Tournament: Cedanats | Round: 4 | Opponent: Wyoming Dilldine-McFarland | Judge: Whitmore

1

The NPT Rev Con was insufficient: divisions that threaten the collapse of the NPT remain – steps towards disarmament are required

Tanya Ogilvie-White, lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences, teaching on the subjects of foreign policy and international organisations at the University of Canterbury, and David Santoro, senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS, where he specializes in nonproliferation and nuclear security, disarmament, arms control, and deterrence issues, 5-27-2011, "Disarmament and Non-proliferation: Towards More Realistic Bargains," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, T26F Online
Although the disarmament steps the current administration has taken have so far been relatively small
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the need to make progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

States pursuing nuclear weapons now

David Albright, founder of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), its current president, and author of several books on proliferation of atomic weapons, holds a Master of Science in physics from Indiana University and a M.Sc. in mathematics from Wright State University, taught physics at George Mason University in Virginia, Andrea Stricker, Senior Policy Analyst at ISIS, MA in Security Policy Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and a BA in Political Science and French, certificate in Middle Eastern Studies, from the University of Arizona, and Houston Wood, Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Virginia, M.S. in mathematics from Mississippi State University, and his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the University of Virginia, He was Visiting Scientist at Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique, Saclay, France and at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Visiting Research Scholar at Princeton University in the Woodrow Wilson School and the Program on Science and Global Security, 7-29-2013 "Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade Mitigating the Threat" ISIS, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2013/Full20Report_DTRA-PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf
As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, several additional
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. One key part of this effort will remain smuggling of nuclear commodities. 

NFU solves and deescalates conflict

Lawrence J. Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress,
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68(2) 34–42 DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
Given the volatile situation in South Asia, think tanks and major international media outlets
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, knowing China will not resort to nuclear weapons unless India does first.

NFU boosts NPT credibility by restoring the grand bargain – allows controls on nuclear technology

Lawrence J. Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress,
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68(2) 34–42 DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
A US decision to declare a no-first-use policy would have benefits
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original policy and thereby improve stability between the South Asian nuclear weapons states.

The aff rallies non-nuclear NPT states– saves the NPT

Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, 2010 "The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
Finally, because NFU would be an important departure from the past six decades of
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. commitment to Article 6 as an excuse not to vigorously support nonproliferation.

Prolif incentivizes aggression – that causes regional instability and increased conventional wars which escalate to global nuclear war

Matthew Kroenig, Professor of Government at Georgetown and Fellow at CFR specializing in Nuclear Security, 5-26-2012, "The History of Proliferation Optimism:  Does It Have A Future?" Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182andrtid=2
Regional instability: The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers contributing to regional
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strike could very well lead to a wider war in the Middle East. 

New prolif causes crises – learning curves and past luck

Francois Heisbourg, Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 4-4-2012, "NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION – LOOKING BACK, THINKING AHEAD: HOW BAD WOULD THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE?" Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1171andrtid=2
Nuclear archives, as other sensitive governmental archives, open up usually after an interval
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serious risks occurring on several occasions since the mid-1980s(17).

Crises force escalation – even rational states’ decisions spin out of control

Matthew Kroenig, Professor of Government at Georgetown and Fellow at CFR specializing in Nuclear Security, 5-26-2012, "The History of Proliferation Optimism:  Does It Have A Future?" Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182andrtid=2
Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten
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incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons could very well be used. 

2

Perceived threat of US dominance fueling China modernization—several reasons

Dan Blumenthal director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and Michael Mazza Johns Hopkins University, program manager for AEI’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy 2011 "China’s Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The PLA’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine and Force Posture," http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Strategic_Forces.pdf
There are a number of items driving China’s nuclear modernization. Perhaps first and foremost
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second strike capability would be threatened and thus its deterrent capabilities undermined.15

Some modernization is inevitable but US first use policies make it worse

George Perkovich, vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Ernest W. Lefever, senior fellow and founder of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, December 2000, "Loose Nukes: Arms Control Is No Place for Folly," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, pp. 162-167
The thousands of American nuclear weapons under a first-use doctrine will also eventually
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Taiwanese President Lee FOREIGN AFFAIRS- November / December 2000 ~ 16 3 ~ 

We have reverse causal evidence – first use policies risk nuclear miscalculation but an NFU reduces the risk

Hans Kristensen et al special advisor to the Danish Minister of Defense Robert Norris a senior research associate with the Natural Resources Defense Council nuclear program and director of the Nuclear Weapons Databook project and Ivan Oelrich vice president for Strategic Security Programs at the Federation of American Scientists 04-2009 "From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons Occasional Paper"
The second nuclear-only mission is a first strike against an enemy’s nuclear forces
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Chinese constraint on missile numbers, payload, and MIRVing will be easier. 

Crisis between the US and China are likely – Seas, Taiwan

Avery Goldstein David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, 2013 "First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations" International Security Spring 2013, Vol. 37, No. 4, Pages 49-89)
U.S.-China Crises: More Likely Than War; More Than Just
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and her suggestion that multilateral forums could be useful in this regard.20 

A first use posture makes these crises unstable – creates the incentive for launch

Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, 2010 "The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
On the other hand, if states do believe that the United States might use
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choose to use nuclear weapons at an early point in the conºict.104 

Miscalculation is the most probable scenario for nuclear use

Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, 2013 "First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations" International Security Spring 2013, Vol. 37, No. 4, Pages 49-89
Two concerns have driven much of the debate about international security in the post–
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nuclear forces indicates why escalation resulting from crisis instability remains a devastating possibility.

India will prolif to counter-balance China modernization—this spills over to Pakistan

Dan Blumenthal director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and Michael Mazza Johns Hopkins University, program manager for AEI’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy 2011 "China’s Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The PLA’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine and Force Posture," http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Strategic_Forces.pdf
The Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is, however, much more complicated. India
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enter a period of flux, with potentially destabilizing consequences for the region.

Indo-Pak war likely

Lawrence J. Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress,
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68(2) 34–42 DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
In the twenty-first century, the Indian subcontinent has surpassed Europe as the
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be used against invading troops on Pakistani soil (The Economist, 2011).

Extinction

Alan Robock, professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University and PhD in Meterology, and Owen Brian Toon, Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, January 2010, "South Asian Threat?  Local Nuclear War = Global Suffering" published in Scientific American magazine, Vol. 302, Issue 1
Worry has focused on the U.S. versus Russia, but a regional
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and to take as our test case an engagement between India and Pakistan.

NFU solves Indo-Pak and China miscalc

Lawrence J. Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress,
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68(2) 34–42 DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
If the United States entered a series of bilateral or multilateral no-first-
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use of a nuclear weapon by another country, including India or Pakistan.

NFU get modeled—creates non-proliferation regime

Lawrence J. Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress,
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68(2) 34–42 DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
A US decision to declare a no-first-use policy would have benefits
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there are reasons to believe India, at least, would be interested.

Plan

The United States Congress should prohibit the first use of nuclear forces without congressional approval.

3

Requiring congressional authorization is equivalent to a No First Use policy

Richard Ullman Prof of International Relations Princeton 07-72 "NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS," Foreign Affairs, July 1972 vol. 50
An alternative to a fiat "no-first-use" declaration, at
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nuclear weapon in a manner which inflicts no damage but nevertheless conveys resolve.

Planning committee is goldilocks – flexibility to use first in unlikely circumstances, ability to signal, but shows restraint

Jeremy J. Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists, 1984 "Presidential First Use Is Unlawful," Foreign Policy, No. 56
The proposal for a planning committee has a number of practical advantages as well as
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for a system in which Congress gets the right to encourage first use.

Tournament: tournament | Round: 6 | Opponent: Arizona State Rajan-Vered | Judge: Feldman

1AC

Plan

Plan: The United States Federal Government should restrict targets of targeted killing operations using remotely piloted aircraft outside declared zones of conflict to individuals identified as leaders of transnational organizations with direct involvement in past or ongoing violent operations against the United States.

Norms

Drone tech prolif inevitable – setting clear limits now is key to establishing controlled norms

Daniel Byman, Professor in Security Studies Program at Georgetown and Senior Fellow at Brookings, July-August 2013, "Why Drones Work," Foreign Affairs, vol 92 no 4
The fact remains that by using drones so much, Washington risks setting a troublesome
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carefully considers the law and the risks to civilians before ordering a strike.

The plan buys us time – squo accelerates drone prolif

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, "The costs and consequences of drone warfare," International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
The emergence of this arms race for drones raises at least five long-term
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and sold by rival Great Powers whose interests do not mirror its own.

That causes rapid drone deployment in Asia – multiple scenarios for conflict – building norms uniquely key

Shawn Brimley, vice president of the Technology and National Security Program for a New American Security, Ben FitzGerald, Director of Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Ely Ratner, deputy director of the Asia Program at the Center for a New American Security, 9-17-2013, "The Drone War Comes to Asia," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/17/the_drone_war_comes_to_asia?page=full
Without a doubt, China’s drone adventure 100-miles north of the Senkakus was
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political leadership, these technologies could very well lead the region into war. 

Aggressive Chinese drone deployment creates multiple scenarios for Asian war – draws in the US

Bill Gertz, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, national security reporter, 3-26-2013, "Game of Drones," Washington Free Beacon, http://freebeacon.com/game-of-drones/
China’s military is expanding its unmanned aerial vehicle forces with a new Predator-like
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may soon have another deadly tool with which to attack the United States."

Extinction

Lawrence Wittner, Professor Emeritus of History at SUNY Albany, 11-28-2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?" www.huntingtonnews.net/14446
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used.
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—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. 

Unrestricted drone prolif guarantees global retaliatory war

Eric Posner, professor at University of Chicago Law School, 5-17-2013, "The drone paradox; When robots eliminate the risk of casualties, wars are likely to become more common," National Post, ln
Similarly, we may be comfortable with giving the president authority to use military force
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killing machines has finally arrived. The law now has to catch up.

Plan cements support for drones and allows the US to shape drone norms

Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon Fellow at the CFR, January 2013, "Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies," CFR, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736
Existing practices carry two major risks for U.S. interests that are  likely
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nations to use these technologies  responsibly, we must use them responsibly."4

US policy sets norms – robust scholarship proves drones arms races result from state policy

Robert Farley, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, 10-12-2011, "U.S. Drone Use Sets Global Precedent," World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10311/over-the-horizon-u-s-drone-use-sets-global-precedent
So which is it? Has the United States sparked a drone race, or
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policymakers should perhaps devote a touch more attention to the precedent they’re setting.

Pakistan

Unrestricted drone strikes are destroying the US-Pakistan relationship – only restricting them creates space for cooperation

Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 7-16-2013, "A New Drone Deal For Pakistan," Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139584/daniel-markey/a-new-drone-deal-for-pakistan?page=show
For all its successes, the U.S. drone program in Pakistan is
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of control over the program, especially when it comes to target selection.

Signature strikes are uniquely bad

James Traub, fellow of the Center International Cooperation, 5-24-2013, "The Indispensable Nation’s Indispensable Weapon," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/indispensible_weapon_drones_obama?page=0,1
And this brings me back to the question of drones. It is hard to
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constitute an implicit recognition that the time has come to restore that balance. 

Kills the relationship

Alex Rodriguez, foreign correspondent for the LA Times, 8-2-2013, "U.S., Pakistan to revive key talks," LA Times, ln
Kerry’s agenda included meetings with Sharif, Aziz and other top civilian and military leaders
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highways to withdraw troops and equipment from Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

Forces Uzbekistan withdrawal

Azad Garibov, a foreign policy analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) in Azerbaijan and a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Khazar University, 5-28-2013, "The U.S. in Central Asia: Still an important balancer?" Turkish Weekly, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/150929/the-u-s-in-central-asia-still-an-important-balancer.html
Recently, in light of the approaching 2014 withdrawal of the majority of U.
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interest in heavy equipment, like helicopters and mine-resistant armored vehicles.

Arming Uzbekistan cause Central Asia conflict and draws in Russia

Joshua Kucera, Central Asia and the Caucasus specialist, 3-26-2013, "Are The U.S. And Russia Fueling Tension Between Uzbekistan And Its Neighbors?" EurasiaNet, http://eurasianhub.com/2013/03/27/are-the-u-s-and-russia-fueling-tension-between-uzbekistan-and-its-neighbors/
The U.S.’s growing military ties with Uzbekistan may be a strategic
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circle of mistrust and tension. What may result, no one knows.

Nuke War

Victor Baranez, military commentator, 12-27-2011, "Who and Where Russia Threatens" Komsomolskaya Pravda, http://www.kp.ru/daily/25812/2790454-http://www.kp.ru/daily/25812/2790454 (translated from Russian)
And yet, where, in your opinion, could erupt war in which Russia
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military conflict between the parties unlikely. Since the mechanism of nuclear deterrence.

Unrestricted drone strikes cause Pakistan collapse

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, "The costs and consequences of drone warfare," International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few
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and scale of drone attacks than it was during the Bush administration. 81

Pakistani instability leads to nuclear terrorism

HWW, Human Wrongs Watch, 7-30-2011, "Government Collapse, Chief Threat to Nuclear Security in Pakistan," International Press Agency (Pressenza), http://pressenza.com/npermalink/government-collapsex-chief-threat-to-nuclear-security-in-pakistan
The research arm of Congress noted that Islamabad in the last decade has made considerable
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programs work in the context where these broader tensions and conflicts are present."

Nuke War

Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010, "After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects," Studies in Conflict 26 Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by
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for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

Pakistan instability leads to Indo-Pak nuclear war

Nathaniel C. Fick et al (Nathaniel C. Fick, CEO of the Center for a New American Security and Captain – US Marine Corps, David John Kilcullen, PhD in Political Science from the University of New South Wales, John Nagl, President of the Center for a New American Security, and Vikram Singh, Senior Defense Advisor at the Center for American Progress), January 2009, "Tell Me Why We’re There? Enduring Interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS20Policy20Brief20-20Enduring20Interests20in20Afghanistan20and20Pakistan_0.pdf
Squeezed by American military operations, many in this shadowy alliance have shifted to Pakistan’s
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two countries are inextricably linked, and America’s safety depends on their future.

Indo-pak war causes miscalc and escalation

Paul K. Kerr, Analyst in Nonproliferation, and Mary Beth Nikitin Specialist in Nonproliferation, 8-29-2011, "Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues," CRS, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf
In addition to the above scenarios, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could also
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nuclear weapons may be more vulnerable to a disarming military strike from India.

Newest models prove even limited use causes extinction

Alan Robock, professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University and PhD in Meterology, and Owen Brian Toon, Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a fellow at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, January 2010, "South Asian Threat?  Local Nuclear War = Global Suffering" published in Scientific American magazine, Vol. 302, Issue 1
Worry has focused on the U.S. versus Russia, but a regional
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and to take as our test case an engagement between India and Pakistan.

Now key – Pakistan is falling apart

Arif Rafiq, adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and president of Vizier Consulting, 8-22-2013, "A Dream Gone Sour," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/22/a_dream_gone_sour_pakistan_terrorism_nawaz_sharif?page=0,1
In an allusion to Pakistan’s growing sectarian strife, the army chief’s address was preceded
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on mosques, Shiite congregations, and funerals; and various political assassinations. 

Signature strikes prevent local cooperation – destroys social fabric and causes instability

ICG, International Crisis Group, 5-21-2013, "Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan," http://www.crisisgroup.org/~~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/247-drones-myths-and-reality-in-pakistan.pdf
Residents in FATA also believe that informants possibly provide false information and exploit their position
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distorting FATA’s cultural and social fabric, as discussed later in this report.

Indiscriminate strikes delegitimize the civilian government

James Cavallaro et al, founding director of Stanford Law School’s International Human Rights and Conflcit Resolution Clinic and professor of law there, Stephan Sonnenberg, Clinical Lecturer in the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford, Sarah Knuckey, professor of international law at NYU’s Global Justice Clinic in the NYU Law School, initially published by IHRCRC, Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at the Stanford Law School, and GJC, Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, with a long list of student researchers in addition, September 2012, "Living Under Drones: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN," http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf
The focus on drones also risks undermining Pakistan’s development by incentivizing undemocratic decision-making
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the polio vaccine; this perception has been exploited by Taliban forces.768

Solvency

Individualized targeting solves due process, maintains operational flexibility, and ends signature strikes

Jennifer Daskal, fellow and adjunct professor at Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law at Georgetown University law Center, April 2013, "The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside of the ’Hot’ Conflict Zone," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, ln
The law of international armed conflict permits the detention and killing of members of the
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an individualized assessment of the threat posed by each of the targets. n146

Establishing HVT norms solves blowback and establishes international norms – doing it publicly is key

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, "The costs and consequences of drone warfare," International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
In his second term, President Obama has an opportunity to reverse course and establish
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the US government holds itself legally and morally accountable for its behaviour. 156

HVTs matter – rigorous statistical data proves decapitation ends hostile groups

Patrick Johnston, associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, 8-18-2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida," RAND, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2012/08/18/PJ.html
My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that
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.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. 

Drones are inevitable – establishing procedure is key

Jennifer Daskal, fellow and adjunct professor at Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law at Georgetown University law Center, April 2013, "The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside of the ’Hot’ Conflict Zone," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, ln
The objections to such a proposal are many. In the context of proposed courts
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to avoid ad hoc decisionmaking and will ensure consistency across administrations and time.

Only statutory restrictions solve CIA operations – they comply with the letter of the law

Naureen Shah et al, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, 2012, "The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions," Center for Civilians in Conflict, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf
As the CIA’s role in drone strikes has gained increasing prominence and notoriety, CIA
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heard—any dissent, any moral objection," to the programs.307

Legislation is key to reign in endless war

Alan W. Dowd, writer on National Defense, Foreign Policy, and International Security, Winter-Spring 2013, "Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings," Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf
Thanks to drones, as Miller’s question suggests, "endless war" is quite
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because there are no Americans in harm’s way—at least not directly.

Obama will comply —- the plan walks the fine-line —- failure to walk the constitution is worse

David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History," 2008, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis)
In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also
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the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

Congress can oversee drones

Naureen Shah et al, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, 2012, "The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions," Center for Civilians in Conflict, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf
Though hampered in many ways, the oversight committees have sufficient authority to impact the
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oversight from this committee...than counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan."332

Policy engagement solves Bush 3.0 – scholars need to speak the language of policy makers – key to public engagement, new perspectives, and peace and checks the impact to the K

Zachary Lockman is Chair of the Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at New York University 2005 "Critique from the Right The Neo-conservative Assault on Middle East Studies" CR: The New Centennial Review 5.1 (2005) 63-110
It may be too soon to tell, but from the vantage point of the first years of the twenty-first century it would seem that area studies has weathered the storms of the immediate post–Cold War period. In large part this may have been because these fields, including Middle East studies as practiced in the United States, were by the 1990s not what they had been 30 years earlier. The sharp decline (within academia, at least) of once dominant paradigms like a cultural-essentialist Orientalism and modernization theory resulted in the dissipation of the intellectual coherence that had characterized the field in its first decades. But the kind of intellectual fragmentation that had come to characterize Middle East studies was the norm across a great many other fields and disciplines and was counterbalanced, probably even outweighed, by the fact that many Middle East specialists, perhaps especially younger scholars, were now not only well versed in the theoretical and methodological issues and debates of their own disciplines but also routinely engaged with innovative work that cut across or transcended disciplinary boundaries. They could thus increasingly manage, without any great difficulty, to participate in productive scholarly conversations not only with their disciplinary colleagues (fellow historians, political scientists, anthropologists, literature specialists, etc.) but also with scholars from other disciplines interested in this part of the world and in others as well.  Moreover, because so many scholars working on the Middle East were participants in the scholarly conversations and debates that had transformed broad segments of the humanities and the social sciences in recent decades, Middle East studies had to a considerable extent overcome its ~End Page 73~ insular and rather backward character and was now much more open to, and engaged with, the wider intellectual world than had once been the case. The developments of the last two or three decades, including the critiques of Orientalism and modernization theory; the broad range of new work on colonialism; innovative approaches to historical, social, and cultural analysis influenced by critical anthropology; and, more broadly, heightened interaction among disciplines and fields had given many within Middle East studies a new set of common languages that facilitated productive intellectual exchange.3 This was also a much more intellectually and politically self-aware and self-critical field than was once the case. As a result, the best of the new work in this field was by the beginning of the twenty-first century very much on a par with the best produced in other area studies fields, and scholars specializing in the Middle East were being read and listened to by scholars specializing in other parts of the world as never before.4  In conjunction with a generally higher level of mastery of relevant languages and the use of innovative theoretical and methodological approaches, scholars in the field were by the late twentieth century also making use of a broader range of sources than in the past. A case in point is work on the history of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. Students and scholars with a command of both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish made increasing use not only of the vast Ottoman imperial archives in Istanbul but also of local Islamic court records and family papers, along with more traditional sources like the writings of European consuls and travelers, to produce portraits of social, political, economic, and cultural life in these lands in the last four hundred years of Ottoman rule of unprecedented depth and complexity.5  These studies helped to undermine what was once conventional wisdom in late Ottoman history, that these lands were economically, socially, and culturally stagnant before Napoleon’s army landed in Egypt in 1798; that they were uniformly characterized by despotism, the oppressive and retrograde imposition of Islamic law, and the rigorous segregation and subordination of non-Muslims; and that all real change was induced by contact with the West. Instead, the newer scholarship began to elucidate indigenous sources and dynamics of change while also showing how this ~End Page 74~ region was part of the broader sweep of world history long before the nineteenth century and the onset of westernization or modernization as conventionally understood. As a result of these scholarly advances, Ottoman historians often came to have much broader and more fully comparative perspectives than historians of early modern Europe, many of whom had only recently come to understand that they needed to overcome their own provincialism by addressing the ways in which developments in Europe were not utterly sui generis but often were bound up with larger patterns and dynamics of change that affected large stretches of Eurasia.   Scholars and the State  If the preceding assessment is accurate, it is fair to say that the changes that transformed Middle East studies in the United States over the last several decades of the twentieth century made it a more intellectually productive and interesting scholarly field. However, this development was accompanied by a growing gap between academics studying the Middle East and the officials, agencies, and institutions of the U.S. government, and a corresponding decline in the influence of university-based scholars on the shaping of foreign policy and on the media, the main purveyor of information, images, and attitudes about the region to the broad public.  For one, a good many (though by no means all) students and scholars in this field were less than happy with U.S. government policies toward the Middle East in the 1980s and beyond. Hard evidence is lacking, but it is probably safe to suggest that much of the membership of the Middle East Studies Association, the field’s main professional organization, was not enthusiastic about U.S. support for Saddam Hussein’s regime in its war against Iran in the 1980s, the U.S.-led Gulf War of 1991, the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq thereafter, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, or, more broadly, the extent to which successive U.S. administrations countenanced Israel’s ongoing occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; its continuing implantation of Jewish settlements there; and its rejection of a Palestinian state in those territories as endorsed by virtually the entire international community. There was a widespread (though never universal) ~End Page 75~ sense that the policies pursued by the United States in the Middle East were hindering, rather than contributing to, peace, democracy, human rights, development, and progress in the region.  This disaffection from official policy and the premises that underpinned it did not mean that U.S.-based scholars studying the Middle East were unwilling to share their perspectives on, and try to influence, U.S. policy toward the region. In fact, many devoted a great deal of time and effort to trying to educate the broader public through informal meetings, lectures, articles, op-ed pieces, radio and television interviews, and the like, and to convey their views to elected officials; not a few were also quite willing to meet with State Department and intelligence agency personnel. It is rather that the shared vision of the world, and of the place of the United States within it, that had once linked the world of academia with the world of policymaking had faded, and many scholars no longer spoke the same language as policymakers.  Adding to this sense of distance and alienation was a new and much more critical understanding of the proper relationship between scholars and the state—not a surprising development in the aftermath of a period in which the pernicious ends to which scholarly knowledge could be put had been made all too visible, in Vietnam but elsewhere as well. In the first decades of the Cold War a good many scholars in this as in other area studies fields, especially social scientists working on contemporary issues, saw no problem with conducting research on behalf of the government and cooperating with intelligence agencies because they were all part of the good fight against Communism. By the 1980s those who were assuming the leadership in U.S. Middle East studies were by and large much more wary about their sources of funding and the ends to which their training and research, and that of their students, might be put. Fewer scholars were willing to allow what they knew about the region to be used in the service of a state about whose policies they were often at least dubious, for example, by conducting research for agencies like the CIA or by encouraging promising students to enter government service. There developed a widespread sense that to allow one’s research agenda to be determined by the needs of the state or to serve potentially pernicious ends was not only a betrayal of one’s ~End Page 76~ integrity as a scholar but might also compromise one’s ability to conduct research in the Middle East, where by the 1980s real or alleged CIA connections had gotten Americans and others denounced, kidnapped, or worse.  At issue was not government funding per se: since the passage of the National Defense Education Act in 1958, a great many students and scholars working on the Middle East had happily made use of NDFL/FLAS and other government fellowships for language training, graduate study, and research. A large proportion of the budgets of the centers for Middle East studies at universities around the country also came from the federal government. But because this individual and institutional funding came through the U.S. Department of Education it was deemed ethically and politically acceptable even by those who most vociferously disagreed with U.S. government policies in the Middle East. Similarly, additional government funding for graduate student and faculty research on the Middle East first made available by the 1992 Near and Middle East Research and Training Act—originally channeled through the Social Science Research Council and later through the Council of American Overseas Research Centers—was not seen as posing a problem because the funding was allocated first through the U.S. Information Agency and then through the State Department budget.  The real issue was which part of the U.S. government was supplying the funding, for what ends, and with what conditions. As early as 1985 the Middle East Studies Association had asked "university-based international studies programs to refrain from responding to requests for research contract proposals from the Defense Academic Research Support Program ~established by the Defense Department to fund academic research on issues of interest to the military~ or from other intelligence entities and call~ed~ upon its members to reflect carefully upon their responsibilities to the academic profession prior to seeking or accepting funding from intelligence sources."6 Some years later MESA also criticized the new National Security Education Program (NSEP), created by the National Security Education Act of 1991. The NSEP sought to bolster the teaching of "less commonly taught" languages (including Arabic, Persian, and Turkish), thereby enabling (as the ~End Page 77~ program’s website put it) "the nation to remain integrally involved in global issues related to U.S. National Security" as well as to "develop a cadre of professionals with more than the traditional knowledge of language and culture who can use this ability to help the U.S. make sound decisions on and deal effectively with global issues related to U.S. National Security" (see the NSEP website at http://www.iie.org/programs/nsep/nsephome.htm). Unlike other programs funding research and training on the Middle East, the NSEP was housed in the Department of Defense, intelligence agency officials sat on its oversight board, and recipients of the funding it offered were required to work for a government agency involved in national security affairs after their fellowship or scholarship was completed. In a 1993 resolution endorsed by a referendum of its membership, MESA joined with the African Studies Association and the Latin American Studies Association to "deplore the location of responsibility in the U.S. defense and intelligence community for a major foreign area research, education, and training program. . . . This connection can only increase the existing difficulties of gaining foreign governmental permissions to carry out research and to develop overseas instructional programs. It can also create dangers for students and scholars by fostering the perception of involvement in military or intelligence activities, and may limit academic freedom." MESA called on the government to establish a peer and merit review process for funding applications that would be independent of military, intelligence, and foreign policy agencies and to broaden the service requirement so that it would include a much wider range of jobs, including those outside government service.  Until its concerns were met, MESA urged that "its members and their institutions not seek or accept program or research funding from NSEA...." Three years later MESA adopted yet another resolution reiterating its rejection of NSEP because the law appropriating funding for the program now required that all fellowship recipients agree to work for the Defense Department or some intelligence agency for at least two years or else repay the cost of their fellowship (see the NSEP website, as well as the MESA resolutions site at http://w3fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/resolutions.htm). (This last requirement was later relaxed somewhat so that recipients who ~End Page 78~ could not find employment with a national security agency despite a "good faith effort" to do so could fulfill the service requirement by working in higher education.) MESA would voice the same concerns about other outgrowths of the NSEP, for example, the 2002 National Flagship Language Initiative–Pilot Program (NFLI-P), launched to address what were seen as America’s extraordinary deficiencies in languages critical to national security. Many (though by no means all) Middle East studies faculty adopted MESA’s perspective on this issue, declining to seek NSEP funding for themselves or their institutions.  The disinclination by MESA and many of its individual and institutional members to cooperate with the government in ways that had been common in the 1950s and 1960s was certainly not shared by everyone in the field. Yet it is instructive that when in the 1980s reports surfaced of questionable links between academics and intelligence agencies, the most vocal response among scholars in the field was condemnation. A case in point is the scandal surrounding Nadav Safran, a political scientist whose first book set forth an analysis of modern Egyptian history informed by modernization theory and who by the mid-1980s was director of Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies. The scandal erupted when it became known that Safran had taken 2445,700 from the Central Intelligence Agency to fund a major international conference he was hosting at Harvard on "Islam and Politics in the Contemporary Muslim World"—a hot topic at the time and one of obvious interest to the CIA. Not only had Safran secretly used CIA funding for this conference, he had not told the invitees, a number of whom were coming from the Middle East, that the CIA was picking up the tab. It then came out that Safran had also received a 24107,430 grant from the CIA for the research project that led to his 1985 book Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Request for Security. Safran’s contract with the CIA stipulated that the agency had the right to review and approve the manuscript before publication and that its role in funding the book would not be disclosed. And indeed, the book as published made no mention of the fact that the research for it had been partially funded by the CIA.  When the scandal broke, about half the invitees to Safran’s conference withdrew, and many of the faculty and students associated with Harvard’s ~End Page 79~ Center for Middle Eastern Studies publicly expressed their opposition to Safran’s actions. A month later the Middle East Studies Association censured Safran on the grounds that his actions had violated its 1982 resolution calling on scholars to disclose their sources of research funding. Safran intimated that his critics were motivated by anti-Semitism, but after an internal investigation at Harvard he agreed to step down as center director at the end of the academic year.7 Safran was surely not the only academic to have secretly or openly solicited or accepted funding from an intelligence agency for his research in this period, and no doubt such relationships persisted long after this scandal, but the reaction to it—unimaginable in the early decades of U.S. Middle East studies—does indicate how the relationship between academia and the state had changed. Think Tanks and Talking Heads  But there was a price to be paid for the gap that had opened up between the world of Middle East scholarship and the world of policymaking. If many college- and university-based academics no longer entirely shared the worldview that prevailed in Washington or no longer felt the need to shape their research agenda so that it was relevant to the policies that flowed from that worldview, there were others who stood ready to meet the demand for knowledge that would serve the state. Many of these were based not in institutions of higher education but in the host of think tanks that had proliferated from the 1970s onward—privately funded institutions oriented toward the production and dissemination of knowledge designed to inform and influence public policy, for our purposes mainly the foreign policy of the United States.  Some of these institutions and organizations went back a long way. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, was founded in 1910 to advance international cooperation, while the Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of the influential journal Foreign Affairs, was established in 1921, originally as a sort of elite dinner club. The liberal Brookings Institution was established in 1927, supported by Carnegie and Rockefeller funding, while the conservative American Enterprise Institute was founded ~End Page 80~ in 1943 to promote "limited government," "free enterprise," and a "strong foreign policy and national defense." After the Second World War, contractors like the huge RAND Corporation entered the field to produce or fund research for the military and intelligence and other government agencies concerned with foreign policy. Another wave beginning in the 1960s had witnessed the establishment of a large number of what one observer called "advocacy" think tanks, like the Center for Strategic and International Studies (1962), the Heritage Foundation (1973), and the Cato Institute (1977), which combined "policy research with aggressive marketing techniques" as they struggled to secure funding and influence in an increasingly competitive marketplace. There are now also many "legacy-based" institutions, like the Carter Center in Atlanta and the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom in Washington, D.C. By the end of the twentieth century there were an estimated 2,000 organizations engaged in policy analysis based in the United States, a substantial proportion of them focused on foreign policy and international relations.8 The 1970s also witnessed the establishment of what Lisa Anderson called "a new generation of professional graduate schools of public policy," many of whose graduates went on to work for policy-oriented think tanks rather than in colleges and universities (Anderson 2000, 21).  The Middle East was a relative backwater for the think tank industry until the 1980s. The Middle East Institute, founded in 1946, published a journal and organized conferences but exercised relatively little political clout. By contrast, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), founded in 1985, quickly achieved a much higher profile and much greater influence. Describing itself as "a public educational foundation dedicated to scholarly research and informed debate on U.S. interests in the Middle East,"9 WINEP emerged as the leading pro-Israel think tank in Washington. Its founding director, Martin Indyk, had previously worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), founded in 1959 and by the 1970s by far the most well-funded, visible, and effective pro-Israel lobbying organization.10  Indyk and his colleagues at WINEP worked hard to strengthen Israel’s standing in Washington as the key U.S. ally in the Middle East and to ensure ~End Page 81~ that U.S. policy in the region coincided with the policies and strategies of the Israeli government. During the late 1980s and early 1990s this meant trying to foil U.S. recognition of the PLO and U.S. pressure on Israel to halt settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza and enter serious negotiations. In the 1990s WINEP expanded its purview to encompass the entire Middle East, but its focus always remained on Israel, for which it tried to build support by arguing that Israel and the United States faced a common threat from Islamic radicalism and terrorism, defined rather broadly to encompass virtually all of Israel’s enemies, state and nonstate. Various other think tanks also began or stepped up research and advocacy on Middle East issues in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These included the Haim Saban Center for Middle East Policy, launched by the Brookings Institution in 2002, and the conservative American Enterprise Institute.  During the Clinton administration a substantial number of WINEP alumni served in key foreign policy positions, including Martin Indyk himself, appointed as special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council and, later, as U.S. ambassador to Israel. They and other Clinton administration officials promulgated the policy of "dual containment," whereby the United States would seek to isolate, and if possible eliminate, the governments of both Iraq and Iran, not coincidentally perceived as two of Israel’s most serious enemies. By the late 1990s, however, WINEP would itself be outflanked by newer rivals that unlike WINEP openly aligned themselves with the stances of the Israeli right (or even far right) and argued for aggressive U.S. action against Israel’s enemies, including the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.  The policies these and other explicitly right-wing think tanks advocated during the Clinton years, when they were in the political wilderness, were initially regarded as extreme and outlandish. But many of them would eventually be adopted by the George W. Bush administration, in which their architects assumed key posts. Among them were Vice President Richard Cheney; Defense Policy Board member (and for a time chair) Richard Perle, a key advocate of war against Iraq; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of State John Bolton; and Undersecretary ~End Page 82~ of Defense Douglas Feith. Before assuming power these (people) men and their colleagues had, through such right-wing organizations as the Project for a New American Century and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, called for the use of U.S. military power to dominate the world, massive increases in military spending, and unequivocal support for the policies of the Israeli right.11 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush openly embraced much of their agenda, tacitly supporting Israel’s effort to crush the Palestinian uprising by force and in March-April 2003 invading and occupying Iraq.  The first years of the twenty-first century thus witnessed an unprecedented convergence in positions of supreme power in Washington of right-wing (and in some cases Christian fundamentalist) zealots and neo-conservative American Jews united by a common vision of securing permanent and unchallengeable U.S. global hegemony, with a strong focus on the Middle East and a close embrace of Israel, a vision to be achieved by military force if necessary. The war against Iraq was in a sense the pilot project for this radical vision. As Michael Ledeen, in 2003 "resident scholar in the Freedom Chair" at the American Enterprise Institute and long a fixture among right-wing foreign-policy activists, was reported to have put it, crudely but not inaccurately: "Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business" (Goldberg 2002). More specifically, a reconstructed, oil-rich Iraq was seen as a valuable new base for U.S. power in the Middle East, enabling the United States to terminate its problematic relationship with Saudi Arabia and compel the Arabs (including the Palestinians) to make peace with Israel on the latter’s terms. That the vast majority of the international community, including a great many Americans, vehemently rejected the use of military force to achieve this vision made no difference whatsoever to its advocates.12  There were certainly voices raised, in academia, the think tank world, and elsewhere, in opposition to this agenda and the understanding of the world that underpinned it, as there had been voices offering alternative views about U.S. policy toward the Middle East at other critical junctures. But during the 1980s, 1990s, and early years of the twenty-first century ~End Page 83~ these voices received relatively little attention, and university-based scholars seemed to play a decreasing role in influencing foreign policy. Critics of U.S. foreign policy also found it difficult to make themselves heard through the mass media. It is striking that the great bulk of the "talking heads" who appeared on television to offer their opinions on the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, on the 2003 Iraq war, and on other issues relating to the Middle East and U.S. policy toward it seemed to come not from academia but from professional pundits, from people associated with think tanks or with one of the public policy schools, and from retired military personnel. Whatever their knowledge (or lack thereof) of the languages, politics, histories, and cultures of the Middle East, these people spoke the language and shared the mindset of the Washington foreign policy world in a way few university-based scholars did. They were also used to communicating their perspective in effective sound bites, whereas academics were often put off by the ignorance and political conformism of much (though by no means all) of American mass media journalism and its tendency to crudely oversimplify complex issues and transform everything (even war) into a form of entertainment.  This helped bring about a considerable narrowing of the perspectives available to the public and the consolidation of a powerful, indeed almost impenetrable, consensus about the Middle East that encompassed most of the political class and the punditocracy. Republicans and Democrats argued mainly over how best to maintain U.S. hegemony in the region, leaving very little room for those who envisioned a fundamentally different foreign policy founded on peace, democracy, human rights, mutual security, multilateral disarmament, nonintervention, and respect for international law. It is, however, worth noting that despite the virtual absence of such views in the mass media, they were embraced by a good many Americans, as evidenced by the massive demonstrations that preceded the U.S. attack on Iraq in March 2003 and the polls that indicated substantial public opposition to war, partly because of the new modes and channels of communication and organizing made possible by the Internet.  Nonetheless, in the aftermath of September 11th, critical (and even moderate) voices were largely drowned out by the right, which quickly and effectively moved to implement its global agenda by exploiting public ~End Page 84~ outrage against the Islamist extremists who had perpetrated the September 11th attacks. They succeeded in "selling" first military intervention in Afghanistan (justified by the fact that the Taliban regime had allowed al-Qa’ida to operate in that country and refused to hand over those responsible for organizing the September 11th attacks) and then war against Iraq, even though no one was able to produce any credible evidence that the regime of Saddam Hussein had had anything to do with the September 11th attacks or still possessed weapons of mass destruction. In this effort conservative scholars like Bernard Lewis played a significant part, graphically illustrating their continuing, even enhanced, clout in right-wing policymaking circles long after their standing in scholarly circles had declined, as well as the durability and power of some very old Orientalist notions many had mistakenly thought dead as a doornail.

Tournament: Ndt | Round: 1 | Opponent: Georgia Davis-Galerstein | Judge: Buntin, Galloway, Warden

1AC

The Treason Clause and al-Aulaqi

Citizen-terrorists like Anwar al-Aulaqi are currently denied their constitutional treason clause protections

Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
The Supreme Court has held for over 150 years that creating merely artificial distinctions between
AND
case where the defendant is a citizen-terrorist charged with terrorism offenses.

There are three ways that a law may violate the treason clause’s prohibition on constructive treasons

Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
Upon close reading and as identified in this note for the first time, Supreme
AND
applied, a statute must be construed to avoid creating a constructive treason.

FISA and Federal crime definitions fail to distinguish treason from terrorism in either actus reus or mens rea – it fails both the additive and subtractive formula for determining constructive treasons

Also answers circumvention
Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
An application of the three formulations of the rule against constructive treasons reveals that neither
AND
another crime in deciding to kill al-Aulaqi without Article III process.

This misapplication of law occurred in the killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi who was not given due process owed to him under the treason clause

Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
Prosecution under a differently named crime that affords the protections of the Treason Clause is
AND
executor, then the case will likely address the merits of the case.

Al-Aulaqi meets the definition of both traitor and terrorist – he is guaranteed the most possible protection. Absent the constructive treasons protections, Congress can effectively dodge ALL restrictions present in the treason clause

Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
Imagine if Congress were to create two crimes, A and B, which,
AND
155 Therefore, al-Aulaqi was both a traitor and a terrorist.

Determining whether the executive is conducting war pursuant to legislation is the definition of judicial review – that means the court has to evaluate whether al-Aulaki was properly targeted and properly executed – the aff is justiciable

John Dehn, Assistant Professor in the Department of Law at the United States Military Academy, 2-7-2011, "Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi," http://www.pennlawreview.com/debates/index.php?id=40
A case must also be justiciable, meaning appropriate for judicial review. Justiciability doctrines
AND
the determination that Al-Aulaqi is a targetable member of that organization.

Obama would comply with the provision of due process rights

Craig Green, Prof of Law at Temple Unviersity , Northwestern University Law Review, 2011, Vol 105, No 3"Ending the Korematsu Era: An Early View From the War on Terror Cases".
Jackson’s hard-nosed analysis may seem intellectually bracing, but it understates the real
AND
they may believe—that Supreme Court precedent is authoritative and binding.312

Curriculum Advantage

Education about positive legal analysis must come first – it creates the foundation for normative inquiry – combining policy and legal approaches causes the normative judgments to swamp descriptive analysis.

Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Law and
AND
, 8 Harv. J. L. 26 Pub. Pol’y 255.
Legal education is a very broad subject, indeed, and I think that in
AND
and then to make his normative choices from a narrower set of possibilities.

Understanding legal reasoning is a prerequisite to debating Presidential war powers authority – our approach is crucial to making this "legal topic" a topic that forces us to actually learn the law.

Geoffrey S. Corn, professor in the International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s School, 1998, "PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER: DO THE COURTS OFFER ANY ANSWERS?" 157 Mil. L. Rev. 180 (1998)
~*180~ Few government decisions have greater impact on the military than ordering combat
AND
by both parties to any future political debate surrounding the use of force.

Legal reasoning training is unique a pedagogically beneficial – evaluating the specific outcome of the plan is incompatible with rules based training.

Frederick Schauer, David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, 2009, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning, pub. Harvard University Press, pp. 1-10.
Law schools the world over claim to instruct their students in how to "think like a lawyer." Studying law is not primarily about learning a bunch of legal rules, the law schools insist, for law has far more rules than can be taught in three years of legal education. Besides, many of the legal rules that might be learned in law school will have been changed by the time the students enter legal practice. Nor is legal education about be- ing instructed in where to stand in the courtroom or how to write a will, for many of these skills are better learned once in practice than at a uni- versity. Now it is true that both knowing some legal rules and acquiring the skills of lawyering are important to success in the practice of law. And it is also true that some of this knowledge is usefully gained in law school. But what really distinguishes lawyers from other sorts of folk, so it is said, is mastery of an array of talents in argument and decision- making that are often collectively described as legal reasoning. So even though law schools do teach some legal rules and some practical profes- sional skills, the law schools also maintain that their most important mis- sion is to train students in the arts of legal argument, legal decision- making, and legal reasoning—in thinking like a lawyer. 1 But is there a form of reasoning that is distinctively legal reasoning? Is there something that can be thought of as thinking like a lawyer? Of course some lawyers do think and reason better than others, but the same can be said for physicians, accountants, politicians, soldiers, and social workers. And many lawyers think more analytically, or more precisely, or 1 1. In the 1973 film The Paper Chase, the notorious Professor Kingsfield pro- vides a dramatic illustration of the traditional claim, proclaiming in his Contracts class that "you teach yourself the law. I train your minds. You come in here with a skull full of mush, and if you survive, you’ll leave thinking like a lawyer." more rigorously, than many ordinary people, but so do many economists, scientists, and investment bankers. So the claims of law schools to teach legal reasoning must be other than just teaching students how to think more effectively, or more rationally, or more rigorously. And indeed they are. Law schools aspire to teach their students how to think differently — differently from ordinary people, and differently from members of other professions. Lord Coke maintained as long ago as 1628 that there was an "artificial" reason to law 2 —a distinction between simple rationality and the special methods of the law, and particularly of judges. Of course Lord Coke might have been wrong. Perhaps he was mistaken to suppose that legal reasoning is distinctive, and perhaps legal reasoning is simply reasoning. Sometimes good reasoning, sometimes bad reasoning, and mostly in between, but nevertheless simply reasoning. But then again, Lord Coke might have been right. After all, the idea that legal reasoning is different from ordinary reasoning, even from very good ordinary rea- soning, has been the traditional belief of most lawyers, most judges, and most law schools for a very long time. So although the traditional belief in the distinctiveness of legal reasoning might be mistaken, it comes to us with a sufficiently distinguished provenance that the possibility that there is legal reasoning ought not to be dismissed out of hand. That there might be something distinctive about legal reasoning does not flow inexorably from the existence of law as a discrete profession, for it is far from obvious that those who take up some specialized calling must necessarily think and reason differently from those outside that calling. Electricians know things that carpenters do not, and carpenters know things that plumbers do not. But it would be odd to talk of think- ing like a carpenter or a plumber. Indeed, maybe it is just as odd to talk of thinking like a lawyer. Yet law schools do not think it odd, nor do most lawyers and judges. Law schools and the lawyers and judges they train suppose that lawyers are characterized by more than knowing things that nonlawyers do not. Knowledge of the law is important, as are skills of advocacy and drafting, but the traditional account of what makes law- yers distinctive is that they have something other than this. What lawyers have other than their technical skills and their knowl- 2 THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 2. Sir Edward Coke ~pronounced "cook"~, Commentaries upon Littleton 97b (Charles Butler ed., 1985) (1628). For a modern elaboration, see Charles Fried, "The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know," 60 Tex. L. Rev. 35 (1981). edge of the law is not so simple to pin down, however. It is relatively easy to say what thinking like a lawyer is not. It is rather more difficult to say what it is, and that difficulty may account for part of why there have been numerous skeptical challenges over the years to law’s claim to distinctiveness. Legal Realists (about whom much more will be said in Chapter 7) such as Jerome Frank and (to a lesser extent) Karl Llewellyn insisted that lawyers and judges do not approach problems in any way that differs significantly from the approaches of other policymakers and public decision-makers. Many of the political scientists who study Su- preme Court decision-making often make similar claims, arguing that the ideologies, attitudes, politics, and policy preferences of the Justices play a larger role in the Court’s decisions than do any of the traditional methods of legal reasoning. 3 Psychologists examining the reasoning processes of lawyers and judges focus less on the supposedly characteristic modes of legal reasoning than on those shortcomings of rationality that bedevil all decision-makers, whether lawyers or not. 4 And as far back as the acid cri- tique of the legal profession ("Judge and Company," he called it) offered by Jeremy Bentham in the early part of the nineteenth century, 5 skeptical or deflationary accounts of legal reasoning have existed. Lawyers and judges may be lawyers and judges, so the common thread of these chal- lenges to the traditional story about legal reasoning goes, but they are also human beings, with more or less the full array of human talents and human failings. And the fact that lawyers and judges are human beings explains far more about the methods of legal and judicial reasoning, it 3 INTRODUCTION: IS THERE LEGAL REASONING? 3. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior (1997); Saul Brenner 26 Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court , 1946–1992 (1995); Lee Epstein 26 Jack Knight, The Choices Justice Make (1998); Jeffrey A. Segal 26 Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002); Harold J. Spaeth 26 Jeffrey A. Segal, Ma- jority Rule or Minority Will (1999); Lawrence Baum, "Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court," 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 905 (1988). 4. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 26 Andrew J. Wistrich, "Inside the Judicial Mind," 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777 (2001); Dan Simon, "A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making," 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 511 (2004); Barbara A. Spellman, "On the Supposed Expertise of Judges in Evaluating Evidence," 155 U. Penn L. Rev. PENNumbra No. 1 (2007), http:// www.pennumbra.com/issues/articles/155–1/Spellman.pdf. 5. Jeremy Bentham, "Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence," in 6 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 22–24 (John Bowring ed., 1843). is said, than anything that lawyers or judges may have learned in law school, mastered in legal practice, or picked up while serving as a judge. The skeptics of legal reasoning do not generally believe that lawyers and judges are lying. They do believe, however, that what lawyers and judges think they are doing—their internal view of their own activities— often masks a deeper reality, one in which policy choices and various other nonlegal attributes play a much larger role in explaining legal argu- ments and legal outcomes than even the participants themselves believe or understand. Insofar as this more skeptical picture accurately reflects reality, legal reasoning may be less distinctive and consequently less im- portant than many have thought. But if instead the traditional account is largely sound, and if lawyers and judges, even though they admittedly share many reasoning characteristics with their fellow humans, possess methods of thinking that are distinctively legal, then it is important to ex- plore just what those special characteristics and methods might be. Con- sequently, one way of approaching the alleged distinctiveness of legal rea- soning is to consider just how much of the reasoning of lawyers and judges is explained by their specialized training and roles, on the one hand, and just how much is explained simply by the fact that they are hu- man, on the other. 6 The claim that there is such a thing as legal reasoning is thus a (con- tested) hypothesis that lawyers have ways of approaching problems and making decisions that others do not. But just what are these ways? Some- times people argue that the special skill of the lawyer is a facility in deal- ing with facts and evidence, coupled with the related ability to under- stand the full context of a particular event, dispute, or decision. 7 Yet although these are important skills for good lawyers to have, it is not so clear that successful lawyers have or need them to a greater extent than successful police detectives, historians, psychiatrists, and anthropol- ogists. Similarly, others have sought to characterize legal reasoning in 4 THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 6. See Frederick Schauer, "Is There a Psychology of Judging?," in David E. Klein 26 Gregory Mitchell, The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making (forth- coming 2009). 7. See, e.g., Steven Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning (3d ed., 2005); Richard A. Bandstra, "Looking Toward Lansing: Could You Be a Law- yer/Legislator?," 89 Mich. B.J. 28 (2005); Martha Minow 26 Elizabeth Spelman, "In Context," 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1597 (1990). terms of a heightened ability to see the other side of an argument, 8 or, relatedly, of being empathetic to individuals and putting one’s self in the shoes of another, 9 but these too are attributes we expect to see in good thinkers and good people of all stripes. Indeed, even the oft-touted legal talent for reasoning by analogy 10 is hardly distinctive to lawyers and judges, for using analogies effectively may well be what distinguishes ex- perts from novices in almost any field of endeavor. 11 So yes, we would like lawyers and judges to be smart, sympathetic, analytic, rigorous, pre- cise, open-minded, and sensitive to factual nuance, among other things, but because these are also the traits we wish to have in our politicians, so- cial workers, physicians, and investment bankers, it is not yet so clear what skills or characteristics, if any, lawyers are supposed to have that others do not. The chapters in this book are dedicated to exploring the various forms of reasoning that have traditionally been especially associated with the legal system, such as making decisions according to rules, treating certain sources as authoritative, respecting precedent even when it ap- pears to dictate the wrong outcome, being sensitive to burdens of proof, and being attuned to questions of decision-making jurisdiction—under- standing that it is one thing to recognize a correct outcome but another to realize that some institutions might be empowered to reach that out- come while others are not. But we should not at the outset set up unreal- istic aspirations for legal reasoning’s claim to distinctiveness. In the first place, law cannot plausibly be seen as a closed system, in the way that games like chess might be. All of the moves of a game of chess can be found in the rules of chess, but not all of the moves in legal argument and 5 INTRODUCTION: IS THERE LEGAL REASONING? 8. See Suzanna Sherry, "Democracy and the Death of Knowledge," 75 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 1053 (2007). 9. See Katherine Bartlett, "Feminist Legal Methods," 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829 (1990). 10. E.g., Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996); Lloyd Weinreb, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument (2005). 11. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Forbus, "Exploring Analogy in the Large," in The An- alogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science 23 (Kenneth D. Forbus, Keith J. Holyoak, 26 Boris N. Kokinov eds., 2001); Keith J. Holyoak, "Analogy," in The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning 117 (Keith J. Holyoak 26 Rob- ert J. Morrison eds., 2005). legal decision-making can be found in the rules of law. 12 Not only does law of necessity depend on numerous skills other than those explicitly understood to be legal, but law is inevitably and especially subject to the unforeseeable complexity of the human condition. We can at best imper- fectly predict the future, just as we continue to be uncertain about what we will do with that future once we get there. As the world continues to throw the unexpected at us, law will find itself repeatedly forced to go outside of the existing rules in order to serve the society in which it ex- ists. Law may well contain within its arsenal of argument and decision- making the resources it needs to adapt to a changing world, but insofar as that is the case, it is even less likely that the image of a totally closed system in which existing rules of law—and maybe even the existing prac- tices of legal argument—will be an accurate picture of what law does and how it does it. Not only is law not a closed system, but its characteristic methods of reasoning, if indeed there are such methods, are also not ones that are completely unique to law. Perhaps there is little overlap between Esto- nian and English, or between literary criticism and multivariate calculus, but it is not plausible to deny that even the most characteristic forms of legal reasoning are found outside the legal system. It is true that lawyers and judges frequently make arguments and decisions based on the dic- tates of written-down rules, but so do bureaucrats, bankers, and every one of us when we observe the speed limit written on a sign. The legal system also seems particularly concerned with precedent—with doing the same thing that has been done before just because it has been done be- fore. But this form of thinking is again hardly unique to law, as is well known to parents when dealing with the argument by a younger child that he or she should be allowed to do something at a certain age only be- cause an older sibling was allowed to do the same thing at that age. And although law is also an institution characterized by authority-based rea- soning—taking the source of a directive rather than the reasons behind it as a justification for following it—this too is hardly unknown outside of the legal system. The family is again a good example, and every parent who has ever in exasperation exclaimed "Because I said so21" to a stub- 6 THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 12. For a well-known denial that law can possibly be seen as a closed and deductive system, see H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 608 (1958). born child recognizes that appeals to authority rather than reason have their place throughout human existence. Yet although the characteristic modes of legal reasoning are all fre- quently found outside the law, it might still be that these forms of rea- soning and decision-making are particularly concentrated in the legal system. For however much these various forms of reasoning do exist throughout our decision-making lives, it is important not to forget that they are odd, and odd in a special way. And this special oddness is that every one of the dominant characteristics of legal reasoning and legal ar- gument can be seen as a route toward reaching a decision other than the best all-things-considered decision for the matter at hand. Often when we obey a speed limit we are driving at a speed that is not the same as what we think is the best speed given the traffic, the driving conditions, and our own driving skills. Consequently, to obey a speed limit is to do something we do not think best. Similarly, making a decision just because the same decision has been made before—following precedent—gets in- teresting primarily when we would otherwise have made a different deci- sion. The parent who gives the younger child the same privileges at the same age as an older child feels the pull of precedent only when he or she otherwise thinks there is a good reason for treating the two differently, and so being constrained by precedent is again a path away from what had otherwise seemed to be the right decision. And we say we are obey- ing or following an authority only if what we are doing because of what the authority has said is not the same as what we would have done if left to our own devices to make the decision we thought best. The soldier who follows an order might well do something else if allowed to make his or her own unguided (or uncommanded) decision, just as the obedi- ent student or child is one who suppresses his or her own desires to do something else. Once we understand that these admittedly common forms of reason- ing and decision-making are nevertheless somewhat peculiar—that they often dictate outcomes other than those the decision-maker would other- wise have chosen—we can understand as well that the substantial pres- ence of these forms of reasoning in the legal system—more substantial, proportionately, than in the totality of our decision-making lives—can provide the foundation for a plausible claim that there is such a thing as legal reasoning. If these somewhat counterintuitive forms of reasoning— forms of reasoning that often lead to results other than what would oth- 7 INTRODUCTION: IS THERE LEGAL REASONING? erwise seem to be the best all-things-considered outcome for the case at hand—are dominant in law but somewhat more exceptional elsewhere, then we might be able to conclude that there is such a thing as legal rea- soning, that there is something we might label "thinking like a lawyer," and that there is accordingly something that it is vitally important that lawyers and judges know how to do well and that law schools must teach their students. To repeat, this array of reasoning methods is not unique to the legal system, and these are not the only methods that the law uses. The modes of legal reasoning are found elsewhere, and the modes of what we might call "ordinary" reasoning have a large place in legal argu- ment and legal decision-making. But if it turns out that there are indeed methods of reasoning that are found everywhere but that are particularly concentrated and dominant in legal argument and decision-making, then the claim that there is something called legal reasoning will turn out to be justified. Law’s seemingly counterintuitive methods are not simply a historical peculiarity. Rather, they are a function of law’s inherent generality. Al- though disputes, in court and out, involve particular people with particu- lar problems engaged in particular controversies, the law tends to treat the particulars it confronts as members of larger categories. Rather than attempting to reach the best result for each controversy in a wholly particularistic and contextual way, law’s goal is often to make sure that the outcome for all or at least most of the particulars in a given category is the right one. Once again Lord Coke is illuminating: "It is better saith the Law to suffer a mischiefe (that is particular to one) than an inconve- nience that may prejudice many." 13 In other words, for Coke it was better to reach the wrong result in the particular controversy than to adopt a rule that would produce what would seem to be the correct result for this case but at the cost of producing the wrong result in many others. Coke’s lesson can be observed in the traditional ritual of Socratic dialogue 14 that takes place between student and teacher in the first year 8 THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 13. Sir Edward Coke, as quoted in J.R. Stoner, Common Law and Liberal The- ory: Coke, Hobbes, and the Origins of American Constitutionalism 25 (1992). 14. There is scant connection between the question-centered methods of teach- ing employed by Socrates in the Platonic dialogues and the type of questioning that has traditionally taken place in the law school classroom. Even apart from the enormous advantage that Plato had over the rest of us in being able to write the an- swers as well as the questions, Socrates’ goal was to extract from his interlocutors some latent but nonspecialized insight, rather than to inculcate in them a special- of law school. After eventually being coaxed into accurately reciting the facts of some reported case, the student is asked what she thinks should be the correct result for the present case. Typically, the student then re- sponds by announcing what she believes to be the fairest or most just outcome between the opposing positions of the particular parties. At this point the student is asked by her interrogator to give the rule or principle that would support this outcome, and here the characteristic pattern of Socratic inquiry begins. By a series of patterned and well-planned (and often well-worn) hypothetical examples, the professor challenges the stu- dent’s initially offered rule, with the aim of demonstrating that the rule that would generate a just or fair or efficient outcome in the present case would generate less just, less fair, or otherwise less satisfactory results in other cases. And in taking the chosen victim through this series of un- comfortable applications of her initially selected rule, the professor at- tempts to get all the students in the class to understand, just as Coke ar- gued, that the best legal rule may at times be one which will produce an unjust result in the present case but which will produce better results in a larger number of cases, the result in the present case notwithstanding. This form of Socratic inquiry is not restricted to the law school class- room, and it is noteworthy that it is the common form of judicial ques- tioning in appellate argument. Because appellate courts often see them- selves as pronouncing rules that will control other and future factual situations, and as writing opinions that will serve as precedents in subse- quent cases, appellate judges are often concerned as much with the effect of their immediate ruling on future cases as with reaching the best result in the present case. As a consequence, appellate advocates frequently find themselves asked in oral argument how the rule or result they are advo- cating will play out in various hypothetical situations. Just as in the law school classroom, judges pose these hypothetical scenarios to the lawyers who argue before them because of the belief that what seems initially to be the right result in the particular dispute before the court will wind up 9 INTRODUCTION: IS THERE LEGAL REASONING? as the actual outcome only if it can be justified in a way that will not pro- duce the wrong outcomes in too many expected future cases. In seeking to demonstrate to the hapless student or the struggling ad- vocate how the best legal outcome may be something other than the best outcome for the immediate controversy, the prototypical Socratic inter- rogation embodies law’s pervasive willingness to reach a result differing from the one that is optimally fair or maximally wise, all things consid- ered, in the particular case. In United States v. Locke, 15 for example, the Supreme Court dealt with a case in which a renewal of a land claim that had been filed on December 31, 1982, had been rejected by the Bureau of Land Management because the relevant statute required that such filings be lodged "prior to December 31" of any given year. Although it seemed obvious to the Court and to virtually everyone else that the language of the statute was defective, and that what Congress really meant to say was "on or prior to December 31," Justice Thurgood Marshall and five other Justices concluded that the particular rights and wrongs of Locke’s own claim were less important than the larger question whether the Supreme Court should be in the business of rewriting even obviously mistaken fed- eral statutes, especially ones dealing with deadlines and filing dates. Here and elsewhere, law is typically concerned with the full array of applica- tions of some general rule and principle, and as a result the law often pur- sues that concern at the cost of being less worried than nonlegal decision- makers might be with a possible error or injustice or unfairness in the particular case. When the Rule of Law is described, as it traditionally was, in contrast to the rule of men, the idea was that the Rule of Law was a principle that was wary of individual judgment and reluctant to rely too heavily on the unguided judgments and whims of particular people. So although it may sometimes seem unfair to take the existence of a clear rule or a clear precedent as commanding a result the judge herself thinks wrong, following even a rule or precedent perceived by the judge to be er- roneous is what, under the traditional understanding, the law often ex- pects its decision-makers to do. 16

Our rules based approach is necessary to develop analogical reasoning

Danny Priel, Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow at Yale Law School, Assistant Professor, University of Warwick School of Law, citing Lloyd Weinreb, Professor at Harvard Law School, 2008, "THINKING LIKE A LAWYER," http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096170
"You come in here with a skull full of mush, and you leave
AND
to understand how law operates unless we understand how reasoning by analogy works.

Analogical reasoning is the best heuristic for developing moral convictions and making decisions in a time-constrained, pluralistic society

Cass Sunstein, Robert Walmsley University Professor and Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, 1993, "On Analogical Reasoning" Harvard Law Review, Vol. 106, No. 3 (Jan., 1993), pp. 741-791
Analogical reasoning is the conventional method of the lawyer; it plays a large role
AND
evaluating our practices, and for deciding whether to change them through law.

Plan

Text: The United States federal judiciary should enjoin targeted killing by the United States federal government of citizens of the United States who are designated by the United States federal government as terrorists without due process on the grounds that federal definitions of terrorism constitute immaterial distinctions from treason.

Tournament: Cedanats | Round: 5 | Opponent: Binghamton Herrera-Cepin | Judge: Cooper

Plan

Plan: The targeted killing war powers authority of the President of the United States should be statutorily prohibited.

Advantage

US drone strikes terrorize the people of Waziristan – they tear apart communities by making it impossible to gather and generate cycles of violence in reprisal attacks – those attacks provide the conditions for more strikes. They should be ended.

Akbar Ahmed, Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at American University, 2013, The Thistle and the Drone, p 81-84
American drone strikes caused further devastation in a landscape already in turmoil. Strikes began
AND
of NWA are against these strikes. I am against these drone strikes21

They also represent a war on democracy in Pakistan – guarantee cycles of violence which empower the military and violent resistance

M.W. Aslam, PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Leeds, 2011, "A critical evaluation of American drone strikes in Pakistan: legality, legitimacy and prudence," Vol 4 no 3, T and F Online
As in some other tribally based societies of the world, the tribal areas of
AND
of supporting Pakistan’s key democratic institution, its National Assembly (Cloughley 2011).

Recognizing the violence the US commits against Pakistanis is critical to creating a relationship of respectful dialogue

Madiha Tahir, independent journalist who worked in Pakistan covering conflict, culture and politics, 10-4-2013, "Life Under Drones in Pakistan," Counterpunch, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/10/04/life-under-drones-in-pakistan/
PG: Can you talk about the victims of drone strikes and the effect drones
AND
continues its meddling, occupation, and funding of the Pakistani political establishment.

The drone strike regime is a tool for violent authoritarianism and should be ethically rejected

Ken Butigan, Depaul Peace Studies, 9-14-2013 http://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/09/14-0, September 14, 2013 by Waging Nonviolence-http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/renouncing-right-bear-drones/ ¶ Renouncing the Right to Bear Drones
The riveting attention paid to chemical weapons in Syria over the past few weeks is
AND
for another group of five people arrested at Beale this past April 30.

The trajectory of unrestricted drone warfare guarantees drone strikes against the entire globe

Eric Posner, professor at University of Chicago Law School, 5-17-2013, "The drone paradox; When robots eliminate the risk of casualties, wars are likely to become more common," National Post, ln
Similarly, we may be comfortable with giving the president authority to use military force
AND
killing machines has finally arrived. The law now has to catch up.

Method

Policy relevance key to public engagement, new perspectives, peace, democracy, and preventing imperialism – scholars need to speak the language of policy makers.

Zachary Lockman is Chair of the Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at New York University 2005 "Critique from the Right The Neo-conservative Assault on Middle East Studies" CR: The New Centennial Review 5.1 (2005) 63-110
It may be too soon to tell, but from the vantage point of the first years of the twenty-first century it would seem that area studies has weathered the storms of the immediate post–Cold War period. In large part this may have been because these fields, including Middle East studies as practiced in the United States, were by the 1990s not what they had been 30 years earlier. The sharp decline (within academia, at least) of once dominant paradigms like a cultural-essentialist Orientalism and modernization theory resulted in the dissipation of the intellectual coherence that had characterized the field in its first decades. But the kind of intellectual fragmentation that had come to characterize Middle East studies was the norm across a great many other fields and disciplines and was counterbalanced, probably even outweighed, by the fact that many Middle East specialists, perhaps especially younger scholars, were now not only well versed in the theoretical and methodological issues and debates of their own disciplines but also routinely engaged with innovative work that cut across or transcended disciplinary boundaries. They could thus increasingly manage, without any great difficulty, to participate in productive scholarly conversations not only with their disciplinary colleagues (fellow historians, political scientists, anthropologists, literature specialists, etc.) but also with scholars from other disciplines interested in this part of the world and in others as well.  Moreover, because so many scholars working on the Middle East were participants in the scholarly conversations and debates that had transformed broad segments of the humanities and the social sciences in recent decades, Middle East studies had to a considerable extent overcome its ~End Page 73~ insular and rather backward character and was now much more open to, and engaged with, the wider intellectual world than had once been the case. The developments of the last two or three decades, including the critiques of Orientalism and modernization theory; the broad range of new work on colonialism; innovative approaches to historical, social, and cultural analysis influenced by critical anthropology; and, more broadly, heightened interaction among disciplines and fields had given many within Middle East studies a new set of common languages that facilitated productive intellectual exchange.3 This was also a much more intellectually and politically self-aware and self-critical field than was once the case. As a result, the best of the new work in this field was by the beginning of the twenty-first century very much on a par with the best produced in other area studies fields, and scholars specializing in the Middle East were being read and listened to by scholars specializing in other parts of the world as never before.4  In conjunction with a generally higher level of mastery of relevant languages and the use of innovative theoretical and methodological approaches, scholars in the field were by the late twentieth century also making use of a broader range of sources than in the past. A case in point is work on the history of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. Students and scholars with a command of both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish made increasing use not only of the vast Ottoman imperial archives in Istanbul but also of local Islamic court records and family papers, along with more traditional sources like the writings of European consuls and travelers, to produce portraits of social, political, economic, and cultural life in these lands in the last four hundred years of Ottoman rule of unprecedented depth and complexity.5  These studies helped to undermine what was once conventional wisdom in late Ottoman history, that these lands were economically, socially, and culturally stagnant before Napoleon’s army landed in Egypt in 1798; that they were uniformly characterized by despotism, the oppressive and retrograde imposition of Islamic law, and the rigorous segregation and subordination of non-Muslims; and that all real change was induced by contact with the West. Instead, the newer scholarship began to elucidate indigenous sources and dynamics of change while also showing how this ~End Page 74~ region was part of the broader sweep of world history long before the nineteenth century and the onset of westernization or modernization as conventionally understood. As a result of these scholarly advances, Ottoman historians often came to have much broader and more fully comparative perspectives than historians of early modern Europe, many of whom had only recently come to understand that they needed to overcome their own provincialism by addressing the ways in which developments in Europe were not utterly sui generis but often were bound up with larger patterns and dynamics of change that affected large stretches of Eurasia.   Scholars and the State  If the preceding assessment is accurate, it is fair to say that the changes that transformed Middle East studies in the United States over the last several decades of the twentieth century made it a more intellectually productive and interesting scholarly field. However, this development was accompanied by a growing gap between academics studying the Middle East and the officials, agencies, and institutions of the U.S. government, and a corresponding decline in the influence of university-based scholars on the shaping of foreign policy and on the media, the main purveyor of information, images, and attitudes about the region to the broad public.  For one, a good many (though by no means all) students and scholars in this field were less than happy with U.S. government policies toward the Middle East in the 1980s and beyond. Hard evidence is lacking, but it is probably safe to suggest that much of the membership of the Middle East Studies Association, the field’s main professional organization, was not enthusiastic about U.S. support for Saddam Hussein’s regime in its war against Iran in the 1980s, the U.S.-led Gulf War of 1991, the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq thereafter, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, or, more broadly, the extent to which successive U.S. administrations countenanced Israel’s ongoing occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; its continuing implantation of Jewish settlements there; and its rejection of a Palestinian state in those territories as endorsed by virtually the entire international community. There was a widespread (though never universal) ~End Page 75~ sense that the policies pursued by the United States in the Middle East were hindering, rather than contributing to, peace, democracy, human rights, development, and progress in the region.  This disaffection from official policy and the premises that underpinned it did not mean that U.S.-based scholars studying the Middle East were unwilling to share their perspectives on, and try to influence, U.S. policy toward the region. In fact, many devoted a great deal of time and effort to trying to educate the broader public through informal meetings, lectures, articles, op-ed pieces, radio and television interviews, and the like, and to convey their views to elected officials; not a few were also quite willing to meet with State Department and intelligence agency personnel. It is rather that the shared vision of the world, and of the place of the United States within it, that had once linked the world of academia with the world of policymaking had faded, and many scholars no longer spoke the same language as policymakers.  Adding to this sense of distance and alienation was a new and much more critical understanding of the proper relationship between scholars and the state—not a surprising development in the aftermath of a period in which the pernicious ends to which scholarly knowledge could be put had been made all too visible, in Vietnam but elsewhere as well. In the first decades of the Cold War a good many scholars in this as in other area studies fields, especially social scientists working on contemporary issues, saw no problem with conducting research on behalf of the government and cooperating with intelligence agencies because they were all part of the good fight against Communism. By the 1980s those who were assuming the leadership in U.S. Middle East studies were by and large much more wary about their sources of funding and the ends to which their training and research, and that of their students, might be put. Fewer scholars were willing to allow what they knew about the region to be used in the service of a state about whose policies they were often at least dubious, for example, by conducting research for agencies like the CIA or by encouraging promising students to enter government service. There developed a widespread sense that to allow one’s research agenda to be determined by the needs of the state or to serve potentially pernicious ends was not only a betrayal of one’s ~End Page 76~ integrity as a scholar but might also compromise one’s ability to conduct research in the Middle East, where by the 1980s real or alleged CIA connections had gotten Americans and others denounced, kidnapped, or worse.  At issue was not government funding per se: since the passage of the National Defense Education Act in 1958, a great many students and scholars working on the Middle East had happily made use of NDFL/FLAS and other government fellowships for language training, graduate study, and research. A large proportion of the budgets of the centers for Middle East studies at universities around the country also came from the federal government. But because this individual and institutional funding came through the U.S. Department of Education it was deemed ethically and politically acceptable even by those who most vociferously disagreed with U.S. government policies in the Middle East. Similarly, additional government funding for graduate student and faculty research on the Middle East first made available by the 1992 Near and Middle East Research and Training Act—originally channeled through the Social Science Research Council and later through the Council of American Overseas Research Centers—was not seen as posing a problem because the funding was allocated first through the U.S. Information Agency and then through the State Department budget.  The real issue was which part of the U.S. government was supplying the funding, for what ends, and with what conditions. As early as 1985 the Middle East Studies Association had asked "university-based international studies programs to refrain from responding to requests for research contract proposals from the Defense Academic Research Support Program ~established by the Defense Department to fund academic research on issues of interest to the military~ or from other intelligence entities and call~ed~ upon its members to reflect carefully upon their responsibilities to the academic profession prior to seeking or accepting funding from intelligence sources."6 Some years later MESA also criticized the new National Security Education Program (NSEP), created by the National Security Education Act of 1991. The NSEP sought to bolster the teaching of "less commonly taught" languages (including Arabic, Persian, and Turkish), thereby enabling (as the ~End Page 77~ program’s website put it) "the nation to remain integrally involved in global issues related to U.S. National Security" as well as to "develop a cadre of professionals with more than the traditional knowledge of language and culture who can use this ability to help the U.S. make sound decisions on and deal effectively with global issues related to U.S. National Security" (see the NSEP website at http://www.iie.org/programs/nsep/nsephome.htm). Unlike other programs funding research and training on the Middle East, the NSEP was housed in the Department of Defense, intelligence agency officials sat on its oversight board, and recipients of the funding it offered were required to work for a government agency involved in national security affairs after their fellowship or scholarship was completed. In a 1993 resolution endorsed by a referendum of its membership, MESA joined with the African Studies Association and the Latin American Studies Association to "deplore the location of responsibility in the U.S. defense and intelligence community for a major foreign area research, education, and training program. . . . This connection can only increase the existing difficulties of gaining foreign governmental permissions to carry out research and to develop overseas instructional programs. It can also create dangers for students and scholars by fostering the perception of involvement in military or intelligence activities, and may limit academic freedom." MESA called on the government to establish a peer and merit review process for funding applications that would be independent of military, intelligence, and foreign policy agencies and to broaden the service requirement so that it would include a much wider range of jobs, including those outside government service.  Until its concerns were met, MESA urged that "its members and their institutions not seek or accept program or research funding from NSEA...." Three years later MESA adopted yet another resolution reiterating its rejection of NSEP because the law appropriating funding for the program now required that all fellowship recipients agree to work for the Defense Department or some intelligence agency for at least two years or else repay the cost of their fellowship (see the NSEP website, as well as the MESA resolutions site at http://w3fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/resolutions.htm). (This last requirement was later relaxed somewhat so that recipients who ~End Page 78~ could not find employment with a national security agency despite a "good faith effort" to do so could fulfill the service requirement by working in higher education.) MESA would voice the same concerns about other outgrowths of the NSEP, for example, the 2002 National Flagship Language Initiative–Pilot Program (NFLI-P), launched to address what were seen as America’s extraordinary deficiencies in languages critical to national security. Many (though by no means all) Middle East studies faculty adopted MESA’s perspective on this issue, declining to seek NSEP funding for themselves or their institutions.  The disinclination by MESA and many of its individual and institutional members to cooperate with the government in ways that had been common in the 1950s and 1960s was certainly not shared by everyone in the field. Yet it is instructive that when in the 1980s reports surfaced of questionable links between academics and intelligence agencies, the most vocal response among scholars in the field was condemnation. A case in point is the scandal surrounding Nadav Safran, a political scientist whose first book set forth an analysis of modern Egyptian history informed by modernization theory and who by the mid-1980s was director of Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies. The scandal erupted when it became known that Safran had taken 2445,700 from the Central Intelligence Agency to fund a major international conference he was hosting at Harvard on "Islam and Politics in the Contemporary Muslim World"—a hot topic at the time and one of obvious interest to the CIA. Not only had Safran secretly used CIA funding for this conference, he had not told the invitees, a number of whom were coming from the Middle East, that the CIA was picking up the tab. It then came out that Safran had also received a 24107,430 grant from the CIA for the research project that led to his 1985 book Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Request for Security. Safran’s contract with the CIA stipulated that the agency had the right to review and approve the manuscript before publication and that its role in funding the book would not be disclosed. And indeed, the book as published made no mention of the fact that the research for it had been partially funded by the CIA.  When the scandal broke, about half the invitees to Safran’s conference withdrew, and many of the faculty and students associated with Harvard’s ~End Page 79~ Center for Middle Eastern Studies publicly expressed their opposition to Safran’s actions. A month later the Middle East Studies Association censured Safran on the grounds that his actions had violated its 1982 resolution calling on scholars to disclose their sources of research funding. Safran intimated that his critics were motivated by anti-Semitism, but after an internal investigation at Harvard he agreed to step down as center director at the end of the academic year.7 Safran was surely not the only academic to have secretly or openly solicited or accepted funding from an intelligence agency for his research in this period, and no doubt such relationships persisted long after this scandal, but the reaction to it—unimaginable in the early decades of U.S. Middle East studies—does indicate how the relationship between academia and the state had changed. Think Tanks and Talking Heads  But there was a price to be paid for the gap that had opened up between the world of Middle East scholarship and the world of policymaking. If many college- and university-based academics no longer entirely shared the worldview that prevailed in Washington or no longer felt the need to shape their research agenda so that it was relevant to the policies that flowed from that worldview, there were others who stood ready to meet the demand for knowledge that would serve the state. Many of these were based not in institutions of higher education but in the host of think tanks that had proliferated from the 1970s onward—privately funded institutions oriented toward the production and dissemination of knowledge designed to inform and influence public policy, for our purposes mainly the foreign policy of the United States.  Some of these institutions and organizations went back a long way. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, was founded in 1910 to advance international cooperation, while the Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of the influential journal Foreign Affairs, was established in 1921, originally as a sort of elite dinner club. The liberal Brookings Institution was established in 1927, supported by Carnegie and Rockefeller funding, while the conservative American Enterprise Institute was founded ~End Page 80~ in 1943 to promote "limited government," "free enterprise," and a "strong foreign policy and national defense." After the Second World War, contractors like the huge RAND Corporation entered the field to produce or fund research for the military and intelligence and other government agencies concerned with foreign policy. Another wave beginning in the 1960s had witnessed the establishment of a large number of what one observer called "advocacy" think tanks, like the Center for Strategic and International Studies (1962), the Heritage Foundation (1973), and the Cato Institute (1977), which combined "policy research with aggressive marketing techniques" as they struggled to secure funding and influence in an increasingly competitive marketplace. There are now also many "legacy-based" institutions, like the Carter Center in Atlanta and the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom in Washington, D.C. By the end of the twentieth century there were an estimated 2,000 organizations engaged in policy analysis based in the United States, a substantial proportion of them focused on foreign policy and international relations.8 The 1970s also witnessed the establishment of what Lisa Anderson called "a new generation of professional graduate schools of public policy," many of whose graduates went on to work for policy-oriented think tanks rather than in colleges and universities (Anderson 2000, 21).  The Middle East was a relative backwater for the think tank industry until the 1980s. The Middle East Institute, founded in 1946, published a journal and organized conferences but exercised relatively little political clout. By contrast, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), founded in 1985, quickly achieved a much higher profile and much greater influence. Describing itself as "a public educational foundation dedicated to scholarly research and informed debate on U.S. interests in the Middle East,"9 WINEP emerged as the leading pro-Israel think tank in Washington. Its founding director, Martin Indyk, had previously worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), founded in 1959 and by the 1970s by far the most well-funded, visible, and effective pro-Israel lobbying organization.10  Indyk and his colleagues at WINEP worked hard to strengthen Israel’s standing in Washington as the key U.S. ally in the Middle East and to ensure ~End Page 81~ that U.S. policy in the region coincided with the policies and strategies of the Israeli government. During the late 1980s and early 1990s this meant trying to foil U.S. recognition of the PLO and U.S. pressure on Israel to halt settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza and enter serious negotiations. In the 1990s WINEP expanded its purview to encompass the entire Middle East, but its focus always remained on Israel, for which it tried to build support by arguing that Israel and the United States faced a common threat from Islamic radicalism and terrorism, defined rather broadly to encompass virtually all of Israel’s enemies, state and nonstate. Various other think tanks also began or stepped up research and advocacy on Middle East issues in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These included the Haim Saban Center for Middle East Policy, launched by the Brookings Institution in 2002, and the conservative American Enterprise Institute.  During the Clinton administration a substantial number of WINEP alumni served in key foreign policy positions, including Martin Indyk himself, appointed as special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council and, later, as U.S. ambassador to Israel. They and other Clinton administration officials promulgated the policy of "dual containment," whereby the United States would seek to isolate, and if possible eliminate, the governments of both Iraq and Iran, not coincidentally perceived as two of Israel’s most serious enemies. By the late 1990s, however, WINEP would itself be outflanked by newer rivals that unlike WINEP openly aligned themselves with the stances of the Israeli right (or even far right) and argued for aggressive U.S. action against Israel’s enemies, including the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.  The policies these and other explicitly right-wing think tanks advocated during the Clinton years, when they were in the political wilderness, were initially regarded as extreme and outlandish. But many of them would eventually be adopted by the George W. Bush administration, in which their architects assumed key posts. Among them were Vice President Richard Cheney; Defense Policy Board member (and for a time chair) Richard Perle, a key advocate of war against Iraq; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of State John Bolton; and Undersecretary ~End Page 82~ of Defense Douglas Feith. Before assuming power these (people) men and their colleagues had, through such right-wing organizations as the Project for a New American Century and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, called for the use of U.S. military power to dominate the world, massive increases in military spending, and unequivocal support for the policies of the Israeli right.11 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush openly embraced much of their agenda, tacitly supporting Israel’s effort to crush the Palestinian uprising by force and in March-April 2003 invading and occupying Iraq.  The first years of the twenty-first century thus witnessed an unprecedented convergence in positions of supreme power in Washington of right-wing (and in some cases Christian fundamentalist) zealots and neo-conservative American Jews united by a common vision of securing permanent and unchallengeable U.S. global hegemony, with a strong focus on the Middle East and a close embrace of Israel, a vision to be achieved by military force if necessary. The war against Iraq was in a sense the pilot project for this radical vision. As Michael Ledeen, in 2003 "resident scholar in the Freedom Chair" at the American Enterprise Institute and long a fixture among right-wing foreign-policy activists, was reported to have put it, crudely but not inaccurately: "Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business" (Goldberg 2002). More specifically, a reconstructed, oil-rich Iraq was seen as a valuable new base for U.S. power in the Middle East, enabling the United States to terminate its problematic relationship with Saudi Arabia and compel the Arabs (including the Palestinians) to make peace with Israel on the latter’s terms. That the vast majority of the international community, including a great many Americans, vehemently rejected the use of military force to achieve this vision made no difference whatsoever to its advocates.12  There were certainly voices raised, in academia, the think tank world, and elsewhere, in opposition to this agenda and the understanding of the world that underpinned it, as there had been voices offering alternative views about U.S. policy toward the Middle East at other critical junctures. But during the 1980s, 1990s, and early years of the twenty-first century ~End Page 83~ these voices received relatively little attention, and university-based scholars seemed to play a decreasing role in influencing foreign policy. Critics of U.S. foreign policy also found it difficult to make themselves heard through the mass media. It is striking that the great bulk of the "talking heads" who appeared on television to offer their opinions on the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, on the 2003 Iraq war, and on other issues relating to the Middle East and U.S. policy toward it seemed to come not from academia but from professional pundits, from people associated with think tanks or with one of the public policy schools, and from retired military personnel. Whatever their knowledge (or lack thereof) of the languages, politics, histories, and cultures of the Middle East, these people spoke the language and shared the mindset of the Washington foreign policy world in a way few university-based scholars did. They were also used to communicating their perspective in effective sound bites, whereas academics were often put off by the ignorance and political conformism of much (though by no means all) of American mass media journalism and its tendency to crudely oversimplify complex issues and transform everything (even war) into a form of entertainment.  This helped bring about a considerable narrowing of the perspectives available to the public and the consolidation of a powerful, indeed almost impenetrable, consensus about the Middle East that encompassed most of the political class and the punditocracy. Republicans and Democrats argued mainly over how best to maintain U.S. hegemony in the region, leaving very little room for those who envisioned a fundamentally different foreign policy founded on peace, democracy, human rights, mutual security, multilateral disarmament, nonintervention, and respect for international law. It is, however, worth noting that despite the virtual absence of such views in the mass media, they were embraced by a good many Americans, as evidenced by the massive demonstrations that preceded the U.S. attack on Iraq in March 2003 and the polls that indicated substantial public opposition to war, partly because of the new modes and channels of communication and organizing made possible by the Internet.  Nonetheless, in the aftermath of September 11th, critical (and even moderate) voices were largely drowned out by the right, which quickly and effectively moved to implement its global agenda by exploiting public ~End Page 84~ outrage against the Islamist extremists who had perpetrated the September 11th attacks. They succeeded in "selling" first military intervention in Afghanistan (justified by the fact that the Taliban regime had allowed al-Qa’ida to operate in that country and refused to hand over those responsible for organizing the September 11th attacks) and then war against Iraq, even though no one was able to produce any credible evidence that the regime of Saddam Hussein had had anything to do with the September 11th attacks or still possessed weapons of mass destruction. In this effort conservative scholars like Bernard Lewis played a significant part, graphically illustrating their continuing, even enhanced, clout in right-wing policymaking circles long after their standing in scholarly circles had declined, as well as the durability and power of some very old Orientalist notions many had mistakenly thought dead as a doornail.

Focus on creating safe spaces misdiagnoses the problem and shift focus away from effective efforts to challenge broader structures of power – their politics of the self refocuses on the individual creating a colonialist conception of the subject.

Andrea Smith, intellectual, feminist, and anti-violence activist, 2013, The Problem with "Privilege," http://anarchalibrary.blogspot.com/2013/08/the-problem-with-privilege-2013.html
This kind of politics then challenges the notions of "safe space" often prevalent
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open ourselves to new possibilities that we cannot imagine now for the future. 

We’re not pro-State, but we’re "anti-anti-statist" – Some things can ONLY be solved "through the system". Restricting drone authority is an instance of that.

Dr. Richard Barbrook, School of Westminster, Nettime, "More Provocations", 6-5-1997,  Amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-1-9706/msg00034.html
 I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-
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can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.

Use reason contextually to respond to situations of oppression – attempts to universally determine in advance the strategy we should use fails and guarantees oppression

Daria Roithmayr, Assoc. Law Prof @ Illinois, 2003, "Beyond Right and Reason," 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 939
The version of pragmatism I want to defend against Schlag’s critique differs quite significantly from
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might advance political or ethical commitments to equality, empowerment, or inclusion.

Legislation is key to reign in endless war

Alan W. Dowd, writer on National Defense, Foreign Policy, and International Security, Winter-Spring 2013, "Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings," Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf
Thanks to drones, as Miller’s question suggests, "endless war" is quite
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because there are no Americans in harm’s way—at least not directly.

Only statutory restrictions solve CIA operations – they comply with the letter of the law

Naureen Shah et al, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, 2012, "The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions," Center for Civilians in Conflict, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf
As the CIA’s role in drone strikes has gained increasing prominence and notoriety, CIA
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heard—any dissent, any moral objection," to the programs.307

Obama will comply with legislative regulation

David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History," 2008, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis)
In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also
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the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

Legal changes cause shifts in values – prohibiting drone strikes that devalue the lives of people in the FATA causes the government to internalize new values respecting those lives

Anthony A. Leiserowitz, director of Strategic Initiatives and the Yale Project on Climate Change, and a research scientist at the School of Forestry 26 Environmental Studies at Yale University and Lisa O. Fernandez, the program coordinator for Strategic Initiatives and the Yale Project on Climate Change, October 2007, "Toward a New Consciousness: Values to Sustain Human and Natural Communities," Environment, http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back20Issues/September-October202008/Leiserowitz-Fernandez-full.html
Policy analysts cannot create a movement by themselves. But they can help prepare the
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that negative responses, such as authoritarianism, do not seize the day.

The violence of drones abroad boomerangs to recreate oppressive practices at home – the foreign spaces "targeted" by drones serve as a testing grounds for technologies and techniques of militarization and security that spillover to police domestic urban spaces

Stephen Graham, Professor of Cities and Society at Newcastle University and previously taught at Durham and MIT, among other universities, 2010, Cities Under Siege: the New Military Urbanism, p. xiii-xvii
Such fantasies of high-tech omnipotence are much more than science fiction.¶ As
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security operations, is the second key feature of the new military urbanism.

Anyone concerned with anti-blackness should be raising hell about drone strikes

Jemima Pierre, editor of Black Agenda Report, a leading website on news commentary and analysis from the black left, 10-9-2012, "Black Ethics and Drone Politics," Black Agenda Report, http://www.blackagendareport.com/content/black-ethics-and-drone-politics
They ought to call it the Nobel Death from the Sky Prize. "Barack
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name of murder. It’s time we raise our voices against drone killings.

Tournament: Texas | Round: 1 | Opponent: California, Berkeley Epner-Martin | Judge: Bato

Plan

Plan: The United States Federal Government should restrict targets of targeted killing operations using remotely piloted vehicles to individuals identified as leaders of transnational organizations with direct involvement in past or ongoing violent operations against the United States

Norms
Prolif is coming – reducing sig strikes sets norms – restrains global drone wars
David Knoll, doctoral candidate in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 10-23-2012, “Will America's Addiction to Drone Strikes Backfire?” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/ok-drone-the-global-proliferation-of-uavs/
The spread of UAVs has also reached America’s foes. Iran touts an indigenously developed
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contribute to rather than detract from U.S. and global security.
The plan buys us time – squo accelerates drone prolif
Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
The emergence of this arms race for drones raises at least five long-term
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and sold by rival Great Powers whose interests do not mirror its own.
That causes rapid drone deployment in Asia – multiple scenarios for conflict – building norms uniquely key
Shawn Brimley, vice president of the Technology and National Security Program for a New American Security, Ben FitzGerald, Director of Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, and Ely Ratner, deputy director of the Asia Program at the Center for a New American Security, 9-17-2013, “The Drone War Comes to Asia,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/17/the_drone_war_comes_to_asia?page=full
Without a doubt, China's drone adventure 100-miles north of the Senkakus was
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political leadership, these technologies could very well lead the region into war. 

Aggressive Chinese drone deployment creates multiple scenarios for Asian war – draws in the US
Bill Gertz, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, national security reporter, 3-26-2013, “Game of Drones,” Washington Free Beacon, http://freebeacon.com/game-of-drones/
China’s military is expanding its unmanned aerial vehicle forces with a new Predator-like
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may soon have another deadly tool with which to attack the United States.”
Extinction
Lawrence Wittner, Professor Emeritus of History at SUNY Albany, 11-28-2011, “Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?” www.huntingtonnews.net/14446
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used.
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—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
Unrestricted drone prolif guarantees global retaliatory war
Eric Posner, professor at University of Chicago Law School, 5-17-2013, “The drone paradox; When robots eliminate the risk of casualties, wars are likely to become more common,” National Post, ln
Similarly, we may be comfortable with giving the president authority to use military force
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killing machines has finally arrived. The law now has to catch up.
Plan cements support for drones and allows the US to shape drone norms
Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon Fellow at the CFR, January 2013, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” CFR, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736
Existing practices carry two major risks for U.S. interests that are  likely
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nations to use these technologies  responsibly, we must use them responsibly.”4
US policy sets norms – robust scholarship proves drones arms races result from state policy
Robert Farley, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, 10-12-2011, “U.S. Drone Use Sets Global Precedent,” World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10311/over-the-horizon-u-s-drone-use-sets-global-precedent
So which is it? Has the United States sparke

Tournament: tournament | Round: 4 | Opponent: Idaho State Doty-Ivanovic | Judge: Parker

1AC

1AC

Plan

Plan: The United States Federal Government should restrict targets of targeted killing operations using pilotless aircraft units outside declared zones of conflict to individuals identified as leaders of transnational organizations with direct involvement in past or ongoing violent operations against the United States.

Norms

Drone tech spread inevitable – setting clear limits now is key to establishing controlled norms

Daniel Byman, Professor in Security Studies Program at Georgetown and Senior Fellow at Brookings, July-August 2013, "Why Drones Work," Foreign Affairs, vol 92 no 4
The fact remains that by using drones so much, Washington risks setting a troublesome
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carefully considers the law and the risks to civilians before ordering a strike.

The plan buys us time – squo accelerates drone prolif

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, "The costs and consequences of drone warfare," International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
The emergence of this arms race for drones raises at least five long-term
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and sold by rival Great Powers whose interests do not mirror its own.

Drone prolif ensures global war against civilians

Alan W. Dowd, writer on National Defense, Foreign Policy, and International Security, Winter-Spring 2013, "Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings," Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf
If these geo-political consequences of remote-control war do not get our
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a new era of danger for the United States and its allies. 48

Those wars necessarily result in retaliatory violence

Eric Posner, professor at University of Chicago Law School, 5-17-2013, "The drone paradox; When robots eliminate the risk of casualties, wars are likely to become more common," National Post, ln
Similarly, we may be comfortable with giving the president authority to use military force
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killing machines has finally arrived. The law now has to catch up.

Plan cements support for drones and allows the US to shape drone norms

Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon Fellow at the CFR, January 2013, "Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies," CFR, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736
Existing practices carry two major risks for U.S. interests that are  likely
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nations to use these technologies  responsibly, we must use them responsibly."4

US policy sets norms – robust scholarship proves drones arms races result from state policy

Robert Farley, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, 10-12-2011, "U.S. Drone Use Sets Global Precedent," World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10311/over-the-horizon-u-s-drone-use-sets-global-precedent
So which is it? Has the United States sparked a drone race, or
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policymakers should perhaps devote a touch more attention to the precedent they’re setting.
Pakistan

Unrestricted drone strikes are destroying the US-Pakistan relationship – only restricting them creates space for cooperation

Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 7-16-2013, "A New Drone Deal For Pakistan," Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139584/daniel-markey/a-new-drone-deal-for-pakistan?page=show
For all its successes, the U.S. drone program in Pakistan is
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of control over the program, especially when it comes to target selection.

Signature strikes are uniquely bad

James Traub, fellow of the Center International Cooperation, 5-24-2013, "The Indispensable Nation’s Indispensable Weapon," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/indispensible_weapon_drones_obama?page=0,1
And this brings me back to the question of drones. It is hard to
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constitute an implicit recognition that the time has come to restore that balance. 

The aff is key - high civilian death tolls are central to relation

Mahrukh Khan, Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A new chapter, a new theater" 2010 http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299569410_88067869.pdf
A significant escalation of drone attacks inside Pakistani tribal region has also been accompanied by
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and their unpopularity is acting as a catalyst for recruitment to extremist groups.

Kills the relationship

Alex Rodriguez, foreign correspondent for the LA Times, 8-2-2013, "U.S., Pakistan to revive key talks," LA Times, ln
Kerry’s agenda included meetings with Sharif, Aziz and other top civilian and military leaders
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highways to withdraw troops and equipment from Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

Unrestricted drone strikes collapses Pakistani democracy

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, "The costs and consequences of drone warfare," International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few
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and scale of drone attacks than it was during the Bush administration. 81

Creates factional conflict and empowers the military

M.W. Aslam, PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Leeds, 2011, "A critical evaluation of American drone strikes in Pakistan: legality, legitimacy and prudence," Vol 4 no 3, T and F Online
As in some other tribally based societies of the world, the tribal areas of
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of supporting Pakistan’s key democratic institution, its National Assembly (Cloughley 2011).

Signature strikes prevent local cooperation – destroys social fabric and causes instability

ICG, International Crisis Group, 5-21-2013, "Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan," http://www.crisisgroup.org/~~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/247-drones-myths-and-reality-in-pakistan.pdf
Residents in FATA also believe that informants possibly provide false information and exploit their position
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distorting FATA’s cultural and social fabric, as discussed later in this report.

Indiscriminate strikes delegitimize the civilian government

James Cavallaro et al, founding director of Stanford Law School’s International Human Rights and Conflcit Resolution Clinic and professor of law there, Stephan Sonnenberg, Clinical Lecturer in the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford, Sarah Knuckey, professor of international law at NYU’s Global Justice Clinic in the NYU Law School, initially published by IHRCRC, Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at the Stanford Law School, and GJC, Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, with a long list of student researchers in addition, September 2012, "Living Under Drones: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN," http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf
The focus on drones also risks undermining Pakistan’s development by incentivizing undemocratic decision-making
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the polio vaccine; this perception has been exploited by Taliban forces.768

Democratic institutions check external conflict and war – statistics prove

Seabn Lynn-Jones, Editor for International Security, March 1998, "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy," Belfer Center @ Harvard.
In addition to improving the lives of individual citizens in new democracies, the spread
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democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.56

That’s key to prevent genocide

Seabn Lynn-Jones, Editor for International Security, March 1998, "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy," Belfer Center @ Harvard.
Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less
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stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents.31

That’s key to prevent illiberal retrenchment and nationalist wars

Fareed Zakaria, Political Science Harvard, editor – Newsweek, 1997, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/other/democracy.html-http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/other/democracy.html
Lang’s embarrassment highlights two common, and often mistaken, assumptions — that the forces
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democratic peace, it turns out, has little to do with democracy.

Rejection of objectivity causes oppression of subordinate groups – reference only to subjective values makes politics a game of power instead of truth – only objectivity creates solidarity

Joseph Wagner, Poly Sci Prof @ Colgate, 5-2-2000, "The Revolt Against Reason," in Critical Thinking, ed. Oxman-Michelli and Weinstein, http://hascall.colgate.edu/jwagner/DownloadFiles/Revolt.doc
By confusing the formal and material conditions of knowledge relativism is guilty of the confusion
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and political program that is as foolish as it is imprudent and unwise.  

Use reason contextually to respond to situations of oppression – their attempt to universally determine in advance the strategy we should use fails and guarantees oppression

Daria Roithmayr, Assoc. Law Prof @ Illinois, 2003, "Beyond Right and Reason," 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 939
The version of pragmatism I want to defend against Schlag’s critique differs quite significantly from
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might advance political or ethical commitments to equality, empowerment, or inclusion.

Solvency

Individualized targeting solves due process and ends signature strikes

Jennifer Daskal, fellow and adjunct professor at Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law at Georgetown University law Center, April 2013, "The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside of the ’Hot’ Conflict Zone," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, ln
The law of international armed conflict permits the detention and killing of members of the
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an individualized assessment of the threat posed by each of the targets. n146

Ending signature strikes solves blowback and establishes international norms – doing it publicly is key

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, "The costs and consequences of drone warfare," International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
In his second term, President Obama has an opportunity to reverse course and establish
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that the US government holds itself legally and morally accountable for its behaviour. 

Lack of practical debate about war powers causes the worst abuses

Janet Cooper Alexander, Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, 2012, "John Yoo’s War Powers: The Law Review and the World", https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1742-alexanderjohn-yoos-war-powers
Yoo’s professional experience was largely in academic or political contexts where he was free to
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the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, or to the State Department.
156

Drones are inevitable – establishing procedure is key

Jennifer Daskal, fellow and adjunct professor at Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law at Georgetown University law Center, April 2013, "The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside of the ’Hot’ Conflict Zone," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, ln
The objections to such a proposal are many. In the context of proposed courts
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to avoid ad hoc decisionmaking and will ensure consistency across administrations and time.

Only statutory restrictions solve CIA operations – they comply with the letter of the law

Naureen Shah et al, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, 2012, "The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions," Center for Civilians in Conflict, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf
As the CIA’s role in drone strikes has gained increasing prominence and notoriety, CIA
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heard—any dissent, any moral objection," to the programs.307

Legislation is key to reign in endless war

Alan W. Dowd, writer on National Defense, Foreign Policy, and International Security, Winter-Spring 2013, "Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings," Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf
Thanks to drones, as Miller’s question suggests, "endless war" is quite
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because there are no Americans in harm’s way—at least not directly.

Congress can oversee drones

Naureen Shah et al, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, 2012, "The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions," Center for Civilians in Conflict, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf
Though hampered in many ways, the oversight committees have sufficient authority to impact the
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oversight from this committee...than counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan."332

Engaging in simulations about the specifics of national security law is pedagogically useful, even if we aren’t the USFG – it also builds portable skills

Laura Donohue, Associate Professor of Law at Georgetown Law School, 4-11-2013, "National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations," http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf
The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law
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undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

The law isn’t static – engaging in discussions about its problems and ways to change it stimulates political engagement and is key to prevent authoritarianism

Todd Hedrick, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University, September 2012, "Democratic Constitutionalism as Mediation: The Decline and Recovery of an Idea in Critical Social Theory," Constellations Vol 19, No 3
Habermas’ alleged abandonment of immanent critique, however, is belied by the role that
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, without the triumphalist pretension of ever being able to fully do so.

Policy engagement is uniquely necessary in the case of the Middle East – empirically, academic withdrawal has ceded politics to the neoconservatives

Zachary Lockman is Chair of the Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at New York University 2005 "Critique from the Right The Neo-conservative Assault on Middle East Studies" CR: The New Centennial Review 5.1 (2005) 63-110
It may be too soon to tell, but from the vantage point of the first years of the twenty-first century it would seem that area studies has weathered the storms of the immediate post–Cold War period. In large part this may have been because these fields, including Middle East studies as practiced in the United States, were by the 1990s not what they had been 30 years earlier. The sharp decline (within academia, at least) of once dominant paradigms like a cultural-essentialist Orientalism and modernization theory resulted in the dissipation of the intellectual coherence that had characterized the field in its first decades. But the kind of intellectual fragmentation that had come to characterize Middle East studies was the norm across a great many other fields and disciplines and was counterbalanced, probably even outweighed, by the fact that many Middle East specialists, perhaps especially younger scholars, were now not only well versed in the theoretical and methodological issues and debates of their own disciplines but also routinely engaged with innovative work that cut across or transcended disciplinary boundaries. They could thus increasingly manage, without any great difficulty, to participate in productive scholarly conversations not only with their disciplinary colleagues (fellow historians, political scientists, anthropologists, literature specialists, etc.) but also with scholars from other disciplines interested in this part of the world and in others as well.  Moreover, because so many scholars working on the Middle East were participants in the scholarly conversations and debates that had transformed broad segments of the humanities and the social sciences in recent decades, Middle East studies had to a considerable extent overcome its ~End Page 73~ insular and rather backward character and was now much more open to, and engaged with, the wider intellectual world than had once been the case. The developments of the last two or three decades, including the critiques of Orientalism and modernization theory; the broad range of new work on colonialism; innovative approaches to historical, social, and cultural analysis influenced by critical anthropology; and, more broadly, heightened interaction among disciplines and fields had given many within Middle East studies a new set of common languages that facilitated productive intellectual exchange.3 This was also a much more intellectually and politically self-aware and self-critical field than was once the case. As a result, the best of the new work in this field was by the beginning of the twenty-first century very much on a par with the best produced in other area studies fields, and scholars specializing in the Middle East were being read and listened to by scholars specializing in other parts of the world as never before.4  In conjunction with a generally higher level of mastery of relevant languages and the use of innovative theoretical and methodological approaches, scholars in the field were by the late twentieth century also making use of a broader range of sources than in the past. A case in point is work on the history of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. Students and scholars with a command of both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish made increasing use not only of the vast Ottoman imperial archives in Istanbul but also of local Islamic court records and family papers, along with more traditional sources like the writings of European consuls and travelers, to produce portraits of social, political, economic, and cultural life in these lands in the last four hundred years of Ottoman rule of unprecedented depth and complexity.5  These studies helped to undermine what was once conventional wisdom in late Ottoman history, that these lands were economically, socially, and culturally stagnant before Napoleon’s army landed in Egypt in 1798; that they were uniformly characterized by despotism, the oppressive and retrograde imposition of Islamic law, and the rigorous segregation and subordination of non-Muslims; and that all real change was induced by contact with the West. Instead, the newer scholarship began to elucidate indigenous sources and dynamics of change while also showing how this ~End Page 74~ region was part of the broader sweep of world history long before the nineteenth century and the onset of westernization or modernization as conventionally understood. As a result of these scholarly advances, Ottoman historians often came to have much broader and more fully comparative perspectives than historians of early modern Europe, many of whom had only recently come to understand that they needed to overcome their own provincialism by addressing the ways in which developments in Europe were not utterly sui generis but often were bound up with larger patterns and dynamics of change that affected large stretches of Eurasia.   Scholars and the State  If the preceding assessment is accurate, it is fair to say that the changes that transformed Middle East studies in the United States over the last several decades of the twentieth century made it a more intellectually productive and interesting scholarly field. However, this development was accompanied by a growing gap between academics studying the Middle East and the officials, agencies, and institutions of the U.S. government, and a corresponding decline in the influence of university-based scholars on the shaping of foreign policy and on the media, the main purveyor of information, images, and attitudes about the region to the broad public.  For one, a good many (though by no means all) students and scholars in this field were less than happy with U.S. government policies toward the Middle East in the 1980s and beyond. Hard evidence is lacking, but it is probably safe to suggest that much of the membership of the Middle East Studies Association, the field’s main professional organization, was not enthusiastic about U.S. support for Saddam Hussein’s regime in its war against Iran in the 1980s, the U.S.-led Gulf War of 1991, the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq thereafter, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, or, more broadly, the extent to which successive U.S. administrations countenanced Israel’s ongoing occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; its continuing implantation of Jewish settlements there; and its rejection of a Palestinian state in those territories as endorsed by virtually the entire international community. There was a widespread (though never universal) ~End Page 75~ sense that the policies pursued by the United States in the Middle East were hindering, rather than contributing to, peace, democracy, human rights, development, and progress in the region.  This disaffection from official policy and the premises that underpinned it did not mean that U.S.-based scholars studying the Middle East were unwilling to share their perspectives on, and try to influence, U.S. policy toward the region. In fact, many devoted a great deal of time and effort to trying to educate the broader public through informal meetings, lectures, articles, op-ed pieces, radio and television interviews, and the like, and to convey their views to elected officials; not a few were also quite willing to meet with State Department and intelligence agency personnel. It is rather that the shared vision of the world, and of the place of the United States within it, that had once linked the world of academia with the world of policymaking had faded, and many scholars no longer spoke the same language as policymakers.  Adding to this sense of distance and alienation was a new and much more critical understanding of the proper relationship between scholars and the state—not a surprising development in the aftermath of a period in which the pernicious ends to which scholarly knowledge could be put had been made all too visible, in Vietnam but elsewhere as well. In the first decades of the Cold War a good many scholars in this as in other area studies fields, especially social scientists working on contemporary issues, saw no problem with conducting research on behalf of the government and cooperating with intelligence agencies because they were all part of the good fight against Communism. By the 1980s those who were assuming the leadership in U.S. Middle East studies were by and large much more wary about their sources of funding and the ends to which their training and research, and that of their students, might be put. Fewer scholars were willing to allow what they knew about the region to be used in the service of a state about whose policies they were often at least dubious, for example, by conducting research for agencies like the CIA or by encouraging promising students to enter government service. There developed a widespread sense that to allow one’s research agenda to be determined by the needs of the state or to serve potentially pernicious ends was not only a betrayal of one’s ~End Page 76~ integrity as a scholar but might also compromise one’s ability to conduct research in the Middle East, where by the 1980s real or alleged CIA connections had gotten Americans and others denounced, kidnapped, or worse.  At issue was not government funding per se: since the passage of the National Defense Education Act in 1958, a great many students and scholars working on the Middle East had happily made use of NDFL/FLAS and other government fellowships for language training, graduate study, and research. A large proportion of the budgets of the centers for Middle East studies at universities around the country also came from the federal government. But because this individual and institutional funding came through the U.S. Department of Education it was deemed ethically and politically acceptable even by those who most vociferously disagreed with U.S. government policies in the Middle East. Similarly, additional government funding for graduate student and faculty research on the Middle East first made available by the 1992 Near and Middle East Research and Training Act—originally channeled through the Social Science Research Council and later through the Council of American Overseas Research Centers—was not seen as posing a problem because the funding was allocated first through the U.S. Information Agency and then through the State Department budget.  The real issue was which part of the U.S. government was supplying the funding, for what ends, and with what conditions. As early as 1985 the Middle East Studies Association had asked "university-based international studies programs to refrain from responding to requests for research contract proposals from the Defense Academic Research Support Program ~established by the Defense Department to fund academic research on issues of interest to the military~ or from other intelligence entities and call~ed~ upon its members to reflect carefully upon their responsibilities to the academic profession prior to seeking or accepting funding from intelligence sources."6 Some years later MESA also criticized the new National Security Education Program (NSEP), created by the National Security Education Act of 1991. The NSEP sought to bolster the teaching of "less commonly taught" languages (including Arabic, Persian, and Turkish), thereby enabling (as the ~End Page 77~ program’s website put it) "the nation to remain integrally involved in global issues related to U.S. National Security" as well as to "develop a cadre of professionals with more than the traditional knowledge of language and culture who can use this ability to help the U.S. make sound decisions on and deal effectively with global issues related to U.S. National Security" (see the NSEP website at http://www.iie.org/programs/nsep/nsephome.htm). Unlike other programs funding research and training on the Middle East, the NSEP was housed in the Department of Defense, intelligence agency officials sat on its oversight board, and recipients of the funding it offered were required to work for a government agency involved in national security affairs after their fellowship or scholarship was completed. In a 1993 resolution endorsed by a referendum of its membership, MESA joined with the African Studies Association and the Latin American Studies Association to "deplore the location of responsibility in the U.S. defense and intelligence community for a major foreign area research, education, and training program. . . . This connection can only increase the existing difficulties of gaining foreign governmental permissions to carry out research and to develop overseas instructional programs. It can also create dangers for students and scholars by fostering the perception of involvement in military or intelligence activities, and may limit academic freedom." MESA called on the government to establish a peer and merit review process for funding applications that would be independent of military, intelligence, and foreign policy agencies and to broaden the service requirement so that it would include a much wider range of jobs, including those outside government service.  Until its concerns were met, MESA urged that "its members and their institutions not seek or accept program or research funding from NSEA...." Three years later MESA adopted yet another resolution reiterating its rejection of NSEP because the law appropriating funding for the program now required that all fellowship recipients agree to work for the Defense Department or some intelligence agency for at least two years or else repay the cost of their fellowship (see the NSEP website, as well as the MESA resolutions site at http://w3fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/resolutions.htm). (This last requirement was later relaxed somewhat so that recipients who ~End Page 78~ could not find employment with a national security agency despite a "good faith effort" to do so could fulfill the service requirement by working in higher education.) MESA would voice the same concerns about other outgrowths of the NSEP, for example, the 2002 National Flagship Language Initiative–Pilot Program (NFLI-P), launched to address what were seen as America’s extraordinary deficiencies in languages critical to national security. Many (though by no means all) Middle East studies faculty adopted MESA’s perspective on this issue, declining to seek NSEP funding for themselves or their institutions.  The disinclination by MESA and many of its individual and institutional members to cooperate with the government in ways that had been common in the 1950s and 1960s was certainly not shared by everyone in the field. Yet it is instructive that when in the 1980s reports surfaced of questionable links between academics and intelligence agencies, the most vocal response among scholars in the field was condemnation. A case in point is the scandal surrounding Nadav Safran, a political scientist whose first book set forth an analysis of modern Egyptian history informed by modernization theory and who by the mid-1980s was director of Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies. The scandal erupted when it became known that Safran had taken 2445,700 from the Central Intelligence Agency to fund a major international conference he was hosting at Harvard on "Islam and Politics in the Contemporary Muslim World"—a hot topic at the time and one of obvious interest to the CIA. Not only had Safran secretly used CIA funding for this conference, he had not told the invitees, a number of whom were coming from the Middle East, that the CIA was picking up the tab. It then came out that Safran had also received a 24107,430 grant from the CIA for the research project that led to his 1985 book Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Request for Security. Safran’s contract with the CIA stipulated that the agency had the right to review and approve the manuscript before publication and that its role in funding the book would not be disclosed. And indeed, the book as published made no mention of the fact that the research for it had been partially funded by the CIA.  When the scandal broke, about half the invitees to Safran’s conference withdrew, and many of the faculty and students associated with Harvard’s ~End Page 79~ Center for Middle Eastern Studies publicly expressed their opposition to Safran’s actions. A month later the Middle East Studies Association censured Safran on the grounds that his actions had violated its 1982 resolution calling on scholars to disclose their sources of research funding. Safran intimated that his critics were motivated by anti-Semitism, but after an internal investigation at Harvard he agreed to step down as center director at the end of the academic year.7 Safran was surely not the only academic to have secretly or openly solicited or accepted funding from an intelligence agency for his research in this period, and no doubt such relationships persisted long after this scandal, but the reaction to it—unimaginable in the early decades of U.S. Middle East studies—does indicate how the relationship between academia and the state had changed. Think Tanks and Talking Heads  But there was a price to be paid for the gap that had opened up between the world of Middle East scholarship and the world of policymaking. If many college- and university-based academics no longer entirely shared the worldview that prevailed in Washington or no longer felt the need to shape their research agenda so that it was relevant to the policies that flowed from that worldview, there were others who stood ready to meet the demand for knowledge that would serve the state. Many of these were based not in institutions of higher education but in the host of think tanks that had proliferated from the 1970s onward—privately funded institutions oriented toward the production and dissemination of knowledge designed to inform and influence public policy, for our purposes mainly the foreign policy of the United States.  Some of these institutions and organizations went back a long way. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, was founded in 1910 to advance international cooperation, while the Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of the influential journal Foreign Affairs, was established in 1921, originally as a sort of elite dinner club. The liberal Brookings Institution was established in 1927, supported by Carnegie and Rockefeller funding, while the conservative American Enterprise Institute was founded ~End Page 80~ in 1943 to promote "limited government," "free enterprise," and a "strong foreign policy and national defense." After the Second World War, contractors like the huge RAND Corporation entered the field to produce or fund research for the military and intelligence and other government agencies concerned with foreign policy. Another wave beginning in the 1960s had witnessed the establishment of a large number of what one observer called "advocacy" think tanks, like the Center for Strategic and International Studies (1962), the Heritage Foundation (1973), and the Cato Institute (1977), which combined "policy research with aggressive marketing techniques" as they struggled to secure funding and influence in an increasingly competitive marketplace. There are now also many "legacy-based" institutions, like the Carter Center in Atlanta and the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom in Washington, D.C. By the end of the twentieth century there were an estimated 2,000 organizations engaged in policy analysis based in the United States, a substantial proportion of them focused on foreign policy and international relations.8 The 1970s also witnessed the establishment of what Lisa Anderson called "a new generation of professional graduate schools of public policy," many of whose graduates went on to work for policy-oriented think tanks rather than in colleges and universities (Anderson 2000, 21).  The Middle East was a relative backwater for the think tank industry until the 1980s. The Middle East Institute, founded in 1946, published a journal and organized conferences but exercised relatively little political clout. By contrast, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), founded in 1985, quickly achieved a much higher profile and much greater influence. Describing itself as "a public educational foundation dedicated to scholarly research and informed debate on U.S. interests in the Middle East,"9 WINEP emerged as the leading pro-Israel think tank in Washington. Its founding director, Martin Indyk, had previously worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), founded in 1959 and by the 1970s by far the most well-funded, visible, and effective pro-Israel lobbying organization.10  Indyk and his colleagues at WINEP worked hard to strengthen Israel’s standing in Washington as the key U.S. ally in the Middle East and to ensure ~End Page 81~ that U.S. policy in the region coincided with the policies and strategies of the Israeli government. During the late 1980s and early 1990s this meant trying to foil U.S. recognition of the PLO and U.S. pressure on Israel to halt settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza and enter serious negotiations. In the 1990s WINEP expanded its purview to encompass the entire Middle East, but its focus always remained on Israel, for which it tried to build support by arguing that Israel and the United States faced a common threat from Islamic radicalism and terrorism, defined rather broadly to encompass virtually all of Israel’s enemies, state and nonstate. Various other think tanks also began or stepped up research and advocacy on Middle East issues in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These included the Haim Saban Center for Middle East Policy, launched by the Brookings Institution in 2002, and the conservative American Enterprise Institute.  During the Clinton administration a substantial number of WINEP alumni served in key foreign policy positions, including Martin Indyk himself, appointed as special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council and, later, as U.S. ambassador to Israel. They and other Clinton administration officials promulgated the policy of "dual containment," whereby the United States would seek to isolate, and if possible eliminate, the governments of both Iraq and Iran, not coincidentally perceived as two of Israel’s most serious enemies. By the late 1990s, however, WINEP would itself be outflanked by newer rivals that unlike WINEP openly aligned themselves with the stances of the Israeli right (or even far right) and argued for aggressive U.S. action against Israel’s enemies, including the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.  The policies these and other explicitly right-wing think tanks advocated during the Clinton years, when they were in the political wilderness, were initially regarded as extreme and outlandish. But many of them would eventually be adopted by the George W. Bush administration, in which their architects assumed key posts. Among them were Vice President Richard Cheney; Defense Policy Board member (and for a time chair) Richard Perle, a key advocate of war against Iraq; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of State John Bolton; and Undersecretary ~End Page 82~ of Defense Douglas Feith. Before assuming power these (people) men and their colleagues had, through such right-wing organizations as the Project for a New American Century and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, called for the use of U.S. military power to dominate the world, massive increases in military spending, and unequivocal support for the policies of the Israeli right.11 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush openly embraced much of their agenda, tacitly supporting Israel’s effort to crush the Palestinian uprising by force and in March-April 2003 invading and occupying Iraq.  The first years of the twenty-first century thus witnessed an unprecedented convergence in positions of supreme power in Washington of right-wing (and in some cases Christian fundamentalist) zealots and neo-conservative American Jews united by a common vision of securing permanent and unchallengeable U.S. global hegemony, with a strong focus on the Middle East and a close embrace of Israel, a vision to be achieved by military force if necessary. The war against Iraq was in a sense the pilot project for this radical vision. As Michael Ledeen, in 2003 "resident scholar in the Freedom Chair" at the American Enterprise Institute and long a fixture among right-wing foreign-policy activists, was reported to have put it, crudely but not inaccurately: "Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business" (Goldberg 2002). More specifically, a reconstructed, oil-rich Iraq was seen as a valuable new base for U.S. power in the Middle East, enabling the United States to terminate its problematic relationship with Saudi Arabia and compel the Arabs (including the Palestinians) to make peace with Israel on the latter’s terms. That the vast majority of the international community, including a great many Americans, vehemently rejected the use of military force to achieve this vision made no difference whatsoever to its advocates.12  There were certainly voices raised, in academia, the think tank world, and elsewhere, in opposition to this agenda and the understanding of the world that underpinned it, as there had been voices offering alternative views about U.S. policy toward the Middle East at other critical junctures. But during the 1980s, 1990s, and early years of the twenty-first century ~End Page 83~ these voices received relatively little attention, and university-based scholars seemed to play a decreasing role in influencing foreign policy. Critics of U.S. foreign policy also found it difficult to make themselves heard through the mass media. It is striking that the great bulk of the "talking heads" who appeared on television to offer their opinions on the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, on the 2003 Iraq war, and on other issues relating to the Middle East and U.S. policy toward it seemed to come not from academia but from professional pundits, from people associated with think tanks or with one of the public policy schools, and from retired military personnel. Whatever their knowledge (or lack thereof) of the languages, politics, histories, and cultures of the Middle East, these people spoke the language and shared the mindset of the Washington foreign policy world in a way few university-based scholars did. They were also used to communicating their perspective in effective sound bites, whereas academics were often put off by the ignorance and political conformism of much (though by no means all) of American mass media journalism and its tendency to crudely oversimplify complex issues and transform everything (even war) into a form of entertainment.  This helped bring about a considerable narrowing of the perspectives available to the public and the consolidation of a powerful, indeed almost impenetrable, consensus about the Middle East that encompassed most of the political class and the punditocracy. Republicans and Democrats argued mainly over how best to maintain U.S. hegemony in the region, leaving very little room for those who envisioned a fundamentally different foreign policy founded on peace, democracy, human rights, mutual security, multilateral disarmament, nonintervention, and respect for international law. It is, however, worth noting that despite the virtual absence of such views in the mass media, they were embraced by a good many Americans, as evidenced by the massive demonstrations that preceded the U.S. attack on Iraq in March 2003 and the polls that indicated substantial public opposition to war, partly because of the new modes and channels of communication and organizing made possible by the Internet.  Nonetheless, in the aftermath of September 11th, critical (and even moderate) voices were largely drowned out by the right, which quickly and effectively moved to implement its global agenda by exploiting public ~End Page 84~ outrage against the Islamist extremists who had perpetrated the September 11th attacks. They succeeded in "selling" first military intervention in Afghanistan (justified by the fact that the Taliban regime had allowed al-Qa’ida to operate in that country and refused to hand over those responsible for organizing the September 11th attacks) and then war against Iraq, even though no one was able to produce any credible evidence that the regime of Saddam Hussein had had anything to do with the September 11th attacks or still possessed weapons of mass destruction. In this effort conservative scholars like Bernard Lewis played a significant part, graphically illustrating their continuing, even enhanced, clout in right-wing policymaking circles long after their standing in scholarly circles had declined, as well as the durability and power of some very old Orientalist notions many had mistakenly thought dead as a doornail.

Pragmatism is the best lens for evaluating policies – evaluate consequences, not abstract theoretical criteria

Joel Mintz, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law Center; Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation, 2004, "Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a Guide to Environmental Protection," 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, Lexis.
Philosophical pragmatism, as initially articulated by William James and other early twentieth century academics
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determined by thoughtful experimentation with new and untried social institutions and arrangements. n33

Technical solutions good – arms control proves we don’t need to have total political change to solve problems

Steven F. Hayward, the F. K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow at AEI, 10-16-2006, "The Fate of the Earth in the Balance,’ AEI, http://www.aei.org/article/society-and-culture/the-fate-of-the-earth-in-the-balance/
\ Today, climate change is said to threaten the same things, only more
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were crucial to his strategy for changing the dynamic of the arms race.

Scholars must engage the law to combat normalization

Lisa Duggan, associate professor of American studies and history at New York University, 1994, Queering the State, Social Text, No. 39 (Summer, 1994), pp. 1-14
When we turn our attention to this project, we run into difficulty the moment
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complex ideas about the construction of racial and sexual identities and their intersections.

Tournament: Texas | Round: 6 | Opponent: Minnesota Milkert-Williams | Judge: Van Luvanee

Plan

Plan: The United States Federal Government should statutorily prohibit executive authority for targeted killing using remotely piloted aircraft.

Advantage

Drone strikes in places like Pakistan and Yemen are a hugely destructive form of violence against marginalized people

Amy Goodman, editor of Democracy Now21, 10-30-2013, "The Rising Resistance to Obama’s Drone Wars," Truthdig, http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/the_rising_resistance_to_obamas_drone_wars_20131030
"I wasn’t scared of drones before, but now when they fly overhead I
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, the drones return, and so, too, does the fear."

The strikes tear apart the social fabric of marginalized FATA communities

ICG, International Crisis Group, 5-21-2013, "Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan," http://www.crisisgroup.org/~~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/247-drones-myths-and-reality-in-pakistan.pdf
Residents in FATA also believe that informants possibly provide false information and exploit their position
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distorting FATA’s cultural and social fabric, as discussed later in this report.

They also represent a war on democracy in Pakistan – guarantee cycles of violence which empower the military and violent resistance

M.W. Aslam, PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Leeds, 2011, "A critical evaluation of American drone strikes in Pakistan: legality, legitimacy and prudence," Vol 4 no 3, T and F Online
As in some other tribally based societies of the world, the tribal areas of
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of supporting Pakistan’s key democratic institution, its National Assembly (Cloughley 2011).

Recognizing the violence the US commits against Pakistanis is critical to creating a relationship of respectful dialogue

Madiha Tahir, independent journalist who worked in Pakistan covering conflict, culture and politics, 10-4-2013, "Life Under Drones in Pakistan," Counterpunch, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/10/04/life-under-drones-in-pakistan/
PG: Can you talk about the victims of drone strikes and the effect drones
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continues its meddling, occupation, and funding of the Pakistani political establishment.

The drone strike regime is a tool for violent authoritarianism and should be ethically rejected

Ken Butigan, Depaul Peace Studies, 9-14-2013 http://www.commondreams.org/view/2013/09/14-0, September 14, 2013 by Waging Nonviolence ¶ Renouncing the Right to Bear Drones
The riveting attention paid to chemical weapons in Syria over the past few weeks is
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for another group of five people arrested at Beale this past April 30.

The trajectory of unrestricted drone warfare guarantees drone strikes against the entire globe

Eric Posner, professor at University of Chicago Law School, 5-17-2013, "The drone paradox; When robots eliminate the risk of casualties, wars are likely to become more common," National Post, ln
Similarly, we may be comfortable with giving the president authority to use military force
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killing machines has finally arrived. The law now has to catch up.

Method

Macro-Institutional starting points are often critiqued. But micro-starting points of SELF or societal, instead of State, transformation are less effective in this narrow context

 John J Stuhr, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy at Emory University, 2008, "A Terrible Love of Hope",  The Journal of Speculative Philosophy New Series, Volume 22, Number 4, Project Muse)
And then what, now what? What should a meliorist do? Terrible lovers
AND
peace must be, in the broadest sense of the term,¶ educational.\

The ballot’s role should include State theorization. Even if Plan’s never passes, our framework advances a broader heuristic imperative. This teaches a State-inclusive civic engagement that spills to many issues.

Eric Liu, the founder of Citizen University and author of several books, including "The Gardens of Democracy" and "The Accidental Asian." He served as a White House policy adviser for President Bill Clinton, 2012, A National Call to Action: A Crucible Moment: College Learning and Democracy’s Future
www.aacu.org/civic_learning/crucible/documents/crucible_508f.pdf?
A Crucible Moment likewise calls for transformations necessary for this  generation. A daunting one
AND
more so, for high school graduates who may never enroll in college.

Particularity Thesis – sweeping claims don’t undercut the Aff. We can advance contingent and particular knowledge without "Big T" Truths.

Richard Price, former prof in the Department of Anthropology at Yale University. Later, he moved to Johns Hopkins University to found the Department of Anthropology, where he served three terms as chair. This article is co-authored with CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT, Monash University, 1998, Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,  European Journal of International Relations 4(3)
http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~~~~courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/PriceReusSmithCriticalInternatlTheoryConstructivism.pdf
One of the central departures of critical international theory from positivism¶ is the view
AND
the interpretive ethos of critical¶ international theory than does critical theory itself.

We’re not pro-State, but we’re "anti-anti-statist" – Some things can ONLY be solved "through the system". Restricting drone authority is an instance of that.

Dr. Richard Barbrook, School of Westminster, Nettime, "More Provocations", 6-5-1997,  Amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-1-9706/msg00034.html
 I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-
AND
can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.

Legislation is key to reign in endless war

Alan W. Dowd, writer on National Defense, Foreign Policy, and International Security, Winter-Spring 2013, "Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings," Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf
Thanks to drones, as Miller’s question suggests, "endless war" is quite
AND
because there are no Americans in harm’s way—at least not directly.

Explicit restrictions on the executive by congress are key – only credible norm

Sarah Harvard, commentator on international relations at the Atlantic Community think tank, editor in chief at DL Magazine and International Relations student at American University, 10-11-2013, "Transparency Key to Reformed US Drone Policy," Atlantic Community, http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/transparency-key-to-reformed-us-drone-policy
In order to repair the damage to its reputation, the US needs to reform
AND
if the President does abide by the regulations or if cooperation is unsatisfactory. 

Only statutory restrictions solve CIA operations – they comply with the letter of the law

Naureen Shah et al, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, 2012, "The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions," Center for Civilians in Conflict, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf
As the CIA’s role in drone strikes has gained increasing prominence and notoriety, CIA
AND
heard—any dissent, any moral objection," to the programs.307

Obama will comply with legislative regulation

David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History," 2008, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis)
In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also
AND
the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

Congress can oversee drones

Naureen Shah et al, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, 2012, "The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions," Center for Civilians in Conflict, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf
Though hampered in many ways, the oversight committees have sufficient authority to impact the
AND
oversight from this committee...than counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan."332

Make no mistake – our argument is not that drones are the ’only’ or even the ’worst’ form of violence. There is nothing mutually exclusive about opposing two different kinds of violence – that kind of either/or binary politics inevitably destroys any coalitions and causes us to marginalize the voices of people ’on the ground’ whose perspectives are crucial for understanding violence

Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy and Co-Chair of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 10-31-2012, "The politics of alliances: feminist peace action, drones and Code Pink," Open Democracy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rebecca-johnson/politics-of-alliances-feminist-peace-action-drones-and-code-pink
The danger with framing the arguments through an attack on Code Pink’s campaign against the
AND
committed, irreverent, determined, nonviolent feminist activists to change the world. 

The law isn’t static – engaging in discussions about its problems and ways to change it stimulates political engagement and is key to prevent authoritarianism

Todd Hedrick, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University, September 2012, "Democratic Constitutionalism as Mediation: The Decline and Recovery of an Idea in Critical Social Theory," Constellations Vol 19, No 3
Habermas’ alleged abandonment of immanent critique, however, is belied by the role that
AND
, without the triumphalist pretension of ever being able to fully do so.

Tournament: CSU Fullerton | Round: 2 | Opponent: NYU EI | Judge: Cat Duffy

There are no pirates – this isn’t the 17^th century

Anna Culaba, writer for RYOT news, 12-27-2013, "Somali Pirates Hijacked Zero Boats This Year," RYOT News, http://www.ryot.org/somali-pirates-hijacked-zero-boats-year/513057
While the topic of piracy grips the public imagination — the success of the film
AND
among vessel owners, who have rerouted and fortified ships to combat piracy.

Not using TK against pirates now

Already in Somalia and yemen

Deepwater-Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico proves biodiv claims are silly

Should have happened by now

No tipping points – earth can take it

Erle C. Ellis, associate professor of geography and environmental systems at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 3-11-2013, "Time to forget global tipping points," New Scientist, http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729070.200-time-to-forget-global-tipping-points.html
HOW much can our poor Earth take? We’ve already transformed most of the biosphere
AND
response to human pressures is merely the sum of all of the changes.

Tankers resilient

Rodney Mills, Commander in the US Navy, 10-31-2008, "Iran and the Strait of Hormuz: Saber Rattling or Global Energy Nightmare," Naval War College, DTIC
Oil tankers would seem to be the ideal target - they are large, not
AND
a tanker and its cargo, thus complicating the Iranian operational problem.6

You have it opposite – strikes now, but they’re bad, but the plan solves the blowback

Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council leading the Yemen Policy Group, 8-19-2013, "The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only ’Act’ Like Terrorists," The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-on-people-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/
 In a place like Yemen, although the American drone program is universally hated
AND
not necessarily planning an imminent act of terror or hold a leadership position.

Tournament: tournament | Round: 6 | Opponent: Arizona State Rajan-Vered | Judge: Feldman

XO

Perm: Do Both

Perm: Do CP

The Zenko ev is out of context – he also argues that statutory restrictions are necessary to compel adherence

Just because he says the CP should happene doesn’t make it sufficient – only stat limits sufficient

Self-restraint is perceived as discretionary and isn’t modeled – Congressional limits bolster accountability and prevents foreign governments from engaging in aggressive drone policy

Rebecca Griffen, political director of Peace Action West, expert on war and drone policy, 1-11-2013, "Will Congress take on drones in 2013?" Peace Action West, http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2013/01/11/will-congress-take-on-drones-in-2013/
Since President Obama took office in 2009, his administration has dramatically increased the use
AND
contribute to an international conversation about global standards for the use of drones.

Presidents effect both the actual XOs but also enforcement of previous ones – large leeway to rollback

Vanessa K. Burrows, Legislative Attorney for Congressional Research Service, 4-25-2010, "Executive Orders: Issuance and Revocation", http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20846_20100325.pdf
Illustrating the fact that executive orders are used to further an administration’s policy goals,
AND
orders, rules, guidelines, and policies that implemented those executive orders.

Congress rolls back the CP

William G Howell Associate professor at Harvard 2005 Unilateral Powers: A Brief overview Presidential Studies quarterly vol 35 issue 3 pg 417
Plainly, presidents cannot institute every aspect of their policy agenda by decree. The
AND
imposed increasing numbers of restrictions on how the money is to be spent.

Agencies roll back – independent of presidential will – the Shah ev from 1AC proves CIA does it behind his back

Harold H. Bruff, Professor of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1-28-2011, "PLACING YOUR FAITH IN THE CONSTITUTION", http://www.tulsalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Bruff.Final_.pdf
For cabinet departments and other nonindependent agencies, the limits of presidential direction are generally
AND
, reveals the serious practical limits to comprehensive control by the President himself.

Links to net benefit -

Interpretation: The negative gets fiat of agents are not the object of the resolution

Violation:

Standards:

Kills topic education – fiats through core of the topic

Moots aff ground – forces generic advantages like SoP and contrived solvency deficits

Stacks the deck – answers like rollback link to the aff

Reject the team – at least reject durable fiat and grant rollback args

Doesn’t reduce strikes

Spencer Ackerman, senior reporter for Wired specializing in national security policy, 3-20-2013, "Little Will Change If the Military Takes Over CIA’s Drone Strikes," Wired, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/military-drones/
If the Obama administration decides to give the U.S. military control of
AND
Navy plans to launch an armed, stealthy drone from an aircraft carrier.

Tournament: CSU Fullerton | Round: 2 | Opponent: NYU EI | Judge: Cat Duffy

2AC

Norms

Norms – Caucuses War

Unrestricted drone use causes nuclear war in the Caucuses

Nick Clayton, Eastern Europe correspondent for the Washington Times the Asia Times and Washington Diplomat, currently the senior editor of Kanal PIK TV’s English Service, 10-23-2012, "Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war", www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war
Armenia and Azerbaijan could soon be at war if drone proliferation on both sides of
AND
~ will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of." 

Pak

AT: Drones Down

New rules didn’t do anything – comprehensive analysis proves

Jack Serle, writer at the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 11-26-2013, "New analysis questions constraint on US drone strikes," BIJ, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/11/26/new-analysis-questions-constraint-on-us-drone-strikes/
Six months after President Obama laid out US rules for using armed drones, a
AND
reduced or ended based upon anything the Obama administration has recently stated.’

Solvency

2AC

No impact to pres powers; only turns – even if ideally it would be good to have that power, empirically it’s squandered

Louis Fisher, Scholar in Residence at The Constitution Project served for four decades as senior specialist in Separation of Powers (Congressional Research Service) and Specialist in Constitutional Law (Law Library), January 2012, "Teaching the Presidency: Idealizing a Constitutional O?ce", http://www.loufisher.org/docs/ci/teach.pdf
Thomas Cronin helped puncture imaginary qualities that other scholars had bestowed on the American president
AND
, and competence rarely seen in those who sit in the Oval O?ce.

Ideas of presidential power are vastly overestimated – especially for Obama

Alan Greenblatt, reporter, 3-12-2013, "Why Obama (And Any President) Fails To Meet Expectations" NPR, http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/03/12/174104878/why-obama-and-any-president-fails-to-meet-expectations
"Expectations tend to be wildly unrealistic," says Thomas Mann, a senior fellow
AND
potential to influence the public through speeches, that really isn’t possible anymore."

Pres power decline inevitable – self-limiting and public checks the executive ~gender modified~

Gregory S. McNeal, Associate Professor of law at Pepperdine University School of Law, 3-5-2013, "Targeted Killing and Accountability," Georgetown law Journal, SSRN
However, none of the examples described answer the question of secrecy and how it
AND
process,478 greater transparency through speeches,479 or demonstrated successes.480

Their link misses the boat – the plan makes pres powers effective – explicit congressional authorization is key to freeing the executive from second-guessing and hesitation ~gender modified~

Graham Cronogue, JD from Duke University School of Law, 2012, "A New AUMF: Defining Combatants in the War on Terror," Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=129426context=djcil
Though the President’s inherent authority to act in times of emergency and war can arguably
AND
his authority will enable him to act quickly, decisively but also constitutionally.

"Generic" pres power claims make no sense – depends on the person

Signal of Presidential weakness is already sent

Margaret Talev, White House correspondent, 5-24-2013, "Obama Sees Sunset on Sept. 11 War Powers in Drone Limits" Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-24/obama-sees-sunset-on-sept-11-war-powers-in-drone-limits.html
President Barack Obama said the broad war powers Congress approved to fight al-Qaeda
AND
from closing a facility that should never have been opened," he said. 

Their card says can’t solve signal

Their card just says that we need targ killing not about sig strikes – Johnston says decap sufficient – still could use in case of war

Still retain use of troops

K

2AC Framework – Theory

Our interpretation is that plan focus is good

Aff choice – other frameworks moot the 1AC

Topic education – only focusing on the resolution ensures different ground from year to year

Reject non-policy alts and links not based on the plan text

2AC Perm

Perm do both – double bind – either the alt can’t overcome the status quo or it can overcome residual link to the plan

Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

Impact

Violence is good – it’s necessary to solve terrorism

Victor Davis Hanson, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and former visiting Professor of Classics, at Stanford University, 2-19-2010, "The Tragic Truth of War," http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson021910.html
Victory has usually been defined throughout the ages as forcing the enemy to accept certain
AND
, and tragically always will — until the nature of man himself changes. 

Consequences outweigh – only moral frame that makes sense

Extinction outweighs – only impact that can’t be reversed

Aff turns the k – squo ensures power consolidation and violent exclusion

Doesn’t turn the aff – your shit not root cause

No root cause– prefer proximate causes

John Norton, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia He formerly served as the first Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, Winter, 2004, "Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle", 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 341, Lexis Law
If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic
AND
dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come.
2AC Alt Vagueness

The alt is vague – it’s a voting issue

Spikes our offense – no way for aff to win

Skews 2AC time

Damage is done – 2NC clarification rewards them because 1AR will always be behind

Kills the political project

Our 1AC ev proves –

Barron – Obama is constrained by the Constitution – even if they’re right that there’s no essential power to the law presidents behave AS IF there is – Obama went to congress for Syria in an instance where US troops would be committed

Shah ev indicates Congress is capable of overseeing grey areas – the plan fiats their stat

Alt fails – speaking truth to power without a mechanism backfires – especially true in the context of peace movements

Daniel McCarthy, editor of the American Conservative, 3-11-2013, "How Not to Stop a War," TAM, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/mccarthy/how-not-to-stop-a-war/
The realignment brought about during the Vietnam era is now cracking up, and that’s
AND
a specific, demonstrated mechanism that gives it a chance to be effective.

No link – too many alt causes to violence

China will still fight Japan

Policy analysis should precede discourse – most effective way to challenge power

Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, "Other Ways", p pq
The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported
AND
political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them. 

CP

2AC

Perm: Do Both – shields the link

Perm: Do CP – text implies action by the executive

Self-restraint is perceived as discretionary and isn’t modeled – Congressional limits bolster accountability and prevents foreign governments from engaging in aggressive drone policy

Rebecca Griffen, political director of Peace Action West, expert on war and drone policy, 1-11-2013, "Will Congress take on drones in 2013?" Peace Action West, http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2013/01/11/will-congress-take-on-drones-in-2013/
Since President Obama took office in 2009, his administration has dramatically increased the use
AND
contribute to an international conversation about global standards for the use of drones.

Captures zero of the norms advantage – Harvard indicates explicit restrictions are key to modeling

Doesn’t solve Pakistan – the strikes themselves are the problem, not inability of people to read a press release

Double bind – either the CP isn’t binding on Obama and can’t solve the advantage or it sends the same signal of weakness and links to the net benefit

No net benefit – Zenko indicates the plan maintains drone strikes, I guess if that’s the net benefit we solve it?

Cullen ev – from 2007 – our Farley ev and Zenko ev indicates that perception is already triggered – only rolling it BACK is sufficient

Pirates

2AC Pirates of the Bab

There are no pirates – this isn’t the 17^th century

Anna Culaba, writer for RYOT news, 12-27-2013, "Somali Pirates Hijacked Zero Boats This Year," RYOT News, http://www.ryot.org/somali-pirates-hijacked-zero-boats-year/513057
While the topic of piracy grips the public imagination — the success of the film
AND
among vessel owners, who have rerouted and fortified ships to combat piracy.

Not using TK against pirates now

Already in Somalia and yemen

Deepwater-Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico proves biodiv claims are silly

Should have happened by now

No tipping points – earth can take it

Erle C. Ellis, associate professor of geography and environmental systems at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 3-11-2013, "Time to forget global tipping points," New Scientist, http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729070.200-time-to-forget-global-tipping-points.html
HOW much can our poor Earth take? We’ve already transformed most of the biosphere
AND
response to human pressures is merely the sum of all of the changes.

Tankers resilient

Rodney Mills, Commander in the US Navy, 10-31-2008, "Iran and the Strait of Hormuz: Saber Rattling or Global Energy Nightmare," Naval War College, DTIC
Oil tankers would seem to be the ideal target - they are large, not
AND
a tanker and its cargo, thus complicating the Iranian operational problem.6

You have it opposite – strikes now, but they’re bad, but the plan solves the blowback

Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council leading the Yemen Policy Group, 8-19-2013, "The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only ’Act’ Like Terrorists," The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-on-people-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/
 In a place like Yemen, although the American drone program is universally hated
AND
not necessarily planning an imminent act of terror or hold a leadership position. 

1AR

Norms

Norms – Caucuses War

Unrestricted drone use causes nuclear war in the Caucuses

Nick Clayton, Eastern Europe correspondent for the Washington Times the Asia Times and Washington Diplomat, currently the senior editor of Kanal PIK TV’s English Service, 10-23-2012, "Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war", www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war
Armenia and Azerbaijan could soon be at war if drone proliferation on both sides of
AND
~ will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of." 

Pak

AT: Drones Down

New rules didn’t do anything – comprehensive analysis proves

Jack Serle, writer at the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 11-26-2013, "New analysis questions constraint on US drone strikes," BIJ, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/11/26/new-analysis-questions-constraint-on-us-drone-strikes/
Six months after President Obama laid out US rules for using armed drones, a
AND
reduced or ended based upon anything the Obama administration has recently stated.’

Solvency

2AC

No impact to pres powers; only turns – even if ideally it would be good to have that power, empirically it’s squandered

Louis Fisher, Scholar in Residence at The Constitution Project served for four decades as senior specialist in Separation of Powers (Congressional Research Service) and Specialist in Constitutional Law (Law Library), January 2012, "Teaching the Presidency: Idealizing a Constitutional O?ce", http://www.loufisher.org/docs/ci/teach.pdf
Thomas Cronin helped puncture imaginary qualities that other scholars had bestowed on the American president
AND
, and competence rarely seen in those who sit in the Oval O?ce.

Ideas of presidential power are vastly overestimated – especially for Obama

Alan Greenblatt, reporter, 3-12-2013, "Why Obama (And Any President) Fails To Meet Expectations" NPR, http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/03/12/174104878/why-obama-and-any-president-fails-to-meet-expectations
"Expectations tend to be wildly unrealistic," says Thomas Mann, a senior fellow
AND
potential to influence the public through speeches, that really isn’t possible anymore."

Pres power decline inevitable – self-limiting and public checks the executive ~gender modified~

Gregory S. McNeal, Associate Professor of law at Pepperdine University School of Law, 3-5-2013, "Targeted Killing and Accountability," Georgetown law Journal, SSRN
However, none of the examples described answer the question of secrecy and how it
AND
process,478 greater transparency through speeches,479 or demonstrated successes.480

Their link misses the boat – the plan makes pres powers effective – explicit congressional authorization is key to freeing the executive from second-guessing and hesitation ~gender modified~

Graham Cronogue, JD from Duke University School of Law, 2012, "A New AUMF: Defining Combatants in the War on Terror," Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=129426context=djcil
Though the President’s inherent authority to act in times of emergency and war can arguably
AND
his authority will enable him to act quickly, decisively but also constitutionally.

"Generic" pres power claims make no sense – depends on the person

Signal of Presidential weakness is already sent

Margaret Talev, White House correspondent, 5-24-2013, "Obama Sees Sunset on Sept. 11 War Powers in Drone Limits" Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-24/obama-sees-sunset-on-sept-11-war-powers-in-drone-limits.html
President Barack Obama said the broad war powers Congress approved to fight al-Qaeda
AND
from closing a facility that should never have been opened," he said. 

Their card says can’t solve signal

Their card just says that we need targ killing not about sig strikes – Johnston says decap sufficient – still could use in case of war

Still retain use of troops

K

2AC Framework – Theory

Our interpretation is that plan focus is good

Aff choice – other frameworks moot the 1AC

Topic education – only focusing on the resolution ensures different ground from year to year

Reject non-policy alts and links not based on the plan text

2AC Perm

Perm do both – double bind – either the alt can’t overcome the status quo or it can overcome residual link to the plan

Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

Impact

Violence is good – it’s necessary to solve terrorism

Victor Davis Hanson, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and former visiting Professor of Classics, at Stanford University, 2-19-2010, "The Tragic Truth of War," http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson021910.html
Victory has usually been defined throughout the ages as forcing the enemy to accept certain
AND
, and tragically always will — until the nature of man himself changes. 

Consequences outweigh – only moral frame that makes sense

Extinction outweighs – only impact that can’t be reversed

Aff turns the k – squo ensures power consolidation and violent exclusion

Doesn’t turn the aff – your shit not root cause

No root cause– prefer proximate causes

John Norton, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia He formerly served as the first Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, Winter, 2004, "Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle", 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 341, Lexis Law
If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic
AND
dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come.
2AC Alt Vagueness

The alt is vague – it’s a voting issue

Spikes our offense – no way for aff to win

Skews 2AC time

Damage is done – 2NC clarification rewards them because 1AR will always be behind

Kills the political project

Our 1AC ev proves –

Barron – Obama is constrained by the Constitution – even if they’re right that there’s no essential power to the law presidents behave AS IF there is – Obama went to congress for Syria in an instance where US troops would be committed

Shah ev indicates Congress is capable of overseeing grey areas – the plan fiats their stat

Alt fails – speaking truth to power without a mechanism backfires – especially true in the context of peace movements

Daniel McCarthy, editor of the American Conservative, 3-11-2013, "How Not to Stop a War," TAM, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/mccarthy/how-not-to-stop-a-war/
The realignment brought about during the Vietnam era is now cracking up, and that’s
AND
a specific, demonstrated mechanism that gives it a chance to be effective.

No link – too many alt causes to violence

China will still fight Japan

Policy analysis should precede discourse – most effective way to challenge power

Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, "Other Ways", p pq
The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported
AND
political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them. 

CP

2AC

Perm: Do Both – shields the link

Perm: Do CP – text implies action by the executive

Self-restraint is perceived as discretionary and isn’t modeled – Congressional limits bolster accountability and prevents foreign governments from engaging in aggressive drone policy

Rebecca Griffen, political director of Peace Action West, expert on war and drone policy, 1-11-2013, "Will Congress take on drones in 2013?" Peace Action West, http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2013/01/11/will-congress-take-on-drones-in-2013/
Since President Obama took office in 2009, his administration has dramatically increased the use
AND
contribute to an international conversation about global standards for the use of drones.

Captures zero of the norms advantage – Harvard indicates explicit restrictions are key to modeling

Doesn’t solve Pakistan – the strikes themselves are the problem, not inability of people to read a press release

Double bind – either the CP isn’t binding on Obama and can’t solve the advantage or it sends the same signal of weakness and links to the net benefit

No net benefit – Zenko indicates the plan maintains drone strikes, I guess if that’s the net benefit we solve it?

Cullen ev – from 2007 – our Farley ev and Zenko ev indicates that perception is already triggered – only rolling it BACK is sufficient

Pirates

2AC Pirates of the Bab

There are no pirates – this isn’t the 17^th century

Anna Culaba, writer for RYOT news, 12-27-2013, "Somali Pirates Hijacked Zero Boats This Year," RYOT News, http://www.ryot.org/somali-pirates-hijacked-zero-boats-year/513057
While the topic of piracy grips the public imagination — the success of the film
AND
among vessel owners, who have rerouted and fortified ships to combat piracy.

Not using TK against pirates now

Already in Somalia and yemen

Deepwater-Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico proves biodiv claims are silly

Should have happened by now

No tipping points – earth can take it

Erle C. Ellis, associate professor of geography and environmental systems at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, 3-11-2013, "Time to forget global tipping points," New Scientist, http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21729070.200-time-to-forget-global-tipping-points.html
HOW much can our poor Earth take? We’ve already transformed most of the biosphere
AND
response to human pressures is merely the sum of all of the changes.

Tankers resilient

Rodney Mills, Commander in the US Navy, 10-31-2008, "Iran and the Strait of Hormuz: Saber Rattling or Global Energy Nightmare," Naval War College, DTIC
Oil tankers would seem to be the ideal target - they are large, not
AND
a tanker and its cargo, thus complicating the Iranian operational problem.6

You have it opposite – strikes now, but they’re bad, but the plan solves the blowback

Danya Greenfield, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council leading the Yemen Policy Group, 8-19-2013, "The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only ’Act’ Like Terrorists," The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-on-people-who-only-act-like-terrorists/278744/
 In a place like Yemen, although the American drone program is universally hated
AND
not necessarily planning an imminent act of terror or hold a leadership position.

Tournament: Texas | Round: 7 | Opponent: Kansas Carey-Duff | Judge: Layton

Perm do both – shields the link to politics

Perm do the counterplan

"Should" means desirable —- this does not have to be a mandate

Atlas Collaboration 99 ("Use of Shall, Should, May Can," http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html)

shall
’shall’ describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses ’shall’, then that
AND
to be stated anywhere (to say nothing of defining what ’thoroughly’ means).

"Should" doesn’t require certainty

Black’s Law 79 (Black’s Law Dictionary – Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from "ought." It is not normally synonymous with "may," and although often interchangeable with the word "would," it does not ordinarily express certainty as "will" sometimes does. 

Uncertainty is inevitable on this topic because the executive can say no – certainty is a solvency issue, not a competition one

Self-restraint is perceived as discretionary and isn’t modeled – Congressional limits bolster accountability and prevents foreign governments from engaging in aggressive drone policy

Rebecca Griffen, political director of Peace Action West, expert on war and drone policy, 1-11-2013, "Will Congress take on drones in 2013?" Peace Action West, http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2013/01/11/will-congress-take-on-drones-in-2013/
Since President Obama took office in 2009, his administration has dramatically increased the use
AND
contribute to an international conversation about global standards for the use of drones.

Too many roadblocks to effective QDR – Panetta, defense cuts

Sandra I. Erwin, Editor for National Defense Magazine, 1-22-2013, "Budget Uncertainty Trumps Quadrennial Defense Review", http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1031
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the fifth such study since Congress first directed it
AND
F. McKenzie, the Marine Corps’ representative to the quadrennial defense review.

QDR doesn’t solve – reinforces SQ and links to politics

Sandra I. Erwin, Editor for National Defense Magazine, 1-22-2013, "Budget Uncertainty Trumps Quadrennial Defense Review", http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1031
Analysts said they are pessimistic that the coming review will shake things up in any
AND
an output of the politics … and a guide that justifies existing choices." 

Harvard says only stat restrictions solve

CPs that result in the plan are a voting issue

Makes it impossible to be aff – encourages lazy neg debates

Contrives topic debate into janky solvency deficits

No right to the CP – infinite neg generics check – don’t need a CP to run the DA

Other agent CPs check – XO, Courts

Their author concedes the counterplan definitely doesn’t solve, links to politics and is net worse for the military

Brimley 13 - Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, served as Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon from 2009 to 2011
(Shawn, "The Next QDR Is the Last Chance for Sanity," http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/07/next-qdr-last-chance-sanity/66629/, AB)
The next nine months will be the most important period for United States defense strategy
AND
, but history suggests they’ll have trouble. They could use some help.

Tournament: Texas | Round: 7 | Opponent: Kansas Carey-Duff | Judge: Layton

Perm do both – shields the link to politics

Perm do the counterplan

"Should" means desirable —- this does not have to be a mandate

Atlas Collaboration 99 ("Use of Shall, Should, May Can," http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html)

shall
’shall’ describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses ’shall’, then that
AND
to be stated anywhere (to say nothing of defining what ’thoroughly’ means).

"Should" doesn’t require certainty

Black’s Law 79 (Black’s Law Dictionary – Fifth Edition, p. 1237)

Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from "ought." It is not normally synonymous with "may," and although often interchangeable with the word "would," it does not ordinarily express certainty as "will" sometimes does. 

Uncertainty is inevitable on this topic because the executive can say no – certainty is a solvency issue, not a competition one

Self-restraint is perceived as discretionary and isn’t modeled – Congressional limits bolster accountability and prevents foreign governments from engaging in aggressive drone policy

Rebecca Griffen, political director of Peace Action West, expert on war and drone policy, 1-11-2013, "Will Congress take on drones in 2013?" Peace Action West, http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2013/01/11/will-congress-take-on-drones-in-2013/
Since President Obama took office in 2009, his administration has dramatically increased the use
AND
contribute to an international conversation about global standards for the use of drones.

Too many roadblocks to effective QDR – Panetta, defense cuts

Sandra I. Erwin, Editor for National Defense Magazine, 1-22-2013, "Budget Uncertainty Trumps Quadrennial Defense Review", http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1031
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the fifth such study since Congress first directed it
AND
F. McKenzie, the Marine Corps’ representative to the quadrennial defense review.

QDR doesn’t solve – reinforces SQ and links to politics

Sandra I. Erwin, Editor for National Defense Magazine, 1-22-2013, "Budget Uncertainty Trumps Quadrennial Defense Review", http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1031
Analysts said they are pessimistic that the coming review will shake things up in any
AND
an output of the politics … and a guide that justifies existing choices." 

Harvard says only stat restrictions solve

CPs that result in the plan are a voting issue

Makes it impossible to be aff – encourages lazy neg debates

Contrives topic debate into janky solvency deficits

No right to the CP – infinite neg generics check – don’t need a CP to run the DA

Other agent CPs check – XO, Courts

Their author concedes the counterplan definitely doesn’t solve, links to politics and is net worse for the military

Brimley 13 - Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, served as Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon from 2009 to 2011
(Shawn, "The Next QDR Is the Last Chance for Sanity," http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/07/next-qdr-last-chance-sanity/66629/, AB)
The next nine months will be the most important period for United States defense strategy
AND
, but history suggests they’ll have trouble. They could use some help.

Tournament: tournament | Round: 6 | Opponent: Arizona State Rajan-Vered | Judge: Feldman
T

We meet and we’re key to the topic

Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations and former official in the Congressional Research Service and the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, "Targeted Killings and Signature Strikes," 6-16-2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes
No matter how U.S. officials (secretly) refer to the practice
AND
After ten years of signature strikes, isn’t this a debate worth having?

Even if they’re right – plan text doesn’t say signature strikes – means it’s solvency not T

Let me quote: "It is targeted killing in its strict sense"

Also only saying this mechanism for sig strikes is how they happen in Afghanistan, not outside the battlefield

1AC ev is from policy makers and contextually prove sig strikes are heart of the topic – prefer ev from policymakers making policy recommendations – ensures best literature and clash

Daskal ev indicates signature strikes are still targeted – they aren’t random cruise missile strikes

Zenko indicates it’s the centerpiece for targeted killing policy globally

Targeted killing is lethal force against someone not in custody – broad interps are better because there isn’t one definition – our interp synthesizing leading definitions

Jan Guardian, translator at the International Monetary Fund, 2013 "Targeted Killings: A Summary," http://acontrarioicl.com/2013/02/27/targeted-killings-a-summary/
Currently there is no legal definition of targeted killings in either international or domestic law
AND
, remain the incidental result of an operation pursuing other aims).~8~

Two net benefits

Aff creativity – neg generics are inevitable – preserving aff innovation is key to all t spec edu

Ground – their interp overlimits by eliminating an entire part of the topic – limits us to terrible affs with terrible DAs

Reasonability – C/I is a race to the bottom

Tournament: CSU Fullerton | Round: 5 | Opponent: Emory AB | Judge: Seth Gannon
T

We meet and we’re key to the topic

Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations and former official in the Congressional Research Service and the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, "Targeted Killings and Signature Strikes," 6-16-2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes
No matter how U.S. officials (secretly) refer to the practice
AND
After ten years of signature strikes, isn’t this a debate worth having?

Plan text limits targets to leaders of terrorist groups – means we still meet by banning individually targeting low level leaders

Signature strikes target individuals

Shazad Ali, contributing analyst at Open Briefing and PhD in European Studies at the University of Karachi and member of the editorial board of Perspectives on Terrorism, and Chris Abbott, founder and executive director of Open Briefing and Honorary Visiting Research Fellow in the School of Social and International Studies at the University of Bradford and the former deputy director of Oxford Research Group, 10-24-2013, "US Drone Strikes in Pakistan: ineffective and illegitimate," Sustainable Security, http://sustainablesecurity.org/2013/10/24/us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan/
Signature strikes target individuals based on predetermined ’signatures’ of behaviour that US intelligence links
AND
were unable to determine the affiliation, if any, of those killed.

Even if they’re right – plan text doesn’t say signature strikes – means it’s solvency not T

1AC ev is from policy makers and contextually prove sig strikes are heart of the topic – prefer ev from policymakers making policy recommendations – ensures best literature and clash

Daskal ev indicates signature strikes are still targeted – they aren’t random cruise missile strikes

Zenko indicates it’s the centerpiece for targeted killing policy globally

Targeted killing is lethal force against someone not in custody – broad interps are better because there isn’t one definition – our interp synthesizing leading definitions

Jan Guardian, translator at the International Monetary Fund, 2013 "Targeted Killings: A Summary," http://acontrarioicl.com/2013/02/27/targeted-killings-a-summary/
Currently there is no legal definition of targeted killings in either international or domestic law
AND
, remain the incidental result of an operation pursuing other aims).~8~

Two net benefits

Aff creativity – neg generics are inevitable – preserving aff innovation is key to all t spec edu

Ground – their interp overlimits by eliminating an entire part of the topic – limits us to terrible affs with terrible DAs

Reasonability – C/I is a race to the bottom

Tournament: Texas | Round: 4 | Opponent: Southern California Purk-Vitzileos | Judge: Bricker

Obama won’t push

Kimberley A. Strassel, political columnist, 2-6-2014, "How Politics May Sink Trade Deals," WSJ, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303496804579367084197445494?mg=reno64-wsj26url=http3A2F2Fonline.wsj.com2Farticle2FSB10001424052702303496804579367084197445494.html
Picture a little boat, christened the USS T.R., trawling out to
AND
with union and green protections to win his liberals he’ll lose GOP votes.

Reid blocks

Eric Bradner, and Manu Raju, political analyst, 1-29-2014, "Harry Reid rejects President Obama’s trade push," Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/harry-reid-barack-obama-trade-deals-102819.html
President Barack Obama’s push for the two largest free trade deals in U.S
AND
harm labor and environmental protections and siphon away U.S. jobs.

Everyone hates it

William Mauldin, columnist, 2-5-2014, "Fast-Track Trade Bill’s Path in Congress Gets Bumpier," WSJ, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304851104579363163316877226?mg=reno64-wsj26url=http3A2F2Fonline.wsj.com2Farticle2FSB10001424052702304851104579363163316877226.html
Opposition from the Senate’s top Democrat to the White House’s trade agenda has highlighted a
AND
in the first six months of this year" for passing fast track.

PC is a myth

Norm Ornstein, PhD in political science and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 5-16-2013, "The Myth of Presidential Leadership" http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/washington-inside-out/the-myth-of-presidential-leadership-20130508
No one defined the agenda or negotiated more brilliantly than Reagan. Did he "
AND
., has said, several did so just to deny Obama a victory.

Obama’s done

PBS, 1-2-2014, "Examining Obama’s options to push his agenda in 2014," http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/jan-june14/yearahead_01-02.html
Mr. Obama finished 2013 with his job approval rating near an all-time
AND
one for the White House and it leaves him with some real vulnerabilities. 

Winners win

Michael Hirsh, chief correspondent for National Journal, 2-7-2013, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital," National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207
In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of
AND
, and one win may well lead to others. "Winning wins."

No other trade deals

Plan solves trade

Econ decline doesn’t cause war

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, October 2012, "The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked" http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations/irony-global-economic-governance-system-worked/p29101
The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great
AND
started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.21

More trade pacts can’t bolster the economy – way too small to make even a dent

Paul Krugman, prof of econ at Princeton, 12-7-2012, "Macro Trumps Micro," NYT, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/macro-trumps-micro/
Or, as the late James Tobin used to say, it takes a lot
AND
to import competition.¶ Globalization is not the answer to the Lesser Depression.

Tournament: CSU Fullerton | Round: 4 | Opponent: Wake Forest DL | Judge: Geoff Lundeen

2AC

K

2AC Framework – Theory

Our interpretation is that the negative should have to forward an argument why the plan is bad

Aff choice – other frameworks moot the 1AC

Topic education – only focusing on the resolution ensures different ground from year to year

Reject non-policy alts and links not based on the plan text

The law isn’t static – engaging in discussions about its problems and ways to change it stimulates political engagement and is key to prevent authoritarianism

Todd Hedrick, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University, September 2012, "Democratic Constitutionalism as Mediation: The Decline and Recovery of an Idea in Critical Social Theory," Constellations Vol 19, No 3
Habermas’ alleged abandonment of immanent critique, however, is belied by the role that
AND
, without the triumphalist pretension of ever being able to fully do so.

2AC Perm

Perm do both – double bind – either the alt can’t overcome the status quo or it can overcome residual link to the plan

Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

Link

Calculation is good in the limited context of government policy. Their fear of calculatability and concern for ontology condemns all practical political engagement

Majid Yar, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Lancaster, 2000, Arendt’s Heideggerianism, Cultural Values 4.1
Similarly, we must consider the consequences that this ’ontological substitution’ for the essence of
AND
, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process.

Obviously not the vital link – the plan doesn’t do anything to INCREASE the amount of men in the executive branch

Pretty sure this "silence" link is called a link of omission – the aff doesn’t preclude discussion of women’s exclusion but it doesn’t increase it – not an offensive reason to vote negative

Civility

No link to civility – the 1AC places no constraints on "proper" behavior

Alt
 

It also is a disaster politically

Helen Tate, Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs at Georgia Southwest State University, 2005, "The Ideological Effects of a Failed Constitutive Rhetoric: The Co-option of the Rhetoric of White Lesbian Feminism", Wom~y~n’s Studies in Communication28.1 (Spring 2005): 1-31
Attempts by white lesbian feminists of the second wave to define feminism resulted in a
AND
play out in the larger public arena in which that social movement operates. 

The alt’s mechanism is vague – it’s a voting issue

Spikes our offense – no way for aff to win

Skews 2AC time

Be lenient towards new 1AR args – inevitable obfuscation through clarification necessitates it for competitive equity

Ethical frameworks are not a-priori – evaluate the goodness of their advocacy through experimentation and practice, not theoretical criteria

Joel Mintz, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law Center; Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation, 2004, "Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a Guide to Environmental Protection," 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, Lexis.
Philosophical pragmatism, as initially articulated by William James and other early twentieth century academics
AND
determined by thoughtful experimentation with new and untried social institutions and arrangements. n33

Impact

War is the independent variable – there’s no internal between gender and war, but war causes gender injustice

Thomas Hayden, San Francisco-based science journalist. Formerly a staff writer at Newsweek and U.S. News 26 World Report, his articles and reviews have appeared in more than 20 publications including National Geographic, Nature, and The Washington Post, 2-15-2012, "Horgan, Hayden, and the Last Word on Warfare," http://www.lastwordonnothing.com/2012/02/15/horgan-hayden-and-the-last-word-on-warfare/
Now, as for the gender factor: I think that Tom and Potts do
AND
poverty, tyranny, gender discrimination, environmental degradation. Nuff for now21

There’s a strong causality

Joshua Goldstein, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, 2001. War and Gender, p. 412
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working
AND
on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate. 

Dowd

Posner

ICG/Cavallero

Their dualistic associations of wom~y~n with peace is essentialist and disempowering

J. Ann Tickner, associate professor of political science at the College of the Holy Cross, Gender in International Relations, 1992, p. 59
Such a notion of citizenship cannot come about, however, until myths that perpetuate
AND
less militarized notion of citizenship cannot be built on such a weak foundation.
Prog PTX

Attitudinal and material changes prove reformism is successful in reducing patriarchy

Danny Hayes, Prof of Political Science at George Washington Univ, 11-25-2012, "Why did wom~y~n do so well in 2012? Because gender bias is declining", The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/11/25/why-did-wom~~y~~n-do-so-well-in-2012-because-gender-bias-is-declining/
When the 113th Congress convenes in January, wom~y~n will occupy
AND
~n’s underrepresentation. But the data make it hard to argue otherwise.

Institutional reforms are working those create major cultural conscious altering shifts – this is a reason postdating their manifesto MATTERS – things CHANGE

Nadia Smiecinska, Writer for Gender Across Borders, 8-10-2010, "Argentina Legalizes Gay Marriage: Why Feminists should care," http://www.genderacrossborders.com/2010/10/08/why-gay-marriage-in-argentina-is-good-for-wom~~y~~n/
In July, Argentina became the 10th country in the world to allow same-
AND
rights are also the places where gays and lesbians live much freer lives.

Neoliberal and authoritarian takeover causes extinction and turns the K

Carl Boggs, Professor of Social Sciences at National University in Los Angeles, 1997, "The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America," Theory and Society, Volume 26, Number 6, December, Springer
The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series
AND
of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75 

1AR

K

Personal PTX

Using debate rounds to change debate or society ends in total failure – they limit politics to private, therapeutic exercises – prevents confrontation with larger power structures which create gender oppression

Joseph P. Zompetti (Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University) "PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY" September 2004  Contemporary Argumentation and Debate volume 25
As such, the problems of diversity and privilege in the debate community cannot be
AND
the community as a whole needs to address, not the individual debaters.

AT: Struct Violence

Existence is a prerequisite to value.

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University. "Leftist Criticism of "Nature" Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age," Dissent Winter 2003 http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm
All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the
AND
, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

Tournament: tournament | Round: 4 | Opponent: Idaho State Doty-Ivanovic | Judge: Parker

Pre Emption

Pre emption high in the squo – only a risk we reduce it

Zachary Lockman is Chair of the Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at New York University 2005 "Critique from the Right The Neo-conservative Assault on Middle East Studies" CR: The New Centennial Review 5.1 (2005) 63-110
It may be too soon to tell, but from the vantage point of the first years of the twenty-first century it would seem that area studies has weathered the storms of the immediate post–Cold War period. In large part this may have been because these fields, including Middle East studies as practiced in the United States, were by the 1990s not what they had been 30 years earlier. The sharp decline (within academia, at least) of once dominant paradigms like a cultural-essentialist Orientalism and modernization theory resulted in the dissipation of the intellectual coherence that had characterized the field in its first decades. But the kind of intellectual fragmentation that had come to characterize Middle East studies was the norm across a great many other fields and disciplines and was counterbalanced, probably even outweighed, by the fact that many Middle East specialists, perhaps especially younger scholars, were now not only well versed in the theoretical and methodological issues and debates of their own disciplines but also routinely engaged with innovative work that cut across or transcended disciplinary boundaries. They could thus increasingly manage, without any great difficulty, to participate in productive scholarly conversations not only with their disciplinary colleagues (fellow historians, political scientists, anthropologists, literature specialists, etc.) but also with scholars from other disciplines interested in this part of the world and in others as well.  Moreover, because so many scholars working on the Middle East were participants in the scholarly conversations and debates that had transformed broad segments of the humanities and the social sciences in recent decades, Middle East studies had to a considerable extent overcome its ~End Page 73~ insular and rather backward character and was now much more open to, and engaged with, the wider intellectual world than had once been the case. The developments of the last two or three decades, including the critiques of Orientalism and modernization theory; the broad range of new work on colonialism; innovative approaches to historical, social, and cultural analysis influenced by critical anthropology; and, more broadly, heightened interaction among disciplines and fields had given many within Middle East studies a new set of common languages that facilitated productive intellectual exchange.3 This was also a much more intellectually and politically self-aware and self-critical field than was once the case. As a result, the best of the new work in this field was by the beginning of the twenty-first century very much on a par with the best produced in other area studies fields, and scholars specializing in the Middle East were being read and listened to by scholars specializing in other parts of the world as never before.4  In conjunction with a generally higher level of mastery of relevant languages and the use of innovative theoretical and methodological approaches, scholars in the field were by the late twentieth century also making use of a broader range of sources than in the past. A case in point is work on the history of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. Students and scholars with a command of both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish made increasing use not only of the vast Ottoman imperial archives in Istanbul but also of local Islamic court records and family papers, along with more traditional sources like the writings of European consuls and travelers, to produce portraits of social, political, economic, and cultural life in these lands in the last four hundred years of Ottoman rule of unprecedented depth and complexity.5  These studies helped to undermine what was once conventional wisdom in late Ottoman history, that these lands were economically, socially, and culturally stagnant before Napoleon’s army landed in Egypt in 1798; that they were uniformly characterized by despotism, the oppressive and retrograde imposition of Islamic law, and the rigorous segregation and subordination of non-Muslims; and that all real change was induced by contact with the West. Instead, the newer scholarship began to elucidate indigenous sources and dynamics of change while also showing how this ~End Page 74~ region was part of the broader sweep of world history long before the nineteenth century and the onset of westernization or modernization as conventionally understood. As a result of these scholarly advances, Ottoman historians often came to have much broader and more fully comparative perspectives than historians of early modern Europe, many of whom had only recently come to understand that they needed to overcome their own provincialism by addressing the ways in which developments in Europe were not utterly sui generis but often were bound up with larger patterns and dynamics of change that affected large stretches of Eurasia.   Scholars and the State  If the preceding assessment is accurate, it is fair to say that the changes that transformed Middle East studies in the United States over the last several decades of the twentieth century made it a more intellectually productive and interesting scholarly field. However, this development was accompanied by a growing gap between academics studying the Middle East and the officials, agencies, and institutions of the U.S. government, and a corresponding decline in the influence of university-based scholars on the shaping of foreign policy and on the media, the main purveyor of information, images, and attitudes about the region to the broad public.  For one, a good many (though by no means all) students and scholars in this field were less than happy with U.S. government policies toward the Middle East in the 1980s and beyond. Hard evidence is lacking, but it is probably safe to suggest that much of the membership of the Middle East Studies Association, the field’s main professional organization, was not enthusiastic about U.S. support for Saddam Hussein’s regime in its war against Iran in the 1980s, the U.S.-led Gulf War of 1991, the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq thereafter, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, or, more broadly, the extent to which successive U.S. administrations countenanced Israel’s ongoing occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; its continuing implantation of Jewish settlements there; and its rejection of a Palestinian state in those territories as endorsed by virtually the entire international community. There was a widespread (though never universal) ~End Page 75~ sense that the policies pursued by the United States in the Middle East were hindering, rather than contributing to, peace, democracy, human rights, development, and progress in the region.  This disaffection from official policy and the premises that underpinned it did not mean that U.S.-based scholars studying the Middle East were unwilling to share their perspectives on, and try to influence, U.S. policy toward the region. In fact, many devoted a great deal of time and effort to trying to educate the broader public through informal meetings, lectures, articles, op-ed pieces, radio and television interviews, and the like, and to convey their views to elected officials; not a few were also quite willing to meet with State Department and intelligence agency personnel. It is rather that the shared vision of the world, and of the place of the United States within it, that had once linked the world of academia with the world of policymaking had faded, and many scholars no longer spoke the same language as policymakers.  Adding to this sense of distance and alienation was a new and much more critical understanding of the proper relationship between scholars and the state—not a surprising development in the aftermath of a period in which the pernicious ends to which scholarly knowledge could be put had been made all too visible, in Vietnam but elsewhere as well. In the first decades of the Cold War a good many scholars in this as in other area studies fields, especially social scientists working on contemporary issues, saw no problem with conducting research on behalf of the government and cooperating with intelligence agencies because they were all part of the good fight against Communism. By the 1980s those who were assuming the leadership in U.S. Middle East studies were by and large much more wary about their sources of funding and the ends to which their training and research, and that of their students, might be put. Fewer scholars were willing to allow what they knew about the region to be used in the service of a state about whose policies they were often at least dubious, for example, by conducting research for agencies like the CIA or by encouraging promising students to enter government service. There developed a widespread sense that to allow one’s research agenda to be determined by the needs of the state or to serve potentially pernicious ends was not only a betrayal of one’s ~End Page 76~ integrity as a scholar but might also compromise one’s ability to conduct research in the Middle East, where by the 1980s real or alleged CIA connections had gotten Americans and others denounced, kidnapped, or worse.  At issue was not government funding per se: since the passage of the National Defense Education Act in 1958, a great many students and scholars working on the Middle East had happily made use of NDFL/FLAS and other government fellowships for language training, graduate study, and research. A large proportion of the budgets of the centers for Middle East studies at universities around the country also came from the federal government. But because this individual and institutional funding came through the U.S. Department of Education it was deemed ethically and politically acceptable even by those who most vociferously disagreed with U.S. government policies in the Middle East. Similarly, additional government funding for graduate student and faculty research on the Middle East first made available by the 1992 Near and Middle East Research and Training Act—originally channeled through the Social Science Research Council and later through the Council of American Overseas Research Centers—was not seen as posing a problem because the funding was allocated first through the U.S. Information Agency and then through the State Department budget.  The real issue was which part of the U.S. government was supplying the funding, for what ends, and with what conditions. As early as 1985 the Middle East Studies Association had asked "university-based international studies programs to refrain from responding to requests for research contract proposals from the Defense Academic Research Support Program ~established by the Defense Department to fund academic research on issues of interest to the military~ or from other intelligence entities and call~ed~ upon its members to reflect carefully upon their responsibilities to the academic profession prior to seeking or accepting funding from intelligence sources."6 Some years later MESA also criticized the new National Security Education Program (NSEP), created by the National Security Education Act of 1991. The NSEP sought to bolster the teaching of "less commonly taught" languages (including Arabic, Persian, and Turkish), thereby enabling (as the ~End Page 77~ program’s website put it) "the nation to remain integrally involved in global issues related to U.S. National Security" as well as to "develop a cadre of professionals with more than the traditional knowledge of language and culture who can use this ability to help the U.S. make sound decisions on and deal effectively with global issues related to U.S. National Security" (see the NSEP website at http://www.iie.org/programs/nsep/nsephome.htm). Unlike other programs funding research and training on the Middle East, the NSEP was housed in the Department of Defense, intelligence agency officials sat on its oversight board, and recipients of the funding it offered were required to work for a government agency involved in national security affairs after their fellowship or scholarship was completed. In a 1993 resolution endorsed by a referendum of its membership, MESA joined with the African Studies Association and the Latin American Studies Association to "deplore the location of responsibility in the U.S. defense and intelligence community for a major foreign area research, education, and training program. . . . This connection can only increase the existing difficulties of gaining foreign governmental permissions to carry out research and to develop overseas instructional programs. It can also create dangers for students and scholars by fostering the perception of involvement in military or intelligence activities, and may limit academic freedom." MESA called on the government to establish a peer and merit review process for funding applications that would be independent of military, intelligence, and foreign policy agencies and to broaden the service requirement so that it would include a much wider range of jobs, including those outside government service.  Until its concerns were met, MESA urged that "its members and their institutions not seek or accept program or research funding from NSEA...." Three years later MESA adopted yet another resolution reiterating its rejection of NSEP because the law appropriating funding for the program now required that all fellowship recipients agree to work for the Defense Department or some intelligence agency for at least two years or else repay the cost of their fellowship (see the NSEP website, as well as the MESA resolutions site at http://w3fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/resolutions.htm). (This last requirement was later relaxed somewhat so that recipients who ~End Page 78~ could not find employment with a national security agency despite a "good faith effort" to do so could fulfill the service requirement by working in higher education.) MESA would voice the same concerns about other outgrowths of the NSEP, for example, the 2002 National Flagship Language Initiative–Pilot Program (NFLI-P), launched to address what were seen as America’s extraordinary deficiencies in languages critical to national security. Many (though by no means all) Middle East studies faculty adopted MESA’s perspective on this issue, declining to seek NSEP funding for themselves or their institutions.  The disinclination by MESA and many of its individual and institutional members to cooperate with the government in ways that had been common in the 1950s and 1960s was certainly not shared by everyone in the field. Yet it is instructive that when in the 1980s reports surfaced of questionable links between academics and intelligence agencies, the most vocal response among scholars in the field was condemnation. A case in point is the scandal surrounding Nadav Safran, a political scientist whose first book set forth an analysis of modern Egyptian history informed by modernization theory and who by the mid-1980s was director of Harvard University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies. The scandal erupted when it became known that Safran had taken 2445,700 from the Central Intelligence Agency to fund a major international conference he was hosting at Harvard on "Islam and Politics in the Contemporary Muslim World"—a hot topic at the time and one of obvious interest to the CIA. Not only had Safran secretly used CIA funding for this conference, he had not told the invitees, a number of whom were coming from the Middle East, that the CIA was picking up the tab. It then came out that Safran had also received a 24107,430 grant from the CIA for the research project that led to his 1985 book Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Request for Security. Safran’s contract with the CIA stipulated that the agency had the right to review and approve the manuscript before publication and that its role in funding the book would not be disclosed. And indeed, the book as published made no mention of the fact that the research for it had been partially funded by the CIA.  When the scandal broke, about half the invitees to Safran’s conference withdrew, and many of the faculty and students associated with Harvard’s ~End Page 79~ Center for Middle Eastern Studies publicly expressed their opposition to Safran’s actions. A month later the Middle East Studies Association censured Safran on the grounds that his actions had violated its 1982 resolution calling on scholars to disclose their sources of research funding. Safran intimated that his critics were motivated by anti-Semitism, but after an internal investigation at Harvard he agreed to step down as center director at the end of the academic year.7 Safran was surely not the only academic to have secretly or openly solicited or accepted funding from an intelligence agency for his research in this period, and no doubt such relationships persisted long after this scandal, but the reaction to it—unimaginable in the early decades of U.S. Middle East studies—does indicate how the relationship between academia and the state had changed. Think Tanks and Talking Heads  But there was a price to be paid for the gap that had opened up between the world of Middle East scholarship and the world of policymaking. If many college- and university-based academics no longer entirely shared the worldview that prevailed in Washington or no longer felt the need to shape their research agenda so that it was relevant to the policies that flowed from that worldview, there were others who stood ready to meet the demand for knowledge that would serve the state. Many of these were based not in institutions of higher education but in the host of think tanks that had proliferated from the 1970s onward—privately funded institutions oriented toward the production and dissemination of knowledge designed to inform and influence public policy, for our purposes mainly the foreign policy of the United States.  Some of these institutions and organizations went back a long way. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, was founded in 1910 to advance international cooperation, while the Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of the influential journal Foreign Affairs, was established in 1921, originally as a sort of elite dinner club. The liberal Brookings Institution was established in 1927, supported by Carnegie and Rockefeller funding, while the conservative American Enterprise Institute was founded ~End Page 80~ in 1943 to promote "limited government," "free enterprise," and a "strong foreign policy and national defense." After the Second World War, contractors like the huge RAND Corporation entered the field to produce or fund research for the military and intelligence and other government agencies concerned with foreign policy. Another wave beginning in the 1960s had witnessed the establishment of a large number of what one observer called "advocacy" think tanks, like the Center for Strategic and International Studies (1962), the Heritage Foundation (1973), and the Cato Institute (1977), which combined "policy research with aggressive marketing techniques" as they struggled to secure funding and influence in an increasingly competitive marketplace. There are now also many "legacy-based" institutions, like the Carter Center in Atlanta and the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom in Washington, D.C. By the end of the twentieth century there were an estimated 2,000 organizations engaged in policy analysis based in the United States, a substantial proportion of them focused on foreign policy and international relations.8 The 1970s also witnessed the establishment of what Lisa Anderson called "a new generation of professional graduate schools of public policy," many of whose graduates went on to work for policy-oriented think tanks rather than in colleges and universities (Anderson 2000, 21).  The Middle East was a relative backwater for the think tank industry until the 1980s. The Middle East Institute, founded in 1946, published a journal and organized conferences but exercised relatively little political clout. By contrast, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), founded in 1985, quickly achieved a much higher profile and much greater influence. Describing itself as "a public educational foundation dedicated to scholarly research and informed debate on U.S. interests in the Middle East,"9 WINEP emerged as the leading pro-Israel think tank in Washington. Its founding director, Martin Indyk, had previously worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), founded in 1959 and by the 1970s by far the most well-funded, visible, and effective pro-Israel lobbying organization.10  Indyk and his colleagues at WINEP worked hard to strengthen Israel’s standing in Washington as the key U.S. ally in the Middle East and to ensure ~End Page 81~ that U.S. policy in the region coincided with the policies and strategies of the Israeli government. During the late 1980s and early 1990s this meant trying to foil U.S. recognition of the PLO and U.S. pressure on Israel to halt settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza and enter serious negotiations. In the 1990s WINEP expanded its purview to encompass the entire Middle East, but its focus always remained on Israel, for which it tried to build support by arguing that Israel and the United States faced a common threat from Islamic radicalism and terrorism, defined rather broadly to encompass virtually all of Israel’s enemies, state and nonstate. Various other think tanks also began or stepped up research and advocacy on Middle East issues in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These included the Haim Saban Center for Middle East Policy, launched by the Brookings Institution in 2002, and the conservative American Enterprise Institute.  During the Clinton administration a substantial number of WINEP alumni served in key foreign policy positions, including Martin Indyk himself, appointed as special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council and, later, as U.S. ambassador to Israel. They and other Clinton administration officials promulgated the policy of "dual containment," whereby the United States would seek to isolate, and if possible eliminate, the governments of both Iraq and Iran, not coincidentally perceived as two of Israel’s most serious enemies. By the late 1990s, however, WINEP would itself be outflanked by newer rivals that unlike WINEP openly aligned themselves with the stances of the Israeli right (or even far right) and argued for aggressive U.S. action against Israel’s enemies, including the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.  The policies these and other explicitly right-wing think tanks advocated during the Clinton years, when they were in the political wilderness, were initially regarded as extreme and outlandish. But many of them would eventually be adopted by the George W. Bush administration, in which their architects assumed key posts. Among them were Vice President Richard Cheney; Defense Policy Board member (and for a time chair) Richard Perle, a key advocate of war against Iraq; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of State John Bolton; and Undersecretary ~End Page 82~ of Defense Douglas Feith. Before assuming power these (people) men and their colleagues had, through such right-wing organizations as the Project for a New American Century and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, called for the use of U.S. military power to dominate the world, massive increases in military spending, and unequivocal support for the policies of the Israeli right.11 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush openly embraced much of their agenda, tacitly supporting Israel’s effort to crush the Palestinian uprising by force and in March-April 2003 invading and occupying Iraq.  The first years of the twenty-first century thus witnessed an unprecedented convergence in positions of supreme power in Washington of right-wing (and in some cases Christian fundamentalist) zealots and neo-conservative American Jews united by a common vision of securing permanent and unchallengeable U.S. global hegemony, with a strong focus on the Middle East and a close embrace of Israel, a vision to be achieved by military force if necessary. The war against Iraq was in a sense the pilot project for this radical vision. As Michael Ledeen, in 2003 "resident scholar in the Freedom Chair" at the American Enterprise Institute and long a fixture among right-wing foreign-policy activists, was reported to have put it, crudely but not inaccurately: "Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business" (Goldberg 2002). More specifically, a reconstructed, oil-rich Iraq was seen as a valuable new base for U.S. power in the Middle East, enabling the United States to terminate its problematic relationship with Saudi Arabia and compel the Arabs (including the Palestinians) to make peace with Israel on the latter’s terms. That the vast majority of the international community, including a great many Americans, vehemently rejected the use of military force to achieve this vision made no difference whatsoever to its advocates.12  There were certainly voices raised, in academia, the think tank world, and elsewhere, in opposition to this agenda and the understanding of the world that underpinned it, as there had been voices offering alternative views about U.S. policy toward the Middle East at other critical junctures. But during the 1980s, 1990s, and early years of the twenty-first century ~End Page 83~ these voices received relatively little attention, and university-based scholars seemed to play a decreasing role in influencing foreign policy. Critics of U.S. foreign policy also found it difficult to make themselves heard through the mass media. It is striking that the great bulk of the "talking heads" who appeared on television to offer their opinions on the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, on the 2003 Iraq war, and on other issues relating to the Middle East and U.S. policy toward it seemed to come not from academia but from professional pundits, from people associated with think tanks or with one of the public policy schools, and from retired military personnel. Whatever their knowledge (or lack thereof) of the languages, politics, histories, and cultures of the Middle East, these people spoke the language and shared the mindset of the Washington foreign policy world in a way few university-based scholars did. They were also used to communicating their perspective in effective sound bites, whereas academics were often put off by the ignorance and political conformism of much (though by no means all) of American mass media journalism and its tendency to crudely oversimplify complex issues and transform everything (even war) into a form of entertainment.  This helped bring about a considerable narrowing of the perspectives available to the public and the consolidation of a powerful, indeed almost impenetrable, consensus about the Middle East that encompassed most of the political class and the punditocracy. Republicans and Democrats argued mainly over how best to maintain U.S. hegemony in the region, leaving very little room for those who envisioned a fundamentally different foreign policy founded on peace, democracy, human rights, mutual security, multilateral disarmament, nonintervention, and respect for international law. It is, however, worth noting that despite the virtual absence of such views in the mass media, they were embraced by a good many Americans, as evidenced by the massive demonstrations that preceded the U.S. attack on Iraq in March 2003 and the polls that indicated substantial public opposition to war, partly because of the new modes and channels of communication and organizing made possible by the Internet.  Nonetheless, in the aftermath of September 11th, critical (and even moderate) voices were largely drowned out by the right, which quickly and effectively moved to implement its global agenda by exploiting public ~End Page 84~ outrage against the Islamist extremists who had perpetrated the September 11th attacks. They succeeded in "selling" first military intervention in Afghanistan (justified by the fact that the Taliban regime had allowed al-Qa’ida to operate in that country and refused to hand over those responsible for organizing the September 11th attacks) and then war against Iraq, even though no one was able to produce any credible evidence that the regime of Saddam Hussein had had anything to do with the September 11th attacks or still possessed weapons of mass destruction. In this effort conservative scholars like Bernard Lewis played a significant part, graphically illustrating their continuing, even enhanced, clout in right-wing policymaking circles long after their standing in scholarly circles had declined, as well as the durability and power of some very old Orientalist notions many had mistakenly thought dead as a doornail.

Can’t solve root cause

D.S.L. Jarvis, Lecturer in IR at the University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenges of Postmodernism, 2000, p. 129
Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recommends in response to what at
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to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places. 

We’ll make a few fw args here in response to their args

Our interp – debate about the plan is good

Key to portable skills – A limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to productive inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills in every and all facets of life—-even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from it being valuably debatable—-this still provides room for flexibility, creativity, and innovation, but targets the discussion to avoid mere statements of fact

Austin J. Freeley, a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, and David L. Steinberg, Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, 2008, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp61-63
 Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference
AND

the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Their critique fails without prior predictability. Mindset change occurs from internal reflection during pre-round preparation, not in-round discourse

Robert E. Goodin, Australian National University philosophy prof, editor of Oxford Handbooks of Political Science, founding editor of Blackwell’s Journal of Political Philosophy, and Simon J. Niemeyer, ANU political science research fellow, 2003, "When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy," POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf
What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in
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least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

Key to competitive equity in debate—strategy and prep imbalance makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role – this doesn’t preclude the possibility of structural imbalances but

Ryan Galloway, professor of communications at Samford University, 2007, "Dinner And Conversation At The Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue", Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco
Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively
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substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

The impact is the Donohue evidence – our pedagogy rests on considering external problems through simulation – useful model of education that is precluded by the alt

Tournament: 2013babyjo | Round: 5 | Opponent: UT San Antonio Morales-Calhoun | Judge: Robinson
ERROR

Tournament: tournament | Round: 6 | Opponent: Arizona State Rajan-Vered | Judge: Feldman
ERROR

Tournament: Ndt | Round: 1 | Opponent: Georgia Davis-Galerstein | Judge: Buntin, Galloway, Warden

2AC Framework

Interpretation: the judge should render a verdict on the legal correctness of the plan – three net benefits

Best heuristic for all reasoning – Sunstein indicates legal reasoning is the foundation of moral decisions

Aff choice – any other framework for decisions moots the 1AC

Key to topic education – Corn indicates legal analysis is key to education about war powers authority

2AC Alt

Permutation do both – the reasoning of the critique does not preclude the case from having presented a legally correct statement

Permutation endorse the legal reasoning of the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative – we can recognize the legal correctness of the aff

Alt fails – reductionist

Ian Loader 7, Professor of Criminology and Director of the Centre for Criminology at the University of Oxford and Neil Walker, Professor of European Law in the Department of Law at the EU Institute, Florence, "Civilizing Security", 2007, guessoumiss.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/civilizing-security.pdf
Against security?
The strands of radical thought outlined in this chapter offer a cogent critique of the
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the state, starting with the claim that it is a cultural monolith.

The alt is vague – it’s a voting issue

Spikes our offense – no way for aff to win

Skews 2AC time

Violates the legal framework – they’ve failed to specify any precedent or rule that sufficiently resolves the K

Damage is done – 2NC clarification rewards them because 1AR will always be behind

2AC Public Fails

Political constraints fail – weak media, governmental secrecy and the existence of a wide array of war powers abuses

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest. 9-13-2012, "Defending the Indefensible" http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/defending-the-indefensible/
Posner is comfortable with the only restraint on executive power being the somewhat amorphous consent
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Americans (possibly excluding University of Chicago law professors) has fallen sharply.

Also a reason the law is key – only tool left that hasn’t been coopted

Activist strategies that focus on statutory change are less feasible than legal approaches – reforms never get off the ground, cause backlash, and get watered down – the perm means we use the right tools for the specific situation – there’s no movement for al-Awlaki which means only the court can be an effective restraint

Scott L Cummings, prof at UCLA School of Law, and Deborah L. Rhode, prof at Stanford Law School, 6-23-2009, "Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and Practice," Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. XXXVI.
2. Relative Efficacy An important premise of the critique of litigation is that political
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must avoid mythologizing rights, so too they must avoid romanticizing political activism.

2AC Legal Solutions Good

Building legal expertise aids activist politics – legal challenges motivate broader movements

Scott L Cummings, prof at UCLA School of Law, and Deborah L. Rhode, prof at Stanford Law School, 6-23-2009, "Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and Practice," Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. XXXVI.
The critique of rights associated with first-wave public interest law partly reflected disillusionment
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would "spread ~resources~ too thin" for structural change.46

Brown v Board led to the civil rights movement, Roe v Wade led to broad consolidation of protections for abortion, Perry v Hollingsworth

Empirically true in the case of war powers – Nixon v US spurred Nixon’s resignation

2AC No Link to Law Bad

Aff is a prereq to fracturing law

Margaret Jane Radin Professor of Law, Stanford University and Frank Michelman Professor of Law, Harvard University, "Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice", April 1991, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 139, No. 4 , pp. 1019-1058 GENDER MODIFIED
Consider legal positivism. It might be thought that legal positivism is the aspiration to
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we are going to exercise upon it our valuational judgment and act accordingly. 

There’s also no link broadly – their evidence is only speaking in the context of policymaking NOT legal decisions

2AC Legal Strategies Good – V2L

Legal and rights based strategies are a critical form of individual resistance—even if we can’t translate our legal arguments to reality, the act of demanding rights affirms life and checks state violence

Muneer I. Ahmad, a Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School, 2009, "RESISTING GUANTÁNAMO: RIGHTS AT THE BRINK OF DEHUMANIZATION", Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 103, p. 1683, American University, WCL Research Paper No. 08-65.
This Article is about the work that rights do, and the work of the
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, state violence is so extreme as to attempt to extinguish the human. 

2AC Discourse

Discursive changes don’t matter – objective real world factors are key – they also influence discourse

John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, Winter 1995, "The False Promise of International Institutions." International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3.
Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in
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appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging. (159)

Tournament: Ndt | Round: 1 | Opponent: Georgia Davis-Galerstein | Judge: Buntin, Galloway, Warden

2AC Restriction

 Prohibition===

We meet – enjoin means prohibit

Merriam Webster’s 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enjoin
1:  to direct or impose by authoritative order or with urgent admonition enjoined us to be careful
2
a :  forbid, prohibit was enjoined by conscience from telling a lie
b :  to prohibit by a judicial order :  put an injunction on a book had been enjoined prior to publication 

Narrowing options through conditions is a restriction

Jean Schiedler-Brown, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown 26 Associates, 2012, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington,  The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/68642920Appellant20Randall20Kincheloe27s.pdf
3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include
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, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In means "within the limits" not all

Cullen, Commissioner, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 11-13-1952 Riehl et al. V. Kentucky unemployment compensation commission, http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19521113_0040095.KY.htm/qx
We do not find any ambiguity in KRS 341.070(1). It
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aware of any authority for ascribing such a meaning to the word ’in’. 

Prefer our interp – it’s more specific to what courts actually do – courts don’t prohibit entire swaths of war powers authority they set narrow conditions under which that authority is justified – see Hamdi and Boumedine

Aff creativity – neg generics are inevitable – they have tons of alternative legal schools like legal realism and CLS or alternative justifications that prove the aff wrong – only our interp preserves nuanced debates and creative engagement with literature

Ground – their interp overlimits because there would only be four affs that link to everything

No limits explosion – we have read the only evidence in the context of war powers authority on this question – legal frameworks are key to understanding the controversy of war powers authority

No right to disads – most are precluded by legal framework

You have to prove our role of the ballot argument is wrong – every aff presumes a frame but the point of the curriculum advantage is that it is useful to develop legal analyses

Education outweighs fairness – it’s the only reason anyone debates – flipping a coin is fair – only debate enables comparison of rigorously researched positions

Safety valve – there is tons of lit contesting our approach to the law – force them to engage it – legal realism, pragmatism, CLS, CRT, CFJ all have beef with the 1AC

Tournament: Ndt | Round: 1 | Opponent: Georgia Davis-Galerstein | Judge: Buntin, Galloway, Warden
2AC XO
The curriculum advantage is a reason to reject the CP – Opportunity cost analysis forecloses legal analysis because it’s necessarily precedent and rule oriented. Two impacts
a) Destroys war powers debates – that’s Corn – we control uniqueness because we’ve had a LEGAL topic without any LEGAL debates
b) Analogical reasoning – Schauer says legal analysis creates unique skills enabling situational cross comparison and attention to
Permutation do both – shields the link by protecting the judiciary from backlash
Perm is uniquely justified – the CP is the first policy statement introduced to the debate – you can affirm the legality of the aff and the policy guidance of the CP
Targeted killing of civilians without judicial due process is unethical – we as citizens have an obligation to oppose killing in our name
Peter Van Buren, served the American Foreign Service for 22 years, receiving several awards, 2-17-2014, “Obama's itchy trigger finger on drone strikes: what happened to due process?” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/17/obama-drone-strikes-due-process
Through what seems to have been an Obama administration leak to the Associated Press, we recently learned that the president and his top officials believe a US citizen – name unknown to us out here – probably somewhere in the tribal backlands of Pakistan, is reputedly planning attacks against Americans abroad. As a result, the White House has, for the last several months, been considering whether or not to assassinate him by drone without trial or due process.¶ Supposedly, the one thing that’s held up sending in the drones is the administration’s desire to make sure the kill is “legal”. (Those quotes again.)¶ Last May, Obama gave a speech on the subject. It was, in part, a response to growing anger in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere over the CIA’s ongoing drone assassination campaigns with all their “collateral damage”, and to the White House’s reported “kill list”. In it, he insisted that any target of the drones must pose “a continuing and imminent threat to the American people”. At the time, the White House also issued a fact sheet that stated:¶ Lethal force must only be used to prevent or stop attacks against U.S. persons, and even then, only when capture is not feasible and no other reasonable alternatives exist to address the threat effectively.¶ While that sounds like a pretty imposing set of hurdles to leap, all of the “legal” criteria are determined in secret by the White House with advice from the Justice Department, but with no oversight or accountability.¶ Even then, it turns out that the supposedly tortured deliberations of the administration are not really necessary. Despite the president’s criteria, according to an unnamed administration official quoted by the Associated Press, Obama could make an exception to his policy and authorize the CIA to strike on a one-time basis, no matter what the circumstances. One way or another, it is Obama who decides who to kill and when.¶ Short-Term Questions¶ At this point, it’s unclear just why the Obama administration leaked its plans in reference to this errant American abroad. After all, official after official has insisted that Edward Snowden’s revelations of secret NSA documents have caused terrorists to change their communication tactics, yet the one American up to no good somewhere in the terrorist world apparently has not done so in response to the leak about his potential fate, and will remain locatable whenever needed as a target. And yet giving notice of a possible attack in advance in the media would, on the face of it, seem both counterproductive and an invitation to the very barrage of criticisms leveled by key officials at Snowden. After all, under the circumstances, an American connected with al-Qaida wouldn’t exactly have to be a Bond villain to decide to change his behavior and his location, stay indoors or outdoors more, keep off his phone for a while or trade it in for another.¶ Could the administration leak have been a trick to flush the bad guy out, causing him to panic and run? Was it an elaborate ruse designed to induce widespread concern in al-Qaida about the liabilities of having American compatriots? Was it a bone thrown to Republicans otherwise eager to paint the president as weak? Could it have been some kind of geopolitical muscle tussle with once compliant but now more assertively anti-drone Pakistan? Or could the leak have been a PSYOP on the American people, an attempt to manipulate us into feeling better about government decisions to kill American citizens by revealing the deliberative and heart-wrenching process Obama goes through? Or could it simply have been an attempt to normalize such acts for us, to make them part of the understandable everyday background noise of a dangerous world?¶ The answer is: we don’t know. Not yet anyway.¶ Not the First Time¶ The Obama administration admits to killing four Americans as part of its war on (or is it “war of”?) terror. We’ll pause here a moment for you to contemplate whether there could have been other, undocumented killings of the same sort awaiting the revelations of some future Edward Snowden or Chelsea Manning.¶ On May 7, 2011, a US drone fired a missile in Yemen aimed at American citizen and key terror suspect Anwar al-Awlaki. The missile blew up a car with two other people in it, quickly labeled “al-Qaida operatives” after we killed them.¶ Such collateral killings should be no surprise. The inaugural article by Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill at their new media venture notes that the National Security Agency regularly identifies targets for CIA assassinations based on metadata analysis and cell-phone tracking. Rather than confirming that target’s identity, the CIA is evidently ready and willing to blow a suspect away based on the location of a mobile phone he assumedly is using. In other words, people can be killed because they borrowed the wrong cell phone. (So much for a deliberative process.)¶ The US had tried to kill al-Awlaki before, including in the Bush years – and missed. In justifying one of these assassination attempts, Obama’s counterterrorism chief, Michael Leiter, claimed that al-Awlaki actually posed a bigger threat to the US “homeland” than Osama bin Laden, albeit without explanation. No matter, they finally got their man. A follow-up strike killed al-Awlaki, and another soon after obliterated his teenage son, also in Yemen. Though no one argues that the boy was in any way linked to terrorism and no administration official has bothered to explain just why he was targeted, former White House press secretary Robert Gibbs did comment that the killing was justified as he “should have had a more responsible father”.¶ Couldn’t Happen Here?¶ Though the president and his officials go to great pains to indicate that such assassinations are only going to happen abroad, there is nothing in the carefully worded distinctions made by the White House to preclude them at home. As a start, in his criteria for killing someone extrajudicially, the president claims there is no difference between an American citizen terrorist and a foreign terrorist. A careful look back at the statements of two government officials makes it clear that thought has already gone into the question of bringing the killings home.¶ Remember the testimony then-FBI Director Robert Mueller gave before a House subcommittee in 2012? When asked point-blank if the president could order the killing of an American in the United States, he replied, “Uh, I’m not certain whether that was addressed or not ... I’m going to defer that to others in the Department of Justice.” Mueller, of course, had the option of saying flat-out, “No, no, of course the president can’t order a hit on an American here in the U.S. where the full judicial system, Constitution and due process protections exist! Are you mad?”¶ The truth emerged only in 2013 when Senator Rand Paul asked point-blank whether the president could authorize lethal force, such as a drone strike, against an American citizen in the United States. Attorney General Eric Holder fired back that while the question was “hypothetical”, the real-world answer was yes. Holder said he could imagine “an extraordinary circumstance in which it would be necessary and appropriate under the Constitution and applicable laws of the United States for the president to authorize the military to use lethal force within the territory of the United States.”¶ It’s easy enough, in fact, to imagine the sort of scenarios that might lend themselves to such an act: a ticking time bomb, a killer believed to have anthrax and on the loose, a suspected dirty-bomb maker in a desolate location, terrorists with a bus full of children on a mountain top. Imagine a slippery slope and... presto! You’re there.¶ They’ve thought about it. They’ve set up the legal manipulations necessary to justify it. The broad, open-ended criteria the president laid out for killing suspected terrorists exposes the post-Constitutional stance our government has already prepared for. All that’s left to do is pull the trigger.¶ Nostalgia for the Fifth Amendment¶ It’s still possible to remember, almost nostalgically, how the Fifth Amendment used to guarantee Americans due process. The key phrase was indeed that “due process”. It meant the government could not take away your property or imprison or execute you without first allowing you a chance to defend yourself. You would have your day in court with a lawyer and a jury of your peers to make the final decision. This would all be quite public and the people involved would be held accountable for their actions. The Fifth was meant by those who wrote it as a check on the ultimate in government excess: the purposeful taking of citizens’ lives. Today, it increasingly seems an artifact of a quaint past, as seemingly lost to history as the corded phone or manual typewriter.¶ Attorney General Eric Holder publicly rewrote the Fifth Amendment in 2012, declaring, in a veiled reference to al-Awlaki, “that a careful and thorough executive branch review of the facts in a case amounts to ‘due process’ and that the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment protection against depriving a citizen of his or her life without due process of law does not mandate a ‘judicial process’.” In other words, in a pinch, skip the courts. In this way, Holder gave us a peak behind the White House curtain, making clear that the president’s personal and secret decision to kill an American, perhaps made over morning coffee, was, in his opinion, good enough to make everything legal.¶ The due process question Holder dismissed so casually still looms large over al-Awlaki’s murder. Prior to the killing, attorneys for his father tried to persuade a U.S. District Court to issue an injunction preventing the government from killing him in Yemen. A judge dismissed the case, ruling that the father did not have “standing” to sue and that government officials themselves were immune from lawsuits for actions carried out as part of their official duties.¶ This was the first time a father had sought to sue the US government to prevent it from killing a son without trial. The judge did call the suit “unique and extraordinary”, but ultimately passed on getting involved. He wrote instead that it was up to the elected branches of government, not the courts, to determine if the United States has the authority to extrajudicially murder its own citizens.¶ The judge’s position was revealing of our moment. The extrajudicial killing of an American citizen seemed to him to be nothing but a political question to be argued out in Congress and the White House, not something intimately woven into the founding documents of our nation. The judge was not alone in his characterization of the problem. Mike Rogers, chair of the House Intelligence Committee, complained that the killing of more terror suspects in a similar manner has been held back by “self-imposed red tape”.¶ There are, however, no footnotes in the Fifth Amendment, no caveats, no secret memos, no exceptions for terrorism, mass rape, child torture, or any other horror the US has confronted in its 238 years of existence. Such addendums to the Fifth were unnecessary, because in the beautiful preciseness of Lincoln’sphrasing at Gettysburg, ours is “a government of the people, by the people, for the people”, one made up of us, beholden to us and whose purpose is to serve us.¶ Such a government would be incapable of killing its own citizens without due care, debate and open trial. Those actions would violate the sacred convent of trust between a people and their government in a democracy, the “consent of the governed” and delegitimize the government itself.¶ That last point is worth a closer look, because it makes clear what murder-by-decree really represents in post-Constitutional America. The phrase “consent of the governed” first appears in the Declaration of Independence, the document by which the United States declared itself no longer under the governance of the British king. The Declaration makes clear that a government’s moral right to use state power is only justified and legal when derived from the people over which that power is exercised. Such consent is the opposite of the divine right of kings, the philosophy under which the British ruled colonial Americans. Its foundational principle was obedience to government and its edicts and decisions, even on issues of life and death, as a religious and moral obligation.¶ Following the more philosophical Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights was a practical exercise written to address directly the specific injustices of rule by royal decree. By turning its back on key elements of our founding, Washington, it seems, has brought us full circle.¶ Life in Post-Constitutional America¶ These days in the pseudo-debates about drone killings in the mainstream media, such changes are treated as matters of no great significance. On the day that the president’s latest plans for the murder of a fellow citizen in the distant tribal backlands of Pakistan first appeared, they caused little stir. The headlines were instead dominated by Olympic gossip and an impending ice storm in Atlanta. Killings extrajudicially mandated by the White House? The Fifth Amendment? Maybe if the target were Shaun White in Sochi, more people would have cared.¶ At the moment, we are threatened with a return to a pre-Constitutional situation that Americans would once have dismissed out of hand, a society in which the head of state can take a citizen’s life on his (or her) own say-so. If it’s the model for the building of post-Constitutional America, we’re in trouble. Indeed the stakes are high, whether we notice or not.¶ The question is: How far will post-Constitutional America stray from the nation so conceived in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights? Because in the twenty-first century, the midnight knock on the door may come not from the King’s men, but from the sky.
Only the Court makes due process a thing – Hamdi opinion
Gary Shaw, Professor of Law, Touro College, 2-18-2013, “Due Process in American Military Tribunals After September 11, 2001”, http://www.tourolawreview.com/2013/02/due-process-in-american-military-tribunals-after-september-11-2001/
There were two issues before the Supreme Court in Hamdi. The initial issue was whether the Executive had plenary power to detain enemy combatants.29 The second issue was what process, if any, was due to persons who were detained as enemy combatants.30 The Supreme Court was badly splintered on how to resolve these two issues. Justice O’Connor issued a plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, in which she announced the judgment of the Court; Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in part and dissented in part; Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented; and Justice Thomas dissented.31 The Court ultimately concluded that it did not have to decide the first issue, finding that Congress had authorized the Executive to detain enemy combatants.32 Five Justices (O’Connor, the justices joining her plurality opinion, and Justice Thomas) concluded that the AUMF authorized the detention.33 The plurality made clear, however, that detention was only authorized when it was “sufficiently clear that the individual is, in fact, an enemy combatant.”34 This reasoning required that a determination be made as to whether there was sufficient evidence that an individual is an enemy combatant, which necessarily raised the issue of what process is due to an individual in the determination as to whether he was an enemy combatant.35 In resolving what process was due, two sub-issues needed to be settled. The first was which branch was to decide the process due to the detained individuals.36 The second was what process was in fact due in determining whether an individual was being properly detained.37 Regarding the issue of who decided what process was due, the Executive’s position was that under the doctrines of separation of powers and political question—in this case, the Supreme Court’s lack of qualifications in “matters of military decision-making”—the Judiciary was limited only to determining whether authorization existed “for the broader detention scheme” and had no authority to determine the propriety of individual detentions.38 Alternatively, the Executive argued that the Court “should review . . . the Executive’s determination that a . . . person is an enemy combatant under a very deferential . . . standard.”39 A majority of the Court (Justice O’Connor, the justices joining her plurality opinion, and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens in his dissent) rejected both of these positions, ruling that it is the Judiciary that makes these determinations.40
CP text is incoherent – XO can’t enjoin – only the courts can – reason to reject the CP on face
Nothing to solve – the aff is a legal argument not a mechanism that averts a harm – CP is an incoherent statement
Also – the past executive targeting is still illegal – the CP is like Ted Bundy getting acquitted because he promised not to do it again
Courts have sole discretion over treason – the Executive has almost no authority and can’t change the definition or render legal
Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, “The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause”, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
While the Statute of Edward III was certainly an improvement over the use of constructive treasons by a handpicked judiciary serving at the pleasure of the King,53 the Founders thought that this was not enough protection for treason defendants. Mindful of their status as traitors while fighting the rule of England,54 they sought to eliminate the potential for abusive prosecution of treason against groups with public grievances by including systemic, constitutional restrictions.55 First they created a fixed, restrictive definition of treason by limiting it to the two offenses enumerated in the Constitution—levying war and adhering to the enemy. 56 Second, they deliberately moved the Treason Clause to its final position in Article III from its draft position in Article I so that the Judiciary would “administer the clause” and Congress would have no power with respect to the scope of the offense.57 Third, they established an evidentiary requirement that two witnesses testify to the same overt treasonous act, which further reflected the “fundamentally restrictive attitude” behind the Drafters’ inclusion of the Clause.58 Finally, regarding the scope of the punishment, corruption of blood,59 the forfeiture of the convicted traitor’s estate and disinheritance of successors, 60 were prohibited entirely. In the broadest sense, the Drafters sought to disable the Government from either amending the definition of treason, or from punishing traitors without first satisfying a high burden of proof. Interpreting the Clause with an eye toward its restrictive nature, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged in Ex parte Bollman that: To prevent the possibility of those calamities . . . that great fundamental law which defines and limits the various departments of our government has given a rule on the subject both to the legislature and the courts of America, which neither can be permitted to transcend. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.62 Accordingly, the Court created a doctrinal rule to reflect the comprehensive yet precisely circumscribed treason definition enshrined in the Constitution: from Bollman in 1807 to Cramer v. United States in 1947, the Court has consistently held that treason may not be extended beyond its constitutional definition.63 By virtue of this rule against constructive treasons, merely immaterial variations in the elements of treason that leave the gravamen of the offense intact will not create a separate offense which avoids bringing the additional procedural protections of the Treason Clause into play. 2. Separation of Powers: The State’s Role in Crimes against the State Although the relocation of the Treason Clause from Article I to Article III was intended to constrain the legislature, “The treason clause  is clearly a limitation  upon all the agencies of government, instead of . . . the legislative branch only.”65 Congress only has the power to prescribe a limited punishment and has no power to redefine treason as such or to expand that category of behavior that falls within the ambit of “treason.” 66 The Judiciary is given the responsibility to administer the law of treason, yet cannot expand the definition of treason.67 The Executive has no express grant of responsibility with respect to treason, but one may reasonably presume that the President’s Article II “take care” powers68 would encompass, for example, the incidental role of serving as prosecutor, custodian, or executioner. The Constitution’s lack of any express grant should be read as giving the President the least authority in the administration of treason. Further, in Ex parte Garland, the Supreme Court read the prohibition against corruptions of blood as a constitutional charge to the Judiciary: “Therefore, to still further guard against this odious form of punishment, it is provided, in section three of article iii, concerning the judiciary that Congress may not work a corruption of blood . . . .” 70 This reading by the Court—that the placement of the Treason Clause and its prohibition on corruptions of blood in Article III charges the Judiciary to guard against its use—further bolsters the conclusion that the placement of treason within Article III textually commits the role of administering treason law to the Judiciary.71 This reading of Article III as a separation of powers regarding the administration of treason law was most recently affirmed in the 2013 case New York Times Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice.
No neg fiat in the context of legal aff – makes it impossible to read this aff because it changes the law in unpredictable ways – produces terrible legal thinking and unrealistic policy choices – that’s the Epstein ev – that’s also uniquely key to war powers thinking – that’s the Corn evidence
If anything, they only CP they would get is coming to the same legal conclusion through different grounds
Independently fiating the object of the plan is a voting issue –
collapses the topic by imagining a world in which the executive doesn’t do the things legal restraints are supposed to apply to
especially true in the context of legal affs because the CP just fiats that the legal dispute wouldn’t exist
makes it impossible to read any other aff because all solvency deficits either link to the aff or are solved by fiat

Tournament: Ndt | Round: 1 | Opponent: Georgia Davis-Galerstein | Judge: Buntin, Galloway, Warden
The Treason Clause and al-Aulaqi

Citizen-terrorists like Anwar al-Aulaqi are currently denied their constitutional treason clause protections

Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
The Supreme Court has held for over 150 years that creating merely artificial distinctions between
AND
case where the defendant is a citizen-terrorist charged with terrorism offenses.

There are three ways that a law may violate the treason clause’s prohibition on constructive treasons

Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
Upon close reading and as identified in this note for the first time, Supreme
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applied, a statute must be construed to avoid creating a constructive treason.

FISA and Federal crime definitions fail to distinguish treason from terrorism in either actus reus or mens rea – it fails both the additive and subtractive formula for determining constructive treasons

Also answers circumvention
Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
An application of the three formulations of the rule against constructive treasons reveals that neither
AND
another crime in deciding to kill al-Aulaqi without Article III process.

This misapplication of law occurred in the killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi who was not given due process owed to him under the treason clause

Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
Prosecution under a differently named crime that affords the protections of the Treason Clause is
AND
executor, then the case will likely address the merits of the case.

Al-Aulaqi meets the definition of both traitor and terrorist – he is guaranteed the most possible protection. Absent the constructive treasons protections, Congress can effectively dodge ALL restrictions present in the treason clause

Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
Imagine if Congress were to create two crimes, A and B, which,
AND
155 Therefore, al-Aulaqi was both a traitor and a terrorist.

Determining whether the executive is conducting war pursuant to legislation is the definition of judicial review – that means the court has to evaluate whether al-Aulaki was properly targeted and properly executed – the aff is justiciable

John Dehn, Assistant Professor in the Department of Law at the United States Military Academy, 2-7-2011, "Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi," http://www.pennlawreview.com/debates/index.php?id=40
A case must also be justiciable, meaning appropriate for judicial review. Justiciability doctrines
AND
the determination that Al-Aulaqi is a targetable member of that organization.

Obama would comply with the provision of due process rights

Craig Green, Prof of Law at Temple Unviersity , Northwestern University Law Review, 2011, Vol 105, No 3"Ending the Korematsu Era: An Early View From the War on Terror Cases".
Jackson’s hard-nosed analysis may seem intellectually bracing, but it understates the real
AND
they may believe—that Supreme Court precedent is authoritative and binding.312

Curriculum Advantage

Education about positive legal analysis must come first – it creates the foundation for normative inquiry – combining policy and legal approaches causes the normative judgments to swamp descriptive analysis.

Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Law and
AND
, 8 Harv. J. L. 26 Pub. Pol’y 255.
Legal education is a very broad subject, indeed, and I think that in
AND
and then to make his normative choices from a narrower set of possibilities.

Understanding legal reasoning is a prerequisite to debating Presidential war powers authority – our approach is crucial to making this "legal topic" a topic that forces us to actually learn the law.

Geoffrey S. Corn, professor in the International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s School, 1998, "PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER: DO THE COURTS OFFER ANY ANSWERS?" 157 Mil. L. Rev. 180 (1998)
~*180~ Few government decisions have greater impact on the military than ordering combat
AND
by both parties to any future political debate surrounding the use of force.

Legal reasoning training is unique a pedagogically beneficial – evaluating the specific outcome of the plan is incompatible with rules based training.

Frederick Schauer, David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, 2009, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning, pub. Harvard University Press, pp. 1-10.
Law schools the world over claim to instruct their students in how to "think like a lawyer." Studying law is AND
 be er- roneous is what, under the traditional understanding, the law often ex- pects its decision-makers to do. 16

Our rules based approach is necessary to develop analogical reasoning

Danny Priel, Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow at Yale Law School, Assistant Professor, University of Warwick School of Law, citing Lloyd Weinreb, Professor at Harvard Law School, 2008, "THINKING LIKE A LAWYER," http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096170
"You come in here with a skull full of mush, and you leave
AND
to understand how law operates unless we understand how reasoning by analogy works.

Analogical reasoning is the best heuristic for developing moral convictions and making decisions in a time-constrained, pluralistic society

Cass Sunstein, Robert Walmsley University Professor and Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, 1993, "On Analogical Reasoning" Harvard Law Review, Vol. 106, No. 3 (Jan., 1993), pp. 741-791
Analogical reasoning is the conventional method of the lawyer; it plays a large role
AND
evaluating our practices, and for deciding whether to change them through law.

Plan

Text: The United States federal judiciary should enjoin targeted killing by the United States federal government of citizens of the United States who are designated by the United States federal government as terrorists without due process on the grounds that federal definitions of terrorism constitute immaterial distinctions from treason.

Tournament: Ndt | Round: 1 | Opponent: Georgia Davis-Galerstein | Judge: Buntin, Galloway, Warden

T

2AC Restriction = Prohibition

We meet – enjoin means prohibit

Merriam Webster’s 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enjoin
1:  to direct or impose by authoritative order or with urgent admonition enjoined us to be careful
2
a :  forbid, prohibit was enjoined by conscience from telling a lie
b :  to prohibit by a judicial order :  put an injunction on a book had been enjoined prior to publication 

Narrowing options through conditions is a restriction

Jean Schiedler-Brown, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown 26 Associates, 2012, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington,  The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/68642920Appellant20Randall20Kincheloe27s.pdf
3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include
AND
, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In means "within the limits" not all

Cullen, Commissioner, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 11-13-1952 Riehl et al. V. Kentucky unemployment compensation commission, http://ky.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.19521113_0040095.KY.htm/qx
We do not find any ambiguity in KRS 341.070(1). It
AND
aware of any authority for ascribing such a meaning to the word ’in’. 

K

2ac Legalism K

Alt fails – reductionist

Ian Loader 7, Professor of Criminology and Director of the Centre for Criminology at the University of Oxford and Neil Walker, Professor of European Law in the Department of Law at the EU Institute, Florence, "Civilizing Security", 2007, guessoumiss.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/civilizing-security.pdf
Against security?
The strands of radical thought outlined in this chapter offer a cogent critique of the
AND
the state, starting with the claim that it is a cultural monolith.

Political constraints fail – weak media, governmental secrecy and the existence of a wide array of war powers abuses

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest. 9-13-2012, "Defending the Indefensible" http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/defending-the-indefensible/-http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/defending-the-indefensible/
Posner is comfortable with the only restraint on executive power being the somewhat amorphous consent
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Americans (possibly excluding University of Chicago law professors) has fallen sharply.

Activist strategies that focus on statutory change are less feasible than legal approaches – reforms never get off the ground, cause backlash, and get watered down – the perm means we use the right tools for the specific situation – there’s no movement for al-Awlaki which means only the court can be an effective restraint

Scott L Cummings, prof at UCLA School of Law, and Deborah L. Rhode, prof at Stanford Law School, 6-23-2009, "Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and Practice," Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. XXXVI.
2. Relative Efficacy An important premise of the critique of litigation is that political
AND
must avoid mythologizing rights, so too they must avoid romanticizing political activism.

Building legal expertise aids activist politics – legal challenges motivate broader movements

Scott L Cummings, prof at UCLA School of Law, and Deborah L. Rhode, prof at Stanford Law School, 6-23-2009, "Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and Practice," Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. XXXVI.
The critique of rights associated with first-wave public interest law partly reflected disillusionment
AND
would "spread ~resources~ too thin" for structural change.46

Aff is a prereq to fracturing law

Margaret Jane Radin Professor of Law, Stanford University and Frank Michelman Professor of Law, Harvard University, "Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice", April 1991, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 139, No. 4 , pp. 1019-1058 GENDER MODIFIED
Consider legal positivism. It might be thought that legal positivism is the aspiration to
AND
we are going to exercise upon it our valuational judgment and act accordingly. 

There’s also no link broadly – their evidence is only speaking in the context of policymaking NOT legal decisions

Legal and rights based strategies are a critical form of individual resistance—even if we can’t translate our legal arguments to reality, the act of demanding rights affirms life and checks state violence

Muneer I. Ahmad, a Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School, 2009, "RESISTING GUANTÁNAMO: RIGHTS AT THE BRINK OF DEHUMANIZATION", Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 103, p. 1683, American University, WCL Research Paper No. 08-65.
This Article is about the work that rights do, and the work of the
AND
, state violence is so extreme as to attempt to extinguish the human. 

Discursive changes don’t matter – objective real world factors are key – they also influence discourse

John Mearsheimer, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, Winter 1995, "The False Promise of International Institutions." International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3.
Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in
AND
appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging. (159) 

CP

2AC XO

Targeted killing of civilians without judicial due process is unethical – we as citizens have an obligation to oppose killing in our name

Peter Van Buren, served the American Foreign Service for 22 years, receiving several awards, 2-17-2014, "Obama’s itchy trigger finger on drone strikes: what happened to due process?" The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/17/obama-drone-strikes-due-process
Through what seems to have been an Obama administration leak to the Associated Press,
AND
door may come not from the King’s men, but from the sky.

Only the Court makes due process a thing – Hamdi opinion

Gary Shaw, Professor of Law, Touro College, 2-18-2013, "Due Process in American Military Tribunals After September 11, 2001", http://www.tourolawreview.com/2013/02/due-process-in-american-military-tribunals-after-september-11-2001/
There were two issues before the Supreme Court in Hamdi. The initial issue was
AND
positions, ruling that it is the Judiciary that makes these determinations.40

Courts have sole discretion over treason – the Executive has almost no authority and can’t change the definition or render legal

Randal John Meyer, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, graduates in 2014, 2013, "The Twin Perils of the al-Aulaqi Case: The Treason Clause and the Equal Protection Clause", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2246981
While the Statute of Edward III was certainly an improvement over the use of constructive
AND
York Times Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice.

2AC Sunbursting

Court Capital

2AC AT: DAs

Approach the DA as a federal judge who needs to justify their decision based on legal doctrines – throw out DA’s that don’t ground their links and impacts in legal rules or precedents

Adrian Vermeule, prof of law at Harvard, 2008, "Connecting positive and normative legal theory," Journal of Constitutional Law, 10:2, http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=120626context=jcl
Confusion arises when skeptics point out that, in certain cases, a fully rational
AND
, that the Justices are not directly motivated to make the law better.

2AC Court Capital

Memo to the neg – lots of court rulings coming – they all are controversial and thump the DA

Jessica Mason Pieklo, Senior Legal Analyst, RH Reality Check, 9-17-2013, "6 Supreme Court Cases to Watch This Term" http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/09/17/six-supreme-court-cases-to-watch-this-term/
The United States Supreme Court term begins in October, and while the entire docket
AND
the reach and effect of the greatest achievements of the civil rights movement.

– provide legitimacy

No spillover —- there’s no reason McCutcheon would be picked for make-up – backlash is compartmentalized and non-transferable

Martin H Redish., Professor of Law – Northwestern University, and Karen L. Drizin, Clerk – Illinois State Supreme Court, New York University Law Review, April 1987, Lexis
The fallacy of the concept of fungible institutional capital. The basis for Dean Choper’s
AND
if it had chosen to stay out of interbranch and intersystemic conflicts. 146

Relations resilient and no risk of war – cold war proves

Richard Weitz, staff writer, 9-27-2011, "Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties," World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10140/global-insights-putin-not-a-game-changer-for-u-s-russia-ties
Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States
AND
of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

Midterms

Warming doesn’t cause extinction – its gradual, humans adapt, and technology solves problems before they occur

Matt Ridley, British scientist, 8-17-2012, "Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times," Wired, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff_apocalypsenot/all/
So, should we worry or not about the warming climate? It is far
AND
arise, not through the mass fear stoked by worst-case scenarios.

Tournament: Texas | Round: 7 | Opponent: Kansas Carey-Duff | Judge: Layton

2AC – War Powers

/= Covert===

Interp – congressional restrictions on use of force are considered restrictions on war powers – this is their card highly lighted to not arbitrarily exclude us.

Robert Bajesky, MA in Political Science and Applied Economics, LLM @ Georgetown, 2013, "Dubitable Security Threats and Low Intensity Interventions as the Achilles’ Heel of War Powers," 32 Miss. C. L. Rev. 9
A numerical comparison indicates that the Framer’s intended for Congress to be the dominant branch
AND
the President was empowered "to repel and not to commence war." n32

Also if they’re right there would be no affs – circumvention args would be literally unbeatable

We meet – targeted killing authority is part of the peripheral powers granted by congress related to commander authority

Jennifer Daskal, Assistant Professor of Law at the American University Washington College of Law, and Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship at the American University Washington College of Law, 2014, "After the AUMF," http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Daskal-Vladeck-Final1.pdf
This understanding has been the driving force behind the past decade of U.S
AND
reports, targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.25

Confirmed by the Dowd evidence and the Daskal evidence from the 1AC

Precision – their interpretation cherry picks their source – undermines aff predictability and topic research

Aff flex – the topic is restriction and the neg has generics – introducing new lit is key to preventing the topic from going stale

No limits explosion – 4 subcategories and substantially checks

Reasonability – good is good enough

If they win this it just means that we can’t reign in the CIA which is a solvency question not a voter.

At best this is an extra topicality argument – we don’t defend any offense based off the extra topical portions of the aff.

Tournament: Texas | Round: 7 | Opponent: Kansas Carey-Duff | Judge: Layton

2AC – War Powers

/= Covert===

Interp – congressional restrictions on use of force are considered restrictions on war powers – this is their card highly lighted to not arbitrarily exclude us.

Robert Bajesky, MA in Political Science and Applied Economics, LLM @ Georgetown, 2013, "Dubitable Security Threats and Low Intensity Interventions as the Achilles’ Heel of War Powers," 32 Miss. C. L. Rev. 9
A numerical comparison indicates that the Framer’s intended for Congress to be the dominant branch
AND
the President was empowered "to repel and not to commence war." n32

Also if they’re right there would be no affs – circumvention args would be literally unbeatable

We meet – targeted killing authority is part of the peripheral powers granted by congress related to commander authority

Jennifer Daskal, Assistant Professor of Law at the American University Washington College of Law, and Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship at the American University Washington College of Law, 2014, "After the AUMF," http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Daskal-Vladeck-Final1.pdf
This understanding has been the driving force behind the past decade of U.S
AND
reports, targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.25

Confirmed by the Dowd evidence and the Daskal evidence from the 1AC

Precision – their interpretation cherry picks their source – undermines aff predictability and topic research

Aff flex – the topic is restriction and the neg has generics – introducing new lit is key to preventing the topic from going stale

No limits explosion – 4 subcategories and substantially checks

Reasonability – good is good enough

If they win this it just means that we can’t reign in the CIA which is a solvency question not a voter.

At best this is an extra topicality argument – we don’t defend any offense based off the extra topical portions of the aff.