that al-Qaida has ever actually presented either as an international menace or as an inspiration or model to homegrown amateurs. Applying the extensive datasets on terrorism that have been generated over the last decades, we conclude that the chances of an American perishing at the hands of a terrorist at present rates is one in 3.5 million per year—well within the range of what risk analysts hold to be “acceptable risk.”40 Yet, despite the importance of responsibly communicating risk and despite the costs of irresponsible fearmongering, just about the only official who has ever openly put the threat presented by terrorism in some sort of context is New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who in 2007 pointed out that people should “get a life” and that they have a greater chance of being hit by lightning than of being a victim of terrorism—an observation that may be a bit off the mark but is roughly accurate.41 (It might be noted that, despite this unorthodox outburst, Bloomberg still managed to be re-elected two years later.) Indeed, much of the reaction to the September 11 attacks calls to mind Hans Christian Andersen’s fable of delusion, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” in which con artists convince the emperor’s court that they can weave stuffs of the most beautiful colors and elaborate patterns from the delicate silk and purest gold thread they are given. These stuffs, they further convincingly explain, have the property of remaining invisible to anyone who is unusually stupid or unfit for office. The emperor finds this quite appealing because not only will he have splendid new clothes, but he will be able to discover which of his officials are unfit for their posts—or in today’s terms, have lost their effectiveness. His courtiers, then, have great professional incentive to proclaim the stuffs on the loom to be absolutely magnificent even while mentally justifying this conclusion with the equivalent of “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Unlike the emperor’s new clothes, terrorism does of course exist. Much of the reaction to the threat, however, has a distinctly delusionary quality. In Carle’s view, for example, the CIA has been “spinning in self-referential circles” in which “our premises were flawed, our facts used to fit our premises, our premises determined, and our fears justified our operational actions, in a self-contained process that arrived at a conclusion dramatically at odds with the facts.” The process “projected evil actions where there was, more often, muddled indirect and unavoidable complicity, or not much at all.” These “delusional ratiocinations,” he further observes, “were all sincerely, ardently held to have constituted a rigorous, rational process to identify terrorist threats” in which “the avalanche of reporting confirms its validity by its quantity,” in which there is a tendency to “reject incongruous or contradictory facts as erroneous, because they do not conform to accepted reality,” and in which potential dissenters are not-so-subtly reminded of career dangers: “Say what you want at meetings. It’s your decision. But you are doing yourself no favors.”42 Consider in this context the alarming and profoundly imaginary estimates of U.S. intelligence agencies in the year after the September 11 attacks that the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000.43 Terrorist cells, they told reporters, were “embedded in most U.S. cities with sizable Islamic communities,” usually in the “run-down sections,” and were “up and active” because electronic intercepts had found some of them to be “talking to each other.”44 Another account relayed the view of “experts” that Osama bin Laden was ready to unleash an “11,000 strong terrorist army” operating in more than sixty countries “controlled by a Mr. Big who is based in Europe,” but that intelligence had “no idea where thousands of these men are.”45 Similarly, FBI Director Robert Mueller assured the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 11, 2003, that, although his agency had yet to identify even one al-Qaida cell in the United States, “I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing,” a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text. Moreover, he claimed that such unidentified entities presented “the greatest threat,” had “developed a support infrastructure” in the country, and had achieved both the “ability” and the “intent” to inflict “signi ficant casualties in the US with little warning.”46 Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.

#### No nuclear terror – operation, cohesion and coordination

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12 The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14 In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15 Although the efforts of would-be terrorists have often seemed pathetic, even comical or absurd, the comedy remains a dark one. Left to their own devices, at least a few of these often inept and almost always self-deluded individuals could eventually have committed some serious, if small-scale, damage.16

#### Even if there is an attack – it would be small scale and disorganized

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

Calculating the Costs of the Counterterrorism Delusion Delusion is a quality that is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, there may be a way to get a sense of its dimensions—or at least of its cost consequences. We have argued that terrorism is a limited problem with limited consequences and that the reaction to it has been excessive, and even delusional. Some degree of effort to deal with the terrorism hazard is, however, certainly appropriate—and is decidedly not delusional. The issue then is a quantitative one: At what point does a reaction to a threat that is real become excessive or even delusional? At present rates, as noted earlier, an American’s chance of being killed by terrorism is one in 3.5 million in a given year. This calculation is based on history (but one that includes the September 11 attacks in the count), and things could, of course, become worse in the future. The analysis here, however, suggests that terrorists are not really all that capable, that terrorism tends to be a counterproductive exercise, and that September 11 is increasingly standing out as an aberration, not a harbinger. Moreover, it has essentially become officially accepted that the likelihood of a large-scale organized attack such as September 11 has declined and that the terrorist attacks to fear most are ones that are small scale and disorganized.66 Attacks such as these can inflict painful losses, of course, but they are quite limited in their effect and, even if they do occur, they would not change the fatality risk for the American population very much.

### 1NC No XTC

#### Long timeframe and adaptation solves

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

### 1NC US/Russia War

#### No escalation – disagreements remain limited

Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely **remain limited and compartmentalized**. Russia and the West **do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over**. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

#### No nuclear strike

Graham 7 (Thomas Graham, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, **than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War**. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and **the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability**. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

### 1NC Russian Miscalc

#### No risk of accidental/unauthorized war.

#### Dr. Leonid Ryabikhin, General (Ret.) Viktor Koltunov and Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, June 2009. Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute; Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic Stability of Rosatom; and Senior Research Scientist, Centre for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. “De-alerting: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Discussion paper presented at the seminar on “Re-framing De Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context,” [www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf](http://www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf).

#### Analysis of the above arguments shows, that they do not have solid grounds. Today Russian and U.S. ICBMs are not targeted at any state. High alert status of the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces has not been an obstacle for building a strategic partnership. The issue of the possibility of an “accidental” nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorization by the national leadership. Besides that it should be mentioned that even the Soviet Union and the United States had taken important bilateral steps toward decreasing the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. Direct emergency telephone “red line” has been established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963. In 1971 the USSR and USA signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Nuclear War Threat. This Agreement established the actions of each side in case of even a hypothetical accidental missile launch and it contains the requirements for the owner of the launched missile to deactivate and eliminate the missile. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have developed proper measures to observe the agreed requirements.

### Moar Defense

#### -- No risk of Russia war

Ball 5 (Desmond, Professor – Strategic Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University, “The Probabilities of ‘On the Beach’ Assessing Armageddon Scenarios in the 21st Century, May, <http://www.manningclark.org.au/papers/se05_ball.html>)

The prospects of a nuclear war between the US and Russia must now be deemed **fairly remote**. There are now no geostrategic issues that warrant nuclear competition and **no inclination** in either Washington or Moscow to provoke such issues. US and Russian strategic forces have been taken off day-to-day alert and their ICBMs 'de-targeted', greatly reducing the possibilities of war by accident, inadvertence or miscalculation. On the other hand, while the US-Russia strategic competition is in abeyance, there are several aspects of current US nuclear weapons policy which are profoundly disturbing. In December 2001 President George W. Bush officially announced that the US was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, one of the mainstays of strategic nuclear arms control during the Cold War, with effect from June 2002, and was proceeding to develop and deploy an extensive range of both theatre missile defence (TMD) and national missile defence (NMD) systems. The first anti-missile missile in the NMD system, designed initially to defend against limited missile attacks from China and North Korea, was installed at Fort Greely in Alaska in July 2004. The initial system, consisting of 16 interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg Air Force in California, is expected to be operational by the end of 2005. The Bush Administration is also considering withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and resuming nuclear testing. (The last US nuclear test was on 23 September 1992). In particular, some key Administration officials believe that testing is necessary to develop a 'new generation' of nuclear weapons, including low-yield, 'bunker-busting', earth-penetrating weapons specifically designed to destroy very hard and deeply buried targets (such as underground command and control centres and leadership bunkers).

#### -- Common ties, Russian leadership, and defense spending checks

Aron 6 (Leon, Director of Russian Studies – American Enterprise Institute, “The United States and Russia”, 6-29,

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24606/pub\_detail.asp)

Yet the probability of a frontal confrontation and a new Cold War remains **very remote** for at least three reasons. First, despite the erosion, the countries geopolitical assets are still very weighty, as the bedrock issues of anti-terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and energy will continue to force them to seek common ground and at least limited partnership.[17] Second, the restorationist foreign policy notwithstanding, the three basic elements of the 1992-1993 national consensus on the foreign policy and defense doctrine remain largely the same. Russia is to stay a nuclear superpower and the regional superpower, but it seems to have settled for the role of one of the world’s great states, rather than a global superpower engaged in a worldwide competition with the United States. While these desiderata will continue to cause occasional sparring with the United States, they are no longer dedicated to the attainment of goals inimical to the vital interests of the United States and are not likely to ignite a relentless antagonistic struggle to the bitter end**.** Lastly, despite the muscular rhetoric emanating of late from the Kremlin, unlike the Soviet Union twenty years ago and China today, Russia is not a revisionist power. It does not seek radically to reshape the geopolitical balance of forces in its favor. Moscow may rail at the score, but it is unlikely to endeavor to change the rules of the game. For that, one needs a different ideology and, as a result, a different set of priorities. Yet even in today’s Russia flush with petrodollars, the share of GDP devoted to defense (around 3 percent) is not only at least ten times smaller than in the Soviet Union, but also below the 1992-1997 average in a Russia that inherited an empty treasury from the Soviet Union and that was, like every revolutionary government, unable to collect taxes. Calculated in purchasing power parity, Russia’s defense expenditures in 2005 ($47.77 billion) were less than one-eleventh of what the U.S. spent ($522 billion).

#### -- Deterrence checks

Turner 2 (Admiral Stansfield, Former Director – Central Intelligence Agency, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter / Spring, 26 Fletcher F. World Aff. 115, Lexis)

There are, of course, other centrals question to be considered: Would Russian psychology differ from American and would Russian society be willing to accept large numbers of nuclear detonations on their soil in order to perpetrate a nuclear war against the United States? These are difficult questions to answer. The more pertinent concern, however, is that this is an issue of life or death. No head of state could contemplate plunging the world into nuclear conflict without considering both the mortal threat to his or her citizens, and also the likelihood of his or her own death, underground shelters notwithstanding. The presumption that heads of state prefer to live than to die gives us one benchmark. Another is the Cuban missile crisis, in which both Leonid Khruschev and President Kennedy quite visibly backed away from the prospect of very limited nuclear war. Finally, Russia’s economy, being about the size of Belgium’s, is so small that its leaders would be well aware that recovery, even from a small nuclear attack, would be a very lengthy process. In terms of nuclear detonation threats, the United States must consider Russian deterrence as very close to its own.

#### -- Won’t go nuclear

Manning 00 (Robert A., Senior Fellow and Director of Asian Studies – Council on Foreign Relations, “Abbott and Costello Nuclear Policy”, Washington Times, 3-10, Lexis)

We don't want to go any lower because we need these weapons for nuclear deterrence, according to State Department spokesman James Rubin. But how many nukes do we need for deterrence to be credible? China, which President Clinton has talked of as a "strategic partner," has a grand total of 20 - count them - strategic warheads that could hit the United States. Nuclear wannabes like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would have only a handful if they did manage to succeed in joining the nuclear club. Russia, which has 6,000 strategic warheads, is no longer an adversary. During the Cold War, it was not hard to envision a conventional war in Europe escalating into nuclear conflict. But today it is difficult to spin a plausible scenario in which the United States and Russia escalate hostilities into a nuclear exchange. Russia has no Warsaw Pact, and not much of a conventional force to speak of. Yet U.S. nuclear planners still base their targeting plans on prospective Russian targets, though no one will say so.

# 2NC

## CP

### Impact – 2NC

#### Impact outweighs –

#### Prolif causes nuclear wars around the world --- it intensifies regional instability and causes tension ripe to escalate --- arms races will cause miscalculation and war --- particularly in the Mideast, Asia, and Russia --- causes extinction -- causes extinction

**Krieger 9**  (David, Pres. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council, “Still Loving the Bomb After All These Years”, 9-4, <https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04_krieger_newsweek_response.php?krieger>)

Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” provides a novel but frivolous argument that nuclear weapons “may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous….” Rather, in Tepperman’s world, “The bomb may actually make us safer.” Tepperman shares this world with Kenneth Waltz, a University of California professor emeritus of political science, who Tepperman describes as “the leading ‘nuclear optimist.’” Waltz expresses his optimism in this way: “We’ve now had 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” Actually, there were a number of proxy wars between nuclear weapons states, such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and some near disasters, the most notable being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s logic is akin to observing a man falling from a high rise building, and noting that he had already fallen for 64 floors without anything bad happening to him, and concluding that so far it looked so good that others should try it. Dangerous logic! Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….” He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.” Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition. “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace….” But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization. One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.” It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed. Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out. The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation. The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer. These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so. The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Tepperman seems to be arguing that seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad policy, and that nuclear weapons, because of their threat, make efforts at non-proliferation unnecessary and even unwise. If some additional states, including Iran, developed nuclear arsenals, he concludes that wouldn’t be so bad “given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.” Those who oppose Tepperman’s favorable disposition toward the bomb, he refers to as “nuclear pessimists.” These would be the people, and I would certainly be one of them, who see nuclear weapons as presenting an urgent danger to our security, our species and our future. Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.” “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species. Yes, that would be serious. He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically. After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future. We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.” Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security. Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack. Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?

#### Draws in all major powers - turns all their impacts

**Müller 8** (Harold, Director – Peace Research Institute and Professor of International Relations – Frankfurt University, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World”, Washington Quarterly, Spring, Lexis)

The signs of this emerging race are apparent. The United States, according to its national security strategies of 2002 and 2006, is poised to defend superiority at almost all costs against all potential rivals.8 In order to achieve this lofty goal, it has developed victory-granting offensive options throughout all dimensions of military contest—sea, land, air, space, and the electronic spectrum. Full spectrum dominance, underlined by the hope and a determined program for ballistic missile defense, may sound promising to U.S. strategists but projects to be a nightmare for those who might view Washington with less trustful eyes than most Europeans do, including major powers China and Russia, among others. Not surprisingly, China has reacted to the trend in U.S. armaments with a measured but steady development of its nuclear deterrent. Yet even today, the second-strike capability of Beijing’s deterrent posture against the United States is at best small and at worst not ensured at all. China has demonstrated an antisatellite capability, although of relatively primitive vintage, which it has tested as a targeted signal to the United States. After many failed Chinese and Russian attempts to negotiate a prohibition of stationing weapons in space, China is prepared to develop its own military options. A situation in which everybody is nervous about the vulnerability of its satellite assets cannot be labeled stable. Russia has reciprocated the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by renouncing its START commitment. Consequently, Russia is free to return to the production and deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, the stability nightmare of the old days. It is now focusing on maneuverable warheads and advanced decoys while also pushing for enhanced conventional options within the limits of its technical capabilities. The recently tested Russian version of the “daisy cutter” bomb, although not the miracle weapon announced in the press, demonstrates a renewed readiness to compete in the arms race. These dangerous weapons could enter the arms trade and eventually end up in the hands of nonstate actors, a sobering thought that should not be lost on security analysts. As China and Russia struggle to find means of self-defense and deterrence to protect their perceived vital interests and status, India is taking efforts to keep up with China’s progress. Although the Indian military expenditure is one-quarter to one-third of China’s, India’s forces are probably more effective, its navy is more experienced and proficient, and its mastery of information technology may make advances in the “revolution in military affairs” smoother than for its Asian neighbor. India and China are in a subdued and relatively slow but nevertheless progressing nuclear arms race, and a naval arms race is ongoing as well, with China’s naval positions in Burma and Pakistan and India’s only joint forces headquarters in the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal as clear indicators. With India racing against China, Pakistan follows, racing behind India as well as it can. The United States is not doing badly for an advanced economy with 3 to 4 percent growth, but the two Asian giants are making headway with growth rates close to or higher than 10 percent. Of course, there are stumbling blocs on their road to development, such as fragmentation and a backward infrastructure in India and vast regional disparities and an anachronistic political system in China. Yet, the United States has its own stumbling block: an enormous budget deficit as a consequence of imperial overstretch that shows no signs of abating. Any or all of the three could stumble or could continue the present economic trend. Assuming continuation, China will be at the United States’ economic level within one generation, and India will be one-half of a generation later. A power transition creates dangerous times.9 Most challenges to a hegemon in world history, whether successful or not, have **precipitated** war or a series of wars. Today’s interdependence will surely serve to make great powers cautious about armed conflict, but it cannot completely guarantee such a conflict will not occur. Bones of contention exist, notably between the United States and China: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the competition for Persian Gulf and Central Asian energy resources. Although there exists a naive belief that great-power war has been eliminated as a possibility in world politics, exaggerated complacency could become extremely dangerous. Interdependence itself and advanced weaponry, nuclear weapons included, would mean that a violent contest among the big powers would be an **unmitigated catastrophe**. The relationships among those powers must be carefully managed if a clash is to be avoided, and nuclear weapons reductions are an **essential contribution** to this management.

### 2NC Perm Do CP

#### Severs – Targeted killing

Masters 13 (John – Council on Foreign Relations, “What Are Targeted Killings? Their Present and Future, Explained”, 1/9, http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/what-are-targeted-killings-their-present-and-future-explained-20130109)

What Are Targeted Killings? According to a UN special report on the subject, targeted killings are premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody. "Targeted killing" is not a term distinctly defined under international law, but gained currency in 2000 after Israel made public a policy of targeting alleged terrorists in the Palestinian territories. The particular act of lethal force, usually undertaken by a nation's intelligence or armed services, can vary widely--from cruise missiles to drone strikes to special operations raids. The primary focus of U.S. targeted killings, particularly through drone strikes, has been on the al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership networks in Afghanistan and the remote tribal regions of Pakistan. However, U.S. operations are continuing to expand in countries such as Somalia and Yemen.

**Special forces conduct important targeted killings**

**Bachmann 13** (Sascha-Dominik Bachmann 13, Reader in International Law (University of Lincoln), 2013, “Targeted Killings: Contemporary Challenges, Risks and Opportunities,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, doi: 10.1093/jcsl/krt007)

Targeted killing has also been used by the USA in theatres of actual combat operations, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as outside these theatres of war and as part of CIA and US military run covert operations in Pakistan. The USA is using drone strikes and Special Forces there to conduct pre-emptive as well as defensive targeted killing operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The argument is brought forward that such operations are necessary to protect US forces and its allies in Afghanistan and to disrupt the existent terrorist infrastructure. The focus of such operations is on the so-called ‘Tribal Areas’ of Pakistan, Waziristan, where the Taliban have effectively established an autonomous sphere of influence to the exclusion of the central government in Peshawar.32 Other such covert operations have seen CIA operated drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia as well Sudan, where a lack of cooperation and/or relative capabilities of the respective governments have created areas which are outside effective state control.33

**It means “prohibition” – affs have to restrict the whole category of targeted killing**

**Northglenn 11** (City of Northglenn Zoning Ordinance, “Rules of Construction – Definitions”, http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch11/content\_11-5.html)

Section 11-5-3. Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, the **term "restriction**" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and **no** such use, **activity**, operation, building, structure or thing shall be **authorized by any permit or license**.

### Link – Active Hostilities (Gtown)

#### Special ops need to react to threats outside active hostilities

Roulo 13 (Claudette – American Forces Press Service, “ Special Operations Forces Outperform Investment, Carter Says”, 6/5, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=120226)

Like the rest of the force, the special operations community is undergoing change, Carter said. “After more than a decade of wars, the force is more capable and battle-tested than ever before,” he said. “But grueling combat, long periods away from home, missed birthdays, anniversaries, and graduations, burying friends and colleagues –- all this has taken a toll. The force is weary. Families are weary.” At the same time, the nature of the threat has changed, Carter said. Asymmetric threats are now more diffuse and geographically dispersed, and as a result, operational environments have changed. More and more, special operations activities occur outside areas of active hostilities, he explained. “This requires that [special operations forces] become more agile, flexible, and able to respond to a range of requirements,” the deputy defense secretary said.

### Link – Oversight (General)

#### Oversight decimates special ops use – they’ll reject it

Lobel 12 (Jules – Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “Covert War and the Constitution”, 2012, 5 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 393, lexis)

The current shadow wars being waged by the U.S. government illustrate the constitutional principles discussed in this essay. To the extent that the United States "secret" war in Pakistan targets al Qaeda leaders or militants, it raises questions of international law, but those attacks would be constitutionally authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) enacted by Congress after the September 11 attacks. That authorization gave the President authority to use necessary force against those persons or organizations which planned, carried out, or aided the September 11 attacks or were harboring those who did. While that authorization was unfortunately vague and potentially unending, Congress nevertheless clearly rejected an effort by the Bush administration to authorize a general war against terrorist groups throughout the world. n67 The Bush administration took the unwarranted position that it had inherent executive power to wage such a war against terror; the Obama administration has interpreted its statutory authority to reach what may amount to essentially the same result. The U.S. covert military and paramilitary operations against terrorist groups around the world utilizing both Special Operations Forces of the U.S. military and CIA operations are engaging in warfare that goes far beyond the authorization provided by Congress. As former Legal Advisor to the State Department, John B. Bellinger has noted, many of the current strikes in "places outside of Afghanistan" are against people or organizations that had nothing to do with the 2001 attacks. n68 Moreover, while the Administration might argue that these individuals or groups are loosely affiliated with al Qaeda, the claim that the Executive can secretly target "affiliated" groups or individuals throughout the world essentially would allow the government to wage a secret war against Islamic extremists, which Congress pointedly refused to authorize in 2001.

#### Speed is critical for special ops – congress takes too long

Bradford 4 (William – Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, “BARBARIANS AT THE GATES: A POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH PROPOSAL TO RATIONALIZE THE LAWS OF WAR”, 2004, 73 Miss. L.J. 639, lexis)

[COMMENTS]

n517 The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was formed on April 1, 1987 and tasked to train and equip special operations forces as the branch of the Armed Forces with primary responsibility for a variety of rapid-reaction, critical missions of strategic importance, including, inter alia, counterterrorism. See Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1987, P.L. 99-661, § 1311, 100 Stat. 3983-86 (1986) [hereinafter Cohen-Nunn Amendment] (mandating creation of USSOCOM, a Board for Low-Intensity Conflict within the National Security Council, and the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict); Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-145, § 1453(a)(3), 99 Stat. 760 (1985) ("The special operations forces of the Armed Forces provide the United States with immediate and primary capability to respond to terrorism."). By capitalizing upon "speed, surprise, audacity, and deception" they "accomplish missions in ways that minimize risks of escalation and maximize returns compared with orthodox applications of military power," rendering special operations forces particularly suited to covert counterterrorism missions. JOHN M. COLLINS, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: AN ASSESSMENT 6 (1994). As such, in practice special operations forces play an inordinate role in the "protection of their parent society against disorder, intimidation, and terrorism." LLOYD, supra note 104, at 204.

### Solves – Norms/Drone Prolif

#### Use of drones is driving drone prolif – the counterplan obviously solves

Roberts 13 (Kristen Roberts, news editor for National Journal, master's in security studies from Georgetown University, master's degree in journalism from Columbia University, March 21st, 2013, "When the Whole World Has Drones," National Journal, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/when-the-whole-world-has-drones-20130321)

To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the threshold for lethal force by reducing the cost and risk of combat. This still-expanding counterterrorism use of drones to kill people, including its own citizens, outside of traditionally defined battlefields and established protocols for warfare, has given friends and foes a green light to employ these aircraft in extraterritorial operations that could not only affect relations between the nation-states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order.¶ Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a lethal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside Syria; Russia picks off militants tampering with oil and gas lines in Ukraine or Georgia; Turkey arms a U.S.-provided Predator to kill Kurdish militants in northern Iraq who it believes are planning attacks along the border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in each case, Tehran, Moscow, and Ankara may point toward Washington and say, we learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan.¶ This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention paid to the drone program in recent weeks—about Americans on the target list (there are none at this writing) and the executive branch’s legal authority to kill by drone outside war zones (thin, by officials’ own private admission)—what goes undiscussed is Washington’s deliberate failure to establish clear and demonstrable rules for itself that would at minimum create a globally relevant standard for delineating between legitimate and rogue uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation.

### Solves – Terrorism/Drone Advantages

#### Counterplan solves terror – special ops are effective and substantially reduce violence relative to drones

McDonnell 12 (Thomas – Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, “SOW WHAT YOU REAP? USING PREDATOR AND REAPER DRONES TO CARRY OUT ASSASSINATIONS OR TARGETED KILLINGS OF SUSPECTED ISLAMIC TERRORISTS”, 2012, 44 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 243, lexis)

Given the exceptional character of an attack on a state that has neither attacked nor threatened to attack the United States, the targeted killing operation must observe a higher standard than the collateral damage (proportionality) rule and aim to prevent all non-combatant casualties. n218 This is analogous to the exceptional proportionality requirement and the sole purpose requirement of humanitarian intervention. As a humanitarian intervention, the state is obligated to go beyond the normal rules of armed conflict. Given the exceptional situation of operating in a state that is either unable or unwilling to arrest or capture terrorists on its soil, but which has neither carried out an armed attack nor used terrorists to do so, states like the United States should comply with exceptional standards here as well. This would require operations more closely resembling the Navy Seals' operation against Osama bin Laden than the routine use of weaponized drones with explosive force of a Hellfire missile. n219 Admittedly, this would put members [\*295] of the armed forces at risk, but it is submitted that a more limited use of armed force will ultimately reduce the cycle of violence carried out by systematic employment of drone attacks.

### Solves – A2: Special Ops Kill Hearts and Minds

#### SOF don’t hurt hearts and minds – CP sufficiently solves this internal link for the Program advantage – SPEC OPS DON”T GENERATE BACKLASH

Thomas and Dougherty 13 (Jim – Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Chris – Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments, “Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces”, 5/10, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2013/05/beyond-the-ramparts-the-future-of-u-s-special-operations-forces/)

SOF’s newfound status as a “crown jewel” within the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) portfolio of capabilities is grounded in the attributes of the operators comprising the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).􀀙 More than any other capability in America’s arsenal, it is the human dimension􀂲both the people who serve and the domain for which they are optimized􀂲that differentiates SOF from both conventional and nuclear forces. SOF’s 􀂳􀂿rst Truth,􀂴 is that 􀂳Humans are more important than hardware.􀂴7 The characteristics that make SOF operators 􀂳special􀂴 go far beyond the rigorous assessment, selection, and qualification processes of SOF units, which only a small fraction of candidates complete. Though SOF have e􀁛ceptional physical and psychological stamina, those selected to serve in SOF are 􀂿rst and foremost problem solvers distinguished by their critical thinking skills and ingenuity. Most SOF operators are well-educated and hold college degrees.􀀛 Although highly trained in the discriminate use of lethal force, SOF are also known for their political acumen and engagement skills, 􀂳winning hearts and minds􀂴 by leveraging their cultural expertise and linguistic proficiency. Because they operate in the human domain, SOF must also be adept at building relationships by understanding the needs of others, showing empathy, and earn-ing trust. SOF are generally more e􀁛perienced than their conventional counterparts, with SOF personnel typically spending eight years in the conventional forces prior to their SOF quali􀂿cation and ranging in average age from twenty-nine (enlisted) to thirty-four (o􀌇cer).9 This combination of problem solving, education, and experience gives SOF the judgment, adaptability, and maturity to execute missions involving high degrees of risk and political sensitivity. These attributes also enable SOF to operate in very small teams (a dozen or fewer operators) with greater independence than their conventional force counterparts, whether they are conducting direct-action missions in denied areas or patiently applying their more indirect and less kinetic engagement skills to enable foreign security partners. It is SOF’s ability to combine direct and indirect actions, surgical strike and special warfare that allow them to achieve strategic e􀌆ects far beyond their small numbers.10

## The PROGRAM

### 2NC US/Russia War

#### Cold war calculations no longer apply – neither side would consider war

Cartwright et al 12 [Gen (Ret) James Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Amb. Richard Burt, former ambassador to Germany and chief negotiator of START; Sen. Chuck Hagel; Amb. Thomas Pickering, former ambassador to the UN; Gen. (Ret.) Jack Sheehan, former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for NATO and Commander-in-Chief for the U.S. Atlantic Command; GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUcLEAR POLicy cOMMiSSiON REPORT, http://orepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/cartwright-report.pdf]

These illustrative next steps are possible and desirable for five basic reasons. First, mutual nuclear deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation to attack is no longer a cornerstone of the U.S.-Russian security relationship. Security is mainly a state of mind, not a physical condition, and mutual assured destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship. To be sure, there remains a physical-technical side of MAD in our relations, but it is increasingly peripheral. Nuclear planning for Cold War-style nuclear conflict between our countries, driven largely by inertia and vested interests left over from the Cold War, functions on the margins using outdated scenarios that are implausible today. There is no conceivable situation in the contemporary world in which it would be in either country’s national security interest to initiate a nuclear attack against the other side. Their current stockpiles (roughly 5,000 nuclear weapons each in their active deployed and reserve arsenals) vastly exceed what is needed to satisfy reasonable requirements of deterrence between the two countries as well as vis-à-vis third countries whose nuclear arsenals pale in comparison quantitatively.

#### No risk of U.S.-Russian war – Russia knows the U.S. is infinitely more powerful and that it couldn’t be a threat.

Bandow 08(Doug, former senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former columnist with Copley News Service, 3/7. “Turning China into the Next Big Enemy.” http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=12472)

In fact, America remains a military colossus. The Bush administration has proposed spending $515 billion next year on the military; more, adjusted for inflation, than at any time since World War II. The U.S. accounts for roughly half of the world's military outlays. Washington is allied with every major industrialized state except China and Russia. America's avowed enemies are a pitiful few: Burma, Cuba, Syria, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea. The U.S. government could destroy every one of these states with a flick of the president's wrist. Russia has become rather contentious of late, but that hardly makes it an enemy. Moreover, the idea that Moscow could rearm, reconquer the nations that once were part of the Soviet Union or communist satellites, overrun Western Europe, and then attack the U.S. – without anyone in America noticing the threat along the way – is, well, a paranoid fantasy more extreme than the usual science fiction plot. The Leninist Humpty-Dumpty has fallen off the wall and even a bunch of former KGB agents aren't going to be able to put him back together.

#### -- No risk of Russia war

Ball 5 (Desmond, Professor – Strategic Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University, “The Probabilities of ‘On the Beach’ Assessing Armageddon Scenarios in the 21st Century, May, <http://www.manningclark.org.au/papers/se05_ball.html>)

The prospects of a nuclear war between the US and Russia must now be deemed **fairly remote**. There are now no geostrategic issues that warrant nuclear competition and **no inclination** in either Washington or Moscow to provoke such issues. US and Russian strategic forces have been taken off day-to-day alert and their ICBMs 'de-targeted', greatly reducing the possibilities of war by accident, inadvertence or miscalculation. On the other hand, while the US-Russia strategic competition is in abeyance, there are several aspects of current US nuclear weapons policy which are profoundly disturbing. In December 2001 President George W. Bush officially announced that the US was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, one of the mainstays of strategic nuclear arms control during the Cold War, with effect from June 2002, and was proceeding to develop and deploy an extensive range of both theatre missile defence (TMD) and national missile defence (NMD) systems. The first anti-missile missile in the NMD system, designed initially to defend against limited missile attacks from China and North Korea, was installed at Fort Greely in Alaska in July 2004. The initial system, consisting of 16 interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg Air Force in California, is expected to be operational by the end of 2005. The Bush Administration is also considering withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and resuming nuclear testing. (The last US nuclear test was on 23 September 1992). In particular, some key Administration officials believe that testing is necessary to develop a 'new generation' of nuclear weapons, including low-yield, 'bunker-busting', earth-penetrating weapons specifically designed to destroy very hard and deeply buried targets (such as underground command and control centres and leadership bunkers).

#### -- Common ties, Russian leadership, and defense spending checks

Aron 6 (Leon, Director of Russian Studies – American Enterprise Institute, “The United States and Russia”, 6-29,

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24606/pub\_detail.asp)

Yet the probability of a frontal confrontation and a new Cold War remains **very remote** for at least three reasons. First, despite the erosion, the countries geopolitical assets are still very weighty, as the bedrock issues of anti-terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and energy will continue to force them to seek common ground and at least limited partnership.[17] Second, the restorationist foreign policy notwithstanding, the three basic elements of the 1992-1993 national consensus on the foreign policy and defense doctrine remain largely the same. Russia is to stay a nuclear superpower and the regional superpower, but it seems to have settled for the role of one of the world’s great states, rather than a global superpower engaged in a worldwide competition with the United States. While these desiderata will continue to cause occasional sparring with the United States, they are no longer dedicated to the attainment of goals inimical to the vital interests of the United States and are not likely to ignite a relentless antagonistic struggle to the bitter end**.** Lastly, despite the muscular rhetoric emanating of late from the Kremlin, unlike the Soviet Union twenty years ago and China today, Russia is not a revisionist power. It does not seek radically to reshape the geopolitical balance of forces in its favor. Moscow may rail at the score, but it is unlikely to endeavor to change the rules of the game. For that, one needs a different ideology and, as a result, a different set of priorities. Yet even in today’s Russia flush with petrodollars, the share of GDP devoted to defense (around 3 percent) is not only at least ten times smaller than in the Soviet Union, but also below the 1992-1997 average in a Russia that inherited an empty treasury from the Soviet Union and that was, like every revolutionary government, unable to collect taxes. Calculated in purchasing power parity, Russia’s defense expenditures in 2005 ($47.77 billion) were less than one-eleventh of what the U.S. spent ($522 billion).

#### -- Deterrence checks

Turner 2 (Admiral Stansfield, Former Director – Central Intelligence Agency, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter / Spring, 26 Fletcher F. World Aff. 115, Lexis)

There are, of course, other centrals question to be considered: Would Russian psychology differ from American and would Russian society be willing to accept large numbers of nuclear detonations on their soil in order to perpetrate a nuclear war against the United States? These are difficult questions to answer. The more pertinent concern, however, is that this is an issue of life or death. No head of state could contemplate plunging the world into nuclear conflict without considering both the mortal threat to his or her citizens, and also the likelihood of his or her own death, underground shelters notwithstanding. The presumption that heads of state prefer to live than to die gives us one benchmark. Another is the Cuban missile crisis, in which both Leonid Khruschev and President Kennedy quite visibly backed away from the prospect of very limited nuclear war. Finally, Russia’s economy, being about the size of Belgium’s, is so small that its leaders would be well aware that recovery, even from a small nuclear attack, would be a very lengthy process. In terms of nuclear detonation threats, the United States must consider Russian deterrence as very close to its own.

#### -- Won’t go nuclear

Manning 00 (Robert A., Senior Fellow and Director of Asian Studies – Council on Foreign Relations, “Abbott and Costello Nuclear Policy”, Washington Times, 3-10, Lexis)

We don't want to go any lower because we need these weapons for nuclear deterrence, according to State Department spokesman James Rubin. But how many nukes do we need for deterrence to be credible? China, which President Clinton has talked of as a "strategic partner," has a grand total of 20 - count them - strategic warheads that could hit the United States. Nuclear wannabes like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would have only a handful if they did manage to succeed in joining the nuclear club. Russia, which has 6,000 strategic warheads, is no longer an adversary. During the Cold War, it was not hard to envision a conventional war in Europe escalating into nuclear conflict. But today it is difficult to spin a plausible scenario in which the United States and Russia escalate hostilities into a nuclear exchange. Russia has no Warsaw Pact, and not much of a conventional force to speak of. Yet U.S. nuclear planners still base their targeting plans on prospective Russian targets, though no one will say so.

### 1NC No XTC

#### Long timeframe and adaptation solves

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

### 2NC Terror

#### No risk of terrorism – a Harvard professor says to prefer our study

Walt 12 (Stephen, Belfer Professor of International Affairs – Harvard University, “What Terrorist Threat?,” Foreign Policy, 8-13, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/13/what\_terrorist\_threat)

Remember how the London Olympics were supposedly left vulnerable to terrorists after the security firm hired for the games admitted that it couldn't supply enough manpower? This "humiliating shambles" forced the British government to call in 3,500 security personnel of its own, and led GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney to utter some tactless remarks about Britain's alleged mismanagement during his official "Foot-in-Mouth" foreign tour last month. Well, surprise, surprise. Not only was there no terrorist attack, the Games themselves came off rather well. There were the inevitable minor glitches, of course, but no disasters and some quite impressive organizational achievements. And of course, athletes from around the world delivered inspiring, impressive, heroic, and sometimes disappointing performances, which is what the Games are all about. Two lessons might be drawn from this event. The first is that the head-long rush to privatize everything -- including the provision of security -- has some obvious downsides. When markets and private firms fail, it is the state that has to come to the rescue. It was true after the 2007-08 financial crisis, it's true in the ongoing euro-mess, and it was true in the Olympics. Bear that in mind when Romney and new VP nominee Paul Ryan tout the virtues of shrinking government, especially the need to privatize Social Security and Medicare. The second lesson is that we continue to over-react to the "terrorist threat." Here I recommend you read John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart's The Terrorism Delusion: America's Overwrought Response to September 11, in the latest issue of International Security. Mueller and Stewart analyze 50 cases of supposed "Islamic terrorist plots" against the United States, and show how virtually all of the perpetrators were (in their words) "incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational and foolish." They quote former Glenn Carle, former deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats saying "we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are," noting further that al Qaeda's "capabilities are far inferior to its desires." Further, Mueller and Stewart estimate that expenditures on domestic homeland security (i.e., not counting the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan) have increased by more than $1 trillion since 9/11, even though the annual risk of dying in a domestic terrorist attack is about 1 in 3.5 million. Using conservative assumptions and conventional risk-assessment methodology, they estimate that for these expenditures to be cost-effective "they would have had to deter, prevent, foil or protect against 333 very large attacks that would otherwise have been successful every year." Finally, they worry that this exaggerated sense of danger has now been "internalized": even when politicians and "terrorism experts" aren't hyping the danger, the public still sees the threat as large and imminent. As they conclude: ... Americans seems to have internalized their anxiety about terrorism, and politicians and policymakers have come to believe that they can defy it only at their own peril.  Concern about appearing to be soft on terrorism has replaced concern about seeming to be soft on communism, a phenomenon that lasted far longer than the dramatic that generated it ... This extraordinarily exaggerated and essentially delusional response may prove to be perpetual." Which is another way of saying that you should be prepared to keep standing in those pleasant and efficient TSA lines for the rest of your life, and to keep paying for far-flung foreign interventions designed to "root out" those nasty jihadis.

#### No nuclear terror – operation, cohesion and coordination

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12 The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14 In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15 Although the efforts of would-be terrorists have often seemed pathetic, even comical or absurd, the comedy remains a dark one. Left to their own devices, at least a few of these often inept and almost always self-deluded individuals could eventually have committed some serious, if small-scale, damage.16

#### Even if there is an attack – it would be small scale and disorganized

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

Calculating the Costs of the Counterterrorism Delusion Delusion is a quality that is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, there may be a way to get a sense of its dimensions—or at least of its cost consequences. We have argued that terrorism is a limited problem with limited consequences and that the reaction to it has been excessive, and even delusional. Some degree of effort to deal with the terrorism hazard is, however, certainly appropriate—and is decidedly not delusional. The issue then is a quantitative one: At what point does a reaction to a threat that is real become excessive or even delusional? At present rates, as noted earlier, an American’s chance of being killed by terrorism is one in 3.5 million in a given year. This calculation is based on history (but one that includes the September 11 attacks in the count), and things could, of course, become worse in the future. The analysis here, however, suggests that terrorists are not really all that capable, that terrorism tends to be a counterproductive exercise, and that September 11 is increasingly standing out as an aberration, not a harbinger. Moreover, it has essentially become officially accepted that the likelihood of a large-scale organized attack such as September 11 has declined and that the terrorist attacks to fear most are ones that are small scale and disorganized.66 Attacks such as these can inflict painful losses, of course, but they are quite limited in their effect and, even if they do occur, they would not change the fatality risk for the American population very much.

#### Al Qaeda is crumbling internally by alienating foreign supporters

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

In fact, it is unclear whether al-Qaida central, now holed up in Pakistan and under sustained attack, has done much of anything since September 11 except issue videos filled with empty, self-infatuated, and essentially delusional threats. For example, it was in October 2002 that Osama bin Laden proclaimed, “Understand the lesson of New York and Washington raids, which came in response to some of your previous crimes. . . . God is my witness, the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear. They will target key sectors of your economy until you stop your injustice and aggression or until the more short-lived of us die.” And in January 2006, he insisted that the “delay” in carrying out operations in the United States “was not due to failure to breach your security measures,” and that “operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished, God willing.”18 Bin Laden’s tiny group of 100 or so followers does appear to have served as something of an inspiration to some Muslim extremists, may have done some training, has contributed a bit to the Taliban’s far larger insurgency in Afghanistan, and may have participated in a few terrorist acts in Pakistan.19 In his examination of the major terrorist plots against the West since September 11, Mitchell Silber finds only two (cases 1 and 20) that could be said to be under the “command and control” of al-Qaida central (as opposed to ones suggested, endorsed, or inspired by the organization), and there are questions about how full its control was even in these two instances.20 This highly limited record suggests that Carle was right in 2008 when he warned, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are.” Al-Qaida “has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist organization,” and although it has threatened attacks, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.”21 Impressively, bin Laden appears to have remained in a state of self-delusion even to his brutal and abrupt end. He continued to cling to the belief that another attack such as September 11 might force the United States out of the Middle East, and he was unfazed that the first such effort had proven to be spectacularly counterproductive in this respect by triggering a deadly invasion of his base in Afghanistan and an equally deadly pursuit of his operatives.22 Other terrorist groups around the world affiliated or aligned or otherwise connected to al-Qaida may be able to do intermittent damage to people and infrastructure, but nothing that is very sustained or focused. In all, extremist Islamist terrorism—whether associated with al-Qaida or not—has claimed 200 to 400 lives yearly worldwide outside war zones. That is 200 to 400 too many, of course, but it is about the same number as bathtub drownings every year in the United States.23 In addition to its delusional tendencies, al-Qaida has, as Patrick Porter notes, a “talent at self-destruction.”24 With the September 11 attacks and subsequent activity, bin Laden and his followers mainly succeeded in uniting the world, including its huge Muslim population, against their violent global jihad.25 These activities also turned many radical Islamists against them, including some of the most prominent and respected.26 No matter how much states around the world might disagree with the United States on other issues (most notably on its war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for them to cooperate to confront any international terrorist problem emanating from groups and individuals connected to, or sympathetic with, al-Qaida. Although these multilateral efforts, particularly by such Muslim states as Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, and even Iran, may not have received sufficient publicity, these countries have felt directly threatened by the militant network, and their diligent and aggressive efforts have led to important breakthroughs against the group.27 Thus a terrorist bombing in Bali in 2002 galvanized the Indonesian government into action and into making extensive arrests and obtaining convictions. When terrorists attacked Saudis in Saudi Arabia in 2003, the government became considerably more serious about dealing with internal terrorism, including a clampdown on radical clerics and preachers. The main result of al-Qaida-linked suicide terrorism in Jordan in 2005 was to outrage Jordanians and other Arabs against the perpetrators. In polls conducted in thirty-five predominantly Muslim countries by 2008, more than 90 percent condemned bin Laden’s terrorism on religious grounds.28 In addition, the mindless brutalities of al-Qaida-affiliated combatants in Iraq—staging beheadings at mosques, bombing playgrounds, taking over hospitals, executing ordinary citizens, performing forced marriages—eventually turned the Iraqis against them, including many of those who had previously been fighting the U.S. occupation either on their own or in connection with the group.29 In fact, they seem to have managed to alienate the entire population: data from polls in Iraq in 2007 indicate that 97 percent of those surveyed opposed efforts to recruit foreigners to fight in Iraq; 98 percent opposed the militants’ efforts to gain control of territory; and 100 percent considered attacks against Iraqi civilians “unacceptable.”30 In Iraq as in other places, “al-Qaeda is its own worst enemy,” notes Robert Grenier, a former top CIA counterterrorism official. “Where they have succeeded initially, they very quickly discredit themselves.”31 Grenier’s improbable company in this observation is Osama bin Laden, who was so concerned about al-Qaida’s alienation of most Muslims that he argued from his hideout that the organization should take on a new name.32 Al-Qaida has also had great difficulty recruiting Americans. The group’s most important, and perhaps only, effort at this is the Lackawanna experience, when a smooth-talking operative returned to the upstate New York town in early 2000 and tried to convert young Yemini-American men to join the cause (case 5). In the summer of 2001, seven agreed to accompany him to an al-Qaida training camp, and several more were apparently planning to go later. Appalled at what they found there, however, six of the seven returned home and helped to dissuade those in the next contingent.

### 1NC Irreversible

#### Catastrophic warming inevitable

Gellerman 12 -- host of "Living on Earth," an award-winning environmental news program; References Bill McKibben, founder of 350.org and Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, author of over 10 books (Bruce, 8/2012, "Environmentalist says global climate catastrophe is inevitable without intervention," http://www.pri.org/stories/science/environment/environmentalist-says-global-climate-catastrophe-is-inevitable-without-intervention-11017.html)

The one thing he said the world has agreed on about climate change is that the temperature can rise only two degrees Celsius, or about 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit before the survival of humanity is in jeopardy. But McKibben said that number is too high. According to him, we’ve already raised the temperature by about one degree Celsius, and have melted 40 percent of the sea ice in the summer Arctic. “If we were at all sensible, we would do what we could to stop right here,” he said. And yet, he said, even that’s not enough. “Were we to hope to stay below two degrees, to have a reasonable chance of keeping the world’s temperature below two degrees, the scientists tell us that we can only emit about 565 gigatons more carbon,” he explained. In reality, we’re emitting 30 gigatons a year, and that amount’s increasing by about three percent each year because of all the coal and gas we’re burning. That only gives us 16 or 17 years, Mckibben said. But the number that really scares him is the amount of carbon that the fossil fuel companies and countries like Venezuela or Kuwait already have in their reserves. He estimates that’s about 2,800 gigatons, or five times more oil, coal and gas than various energy companies and climate scientists think is safe to burn. That means around four out of five of those barrels of oil and tons of coal, or at current market value, $20 trillion worth of oil and coal, need to be kept underground. “That’s the trouble that we’re in. We’re about to go way-way-way over the limit. And nobody, no president, no politburo, no anybody is effectively saying: time to slow down,” McKibben said. “What we’re dealing with is the out-of-control greed of a few companies. We know what the future should look like, and we know how to do it."

#### Warming is irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

### 1NC Terror Adv

#### No chance restrictions on drones are coming now.

Byman & Wittes 13 [Daniel L., Research Director at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy of The Brookings Institute, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy of The Brookings Institute, & Benjamin, Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, 6/17, “Tools and Tradeoffs: Confronting U.S. Citizen Terrorist Suspects Abroad”, p. 52-53, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/07/23%20us%20citizen%20terrorist%20suspects%20awlaki%20jihad%20byman%20wittes/toolsandtradeoffs.pdf]

If the United States were ever to target a larger number of its citizens abroad, the problem of the legal and oversight framework in which it does so would emerge acutely. The courts, so far, have shown no interest in involving themselves in sorting out who can be killed and under what circumstances. Prior to the Awlaki strike, his father, Nasser Awlaki, filed suit—with the aid of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights—in an effort to preclude the targeting of his son. A district court in Washington dismissed the case, on grounds that he lacked standing to bring it (in other words, the father could not claim to represent the son), and that targeting is a political question in which the judiciary has no role. Judge John D. Bates—the same Judge Bates that ruled in the Abu Ali case—was fully aware of the oddity of the case and the oddity of declining to hear it. In dismissing the matter, he wrote that “Stark, and perplexing, questions readily come to mind.” Asked Judge Bates: ¶ How is it that judicial approval is required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic surveillance, but that, according to defendants, judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death? Can a U.S. citizen—himself or through another—use the U.S. judicial system to vindicate his constitutional rights while simultaneously evading U.S. law enforcement authorities, calling for “jihad against the West,” and engaging in operational planning for an organization that has already carried out numerous terrorist attacks against the United States? ¶ There were other questions too—all of them interesting. Can the courts really make realtime targeting decisions? Are they really positioned to weigh the benefits and costs of possible diplomatic and military responses, and ultimately decide whether, and under what circumstances, the use of military force against such threats is justified? Would the United States really litigate these questions, thereby disclosing in advance to the prospective target “the precise standards under which [the United States] will take that military action”? Ultimately, however, Judge Bates avoided all of the questions. “No matter how interesting and no matter how important this case may be . . . we cannot address it unless we have jurisdiction.”123¶ At least for now, the courts—though fully aware of the significance of their hands off approach—show no sign of insinuating themselves into the process.¶ Because the courts appear determined to avoid entering the debate over the parameters of when, how, and where an American abroad can be killed in the name of counterterrorism, Congress becomes the only plausible external source for the imposition of restraint on the Executive Branch. Congressional intervention, however, seems highly unlikely as long as drone strikes remain as popular—and as apparently effective—as they are. If Obama, derided as a Marxist and crypto-Muslim by his foes, asserts the right to use drone strikes against Americans, any other likely administration will as well. Not surprisingly, in the 2012 election Governor Mitt Romney also endorsed drone strikes “entirely” and stated that “we should continue to use it to go after the people who represent a threat to this nation and to our friends.”124

#### Naval drones solve basing – means even if we get kicked out – that solves your advantage

Dillow 7-11 [CNN By Clay Dillow; “X-47B: The Navy's milestone drone”; 7/11/2013; http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/07/11/x-47b-the-navys-milestone-drone/

But for naval aviation and drone technology in general, the end of the X-47B program is just the beginning. The X-47B Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAS) that made aviation history Wednesday was one of just two built by Northrop Grumman for the Navy to demonstrate technologies that are pulling naval operations -- many of which were developed in the first half of the last century--into the digital age. These technologies include precision GPS and relative navigation systems that will become commonplace in future naval air wings (both manned and unmanned) as well as various technologies and strategies that will allow unmanned planes to work safely alongside their human-piloted counterparts. Navy brass call this "digitizing the carrier airspace," and it represents a full-blown paradigm shift for the Navy as it begins the process of integrating unmanned aircraft -- including armed strike aircraft -- into its carrier-capable fleet. It also marks the beginning of the race for what's next. What's been lost amid the cheering for the X-47B is that the UCAS program was really less about the aircraft and more about the platform. With the platform in place, now begins the challenge of building the actual product. The X-47B was born out of a need to incorporate unmanned aircraft into the naval fleet, largely for persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT) missions. That is, the Navy wanted something fast and stealthy, and with a long enough range, that could essentially keep a constant eye on the areas surrounding its carrier groups while also helping manned fighters identify targets and, if necessary, deliver limited strike capabilities itself. MORE: Microsoft's reorg is only step one Such a drone would offer U.S. Naval forces a unique capability to deliver strikes in hostile airspace without putting pilots at risk and at ranges far exceeding that of manned fighter jets. This also serves the dual purpose of allowing the Navy's prized aircraft carriers to remain farther away from increasingly potent anti-ship threats like land-based medium range ballistic missiles (that's a thinly veiled euphemism for China). The X-47B, in many ways, is that aircraft. Its sleek, tailless, "cranked-kite" batwing design offers it a reduced radar signature, and though its lack of a tail makes it less stable, the fact that it pilots itself via computer means it can make thousands of small corrections per minute to compensate. Human operators control the X-47B by telling it where to go and what to do, but the aircraft handles the actual piloting itself -- there is no aviator remotely controlling it with a joystick -- making it immune to such vulnerabilities as low visibility or good old-fashioned human error. But more important than the aircraft itself is the technology underpinning it that allows it to trade data with computers and positional sensors aboard the aircraft carrier a hundred times per second. That, along with a new interface that essentially digitizes the many vocal commands and visual signals already used by carrier flight deck crews so that a computer can understand them, means that the Navy now has a platform in place that it can use to integrate any future robotic aircraft into its operations. That's why Wednesday's landing of the first robotic airplane on an aircraft carrier is so significant, and that's why this is really a beginning rather than an end. UCAS was a technology demonstration program. Its follow-on program -- the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike program, or UCLASS -- is where the aviation skunkworks of some of the biggest names in aerospace are going to take this new platform and try to build a game-changing product for it -- an actual carrier-capable combat drone for active service in the U.S. Navy. MORE: Inside the cult of unboxing Though the specifics of UCLASS are technically under wraps at this point, leaked naval documents obtained by the U.S. Naval Institute loosely outline what the Navy wants from its combat drone of the future: a fast, long-range, autonomous, unmanned aircraft capable of launching from and landing on an aircraft carrier and operating at up to 2,000 nautical miles from the carrier while carrying 3,000 pounds of payload (plenty for a few of the 500-pound guided JDAM bombs). In an ISRT role it must be able to fly two un-refueled orbits of the carrier at 600 nautical miles, or a single un-refueled orbit at 1,200 nautical miles, offering the Navy persistent eyes over the ocean like it has never had before. Four companies are currently drawing up proposals for UCLASS -- Northrop Grumman (NOC), Lockheed Martin (LMT), Boeing (BA), and General Atomics (maker of the now ubiquitously-known Predator and Reaper UAVs). All will have access to the platform developed during the X-47B program, and each will try to build an even better robotic aircraft around it. And this will be a proper race; the Navy wants to put its UCLASS aircraft in service starting in 2020. That's not an unreasonable timeline given the frenetic pace of innovation in both unmanned aviation and robotic autonomy. Consider traditional aviation's historical trajectory: From the first launch of a manned aircraft off a ship in 1910, it took three decades (and World War II) to really hone naval aviation to a science, and another three decades (and a Cold War) to evolve it into the modern, jet-powered sea and air force the Navy is today. But in roughly 15 years, unmanned aviation technology has gone from that first generation of noisy, non-stealthy, lumbering remote-controlled surveillance aircraft to what the world caught a glimpse of Wednesday: an autonomous fighter jet that pilots itself, packing more and better technology than the average manned fighter jet. Even as the Federal Aviation Administration works to integrate civilian drone technology into the national airspace and a burgeoning domestic drone industry stands poised to become a significant segment of the larger aerospace sector, the pace of innovation in this space continues to accelerate unabated. The X-47B made aviation history, sure. But far more importantly, it made aviation's future.

## Norms Advantage

### US Not Key/No Modeling – 1nc

#### US drone policy doesn’t set a precedent – other countries don’t act based on our use

Boot 12 (Max, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies @ Council on Foreign Relations, "The Incoherence of a Drone-Strike Advocate," http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/the-incoherence-of-a-drone-strike-advocate/265256/)

Naureen Shah of Columbia Law School, a guest on the show, had raised the possibility that America is setting a dangerous precedent with drone strikes. If other people start doing what America does--fire drones into nations that house somebody they want dead--couldn't this come back to haunt us? And haunt the whole world? Shouldn't the U.S. be helping to establish a global norm against this sort of thing? Host Warren Olney asked Boot to respond.¶ Boot started out with this observation:¶ I think the precedent setting argument is overblown, because I don't think other countries act based necessarily on what we do and in fact we've seen lots of Americans be killed by acts of terrorism over the last several decades, none of them by drones but they've certainly been killed with car bombs and other means.¶ That's true--no deaths by terrorist drone strike so far. But I think a fairly undeniable premise of the question was that the arsenal of terrorists and other nations may change as time passes. So answering it by reference to their current arsenal isn't very illuminating. In 1945, if I had raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might one day have nuclear weapons, it wouldn't have made sense for you to dismiss that possibility by noting that none of the Soviet bombs dropped during World War II were nuclear, right?¶ As if he was reading my mind, Boot immediately went on to address the prospect of drone technology spreading. Here's what he said:¶ You know, drones are a pretty high tech instrument to employ and they're going to be outside the reach of most terrorist groups and even most countries. But whether we use them or not, the technology is propagating out there. We're seeing Hezbollah operate Iranian supplied drones over Israel, for example, and our giving up our use of drones is not going to prevent Iran or others from using drones on their own. So I wouldn't worry too much about the so called precedent it sets..."

#### Other countries won’t model US legal standards or oversight

Saunders 13 (Paul J., executive director of the Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest, 3/4, “We Won’t Always Drone Alone,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177?page=1>)

That said, the United States has well-established rules for the use of lethal force in war and in law enforcement operations. There are extensive rules governing surveillance, too. From this perspective, drones represent a new way of doing things that the executive branch has done for some time and do not pose a radical challenge to existing policies and procedures—except, perhaps, for strains imposed by the sheer number of strikes. Ultimately, however, America has had the drone debate before in various guises and will eventually find a way forward that satisfies legal and oversight concerns.¶ A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will use drones, whether armed or unarmed, and what lessons they will draw from Washington’s approach. Thus far, the principal lesson may well be that drones can be extremely effective in killing your opponents, wherever they are, without risking your own troops and without sending soldiers or law enforcement personnel across another country’s borders. It seems less likely that others will adopt U.S.-style legal standards and oversight procedures, or that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace.

### A2 Russia/China Models

#### China and Russia will inevitably use, no global support for norm creation, and Israel means targeted killing will continue

Fisher 7 (Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711, lexis)

The above discussion is not meant to suggest that the worldwide spread and acceptance of a targeted killing norm is preordained, rather only that it seems likely, at present, that the norm will achieve greater prominence. That prognosis could change, however, if a powerful State or group of States or collection of committed non-State actors with State support, or some combination thereof, acting as a norm entrepreneur, actively works to thwart the development of a norm permitting targeted killing for counter-terrorism purposes. n179 Several Arab and Middle Eastern States, the European Union, Russia, and others have made statements criticizing targeted killing after high-profile targeted killings have been carried out. n180 Yet none of them, it seems, has yet attempted to assume the position of norm entrepreneur and to engage in a sustained effort to end use of the tactic. Moreover, there is evidence that Russia and China, perhaps revealing their true preferences, have themselves employed targeted killing - Russia in its ongoing conflict with Chechen rebels and China in its hostilities with members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement in Xinjiang province. n181 Currently, it does not appear that a norm entrepreneur with the status or relevance of the United States or Israel has emerged to challenge the targeted killing norm, something that would seem to be necessary if its present trajectory is to be altered.¶ A norm permitting the use of targeted killing for counter-terrorism purposes may be viewed as having already achieved a certain degree of prominence because of the status and visibility of the two States that are known to have adopted it: the United States and Israel. Furthermore, given the positioning of the United States and [\*742] Israel in the international system and the absence of a significant norm entrepreneur pushing in the opposite direction, it seems likely that, whether by emulation, restrained norm entrepreneurship, or both, a targeted killing norm will achieve even greater prominence.

#### Russia can and will cite Israel to continue counter-terror policies – US policy isn’t key

Alston 11 (Philip, Professor of Law, New York University, "The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders," 2 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 283, lexis)

Thus when the United States argues that targeted killings are legitimate when used in response to a transnational campaign of terror directed at it, it needs to bear in mind that other states can also claim to be so afflicted, even if the breadth of the respective terrorist threats is not comparable. Take Russia, for example, in relation to terrorists from the Caucasus. It has characterized its military operations in Chechnya since 1999 as a counter-terrorism operation and has deployed "seek and destroy" groups of army commandoes to "hunt down groups of insurgents." n611 It has been argued that the targeted killings that have resulted are justified because they are necessary to Russia's fight against terrorism. n612 Although [\*443] there are credible reports of targeted killings conducted outside of Chechnya, Russia has refused to acknowledge responsibility for, or otherwise justify, such killings. It has also refused to cooperate with any investigation or prosecution. n613¶ In 2006, the Russian Parliament passed a law permitting the Federal Security Service (FSB) to kill alleged terrorists overseas, if authorized to do so by the President. n614 The law defines terrorism and terrorist activity extremely broadly, including "practices of influencing the decisions of government, local self-government or international organizations by terrorizing the population or through other forms of illegal violent action," and also any "ideology of violence." n615¶ Under the law, there appears to be no restriction on the use of military force "to suppress international terrorist activity outside the Russian Federation." n616 The law requires the President to seek the endorsement of the Federation Council to use regular armed forces outside Russia, but the President may deploy FSB security forces at his own discretion. According to press accounts, at the time of the law's passage, "Russian legislators stressed that the law was designed to target terrorists hiding in failed States and that in other situations the security services would work with foreign intelligence services to pursue their goals." n617 There is no publicly available information about any procedural safeguards to ensure Russian targeted killings are lawful, the criteria for those who may be targeted, or accountability mechanisms for review of targeting operations. In adopting the legislation, Russian parliamentarians claimed that, "they were emulating Israeli and US actions in adopting a law [\*444] allowing the use of military and special forces outside the country's borders against external threats." n618

#### US isn’t key to Russian or Chinese drone use AND low risk that drones will be used against local separatists

Lewis 11 (Michael, teaches international law and the law of war at Ohio Northern University School of Law, "Unfounded drone fears," http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/17/opinion/la-oe--lewis-drones-20111017)

Myth 3: The U.S. use of drones in cases such as the Awlaki killing in Yemen serves to legitimize their use by China or Russia. International law places the same restrictions on the use of drones that it places on any other use of military force. The U.S. used a drone on Yemeni territory to kill Awlaki because it was given permission to do so by the Yemeni government, and because Awlaki was an active member of an Al Qaeda affiliate who had repeatedly been involved in operations designed to kill Americans at home and abroad. With such permission, the U.S. could instead have employed special forces or a conventional airstrike.¶ Numerous commentators have suggested that U.S. drone use legitimizes Russian drone use in Chechnya or Chinese drone use against the Uighurs. If China or Russia were facing genuine threats from Chechen or Uighur separatists, they might be allowed under international law to use drones in neighboring states if those states gave them permission to do so. However, given the fact that Chechen separatists declared an end to armed resistance in 2009, and that the greatest concern Russians currently have with Chechnya is with the lavish subsidies that Russia is currently providing it, the likelihood of armed Russian drones over Chechnya seems remote at best.¶ Likewise, there is no Uighur separatist organization that even remotely resembles Al Qaeda. Uighur unrest has taken the form of uprisings in Urumqi and other areas, similar to the Tibetan unrest of a few years ago. The Chinese eliminated such unrest with widespread arrests and disappearances, which raised serious human rights concerns. But there has been no time in which Uighur opposition has met the threshold established by international law that would allow for the use of armed drones in response to Uighur actions.

### 1NC Drone Prolif

#### Drone prolif is slow and the impact is small

Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out¶ distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests.¶ However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most¶ likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial¶ base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited¶ firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the¶ intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and crossborder¶ adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks¶ by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia¶ into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into¶ Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingencies¶ do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support.¶ Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat¶ to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term.

### 2NC Drone Prolif

#### States won’t have the capability to do strikes even if they have the initial tech – other investments are needed. That’s Zenko

#### US tech sales and economic benefits make prolif inevitable

CRG 12 (The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) is an independent research and media organization based in Montreal, a registered non-profit organization in the province of Quebec, Canada, “Mapping Drone Proliferation: UAVs in 76 Countries,” September 18, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/mapping-drone-proliferation-uavs-in-76-countries>)

The report goes on: “Currently, there are over 50 countries developing more than 900 different UAV systems. This growth is attributed to countries seeing the success of the United States with UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan and deciding to invest resources into UAV development to compete economically and militarily in this emerging area.”¶ While the report fails to highlight the danger of growing drone proliferation to global peace and security it does emphasize the danger of drone proliferation to “US interests”. The report states that “the use of UAVs by foreign parties to gather information on U.S. military activities has already taken place” and “the significant growth in the number of countries that have acquired UAVs, including key countries of concern, has increased the threat to the United States.”¶ Despite this, the report states “the U.S. government has determined that selected transfers of UAV technology support its national security interests”, thus highlighting the contradiction at the heart of current arms control measures. ‘Private sector representatives’ told the reports authors that “UAVs are one of the most important growth sectors in the defense industry and provide significant opportunities for economic benefits if U.S. companies can remain competitive in the global UAV market.”

### Norms

#### Precedent locked in

Jacobson 13 **(**Mark R., senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. From 2009 to 2011, he served with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, “Column: Key Assumptions About Drones Are Based on Misconceptions,” <http://www.vnews.com/opinion/4393278-95/drones-drone-armed-civilian>]

Armed drones are neither as simple as model airplanes nor as complex as high-performance fighter jets. Of course, a remote-controlled helicopter that you can build in your garage is certainly not as capable as the $26.8 million MQ-9 Reaper, the primary U.S. hunter-killer drone. But drones are much less expensive than fighter aircraft, and in an age of increasing austerity, it is tempting for nations to consider replacing jets with drones. More than 50 countries operate surveillance drones, and armed drones will quickly become standard in military arsenals. The challenge is to consider what international rules, if any, should govern the use of armed drones. The United States is setting the precedent; our approach may define the global rules of engagement. Of course, we cannot expect other nations to adopt the oversight and restrictions we have. What doors are we opening for other nations’ use of drones? What happens when terrorist groups acquire them? The United States must prepare for being the prey, not just the predator.

#### US drone model is irrelevant

Wittes and Singh 12 (Benjamin, a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution where he co-directs the Harvard Law School-Brookings Project on Security and Law, specializes in the legal issues surrounding international security and the war on terrorism, member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and the Law, Ritika, a research assistant on law and national security issues at the Brookings Institution. She graduated with majors in International Affairs and Government from Skidmore College, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,” 1-11-12, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity>)

Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.

### 2NC US/China War – NDT

#### No US-China conflict

Allison & Blackwill 3/5 -- \*director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND \*\*Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert D., 2013, "Interview: Lee Kuan Yew on the Future of U.S.- China Relations," http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/)

Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, the founding prime minister of Singapore, one of Asia's most prominent public intellectuals, a member of the Fondation Chirac's honour committee

Competition between the United States and China is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world. There will be a struggle for influence. I think it will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States, need U.S. markets, U.S. technology, need to have students going to the United States to study the ways and means of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. If you quarrel with the United States and become bitter enemies, all that information and those technological capabilities will be cut off. The struggle between the two countries will be maintained at the level that allows them to still tap the United States. Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between the United States and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market. Sino-American relations are both cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive. A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires cooperation from and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict between China and the United States is low. Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades. They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but to be able, if necessary, to pressure Taiwan by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone -- at least not for the next 15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight.

#### No China conflict

Aliison & Blackwill 13 -- \*director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas Dillon Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government AND \*\*Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, 1/28/2013, "Beijing Still Prefers Diplomacy Over Force," http://www.cfr.org/china/beijing-still-prefers-diplomacy-over-force/p29892)

As China has become a leading export market for its neighbours, it expects them to be "more respectful", in Mr Lee's words. In public statements, China usually downplays the advantages its size begets, but in a heated moment at a 2010 regional security meeting, its foreign minister had a different message: "China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact." Mr Lee has a phrase for this message: "Please know your place." Unlike free-market democracies, in which governments are unable or unwilling to squeeze imports of bananas from the Philippines or cars from Japan, China's government can use its economic muscle. As tensions mount over competing claims for contested territories, should we expect Beijing to use military force to advance its claims? From the perspective of the grand strategist, the answer is no – unless it is provoked by others. "China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, and that it needs open sea lanes. They are determined to avoid the mistakes made by Germany and Japan," Mr Lee says. In his view, it is highly unlikely that China would choose to confront the US military at this point, since it is still at a clear technological and military disadvantage. This means that, in the near term, it will be more concerned with using diplomacy, not force, in foreign policy. Henry Kissinger, the western statesman who has spent most quality time with Chinese leaders in the past four decades, offers a complementary perspective. As he has written, their approach to the outside world is best understood through the lens of Sun Tzu, the ancient strategist who focused on the psychological weaknesses of the adversary. "China seeks its objectives," Mr Kissinger says, "by careful study, patience and the accumulation of nuances – only rarely does China risk a winner-take-all showdown." In Mr Lee's view, China is playing a long game driven by a compelling vision. "It is China's intention," Mr Lee says, "to be the greatest power in the world." Success in that quest will require not only sustaining historically unsustainable economic growth rates but also exercising greater caution and subtlety than it has shown recently, in order to avoid an accident or blunder that sparks military conflict over the Senkakus, which would serve no one's interests.

### 2NC US/China War – Economics

#### Economics places multiple checks on conflict

Haixia 12 (Qi, Lecturer at Department of International Relations – Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2), Summer, p. 105-127, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/105.full)

Economic globalization created a strategic need for superficial friendship between China and the United States. While scholars disagree over exactly when economic globalization began, all agree that it sped up after the end of the Cold War. This is because the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulting in a global market. Meanwhile, the pace of information-flow increased among states, shrinking the size of the globe and leading to popularization of the expression ‘global village’. Levels of interdependence have increased along with the growing proximity of international economic relations. That a strategy of complete confrontation can no longer effectively protect national interests is now obvious. It is for this reason that certain scholars argue that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the security dilemma since end of the Cold War.35 Under the conditions of globalization, interdependence between China and the United States has continued to grow, and for the sake of economic interests, neither is willing to adopt a strategy of all-out confrontation. Economic interdependence, however, will not diffuse the political and security conflicts between the two states. Different interests in different spheres have thus created a foundation for superficial friendship between the United States and China. Involvement in the globalization process has rapidly expanded China's involvement in international organizations in ever-growing fields,36 within many of which China accepts West-led international norms.37 The country has thus shifted from ‘opposing the international order’ to ‘reforming the international order’ to ‘maintaining the international order’.38 Globalization has changed not only China's but also United States’ behavioral principles. The growth of Sino–US economic interdependence has prompted the United States’ adoption of a two-pronged policy of military and political containment and of economic engagement. Its aim is to reduce the risk of a head-on conflict that could considerably damage United States’ interests. These contradictory strands of US policy towards China are an indicator of superficial friendship. Under the context of economic globalization, China has also developed economic interdependence with United States’ allies. This has reduced incentives to participate in containment of China and also dampened United States’ resolve to maintain a policy of complete containment. As a result, certain scholars argue that enhanced levels of interdependence among China and other nations have diminished the probability of China's opting to rise through forceful expansion.39

# 1NR

#### Lost this doc – Most of the same cards and one’s extended in 2NR were same as the Gtown doubles and round 8 debate at GSU

#### It was the state secrets DA