# 2AC

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#### We meet and we’re key to the topic

Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations and former official in the Congressional Research Service and the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Targeted Killings and Signature Strikes,” 6-16-2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes

No matter how U.S. officials (secretly) refer to the practice, signature strikes against military-age men have been part of U.S. targeted killings outside of battlefields from their beginning. In fact, the very first targeted killing was a signature strike. After a year-long manhunt and several missed opportunities by Yemeni soldiers, on November 3, 2002, a fusion of human intelligence assets and signals intercepts pinpointed Abu Ali al-Harithi—an operational planner in the al-Qaeda cell that bombed the USS Cole in 2002—and his bodyguards living in the Marib region near the border with Saudi Arabia. Yemeni and U.S. forces on the ground, supported by a Predator drone circling above, were monitoring al-Harithi’s group when they left a compound in two Toyota SUVs. All of the men were in one vehicle and the women in the other. According to an unnamed U.S. official, “If the women hadn’t gotten into another car, we wouldn’t have fired.” (A member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence later wondered, “What do we do, next time, if the women get into the car?”) Reportedly, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted a satellite phone call coming from the SUV filled with men. After an NSA analyst—who had listened to tapes of al-Harithi’s voice for years—heard confirming evidence, he shouted: “He’s in the backseat, and he’s giving the driver directions!” With that confirmation, a CIA-controlled Predator drone was authorized to fire a single Hellfire missile, which destroyed the SUV and killed al-Harithi, four unknown Yemenis, and Ahmed Hijazi (otherwise known as Kemal Derwish)—a naturalized U.S. citizen who recruited six men from Lackawanna, New York, to briefly attend an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the Lackawanna Six pled guilty to providing material support to al-Qaeda and received sentences ranging from seven to nine years in federal prison. As the Los Angeles Times reported the drone strike: “Even though the CIA wasn’t sure who else was in the car, the customary rules of armed conflict say that anyone sitting next to a legitimate target such as Harithi was, in effect, accepting the risk of imminent death.” (Many international legal scholars would dispute this interpretation.) At the same time, U.S. officials acknowledged that the CIA did not know Hijazi was in the vehicle before the CIA launched the missile, although one later claimed his death was justifiable “collateral damage” since “he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time.” It is plausible that the military-age males who happened to get into al-Harithi’s SUV that day were involved with the suspected al-Qaeda operative in planning terrorist plots. However, there is no way to know this with any certainty, and the Bush administration never presented any supporting evidence to this effect. Moreover, we will never know what specific evidence was used to target al-Harithi, because some of it came from suspected al-Qaeda operative Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri. In 2008, CIA director Hayden testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Nashiri was one of three detainees that the CIA waterboarded, and information obtained by torture is not admissible in a military commission trial. Whether they are called signature strikes, crowd killing, or Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes, all have been part of U.S. targeted killings from the start, and continue with the CIA’s tactic of staggered drone strikes to kill rescuers of initial victims. The Obama administration makes the false choice that kinetic counterterrorism options are either “large, intrusive military deployments” or drone strikes (although some signature strikes have been conducted with cruise missiles). Or, as former CIA official Henry Crumpton—who, according to his memoir, authorized the first U.S. drone strike on October 20, 2001, in Afghanistan—crudely described the dichotomy: “Look at the firebombing of Dresden, and compare what we’re doing today.” However, people have the right to disagree with the ethical and moral tradeoffs of how drone strikes are currently conducted, and the unwillingness of the Obama administration to discuss them, as well as Congress’ reticence to question them. After ten years of signature strikes, isn’t this a debate worth having?

#### Even if they’re right – plan text doesn’t say signature strikes – means it’s solvency not T

#### Let me quote: “It is targeted killing in its strict sense”

#### Also only saying this mechanism for sig strikes is how they happen in Afghanistan, not outside the battlefield

#### 1AC ev is from policy makers and contextually prove sig strikes are heart of the topic – prefer ev from policymakers making policy recommendations – ensures best literature and clash

#### Daskal ev indicates signature strikes are still targeted – they aren’t random cruise missile strikes

#### Zenko indicates it’s the centerpiece for targeted killing policy globally

#### Targeted killing is lethal force against someone not in custody – broad interps are better because there isn’t one definition – our interp synthesizing leading definitions

Jan Guardian, translator at the International Monetary Fund, 2013 “Targeted Killings: A Summary,” http://acontrarioicl.com/2013/02/27/targeted-killings-a-summary/

Currently there is no legal definition of targeted killings in either international or domestic law.[1] ‘Targeted killing’ is rather a descriptive notion frequently used by international actors in order to refer to a specific action undertaken in respect to certain individuals.¶ Various scholars propose different definitions. Machon, for example, refers to ‘targeted killing’ as an “intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit governmental approval,”[2] whereas Solis suggests that for there to be a targeted killing (i) there must be an armed conflict, either international or non-international in character; (ii) the victim must be specifically targeted; (iii) he must be beyond a reasonable possibility of arrest; (iv) the killing must be authorized by senior military commanders or the head of government; (v) and the target must be either a combatant or someone directly participating in the hostilities.[3] But whereas some scholars seek to use a human rights-based definition, [4] others propose those which do not entail the applicability of international humanitarian law. [5]¶ However, such definitions are incorrect for several reasons. First of all, the definition of a ‘targeted killing’ has to be broad enough as to cover a wide range of practices and flexible enough as to encompass situations within and outside the scope of an armed conflict, thus, being subject to the application of both international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as opposed to the definition provided by some scholars and even states themselves.[6] Secondly, one should bear in mind that defining an act as an instance of ‘targeted killing’ should not automatically render the illegality of such an act at stake.[7] Moreover, the definition also has to cover situations where such an act is carried out by other subjects of international law, rather than only by states.¶ Therefore, maintaining an element-based approach and synthesizing common characteristics of multiple definitions, it is more advisable to use the one employed by Alston and Melzer, which refers to targeted killings as a use of lethal force by a subject of international law (encompassing non-state actors) that is directed against an individually selected person who is not in custody and that is intentional (rather than negligent or reckless), premeditated (rather than merely voluntary), and deliberate (meaning that ‘the death of the targeted person [is] the actual aim of the operation, as opposed to deprivations of life which, although intentional and premeditated, remain the incidental result of an operation pursuing other aims).[8]

#### Two net benefits

#### Aff creativity – neg generics are inevitable – preserving aff innovation is key to all t spec edu

#### Ground – their interp overlimits by eliminating an entire part of the topic – limits us to terrible affs with terrible DAs

#### Reasonability – C/I is a race to the bottom

## Solvency

### AT: Ending

#### Wrong – didn’t do anything – it’s a reason the CP fails

Muhammad Ahmad, a Glasgow-based sociologist with a specialization in US foreign policy, 7-3-2013, “Obama won't end the drone war, but Pakistan might” Aljazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136247465532652.html

The only concrete proposal, a restrictive targeting criteria codified in a Presidential Policy Guidance, which in principle should have ended "signature strikes", was quickly undermined by administration officials who told the press that the attacks would continue regardless. It also nullified Obama's claim that a "high threshold" had been set for lethal action against "potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens". Far from reassuring non-Americans, it should alarm US citizens. ¶ But there was also a true statement in Obama's speech. "America cannot take strikes wherever we choose," he said. "Our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty." ¶ The drone war will not end by a presidential epiphany. It will need political pressure and practical obstacles to stop it - mostly outside the US. Few Democrats are willing to criticise Obama, and Republicans rarely shrink from actions that result in dead foreigners; as long as the war's cost are borne by others, it is unlikely that a critical mass of opinion would emerge to force a reconsideration of policy.

### AT: Mil Backlash

#### Congress would use the power of the purse

Jennifer K Elsea et al, legislative attorney with the Congressional Research Service, 2-19-2013, “Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations,” CRS, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/206121.pdf

The Purpose Statute states that funds may be used only for purposes for which they have been appropriated; by implication it precludes using funds for purposes that Congress has prohibited. When Congress states that no funds may be used for a purpose, an agency would violate the Purpose Statute if it should use funds for that purpose; it also in some circumstances could contravene a provision of the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. Section 1341. Section 1341 prohibits entering into obligations or expending funds in advance of or in excess of an amount appropriated unless authorized by law. If Congress has barred using funds for a purpose, entering into an obligation or expending any amount for it would violate the act by exceeding the amount— zero—that Congress has appropriated for the prohibited purpose.157

#### Courts compel adherence

Jennifer K Elsea et al, legislative attorney with the Congressional Research Service, 2-19-2013, “Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations,” CRS, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/206121.pdf

Congress has frequently, although not invariably, acceded to presidential initiatives involving the use of military force. While a history of congressional acquiescence may create a gloss on the constitutional allocation of powers,192 such a gloss will not necessarily withstand an express statutory mandate to the contrary. It does not appear that Congress has developed a sufficiently consistent or lengthy historical practice to have abandoned either its war power or its authority over § Marked 17:36 § appropriations. The executive branch has objected to legislative proposals it views as intrusive into presidential power, including limitations found in appropriations measures.193 And it remains possible to construe the function of “conducting military operations” broadly to find impermissible congressional interference in even the most mundane statutes regulating the Armed Forces. To date, however, no court has invalidated a statute passed by Congress on the basis that it impinges the constitutional authority of the Commander in Chief,194 whether directly or indirectly through appropriations. In contrast, presidential assertions of authority based on the Commander-in-Chief Clause, in excess of or contrary to congressional authority, have been struck down by the courts.195

## Norms

### Norms – Turkey Strike

#### US precedent causes Turkey to strike PKK

Aaron Stein, Ph.D candidate at King’s College, London and the Nonproliferation Program Director at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies an independent think tank in Istanbul, “Turkey’s Negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Armed Drones” 2-26-2013, Turkey Wonk Blog

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently re-intiated peace talks with Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Erdogan’s AKP, like Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party, has sought to address Turkey’s Kurdish Issue – or the Kurds’ Turkey Problem – by focusing on the two groups’ shared muslim identity, rather than the previous policy of forced ethnic assimilation. Erdogan has previously engaged the PKK in peace talks, however, these efforts were unsuccessful. During the previous round of negotiations, Erdogan opted to hold the talks in secret, rather than subject himself to the inevitable backlash from Turkish nationalists (An important AKP voting bloc by the way). The talks, despite having made some progress, broke down after President Abdullah Gul went public with the negotiations and the subsequent celebration at the Habur border gate in 2009 when Kurdish fighters returned from the PKK camps in Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkish territory. The AKP appeared to have been caught off guard and ill-prepared to deal with the imagery of thousands of Kurds welcoming home the PKK fighters as national heroes. The Turkish nationalist backlash, combined with the AKP’s political ambitions, led to the end of the talks and the re-militarization of the Kurdish issue. This time around, Erdogan has opted to publicize the talks, which has, in my opinion, placed the responsibility for success squarely on the shoulders of Abdullah Ocalan. Erdogan’s public statements, as well as the policies that his party is now pursuing are politically dangerous, though the powerful Prime Minister has a number of reasons to solve the Kurdish issue. Most importantly, the AKP has shown an off and on commitment to ending the Turkish – Kurdish conflict, which has claimed an estimated 40,000 lives since the current conflict began in 1984. Moreover, Erdogan, who has made no secret of his desire to move to an executive Presidency, has an incentive to engage and secure the support of the Kurdish BDP for his proposed constitution. In addition, Erdogan’s 2009 – 2012 alliance with Turkey’s ultra-nationalist MHP has alienated Turkish liberals, which, despite being less religious than the AKP, are keen on implementing European Union reforms and deepening the country’s democratic system (Both AKP campaign themes). Erdogan, I am assuming, is betting that if he solves the PKK problem, the majority of Turks, who continue to be wary of negotiating with what they consider to be a terrorist group akin to Al Qaeda, will eventually support his decision. This of course hinges on his kicking out the fighters from Turkish territory, so as to ensure a drop in violence, which would in turn give him the credibility to go before the wary Turkish electorate and claim that he has brought peace. This political path is fraught with potential pitfalls, as illustrated by the recent attack of BDP MPs in the nationalist strongholds of Sinop and Samsun (For an excellent overview of the recent attack, see this blog post by the excellent Frederike Geerdink). The AKP, however, receives a tremendous amount of political support from nationalists. The AKP, which faces little resistance from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), is far more concerned about the potential for its base to splinter, which would in turn lead to it loosing some votes to the MHP, the BDP, and the Islamist Saadet Party. The AKP, therefore, is seeking to balance the current PKK negotiations with its need to continue to engage and appeal to Turkish nationalists. It is an incredibly difficult policy to pursue and is likely the reason why Erdogan’s messaging has vacillated wildly between themes like re-instituting the death penalty and the need to open chapters for Turkey’s stalled European Union bid. However, because the AKP has shown an incredible ability to set Turkey’s political agenda – using coordinated leaks, trial balloons, and speeches, which are framed by overarching themes like justice and development (The translation of the AKP’s name) – I believe that the AKP is capable of keeping its coalition together and ending the conflict with the PKK. (The PKK also has a lot to with this, but that is the subject for another blog post.) However, as I explain in my current piece on Foreign Policy, Ankara has opted to follow Washington’s example of using drones for counter-terrorism missions. Turkey, as I explain in the piece, has developed a surveillance drone and is seeking to use the current platform to develop an armed version. While Ankara has been characteristically opaque about the drones’ development, it does not take a genius to figure out that the Turkish military hopes to use armed drones to shorten to “kill-chain” for targeted strikes against PKK operatives. However, Turkey has not publicized who makes the decisions about when to use deadly force, nor has it publicly explained the legal rationale for using armed drones to assassinate Turkish citizens without due process. (As an EU candidate country, one would assume Turkey would try and figure this out). Moreover, if the drone is used in the southeast to attack PKK militants, it is likely that some of those killed will be Turkish citizens. Given the trajectory of the cease fire talks, I see a disconnect between Erdogan’s intentions, the likely use of armed drones in the future, and the military establishment’s opaque drone policy. To be clear, I am not advocating that Ankara disarm or cease in its efforts to further develop its anti-terror capabilities. However, I do think it would be prudent for the Turkish government to publicize its drone policies, in order to build trust with the Kurdish minority. Moreover, Turkey should also seek to clarify the current legal structure that has been put in place for the killing of Turkish citizens. (If one does not exist, Ankara should start writing.) It would also be prudent for the Turkish government to explain whether or not it conducts signature strikes (I think it does, one need not look any further than the Uludere tragedy for confirmation). If Ankara presses ahead with its armed drone program (and it will), the government should seek to be more forthcoming with information about the program’s goals and its intended use. Otherwise, it risks undermining trust with the Kurdish minority and, should the two sides agree to a cease fire, could risk re-igniting the conflict. Moreover, the program, which is still in the design phase, provides Ankara with a political opportunity. On the one hand, Erodgan can tout the program as a symbol of Turkey’s strength – which would win him support from the nationalists. However, he could pair the rhetoric with a clear articulation of Turkey’s drone policy, which should include a clear legal framework for the strikes, in order to assuage Turkish liberals and Turkey’s Kurds. This would allow for him to continue to balance the two sides’ political demands and, from the perspective of AKP political operatives, help them grow their voter base.

#### Turkey intervention causes nuclear war

Michael T. Snyder, a graduate of the McIntire School of Commerce at the University of Virginia and has two law degrees from the University of Florida, 6-28-2011, “Could We Actually See A War Between Syria And Turkey?” endoftheamericandream.com/archives/could-we-actually-see-a-war-between-syria-and-turkey

In recent days, there have been persistent rumors that we could potentially be on the verge of a military conflict between Syria and Turkey. As impossible as such a thing may have seemed just a few months ago, it is now a very real possibility. Over the past several months, we have seen the same kind of "pro-democracy" protests erupt in Syria that we have seen in many of the other countries in the Middle East. The Syrian government has no intention of being toppled by a bunch of protesters and has cracked down on these gatherings harshly. There are reports in the mainstream media that say that over 1,300 people have been killed and more than 10,000 people have been arrested since the protests began. Just like with Libya, the United States and the EU are strongly condemning the actions that the Syrian government has taken to break up these protests. The violence in Syria has been particularly heavy in the northern sections of the country, and thousands upon thousands of refugees have poured across the border into neighboring Turkey. Syria has sent large numbers of troops to the border area to keep more citizens from escaping. Turkey has responded by reinforcing its own troops along the border. Tension between Turkey and Syria is now at an all-time high. So could we actually see a war between Syria and Turkey? A few months ago anyone who would have suggested such a thing would have been considered crazy. But the world is changing and the Middle East is a powder keg that is just waiting to explode. Since the Syrian government began cracking down on the protests, approximately 12,000 Syrians have flooded into Turkey. The Turkish government is deeply concerned that Syria may try to strike these refugees while they are inside Turkish territory. Troop levels are increasing on both sides of the border and tension is rising. One wrong move could set off a firestorm. The government of Turkey is demanding that Syrian military forces retreat from the border area. The government of Syria says that Turkey is just being used to promote the goals of the U.S. and the EU. Syria also seems to be concerned that Turkey may attempt to take control of a bit of territory over the border in order to provide a "buffer zone" for refugees coming from Syria. What makes things even more controversial is that the area where many of the Syrian refugees are encamped actually used to belong to Syria. In fact, many of the maps currently in use inside Syria still show that the area belongs to Syria. War between Syria and Turkey has almost happened before. Back in the 1990s, the fact that the government of Syria was strongly supporting the Kurds pushed the two nations dangerously close to a military conflict. Today, the border between Syria and Turkey is approximately 850 kilometers long. The military forces of both nations are massing along that border. One wrong move could set off a war. Right now, it almost sounds as though the U.S. government is preparing for a war to erupt in the region. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently stated that the situation along the border with Turkey is "very worrisome" and that we could see "an escalation of conflict in the area". Not only that, but when you study what Clinton and Obama have been saying about Syria it sounds very, very similar to what they were saying about Libya before the airstrikes began. In a recent editorial entitled "There Is No Going Back in Syria", Clinton wrote the following.... Finally, the answer to the most important question of all -- what does this mean for Syria's future? -- is increasingly clear: There is no going back. Syrians have recognized the violence as a sign of weakness from a regime that rules by coercion, not consent. They have overcome their fears and have shaken the foundations of this authoritarian system. Syria is headed toward a new political order -- and the Syrian people should be the ones to shape it. They should insist on accountability, but resist any temptation to exact revenge or reprisals that might split the country, and instead join together to build a democratic, peaceful and tolerant Syria. Considering the answers to all these questions, the United States chooses to stand with the Syrian people and their universal rights. We condemn the Assad regime's disregard for the will of its citizens and Iran's insidious interference. "There is no going back"? "Syria is headed toward a new political order"? It almost sounds like they are already planning the transitional government. The EU has been using some tough language as well. A recent EU summit in Brussels issued a statement that declared that the EU "condemns in the strongest possible terms the ongoing repression and unacceptable and shocking violence the Syrian regime continues to apply against its own citizens. By choosing a path of repression instead of fulfilling its own promises on broad reforms, the regime is calling its legitimacy into question. Those responsible for crimes and violence against civilians shall be held accountable." If you take the word "Syrian" out of that statement and replace it with the word "Libyan" it would sound exactly like what they were saying about Gadhafi just a few months ago. The EU has hit Syria with new economic sanctions and it is also calling on the UN Security Council to pass a resolution condemning the crackdown by the Syrian government. It seems clear that the U.S. and the EU want to see "regime change" happen in Syria. The important thing to keep in mind in all of this is that Turkey is a member of NATO. If anyone attacks Turkey, NATO has a duty to protect them. If Syria attacked Turkey or if it was made to appear that Syria had attacked Turkey, then NATO would have the justification it needs to go to war with Syria. If NATO goes to war with Syria, it is very doubtful that Iran would just sit by and watch it happen. Syria is a very close ally to Iran and the Iranian government would likely consider an attack on their neighbor to be a fundamental threat to their nation. In fact, there are already reports in the international media that Iran has warned Turkey that they better not allow NATO to use their airbases to attack Syria. So if it was NATO taking on Syria and Iran, who else in the Middle East would jump in? Would Russia and China sit by and do nothing while all of this was going on? Could a conflict in the Middle East be the thing that sets off World War III? Let's certainly hope not. More war in the Middle East would not be good for anyone. Unfortunately, tensions are rising to frightening levels throughout the region. Even if things between Syria and Turkey cool off, that doesn't mean that war won't break out some place else. Riots and protests continue to sweep across the Middle East and the entire region has been arming for war for decades. Eventually something or someone is going to snap. When it does, let us just hope that World War III does not erupt as a result.

### Norms – Caucuses War

#### Unrestricted drone use causes nuclear war in the Caucuses

Nick Clayton, Eastern Europe correspondent for the Washington Times the Asia Times and Washington Diplomat, currently the senior editor of Kanal PIK TV's English Service, 10-23-2012, "Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war", www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war

Armenia and Azerbaijan could soon be at war if drone proliferation on both sides of the border continues. In a region where a fragile peace holds over three frozen conflicts, the nations of the South Caucasus are buzzing with drones they use to probe one another’s defenses and spy on disputed territories. The region is also host to strategic oil and gas pipelines and a tangled web of alliances and precious resources that observers say threaten to quickly escalate the border skirmishes and airspace violations to a wider regional conflict triggered by Armenia and Azerbaijan that could potentially pull in Israel, Russia and Iran. To some extent, these countries are already being pulled towards conflict. Last September, Armenia shot down an Israeli-made Azerbaijani drone over Nagorno-Karabakh and the government claims that drones have been spotted ahead of recent incursions by Azerbaijani troops into Armenian-held territory. Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, said in a briefing that attacks this summer showed that Azerbaijan is eager to “play with its new toys” and its forces showed “impressive tactical and operational improvement.” The International Crisis Group warned that as the tit-for-tat incidents become more deadly, “there is a growing risk that the increasing frontline tensions could lead to an accidental war.” “Everyone is now saying that the war is coming. We know that it could start at any moment.” ~Grush Agbaryan, mayor of Voskepar With this in mind, the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have long imposed a non-binding arms embargo on both countries, and both are under a de facto arms ban from the United States. But, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), this has not stopped Israel and Russia from selling to them. After fighting a bloody war in the early 1990s over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been locked in a stalemate with an oft-violated ceasefire holding a tenuous peace between them. And drones are the latest addition to the battlefield. In March, Azerbaijan signed a $1.6 billion arms deal with Israel, which consisted largely of advanced drones and an air defense system. Through this and other deals, Azerbaijan is currently amassing a squadron of over 100 drones from all three of Israel’s top defense manufacturers. Armenia, meanwhile, employs only a small number of domestically produced models. Intelligence gathering is just one use for drones, which are also used to spot targets for artillery, and, if armed, strike targets themselves. Armenian and Azerbaijani forces routinely snipe and engage one another along the front, each typically blaming the other for violating the ceasefire. At least 60 people have been killed in ceasefire violations in the last two years, and the Brussels-based International Crisis Group claimed in a report published in February 2011 that the sporadic violence has claimed hundreds of lives. “Each (Armenia and Azerbaijan) is apparently using the clashes and the threat of a new war to pressure its opponent at the negotiations table, while also preparing for the possibility of a full-scale conflict in the event of a complete breakdown in the peace talks,” the report said. Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Institute in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, said that the arms buildup on both sides makes the situation more dangerous but also said that the clashes are calculated actions, with higher death tolls becoming a negotiating tactic. “This isn’t Somalia or Afghanistan. These aren’t independent units. The Armenian, Azerbaijani and Karabakh armed forces have a rigid chain of command so it’s not a question of a sergeant or a lieutenant randomly giving the order to open fire. These are absolutely synchronized political attacks,” Iskandaryan said. The deadliest recent uptick in violence along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the line of contact around Karabakh came in early June as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was on a visit to the region. While death tolls varied, at least two dozen soldiers were killed or wounded in a series of shootouts along the front. The year before, at least four Armenian soldiers were killed in an alleged border incursion by Azerbaijani troops one day after a peace summit between the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian presidents in St. Petersburg, Russia. “No one slept for two or three days [during the June skirmishes],” said Grush Agbaryan, the mayor of the border village of Voskepar for a total of 27 years off and on over the past three decades. “Everyone is now saying that the war is coming. We know that it could start at any moment." Azerbaijan refused to issue accreditation to GlobalPost’s correspondent to enter the country to report on the shootings and Azerbaijan’s military modernization. Flush with cash from energy exports, Azerbaijan has increased its annual defense budget from an estimated $160 million in 2003 to $3.6 billion in 2012. SIPRI said in a report that largely as a result of its blockbuster drone deal with Israel, Azerbaijan’s defense budget jumped 88 percent this year — the biggest military spending increase in the world. Israel has long used arms deals to gain strategic leverage over its rivals in the region. Although difficult to confirm, many security analysts believe Israel’s deals with Russia have played heavily into Moscow’s suspension of a series of contracts with Iran and Syria that would have provided them with more advanced air defense systems and fighter jets. Stephen Blank, a research professor at the United States Army War College, said that preventing arms supplies to Syria and Iran — particularly Russian S-300 air defense systems — has been among Israel’s top goals with the deals. “There’s always a quid pro quo,” Blank said. “Nobody sells arms just for cash.” In Azerbaijan in particular, Israel has traded its highly demanded drone technology for intelligence arrangements and covert footholds against Iran. In a January 2009 US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, a US diplomat reported that in a closed-door conversation, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev compared his country’s relationship with Israel to an iceberg — nine-tenths of it is below the surface. Although the Jewish state and Azerbaijan, a conservative Muslim country, may seem like an odd couple, the cable asserts, “Each country finds it easy to identify with the other’s geopolitical difficulties, and both rank Iran as an existential security threat.” Quarrels between Azerbaijan and Iran run the gamut of territorial, religious and geo-political disputes and Tehran has repeatedly threatened to “destroy” the country over its support for secular governance and NATO integration. In the end, “Israel’s main goal is to preserve Azerbaijan as an ally against Iran, a platform for reconnaissance of that country and as a market for military hardware,” the diplomatic cable reads. But, while these ties had indeed remained below the surface for most of the past decade, a series of leaks this year exposed the extent of their cooperation as Israel ramped up its covert war with the Islamic Republic. In February, the Times of London quoted a source the publication said was an active Mossad agent in Azerbaijan as saying the country was “ground zero for intelligence work.” This came amid accusations from Tehran that Azerbaijan had aided Israeli agents in assassinating an Iranian nuclear scientist in January. Then, just as Baku had begun to cool tensions with the Islamic Republic, Foreign Policy magazine published an article citing Washington intelligence officials who claimed that Israel had signed agreements to use Azerbaijani airfields as a part of a potential bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear sites. Baku strongly denied the claims, but in September, Azerbaijani officials and military sources told Reuters that the country would figure in Israel’s contingencies for a potential attack against Iran. "Israel has a problem in that if it is going to bomb Iran, its nuclear sites, it lacks refueling," Rasim Musabayov, a member of the Azerbiajani parliamentary foreign relations committee told Reuters. “I think their plan includes some use of Azerbaijan access. We have (bases) fully equipped with modern navigation, anti-aircraft defenses and personnel trained by Americans and if necessary they can be used without any preparations." He went on to say that the drones Israel sold to Azerbaijan allow it to “indirectly watch what's happening in Iran.” According to SIPRI, Azerbaijan had acquired about 30 drones from Israeli firms Aeronautics Ltd. and Elbit Systems by the end of 2011, including at least 25 medium-sized Hermes-450 and Aerostar drones. In October 2011, Azerbaijan signed a deal to license and domestically produce an additional 60 Aerostar and Orbiter 2M drones. Its most recent purchase from Israel Aeronautics Industries (IAI) in March reportedly included 10 high altitude Heron-TP drones — the most advanced Israeli drone in service — according to Oxford Analytica. Collectively, these purchases have netted Azerbaijan 50 or more drones that are similar in class, size and capabilities to American Predator and Reaper-type drones, which are the workhorses of the United States’ campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. Although Israel may have sold the drones to Azerbaijan with Iran in mind, Baku has said publicly that it intends to use its new hardware to retake territory it lost to Armenia. So far, Azerbaijan’s drone fleet is not armed, but industry experts say the models it employs could carry munitions and be programmed to strike targets. Drones are a tempting tool to use in frozen conflicts, because, while their presence raises tensions, international law remains vague at best on the legality of using them. In 2008, several Georgian drones were shot down over its rebel region of Abkhazia. A UN investigation found that at least one of the drones was downed by a fighter jet from Russia, which maintained a peacekeeping presence in the territory. While it was ruled that Russia violated the terms of the ceasefire by entering aircraft into the conflict zone, Georgia also violated the ceasefire for sending the drone on a “military operation” into the conflict zone. The incident spiked tensions between Russia and Georgia, both of which saw it as evidence the other was preparing to attack. Three months later, they fought a brief, but destructive war that killed hundreds. The legality of drones in Nagorno-Karabakh is even less clear because the conflict was stopped in 1994 by a simple ceasefire that halted hostilities but did not stipulate a withdrawal of military forces from the area. Furthermore, analysts believe that all-out war between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be longer and more difficult to contain than the five-day Russian-Georgian conflict. While Russia was able to quickly rout the Georgian army with a much superior force, analysts say that Armenia and Azerbaijan are much more evenly matched and therefore the conflict would be prolonged and costly in lives and resources. Blank said that renewed war would be “a very catastrophic event” with “a recipe for a very quick escalation to the international level.” Armenia is militarily allied with Russia and hosts a base of 5,000 Russian troops on its territory. After the summer’s border clashes, Russia announced it was stepping up its patrols of Armenian airspace by 20 percent. Iran also supports Armenia and has important business ties in the country, which analysts say Tehran uses as a “proxy” to circumvent international sanctions. Blank said Israel has made a risky move by supplying Azerbaijan with drones and other high tech equipment, given the tenuous balance of power between the heavily fortified Armenian positions and the more numerous and technologically superior Azerbaijani forces. If ignited, he said, “[an Armenian-Azerbaijani war] will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of.”

### Yemen Addon

#### Signature strikes boost AQAP

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf

Just as in Pakistan, the result of a drone-first policy in Yemen has been to increase the ranks of the government’s enemies. Drone strikes against AQAP have fostered anti-American sentiment in the tribal regions of the country and encouraged friends and family of civilians killed to join AQAP or other militant networks. The drone strikes have bred ‘psychological acceptance’ of AQAP among Yemenis, in part because they appear to confirm its narrative of a bloodthirsty US dropping bombs from afar with no concern for who is killed. 107 A prominent Yemeni youth activist, Ibrahim Mothana, has argued that ‘drone strikes are causing more and more Yemenis to hate America and join radical militants; they are not driven by ideology but rather by a sense of revenge and despair’. 108 As Zenko has reported, AQAP has increased its membership from a few hundred in 2010 to a ‘few thousand’ today. 109 It is impossible to know how many of these recruits have come to AQAP as a result of the drone strikes or because of other factors, but this trend raises the worrying possibility that AQAP may gain several recruits for every leader killed in a drone strike. 110 As one local human rights leader put it, ‘the drones are killing al Qaeda leaders, but they are also turning them into heroes’. 111 Another beneficiary of drone strikes in Yemen has been Ansar al-Sharia, a Yemeni group affiliated with AQAP which has waged an increasingly vicious insurgency against the government since the beginning of the Arab Spring. 112 As the Yemeni government has relied more on American drones to patrol its ungoverned spaces, Ansar al-Sharia has stepped into the vacuum and begun to provide social services in its place. The danger, as former CIA official Robert Grenier put it, is that the increasing reliance on signature drone strikes may create a ‘larger terrorist safe haven’ in Yemen. 11

#### Yemen terrorism causes massive oil spikes

Amy Harder, Energy Correspondent for National Journal, 5-29-2013, “Al-Qaida Retaliation Would Drive Spike in Oil Prices,” National Journal, http://www.nationaljournal.com/al-qaida-retaliation-would-drive-spike-in-oil-prices-20110502

“But Yemen now sticks out as the real country to watch because it has both,” added Parthemore, referring to the fact that al-Qaida’s most active branch, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, is based in Yemen, and that the country is experiencing political upheaval. To boot, Yemen sits at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden. About 10 percent of the world’s seaborne oil passes through that gulf, including oil from Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest producer and exporter. Parthemore said terrorists regularly try to attack petroleum infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, and noted that bin Laden’s death could trigger more efforts. “I’m particularly concerned about reprisal attacks focusing on petroleum infrastructure there [Saudi Arabia] -- probably more so than is being represented in the media now,” she said. Other experts said if terrorism occurs in Saudi Arabia or Yemen, oil prices could skyrocket. “If the al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula were able to stir things up a bit and do something in or near the border of Saudi Arabia … I think you would see a very sharp move upward in petroleum prices,” said Charles Ebinger, who directs the Brookings Institution’s energy-security initiative and is a senior fellow in foreign policy.

#### Causes extinction and turns the impact

Roberts 04 (Paul, Regular Contributor to Harpers and NYT Magazine, “The End of Oil: On The Edge of a Perilous New World”, p. 93-94)

The obsessive focus on oil is hardly surprising, given the stakes. In the fast-moving world of oil politics, oil is not simply a source of world power, but a medium for that power as well, a substance whose huge importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil “event” — a pipeline explosion in Iraq, political unrest in Venezuela, a bellicose ex change between the Russian and Saudi oil ministers — sends shockwaves through the world energy order, pushes prices tip or down, and sets off tec tonic shifts in global wealth and power. Each day that the Saudi-Russian spat kept oil supplies high and prices low, the big oil exporters were losing hundreds of millions of dollars and, perhaps, moving closer to financial and political disaster — while the big consuming nations enjoyed what amounted to a massive tax break. Yet in the volatile world of oil, the tide could quickly turn. A few months later, as anxieties over a second Iraq war drove prices up to forty dollars, the oil tide abruptly changed directions, transferring tens of billions of dollars from the economies of the United States, Japan, and Europe to the national banks in Riyadh, Caracas, Kuwait City, and Baghdad, and threatening to strangle whatever was left of the global economic recovery. So embedded has oil become in today’s political and economic spheres that the big industrial governments now watch the oil markets as closely as they once watched the spread of communism — and with good reason: six of the last seven global recessions have been preceded by spikes in the price of oil, and fear is growing among economists and policymakers that, in today’s growth-dependent, energy-intensive global economy, oil price volatility itself may eventually pose more risk to prosperity and stability and simple survival than terrorism or even war.

## Pak

#### Not zero sum – drones don’t trade off with boots on the ground

Alan W. Dowd, writer on National Defense, Foreign Policy, and International Security, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring\_2013/1\_Article\_Dowd.pdf

As Michael Ignatieff asked in 2000, years before the drone war began, “If war becomes unreal to the citizens of modern democracies, will they care enough to restrain and control the violence exercised in their name . . . if they and their sons and daughters are spared the hazards of combat?”29 That question is directly linked to policymakers in the drone age. The risks policymakers take with UCAVs are greater because the accountability is less than with manned aircraft. After all, the loss of a drone is the loss of nothing more than metal. “More willing to lose is more willing to use,” as Daniel Haulman of the Air Force Historical Research Agency puts it.30 Yet as America’s deepening involvement in Yemen underscores, drones may actually make boots-on-the-ground intervention more likely. To identify new targets and authenticate existing targets for the drone war, Washington has quietly sent US troops into Yemen. According to unnamed military officials, the contingent of American troops is growing.31 As the troops identify targets, they become targets. Thus, far from preventing more direct and riskier forms of military engagement, drones are encouraging such engagement—even as many of their operators paradoxically carry out their lethal missions from the safety of bases in Nevada or New Mexico.

#### Drones worse – smaller individual casualties but more wars

Muhammad Ahmad, a Glasgow-based sociologist with a specialization in US foreign policy, 7-3-2013, “Obama won't end the drone war, but Pakistan might” Aljazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136247465532652.html

Equally disingenuous was Obama's claim that drone attacks were preferable because putting boots on the ground would cause greater casualties. Indeed, for that very reason the US has been using drones in places where it would not dare setting American feet. "The collateral damage [from drones] may be less than aerial bombardment," Heyns observed, "but because they eliminate the risk to soldiers they can be used more often."

#### Wouldn’t invade – reason we use drones is boots aren’t possible

## XO

#### Perm: Do Both

#### Perm: Do CP

#### The Zenko ev is out of context – he also argues that statutory restrictions are necessary to compel adherence

#### Just because he says the CP should happene doesn’t make it sufficient – only stat limits sufficient

#### Self-restraint is perceived as discretionary and isn’t modeled – Congressional limits bolster accountability and prevents foreign governments from engaging in aggressive drone policy

Rebecca Griffen, political director of Peace Action West, expert on war and drone policy, 1-11-2013, “Will Congress take on drones in 2013?” Peace Action West, http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2013/01/11/will-congress-take-on-drones-in-2013/

Since President Obama took office in 2009, his administration has dramatically increased the use of unmanned armed drones throughout the Middle East and Africa. The administration has overseen more than 300 drones strikes, with more than 2,500 killed by the CIA and the military. Thus far, Congress has not engaged on an in-depth level on important questions surrounding the reliance on this technology and the overarching policy governing its use.¶ The Obama administration reportedly began assembling parameters for the use of drones in the pursuit of suspected terrorists, but the proposed regulations have not yet been made public. Last year, President Obama stated, “One of the things we’ve got to do is put a legal architecture in place, and we need congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in but any president’s reined in terms of some of the decisions that we’re making.”¶ The 113th Congress should heed this call and exercise greater oversight over drone policy. Issues to address include:¶ Defining the “battlefield” and authorization for the use of force¶ As Al-Qaeda’s presence continues to wane, the already tenuous interpretation of the authorization for the use of military force in 2001 will not provide strong justification for drone attacks like those that have occurred in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. As former Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson argued, the US should “be able to say … that our efforts should no longer be considered an armed conflict against al-Qaida and its affiliates,” and that responsibility for pursuing Al-Qaeda should shift to law enforcement agencies.¶ This is a critical time for Congress to assert its role in oversight over military force and standards for expanding or continuing the drone war outside of the framework of armed conflict.¶ Civilian casualties and ensuing blowback¶ It is very difficult to obtain accurate numbers of civilian casualties in drone strikes. This is exacerbated by the CIA policy of counting military-age males as militants unless they have specific evidence pointing to their innocence. US policy of using “secondary strikes,” attacking rescuers who come to the aid of victims of initial strikes, puts civilians at even greater risk.¶ An in-depth report by Stanford and NYU Law Schools disputes the characterization of drones as a precise, targeted tool with minimal impact on innocent civilians. The study notes that despite US claims downplaying civilian casualties, the best available data indicate that drone strikes in just Pakistan killed 474-881 civilians and injured 1,228-1,362. The report also highlights significant harm other than injury and death, including anxiety and psychological trauma.¶ Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen notes, “Testimonies from Qaeda fighters and interviews I and local journalists have conducted across Yemen attest to the centrality of civilian casualties in explaining Al Qaeda’s rapid growth there. The United States is killing women, children and members of key tribes. ‘Each time they kill a tribesman, they create more fighters for Al Qaeda,’ one Yemeni explained to me over tea in Sana, the capital, last month. Another told CNN, after a failed strike, ‘I would not be surprised if a hundred tribesmen joined Al Qaeda as a result of the latest drone mistake.’” Johnsen points out that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has more than tripled in Yemen since the US started bombing the country in 2009.¶ Congress should push for greater transparency and more accurate accounting of civilian casualties, and for the end of secondary strikes. A full accounting of the impact of US drone strikes will better allow Congress and the public to weigh any potential benefits of the use of drones against their negative impacts.¶ The use of so-called “signature strikes”¶ In 2012, the Obama administration approved the use of so-called “signature strikes,” allowing the targeting of people whose identities are unknown. Targeting based on patterns of behavior rather than evidence of an imminent threat to US interests sets a dangerous precedent, increases the likelihood of blowback, and vastly increases the risk of killing innocent civilians. Congress should push for greater transparency in the use of signature strikes and ultimately to end their use.¶ Targeted § Marked 17:39 § assassination of US citizens¶ The Obama administration used dubious legal justification to kill a US citizen, Anwar Al-Awlaki, in Yemen. The threat Al-Awlaki posed, as well as his prominence within Al-Qaeda, has been called into question by experts on the region. The administration has resisted calls for greater transparency in this case and implications for future use of force. Other American citizens, including Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, have been killed in drone strikes in which they were not the intended targets.¶ President Obama has an unreleased list of targets for killing and capture that reportedly includes additional Americans, as well as targets as young as teenagers. Congress must demand greater transparency around targeting and rein in executive power to kill targets that could be pursued by other means, or may not pose an imminent threat to the US, including American citizens.¶ Precedent setting and future proliferation of drone technology¶ As with any technology, the United States will not maintain a monopoly on the use of armed drones. The New America Foundation cites 70 countries that currently have some kind of drone. Examining our standards for use of drones and setting specific parameters will become even more critical as we set a precedent for international drone use.¶ As Human Rights Watch points out, “Because the US treats many of the most important constraints on the use of force as matters of discretionary prudence rather than legal requirements, the US approach would not forbid the Russians to target an alleged Chechen militant in New York, or the Chinese a Uighur separatist in Washington, DC, if they said they were at war with these groups and the US didn’t apprehend them. That is a deeply troublesome precedent to set.”¶ Congress should push for clear, public standards that can contribute to an international conversation about global standards for the use of drones.

#### Presidents effect both the actual XOs but also enforcement of previous ones – large leeway to rollback

Vanessa K. Burrows, Legislative Attorney for Congressional Research Service, 4-25-2010, “Executive Orders: Issuance and Revocation”, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20846\_20100325.pdf

Illustrating the fact that executive orders are used to further an administration’s policy goals, there are frequent examples of situations in which a sitting President has revoked or amended orders issued by his predecessor.37 This practice is particularly apparent where Presidents have used these instruments to assert control over and influence the agency rulemaking process. President Ford, for instance, issued Executive Order 11821, requiring agencies to issue inflation impact statements for proposed regulations.38 President Carter altered this practice with Executive Order 12044, requiring agencies to consider the potential economic impact of certain rules and identify potential alternatives.39 Shortly after taking office, President Reagan revoked President Carter’s order, implementing a scheme asserting much more extensive control over the rulemaking process. Executive Order 12291 directed agencies to implement rules only if “the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society,” requiring agencies to prepare a cost-benefit analysis for any proposed rule that could have a significant economic impact.40 This order was criticized by some as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, on the grounds that it imbued the President with the power to essentially control rulemaking authority that had been committed to a particular agency by Congress.41 Despite these concerns, there were no court rulings assessing the validity of President Reagan’s order. In turn, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12866, modifying the system established during the Reagan Administration.42 While retaining many of the basic features of President Reagan’s order, E.O. 12866 eased cost benefit analysis requirements, and recognized the primary duty of agencies to fulfill the duties committed to them by Congress. President George W. Bush issued two executive orders amending E.O. 12866, E.O. 13258, and E.O. 13422, both of which were revoked by President Obama in E.O. 13497.43 President Bush’s E.O. 13258 concerned regulatory planning and review, and it removed references in E.O. 12866 to the role of the Vice President, replacing several of them with a reference to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or the Chief of Staff to the President.44 E.O. 13422 defined guidance documents and significant guidance documents and applied several parts of E.O. 12866 to guidance documents, as well as required each agency head to designate a presidential appointee to the newly created position of regulatory policy officer.45 E.O. 13422 also made changes to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA’s) duties and authorities, including a requirement that OIRA be given advance notice of significant guidance documents.46 President Obama’s executive order revoking E.O. 13258 and E.O. 13422 also directed the Director of OMB and the heads of executive departments and agencies to rescind orders, rules, guidelines, and policies that implemented those executive orders.

#### Congress rolls back the CP

William G Howell Associate professor at Harvard 2005 Unilateral Powers: A Brief overview Presidential Studies quarterly vol 35 issue 3 pg 417

Plainly, presidents cannot institute every aspect of their policy agenda by decree. The checks and balances that define our system of governance are alive, though not always well, when presidents contemplate unilateral action. Should the president proceed without statutory or constitutional authority, the courts stand to overturn his actions, just as Congress can amend them, cut funding for their operations, or eliminate them outright. (4) Even in those moments when presidential power reaches its zenith--namely, during times of national crisis--judicial and congressional prerogatives may be asserted (Howell and Pevehouse 2005, forthcoming; Kriner, forthcoming; Lindsay 1995, 2003; and see Fisher's contribution to this volume). In 2004, as the nation braced itself for another domestic terrorist attack and images of car bombings and suicide missions filled the evening news, the courts extended new protections to citizens deemed enemy combatants by the president, (5) as well as noncitizens held in protective custody abroad. (6) And while Congress, as of this writing, continues to authorize as much funding for the Iraq occupation as Bush requests, members have imposed increasing numbers of restrictions on how the money is to be spent.

#### Agencies roll back – independent of presidential will – the Shah ev from 1AC proves CIA does it behind his back

Harold H. Bruff, Professor of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1-28-2011, “PLACING YOUR FAITH IN THE CONSTITUTION”, http://www.tulsalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Bruff.Final\_.pdf

For cabinet departments and other nonindependent agencies, the limits of presidential direction are generally understood to be as follows. First, since Congress routinely grants authority to administer statutes to these officers, not the President, they must make the formal decisions. The President is free to direct them to make a particular decision and, if they resist for legal or policy reasons, to remove and replace them, 24 but the President may not exercise statutory authority granted to these officers himself. Presidents also issue executive orders that require the agencies to consult with the White House about the costs and benefits of their proposed regulations; Congress has acquiesced in these orders.25 Thus, the power to supervise the executive branch is shared between the President and Congress in ways that are compromised and are based more on history than on grand theory. The advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement are known. To a pluralist, the arrangement is within constitutional limits, its messiness being offset by the benefits of the creative tension that results from involving both political branches in oversight of the executive agencies. Calabresi and Yoo reject the desirability of this power sharing in favor of the benefits of clean and strong lines of political accountability to the President. Here they must envision a world that does not currently exist - their promised land of a new and improved federal government. What they do not do, however, is paint any detailed picture of the altered landscape, of the practical differences they envision if the unitary executive is endorsed by the Supreme Court. Would newly empowered presidents seize the reins of power and bring the unwieldy bureaucracy under control? It is quite unclear that presidents can do much more to control the bureaucracy than they now attempt. The fact that President Obama felt the need to create various “czars,” his own new bureaucracy to control the bureaucracy, reveals the serious practical limits to comprehensive control by the President himself.

#### Links to net benefit -

#### Interpretation: The negative gets fiat of agents are not the object of the resolution

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### Kills topic education – fiats through core of the topic

#### Moots aff ground – forces generic advantages like SoP and contrived solvency deficits

#### Stacks the deck – answers like rollback link to the aff

#### Reject the team – at least reject durable fiat and grant rollback args

#### Doesn’t reduce strikes

Spencer Ackerman, senior reporter for Wired specializing in national security policy, 3-20-2013, “Little Will Change If the Military Takes Over CIA’s Drone Strikes,” Wired, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/military-drones/

If the Obama administration decides to give the U.S. military control of the CIA’s drone effort, the institutional changes to the controversial global drone strikes will be minor. That’s because the important leverage points over the drones — and the global, targeted-killing program they support — are political, not institutional. Daniel Klaidman at The Daily Beast reports that President Barack Obama is nearing a decision to divest the CIA of its lethal drone fleet. According to Klaidman, the CIA will “remain involved in lethal targeting,” but uniformed personnel will pull the trigger from now on. “It looks like the White House may now be preparing to launch a campaign to counter the growing perception — with elites if not the majority of the public — that Obama is running a secretive and legally dubious killing machine,” Klaidman writes. Except he’ll still be running one. The CIA conducts armed drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, among other places. The U.S. military conducts armed drone strikes in Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia, and has extensive airbases and support networks for drone strikes in east Africa and now in Niger. Military launchpads are often — but not always — launchpads for the CIA’s drones, too. And the CIA sometimes borrows the Air Force’s drone fleet. In short, the military infrastructure for the drone strikes is robust and global. In the near future, those drone launchpads will move out to sea. A newly reconfigured Navy ship, the USS Ponce, is the first of a new kind of floating staging ground for commandos and the armed robots they’ll operate. Later in the decade, the Navy plans to launch an armed, stealthy drone from an aircraft carrier.

## Flex

#### No impact – signature strikes are not eky to deter anything

#### No impact to heg

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9-26-2011, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Perfcon with your security K

#### Not deterred now – Brimley ev and Gertz ev indicate China already expanding in response to policy

#### NDAA and Obama already restricted his war powers

WSJ, 1-8-2013, “War Powers Reversal” Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323374504578221801531272148.html

Perhaps the greatest irony of the Obama Presidency is how much it has vindicated the antiterror strategy of its predecessor. The latest example is President Obama's vexed statement in signing the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013.¶ Among many other things, the bill strengthens existing Congressional limits on transferring detainees out of Guantánamo and other U.S. facilities either to the U.S. or to a third country. But while signing the law last week, Mr. Obama issued a nearly 1,800 word statement objecting to various provisions.¶ He protested, for example, that a provision limiting the transfer of detainees held in Afghanistan "could interfere with my ability as Commander in Chief to make time-sensitive determinations about the appropriate disposition of detainees in an active area of hostilities." Such decisions are typically made based on "the judgment of experienced military commanders and national security professionals without unwarranted interference by Members of Congress," he wrote. And he even suggested that if the provision "operates in a manner that violates constitutional separation of powers principles," he'll ignore it.¶ Well, well. Perhaps readers recall the uproar when George W. Bush issued similar "signing statements" defending Presidential war powers. The criticism was withering—from Barack Obama.¶ In 2007 Senator Obama made this pledge: "I will not use signing statements to nullify or undermine congressional instructions as enacted into law." In 2008 Candidate Obama said "Congress's job is to pass legislation. The president can veto it or he can sign it."¶ Last week, President Obama wrote that "though I continue to oppose certain sections" of the defense bill, "the need to renew critical defense authorities and funding was too great" not to sign it. Mr. Obama has issued more than 20 signing statements so far.¶ In his latest, Mr. Obama also criticized Congress for trying to limit his "constitutional duty to supervise the executive branch." This sounds a lot like the theory of the "unitary executive" that turned Bush-era officials like John Yoo into pariahs in the legal academy.¶ Democrats and most liberal journalists are now mute at this irony, though some on the anti-antiterror left admit they've been had. Andrea Prasow of Human Rights Watch declared last week that Mr. Obama should have vetoed the law: "The administration blames Congress for making it harder to close Guantánamo, yet for a second year President Obama has signed damaging Congressional restrictions into law."¶ On the merits, we don't much like these intrusions on executive war power, but Congress is surely within its rights to use the power of the purse on Guantánamo and detainee transfers. The defense bill runs closer to the edge of unconstitutionality when it tries to make plea bargains in military tribunals more difficult. But given the Supreme Court's decisions (Hamdan and Boumediene) on military tribunals and inviting Congressional-executive cooperation, Congress probably can do that too.¶ Senator Obama liked those rulings. But President Obama is finding that the cheerleading he did then against the supposedly Imperial Bush is infringing on his ability to pursue his own national security policies. Mr. Bush must be smiling.

#### Syria also thumps

#### Pres power decline inevitable – self-limiting and public checks the executive [gender modified]

Gregory S. McNeal, Associate Professor of law at Pepperdine University School of Law, 3-5-2013, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” Georgetown law Journal, SSRN

However, none of the examples described answer the question of secrecy and how it can stifle political accountability. Just as secrecy has the potential to hinder accountability, it may also undermine executive power by damaging executive branch credibility. While some arguments can be made to suggest that the executive branch has too great an ability to hide relevant information from courts or the legislature, few have recognized the credibility costs associated with such decisions. 474 One scholarly attempt to describe the credibility problem is the agency approach adopted by Posner and Vermeule, they write: The president is the agent and the public is the principal. The public cares about national security but also cares about civil liberties and the well-being of potential targets of the war on terror; its optimal policy trades off these factors. However, the public cannot directly choose the policy; instead, it delegates that power to the government and, in particular, the president. The president knows the range of options available, their likely effects, their expected costs and benefits—thanks to the resources and expertise of the executive branch—and so, if he is well-motivated, he will choose the best measures available.475 Understanding the political accountability challenge in this way has a lot of explanatory purchase. It demonstrates that the president requires credibility to act§ Marked 17:41 § , and to signal his commitment to what the public is interested in, he will need to choose the best measures available to maintain their support. Stated differently, no “president can accomplish his [or her] goals if the public does not trust him [or her]. This concern with reputation may put a far greater check on the president’s actions than do the reactions of the other branches.” 476 Therefore, choosing the best targeted killing measures is a form of self- binding,477 and exposing information about those measures may come through selective leaks about the targeted killing process,478 greater transparency through speeches,479 or demonstrated successes.480

#### Congressional regulations don’t restrict presidential command – their ev about funding

Jennifer Elsea et. al., legislative attorney, 2-19-2013, “Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations, CRS, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/206121.pdf

In sum, it seems that under the constitutional allocation of powers Congress has the prerogative of ¶ placing a legally binding condition on the use of appropriations to regulate or end the deployment ¶ of U.S. Armed Forces. Such a prohibition seems directly related to the allocation of resources at ¶ the President’s disposal, and would therefore not appear to interfere impermissibly with the ¶ President’s ability to exercise command and control over the U.S. Armed Forces. Although not ¶ beyond question, such a prohibition would arguably survive challenge as an incident both of ¶ Congress’s war power and of its power over appropriations.

#### No impact to pres powers; only turns – even if ideally it would be good to have that power, empirically it’s squandered

Louis Fisher, Scholar in Residence at The Constitution Project served for four decades as senior specialist in Separation of Powers (Congressional Research Service) and Specialist in Constitutional Law (Law Library), January 2012, “Teaching the Presidency: Idealizing a Constitutional Oﬃce”, http://www.loufisher.org/docs/ci/teach.pdf

Thomas Cronin helped puncture imaginary qualities that other scholars had bestowed on the American president. In a recent book, On the Presidency (2010), he reviews the record of 14 presidents from 1920 to 2009 and concludes: “Maybe about three were successful. At least half a dozen failed in one way or another” (Cronin 2010, 2). He deleted from the list of successful presidents those who were forced from oﬃce, impeached, rejected when they sought reelection, or decided to step aside rather than face voter rebuke. Those who survived that winnowing process were three: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan. That is one realistic measure of the real presidency. Many studies on presidential power rely on imaginary and idealistic qualities. It is unfortunate that so much scholarly guidance came from the works of Schlesinger, Commager, Rossiter, and Neustadt, who looked less to evidence than their own personal and idiosyncratic fancies. The fault is not merely in the deﬁciencies of their research but in the willingness of the academic profession to tolerate their work for such a long time and to extend repeated and undeserved praise. Some contemporary scholars continue to attribute to the presidency highly romantic qualities of integrity, honesty, and competence rarely seen in those who sit in the Oval Oﬃce.

#### No artic of what president would do to deter

## K

### 2AC Framework – Theory

#### Our interpretation is that plan focus is good

#### Aff choice – other frameworks moot the 1AC

#### Topic education – only focusing on the resolution ensures different ground from year to year

#### Reject non-policy alts and links not based on the plan text

### 2AC Perm

#### Perm do both – double bind – either the alt can’t overcome the status quo or it can overcome residual link to the plan

#### Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

### Impact Extension

#### Consequences outweigh – only moral frame that makes sense

#### Extinction outweighs – only impact that can’t be reversed

#### Aff turns the k – squo ensures power consolidation and violent exclusion

#### Doesn’t turn the aff – no such thing as root cause – proximate cause focus is key

#### China response is based on US failure to create drone norms and Pakistan is a proximate cause of outrage over drone strikes

### 2AC Threats Real – Knudsen

#### Threats aren’t arbitrary – focus on personal perceptions can’t prevent objective threats – only concrete strategies cope with perceptions and material reality

Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, 2001, Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 360

During the Cold War, peace research was struggling to gain the status of so- cial and intellectual respectability then only accorded strategic studies. The concept of securitization has helped to change that. A key aspect of the securitization idea is to create awareness of the (allegedly) arbitrary nature of ‘threats’, to stimulate the thought that the foundation of any national security policy is not given by ‘nature’ but chosen by politicians and decisionmakers who have an interest in defining it in just that way. That interest (according to this line of reasoning) is heavily embodied not just in each country’s military establishment, but also in the power and influence flowing from the military’s privileged position with respect to the network of decisionmakers and politi- cians serving that establishment. Hence, ‘securitization’ gave a name to the process, hitherto vaguely perceived, of raising security issues above politics and making them something one would never question. This argument is convincing as far as its description of the military estab- lishment and decisionmakers goes, but its heyday is gone. It was a Cold War phenomenon, and things just aren’t so anymore. In the post-Cold War period, agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the concept; the change in security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parlia- ments before the concept was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the post-Cold War period. Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unim- portant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misper- ceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which § Marked 17:42 § are perceived to be threatening. The point of Wæver’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the utterance itself that is the act.’ The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Wæver’s joint article of the same year. As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its founda- tion. Yet I see that Wæver himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article. This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Wæver first began his argu- ment in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the consequent ‘politics of panic’, as Wæver aptly calls it. Now, here – in the case of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Wæverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Wæver’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just an- other argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Wæver does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

#### Threatcon is necessary not sufficient – all threats don’t lead to genocide

### 2AC Link

#### Aff isn’t key – multiple instances outweigh

#### The link is the OPPOSITE of the plan – we REDUCE the state’s oppressive machinery – don’t let them get away with genero links on this topic

### 2AC Dissident IR Fails – Agathenagelou

#### Dissident IR fails – it lacks a mechanism to convert theory into practice – maintains same violent structures.

Anna M. Agathangelou, Dir. Global Change Inst. And Women’s Studies Prof @ Oberlin, and L.H.M. Ling, Inst. For Social Studies @ Hague, Fall 1997, Studies in Political Economy, v. 54, p 7-8

Yet, ironically if not tragically, dissident IR also paralyzes itself into non-action. While it challenges the status quo, dissident IR fails to transform it. Indeed, dissident IR claims that a “coherent” paradigm or research program — even an alternative one — reproduces the stifling parochialism and hidden power-mongering of sovereign scholarship. “Any agenda of global politics informed by critical social theory perspectives,” writes Jim George “must forgo the simple, albeit self-gratifying, options inherent in ready-made alternative Realisms and confront the dangers, closures, paradoxes, and complicities associated with them. Even references to a “real world, dissidents argue, repudiate the very meaning of dissidence given their sovereign presumption of a universalizable, testable Reality. What dissident scholarship opts for, instead, is a sense of disciplinary crisis that “resonates with the effects of marginal and dissident movements in all sorts of other localities.” Despite its emancipatory intentions, this approach effectively leaves the prevailing prison of sovereignty intact. It doubly incarcerates when dissident IR highlights the layers of power that oppress without offering a heuristic, not to mention a program, for emancipatory action. Merely politicizing the supposedly non-political neither guides emancipatory action nor guards it against demagoguery. At best, dissident IR sanctions a detached criticality rooted (ironically) in Western modernity. Michael Shapiro, for instance, advises the dissident theorist to take “a critical distance” or “position offshore’ from which to “see the possibility of change.” But what becomes of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like while the esoteric dissident observes “critically” from offshore? What hope do they have of overthrowing these shackles of sovereignty? In not answering these questions, dissident IR ends up reproducing despite avowals to the contrary, the sovereign outcome of discourse divorced from practice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving.

### 2AC Alt Vagueness

#### The alt is vague – it’s a voting issue

#### Spikes our offense – no way for aff to win

#### Skews 2AC time

#### Damage is done – 2NC clarification rewards them because 1AR will always be behind

#### Kills the political project

# 1AR

## T

### CI

#### It’s Obama’s definition – that’s key to making the resolution coherent

Matt Sledge, international correspondent for huffington post, 6-19-2013, “Drone 'Signature Strike' Witness Responds To Obama Speech: 'I Don't Trust A Single Word,” Huff Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/19/drone-signature-strike\_n\_3421586.html

Such so-called "signature strikes" are one of the most controversial practices in the drone war. When first elected, President Barack Obama was highly skeptical of such attacks, begun under former President George W. Bush in 2008. With time in the Oval Office and advice from military leaders, however, Obama came to accept their use as a vital part of the fight against terrorism.¶ Those signature strikes and their anonymous victims fall under Obama's definition of targeted killings. Unnamed U.S. officials have told The New York Times the signature strikes will continue in Pakistan. In a major national security speech in May, Obama acknowledged that drones sometimes make mistakes, but said their work must carry on.

### AT: Precision

#### And, that neg Anderson is AFF ev---- it concedes that we should adopt changing definitions- rigid legal analysis is bad

**Anderson ’11** [Kenneth, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Hoover Institution visiting fellow, Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at Brookings, “Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Targeted Killing Through Drone Warfare,” online]

Speaking to the broad future of the technology, however, and given the direction of¶ technology and cost, it appears **inevitable that drones will take on many more operational¶ roles over time**, whether in conventional war, special operations, and what has here been¶ called generically “intelligence-driven uses of force.” Drones will likely evolve – as¶ aircraft, as well as in the weapons and sensor systems they bear – into many specialized¶ types. They will get both bigger and smaller than they are now, for example, and they¶ will surely evolve into those specialized for surveillance and those specialized to fire¶ weapons. And they will also surely evolve into those specialized in high-value,¶ “intelligence-driven” targeted killing of individuals and those that are suited to¶ conventional operations. Bearing in mind these increasingly varied uses is essential to understanding, when it comes to targeted killing and/or drone warfare, that **one-size-fitsall¶ legal analysis** is not sufficient.

### Standards

#### The topic is already neg biased – very few defensible solvency advocates with US key warrants means you should err on the side of ensuring aff solvency mechanisms since the neg still gets their generics. Neg also gets say no and empirical solvency takeouts

#### Arbitrary neg interps are always self serving and can exclude any aff – means the neg always wins and makes aff creativity impossible – also excludes relevant lit from the topic – undermines Topic specific education

#### Number of affs isn’t important – topic = two mechanisms – statutory and judicial – key to all disad links and counterplan competition – ensures they get access to core neg generics. Topic disads only require Cong/courts action to get a link – mech is key to any neg strategy

#### Reasonability should frame how you evaluate competing interpretations – if we win it was very debatable for the negative, but they make the topic undebatable for the aff – its offense for us– we dont open the floodgates – teams don’t model other teams aff decisions – no spillover to topic explosion

## CP

### Obj Fiat

#### Interpretation: The negative gets fiat of agents are not the object of the resolution

#### Violation:

#### Standards:

#### Kills topic education – fiats through core of the topic

#### Moots aff ground – forces generic advantages like SoP and contrived solvency deficits

#### Stacks the deck – answers like rollback link to the aff

#### Reject the team – at least reject durable fiat and grant rollback args

### No Solve

#### Doesn’t reduce strikes

Spencer Ackerman, senior reporter for Wired specializing in national security policy, 3-20-2013, “Little Will Change If the Military Takes Over CIA’s Drone Strikes,” Wired, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/military-drones/

If the Obama administration decides to give the U.S. military control of the CIA’s drone effort, the institutional changes to the controversial global drone strikes will be minor. That’s because the important leverage points over the drones — and the global, targeted-killing program they support — are political, not institutional. Daniel Klaidman at The Daily Beast reports that President Barack Obama is nearing a decision to divest the CIA of its lethal drone fleet. According to Klaidman, the CIA will “remain involved in lethal targeting,” but uniformed personnel will pull the trigger from now on. “It looks like the White House may now be preparing to launch a campaign to counter the growing perception — with elites if not the majority of the public — that Obama is running a secretive and legally dubious killing machine,” Klaidman writes. Except he’ll still be running one. The CIA conducts armed drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, among other places. The U.S. military conducts armed drone strikes in Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia, and has extensive airbases and support networks for drone strikes in east Africa and now in Niger. Military launchpads are often — but not always — launchpads for the CIA’s drones, too. And the CIA sometimes borrows the Air Force’s drone fleet. In short, the military infrastructure for the drone strikes is robust and global. In the near future, those drone launchpads will move out to sea. A newly reconfigured Navy ship, the USS Ponce, is the first of a new kind of floating staging ground for commandos and the armed robots they’ll operate. Later in the decade, the Navy plans to launch an armed, stealthy drone from an aircraft carrier.

## DA

### Heg

#### Even if they win pres powers are good for heg, capabilities matter – not credibility

Christopher Fettweis, professor of political science at Tulane, Credibility and the War on Terror, Winter 2008, Political Science Quarterly, Ingenta.

Mercer’s larger conclusions were that states cannot control their reputations or level of credibility, and that target adversaries and allies will ultimately form their own perceptions. Sending messages for their consideration in future crises, therefore, is all but futile. These arguments echoed some of the broader critiques of the credibility imperative that had emerged in response to the war in Vietnam, both by realists like Morgenthau and Waltz and by so-called area specialists, who took issue with the interdependence beliefs of the generalists. As Jervis observed, a common axis of disagreement in American foreign policy has been between those who focus on the specific situation and the particular nations involved (often State Department officials or area experts), and those who take a global geopolitical perspective (often in theWhiteHouse or outside foreign policy generalists). The former usually believe that states in a region are strongly driven by domestic concerns and local rivalries; the latter are predisposed to think that these states look to the major powers for their cues and have little control over their own fates. 41 Throughout most of the Cold War, since those who argued that events are interdependent won most of the policy debates, U.S. foreign policy was obsessed with credibility. A series of other studies have followed those of Hopf and Mercer, yielding similar results. The empirical record seems to suggest that there have been few instances of a setback in one arena influencing state behavior in a second arena. Daryl Press began his recent study expecting to find that perceptions of the opponent’s credibility would be an important variable affecting state behavior. He chose three cases in which reputation would presumably have been vital to the outcome—the outbreak of the First World War, the Berlin Crisis of the late 1950s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis—and found, to his surprise, that in all three cases, leaders did not appear to be influenced at all by prior actions of their rivals, for better or for worse. Crisis behavior appeared to be entirely independent; credibility, therefore, was all but irrelevant. Mercer’s conclusions about reputation seem to have amassed a good deal more supporting evidence in the time since he wrote.

#### US heg doesn’t solve war – your authors assume that the US has more influence than it does – unipolarity and stability are simply a coincidence

Christopher J. Fettweis, assistant professor of national security affairs at the US Naval War College, 2010, Dangerous Times: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 173

First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.

#### No transition crisis – powers integrate, they don’t challenge.

John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, Summer 2011, “A World of Our Making,” Democracy, Issue #21, http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=2

Fourth, all the great powers have alignments of interests that will continue to bring them together to negotiate and cooperate over the management of the system. All the great powers—old and rising—are status-quo powers. All are beneficiaries of an open world economy and the various services that the liberal international order provides for capitalist trading states. All worry about religious radicalism and failed states. Great powers such as Russia and China do have different geopolitical interests in various key trouble spots, such as Iran and South Asia, and so disagreement and noncooperation over sanctions relating to nonproliferation and other security issues will not disappear. But the opportunities for managing differences with frameworks of great-power cooperation exist and will grow. Overall, the forces for continuity are formidable. Of course, there are many forces operating in the world that can generate upheaval and discontinuity. The collapse of the global financial system and an economic depression that triggers massive protectionism are possibilities. Terrorism and other forms of transnational violence can also trigger political panic and turmoil that would lead governments to shut down borders and reimpose restrictions on the movement of goods and people. But in the face of these seismic events in world politics, there are deep forces that keep the system anchored and stable.