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### 2AC WPA – CIA

#### We win – here’s a government memo that says CIA operations are directly part of the president’s war powers – the Supreme Court also agrees btw

Fred Manget, 25-year veteran of the CIA, formerly legal adviser at the Office of General Counsel, Summer 1987, “Presidential War Powers: A Constitutional Basis for Foreign Intelligence Operations,” Declassified internal CIA memo from the National Archives, http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-10-114-7/263-a1-27-box-10-114-7.pdf

The President is authorized to conduct foreign intelligence operations by [her or] his constitutional war powers. This authority is derived from the Constitution itself and does not depend on any grant of legislative authority conferred on the President by Congress.42 In a case where CIA sued a former employee (Marchetti) to enjoin him from publishing a book in violation of his secrecy oath and agreement, the court stated: "Gathering intelligence information and the other activities of the Agency, including clandestine affairs against other nations, are all within the President's constitutional responsibility for the security of the nation as the Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief of our armed forces. Const., art. II, 2. "43 In another case, the court said: Congress and the court recognize that in this time of global tension and distrust, the United States must have an efficient means of acquiring information about other countries, information not obtainable except by covert means. It is a legitimate function of the Executive to provide for such intelligence operations and to maintain their secrecy.44 The conclusion to be drawn from the principles outlined above is that to the extent foreign intelligence operations are directed toward preparation for any armed conflict or the conduct of any military or paramilitary activities, they spring directly from the powers granted to the Executive by the war powers clause of the Constitution. This chain of authority exists and operates in the absence of congressional action and even despite congressional opposition to particular foreign intelligence operations. And, in fact, almost all foreign intelligence operations are directed toward war or the potential for war because of the nature of modern armed conflict and the current state of relations between nations.

#### History proves – covert action has ALWAYS been part of war – read your Bible

Fred Manget, 25-year veteran of the CIA, formerly legal adviser at the Office of General Counsel, Summer 1987, “Presidential War Powers: A Constitutional Basis for Foreign Intelligence Operations,” Declassified internal CIA memo from the National Archives, http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-10-114-7/263-a1-27-box-10-114-7.pdf

Foreign intelligence operations. have been an integral part of the conduct of armed conflict throughout history. As described in the Old Testament, Moses was in the wilderness with the children of Israel when he was directed by God "to spy out the land of Canaan. "45 Moses sent a ruler of each of the tribes of Israel to gather intelligence on the Canaanites, who would soon be his enemies, to see the land and the people, and to determine whether they were strong or weak.46 Joshua sent men into Jericho to "spy secretly" before his great assault on the walled city. They stayed in the house of Rahab, the harlot, who concealed them and later got them out of the city with their intelligence. The Israelites destroyed Jericho and its people utterly, except for Rahab and her family. 4; Four centuries before Christ, a Chinese military strategist named Sun Tzu wrote a classic treatise on war and included a chapter entitled "Employment of Secret Agents. "48 In that treatise, Sun Tzu wrote: The reason the enlightened prince or the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge . ... What is called "foreknowledge" cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from the gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.49 The history of the great wars fought by the Greeks is filled with examples of foreign intelligence operations that were integral parts of the struggles. They range from mythology (the Trojan Horse) to historical descriptions by Herodotus of intelligence gathered for use in battles fought against Xerxes, such as Thermopylae and Marathon.50 Hannibal, Edward III at Crecy, and Queen Elizabeth I were some of the wartime leaders who depended on intelligence to win vital battles.51 When the history of foreign intelligence operations is discussed, it is inevitably a story of war. 52 The American experience is similar. George Washington used intelligence operations as a natural part of his strategy in defeating the British Army, writing to one of his officers: The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as sP.cret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of the kind, and for want of it they are generally defeated.s3 The War of Independence generated many foreign intelligence operations that were important to the ultimate American victory, including the exploits of an American sculptress in London and a Swiss journalist at The Hague.5.( Lincoln used his constitutional authority to hire secret agents in the Civil War.55 There is also a painful memory: One of the great failures of US intelligence was the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought America into World War 11.56 Professional intelligence officers who have written studies of American intelligence operations comment extensively on the connection between war, military operations, and intelligence activity. For example, former Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles attributed the paramount modern emphasis on the military aspects of foreign intelligence to the growth in the 19th century of large armed forces. 57 Ray Cline, another former high-ranking CIA official, describes how the central intelligence establishment in the United States was born in World War II because the lack of coordination hampered the intelligence activities of each armed service.58 A former Executive Director of CIA writes that, "Unless we have advance and accurate intelligence, we could well prepare for the wrong war, at the wrong place, and the wrong time. "59 Also, covert action operations are often military in character. Paramilitary activities in Chile, Angola, Congo, Iran, Cuba, Laos, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, South Vietnam, and Nicaragua have been publicly described. They involved aspects of armed conflict ranging from supplying war material to training troops for combat to actual operations in support of armed forc~s. 60 It is clear that almost every foreign intelligence operation in American history has been concerned with matters relating directly or indirectly to the intentions and capabilities of foreign groups or nations to wage war against America or its allies. 61 Foreign intelligence operations have been and remain an innate part of war and the preparation for war, and thus the President may conduct such operations under constitutional war powers authority.

#### Also the Air Force pilots all drones even if the CIA directs them – means the plan only prevents pulling the trigger without sufficient intelligence

Wells Bennett, managing editor of Lawfare and a Fellow in National Security law at the Brookings Institution, 3-17-2013, “The White Paper, the Public Authority Defense, and “Five Truths About the Drone War,” Lawfare, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/the-white-paper-the-public-authority-defense-and-five-truths-about-the-drone-war/#.UvrJEoZTYtU

Earlier this week—at the Week, naturally enough—Marc Ambinder posted this piece, ”Five Truths about the Drone War.” Of the five, the second of Ambinder’s verities struck me as most noteworthy. I’ve supplied the emphasis to Ambinder’s words: 2. The CIA does not “fly” drones. It “owns” drones, but the Air Force flies them. The Air Force coordinates (and deconflicts) their use through the CIA’s Office of Military Affairs, which is run by an Air Force general. The Air Force performs maintenance on them. The Air Force presses the button that releases the missile. There are no CIA civilians piloting remote controlled air vehicles. The Agency has about 40 unmanned aerial vehicles in its worldwide arsenal, about 30 of which are deployed in the Middle East and Africa. Most of these thingies are equipped with sophisticated surveillance gear. A few of them are modified to launch missiles. The Air Force owns many more “lethal” RPVs, but it uses them in the contiguous battlefield of Afghanistan. That’s an interesting “truth”—assuming it is, indeed, true—in light of the DOJ White Paper. Among other things, the White Paper concluded that, under its given facts, a hypothetical violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1119 (or the “murder of a U.S. citizen abroad” statute) likely would be justified on “public authority” grounds. This part of the White Paper proceeded in two steps: first, by noting 1119′s incorporation of other federal laws which criminalize only “unlawful” killings; and second, by pointing out that the targeted killing, abroad and away from any zone of active hostilities, of a senior Al-Qaeda leader who is a U.S. citizen and poses an imminent threat—would be lawful. That is, the killing would be conducted in accordance with the laws of war, which govern the United States’ non-international armed conflict with Al-Qaeda. And that, apparently, would furnish “public authority” sufficient to justify a violation of the statute under such circumstances. This raised Kevin Jon Heller’s eyebrow. Kevin doesn’t seem to quarrel with the White Paper’s “public authority” claim, so far as concerns drone strikes conducted by the U.S. military. But he stoutly rejects it, so far as concerns drone strikes conducted by the CIA. And his assumption—supported by news accounts and what seems to be conventional wisdom—was that agency officials operated the drone that killed U.S. citizen Anwar Al-Aulaqi. That’s where Ambinder’s reporting comes in. For if Ambinder is correct, then it is military personnel who do the drone-flying and the button-pushing, and military personnel can invoke a public authority justification for strikes implicating 1119, in Kevin’s view. To be clear: I do not mean to suggest that the CIA program’s bureaucratic structure reflects a deliberate effort to mitigate hypothetical 1119 liability, for agency civilians involved in drone strikes against U.S. citizens. But that appears nevertheless to be one possible consequence of the structure, as described by Ambinder. (Relatedly, I also acknowledge some interesting, and I suspect, quite difficult questions about blended CIA and military operations here—but I’ll leave them to more knowledgeable folk. Bobby, I’m looking at you.)

#### It’s key to the topic – traditionally military operations are being transferred to the CIA to avoid accountability – if we want to talk about modern warfare, we have to talk about CIA

Kevin Drum, national security writer for Mother Jones, 11-13-2012, “How the CIA Became the 6th Branch of the Military,” Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/11/how-cia-became-6th-branch-military

Robert Wright, in an obvious effort to use Petraeusgate to draw attention to a boring subject that has nothing to do with sex, says the real scandal here isn't Petraeus leaving the CIA, it's the fact that he arrived there in the first place: When, in the fall of 2011, David Petraeus moved from commanding the Afghanistan war effort to commanding the CIA, it was a disturbingly natural transition. I say "natural" because the CIA conducts drone strikes in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and is involved in other military operations there, so Petraeus, in his new role, was continuing to fight the Afghanistan war. I say "disturbingly" because this overlap of Pentagon and CIA missions is the result of a creeping militarization of the CIA that may be undermining America's national security. The militarization of the CIA raises various questions. For example, if the CIA is psychologically invested in a particular form of warfare—and derives part of its budget from that kind of warfare—can it be trusted to impartially assess the consequences, both positive and negative, direct and indirect? And then there's the transparency question. [A piece in the Washington Post] noted concerns among some activists that "the CIA now functions as a military force beyond the accountability that the United States has historically demanded of its armed services. The CIA doesn't officially acknowledge the drone program, let alone provide public explanation about who shoots and who dies, and by what rules." Indeed, only a few months ago, in compliance with the War Powers Resolution, the Obama administration reported (vaguely) on targeted killings in Somalia and Yemen that had been conducted by the military, but not on those conducted by the CIA. ....The circumstances of Petraeus's departure from the CIA are a little alarming; you'd rather your chief spy not be reckless. But the circumstances of his arrival at the CIA a year ago were more troubling. Yet no alarm was sounded that was anywhere near as loud as the hubbub surrounding Petraeus now. That's scandalous. As near as I can tell, drone warfare was largely handed over to the CIA precisely in order to avoid normal military accountability. That really is scandalous, but it attracted only fleeting notice. It's probably too much to hope that the Petraeus scandal will cause anyone to rethink this, but rethink it we should. Wright has more at the link.

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### \*2AC Self-Restraint

#### Self-restraint is perceived as discretionary and isn’t modeled – Congressional limits bolster accountability and prevents foreign governments from engaging in aggressive drone policy

Rebecca Griffen, political director of Peace Action West, expert on war and drone policy, 1-11-2013, “Will Congress take on drones in 2013?” Peace Action West, http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2013/01/11/will-congress-take-on-drones-in-2013/

Since President Obama took office in 2009, his administration has dramatically increased the use of unmanned armed drones throughout the Middle East and Africa. The administration has overseen more than 300 drones strikes, with more than 2,500 killed by the CIA and the military. Thus far, Congress has not engaged on an in-depth level on important questions surrounding the reliance on this technology and the overarching policy governing its use.¶ The Obama administration reportedly began assembling parameters for the use of drones in the pursuit of suspected terrorists, but the proposed regulations have not yet been made public. Last year, President Obama stated, “One of the things we’ve got to do is put a legal architecture in place, and we need congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in but any president’s reined in terms of some of the decisions that we’re making.”¶ The 113th Congress should heed this call and exercise greater oversight over drone policy. Issues to address include:¶ Defining the “battlefield” and authorization for the use of force¶ As Al-Qaeda’s presence continues to wane, the already tenuous interpretation of the authorization for the use of military force in 2001 will not provide strong justification for drone attacks like those that have occurred in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. As former Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson argued, the US should “be able to say … that our efforts should no longer be considered an armed conflict against al-Qaida and its affiliates,” and that responsibility for pursuing Al-Qaeda should shift to law enforcement agencies.¶ This is a critical time for Congress to assert its role in oversight over military force and standards for expanding or continuing the drone war outside of the framework of armed conflict.¶ Civilian casualties and ensuing blowback¶ It is very difficult to obtain accurate numbers of civilian casualties in drone strikes. This is exacerbated by the CIA policy of counting military-age males as militants unless they have specific evidence pointing to their innocence. US policy of using “secondary strikes,” attacking rescuers who come to the aid of victims of initial strikes, puts civilians at even greater risk.¶ An in-depth report by Stanford and NYU Law Schools disputes the characterization of drones as a precise, targeted tool with minimal impact on innocent civilians. The study notes that despite US claims downplaying civilian casualties, the best available data indicate that drone strikes in just Pakistan killed 474-881 civilians and injured 1,228-1,362. The report also highlights significant harm other than injury and death, including anxiety and psychological trauma.¶ Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen notes, “Testimonies from Qaeda fighters and interviews I and local journalists have conducted across Yemen attest to the centrality of civilian casualties in explaining Al Qaeda’s rapid growth there. The United States is killing women, children and members of key tribes. ‘Each time they kill a tribesman, they create more fighters for Al Qaeda,’ one Yemeni explained to me over tea in Sana, the capital, last month. Another told CNN, after a failed strike, ‘I would not be surprised if a hundred tribesmen joined Al Qaeda as a result of the latest drone mistake.’” Johnsen points out that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has more than tripled in Yemen since the US started bombing the country in 2009.¶ Congress should push for greater transparency and more accurate accounting of civilian casualties, and for the end of secondary strikes. A full accounting of the impact of US drone strikes will better allow Congress and the public to weigh any potential benefits of the use of drones against their negative impacts.¶ The use of so-called “signature strikes”¶ In 2012, the Obama administration approved the use of so-called “signature strikes,” allowing the targeting of people whose identities are unknown. Targeting based on patterns of behavior rather than evidence of an imminent threat to US interests sets a dangerous precedent, increases the likelihood of blowback, and vastly increases the risk of killing innocent civilians. Congress should push for greater transparency in the use of signature strikes and ultimately to end their use.¶ Targeted assassination of US citizens¶ The Obama administration used dubious legal justification to kill a US citizen, Anwar Al-Awlaki, in Yemen. The threat Al-Awlaki posed, as well as his prominence within Al-Qaeda, has been called into question by experts on the region. The administration has resisted calls for greater transparency in this case and implications for future use of force. Other American citizens, including Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, have been killed in drone strikes in which they were not the intended targets.¶ President Obama has an unreleased list of targets for killing and capture that reportedly includes additional Americans, as well as targets as young as teenagers. Congress must demand greater transparency around targeting and rein in executive power to kill targets that could be pursued by other means, or may not pose an imminent threat to the US, including American citizens.¶ Precedent setting and future proliferation of drone technology¶ As with any technology, the United States will not maintain a monopoly on the use of armed drones. The New America Foundation cites 70 countries that currently have some kind of drone. Examining our standards for use of drones and setting specific parameters will become even more critical as we set a precedent for international drone use.¶ As Human Rights Watch points out, “Because the US treats many of the most important constraints on the use of force as matters of discretionary prudence rather than legal requirements, the US approach would not forbid the Russians to target an alleged Chechen militant in New York, or the Chinese a Uighur separatist in Washington, DC, if they said they were at war with these groups and the US didn’t apprehend them. That is a deeply troublesome precedent to set.”¶ Congress should push for clear, public standards that can contribute to an international conversation about global standards for the use of drones.

#### Captures zero of the norms advantage – Harvard indicates explicit restrictions are key to modeling

#### Executive actions link to politics – causes huge fights – also gets rolled back

Ginger Gibson, writer at Politico, 1-29-2014, Republicans bash Obama for overstepping bounds, dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=B6D21B66-98C7-4059-B77D-8CFB4009563F

In his State of the Union address Tuesday night, President Barack Obama said if Congress won’t help him get things done, he’ll do it on his own — and congressional Republicans aren’t pleased. Many in the GOP said they don’t intend to sit quietly if Obama starts signing executive orders. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) had sharp criticism for the president’s expanded authority. “I think it’s unfortunate, I think it’s divisive and quite frankly, borderline unconstitutional on many of those issues,” Rubio said. “I understand the [legislative] process takes long and can be frustrating, but I think it truly undermines the republic.” Rep. Tim Huelskamp (R-Kan.) said the president requested more controversial pieces of legislation — like immigration reform — than he did when Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress. “Suddenly he wants things that Republicans won’t give him that he didn’t ask Democrats to do — it seems like a lot of theatrics,” Huelskamp said. Huelskamp said he joked with fellow members that he’s going to file legislation that doesn’t require a presidential signature. The Kansas conservative said there are ways Republicans could push back at Obama’s executive orders but that he doesn’t think the GOP leadership is willing to wage the fight. “There are things we can do — I’m just afraid leadership is not willing to challenge them,” he said. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) argued that Obama employing executive powers could harm the Democrats as a whole. “I think he’s going to create a narrative for himself that’s going to hurt Democrats by acting unilaterally,” Graham said. “I think he’s going to create an impression among the American people that he’s abusing the power of his office and that will hurt Democrats.” Rep. Tom Cole (R-Okla.) took a soft approach to criticizing the president for overstepping his bounds on executive orders. “We’ll wait and see what he does,” Cole said. “The president has certain executive powers, but if he wants to achieve anything, an executive order is not a very good way to do it. Usually legislative achievement is what is enduring achievement. Executive orders are like writing on the beach, it may last a while but when the tide comes in or goes out, it disappears. So I think it’s a poor way to govern.” Sen. Tim Scott (R-S.C.) said acting without congressional authority is problematic. “We continue to erode the whole notion of the rule of law,” Scott said. “To the extent that he continues to move unilaterally without the consent of Congress, I think it doesn’t sit well with a message of unity.”

#### Unrestricted drone use causes nuclear war in the Caucuses

Nick Clayton, Eastern Europe correspondent for the Washington Times the Asia Times and Washington Diplomat, currently the senior editor of Kanal PIK TV's English Service, 10-23-2012, "Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war", www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war

Armenia and Azerbaijan could soon be at war if drone proliferation on both sides of the border continues. In a region where a fragile peace holds over three frozen conflicts, the nations of the South Caucasus are buzzing with drones they use to probe one another’s defenses and spy on disputed territories. The region is also host to strategic oil and gas pipelines and a tangled web of alliances and precious resources that observers say threaten to quickly escalate the border skirmishes and airspace violations to a wider regional conflict triggered by Armenia and Azerbaijan that could potentially pull in Israel, Russia and Iran. To some extent, these countries are already being pulled towards conflict. Last September, Armenia shot down an Israeli-made Azerbaijani drone over Nagorno-Karabakh and the government claims that drones have been spotted ahead of recent incursions by Azerbaijani troops into Armenian-held territory. Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, said in a briefing that attacks this summer showed that Azerbaijan is eager to “play with its new toys” and its forces showed “impressive tactical and operational improvement.” The International Crisis Group warned that as the tit-for-tat incidents become more deadly, “there is a growing risk that the increasing frontline tensions could lead to an accidental war.” “Everyone is now saying that the war is coming. We know that it could start at any moment.” ~Grush Agbaryan, mayor of Voskepar With this in mind, the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have long imposed a non-binding arms embargo on both countries, and both are under a de facto arms ban from the United States. But, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), this has not stopped Israel and Russia from selling to them. After fighting a bloody war in the early 1990s over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been locked in a stalemate with an oft-violated ceasefire holding a tenuous peace between them. And drones are the latest addition to the battlefield. In March, Azerbaijan signed a $1.6 billion arms deal with Israel, which consisted largely of advanced drones and an air defense system. Through this and other deals, Azerbaijan is currently amassing a squadron of over 100 drones from all three of Israel’s top defense manufacturers. Armenia, meanwhile, employs only a small number of domestically produced models. Intelligence gathering is just one use for drones, which are also used to spot targets for artillery, and, if armed, strike targets themselves. Armenian and Azerbaijani forces routinely snipe and engage one another along the front, each typically blaming the other for violating the ceasefire. At least 60 people have been killed in ceasefire violations in the last two years, and the Brussels-based International Crisis Group claimed in a report published in February 2011 that the sporadic violence has claimed hundreds of lives. “Each (Armenia and Azerbaijan) is apparently using the clashes and the threat of a new war to pressure its opponent at the negotiations table, while also preparing for the possibility of a full-scale conflict in the event of a complete breakdown in the peace talks,” the report said. Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Institute in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, said that the arms buildup on both sides makes the situation more dangerous but also said that the clashes are calculated actions, with higher death tolls becoming a negotiating tactic. “This isn’t Somalia or Afghanistan. These aren’t independent units. The Armenian, Azerbaijani and Karabakh armed forces have a rigid chain of command so it’s not a question of a sergeant or a lieutenant randomly giving the order to open fire. These are absolutely synchronized political attacks,” Iskandaryan said. The deadliest recent uptick in violence along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the line of contact around Karabakh came in early June as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was on a visit to the region. While death tolls varied, at least two dozen soldiers were killed or wounded in a series of shootouts along the front. The year before, at least four Armenian soldiers were killed in an alleged border incursion by Azerbaijani troops one day after a peace summit between the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian presidents in St. Petersburg, Russia. “No one slept for two or three days [during the June skirmishes],” said Grush Agbaryan, the mayor of the border village of Voskepar for a total of 27 years off and on over the past three decades. “Everyone is now saying that the war is coming. We know that it could start at any moment." Azerbaijan refused to issue accreditation to GlobalPost’s correspondent to enter the country to report on the shootings and Azerbaijan’s military modernization. Flush with cash from energy exports, Azerbaijan has increased its annual defense budget from an estimated $160 million in 2003 to $3.6 billion in 2012. SIPRI said in a report that largely as a result of its blockbuster drone deal with Israel, Azerbaijan’s defense budget jumped 88 percent this year — the biggest military spending increase in the world. Israel has long used arms deals to gain strategic leverage over its rivals in the region. Although difficult to confirm, many security analysts believe Israel’s deals with Russia have played heavily into Moscow’s suspension of a series of contracts with Iran and Syria that would have provided them with more advanced air defense systems and fighter jets. Stephen Blank, a research professor at the United States Army War College, said that preventing arms supplies to Syria and Iran — particularly Russian S-300 air defense systems — has been among Israel’s top goals with the deals. “There’s always a quid pro quo,” Blank said. “Nobody sells arms just for cash.” In Azerbaijan in particular, Israel has traded its highly demanded drone technology for intelligence arrangements and covert footholds against Iran. In a January 2009 US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, a US diplomat reported that in a closed-door conversation, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev compared his country’s relationship with Israel to an iceberg — nine-tenths of it is below the surface. Although the Jewish state and Azerbaijan, a conservative Muslim country, may seem like an odd couple, the cable asserts, “Each country finds it easy to identify with the other’s geopolitical difficulties, and both rank Iran as an existential security threat.” Quarrels between Azerbaijan and Iran run the gamut of territorial, religious and geo-political disputes and Tehran has repeatedly threatened to “destroy” the country over its support for secular governance and NATO integration. In the end, “Israel’s main goal is to preserve Azerbaijan as an ally against Iran, a platform for reconnaissance of that country and as a market for military hardware,” the diplomatic cable reads. But, while these ties had indeed remained below the surface for most of the past decade, a series of leaks this year exposed the extent of their cooperation as Israel ramped up its covert war with the Islamic Republic. In February, the Times of London quoted a source the publication said was an active Mossad agent in Azerbaijan as saying the country was “ground zero for intelligence work.” This came amid accusations from Tehran that Azerbaijan had aided Israeli agents in assassinating an Iranian nuclear scientist in January. Then, just as Baku had begun to cool tensions with the Islamic Republic, Foreign Policy magazine published an article citing Washington intelligence officials who claimed that Israel had signed agreements to use Azerbaijani airfields as a part of a potential bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear sites. Baku strongly denied the claims, but in September, Azerbaijani officials and military sources told Reuters that the country would figure in Israel’s contingencies for a potential attack against Iran. "Israel has a problem in that if it is going to bomb Iran, its nuclear sites, it lacks refueling," Rasim Musabayov, a member of the Azerbiajani parliamentary foreign relations committee told Reuters. “I think their plan includes some use of Azerbaijan access. We have (bases) fully equipped with modern navigation, anti-aircraft defenses and personnel trained by Americans and if necessary they can be used without any preparations." He went on to say that the drones Israel sold to Azerbaijan allow it to “indirectly watch what's happening in Iran.” According to SIPRI, Azerbaijan had acquired about 30 drones from Israeli firms Aeronautics Ltd. and Elbit Systems by the end of 2011, including at least 25 medium-sized Hermes-450 and Aerostar drones. In October 2011, Azerbaijan signed a deal to license and domestically produce an additional 60 Aerostar and Orbiter 2M drones. Its most recent purchase from Israel Aeronautics Industries (IAI) in March reportedly included 10 high altitude Heron-TP drones — the most advanced Israeli drone in service — according to Oxford Analytica. Collectively, these purchases have netted Azerbaijan 50 or more drones that are similar in class, size and capabilities to American Predator and Reaper-type drones, which are the workhorses of the United States’ campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. Although Israel may have sold the drones to Azerbaijan with Iran in mind, Baku has said publicly that it intends to use its new hardware to retake territory it lost to Armenia. So far, Azerbaijan’s drone fleet is not armed, but industry experts say the models it employs could carry munitions and be programmed to strike targets. Drones are a tempting tool to use in frozen conflicts, because, while their presence raises tensions, international law remains vague at best on the legality of using them. In 2008, several Georgian drones were shot down over its rebel region of Abkhazia. A UN investigation found that at least one of the drones was downed by a fighter jet from Russia, which maintained a peacekeeping presence in the territory. While it was ruled that Russia violated the terms of the ceasefire by entering aircraft into the conflict zone, Georgia also violated the ceasefire for sending the drone on a “military operation” into the conflict zone. The incident spiked tensions between Russia and Georgia, both of which saw it as evidence the other was preparing to attack. Three months later, they fought a brief, but destructive war that killed hundreds. The legality of drones in Nagorno-Karabakh is even less clear because the conflict was stopped in 1994 by a simple ceasefire that halted hostilities but did not stipulate a withdrawal of military forces from the area. Furthermore, analysts believe that all-out war between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be longer and more difficult to contain than the five-day Russian-Georgian conflict. While Russia was able to quickly rout the Georgian army with a much superior force, analysts say that Armenia and Azerbaijan are much more evenly matched and therefore the conflict would be prolonged and costly in lives and resources. Blank said that renewed war would be “a very catastrophic event” with “a recipe for a very quick escalation to the international level.” Armenia is militarily allied with Russia and hosts a base of 5,000 Russian troops on its territory. After the summer’s border clashes, Russia announced it was stepping up its patrols of Armenian airspace by 20 percent. Iran also supports Armenia and has important business ties in the country, which analysts say Tehran uses as a “proxy” to circumvent international sanctions. Blank said Israel has made a risky move by supplying Azerbaijan with drones and other high tech equipment, given the tenuous balance of power between the heavily fortified Armenian positions and the more numerous and technologically superior Azerbaijani forces. If ignited, he said, “[an Armenian-Azerbaijani war] will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of.”

#### US precedent causes Turkey to strike PKK

Aaron Stein, Ph.D candidate at King’s College, London and the Nonproliferation Program Director at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies an independent think tank in Istanbul, “Turkey’s Negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Armed Drones” 2-26-2013, Turkey Wonk Blog

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently re-intiated peace talks with Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). Erdogan’s AKP, like Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party, has sought to address Turkey’s Kurdish Issue – or the Kurds’ Turkey Problem – by focusing on the two groups’ shared muslim identity, rather than the previous policy of forced ethnic assimilation. Erdogan has previously engaged the PKK in peace talks, however, these efforts were unsuccessful. During the previous round of negotiations, Erdogan opted to hold the talks in secret, rather than subject himself to the inevitable backlash from Turkish nationalists (An important AKP voting bloc by the way). The talks, despite having made some progress, broke down after President Abdullah Gul went public with the negotiations and the subsequent celebration at the Habur border gate in 2009 when Kurdish fighters returned from the PKK camps in Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkish territory. The AKP appeared to have been caught off guard and ill-prepared to deal with the imagery of thousands of Kurds welcoming home the PKK fighters as national heroes. The Turkish nationalist backlash, combined with the AKP’s political ambitions, led to the end of the talks and the re-militarization of the Kurdish issue. This time around, Erdogan has opted to publicize the talks, which has, in my opinion, placed the responsibility for success squarely on the shoulders of Abdullah Ocalan. Erdogan’s public statements, as well as the policies that his party is now pursuing are politically dangerous, though the powerful Prime Minister has a number of reasons to solve the Kurdish issue. Most importantly, the AKP has shown an off and on commitment to ending the Turkish – Kurdish conflict, which has claimed an estimated 40,000 lives since the current conflict began in 1984. Moreover, Erdogan, who has made no secret of his desire to move to an executive Presidency, has an incentive to engage and secure the support of the Kurdish BDP for his proposed constitution. In addition, Erdogan’s 2009 – 2012 alliance with Turkey’s ultra-nationalist MHP has alienated Turkish liberals, which, despite being less religious than the AKP, are keen on implementing European Union reforms and deepening the country’s democratic system (Both AKP campaign themes). Erdogan, I am assuming, is betting that if he solves the PKK problem, the majority of Turks, who continue to be wary of negotiating with what they consider to be a terrorist group akin to Al Qaeda, will eventually support his decision. This of course hinges on his kicking out the fighters from Turkish territory, so as to ensure a drop in violence, which would in turn give him the credibility to go before the wary Turkish electorate and claim that he has brought peace. This political path is fraught with potential pitfalls, as illustrated by the recent attack of BDP MPs in the nationalist strongholds of Sinop and Samsun (For an excellent overview of the recent attack, see this blog post by the excellent Frederike Geerdink). The AKP, however, receives a tremendous amount of political support from nationalists. The AKP, which faces little resistance from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), is far more concerned about the potential for its base to splinter, which would in turn lead to it loosing some votes to the MHP, the BDP, and the Islamist Saadet Party. The AKP, therefore, is seeking to balance the current PKK negotiations with its need to continue to engage and appeal to Turkish nationalists. It is an incredibly difficult policy to pursue and is likely the reason why Erdogan’s messaging has vacillated wildly between themes like re-instituting the death penalty and the need to open chapters for Turkey’s stalled European Union bid. However, because the AKP has shown an incredible ability to set Turkey’s political agenda – using coordinated leaks, trial balloons, and speeches, which are framed by overarching themes like justice and development (The translation of the AKP’s name) – I believe that the AKP is capable of keeping its coalition together and ending the conflict with the PKK. (The PKK also has a lot to with this, but that is the subject for another blog post.) However, as I explain in my current piece on Foreign Policy, Ankara has opted to follow Washington’s example of using drones for counter-terrorism missions. Turkey, as I explain in the piece, has developed a surveillance drone and is seeking to use the current platform to develop an armed version. While Ankara has been characteristically opaque about the drones’ development, it does not take a genius to figure out that the Turkish military hopes to use armed drones to shorten to “kill-chain” for targeted strikes against PKK operatives. However, Turkey has not publicized who makes the decisions about when to use deadly force, nor has it publicly explained the legal rationale for using armed drones to assassinate Turkish citizens without due process. (As an EU candidate country, one would assume Turkey would try and figure this out). Moreover, if the drone is used in the southeast to attack PKK militants, it is likely that some of those killed will be Turkish citizens. Given the trajectory of the cease fire talks, I see a disconnect between Erdogan’s intentions, the likely use of armed drones in the future, and the military establishment’s opaque drone policy. To be clear, I am not advocating that Ankara disarm or cease in its efforts to further develop its anti-terror capabilities. However, I do think it would be prudent for the Turkish government to publicize its drone policies, in order to build trust with the Kurdish minority. Moreover, Turkey should also seek to clarify the current legal structure that has been put in place for the killing of Turkish citizens. (If one does not exist, Ankara should start writing.) It would also be prudent for the Turkish government to explain whether or not it conducts signature strikes (I think it does, one need not look any further than the Uludere tragedy for confirmation). If Ankara presses ahead with its armed drone program (and it will), the government should seek to be more forthcoming with information about the program’s goals and its intended use. Otherwise, it risks undermining trust with the Kurdish minority and, should the two sides agree to a cease fire, could risk re-igniting the conflict. Moreover, the program, which is still in the design phase, provides Ankara with a political opportunity. On the one hand, Erodgan can tout the program as a symbol of Turkey’s strength – which would win him support from the nationalists. However, he could pair the rhetoric with a clear articulation of Turkey’s drone policy, which should include a clear legal framework for the strikes, in order to assuage Turkish liberals and Turkey’s Kurds. This would allow for him to continue to balance the two sides’ political demands and, from the perspective of AKP political operatives, help them grow their voter base.

#### Turkey intervention causes nuclear war

Michael T. Snyder, a graduate of the McIntire School of Commerce at the University of Virginia and has two law degrees from the University of Florida, 6-28-2011, “Could We Actually See A War Between Syria And Turkey?” endoftheamericandream.com/archives/could-we-actually-see-a-war-between-syria-and-turkey

In recent days, there have been persistent rumors that we could potentially be on the verge of a military conflict between Syria and Turkey. As impossible as such a thing may have seemed just a few months ago, it is now a very real possibility. Over the past several months, we have seen the same kind of "pro-democracy" protests erupt in Syria that we have seen in many of the other countries in the Middle East. The Syrian government has no intention of being toppled by a bunch of protesters and has cracked down on these gatherings harshly. There are reports in the mainstream media that say that over 1,300 people have been killed and more than 10,000 people have been arrested since the protests began. Just like with Libya, the United States and the EU are strongly condemning the actions that the Syrian government has taken to break up these protests. The violence in Syria has been particularly heavy in the northern sections of the country, and thousands upon thousands of refugees have poured across the border into neighboring Turkey. Syria has sent large numbers of troops to the border area to keep more citizens from escaping. Turkey has responded by reinforcing its own troops along the border. Tension between Turkey and Syria is now at an all-time high. So could we actually see a war between Syria and Turkey? A few months ago anyone who would have suggested such a thing would have been considered crazy. But the world is changing and the Middle East is a powder keg that is just waiting to explode. Since the Syrian government began cracking down on the protests, approximately 12,000 Syrians have flooded into Turkey. The Turkish government is deeply concerned that Syria may try to strike these refugees while they are inside Turkish territory. Troop levels are increasing on both sides of the border and tension is rising. One wrong move could set off a firestorm. The government of Turkey is demanding that Syrian military forces retreat from the border area. The government of Syria says that Turkey is just being used to promote the goals of the U.S. and the EU. Syria also seems to be concerned that Turkey may attempt to take control of a bit of territory over the border in order to provide a "buffer zone" for refugees coming from Syria. What makes things even more controversial is that the area where many of the Syrian refugees are encamped actually used to belong to Syria. In fact, many of the maps currently in use inside Syria still show that the area belongs to Syria. War between Syria and Turkey has almost happened before. Back in the 1990s, the fact that the government of Syria was strongly supporting the Kurds pushed the two nations dangerously close to a military conflict. Today, the border between Syria and Turkey is approximately 850 kilometers long. The military forces of both nations are massing along that border. One wrong move could set off a war. Right now, it almost sounds as though the U.S. government is preparing for a war to erupt in the region. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently stated that the situation along the border with Turkey is "very worrisome" and that we could see "an escalation of conflict in the area". Not only that, but when you study what Clinton and Obama have been saying about Syria it sounds very, very similar to what they were saying about Libya before the airstrikes began. In a recent editorial entitled "There Is No Going Back in Syria", Clinton wrote the following.... Finally, the answer to the most important question of all -- what does this mean for Syria's future? -- is increasingly clear: There is no going back. Syrians have recognized the violence as a sign of weakness from a regime that rules by coercion, not consent. They have overcome their fears and have shaken the foundations of this authoritarian system. Syria is headed toward a new political order -- and the Syrian people should be the ones to shape it. They should insist on accountability, but resist any temptation to exact revenge or reprisals that might split the country, and instead join together to build a democratic, peaceful and tolerant Syria. Considering the answers to all these questions, the United States chooses to stand with the Syrian people and their universal rights. We condemn the Assad regime's disregard for the will of its citizens and Iran's insidious interference. "There is no going back"? "Syria is headed toward a new political order"? It almost sounds like they are already planning the transitional government. The EU has been using some tough language as well. A recent EU summit in Brussels issued a statement that declared that the EU "condemns in the strongest possible terms the ongoing repression and unacceptable and shocking violence the Syrian regime continues to apply against its own citizens. By choosing a path of repression instead of fulfilling its own promises on broad reforms, the regime is calling its legitimacy into question. Those responsible for crimes and violence against civilians shall be held accountable." If you take the word "Syrian" out of that statement and replace it with the word "Libyan" it would sound exactly like what they were saying about Gadhafi just a few months ago. The EU has hit Syria with new economic sanctions and it is also calling on the UN Security Council to pass a resolution condemning the crackdown by the Syrian government. It seems clear that the U.S. and the EU want to see "regime change" happen in Syria. The important thing to keep in mind in all of this is that Turkey is a member of NATO. If anyone attacks Turkey, NATO has a duty to protect them. If Syria attacked Turkey or if it was made to appear that Syria had attacked Turkey, then NATO would have the justification it needs to go to war with Syria. If NATO goes to war with Syria, it is very doubtful that Iran would just sit by and watch it happen. Syria is a very close ally to Iran and the Iranian government would likely consider an attack on their neighbor to be a fundamental threat to their nation. In fact, there are already reports in the international media that Iran has warned Turkey that they better not allow NATO to use their airbases to attack Syria. So if it was NATO taking on Syria and Iran, who else in the Middle East would jump in? Would Russia and China sit by and do nothing while all of this was going on? Could a conflict in the Middle East be the thing that sets off World War III? Let's certainly hope not. More war in the Middle East would not be good for anyone. Unfortunately, tensions are rising to frightening levels throughout the region. Even if things between Syria and Turkey cool off, that doesn't mean that war won't break out some place else. Riots and protests continue to sweep across the Middle East and the entire region has been arming for war for decades. Eventually something or someone is going to snap. When it does, let us just hope that World War III does not erupt as a result.

## Midterms D/A

### Midterms – GOP Good

#### Republicans are throwing the game – setting the bar too high

Lara Brown, analyst for US news, 3-19-2014, “The Danger of Talking a Big Game”, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/lara-brown/2014/03/19/republicans-should-stop-talking-about-their-2014-midterm-advantage

On Tuesday, Republican National Committee Chairman Reince Priebus suggested that the “2014 midterm elections would have the force of a 'tsunami' in delivering GOP election victories across the country.” And on Monday, Rush Limbaugh not only repeated his February pronouncement of a large Republican midterm election “wave,” but also criticized Karl Rove for offering his party some cautionary notes on television and in print (“Don’t uncork the champagne.”). In short, ever since Republican lobbyist David Jolly bested former Democratic gubernatorial nominee Alex Sink in the special election for a House seat in Florida on March 11, Republicans have been echoing (when they should be denying) the media stories (here and here) arguing that that the GOP will dominate November’s elections. Maybe they think they will create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Maybe they think that they will intimidate the Democrats into surrendering the battleground? Maybe they think that this will help with their final recruiting push for Republican candidates? Whatever is it that they’re thinking, it’s not enough. In fact, if they want to win at the ballot box and win “big” with the mainstream media, then it’s strategically foolish. Republicans have forgotten two very simple and related maxims in practical politics: (1) keep your strategy under wraps, so as to keep your opponent guessing and (2) high media expectations will undermine the force of your achievements. As master Chinese strategist and philosopher Sun Tzu bluntly explained: All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Said another way, surprise has its benefits. By Republicans not just telegraphing, but virtually trumpeting their dominance and talking about which Senate races they’ll win and how they hope to spread the field, they’re giving the Democrats every opportunity to regroup and respond. More specifically, they’re providing the Democrats with a veritable treasure trove of fundraising material, television advertising copy, and get-out-the-vote messages. Because nothing works to raise money or turn out one’s base like fear. Fear of what the other side will do to them not if, but according to these Republican prophecies, when they win. The Democratic establishment has nearly eight months to strike fear into the hearts of their fellow partisans about a Republican-controlled Congress. It is precisely this fear, which may make Republicans not win. And given all the hype that we’ve heard thus far, were the Republicans to “only” net five Senate seats, missing the majority mark of six; suffer a single-digit loss, not a gain in the House; and give up a couple of governorships (e.g., Pennsylvania and Florida), then the mainstream media would consider the 2014 cycle not just another missed electoral opportunity, but a complete disaster. High expectations for Republicans could again banish them to the political desert.

#### New statutory restrictions trigger all your disad links but don’t affect the case

Greg Miller, chief national security correspondent for the Washington Post, 1-15-2014, “Lawmakers seek to stymie plan to shift control of drone campaign from CIA to Pentagon,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-seek-to-stymie-plan-to-shift-control-of-drone-campaign-from-cia-to-pentagon/2014/01/15/c0096b18-7e0e-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84\_story.html

Congress has moved to block President Obama’s plan to shift control of the U.S. drone campaign from the CIA to the Defense Department, inserting a secret provision in the massive government spending bill introduced this week that would preserve the spy agency’s role in lethal counterterrorism operations, U.S. officials said. The measure, included in a classified annex to the $1.1 trillion federal budget plan, would restrict the use of any funding to transfer unmanned aircraft or the authority to carry out drone strikes from the CIA to the Pentagon, officials said. The provision represents an unusually direct intervention by lawmakers into the way covert operations are run, impeding an administration plan aimed at returning the CIA’s focus to traditional intelligence gathering and possibly bringing more transparency to drone strikes. The move also reflects some lawmakers’ lingering doubts about the U.S. military’s ability to conduct strikes against al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates without hitting the wrong targets and killing civilians.

#### Even if it’s close – nothing gets done which means no impact

Jim Malone, analyst for Voice of America, 3-19-2014, “Obama’s Low Approval Hurting Democrats”, http://www.voanews.com/content/obamas-low-approval-hurting-democrats/1874619.html

Most experts now say the Democrats have a tough slog to try to retake the House. They would need a pickup of 17 seats in the 435-seat House and that is not looking very likely. The real battle remains the Senate where a gain of six Republican seats would give them a narrow majority in the Senate. Republican control of both the House and the Senate in the final two years of the Obama presidency would likely be a recipe for even tighter gridlock than we have seen in the past four years. Fortier says even if Republicans only come close to winning control of the Senate, the die may be cast for the remainder of the Obama presidency. “I think either way we are facing divided government for the rest of President Obama’s term and that means either a lot of conflict or an occasional issue where they can find some sort of compromise.”

#### Too early to predict the midterms – and the aff isn’t key to midterm races

Greg Sargent, political analyst at the Plum Line, 2-28-2014, “A note on the Senate map: How bad is it for Dems?,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/02/28/a-note-on-the-senate-map-how-bad-is-it-for-dems/

There are all kinds of unknowns that will influence which scenario above is most likely, such as the state of the economy and external events. To make things more unpredictable, there are all kinds of unknowns that will influence how things unfold in individual races within whichever larger scenario takes hold — factors like the candidates, their campaigns, and local issues. Bottom line: Dems are very much on defense, but that’s largely due to the fundamentals, which turn on the fact that the race will be decided in a core battleground made up of red states. A GOP takeover is very possible. But it’s way too early to say with any certainty how all of this will play out, because so much is in flux.

#### Public doesn’t care about war powers – laundry list of economic and social issues trump – polls

Michael Hirsh, writer at the National Journal, and James Oliphant, writer at the National Journal,

2-27-2014, “Obama Will Never End the War on Terror,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/obama-will-never-end-the-war-on-terror-20140227

Judging from the polls, a weary, inward-looking American public has long since stopped caring much about what used to be called the "war on terror," especially compared with issues like economic stagnation, or gay marriage, or immigration. What began as one horrific attack 13 years ago and a simple, 60-word Authorization for the Use of Military Force three days later has morphed all but unnoticed into a war with no name or parameters—against an enemy that the government will no longer even officially identify, on battlefields that didn't exist when the measure hurriedly passed Congress.

### Impact

#### No impact to Iran prolif

Christopher Layne, Professor of International Studies at the University of Miami. 2007. *American Empire: A Debate*. Pg. 79-80

The same architects of illusion who fulminated for war with Iraq now are agitating for war with Iran. If Iran gets nuclear weapons they say, three bad things could happen: it could trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; it might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region or to engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is improbable in the extreme. During the early 1960s, American policy-makers had similar fears that China’s acqui­sition of nuclear weapons would trigger a proliferation stampede, but these fears did not materialize—and a nuclear Iran will not touch off a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a nuclear power (as is Pakistan, another regional power). The other three states that might be tempted to go for a nuclear weapons capability are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. As MIT professor Barry Posen points out, however, each of these three states would be under strong pressure not do to 50.84 Egypt is particu­larly vulnerable to outside pressure to refrain from going nuclear because its shaky economy depends on foreign—especially U.S.—economic assistance. Saudi Arabia would find it hard to purchase nuclear weapons or material on the black market—which is closely watched by the United States—and, Posen notes, it would take the Saudis years to develop the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously. Turkey is constrained by its membership in NATO and its quest to be admitted to membership of the European Union. Notwithstanding the near-hysterical rhetoric of the Bush administration and the neoconservatives, Iran is not going to give nuclear weapons to terror­ists. This is not to say that Tehran has not abetted groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, or Hamas in the Palestinian Authority. Clearly, it has. However, there are good reasons that states—even those that have ties to terrorists—draw the line at giving them nuclear weapons (or other WMD): if the terrorists were to use these weapons against the United States or its allies, the weapons could be traced back to the donor state—which would be at risk of annihilation by an American retaliatory strike. Iran’s leaders have too much at stake to run this risk. Even if one believed the administration’s overheated rhetoric about the indifference of rogue state leaders about the fate of their populations, they do care very much about the survival of their regimes—which means that they can be deterred. For the same reason, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran with options to attack or intimidate its neighbors. Just as it did during the Cold War, the United States can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region—like Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Tur­key. American security guarantees not only will dissuade Iran from acting recklessly but will also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to build their own nuclear weapons. Given the overwhelming U.S. advantage in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities, Iran is not going to risk national suicide by challenging America’s security commitments in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran hardly is desirable, neither is it “intolerable,” because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the United States.

#### Israel won’t strike Iran—multiple reasons

Robert Dreyfuss, foreign affairs fellow at the Diplomat, 10-22-12 Why Israel Won’t Attack Iran http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/22/why-israel-wont-attack-iran/

What kind of coercion is it when the guy with the gun says: “Do this or I’ll shoot myself in the head?” Not much at all, unless you believe that Israel is hell bent on inflicting great pain on itself, as Seymour Hersh implied back in 1991, in The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Despite the fact that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and a panoply of American backers of Israel have ratcheted up their much-hyped threat to bomb Iran, doing so would explode in Israel’s face. Which is why it won’t happen. How so? For starters, by attacking Iran – even in the midst of a U.S. election campaign – Israel would run the risk of angering and alienating Washington, its main patron, in a manner likely to forever change the U.S.-Israeli relationship for the worse. Second, with nearly the entire Israeli national security establishment strongly opposed to striking Iran, Netanyahu and Barak would isolate themselves politically, collapse their own government, and perhaps propel a much more dovish coalition into power. Third, striking Iran would trigger devastating counterattacks from Tehran and its allies, including the well-armed Hezbollah movement in Lebanon, leading to hundreds if not thousands of Israel civilian casualties. Fourth, already isolated internationally, Israel would turn itself into a global pariah, a kind of rogue state blamed for the subsequent spike in oil prices, economic carnage, and military conflict in and around the Persian Gulf that could roil the region for a decade or more. Perhaps most important, nearly all military analysts, in Washington and in Israel itself, believe that even an all-out Israeli attack on Iran would not eliminate its ability to produce a nuclear weapon, Indeed, as Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated last week, “I think that it's a fair characterization to say that they could delay but not destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities.” Worse, as Israel knows, an attack would solidify the power of hawks in Iran’s government. Not to mention that Iran has no bomb, it isn’t likely to get one for a few years (even if that’s Iran’s intention), and it has no means of delivering a weapon – meaning that the dire threat that Israel says might require a unilateral strike doesn’t exist.

#### Failure of sanctions causes Israle strikes anyway

Jon Perr, B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University; technology marketing consultant based in Portland, Oregon, 12-24-2013, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” Daily Kos, [http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#](http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran)

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran. On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates: If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence. Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July: "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb." Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come." But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway. Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza. That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback? Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

## LET D/A

#### Deterrence solves Indo-Pak war – encourages mutual restraint

Sumit Ganguly, Professor of Political at Indiana University, Fall 2008, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security, Volume 33, Number 2, Muse

As the outcomes of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises show, nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Both crises were contained at levels considerably short of full-scale war. That said, as Paul Kapur has argued, Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may well have emboldened its leadership, secure in the belief that India had no good options to respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while containing the possibilities of conºict escalation, especially to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian military planners can fashion such a calibrated strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open question. This article’s analysis of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises does suggest, however, that nuclear deterrence in South Asia is far from parlous, contrary to what the critics have suggested. Three speciªc forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First, there is a serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably, Pakistan’s willingness to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two parallel developments that equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle in India’s internal affairs—particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that occurred was the end of the conºict with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use in a new jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous uprising within the state as a result of Indian political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized, trained, armed, and unleashed, it is far from clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions of every resulting jihadist organization.80 Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did multiply during the 1990s, it is difªcult to establish a ªrm causal connection between the growth of Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of a full-ºedged nuclear weapons capability. Second, India did respond with considerable force once its military planners realized the full scope and extent of the intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite the vigor of this response, India did exhibit restraint. For example, Indian pilots were under strict instructions not to cross the Line of Control in pursuit of their bombing objectives.81 They adhered to these guidelines even though they left them more vulnerable to Pakistani ground ªre.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident at another level. During the last war in Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its onset, the Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the regional capital, Lahore. The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not especially propitious for the country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s ªrst prime minister, had died in late 1964. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain stature and standing, and the Indian military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border war with the People’s Republic of China.83 Finally, because of its role in the ColdWar, the Pakistani military was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the F-104 Starªghter aircraft. India, on the other hand, had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a small number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian military remained concerned that China might open a second front along the Himalayan border. Such concerns were not entirely chimerical, because a Sino-Pakistani entente was under way. Despite these limitations, the Indian political leadership responded to Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the Indian military the necessary authority to expand the scope of the war. In marked contrast to the politico-military context of 1965, in 1999 India had a self-conªdent (if belligerent) political leadership and a substantially more powerful military apparatus. Moreover, the country had overcome most of its Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force to resolve disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India had at least two reserve strike corps in the Punjab in a state of military readiness and poised to attack across the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these signiªcant differences and advantages, the Indian political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope of the conºict to the Kargil region. As K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political commentator, wrote in 1993: The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble nuclear weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of India. In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its “Operation Gibraltar” and sent in inªltrators, India sent its army across the cease-ªre line to destroy the assembly points of the inªltrators. That escalated into a full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive inªltration of terrorists trained in Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send its army into Pakistanoccupied Kashmir. Subrahmanyam’s argument takes on additional signiªcance in light of the overt acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan.

#### Plan makes strikes sustainable

Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon fellow at the Center for Preventive Action at CFR, January 2013, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” CFR, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf

The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping. Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage, and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S. support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 percent to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S. drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gunships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forcing the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making significant investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships, conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allowing downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks on the ground that are critical for identifying targets. According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resistance— such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones— is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attacking Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place, political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region. To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.

#### Blowback outweighs the link

Hassan Abbas, senior advisor at Asia Society, 8-23-2013, “How Drones Create More Terrorists,” The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/how-drones-create-more-terrorists/278743/

Recently, strong evidence has begun to suggest that terrorists use drone strikes as a recruitment tool. Of course, the value of drones in the arena of intelligence-gathering and secret surveillance of foes (and even friends) is unmistakable. In warzones too, it can support ground operations in significant and even decisive ways. None of this is controversial, though the ones on the receiving end will certainly not like it. What is debatable is its use as a counter-terrorism instrument in theaters that are not declared war zones, or in cases where a sovereign state is not fully and publicly on board with this policy. Lack of transparency in regulations that govern this new type of warfare, the unverifiable nature of targets, and questions over the credibility of intelligence only complicates the matter. Mark Bowden's important contribution to the drone debate raises critical questions that policy makers will be wise to consider for the future use of this new tool of war. One of the important arguments mentioned in the piece revolves around the notion that drone strikes might be less provocative than ground assaults for terrorists, meaning that standard warfare might create more terrorists than drones do. Let’s first accept what is obvious: more civilians are killed in standard warfare, and the history of warfare in the 20th century sufficiently proves the point. When it comes to drones strikes, the ratio of civilian deaths is certainly lower, but the issue is not about the number of civilian casualties alone. The inherently secret nature of the weapon creates a persistent feeling of fear in the areas where drones hover in the sky, and the hopelessness of communities that are on the receiving end of strikes causes severe backlash -- both in terms of anti-U.S. opinion and violence. Response to drone strikes comes in many varieties. First, revenge is targeted at those within the easy range of the insurgents and militants. The victims of those revenge terrorist attacks also consider the drone strikes responsible for all the mayhem. Consequently, terrorists and ordinary people are drawn closer to each other out of sympathy, whereas a critical function of any successful counter-terrorism policy is to win over public confidence so that they join in the campaign against the perpetrators of terror. Poor public awareness -- which is often a function of inadequate education -- about terrorist organizations indeed plays a role in building this perspective. Public outrage against drone strikes circuitously empowers terrorists. It allows them space to survive, move around, and maneuver. Pakistan is a perfect example of this phenomenon. Many in Pakistan now believe that drone strikes tend to motivate Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban to conduct terrorist attacks that target Pakistan's security forces as well as civilians. The duplicity of Pakistan's political and military elite in giving a green light to the U.S. drone policy proved to be counterproductive. The sponsors and supporters of drone strikes in U.S. policy circles apparently ignored the wider socio-political impact and indirect costs when evaluating its efficacy. Supporters of drone strikes are only grudgingly acknowledging now that affiliates of Al-Qaeda are alive and kicking in various parts of the world, even though its founder is dead and its top layer of leadership is disabled and dysfunctional. Drone strikes that specifically target hardcore terrorists can work effectively provided they are supported by a parallel public relations endeavor that challenges the ideas projected by those terrorists. Terrorists and their misguided sympathizers often expose and market civilian casualties -- particularly women and children -- quite effectively. Meanwhile, those who direct and authorize these strikes rarely provide any justification and rationale for it. This is simply seen as arrogance by those whom the U.S. expects to be on their side in this battle. The crux of my viewpoint is that drone attacks cannot be compared to "boots on ground" operations. They are two different methods of battling enemies. Wars are mainly about national interests -- resources, territory, the balance of power, and religion. Drone strikes directed at terrorists perform a comparable but different role. In battling terrorism, physical elimination of the enemy matters but is not decisive. Hitting at the mindset of the terrorist and discrediting the ideas that generate terrorism is the big prize. A law enforcement action that flows out of a "rule of law" paradigm, involving meticulous investigations and prosecution in courts, is likely to be far more damaging for the ideas that terrorists stand for. Limited and internationally regulated use of drones targeting the most wanted terrorists can be a part of this comprehensive approach -- it may take longer to deliver, but it will be more sustainable and the results will be more durable.

#### No immediate threats

Harold Brown, fmr US Secretary of Defense and trustee emeritus of the RAND Corporation and trustee of CSIS, 5-14-2013, “Drones Are Useful, but Not the Solution or the Problem,” RAND, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2013/05/14/TH.html

The effectiveness of our attacks, particularly by drones, has already decimated the al Qaeda hierarchy. That achievement, together with the negative effect on Muslim publics of drone attacks, suggests that the rate of their usage could be moderated. We could redirect some of our analytical and material resources toward pre-empting what is likely to be a rise in domestic terrorist actions inspired by the Boston Marathon bombing. As the U.S. reduces its activities in Afghanistan to an advisory role, elements in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the Taliban, will continue to contend for power. It is worth seeking an agreement among the major powers with interests there (Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Iran the U.S.) and with the Afghan factions including the Taliban, to end or at least tamp down the conflict. That probably will not succeed. Therefore, the U.S. will need to depend on action from a distance, largely using drones, to attack al Qaeda in Afghanistan and in Pakistan when those governments are unable or unwilling to suppress terrorists. The senior leadership of al Qaeda has been badly damaged by the U.S. campaign against it, but dispersed lower-level elements remain and could be proliferating. Dealing with them will require a different mix of capabilities and tactics. Without minimizing the threat of more terrorist action against the U.S., either from domestic groups or those based abroad, it is important to remember that they are not existential threats.

# 1AR

## Midterms

### AT: MPX – Iran

#### Iran won’t cause a Mideast arms race

Kenneth Waltz, Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, 6-17-2012, “Iranian Nukes? No Worries” http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/story/2012-06-17/iran-nuclear-bomb-israel-proliferation/55654248/1

Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear Iran should now.

#### Economic ties restrain Iranian aggression

Alireza Nader, Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, 5-28-2013, “Think Again: A Nuclear Iran” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/28/think\_again\_a\_nuclear\_iran?page=full

"Nuclear weapons would embolden Iran" Not quite. A common fear of a nuclear Iran is not that it would use nukes directly against rivals such as Saudi Arabia, but that it would become more aggressive in undermining conservative Arab regimes. A nuclear-armed Iran, for example, might feel more secure in impeding shipping through the Strait of Hormuz or stoking unrest in the Persian Gulf. In reality, however, a nuclear bomb would not be of much use to Iranian efforts to spread its influence across the Middle East. The Saudis and their allies, including the Sunni-dominated Bahraini regime, often claim that Iran uses minority Shia populations as a fifth column to further its own ambitions. It is true that Iran has supported Shia seditionists in the past -- Tehran was tied to a 1981 attempt by Shia groups to overthrow the Bahraini monarchy -- but today, its influence is rather limited. The Shia-led revolt in Bahrain is not being directed from Tehran, but is the result of the Bahraini government's repression of its own population. Saudi fears of Iranian machinations should not obscure the real reasons for instability in some Gulf Arab states. Many Arabs now realize that the Islamic Republic is not so different than their own repressive regimes, especially after having witnessed Tehran's brutal reaction to the 2009 post-election protests. Iran's continued support of the violent Syrian regime has also undermined its position in the region. Moreover, most Gulf Shia do not appear to be devoted followers of Ayatollah Khamenei, but instead follow other religious leaders, such as Iraq's Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Tehran's possession of nuclear weapons is unlikely to increase its influence with them. A nuclear-armed Iran would still be economically dependent on the Gulf Arab states in any case. Saudi Arabia is the most powerful player in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whereas Iran's position has declined in recent years. Riyadh's increased energy exports to Iran's traditional customers, mostly Asian countries, have allowed the United States to impose sanctions on Iran without a dramatic rise in oil prices. Iran also depends heavily on the United Arab Emirates -- despite sanctions, the emirate of Dubai serves as Iran's economic gateway to the outside world. A nuclear Iran would still have to consider its economic health: Meddling with shipping in the Strait of Hormuz could damage its interests more so than those of its neighbors. The Islamic Republic might not give up its opposition to the Gulf Arab states any time soon, but its ability to undermine the regional order is quite limited -- and will remain so, even if it obtains nuclear weapons.

### 2AC

#### New statutory restrictions trigger all your disad links but don’t affect the case

Greg Miller, chief national security correspondent for the Washington Post, 1-15-2014, “Lawmakers seek to stymie plan to shift control of drone campaign from CIA to Pentagon,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-seek-to-stymie-plan-to-shift-control-of-drone-campaign-from-cia-to-pentagon/2014/01/15/c0096b18-7e0e-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84\_story.html

Congress has moved to block President Obama’s plan to shift control of the U.S. drone campaign from the CIA to the Defense Department, inserting a secret provision in the massive government spending bill introduced this week that would preserve the spy agency’s role in lethal counterterrorism operations, U.S. officials said. The measure, included in a classified annex to the $1.1 trillion federal budget plan, would restrict the use of any funding to transfer unmanned aircraft or the authority to carry out drone strikes from the CIA to the Pentagon, officials said. The provision represents an unusually direct intervention by lawmakers into the way covert operations are run, impeding an administration plan aimed at returning the CIA’s focus to traditional intelligence gathering and possibly bringing more transparency to drone strikes. The move also reflects some lawmakers’ lingering doubts about the U.S. military’s ability to conduct strikes against al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates without hitting the wrong targets and killing civilians.

#### Even if it’s close – nothing gets done which means no impact

Jim Malone, analyst for Voice of America, 3-19-2014, “Obama’s Low Approval Hurting Democrats”, http://www.voanews.com/content/obamas-low-approval-hurting-democrats/1874619.html

Most experts now say the Democrats have a tough slog to try to retake the House. They would need a pickup of 17 seats in the 435-seat House and that is not looking very likely. The real battle remains the Senate where a gain of six Republican seats would give them a narrow majority in the Senate. Republican control of both the House and the Senate in the final two years of the Obama presidency would likely be a recipe for even tighter gridlock than we have seen in the past four years. Fortier says even if Republicans only come close to winning control of the Senate, the die may be cast for the remainder of the Obama presidency. “I think either way we are facing divided government for the rest of President Obama’s term and that means either a lot of conflict or an occasional issue where they can find some sort of compromise.”

#### Too early to predict the midterms – and the aff isn’t key to midterm races

Greg Sargent, political analyst at the Plum Line, 2-28-2014, “A note on the Senate map: How bad is it for Dems?,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/02/28/a-note-on-the-senate-map-how-bad-is-it-for-dems/

There are all kinds of unknowns that will influence which scenario above is most likely, such as the state of the economy and external events. To make things more unpredictable, there are all kinds of unknowns that will influence how things unfold in individual races within whichever larger scenario takes hold — factors like the candidates, their campaigns, and local issues. Bottom line: Dems are very much on defense, but that’s largely due to the fundamentals, which turn on the fact that the race will be decided in a core battleground made up of red states. A GOP takeover is very possible. But it’s way too early to say with any certainty how all of this will play out, because so much is in flux.

#### Public doesn’t care about war powers – laundry list of economic and social issues trump – polls

Michael Hirsh, writer at the National Journal, and James Oliphant, writer at the National Journal,

2-27-2014, “Obama Will Never End the War on Terror,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/obama-will-never-end-the-war-on-terror-20140227

Judging from the polls, a weary, inward-looking American public has long since stopped caring much about what used to be called the "war on terror," especially compared with issues like economic stagnation, or gay marriage, or immigration. What began as one horrific attack 13 years ago and a simple, 60-word Authorization for the Use of Military Force three days later has morphed all but unnoticed into a war with no name or parameters—against an enemy that the government will no longer even officially identify, on battlefields that didn't exist when the measure hurriedly passed Congress.

### Veto – AT: Fil

#### Six to eight – at: filibuster – Obama vetoes – takes 67 to override – GOP can’t get that

Trende 3/11

Sean, Senior Elections Analyst for RealClear Politics, “Another Look at Dems' Chances of Losing the Senate”, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2014/03/11/another\_look\_at\_dems\_chances\_of\_losing\_the\_senate.html

Applying the model to 2014, here are the probabilities for Democrats winning each individual seat at various job approval ratings.¶ For a summation of the results, see the following table:¶ Given the “bonus” that Democrats receive for potential Tea Party upsets and incumbent advantages, its unsurprising that they fare a bit better in each “bracket” than they did in the earlier iteration of this model. Again, even this may be a touch too generous to Republicans, given the strength of incumbents like Warner and (possibly) Jeanne Shaheen.¶ But because we’ve also downgraded Obama’s chances of scoring an unusually high job approval by using only data from his second term, the overall probabilities using randomized job approval scores look a lot like they did before: Republicans win the Senate about 80 percent of the time, they gain seven-to-nine seats about 45 percent of the time, more than that 25 percent of the time, and less than that 30 percent of the time:¶ Why is this different from outcomes predicted by other modelers, such as Alan Abramowitz and John Sides/Eric McGhee? Part of it is that the predicted outcomes really aren’t that different. Abramowitz’s most likely outcome is a GOP pickup of six, while this model’s most likely outcome is a pickup of eight. This has great substantive importance, but in statistical terms, the findings are well within the confidence intervals of the various models.¶ These other models also take a much broader swath, putting results from back to the 1950s into their data set. One of the assumptions behind this model is that something has substantially changed in the past few cycles as we’ve become increasingly polarized. Red states don’t vote for blue senators except in exceptional circumstances, and vice versa. There’s some support for this in the Sides/McGhee models; if they base their predictions off of findings from 1980 to the present, instead of from 1952 to the present, they find that Tom Cotton’s chances of winning in Arkansas skyrocket.¶ At the end of the day, it’s important to remember that these models are largely heuristic devices, especially this far out. There’s also still a lot we don’t know: While the model predicts 2006 quite well when you know who the “problem” senators will be and that Bush’s job approval will be at 39 percent on Election Day, it suggests that Republicans are likely to lose only three Senate seats when you randomize his job approval and don’t yet know that Burns or Allen will be badly damaged incumbents on Election Day.¶ But here’s the important thing: All the modelers seem to agree that the Democrats’ Senate majority is in real trouble, and that they may even be underdogs in their quest to keep it. The current polling certainly bears out this view, with Democrats behind in seven seats, below 45 percent in three seats, and below 50 percent in another three. Of course, there is still a lot of football to be played: The president’s job approval could improve, or the GOP could implode in the primaries. But for right now, it doesn’t look like that will be enough.