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#### We meet and we’re key to the topic

Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations and former official in the Congressional Research Service and the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Targeted Killings and Signature Strikes,” 6-16-2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes

No matter how U.S. officials (secretly) refer to the practice, signature strikes against military-age men have been part of U.S. targeted killings outside of battlefields from their beginning. In fact, the very first targeted killing was a signature strike. After a year-long manhunt and several missed opportunities by Yemeni soldiers, on November 3, 2002, a fusion of human intelligence assets and signals intercepts pinpointed Abu Ali al-Harithi—an operational planner in the al-Qaeda cell that bombed the USS Cole in 2002—and his bodyguards living in the Marib region near the border with Saudi Arabia. Yemeni and U.S. forces on the ground, supported by a Predator drone circling above, were monitoring al-Harithi’s group when they left a compound in two Toyota SUVs. All of the men were in one vehicle and the women in the other. According to an unnamed U.S. official, “If the women hadn’t gotten into another car, we wouldn’t have fired.” (A member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence later wondered, “What do we do, next time, if the women get into the car?”) Reportedly, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted a satellite phone call coming from the SUV filled with men. After an NSA analyst—who had listened to tapes of al-Harithi’s voice for years—heard confirming evidence, he shouted: “He’s in the backseat, and he’s giving the driver directions!” With that confirmation, a CIA-controlled Predator drone was authorized to fire a single Hellfire missile, which destroyed the SUV and killed al-Harithi, four unknown Yemenis, and Ahmed Hijazi (otherwise known as Kemal Derwish)—a naturalized U.S. citizen who recruited six men from Lackawanna, New York, to briefly attend an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the Lackawanna Six pled guilty to providing material support to al-Qaeda and received sentences ranging from seven to nine years in federal prison. As the Los Angeles Times reported the drone strike: “Even though the CIA wasn’t sure who else was in the car, the customary rules of armed conflict say that anyone sitting next to a legitimate target such as Harithi was, in effect, accepting the risk of imminent death.” (Many international legal scholars would dispute this interpretation.) At the same time, U.S. officials acknowledged that the CIA did not know Hijazi was in the vehicle before the CIA launched the missile, although one later claimed his death was justifiable “collateral damage” since “he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time.” It is plausible that the military-age males who happened to get into al-Harithi’s SUV that day were involved with the suspected al-Qaeda operative in planning terrorist plots. However, there is no way to know this with any certainty, and the Bush administration never presented any supporting evidence to this effect. Moreover, we will never know what specific evidence was used to target al-Harithi, because some of it came from suspected al-Qaeda operative Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri. In 2008, CIA director Hayden testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Nashiri was one of three detainees that the CIA waterboarded, and information obtained by torture is not admissible in a military commission trial. Whether they are called signature strikes, crowd killing, or Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes, all have been part of U.S. targeted killings from the start, and continue with the CIA’s tactic of staggered drone strikes to kill rescuers of initial victims. The Obama administration makes the false choice that kinetic counterterrorism options are either “large, intrusive military deployments” or drone strikes (although some signature strikes have been conducted with cruise missiles). Or, as former CIA official Henry Crumpton—who, according to his memoir, authorized the first U.S. drone strike on October 20, 2001, in Afghanistan—crudely described the dichotomy: “Look at the firebombing of Dresden, and compare what we’re doing today.” However, people have the right to disagree with the ethical and moral tradeoffs of how drone strikes are currently conducted, and the unwillingness of the Obama administration to discuss them, as well as Congress’ reticence to question them. After ten years of signature strikes, isn’t this a debate worth having?

#### Plan text limits targets to leaders of terrorist groups – means we still meet by banning individually targeting low level leaders

#### Signature strikes target individuals

Shazad Ali, contributing analyst at Open Briefing and PhD in European Studies at the University of Karachi and member of the editorial board of Perspectives on Terrorism, and Chris Abbott, founder and executive director of Open Briefing and Honorary Visiting Research Fellow in the School of Social and International Studies at the University of Bradford and the former deputy director of Oxford Research Group, 10-24-2013, “US Drone Strikes in Pakistan: ineffective and illegitimate,” Sustainable Security, http://sustainablesecurity.org/2013/10/24/us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan/

Signature strikes target individuals based on predetermined ‘signatures’ of behaviour that US intelligence links to militant activity. In other words, people are targeted merely on the basis of their behaviour patterns. This is different to personality strikes, which use intelligence to target specific terror suspects. In a June 2013 report that cited classified documents, NBC News revealed that one in four people killed in drone strikes in Pakistan between 3 September 2010 and 30 October 2011 were classified as ‘other militants’ by CIA. This means the CIA were unable to determine the affiliation, if any, of those killed.

#### Even if they’re right – plan text doesn’t say signature strikes – means it’s solvency not T

#### 1AC ev is from policy makers and contextually prove sig strikes are heart of the topic – prefer ev from policymakers making policy recommendations – ensures best literature and clash

#### Daskal ev indicates signature strikes are still targeted – they aren’t random cruise missile strikes

#### Zenko indicates it’s the centerpiece for targeted killing policy globally

#### Targeted killing is lethal force against someone not in custody – broad interps are better because there isn’t one definition – our interp synthesizing leading definitions

Jan Guardian, translator at the International Monetary Fund, 2013 “Targeted Killings: A Summary,” http://acontrarioicl.com/2013/02/27/targeted-killings-a-summary/

Currently there is no legal definition of targeted killings in either international or domestic law.[1] ‘Targeted killing’ is rather a descriptive notion frequently used by international actors in order to refer to a specific action undertaken in respect to certain individuals.¶ Various scholars propose different definitions. Machon, for example, refers to ‘targeted killing’ as an “intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit governmental approval,”[2] whereas Solis suggests that for there to be a targeted killing (i) there must be an armed conflict, either international or non-international in character; (ii) the victim must be specifically targeted; (iii) he must be beyond a reasonable possibility of arrest; (iv) the killing must be authorized by senior military commanders or the head of government; (v) and the target must be either a combatant or someone directly participating in the hostilities.[3] But whereas some scholars seek to use a human rights-based definition, [4] others propose those which do not entail the applicability of international humanitarian law. [5]¶ However, such definitions are incorrect for several reasons. First of all, the definition of a ‘targeted killing’ has to be broad enough as to cover a wide range of practices and flexible enough as to encompass situations within and outside the scope of an armed conflict, thus, being subject to the application of both international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as opposed to the definition provided by some scholars and even states themselves.[6] Secondly, one should bear in mind that defining an act as an instance of ‘targeted killing’ should not automatically render the illegality of such an act at stake.[7] Moreover, the definition also has to cover situations where such an act is carried out by other subjects of international law, rather than only by states.¶ Therefore, maintaining an element-based approach and synthesizing common characteristics of multiple definitions, it is more advisable to use the one employed by Alston and Melzer, which refers to targeted killings as a use of lethal force by a subject of international law (encompassing non-state actors) that is directed against an individually selected person who is not in custody and that is intentional (rather than negligent or reckless), premeditated (rather than merely voluntary), and deliberate (meaning that ‘the death of the targeted person [is] the actual aim of the operation, as opposed to deprivations of life which, although intentional and premeditated, remain the incidental result of an operation pursuing other aims).[8]

#### Two net benefits

#### Aff creativity – neg generics are inevitable – preserving aff innovation is key to all t spec edu

#### Ground – their interp overlimits by eliminating an entire part of the topic – limits us to terrible affs with terrible DAs

#### Reasonability – C/I is a race to the bottom

## Case

## Pakistan

### Strikes Good

#### Restrictions are inevitable – that’s Zenko – backlash necessarily curtails operations in unpredictable ways – only the plan maintains op flex

#### Decap ops are sufficient – Johnston indicates those are the effective strikes

#### Blowback outweighs the link

Hassan Abbas, senior advisor at Asia Society, 8-23-2013, “How Drones Create More Terrorists,” The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/how-drones-create-more-terrorists/278743/

Recently, strong evidence has begun to suggest that terrorists use drone strikes as a recruitment tool. Of course, the value of drones in the arena of intelligence-gathering and secret surveillance of foes (and even friends) is unmistakable. In warzones too, it can support ground operations in significant and even decisive ways. None of this is controversial, though the ones on the receiving end will certainly not like it. What is debatable is its use as a counter-terrorism instrument in theaters that are not declared war zones, or in cases where a sovereign state is not fully and publicly on board with this policy. Lack of transparency in regulations that govern this new type of warfare, the unverifiable nature of targets, and questions over the credibility of intelligence only complicates the matter. Mark Bowden's important contribution to the drone debate raises critical questions that policy makers will be wise to consider for the future use of this new tool of war. One of the important arguments mentioned in the piece revolves around the notion that drone strikes might be less provocative than ground assaults for terrorists, meaning that standard warfare might create more terrorists than drones do. Let’s first accept what is obvious: more civilians are killed in standard warfare, and the history of warfare in the 20th century sufficiently proves the point. When it comes to drones strikes, the ratio of civilian deaths is certainly lower, but the issue is not about the number of civilian casualties alone. The inherently secret nature of the weapon creates a persistent feeling of fear in the areas where drones hover in the sky, and the hopelessness of communities that are on the receiving end of strikes causes severe backlash -- both in terms of anti-U.S. opinion and violence. Response to drone strikes comes in many varieties. First, revenge is targeted at those within the easy range of the insurgents and militants. The victims of those revenge terrorist attacks also consider the drone strikes responsible for all the mayhem. Consequently, terrorists and ordinary people are drawn closer to each other out of sympathy, whereas a critical function of any successful counter-terrorism policy is to win over public confidence so that they join in the campaign against the perpetrators of terror. Poor public awareness -- which is often a function of inadequate education -- about terrorist organizations indeed plays a role in building this perspective. Public outrage against drone strikes circuitously empowers terrorists. It allows them space to survive, move around, and maneuver. Pakistan is a perfect example o f this phenomenon. Many in Pakistan now believe that drone strikes tend to motivate Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban to conduct terrorist attacks that target Pakistan's security forces as well as civilians. The duplicity of Pakistan's political and military elite in giving a green light to the U.S. drone policy proved to be counterproductive. The sponsors and supporters of drone strikes in U.S. policy circles apparently ignored the wider socio-political impact and indirect costs when evaluating its efficacy. Supporters of drone strikes are only grudgingly acknowledging now that affiliates of Al-Qaeda are alive and kicking in various parts of the world, even though its founder is dead and its top layer of leadership is disabled and dysfunctional. Drone strikes that specifically target hardcore terrorists can work effectively provided they are supported by a parallel public relations endeavor that challenges the ideas projected by those terrorists. Terrorists and their misguided sympathizers often expose and market civilian casualties -- particularly women and children -- quite effectively. Meanwhile, those who direct and authorize these strikes rarely provide any justification and rationale for it. This is simply seen as arrogance by those whom the U.S. expects to be on their side in this battle. The crux of my viewpoint is that drone attacks cannot be compared to "boots on ground" operations. They are two different methods of battling enemies. Wars are mainly about national interests -- resources, territory, the balance of power, and religion. Drone strikes directed at terrorists perform a comparable but different role. In battling terrorism, physical elimination of the enemy matters but is not decisive. Hitting at the mindset of the terrorist and discrediting the ideas that generate terrorism is the big prize. A law enforcement action that flows out of a "rule of law" paradigm, involving meticulous investigations and prosecution in courts, is likely to be far more damaging for the ideas that terrorists stand for. Limited and internationally regulated use of drones targeting the most wanted terrorists can be a part of this comprehensive approach -- it may take longer to deliver, but it will be more sustainable and the results will be more durable.

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#### Dawg, read the news

Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon Fellow at the Center for Preventive Action at CFR, 6-11-2013, “How does the recent shift in U.S. drone policy impact “signature strikes”?” CFR, http://www.cfr.org/drones/does-recent-shift-us-drone-policy-impact-signature-strikes/p30885

"Signature strikes"—attacks based on patterns of activity—were first authorized by President George W. Bush in 2008 for CIA drone strikes against suspected militants in Pakistan. As reported by David Sanger in his book The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power, the threshold for who could be killed was lowered in 2008 from "high-value targets" (HVTs) or "personality strikes," to what was termed the "reasonable man" standard. Subsequent reporting by Jo Becker and Scott Shane in the New York Times revealed that the Obama administration continued the policy whereby a signature strike "in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants." The Obama administration has also expanded this practice for targeted killings in Yemen in 2012. The Obama administration has repeatedly refused to acknowledge that it conducts signature strikes, or to explain how the killing of anonymous military-aged males based on their observable behavior meets the principle of distinction in the law of armed conflict (the idea of distinction is to only engage valid military targets). Before President Obama's recent counterterrorism speech, it was reported that the United States was going to either scale back or end signature strikes. However, the president never discussed implementing these options, and when his senior aides were asked about them in a background briefing prior to the speech, they too were unresponsive. Subsequently, there is no evidence that signature strikes will be reduced or ended based upon anything the Obama administration has recently stated.

#### Wrong – there was a strike a couple weeks ago

Natasha Lennard, assistant news editor at Salon, 9-6-2013, “U.S. drone strike kills six in Pakistan,” Salon, http://www.salon.com/2013/09/06/u\_s\_drone\_strike\_kills\_six\_in\_pakistan/singleton/

On Friday, reports from Pakistani officials claim that six people were killed by a U.S. drone in a suspected militant hideout in the North Waziristan tribal region. While the news cycle fixates on likely U.S. military action against Syria, remember that our limitless and borderless drone wars continue. As the AP noted, Pakistani officials say the “identity and nationality of the slain men was not immediately known.” Whether the exact identity of the suspected militants was known to the U.S. is not clear. Regularly U.S. drone strikes are based on no more than recognizing “signature” behavior of militants; as the U.K.-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism notes, based on local reports, U.S. drone strikes may have killed up to 926 Pakistani civilians since 2003. In a speech earlier this year, President Obama announced shifts in the CIA’s drone program such that “signature strikes” — wherein civilians have been conflated with militants all too often — would play a smaller part in the drone program.

### Yemen – Oil

#### Signature strikes boost AQAP

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf

Just as in Pakistan, the result of a drone-first policy in Yemen has been to increase the ranks of the government’s enemies. Drone strikes against AQAP have fostered anti-American sentiment in the tribal regions of the country and encouraged friends and family of civilians killed to join AQAP or other militant networks. The drone strikes have bred ‘psychological acceptance’ of AQAP among Yemenis, in part because they appear to confirm its narrative of a bloodthirsty US dropping bombs from afar with no concern for who is killed. 107 A prominent Yemeni youth activist, Ibrahim Mothana, has argued that ‘drone strikes are causing more and more Yemenis to hate America and join radical militants; they are not driven by ideology but rather by a sense of revenge and despair’. 108 As Zenko has reported, AQAP has increased its membership from a few hundred in 2010 to a ‘few thousand’ today. 109 It is impossible to know how many of these recruits have come to AQAP as a result of the drone strikes or because of other factors, but this trend raises the worrying possibility that AQAP may gain several recruits for every leader killed in a drone strike. 110 As one local human rights leader put it, ‘the drones are killing al Qaeda leaders, but they are also turning them into heroes’. 111 Another beneficiary of drone strikes in Yemen has been Ansar al-Sharia, a Yemeni group affiliated with AQAP which has waged an increasingly vicious insurgency against the government since the beginning of the Arab Spring. 112 As the Yemeni government has relied more on American drones to patrol its ungoverned spaces, Ansar al-Sharia has stepped into the vacuum and begun to provide social services in its place. The danger, as former CIA official Robert Grenier put it, is that the increasing reliance on signature drone strikes may create a ‘larger terrorist safe haven’ in Yemen. 11

#### Yemen terrorism causes massive oil spikes

Amy Harder, Energy Correspondent for National Journal, 5-29-2013, “Al-Qaida Retaliation Would Drive Spike in Oil Prices,” National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/al-qaida-retaliation-would-drive-spike-in-oil-prices-20110502

“But Yemen now sticks out as the real country to watch because it has both,” added Parthemore, referring to the fact that al-Qaida’s most active branch, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, is based in Yemen, and that the country is experiencing political upheaval. To boot, Yemen sits at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden. About 10 percent of the world’s seaborne oil passes through that gulf, including oil from Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest producer and exporter. Parthemore said terrorists regularly try to attack petroleum infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, and noted that bin Laden’s death could trigger more efforts. “I’m particularly concerned about reprisal attacks focusing on petroleum infrastructure there [Saudi Arabia] -- probably more so than is being represented in the media now,” she said. Other experts said if terrorism occurs in Saudi Arabia or Yemen, oil prices could skyrocket. “If the al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula were able to stir things up a bit and do something in or near the border of Saudi Arabia … I think you would see a very sharp move upward in petroleum prices,” said Charles Ebinger, who directs the Brookings Institution’s energy-security initiative and is a senior fellow in foreign policy.

#### Oil shocks risk extinction

Roberts 04 (Paul, Regular Contributor to Harpers and NYT Magazine, “The End of Oil: On The Edge of a Perilous New World”, p. 93-94)

The obsessive focus on oil is hardly surprising, given the stakes. In the fast-moving world of oil politics, oil is not simply a source of world power, but a medium for that power as well, a substance whose huge importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil “event” — a pipeline explosion in Iraq, political unrest in Venezuela, a bellicose ex change between the Russian and Saudi oil ministers — sends shockwaves through the world energy order, pushes prices tip or down, and sets off tec tonic shifts in global wealth and power. Each day that the Saudi-Russian spat kept oil supplies high and prices low, the big oil exporters were losing hundreds of millions of dollars and, perhaps, moving closer to financial and political disaster — while the big consuming nations enjoyed what amounted to a massive tax break. Yet in the volatile world of oil, the tide could quickly turn. A few months later, as anxieties over a second Iraq war drove prices up to forty dollars, the oil tide abruptly changed directions, transferring tens of billions of dollars from the economies of the United States, Japan, and Europe to the national banks in Riyadh, Caracas, Kuwait City, and Baghdad, and threatening to strangle whatever was left of the global economic recovery. So embedded has oil become in today’s political and economic spheres that the big industrial governments now watch the oil markets as closely as they once watched the spread of communism — and with good reason: six of the last seven global recessions have been preceded by spikes in the price of oil, and fear is growing among economists and policymakers that, in today’s growth-dependent, energy-intensive global economy, oil price volatility itself may eventually pose more risk to prosperity and stability and simple survival than terrorism or even war.

## Norms

#### US precedent causes Turkey to strike PKK

Aaron Stein, Ph.D candidate at King’s College, London and the Nonproliferation Program Director at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies an independent think tank in Istanbul, “Turkey’s Negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Armed Drones” 2-26-2013, Turkey Wonk Blog

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently re-intiated peace talks with Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Erdogan’s AKP, like Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party, has sought to address Turkey’s Kurdish Issue – or the Kurds’ Turkey Problem – by focusing on the two groups’ shared muslim identity, rather than the previous policy of forced ethnic assimilation. Erdogan has previously engaged the PKK in peace talks, however, these efforts were unsuccessful. During the previous round of negotiations, Erdogan opted to hold the talks in secret, rather than subject himself to the inevitable backlash from Turkish nationalists (An important AKP voting bloc by the way). The talks, despite having made some progress, broke down after President Abdullah Gul went public with the negotiations and the subsequent celebration at the Habur border gate in 2009 when Kurdish fighters returned from the PKK camps in Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkish territory. The AKP appeared to have been caught off guard and ill-prepared to deal with the imagery of thousands of Kurds welcoming home the PKK fighters as national heroes. The Turkish nationalist backlash, combined with the AKP’s political ambitions, led to the end of the talks and the re-militarization of the Kurdish issue. This time around, Erdogan has opted to publicize the talks, which has, in my opinion, placed the responsibility for success squarely on the shoulders of Abdullah Ocalan. Erdogan’s public statements, as well as the policies that his party is now pursuing are politically dangerous, though the powerful Prime Minister has a number of reasons to solve the Kurdish issue. Most importantly, the AKP has shown an off and on commitment to ending the Turkish – Kurdish conflict, which has claimed an estimated 40,000 lives since the current conflict began in 1984. Moreover, Erdogan, who has made no secret of his desire to move to an executive Presidency, has an incentive to engage and secure the support of the Kurdish BDP for his proposed constitution. In addition, Erdogan’s 2009 – 2012 alliance with Turkey’s ultra-nationalist MHP has alienated Turkish liberals, which, despite being less religious than the AKP, are keen on implementing European Union reforms and deepening the country’s democratic system (Both AKP campaign themes). Erdogan, I am assuming, is betting that if he solves the PKK problem, the majority of Turks, who continue to be wary of negotiating with what they consider to be a terrorist group akin to Al Qaeda, will eventually support his decision. This of course hinges on his kicking out the fighters from Turkish territory, so as to ensure a drop in violence, which would in turn give him the credibility to go before the wary Turkish electorate and claim that he has brought peace. This political path is fraught with potential pitfalls, as illustrated by the recent attack of BDP MPs in the nationalist strongholds of Sinop and Samsun (For an excellent overview of the recent attack, see this blog post by the excellent Frederike Geerdink). The AKP, however, receives a tremendous amount of political support from nationalists. The AKP, which faces little resistance from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), is far more concerned about the potential for its base to splinter, which would in turn lead to it loosing some votes to the MHP, the BDP, and the Islamist Saadet Party. The AKP, therefore, is seeking to balance the current PKK negotiations with its need to continue to engage and appeal to Turkish nationalists. It is an incredibly difficult policy to pursue and is likely the reason why Erdogan’s messaging has vacillated wildly between themes like re-instituting the death penalty and the need to open chapters for Turkey’s stalled European Union bid. However, because the AKP has shown an incredible ability to set Turkey’s political agenda – using coordinated leaks, trial balloons, and speeches, which are framed by overarching themes like justice and development (The translation of the AKP’s name) – I believe that the AKP is capable of keeping its coalition together and ending the conflict with the PKK. (The PKK also has a lot to with this, but that is the subject for another blog post.) However, as I explain in my current piece on Foreign Policy, Ankara has opted to follow Washington’s example of using drones for counter-terrorism missions. Turkey, as I explain in the piece, has developed a surveillance drone and is seeking to use the current platform to develop an armed version. While Ankara has been characteristically opaque about the drones’ development, it does not take a genius to figure out that the Turkish military hopes to use armed drones to shorten to “kill-chain” for targeted strikes against PKK operatives. However, Turkey has not publicized who makes the decisions about when to use deadly force, nor has it publicly explained the legal rationale for using armed drones to assassinate Turkish citizens without due process. (As an EU candidate country, one would assume Turkey would try and figure this out). Moreover, if the drone is used in the southeast to attack PKK militants, it is likely that some of those killed will be Turkish citizens. Given the trajectory of the cease fire talks, I see a disconnect between Erdogan’s intentions, the likely use of armed drones in the future, and the military establishment’s opaque drone policy. To be clear, I am not advocating that Ankara disarm or cease in its efforts to further develop its anti-terror capabilities. However, I do think it would be prudent for the Turkish government to publicize its drone policies, in order to build trust with the Kurdish minority. Moreover, Turkey should also seek to clarify the current legal structure that has been put in place for the killing of Turkish citizens. (If one does not exist, Ankara should start writing.) It would also be prudent for the Turkish government to explain whether or not it conducts signature strikes (I think it does, one need not look any further than the Uludere tragedy for confirmation). If Ankara presses ahead with its armed drone program (and it will), the government should seek to be more forthcoming with information about the program’s goals and its intended use. Otherwise, it risks undermining trust with the Kurdish minority and, should the two sides agree to a cease fire, could risk re-igniting the conflict. Moreover, the program, which is still in the design phase, provides Ankara with a political opportunity. On the one hand, Erodgan can tout the program as a symbol of Turkey’s strength – which would win him support from the nationalists. However, he could pair the rhetoric with a clear articulation of Turkey’s drone policy, which should include a clear legal framework for the strikes, in order to assuage Turkish liberals and Turkey’s Kurds. This would allow for him to continue to balance the two sides’ political demands and, from the perspective of AKP political operatives, help them grow their voter base.

#### Turkey intervention causes nuclear war

Michael T. Snyder, a graduate of the McIntire School of Commerce at the University of Virginia and has two law degrees from the University of Florida, 6-28-2011, “Could We Actually See A War Between Syria And Turkey?” endoftheamericandream.com/archives/could-we-actually-see-a-war-between-syria-and-turkey

In recent days, there have been persistent rumors that we could potentially be on the verge of a military conflict between Syria and Turkey. As impossible as such a thing may have seemed just a few months ago, it is now a very real possibility. Over the past several months, we have seen the same kind of "pro-democracy" protests erupt in Syria that we have seen in many of the other countries in the Middle East. The Syrian government has no intention of being toppled by a bunch of protesters and has cracked down on these gatherings harshly. There are reports in the mainstream media that say that over 1,300 people have been killed and more than 10,000 people have been arrested since the protests began. Just like with Libya, the United States and the EU are strongly condemning the actions that the Syrian government has taken to break up these protests. The violence in Syria has been particularly heavy in the northern sections of the country, and thousands upon thousands of refugees have poured across the border into neighboring Turkey. Syria has sent large numbers of troops to the border area to keep more citizens from escaping. Turkey has responded by reinforcing its own troops along the border. Tension between Turkey and Syria is now at an all-time high. So could we actually see a war between Syria and Turkey? A few months ago anyone who would have suggested such a thing would have been considered crazy. But the world is changing and the Middle East is a powder keg that is just waiting to explode. Since the Syrian government began cracking down on the protests, approximately 12,000 Syrians have flooded into Turkey. The Turkish government is deeply concerned that Syria may try to strike these refugees while they are inside Turkish territory. Troop levels are increasing on both sides of the border and tension is rising. One wrong move could set off a firestorm. The government of Turkey is demanding that Syrian military forces retreat from the border area. The government of Syria says that Turkey is just being used to promote the goals of the U.S. and the EU. Syria also seems to be concerned that Turkey may attempt to take control of a bit of territory over the border in order to provide a "buffer zone" for refugees coming from Syria. What makes things even more controversial is that the area where many of the Syrian refugees are encamped actually used to belong to Syria. In fact, many of the maps currently in use inside Syria still show that the area belongs to Syria. War between Syria and Turkey has almost happened before. Back in the 1990s, the fact that the government of Syria was strongly supporting the Kurds pushed the two nations dangerously close to a military conflict. Today, the border between Syria and Turkey is approximately 850 kilometers long. The military forces of both nations are massing along that border. One wrong move could set off a war. Right now, it almost sounds as though the U.S. government is preparing for a war to erupt in the region. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently stated that the situation along the border with Turkey is "very worrisome" and that we could see "an escalation of conflict in the area". Not only that, but when you study what Clinton and Obama have been saying about Syria it sounds very, very similar to what they were saying about Libya before the airstrikes began. In a recent editorial entitled "There Is No Going Back in Syria", Clinton wrote the following.... Finally, the answer to the most important question of all -- what does this mean for Syria's future? -- is increasingly clear: There is no going back. Syrians have recognized the violence as a sign of weakness from a regime that rules by coercion, not consent. They have overcome their fears and have shaken the foundations of this authoritarian system. Syria is headed toward a new political order -- and the Syrian people should be the ones to shape it. They should insist on accountability, but resist any temptation to exact revenge or reprisals that might split the country, and instead join together to build a democratic, peaceful and tolerant Syria. Considering the answers to all these questions, the United States chooses to stand with the Syrian people and their universal rights. We condemn the Assad regime's disregard for the will of its citizens and Iran's insidious interference. "There is no going back"? "Syria is headed toward a new political order"? It almost sounds like they are already planning the transitional government. The EU has been using some tough language as well. A recent EU summit in Brussels issued a statement that declared that the EU "condemns in the strongest possible terms the ongoing repression and unacceptable and shocking violence the Syrian regime continues to apply against its own citizens. By choosing a path of repression instead of fulfilling its own promises on broad reforms, the regime is calling its legitimacy into question. Those responsible for crimes and violence against civilians shall be held accountable." If you take the word "Syrian" out of that statement and replace it with the word "Libyan" it would sound exactly like what they were saying about Gadhafi just a few months ago. The EU has hit Syria with new economic sanctions and it is also calling on the UN Security Council to pass a resolution condemning the crackdown by the Syrian government. It seems clear that the U.S. and the EU want to see "regime change" happen in Syria. The important thing to keep in mind in all of this is that Turkey is a member of NATO. If anyone attacks Turkey, NATO has a duty to protect them. If Syria attacked Turkey or if it was made to appear that Syria had attacked Turkey, then NATO would have the justification it needs to go to war with Syria. If NATO goes to war with Syria, it is very doubtful that Iran would just sit by and watch it happen. Syria is a very close ally to Iran and the Iranian government would likely consider an attack on their neighbor to be a fundamental threat to their nation. In fact, there are already reports in the international media that Iran has warned Turkey that they better not allow NATO to use their airbases to attack Syria. So if it was NATO taking on Syria and Iran, who else in the Middle East would jump in? Would Russia and China sit by and do nothing while all of this was going on? Could a conflict in the Middle East be the thing that sets off World War III? Let's certainly hope not. More war in the Middle East would not be good for anyone. Unfortunately, tensions are rising to frightening levels throughout the region. Even if things between Syria and Turkey cool off, that doesn't mean that war won't break out some place else. Riots and protests continue to sweep across the Middle East and the entire region has been arming for war for decades. Eventually something or someone is going to snap. When it does, let us just hope that World War III does not erupt as a result.

## XO

### 2AC

#### Perm: Do Both – shields the link

#### Perm: Do CP – text implies action by the executive

#### CP is perceived as self-restraint and not modeled – congressional passivity is the cause of proliferation of unrestricted drones

Rebecca Griffen, political director of Peace Action West, expert on war and drone policy, 1-11-2013, “Will Congress take on drones in 2013?” Peace Action West, http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2013/01/11/will-congress-take-on-drones-in-2013/

Since President Obama took office in 2009, his administration has dramatically increased the use of unmanned armed drones throughout the Middle East and Africa. The administration has overseen more than 300 drones strikes, with more than 2,500 killed by the CIA and the military. Thus far, Congress has not engaged on an in-depth level on important questions surrounding the reliance on this technology and the overarching policy governing its use.¶ The Obama administration reportedly began assembling parameters for the use of drones in the pursuit of suspected terrorists, but the proposed regulations have not yet been made public. Last year, President Obama stated, “One of the things we’ve got to do is put a legal architecture in place, and we need congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in but any president’s reined in terms of some of the decisions that we’re making.”¶ The 113th Congress should heed this call and exercise greater oversight over drone policy. Issues to address include:¶ Defining the “battlefield” and authorization for the use of force¶ As Al-Qaeda’s presence continues to wane, the already tenuous interpretation of the authorization for the use of military force in 2001 will not provide strong justification for drone attacks like those that have occurred in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. As former Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson argued, the US should “be able to say … that our efforts should no longer be considered an armed conflict against al-Qaida and its affiliates,” and that responsibility for pursuing Al-Qaeda should shift to law enforcement agencies.¶ This is a critical time for Congress to assert its role in oversight over military force and standards for expanding or continuing the drone war outside of the framework of armed conflict.¶ Civilian casualties and ensuing blowback¶ It is very difficult to obtain accurate numbers of civilian casualties in drone strikes. This is exacerbated by the CIA policy of counting military-age males as militants unless they have specific evidence pointing to their innocence. US policy of using “secondary strikes,” attacking rescuers who come to the aid of victims of initial strikes, puts civilians at even greater risk.¶ An in-depth report by Stanford and NYU Law Schools disputes the characterization of drones as a precise, targeted tool with minimal impact on innocent civilians. The study notes that despite US claims downplaying civilian casualties, the best available data indicate that drone strikes in just Pakistan killed 474-881 civilians and injured 1,228-1,362. The report also highlights significant harm other than injury and death, including anxiety and psychological trauma.¶ Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen notes, “Testimonies from Qaeda fighters and interviews I and local journalists have conducted across Yemen attest to the centrality of civilian casualties in explaining Al Qaeda’s rapid growth there. The United States is killing women, children and members of key tribes. ‘Each time they kill a tribesman, they create more fighters for Al Qaeda,’ one Yemeni explained to me over tea in Sana, the capital, last month. Another told CNN, after a failed strike, ‘I would not be surprised if a hundred tribesmen joined Al Qaeda as a result of the latest drone mistake.’” Johnsen points out that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has more than tripled in Yemen since the US started bombing the country in 2009.¶ Congress should push for greater transparency and more accurate accounting of civilian casualties, and for the end of secondary strikes. A full accounting of the impact of US drone strikes will better allow Congress and the public to weigh any potential benefits of the use of drones against their negative impacts.¶ The use of so-called “signature strikes”¶ In 2012, the Obama administration approved the use of so-called “signature strikes,” allowing the targeting of people whose identities are unknown. Targeting based on patterns of behavior rather than evidence of an imminent threat to US interests sets a dangerous precedent, increases the likelihood of blowback, and vastly increases the risk of killing innocent civilians. Congress should push for greater transparency in the use of signature strikes and ultimately to end their use.¶ Targeted assassination of US citizens¶ The Obama administration used dubious legal justification to kill a US citizen, Anwar Al-Awlaki, in Yemen. The threat Al-Awlaki posed, as well as his prominence within Al-Qaeda, has been called into question by experts on the region. The administration has resisted calls for greater transparency in this case and implications for future use of force. Other American citizens, including Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, have been killed in drone strikes in which they were not the intended targets.¶ President Obama has an unreleased list of targets for killing and capture that reportedly includes additional Americans, as well as targets as young as teenagers. Congress must demand greater transparency around targeting and rein in executive power to kill targets that could be pursued by other means, or may not pose an imminent threat to the US, including American citizens.¶ Precedent setting and future proliferation of drone technology¶ As with any technology, the United States will not maintain a monopoly on the use of armed drones. The New America Foundation cites 70 countries that currently have some kind of drone. Examining our standards for use of drones and setting specific parameters will become even more critical as we set a precedent for international drone use.¶ As Human Rights Watch points out, “Because the US treats many of the most important constraints on the use of force as matters of discretionary prudence rather than legal requirements, the US approach would not forbid the Russians to target an alleged Chechen militant in New York, or the Chinese a Uighur separatist in Washington, DC, if they said they were at war with these groups and the US didn’t apprehend them. That is a deeply troublesome precedent to set.”¶ Congress should push for clear, public standards that can contribute to an international conversation about global standards for the use of drones.

#### Captures zero of the norms advantage – Harvard indicates explicit restrictions are key to modeling

#### Doesn’t solve Pakistan – no signal and CIA circumvents everything except letter of law

#### Interpretation: The negative gets fiat of agents are not the object of the resolution

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### Kills topic education – fiats through core of the topic

#### Moots aff ground – forces generic advantages like SoP and contrived solvency deficits

#### Stacks the deck – answers like rollback link to the aff

#### Reject the team – key to set a precedent that saves the topic

#### XOs are perceived – previous fights prove Congress will backlash

Zachary Goldfarb, writer at the Washington Post, 2-10-2013, “Obama weighing executive actions on housing, gays and other issues” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-10/business/37026076\_1\_actions-on-gun-violence-executive-actions-obama-administration

These and other potential actions suggest that Obama is likely to rely heavily on executive powers to set domestic policy in his second term. One White House official said that while the president does not see the actions as substitutes for more substantial legislation, he also wants to move forward on top priorities. But the approach risks angering Republican lawmakers in Congress, who say they are leery of granting the executive branch too much power and have already clashed with Obama over the issue. In a ruling last month, a federal appeals court said Obama exceeded his constitutional powers in naming several people to the National Labor Relations Board while the Senate was on a break. “It is a very dangerous road he’s going down contrary to the spirit of the Constitution,” Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) said in a recent interview. “Just because Congress doesn’t act doesn’t mean the president has a right to act.”

## Politics

### 2AC Top

#### Obama won’t push TPA – empirically

Chicago Tribune, 12-30-2013, “Editorial: Obama needs fast-track trade authority,” http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-12-30/opinion/ct-give-obama-tpa-fast-track-trade-edit-1230-jm-20131230\_1\_trade-deals-trade-promotion-authority-tpa

The last TPA authorization expired in 2007. The delay in reauthorizing it to some extent reflects congressional dysfunction. To a greater extent, however, the delay results from the Obama administration's ineffectiveness at pursuing its agenda.¶ The president made no push for TPA in his first four years. Recently, he has spoken out about the need for it. But he has not twisted arms on Capitol Hill. If TPA is the high priority that it should be for his administration, Obama needs to demand it from members of both parties. Along with immigration reform, free-trade deals could be Obama's best hope for a positive legacy in his second term.

#### Their ev doesn’t say he will push – says he wants it and they won’t give it to him

#### Debt ceiling thumps

Jake Miller, political analyst, 1-2-2013, “What will Congress do about the debt ceiling?” CBSNews, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-will-congress-do-about-the-debt-ceiling/

 But don’t despair - 2014 will bring all sorts of new and exciting opportunities for lawmakers to play games with the United States economy, squabbling over fiscal policy and blowing past deadlines.¶ Up first on the fiscal docket when Congress returns next week: the debt ceiling fight (again.)¶ Treasury Secretary Jack Lew fired the customary opening salvo in December, pleading with lawmakers to raise the nation’s borrowing authority “well before” a February deadline.¶ “I am writing to urge Congress to take prompt action to protect the full faith and credit of the United States by extending the nation's borrowing authority,” he wrote in a letter to House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, and other congressional leaders. “The American public expects its leaders to put an end to governing by crisis and to focus on promoting economic growth and job creation. I respectfully urge Congress to take action to raise the debt limit at the earliest possible moment and ideally well before February 7, 2014.”¶ Lew noted in his letter that extraordinary measures on his part could extend that deadline by a few weeks, but his warning was clear: Don’t play with fire again, folks.¶ The president and Democrats in Congress haven’t budged in their approach to the issue, demanding a clean, prompt vote to raise the debt ceiling with no strings attached. They’ve also warned that a failure to raise the debt ceiling before the nation’s borrowing authority expires could invite the calamitous prospect of a default on U.S. sovereign debt.¶ Asked by CNN’s Brianna Keillar at his final 2013 news conference whether he would negotiate with Republicans on the debt ceiling, Mr. Obama seemed amused she even had to ask.¶ “Oh, Brianna, you know the answer to his question,” he replied. “No, we're not going to negotiate for Congress to pay bills that it has accrued.”¶ W.H.: We don't expect GOP to threaten default, shutdown again¶ Mr. Obama also expressed a hope that the recent bipartisan good-feeling surrounding the budgetary agreement could bleed over into the debate over the debt ceiling. “I can't imagine that having seen this possible daylight breaking when it comes to cooperation in Congress, that folks are thinking, actually, about plunging us back into the kinds of brinksmanship and governance by crisis that has done us so much harm over the last couple of years,” he said. “I've got to assume folks aren't crazy enough to start that thing all over again.”¶ Key congressional Democrats have voiced similar hopes for a smooth process. “I would predict that Republicans will back off any hostage taking, adding extraneous, irrelevant issues to the debt ceiling,” said Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., the third-in-command Senate Democrat, last month on NBC’s “Meet the Press.” “I understand there is some saber-rattling right now by Speaker [John] Boehner and [Senate] Minority Leader [Mitch] McConnell. And that’s natural.”¶ But for all the optimistic predictions from Democrats, it’s not at all clear that Republicans are ready to play nice.¶ Since President Obama took office in 2009, Republicans have routinely used the debt ceiling vote to extract spending cuts from Democrats, leveraging the pressure of a potential default to push § Marked 15:59 § their own preferred fiscal policies.¶ The last budget fight and the resultant government shutdown took a toll on Republicans’ approval ratings, dragging the party into its deepest level of unpopularity in years.¶ But for all the damage done to the party by the last fiscal fight, there are emerging signs that Republicans are gearing up for a fresh confrontation, prepping a list of demands in advance of any congressional action on the debt ceiling.

### 2AC Link

#### Obama PC is a myth

Jonathan Chait, New York Magazine, Barack Obama Is Not George W. Bush, 12-20-2013, 2<http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/12/barack-obama-is-not-george-w-bush.html>

It is certainly true that Obama’s approval ratings have fallen to Bush-2005 levels. It’s also entirely possible they’ll fall further still: The administration’s panicky preparations for January suggest the first month of actual Obamacare coverage may be just as chaotic and unpopular as the onset of Medicare Part D. Yet the Bush comparisons state, or imply, broader forces at work than mere sagging approval ratings. They suggest a presidency that has hit a new inflection point beyond which its credibility is severed and its agenda broken. And that conclusion falls apart because it completely misses how power works in the Obama era.¶ If you measure the power of Obama’s presidency as the ability to move his agenda through Congress, his presidency has been dead since Republicans took control of the House in January 2011. If you measure it by his ability to use his popularity to force the opposing party to cooperate, it has literally been dead from the outset. In Obama’s first few weeks, with approval ratings in the seventies, he could not persuade a single House Republican to support a fiscal response § Marked 15:59 § to the most dire economic emergency in 80 years.¶ Bush’s power worked very differently. He enjoyed control of Congress for most of his first term and the first two years of his second. What’s more, his opposition party genuinely feared being seen as obstructionist. Substantial minorities of Democrats decided to vote for elements of Bush’s agenda on the calculation that being seen as bipartisan, and winning narrow concessions, made more political sense than opposing Bush. A dozen Democratic senators voted for the Bush tax cuts, and another seven abstained. Democrats supported the porky energy bill, and could have blocked Medicare Part D through a filibuster but decided not to.¶ Republicans like to blame Hurricane Katrina for fundamentally breaking Bush’s presidency. It’s a handy rationalization both for Bush loyalists, who can blame his failure on a single freak event, and for conservatives, who can avoid implicating conservative ideology. (They also throw in Republican corruption scandals.) McInturff, a Republican pollster, repeats this mythology in his Bush-is-Obama memo, in which he argues, “Hurricane Katrina is rightly remembered as a dividing point in the Bush presidency.”¶ Here’s a chart of Bush’s approval ratings. See any “dividing point”? I don’t:¶ Now, Bush’s approval ratings did fall more steeply in 2005 than at other points. What happened in 2005, before Katrina, is that Bush devoted the entire year to using his popularity to sell the public on a plan to privatize Social Security. Americans loathed the idea, but Republicans thought that if Bush spent enough time selling them on it, he could win them over. Instead both the policy and Bush grew less popular.¶ Of course, Iraq was also spiraling into dysfunction at the time. But Social Security privatization represented a real break point for Democrats in Congress. Faced with a radical challenge to their governing philosophy (and a genuinely awful proposal), they had to decide whether to continue working with Bush in return for marginal concessions or to oppose him en masse. Social Security privatization flipped their political calculus. Then the 2006 midterms handed control of Congress to Democrats. The first two years of Bush’s second term successively cost him a pliant opposition, and then turned that opposition into a majority.¶ Obama, by contrast, faced an opposition party that began in the place Bush’s opposition party ended. The political insight of the Republican Congress, and Mitch McConnell in particular, was the recognition that Democrats under Bush had the politics backward. Their path to self-preservation – show America they were willing to reach across the aisle – not only failed but backfired. It made the president more popular, made public opinion more favorable to his party, and thus made them more vulnerable. Since most Americans hold the president responsible for what happens, the opposition party has an incentive to withhold support for anything, making the president seem partisan. As McConnell put it, “It was absolutely critical that everybody be together because if the proponents of the bill were able to say it was bipartisan, it tended to convey to the public that this is O.K., they must have figured it out.”¶ Fear the turtle.¶ Obama’s agenda since 2011 worked very differently. He hasn’t lost power the way Bush did, because he never had it — at least not after his first two years. The prospect of Republican cooperation on his agenda was always phantasmal. Unlike Bush, he never had any hope of getting GOP support for major reforms, either by horse trading or by public campaigning. In January, I wrote a column outlining what a successful second Obama term might look like. The most promising avenue for his agenda lay in the use of executive power, especially on climate change. Obama did stand a chance of passing immigration reform.¶ Almost one year later, the prospects appear about the same. Immigration reform is weaker, but not yet dead. And its weakness has nothing to do with Obama’s popularity — its fate rests on the internal calculus of the House leadership weighing the risks of long-term demographic decline against an immediate conservative revolt.¶ Obama’s prospects for executive action are actually stronger now. The main impediments to an aggressive regulatory agenda were twofold. First, Republicans could stop regulations by blocking nominees for major agencies. Second, they held a functional majority on the D.C. Circuit Court, and stood poised to block Obama’s environmental and financial reforms. Republicans understood full well the importance of that court to Obama’s second term. (McConnell, again, identified the crucial dynamic: Obama’s second-term agenda, he said, “runs straight through the D.C. Circuit.”) That’s why Republicans took the extraordinary step of declaring a full blockade on any nominee for the court’s three vacancies, however ideologically moderate.¶ And it’s why the Senate Democrats’ decision to abolish the judicial filibuster looms so large. With a stroke, they eliminated the strongest leverage Republicans have to gum up the president’s second term. Obama has managed to seat nominees to the Federal Housing Authority and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. And the odds that the court will overturn new regulations have diminished sharply.¶ Additionally, Obama has neutralized the most aggressive, confrontational Republican tactics in Congress. In my column from last January, I wrote that Republicans could, through sheer nihilistic confrontation, sow destruction: “They can shut down the government, they can block administrators, they can begin impeachment — to create the kind of political and economic chaos that would make any progress vastly more complicated.” Almost as important as changes in the Senate is Obama’s success at defeating those tactics. In a series of confrontations, he turned Republican threats to shut down the government and default on the national debt against the GOP, persuading its leadership that over-the-top confrontation was self-defeating.¶ The conventional wisdom – propounded by many of the same pundits now equating Obama with Bush – held that Obama’s hardball tactics would backfire. Obama needed to negotiate over the debt ceiling, and didn’t dare change the Senate’s rules\*, argued, to take one example, Ron Fournier. To fail to placate conservatives would only enrage them more. This analysis turned out to have it backward. Congress managed to pass a budget for the first time in three years precisely because Obama defeated the GOP’s extortion tactics, forcing Republicans to actually trade policy concessions rather than demand a ransom.¶ The prospects for Obama’s second term remain constricted. Not many deals beckon in Congress. The Obamacare rollout was surely a political disaster, but the administration has three more years to get the law up and running. By the end of 2005, George W. Bush had seen the promise of his presidency collapse from justifiably lofty heights. At the end of 2013, Obama stands at just about the same place he began his term.

#### PC is a myth

Norm Ornstein, PhD in political science and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 5-16-2013, “The Myth of Presidential Leadership” http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/washington-inside-out/the-myth-of-presidential-leadership-20130508

No one defined the agenda or negotiated more brilliantly than Reagan. Did he “work his will”? On almost every major issue, he had to make major compromises with Democrats, including five straight years with significant tax increases. But he was able to do it—as he was able to achieve a breakthrough on tax reform—because he had key Democrats willing to work with him and find those compromises. For Obama, we knew from the get-go that he had no Republicans willing to work with him. As Robert Draper pointed out in his book Do Not Ask What Good We Do, key GOP leaders such as Eric Cantor and Paul Ryan determined on inauguration eve in January 2009 that they would work to keep Obama and his congressional Democratic allies from getting any Republican votes for any of his priorities or initiatives. Schmoozing was not going to change that. Nor would arm-twisting. On the gun-control vote in the Senate, the press has focused on the four apostate Democrats who voted against the Manchin-Toomey plan, and the unwillingness of the White House to play hardball with Democrat Mark Begich of Alaska. But even if Obama had bludgeoned Begich and his three colleagues to vote for the plan, the Democrats would still have fallen short of the 60 votes that are now the routine hurdle in the Senate—because 41 of 45 Republicans voted no. And as Sen. Pat Toomey, R-Pa., has said, several did so just to deny Obama a victory.

#### No controversy

Jeremy Herb, congressional correspondent for the Hill, 6-13-2012, “Lawmakers want legal justification for drone strikes,” The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/232523-lawmakers-want-legal-justification-for-drone-strikes

A group of more than two dozen anti-war lawmakers wants the White House to explain the legal justification for “signature” drone strikes, in which drone attacks can be launched when the identity of those killed is not known. The Obama administration gave the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) the new authority in Yemen to target al Qaeda militants, as the administration has stepped up its drone program there this year. The House members warned in a letter to President Obama Tuesday that the “signature” strikes can generate “powerful and enduring anti-American sentiment.” “We are concerned that the use of such ‘signature’ strikes could raise the risk of killing innocent civilians or individuals who may have no relationship to attacks on the United States,” they wrote. “The implications of the use of drones for our national security are profound. They are faceless ambassadors that cause civilian deaths, and are frequently the only direct contact with Americans that the targeted communities have.” Twenty-six lawmakers who signed the letter, led by Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio), including anti-war Republicans Reps. Ron Paul (Texas) and Walter Jones (N.C.). The lawmakers want the White House to tell Congress the process by which signature strikes are authorized and the legal justifications for conducting them. The new signature drone attacks in Yemen, which were first reported by The Washington Post in April, has been a tactic used for drone attacks in Pakistan.

#### No econ crisis coming now – their ev just says it helps the economy – doesn’t give any threshold for collapse

### Impact

#### ( ) Liberalization inevitable, no regional trade blocks, and trade wars are unlikely

Daniel Ikenson, associate director of the Cato Institute’s center for trade policy studies, Cato Daily Podcast, 7-31-2008, Doha is Dead, Liberalization Lives, transcribed by Chalfant on 9-17-2008, interviewer’s questions removed, http://www.cato.org/dailypodcast/podcast-archive.php?podcast\_id=699

I think that the equation or the calculation has changed since the doha round was launched in 2001. At that time I think india was certainly in the market for a deal, but they’ve experienced very strong economic growth This decade, and I kind of feel that it’s become a bit of – the market for trade agreements has become sort of a buyer’s market and india was uh – in fact india lowered many of its tariffs this decade and that’s one of the reasons that they’ve been doing – that their economy has been growing the way it has. The question here was whether or not they were going to be able to lock those tariffs in, and I think that Locking those tariffs in was something that would come at too great a political cost for the Indian trade minister, and as a result, it was more in his interest to scuttle the deal than to have one, but by and large, trade flows have continued to rise at a rapid pace. I think trade flows are up 70 percent from 2001 when the doha round was launched. The global economy, we’re talking about 30-35 percent growth in real terms since 2001. the global gdp is about 55 trillion dollars and the benefits of a doha round were estimated to be somewhere between around a hundred billion and 800 billion, so The failure of doha is certainly not going to sink the global economy and meanwhile countries can liberalize on their own – many have been doing that - Trade facilitation, overcoming customs, bottlenecks, and infrastructure problems should be at the top of the agenda for many of these countries

#### Continued…

Well there’s a couple of arguments – one is that bilateral deals are trade-diverting. If you give preferential access to a country that is not the optimal producer, you’re actually diverting trade From the optimal producer and your market. The other concern is that it creates what professor baghwati calls a A spaghetti bowl of rules that makes it complicated and costly to comply with the various rules. I find multilateral trade agreements to also be trade diverting in the sense that you have to wait many many years to get an agreement and in that sense, that delay is trade diverting, and even when you do get an agreement, it could be diverting in the sense that My country might be willing to eliminate tariffs altogether but if another country is only willing to eliminate them halfway – that’s the least common denominator, we only liberalize halfway and as a result, it’s trade-diverting. We’re getting less liberalization had we acted on our own. So I think unilateral liberalization is really the direction we’re headed in, there is a lot of concern that we’re going to have these regional trading blocs, and it’s going to lead to trade wars and problems that we haven’t seen in many decades, but I think the world economy is different today than it was 10 years ago in the sense that it’s no longer our producers against their producers, we are – countries are competing for investments and markets. You need to be open in order to attract that investment and I think countries will find that it is in their own interest to reduce frictions in their supply chains, to have a friendly business climate, To welcome investment and imports and in that sense, why do we really need trade agreements? Why do we need additional rules when that is the optimal policy for countries to pursue anyway?

#### Trade does not solve war—there’s no correlation between trade and peace

MARTIN, MAYER, AND THOENIG 2008 (Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

#### No scenario for trade solving WMD – nonsensical

## Nonviolence

### 2AC Framework – Theory

#### Our interpretation is that plan focus is good

#### Aff choice – other frameworks moot the 1AC

#### Topic education – only focusing on the resolution ensures different ground from year to year

#### Reject non-policy alts and links not based on the plan text

### 2AC Perm

#### Perm do both – double bind – either the alt can’t overcome the status quo or it can overcome residual link to the plan

#### Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

### Impact

#### No risk of genocidal wars

#### No root cause– prefer proximate causes

John Norton, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia He formerly served as the first Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, Winter, 2004, “Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle”, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341, Lexis Law

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty and social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, perceptions of "honor," and many other factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these factors may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high-risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling armed conflict. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents. [n158](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1329520437445&returnToKey=20_T13973620735&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.647208.6119287203#n158) Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war that is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may doom us to war for generations to come.

#### Ethical frameworks are not a-priori – evaluate the goodness of their advocacy through experimentation and practice, not theoretical criteria

Joel Mintz, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law Center; Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation, 2004, “Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a Guide to Environmental Protection,” 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, Lexis.

Philosophical pragmatism, as initially articulated by William James and other early twentieth century academics, is, in one sense, an attitude or method of thought. n4 It emphasizes a focus on facts and consequences, as opposed to theories and principles. n5 As James explained it, pragmatism stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save for its method. . . . It lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an atheistic volume; in the next some one on his knees praying for faith and strength; in a third a chemist investigating a body's properties. In a fourth a system of idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated; in a fifth the impossibility of metaphysics is being shown. But they all own the corridor, and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of their respective rooms. n6 In addition to being a method of thought--with sufficient flexibility to appeal to individuals who have divergent views in many respects, as noted above--philosophical pragmatism is also distinguished by its experiential, provisional, and pluralistic notion of truth. n7 In William James's words: Pragmatism . . . asks its usual question. "Grant an idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?" The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we can not. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as. n8 [\*4] Richard Rorty takes a relatively similar view. n9 In his introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty states that "a pragmatist theory about truth . . . says that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about. For pragmatists, 'truth' is just the name of a property which all true statements share." n10 Rorty believes that there is little of significance to be said about this common property of true statements. n11 He thus feels that the Platonic tradition, with its emphasis on fixed, a priori notions of Truth and Goodness, has "outlived its usefulness." n12 John Dewey, another highly influential pragmatist, expressed his theory of truth in like fashion. n13 Dewey wrote, "Truth is a collection of truths; and these constituent truths are in the keeping and testing as to matters-of-fact." n14 For Dewey as well, knowledge was to be grasped from the concrete particulars of experience, rather than logically deduced by abstract reasoning or transcendentally revealed. n15 Another closely related common feature of philosophical pragmatism is its firm rejection of rigid canons and dogmatic beliefs. n16 As James put it, as an intellectual approach pragmatism is "a mediator and a reconciler. . . . She has, in fact, no prejudices whatever, no obstructive dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof. She is completely genial. She will entertain any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence." n17 In keeping with this doctrinal flexibility, philosophical pragmatism puts considerable emphasis upon indeterminacy and the limitations of human understanding. n18 As Kelly A. Parker has noted, for the pragmatist "there is an irreducible pluralism in the world we encounter. There is [also] the idea (supported by contemporary physics) that indeterminacy and chance are real features of the world. Change, development and novelty are everywhere the rule." n19 [\*5] Pragmatic notions of ethics also emphasize change, development, and pluralism. n20 Pragmatists generally reject universally valid ethical theories. n21 Pragmatists believe that as the world evolves, and human societies grow and change, new kinds of ethical dilemmas emerge. n22 To solve them, people need to develop new methods of understanding what is right and wrong. n23 As Kelly Parker has written: Pragmatism maintains that no set of ethical concepts can be the absolute foundation for evaluating the rightness of our actions. . . . [Instead,] the aim of ethics is not perfect rightness . . . but rather creative mediation of conflicting claims to value, aimed at making life on the planet relatively better than it is. n24 Pragmatic ideas regarding ethics are further manifested in the area of social and political thought. n25 For John Dewey and other pragmatists, social and political institutions exist (or should exist) to provide for the needs of individuals. n26 The worth of projects is to be judged by the extent of their conformity to social needs. n27 Moreover, since human needs and social circumstances are frequently in flux, social institutions need frequent reform. n28 This can be best accomplished where diverse individuals participate actively and regularly in public affairs, so that society as a whole may take advantage of their diverse experience and intelligence. n29 Finally, in its social outlook and elsewhere, philosophical pragmatism places an especially high value on experimentation. n30 For pragmatists, "because the public consists of a vast plurality of people and things valued, and because the world is changing at every moment, the ways and means of best providing for the individual and common good have to be experimentally determined." n31 Rather than being measured [\*6] against some objective, impersonal set of abstract criteria, social projects are to be tested by their human consequences and their fulfillment of practical social needs. n32 What works is what benefits people; what benefits people can often be determined by thoughtful experimentation with new and untried social institutions and arrangements. n33

### 2AC Alt Vagueness

#### The alt is vague – it’s a voting issue

#### Spikes our offense – no way for aff to win

#### Skews 2AC time

#### Damage is done – 2NC clarification rewards them because 1AR will always be behind

#### Kills the political project

#### Violence doesn’t lead to more. It is frequently the answer.

Jean Bethke Elshtain, Prof. Social and Pol. Ethics – U. Chicago, 2003, “Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World”, p. 53-54

Peace is a good, and so is justice, but neither is an absolute good. Neither automatically trumps the other, save for those pacifists who claim that "violence is never the solution," "fighting never settled anything," and "violence only begets more violence." Does it? Not always, not necessarily. One can point to one historical example after another of force being deployed in the name of justice and leading to not only a less violent world but a more just one. Consider the force used to combat Japanese militarism in World War II. Defeating Japan in the war, occupying Japan in its aftermath and imposing a constitutional order did not incite further Japanese aggression of the sort witnessed in its full horror in what came to be known as "the rape of Manchuria." What emerged instead was a democratic Japan. Are there living Japanese who believe it is time to return to a violent world of militarist dominance or the world of violent self-help associated with the samurai tradition? When the great Japanese writer Yukio Mishima called for a mass uprising and restoration of the old militarism in 1970, only a couple of pathetic disciples responded. Mishima's bizarre fantasy of the return of a more violent world was regarded by the Japanese as daft and nigh-unintelligible. All violence, including the rule-governed violence of warfare, is tragic. But even more tragic is permitting gross injustices and massive crimes to go unpunished. Just war stipulates that the goods of settled social life cannot be achieved in the face of pervasive and unrelenting violence. The horror of today's so-called failed states is testament to that basic requirement of the "tranquillity of order." In Somalia, as warlords have jostled for power for more than a decade, people have been abused cynically and routinely. Anyone at anytime may be a target. The tragedy of American involvement in Somalia is not that U.S. soldiers were sent there, but that the American commitment was not sufficient to restore minimal civic peace and to permit the Somalian people to begin to rebuild their shattered social framework. Can anyone doubt that a sufficient use of force to stop predators from killing and starving people outright would have been the more just course in Somalia and, in the long run, the one most conducive to civic peace?

#### Use of the law is the best way to prevent authoritarian excess

Leila Brännström, Assistant Professor, Lund University Faculty of Law, April 2008, “How I learned to stop worrying¶ and use the legal argument,” http://www.helsinki.fi/nofo/NoFo5Brannstrom.pdf

G¶ iorgio Agamben’s¶ Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life¶ (1998 [1995]),¶ and¶ State of Exception¶ (2005 [2003]) are, among other things, efforts to¶ explore the deep structures shaping contemporary tendencies in the development of¶ law and politics.¶ 1¶ Agamben offers us the diagnosis that we live in a ‘permanent state¶ of exception’ – a situation in which law cannot be distinguished from lawlessness.¶ He also suggests a prescription; we ought to look beyond law and reach for a realm¶ of human activity ‘uncontaminated’ by law. He warns us that if we do not overcome law, we risk the ‘juridico-political’ system transforming itself into ‘a killing¶ machine’, thus causing an ‘unprecedented biopolitical catastrophe’ (Agamben 1998,¶ 188; Agamben 2005, 86).¶ In this article, I will argue against both Agamben’s diagnosis and his¶ prescription. One of the troubles with his line of reasoning, the one that I will focus¶ on, is its deadlocked and overly formalistic understanding of how law operates and¶ of how it might be used and transformed.¶ 2¶ Surely Agamben insightfully points out¶ certain dangerous trajectories in contemporary law and politics, but I believe that¶ the rigid way in which he analyses law and politics forecloses the most promising¶ ways of responding to and acting upon the problems that he outlines.¶ There is a more general rationale for scrutinizing Agamben’s analysis of law¶ and of the state of exception and the implications of his analysis. Agamben’s¶ understanding of law as a mechanism that puts limitations to our political potential¶ and imagination and his conviction that law cannot be used for emancipatory¶ purposes, is shared by many engaged in the field of critical legal and social studies¶ who assume that exposing the repressive character of law and legal practices is the¶ only possible way of conducting critical studies of law. Such an assumption is¶ problematic as it overlooks the possibility to raise legal arguments and to engage in¶ legal practices for pursuing emancipatory politics, a possibility that in many cases¶ would be both forceful and productive. Sometimes, as in Agamben’s case, these¶ assumptions are built on a perception of law as a machine whose workings, effects¶ and possibilities are given beforehand – once and for all. The objectification of law,¶ in turn, induces fear and aversion which often leads to political, social and legal¶ analyses that suffer, like Agamben’s analysis does, from an overemphasis on, and an¶ overestimation of, the legally authorized power of the state which nourishes the¶ persisting, but misleading, idea that the major threats to our freedom and to a better¶ future are to be found in repressive state-practices.¶ Since Agamben argues that Guantánamo Bay Naval Base (hereinafter ‘Guan-¶ tánamo’) – where men and boys who were captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere¶ have been imprisoned since January 2002 – is the locus par excellence of the new¶ state of exception, I will take his characterization of the situation of the detainees at¶ the Naval Base – abandoned by law and dwelling in a state of exception – as the¶ point of departure for fleshing out what Agamben means when he talks about law¶ and the permanent state of exception. The choice of Guantánamo as the starting,¶ and the focal, point is also motivated by the fact that the raising of legal arguments,¶ which is dismissed by Agamben as a constructive form of political action, seems to¶ be one of the best ways of opposing the state of affairs at Guantánamo.¶ While many have described Guantánamo as a place where law is absent, ‘a legal¶ black hole’ (Steyn 2004), ‘a lawless enclave’ (Hafetz 2006), ‘a prison beyond the law’¶ (Margulies 2004), et cetera, it has also been accurately pointed out that the situation¶ at the the naval base has been created and sustained through legal regulations and¶ measures.¶ 3¶ In the following, I will first sketch the coinciding lawlessness and legal¶ rule that govern the life of the detainees at the Naval Base, which make Agamben’s¶ portrayal of Guantánamo as a place where law and lawlessness are simultaneously¶ present and indistinguishable from one another, seem plausible. Next, however, I¶ will argue that when looked at closer Agamben’s characterization of the state of law¶ at Guantánamo turns out to be based on an ahistorical and reductive understanding¶ of law which leads to fatalistic conclusions about the fate of law at Guantánamo and¶ elsewhere. After that I will discuss the possibilities of contesting the situation of the¶ detainees at Guantánamo, and of engaging in political struggles in general by way of¶ asserting legal rights and using legal arguments and strategies.

#### Ontology not first --- the black hole of philosophy will indefinitely delay needed action to confront immediate crises

Kenneth Booth, Professor of International Politics – University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1995, International Relations Theory Today, Ed. Booth & Smith, p. 330

The implications of saying ‘Dare not to know’ in international relations are profound. They entail a revolution in the ontology, epistemology and agenda of the discipline. Dare not to know means: re-examining basic concepts; opening up to what has been closed out; rehumanizing what has been dehumanized; de-gendering what has been gendered; celebrating confusion rather than certainty; dethroning the logic of anarchy with the logics of anarchy; denaturalizing established common sense; populating the frontier zones between international relations and other academic disciplines; ideologizing the supposedly ‘objective’; re-imagining the humanly constituted; contextualizing the tradition; making normativity a norm; and listening carefully to the subject’s ‘screaming silences’. To accept such a programme obviously entails the risk of academic international relations being sucked into the black hole of philosophy. Thinking about thinking always threatens to undermine any confidence we may have in what we know and how we act. This is particularly disturbing for a subject such as international relations, which has always been thought about as a policy science, intimately concerned with decisions and their consequences. Implicitly, international relations has operated on the old principle that ‘there is nothing so practical as a good theory’. A reinvented future for the subject requires consideration of the interplay of practice and theory. Dreams that are not operationalized leave the world as it is. Putting all this together, politically speaking, means that we cannot wait for philosophy to deliver final judgements about beauty and truth. The world is confronted by numerous immediate and long-term problems, so we have to demonstrate the ‘courage of our confusions’ if we hope to get from here to the future in good shape. For several reasons, the year 2045 can be taken as the symbolic marker of the future.

#### Theory-driven ontological approaches fail – scholars should begin by analyzing problems and presenting solutions like the 1AC

David Owen, University of Southampton, July 2002, “Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Practical Reasoning,” Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 31.3, p. 655-656

Commenting on the 'philosophical turn' in IR, Wæver remarks that '[a] frenzy for words like "epistemology" and "ontology" often signals this philosophical turn', although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory [end page 655] to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, 'theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program' in that it 'dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory'.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since 'whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry'.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) 'the Highlander view'—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates [end page 656] the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

# 1AR

## XO CP

### No Solve

#### Executive orders to end signature strikes fail – political obstacles key to pressure executive officials

Muhammad Ahmad, a Glasgow-based sociologist with a specialization in US foreign policy, 7-3-2013, “Obama won't end the drone war, but Pakistan might” Aljazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136247465532652.html

The only concrete proposal, a restrictive targeting criteria codified in a Presidential Policy Guidance, which in principle should have ended "signature strikes", was quickly undermined by administration officials who told the press that the attacks would continue regardless. It also nullified Obama's claim that a "high threshold" had been set for lethal action against "potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens". Far from reassuring non-Americans, it should alarm US citizens. ¶ But there was also a true statement in Obama's speech. "America cannot take strikes wherever we choose," he said. "Our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty." ¶ The drone war will not end by a presidential epiphany. It will need political pressure and practical obstacles to stop it - mostly outside the US. Few Democrats are willing to criticise Obama, and Republicans rarely shrink from actions that result in dead foreigners; as long as the war's cost are borne by others, it is unlikely that a critical mass of opinion would emerge to force a reconsideration of policy.

### CP Links to PTX

#### Unilateral XOs link to politics

Megan Covington, Vanderbilt School of Engineering, 2012, “Executive Legislation and the Expansion of Presidential Power”, http://ejournals.library.vanderbilt.edu/ojs/index.php/vurj/article/view/3556

Just because presidents can bypass Congress so efficiently, however, does not mean they always rely on executive legislation. A president who used only executive orders and did not work with Congress at all would certainly earn sharp criticism from both parties and the media. A president’s bill that has been passed by Congress is a much bigger accomplishment and is more permanent than a policy enacted by executive order, meaning presidents will always have some incentive to work with Congress to achieve their goals. Crenson and Ginsberg argue that one of the reasons for this reliance on executive legislation is that presidents have lost traditional avenues of accomplishing their policy goals.61 Before C-SPAN continuously broadcasted Congress, the president had the advantage in using the media to appeal to the people, and with the recent decrease in party strength, the president can no longer rely on fellow party members and party loyalty as he once did. No president can rule entirely by executive legislation and expect the other two branches to stand docile while he makes major policy change; presidents still have to take Congress into account when passing executive legislation.62 For example, President Clinton could have easily passed an executive order repealing the military’s ban on gays serving openly, but he never issued any such directive, largely because he did not want to risk Congress passing legislation making the ban permanent. 63 Congress is not in danger of losing its functionality entirely, but the extent to which modern presidents can unilaterally effect change was certainly unintended and unforeseen by the Founding Fathers.

#### XOs are perceived – drain PC

Todd Eberly, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at St Mary’s College, 1-21-2013, “The Presidential Power Trap” http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121\_1\_political-system-george-hw-bush-party-support

Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.

## PTX

### AT: Trade

#### Not reverse causal

#### Timeframe for TPA – nobody knows if or when the trade deals will be negotiated or if Congress would approve them – no evidence speaks to this – case impacts will be triggered soon while the disad impacts from passing newly negotiated trade agreements are years away

#### Liberalization inevitable, no regional trade blocks, and trade wars are unlikely

Daniel Ikenson, associate director of the Cato Institute’s center for trade policy studies, Cato Daily Podcast, 7-31-2008, Doha is Dead, Liberalization Lives, transcribed by Chalfant on 9-17-2008, interviewer’s questions removed, http://www.cato.org/dailypodcast/podcast-archive.php?podcast\_id=699

I think that the equation or the calculation has changed since the doha round was launched in 2001. At that time I think india was certainly in the market for a deal, but they’ve experienced very strong economic growth This decade, and I kind of feel that it’s become a bit of – the market for trade agreements has become sort of a buyer’s market and india was uh – in fact india lowered many of its tariffs this decade and that’s one of the reasons that they’ve been doing – that their economy has been growing the way it has. The question here was whether or not they were going to be able to lock those tariffs in, and I think that Locking those tariffs in was something that would come at too great a political cost for the Indian trade minister, and as a result, it was more in his interest to scuttle the deal than to have one, but by and large, trade flows have continued to rise at a rapid pace. I think trade flows are up 70 percent from 2001 when the doha round was launched. The global economy, we’re talking about 30-35 percent growth in real terms since 2001. the global gdp is about 55 trillion dollars and the benefits of a doha round were estimated to be somewhere between around a hundred billion and 800 billion, so The failure of doha is certainly not going to sink the global economy and meanwhile countries can liberalize on their own – many have been doing that - Trade facilitation, overcoming customs, bottlenecks, and infrastructure problems should be at the top of the agenda for many of these countries. Well there’s a couple of arguments – one is that bilateral deals are trade-diverting. If you give preferential access to a country that is not the optimal producer, you’re actually diverting trade From the optimal producer and your market. The other concern is that it creates what professor baghwati calls a A spaghetti bowl of rules that makes it complicated and costly to comply with the various rules. I find multilateral trade agreements to also be trade diverting in the sense that you have to wait many many years to get an agreement and in that sense, that delay is trade diverting, and even when you do get an agreement, it could be diverting in the sense that My country might be willing to eliminate tariffs altogether but if another country is only willing to eliminate them halfway – that’s the least common denominator, we only liberalize halfway and as a result, it’s trade-diverting. We’re getting less liberalization had we acted on our own. So I think unilateral liberalization is really the direction we’re headed in, there is a lot of concern that we’re going to have these regional trading blocs, and it’s going to lead to trade wars and problems that we haven’t seen in many decades, but I think the world economy is different today than it was 10 years ago in the sense that it’s no longer our producers against their producers, we are – countries are competing for investments and markets. You need to be open in order to attract that investment and I think countries will find that it is in their own interest to reduce frictions in their supply chains, to have a friendly business climate, To welcome investment and imports and in that sense, why do we really need trade agreements? Why do we need additional rules when that is the optimal policy for countries to pursue anyway?

### No Obama Push

#### Obama won’t push and isn’t key anyway

WSJ, 11-19-2013, “Obama's Trade Jeopardy,” http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304243904579196203165156712

Mr. Obama has rarely mentioned trade in his speeches, and he hasn't reached out to House Republicans who will have to provide most of the free-trade votes. Instead, he's left Senate Finance Chairman Max Baucus and House Ways and Means Chairman David Camp to thread the needle between unions that oppose free trade and tea partiers who are suspicious of the President.

#### Obama won’t push

Doug Palmer, one of the most experienced trade reporters, 10-23-2013, “Does President Obama have chops to wrap up his trade deals?” Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/barack-obama-trade-deals-98712.html

Four years later, Obama has a chance to create the biggest free-trade deal in history — a pact involving 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, dwarfing NAFTA — and remaking global trade policy for a generation.¶ The question is, can Obama actually do it? There’s plenty of reason for doubt.¶ Republicans see little evidence that Obama is prepared to commit the political capital to win approval of trade promotion authority, legislation many believe is critical to the negotiation of trade deals. The biggest battle Obama could face there is with fellow Democrats because of their close ties to union groups who see trade deals as vehicles for companies to ship jobs overseas.¶ “Any president who doesn’t want that [TPA] is nuts. But yet, they haven’t pushed that, and I suspect that it’s because the unions don’t want them to do it,” Utah Sen. Orrin Hatch, the top Republican on the Finance Committee, told POLITICO.

### 1AR PC Fails

#### Obama’s done

PBS, 1-2-2014, “Examining Obama's options to push his agenda in 2014,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white\_house/jan-june14/yearahead\_01-02.html

Mr. Obama finished 2013 with his job approval rating near an all-time low, following the botched rollout of the health care law. What are the prospects for a turnaround in 2014? ¶ We consider that question with Susan Page, Washington bureau chief for USA Today, and Jerry Seib, Washington bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal.¶ Welcome to you both. ¶ GERALD SEIB, The Wall Street Journal: Thank you. ¶ SUSAN PAGE, USA Today: Good to be with you.¶ RELATED INFORMATION¶ Shields and Gerson on the political lessons of 2013¶ JUDY WOODRUFF: So, Susan, just what shape is the president in as he begins this new year?¶ SUSAN PAGE: Well, I think he's in pretty sorry shape and it's bad news for him, because the first year of your second term is really the opportunity you have to get things launched if you are going to get new legislative proposals through. ¶ You have just got a little bit of window there before campaign politics starts to take over again. And much that time is gone. He still has got a little time left, a little time next year in the early part of the year. But this year has been quite a disappointing one for the White House and it leaves him with some real vulnerabilities.

#### This evidence is in the context of the GOP never getting on board with what Obama wants to do – that’s because they ideologically opposed other policies that had nothing to do with trade – the GOP will get onboard with trade and fast track because they historically vote for it – Obama needs PC more for his democratic base

Inside U.S. Trade 12/20/13

HEADLINE: Froman Engaging With New Democrats To Explore Strategy For Fast Track

U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman has been working with House Democrats who plan to support a new fast-track bill on a strategy to avoid a partisan fight, according to informed sources. For example, he met last week with members of the New Democrat Coalition to discuss complaints from labor representatives that Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations are not transparent, according to a Democratic aide. House critics of the fast track have argued that the administration has not provided meaningful information about the TPP negotiations, and should therefore not get fast-track authority, which bans amendments and limits Congress to an up or down vote. In addition, several New Democrats, including coalition Chairman Ron Kind (D-WI), have scheduled meetings with labor representatives over the next few weeks to discuss trade, this aide said. The aide made the point that union leaders in the Labor Advisory Committee have the same amount of access to the TPP text as members of Congress. But a labor source dismissed that argument by saying that seeing the U.S. negotiating proposals provides little information since cleared advisers cannot see revisions, side-by-side comparisons or counterproposals by trading partners. As a result, they know little more than the opening U.S. position and have little information about the actual negotiations. In meeting with labor representatives this week, administration officials conveyed the message that they are seeking to cooperate and engage them on trade issues, sources said. One pro-TPA lobbyist speculated that the number of Democrats that would support an eventual fast-track bill will fall between the number of Democratic votes for the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement, which was 31, and the U.S.-Korea FTA, which attracted 59 Democrats. He and others said that more Democrats than otherwise will likely vote for fast track because it is for a Democratic president, and fewer Republicans than otherwise would will vote for it because it is for the same reason. Nevertheless, fast-track supporters expect a strong majority of the Republican caucus to vote for the bill. However, the Republican leadership will demand a certain number of votes from Democrats to pass the bill in order to create the "maximum discomfort" to the Democratic caucus, a fast-track opponent said.

#### Obama’s dead in the water – PC can’t do anything

Brendan Nyhan, Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, 4-30-2013, “Covering ‘The American Presidency’: Fiction vs Reality in Coverage of the White House” http://www.cjr.org/united\_states\_project/fiction\_vs\_reality\_in\_coverage\_of\_white\_house.php?page=all

In reality, the idea that the President can force an uncooperative Congress to do his bidding has been falsified over and over again—not just during President Obama’s administration on issues like gun control, but during previous presidencies. Even Lyndon Baines Johnson, the prototypical presidential wheeler-dealer, became far less persuasive when the national political climate changed after the 1966 midterm elections (one aide commented that by the end LBJ “couldn’t get Mother’s Day through” Congress). § Marked 16:46 § And yet journalists and commentators still try to defend their misguided notions of presidential power, suggesting instead that, for instance, Obama is being held back by a lack of personal charm or a failure to twist enough arms in Congress. The most absurd version of the president-centric journalistic worldview was expressed in a New York Times column by Maureen Dowd, who slammed the White House for not employing “a war room full of charts with the names of pols they had to capture” as she saw in a fictional movie: The White House should have created a war room full of charts with the names of pols they had to capture, like they had in The American President. Soaring speeches have their place, but this was about blocking and tackling. Instead of the pit-bull legislative aides in Aaron Sorkin’s movie, Obama has Miguel Rodriguez, an arm-twister so genteel that The Washington Post’s Philip Rucker wrote recently that no one in Congress even knows who he is. Dowd also criticized Obama for not being tough enough on members of Congress, writing that “Obama should have called Senator Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota over to the Oval Office and put on the squeeze” (an unrealistic Sorkin-esque monologue of political advice) and held “big rallies to get the public riled up to put pressure” on GOP senators in states he won in 2012. Dowd’s critique was dismissed by observers ranging from Salon’s Joan Walsh to National Review Online’s Robert Costa and ridiculed by President Obama at Saturday night’s White House Correspondents’ Association Dinner, where he asked Michael Douglas, who played the lead role in “The American President,” how he accomplished so much more than Obama: “Michael, what’s your secret, man? Could it be that you were an actor in an Aaron Sorkin liberal fantasy?” The tension between the Hollywood version of the presidency and the actual world runs deep in journalism. Dowd’s column was notable because it let the mask slip, showing how much coverage of the presidency is driven by assumptions that bear little resemblance to reality. In particular, much of the reporting and commentary we’ve seen blaming Obama for his stalled second-term agenda employs what I call the the underpants gnomes theory of presidential influence (in schematic form: charm offensives, arm-twisting, and war rooms -> ??? -> GOP votes for the Obama agenda!). Like the underwear-stealing “South Park” characters, proponents of the theory leave out a crucial missing step—namely, how exactly those tactics are supposed to change the votes of enough Republicans in Congress to make a difference. While some tactics might make a small difference on the margin, Obama’s powers are far more limited than most press coverage suggests—he can’t offer earmarks to legislators, the bully pulpit is typically ineffective, presidential arm-twisting rarely works, and his direct involvement in legislative debates tends to polarize the GOP against his proposals.