## 1AC

### Plan

#### Plan: The United States Federal Government should restrict targets of targeted killing operations using pilotless aircraft units outside declared zones of conflict to individuals identified as leaders of transnational organizations with direct involvement in past or ongoing violent operations against the United States.

### Norms

#### Drone tech spread inevitable – setting clear limits now is key to establishing controlled norms

Daniel Byman, Professor in Security Studies Program at Georgetown and Senior Fellow at Brookings, July-August 2013, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, vol 92 no 4

The fact remains that by using drones so much, Washington risks setting a troublesome precedent with regard to extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings. Zeke Johnson of Amnesty International contends that "when the U.S. government violates international law, that sets a precedent and provides an excuse for the rest of the world to do the same." And it is alarming to think what leaders such as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who has used deadly force against peaceful pro-democracy demonstrators he has deemed terrorists, would do with drones of their own. Similarly, Iran could mockingly cite the U.S. precedent to justify sending drones after rebels in Syria. Even Brennan has conceded that the administration is "establishing precedents that other nations may follow." Controlling the spread of drone technology will prove impossible; that horse left the barn years ago. Drones are highly capable weapons that are easy to produce, and so there is no chance that Washington can stop other militaries from acquiring and using them. Nearly 90 other countries already have surveillance drones in their arsenals, and China is producing several inexpensive models for export. Armed drones are more difficult to produce and deploy, but they, too, will likely spread rapidly. Beijing even recently announced (although later denied) that it had considered sending a drone to Myanmar (also called Burma) to kill a wanted drug trafficker hiding there. The spread of drones cannot be stopped, but the United States can still influence how they are used. The coming proliferation means that Washington needs to set forth a clear policy now on extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings of terrorists -- and stick to it. Fortunately, Obama has begun to discuss what constitutes a legitimate drone strike. But the definition remains murky, and this murkiness will undermine the president's ability to denounce other countries' behavior should they start using drones or other means to hunt down enemies. By keeping its policy secret, Washington also makes it easier for critics to claim that the United States is wantonly slaughtering innocents. More transparency would make it harder for countries such as Pakistan to make outlandish claims about what the United States is doing. Drones actually protect many Pakistanis, and Washington should emphasize this fact. By being more open, the administration could also show that it carefully considers the law and the risks to civilians before ordering a strike.

#### The plan buys us time – squo accelerates drone prolif

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf

The emergence of this arms race for drones raises at least five long-term strategic consequences, not all of which are favourable to the United States over the long term. First, it is now obvious that other states will use drones in ways that are inconsistent with US interests. One reason why the US has been so keen to use drone technology in Pakistan and Yemen is that at present it retains a substantial advantage in high-quality attack drones. Many of the other states now capable of employing drones of near-equivalent technology—for example, the UK and Israel—are considered allies. But this situation is quickly changing as other leading geopolitical players, such as Russia and China, are beginning rapidly to develop and deploy drones for their own purposes. While its own technology still lags behind that of the US, Russia has spent huge sums on purchasing drones and has recently sought to buy the Israeli-made Eitan drone capable of surveillance and firing air-to-surface missiles. 132 China has begun to develop UAVs for reconnais - sance and combat and has several new drones capable of long-range surveillance and attack under development. 133 China is also planning to use unmanned surveil - lance drones to allow it to monitor the disputed East China Sea Islands, which are currently under dispute with Japan and Taiwan. 134 Both Russia and China will pursue this technology and develop their own drone suppliers which will sell to the highest bidder, presumably with fewer export controls than those imposed by the US Congress. Once both governments have equivalent or near-equivalent levels of drone technology to the United States, they will be similarly tempted to use it for surveillance or attack in the way the US has done. Thus, through its own over-reliance on drones in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, the US may be hastening the arrival of a world where its qualitative advantages in drone technology are eclipsed and where this technology will be used and sold by rival Great Powers whose interests do not mirror its own.

#### Drone-induced tensions in Asia creates multiple scenarios for Asian war – draws in the US

Bill Gertz, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, national security reporter, 3-26-2013, “Game of Drones,” Washington Free Beacon, http://freebeacon.com/game-of-drones/

China’s military is expanding its unmanned aerial vehicle forces with a new Predator-like armed drone and a new unmanned combat aircraft amid growing tensions with neighbors in Asia, according to U.S. intelligence officials. New unarmed drone deployments include the recent stationing of reconnaissance and ocean surveillance drones in Northeast Asia near Japan and the Senkaku islands and along China’s southern coast. Drones also are planned for the South China Sea where China has been encroaching on international waters and bullying nations of that region in asserting control over international waters, said officials familiar with intelligence reports. “Unmanned aerial vehicles are emerging as critical enablers for PLA long range precision strike operations,” said Mark Stokes, a former military intelligence official now with the Project 2049 Institute. “A general operational PLA requirement appears to be persistent surveillance of fixed and moving targets out to 3,000 kilometers of Chinese shores.” Japan, meanwhile, is developing and purchasing military drone capabilities to counter what it regards as Chinese aggression and Beijing’s growing military capabilities as Tokyo’s dispute with China over the Senkaku islands intensifies, the officials said. After Chinese aircraft intruded into Japanese airspace over the Senkakus undetected late last year, Tokyo stepped up efforts to seek drone capabilities. The efforts include building an indigenous missile-tracking drone and high-altitude U.S. drones. So far, unlike Beijing, Tokyo asserts its drone will be unarmed, the officials said. “China has started deploying UAVs for reconnaissance and oceanic surveillance purposes in the vicinity of disputed maritime territories, such as the Senkaku Islands,” said one military source. Of particular concern to U.S. intelligence agencies are two new missile-equipped drones known as the CH-4 and Yi Long. The aircraft were shown off along with six other military drones at a major Chinese arms show last November in Zhuhai. Photos of the drones reveal the designs appear to be copied from the U.S. Predator armed drone that has been leading the Obama administration’s war on al Qaeda in Pakistan and elsewhere. Photos of the CH-4 show it armed with Blue Arrow-7 anti-tank missiles that appear similar in size to the U.S. Hellfire fired from Predators. Even more of a concern, according to the officials, are intelligence reports from Asia indicating that China is well along in building a large stealth unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV)—an upiloted jet—that was revealed recently in an online Chinese military video. The drone combat jet is nearly identical in shape to the experimental batwing-shaped U.S. Air Force X-47B currently under development. The X-47B was tested on an aircraft carrier in December. The Chinese UCAV is expected to have enough range to reach the U.S. island of Guam, some 1,800 miles from the Chinese coast and the hub of the Pentagon’s shift to Asia, officials said. Video and photos of the Chinese UCAV were posted on Chinese military enthusiast Internet sites recently. Also, a model of the drone combat jet was on display at Zhuhai. The aircraft is being built by the China Shenyang Aerospace Institute and could be deployed on China’s new aircraft carrier, officials said. Richard Fisher, a China military analyst with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the first prototype flying wing UCAV was completed at China’s Hongdu Aircraft Corp in mid-December. The drone weighs 10 to 14 tons and could be carrier based. “This means that the U.S. attempt to ‘outrange’ an emergent PLA anti-access systems, like the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, could soon be outflanked by a new PLA carrier-based UCAV,” Fisher said. Japan, alarmed at fierce Chinese reaction to its efforts to solve the Senkakus dispute by nationalizing several of the uninhabited but oil-rich islands last year, is bolstering its military forces with both missile-detecting and maritime surveillance with drones. Japanese Defense Ministry officials, quoted in press reports, have called the purchase of several long-range U.S. Global Hawk surveillance drones an urgent priority. Tokyo is seeking up to three Global Hawks by 2015 but could speed up purchases in response to what it regards as growing Chinese aggressiveness toward Japan over the Senkakus. The U.S. military currently has Global Hawks deployed at Guam. The Japanese do not plan to develop armed drones and plan to limit initial purchases to the Global Hawk, which fly nearly 60,000 feet for extended missions. It is able to track vessels using sensors and radar. Japan also is developing an unmanned drone aircraft that will be used to detect North Korean nuclear missile attacks and to counter the Chinese military buildup, the officials said. The anti-missile drone program is being developed over the next four years with the first drone deployed by 2020. It will use infrared sensors designed to detect missiles shortly after launch. China’s drone program is believed to have benefitted from its aggressive economic and cyber espionage operations against the United States. Those efforts have included breaking into both government and defense industry networks and stealing valuable drone technology. Officials also said China’s drone program is receiving a boost from an unlikely source: Taiwan. The largest Chinese drone production center is being built at Wuhan in Hubei province, site of a joint construction project by China’s Wuhan Visiontek Inc. and Taiwan’s Carbon-Based Technology, Inc. Officials said China launched a crash program to develop military drones beginning around 2007. Beijing is planning a range of unmanned aircraft capabilities, including high-altitude, long-endurance drones, integrated air and sea warfare drones, sea-based drones and UCAVs. More than 60 drones were on display in Beijing last June, including a drone helicopter, and a drone with simulated birds’ wings. Additionally, officials have said drone bases are being set up in the South China Sea to monitor Scarborough reef, which is claimed by Philippines and China; Macclesfield Bank; the Paracel Islands; and the Spratly Islands. China also is using drone to monitor the Socotra Reef claimed by South Korea. A report made public March 11 by the Project 2049 Institute on Chinese drones estimated that China has more than 280 military drones. “The PLA has developed one of the largest and most organizationally complex UAV programs in the world,” the report stated. For the immediate future, the Chinese drones are monitoring disputed maritime and land boundaries that are likely to “increase tensions” since other states in the region lack the same capabilities. “Like any new capability, UAVs may encourage the inexperienced to overreach and engage in risk taking,” the report said. “There could be a sense that because human pilot lives are not at stake, operators can push farther than they otherwise might.” An isolated UAV attack during a crisis also could lead to a major conflict. “In the future, PRC decision-makers might feel compelled to order ‘plausibly deniable’ UAV attacks as a means of sending a political signal only to inadvertently wind up escalating tensions,” the report said. Over the long term, Chinese drones will support the expansion of Chinese military operational areas by pushing the ability to hit targets further into the western Pacific. The report said China likely will use its UAV force for targeting and guidance of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile designed to strike U.S. aircraft carriers more than a thousand miles from China’s coast. “While the potential for a large scale conflict in the region currently appears low, the lack of adequate preparation for worst case scenarios could encourage and invite adventurous adversary behavior, ultimately increasing risks to peace and stability,” the report stated. U.S. intelligence agencies reported earlier this month that China plans to build 11 drone bases along its coastline by 2015, with each base deploying at least one unmanned aircraft. The People’s Liberation Army currently has two drone bases in northeast Liaoning province. A third base was disclosed further south at Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province, also on the Bohai Sea. The bases were announced in August by the State Oceanic Administration, which has been used as a proxy by the Chinese military to lay claim to international waters and islands as part of a strategy of pushing Chinese maritime control hundreds and eventually thousands of miles from the coast through what Beijing calls its two Asian island chain strategy. The island chains stretch from Northeast Asia through Southeast Asia. The two bases in the Bohai Sea are located at Yingkou and Dalian to provide surveillance of the Bohai and Yellow Seas. China called U.S. aircraft carrier exercises held in the Yellow Sea three years ago “a threat to China” even though the carrier maneuvers were carried out in international waters. The maritime surveillance drones provide high-definition remote imagery and will be used by China to respond to emergencies in the region and also to identify what China claims are illegal resource extraction from undersea gas and oil deposits. U.S. officials regard recent highlighting of attack drones as a sign that Beijing remains intent on taking control of the Senkakus. The increased use of drones by both China and Japan is expected to increase tensions over the Senkakus, the officials said. According to Fisher, China is also exporting two of its armed drones, the Yi Long and CH-3, to the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. The UAE government purchased the Yi Long, and a smaller CH-3 was sold to Pakistan and repackaged by Islamabad as the Shahpar. Fisher said he is concerned China will sell the new and larger CH-4 to Iran. “Because it is not connected to the Aviation Industries Corporation (AVIC) which wants to do business in the United States, the CH-4 stands a better chance of being sold to Iran,” he told the Free Beacon. “China’s willingness to sell UCAV technology to terrorist-linked states means that terrorists may soon have another deadly tool with which to attack the United States.”

#### High risk

Richard Parker, a journalist, 5-12-2013, “Pilotless Planes, Pacific Tensions,” NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/opinion/drones-and-the-rivalry-between-the-us-and-china.html

THIS week the Navy will launch an entirely autonomous combat drone — without a pilot on a joystick anywhere — off the deck of an aircraft carrier, the George H. W. Bush. The drone will then try to land aboard the same ship, a feat only a relatively few human pilots in the world can accomplish. This exercise is the beginning of a new chapter in military history: autonomous drone warfare. But it is also an ominous turn in a potentially dangerous military rivalry now building between the United States and China. The X-47B, a stealth plane nicknamed “the Robot” by Navy crews, is a big bird — 38 feet long, with a 62-foot wingspan — that flies at high subsonic speeds with a range of over 2,000 miles. But it is the technology inside the Robot that makes it a game-changer in East Asia. Its entirely computerized takeoff, flight and landing raise the possibility of dozens or hundreds of its successors engaged in combat at once. It is also capable of withstanding radiation levels that would kill a human pilot and destroy a regular jet’s electronics: in addition to conventional bombs, successors to this test plane could be equipped to carry a high-power microwave, a device that emits a burst of radiation that would fry a tech-savvy enemy’s power grids, knocking out everything connected to it, including computer networks that connect satellites, ships and precision-guided missiles. And these, of course, are among the key things China has invested in during its crash-course military modernization. While the United States Navy is launching an autonomous drone, the Chinese Navy is playing catch-up with piloted carrier flight. Last November the Chinese Navy landed a J-15 jet fighter on the deck of the Liaoning aircraft carrier, the country’s first carrier landing. Though China still has miles to go in developing a carrier fleet to rival America’s, the landing demonstrates its ambitions. With nearly half a million sailors and fast approaching 1,000 vessels, its navy is by some measures already the second largest in the world. With that new navy, Beijing seeks to project its power over a series of island chains far into the Pacific: the first extends southward from the Korean Peninsula, down the eastern shore of Taiwan, encircling the South China Sea, while the second runs southeast from Japan to the Bonin and Marshall Islands, encompassing both the Northern Mariana Islands, a United States territory, and Guam — the key American base in the western Pacific. Some unofficial Chinese military literature even refers to a third chain: the Hawaiian Islands. To project this kind of power, China must rely not only on the quantity of its ships but also on the quality of its technology. Keeping the Americans half an ocean away requires the capability for long-range precision strikes — which, in turn, require the satellite reconnaissance, cyber warfare, encrypted communications and computer networks in which China has invested nearly $100 billion over the last decade. Ideally for both countries, China’s efforts would create a new balance of power in the region. But to offset China’s numerical advantage and technological advances, the United States Navy is betting heavily on drones — not just the X-47B and its successors, but anti-submarine reconnaissance drones, long-range communications drones, even underwater drones. A single hunter-killer pairing of a Triton reconnaissance drone and a P-8A Poseidon piloted anti-submarine plane can sweep 2.7 million square miles of ocean in a single mission. The arms race between the world’s largest navies undermines the likelihood of attaining a new balance of power, and raise the possibility of unintended collisions as the United States deploys hundreds, even thousands of drones and China scrambles for ways to counter the new challenge. And drones, because they are cheap and don’t need a human pilot, lower the bar for aggressive behavior on the part of America’s military leaders — as they will for China’s navy, as soon as it makes its own inevitable foray into drone capabilities (indeed, there were reports last week that China was preparing its own stealth drone for flight tests). By themselves, naval rivalries do not start wars. During peacetime, in fact, naval operations are a form of diplomacy, which provide rivals with healthy displays of force that serve as deterrents to war. But they have to be enveloped in larger political relationships, too. At present, the United States-China relationship is really just about economics. As long as that relationship remains vibrant, confrontation is in neither country’s interest. But should that slender reed snap, there is little in the way of a larger political relationship, let alone alliance, to take its place. The only thing between crisis and conflict, then, would be two ever larger, more dangerous navies, prepared to fight a breed of drone-centric war we don’t yet fully understand, and so are all the more likely to fall into.

#### That results in extinction

Straits Times (Singapore), June 25, 2000, No one gains in war over Taiwan

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable.Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.

#### Unrestricted drone spread guarantees global retaliatory war

Eric Posner, professor at University of Chicago Law School, 5-17-2013, “The drone paradox; When robots eliminate the risk of casualties, wars are likely to become more common,” National Post, ln

Similarly, we may be comfortable with giving the president authority to use military force on his own when he must put soldiers into harm's way, knowing that he will not risk lives lightly. Presidents have learned through hard experience that the public will not tolerate even a handful of casualties if it does not believe that the mission is justified. But when drones eliminate the risk of casualties, the president is more likely to launch wars too often. The same problem arises internationally. The international laws that predate drones assume that military intervention across borders risks significant casualties. Since that check normally kept the peace, international law could give a lot of leeway for using military force to chase down terrorists. But if the risk of casualties disappears, then nations might too eagerly attack, resulting in blowback and retaliation. Ironically, the reduced threat to civilians in tactical operations could wind up destabilizing relationships between countries, including even major powers like the United States and China, making the long-term threat to human life much greater. These three scenarios illustrate the same lesson: that law and technology work in tandem. When technological barriers limit the risk of government abuse, legal restrictions on governmental action can be looser. When those technological barriers fall, legal restrictions may need to be tightened. These anxieties generate some standard meta-arguments that are now little more than incantations -that the president should consult with Congress more, or should use clearer standards when targeting enemies, or should be less secretive. The generic criticisms overlook basic practical hurdles. Secrecy is necessary to gather intelligence. Standards for targeting enemies will always be fuzzy because it's difficult to anticipate the shape of future threats. (The much-criticized DOJ rules for drones are hardly less clear than the rules governing ordinary police work.) And both of these factors mean that Congress can never play more than a formulaic role. Bans on the use of drones for domestic surveillance are premature. But U.S. courts should ready themselves to update surveillance rules to take into account drones, as well as technology like the GPS tracking devices discussed in U.S. v. Jones. Courts need to address how these technologies can be abused and whether police seem to be abusing them, and they will need to use more flexible rules than the trespass standard the Supreme Court has adopted so far. A rule against trespassing without a warrant won't stop police drones mounted with video cameras and image-identifying software from lingering outside every home as they search for suspected crooks. When it comes to presidential power, only time will tell whether the risks of blowback exceed the value of drones. Many critics seem confident that President Obama's drone war has undermined American security, but we do not know what would have happened if he had shown more restraint. Nonetheless, it is quite a paradox that we trust the president with nuclear weapons because we know that he cannot use them, while we may not trust the president with drones because we know that he can. Internationally, nations might benefit from an arms control agreement governing drones, but it is hard to imagine any such agreement in the near future, given uncertainties about how drone technologies will develop, the difficulty of monitoring drones, and the asymmetries that mean the best-equipped states will resist any constraints. But a starting point is to recognize that the laws of war currently favour drones because they limit civilian casualties, while disfavouring conventional weapons - a surefire recipe for a destabilizing arms race. It would be nice to think that future wars will be fought by robots, with no risk to civilians or even soldiers - just as in ancient times a duel between heroes could settle a dispute between armies without a battle. But the gods liked to play havoc with duels, and drone warfare is likely to be similarly unpredictable. The long-predicted science-fiction world of robotic killing machines has finally arrived. The law now has to catch up.

#### Plan cements support for drones and allows the US to shape drone norms

Micah Zenko, Douglas Dillon Fellow at the CFR, January 2013, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” CFR, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736

Existing practices carry two major risks for U.S. interests that are likely to grow over time. The first comes from operational restrictions on drones due to domestic and international pressure. In the United States, the public and policymakers are increasingly uneasy with limited transparency for targeted killings.3 If the present trajectory continues, drones may share the fate of Bush-era enhanced interrogation techniques and warrantless wiretapping—the unpopularity and illegality of which eventually caused the policy’s demise. Internationally, objections from host states and other counterterrorism partners could also severely circumscribe drones’ effectiveness. Host states have grown frustrated with U.S. drone policy, while opposition by nonhost partners could impose additional restrictions on the use of drones. Reforming U.S. drone strike policies can do much to allay concerns internationally by ensuring that targeted killings are defensible under international legal regimes that the United States itself helped establish, and by allowing U.S. officials to openly address concerns and counter misinformation. The second major risk is that of proliferation. Over the next decade, the U.S. near-monopoly on drone strikes will erode as more countries develop and hone this capability. The advantages and effectiveness of drones in attacking hard-to-reach and time-sensitive targets are compelling many countries to indigenously develop or explore purchasing unmanned aerial systems. In this uncharted territory, U.S. policy provides a powerful precedent for other states and nonstate actors that will increasingly deploy drones with potentially dangerous ramifications. Reforming its practices could allow the United States to regain moral authority in dealings with other states and credibly engage with the international community to shape norms for responsible drone use. The current trajectory of U.S. drone strike policies is unsustainable. Without reform from within, drones risk becoming an unregulated, unaccountable vehicle for states to deploy lethal force with impunity. Consequently, the United States should more fully explain and reform aspects of its policies on drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings by ending the controversial practice of “signature strikes”; limiting targeted killings to leaders of transnational terrorist organizations and individuals with direct involvement in past or ongoing plots against the United States and its allies; and clarifying rules of the road for drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings. Given that the United States is currently the only country—other than the United Kingdom in the traditional battlefield of Afghanistan and perhaps Israel—to use drones to attack the sovereign territory of another country, it has a unique opportunity and responsibility to engage relevant international actors and shape development of a normative framework for acceptable use of drones. Although reforming U.S. drone strike policies will be difficult and will require sustained high-level attention to balance transparency with the need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods, it would serve U.S. national interests by ■■ allowing policymakers and diplomats to paint a more accurate portrayal of drones to counter the myths and misperceptions that currently remain unaddressed due to secrecy concerns; ■■ placing the use of drones as a counterterrorism tactic on a more legitimate and defensible footing with domestic and international audiences; increasing the likelihood that the United States will sustain the international tolerance and cooperation required to carry out future drone strikes, such as intelligence support and host-state basing rights; ■■ exerting a normative influence on the policies and actions of other states; and ■■ providing current and future U.S. administrations with the requisite political leverage to shape and promote responsible use of drones by other states and nonstate actors. As Obama administration officials have warned about the proliferation of drones, “If we want other nations to use these technologies responsibly, we must use them responsibly.”4

### Pakistan

#### Unrestricted drone strikes are destroying the US-Pakistan relationship – only restricting them creates space for cooperation

Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 7-16-2013, “A New Drone Deal For Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139584/daniel-markey/a-new-drone-deal-for-pakistan?page=show

For all its successes, the U.S. drone program in Pakistan is unlikely to survive much longer in its current form. Less than a week after his election on May 11, Pakistan’s new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, reportedly declared to his cabinet that “the policy of protesting against drone strikes for public consumption, while working behind the scenes to make them happen, is not on.” This fall, Pakistan’s national and provincial assemblies will elect a new president, likely a Sharif loyalist, and the prime minister will also select a new army chief. It is safe to say that these men are unlikely to follow their predecessors in offering tacit endorsements of the United States' expansive counterterrorism efforts. In other words, the United States is going to have to hammer out a new drone deal with Pakistan in the years ahead, one that is sensitive to Pakistan's own concerns and objectives. This will likely mean that Washington will face new constraints in its counterterrorism operations. But managed with care, a new agreement could put the targeted killing campaign against al Qaeda on firmer political footing without entirely eliminating its effectiveness. Ever since its inception in 2004, the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan has been stumbling along shaky legal and strategic ground. At various points in time, Washington and Islamabad constructed different fictions to enable the drone campaign. Before launching the first drone strike that killed Taliban leader Nek Muhammad in June 2004, Washington sought personal authorization from then President and army chief Pervez Musharraf. For several years thereafter, the Pakistani army claimed responsibility for all drone strikes, publicly denying (however implausibly) American intervention. But the program’s remarkable success in killing al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, combined with the otherwise largely unaddressed problem of sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal areas, encouraged U.S. officials to expand their list of targets. As the program grew, and especially as Washington killed militants with suspected links to Pakistan’s own military and intelligence services, such as members of the Afghan Taliban–affiliated Haqqani Network, Pakistani officials shed the fiction that the strikes were their own. Islamabad instead bowed to what it perceived as a powerful domestic consensus against the drones and criticized the United States in increasingly shrill terms for violating Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty. Privately, however, Musharraf and his immediate successors -- including the civilian government led by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the army under General Kayani -- continued to greenlight the drone program. As the drone strikes mounted, the hypocrisy of the official Pakistani position became ever more difficult to hide. Opposition politician and former cricket star Imran Khan made the criticism of drones a centerpiece of his Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party’s election campaign in 2011 and 2012. And in early 2012, the Pakistani parliament unequivocally denounced the drone strikes and called for them to end. This unmistakable sovereign act called into question oft-repeated U.S. claims that Pakistan actually provides “tacit consent” for the drone campaign. Pakistan's current and future leaders, starting with Nawaz Sharif, will have little reason to implicate themselves in the drone hypocrisy of their predecessors. Sharif is on sounder political footing than his predecessor, but -- as his top lieutenants are already signaling -- he cannot weather the political storm that is likely to result if the United States appears to blithely disregard his authority. Washington’s failure to shift its policy would lead Islamabad to escalate its diplomatic protests. One step in this escalation has already happened, with Pakistan taking its case against drones to the international community by way of the United Nations. If Pakistani frustration mounts without yielding results, one can imagine Sharif’s new army chief threatening to shoot U.S. drones from the sky, just as past Pakistani leaders have threatened to take down helicopters that cross into the nation’s airspace. At that stage, Washington would likely pull the drones from normal operation rather than play a high-stakes game of chicken. (Indeed, Washington has a habit of taking extended breaks from drone strikes at sensitive periods: for instance, there were no strikes for over six weeks after the so-called Salala incident at the Afghan border.) The question is whether Washington and Islamabad can find a deal that addresses Pakistani concerns without depriving the United States of a counterterrorism tool that has been more effective, at least in a tactical sense, than any other. Short of ending the drone program altogether, the only way that Pakistan’s leaders can credibly claim to assert their sovereign authority -- and thereby prove their nationalist credentials to political allies and adversaries alike -- is if Washington cedes to Islamabad a greater degree of control over the program, especially when it comes to target selection.

#### Signature strikes are uniquely bad

James Traub, fellow of the Center International Cooperation, 5-24-2013, “The Indispensable Nation's Indispensable Weapon,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/indispensible\_weapon\_drones\_obama?page=0,1

And this brings me back to the question of drones. It is hard to dispute the effectiveness of drones in Pakistan, where the United States has no other means of targeting al Qaeda and other radical Islamist forces who launch attacks against Afghanistan -- and, undisturbed, might well threaten the United States and the West. Drones have killed about 3,500 people along the border between the two countries, according to a recent report by Micah Zenko at the Council on Foreign Relations; and almost all of them have been intended targets. The three studies he cites estimate civilian deaths at 5 percent, 7 percent, and 23 percent of the total. According to a report from the New America Foundation, the civilian death rate has declined sharply since 2008 and is now very close to zero. Drones work; and yet Pakistanis hate them. A 2012 poll of Pakistanis found that only 17 percent of respondents would support drone strikes even if carried out with their government's cooperation. The same poll found that disapproval of U.S. policies has grown every year since Barack Obama became president, a finding that may have something to do with the steady growth of drone strikes, at least until the last year. Whatever you think of it, Pakistan is a democracy. This means that its rulers both respond to public opinion and actively exploit it. Pakistan's military and civilian leaders have quietly collaborated with drone operations, but at the same time they reinforce their public legitimacy by denouncing the policy as a violation of national sovereignty -- which in turn further inflames public opinion. The net consequence is that U.S. relations with this vital and profoundly brittle country are a disaster. Like the V2 rockets which the Germans used in World War II, and whose apocalyptic effect Thomas Pynchon evokes in Gravity's Rainbow, drones have gained a powerful grip on the public imagination. The rage and dread they cause, at least in the places where they are used, has more to do with their remote, silent, super-high-tech lethality than with their actual effect. And it doesn't matter if that hatred is justified or not; the argument can't be waged on the merits. Obama's speech seems to signify an acceptance of this elemental fact (though of course some of the other decisions he announced, including shifting responsibility for drones from the CIA to the military, has more to do with domestic criticism about the program's lack of transparency). Obama knows that the war on terror requires that the United States kill or capture a very small number of implacable enemies, and change the minds and the lives of tens of millions of others. Indeed, in his speech he acknowledged that "in the absence of a strategy that reduces the wellspring of extremism, a perpetual war -- through drones or Special Forces or troop deployments -- will prove self-defeating, and alter our country in troubling ways." Even former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once worried that the United States was making enemies faster than it was killing them. But the short-term urgency of killing bad guys inevitably eclipses the long-term goal of changing the conditions which produce terrorism. So even a figure as conscientious as Obama slides down the slippery slope from approving the rare drone strike against "high-value targets" to approving the less discriminating "signature strike" against unidentified individuals engaged in a pattern of threatening activity. Both ending that practice and closing Guantanamo, which Obama also vowed in his speech to take steps to do, constitute an implicit recognition that the time has come to restore that balance.

#### The aff is key - high civilian death tolls are central to relation

Mahrukh Khan, Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A new chapter, a new theater” 2010 http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299569410\_88067869.pdf

A significant escalation of drone attacks inside Pakistani tribal region has also been accompanied by the yet unfulfilled idea of expanding the attacks to areas of southern Punjab where militant leaders are reportedly taking shelter. Such an approach may also include other parts of the country; for instance, Balochistan; where the Quetta Shura led by Mullah Omar is still reportedly active. The issue of drone attacks has become a sour point in relations between Washington and Islamabad since they have resulted in heavy civilian casualties – an issue that complicates Pakistan‟s role in America's war on terror. Between 2004 and 2009, there have been 99 drone strikes in Pakistan with 506 reported deaths, including both militants and civilians. Given that the Taliban insurgency has grown in recent years, especially in parts of Punjab and Balochistan, the new strategy of war pushes the idea of drone strikes in these areas. Drones attacks for now are the primary method for targeting militant hideouts in the northwestern part of the country. U.S. defence analysts and policymakers believe that their positive effects are measurable and that they avoid coalition casualties. They are also credited with creating a sense of insecurity among militants and constraining interaction among their networks. However, open-source reports from Pakistan suggest that attacks since early 2006 have killed around 14 militant leaders and over 700 civilians - over fifty civilians for every militant killed. According to a report published by the New America Foundation, there are three major „strategic concerns‟ in relation to drone strikes inside Pakistan: 1. They can be legally challenged, 2. They do not constitute a strategy, but rather a reactionary tactic, 3. Their unpopularity with the people of Pakistan is increasing at an alarming rate. To be more precise, a New America Foundation report mentions 115 strikes in the northwest since 2004, including 19 in 2010 that have killed between 837 and 1,221 individuals, of whom around 552 to 854 are described as militants. In effect, the civilian fatality ratio comes out to be a rather embarrassing 32 per cent if these reports are to be believed. Due to such inefficiency, drone strikes come under constant criticism and their unpopularity is acting as a catalyst for recruitment to extremist groups.

#### Kills the relationship

Alex Rodriguez, foreign correspondent for the LA Times, 8-2-2013, “U.S., Pakistan to revive key talks,” LA Times, ln

Kerry's agenda included meetings with Sharif, Aziz and other top civilian and military leaders. Although both Kerry and Aziz said their countries were making headway in their bid to forge stronger ties, key security issues continue to cloud the relationship. At the top of the list is Pakistan's opposition to Washington's drone missile campaign. The U.S. has relied heavily on drone strikes to erode Al Qaeda's ability to plan and carry out attacks against Western targets. Since the start of President Obama's first term in January 2009, the U.S. has carried out nearly 300 drone strikes in northwestern Pakistan, according to the Long War Journal website, which tracks drone statistics. However, Pakistanis view the drone program as a blatant infringement of their country's sovereignty and argue that it has become a major recruiting tool for militants because of the number of civilians mistakenly killed in the strikes. Pakistani leaders welcomed Obama's speech in May outlining drone program restrictions that would reduce the number of strikes. But in mid-July, Sharif's interior minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, warned that continuation of Washington's drone program could lead to "a direct standoff" and suggested Pakistan could balk at allowing the U.S. to use its highways to withdraw troops and equipment from Afghanistan at the end of 2014.

#### Forces Uzbekistan withdrawal

Azad Garibov, a foreign policy analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) in Azerbaijan and a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Khazar University, 5-28-2013, “The U.S. in Central Asia: Still an important balancer?” Turkish Weekly, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/150929/the-u-s-in-central-asia-still-an-important-balancer.html

Recently, in light of the approaching 2014 withdrawal of the majority of U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan, Washington has been intensifying contact with Central Asian countries situated on Northern Distribution Network (NDN) routes. The NDN was first established in 2008-09 after talks between the U.S., Central Asian states, and Russia as a collection of routes that allowed the U.S. and NATO to ship nonlethal supplies to Afghanistan “without going through Pakistan and the Khyber Pass – logistical arrangements exposed to Taliban attacks as well as massive delays due to Pakistani obstruction.” After Salala incident of November 2011, involving US aerial strikes that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and injured 13 others, Pakistan closed all NATO supply lines to Afghanistan passing through its territory. Lines remained closed for more than half of a year which massively increased the NDN’s importance for the U.S. In order to guarantee the smooth functioning of the distribution network, the U.S. promised countries in the NDN part of its Afghan military equipment and more financial aid. During this time Uzbekistan has become the main Central Asian partner of Washington. Currently A large percentage of U.S. military cargo going to Afghanistan passes through Uzbekistan, and Uzbekistan has seized this opportunity to build closer military ties with the U.S. Uzbek president Islam Karimov, in negotiations with U.S. officials, stated his wish for remaking his military, replacing its Russian gear with entirely American gear. Accordingly, “in late 2011 Washington loosened restrictions on military aid to Uzbekistan that had been in place for nearly a decade due to human rights concerns.” And as the U.S. promises to leave some of its equipment behind in Central Asia after withdrawal, Karimov has reportedly expressed interest in heavy equipment, like helicopters and mine-resistant armored vehicles.

#### Arming Uzbekistan cause Central Asia conflict and draws in Russia

Joshua Kucera, Central Asia and the Caucasus specialist, 3-26-2013, “Are The U.S. And Russia Fueling Tension Between Uzbekistan And Its Neighbors?” EurasiaNet, http://eurasianhub.com/2013/03/27/are-the-u-s-and-russia-fueling-tension-between-uzbekistan-and-its-neighbors/

The U.S.’s growing military ties with Uzbekistan may be a strategic necessity, given the importance of the Central Asian country in the U.S.’s war effort in Afghanistan. But it is forcing the U.S. to confront an important, if little-discussed, complication: Uzbekistan is the least-trusted, most-feared country in the region. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have well-known border and water conflicts with Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan sees Uzbekistan as a regional rival. So is the U.S.’s military aid to Uzbekistan raising regional tensions?¶ U.S. military aid, after being suspended for several years because of human rights concerns, is steadily being ramped up. That the U.S. is giving small surveillance drones to Uzbekistan is the worst-kept secret in Washington (OK, in the narrow slice of Washington that The Bug Pit inhabits). It’s also giving Uzbekistan’s armed forces night-vision goggles, body armor, and GPS systems, and there are credible rumors in Washington of heavier military equipment being considered for Uzbekistan to either buy or be given. (And it’s not just the U.S.: Uzbekistan has pledged to work more closely with NATO on training, and the U.K. is also planning to make some donations to Uzbekistan as well.) The U.S. (and NATO partners) have also signaled their intention to donate excess military equipment to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well. And the U.S., of course, operates an air base in Kyrgyzstan. So it’s hardly like the U.S. military is exclusively cooperating with Uzbekistan. Yet, perhaps because more concrete information has come out regarding donations to Uzbekistan, and perhaps because the U.S.-Uzbekistan military relationship is growing quickly (having started from almost zero after the sanctions imposed in the early 2000s), there seems to be a perception growing that the U.S. is favoring Uzbekistan.¶ A report in Kazakhstan’s Tengrinews argues that “close relations between Uzbekistan and the U.S. can lead to conflict in Central Asia.” It quotes Russian political analyst Alexander Sobyanin saying that “Uzbekistan is ambitiously becoming the economic and military giant of the region, and that means that for Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, ‘peaceful life has ended.’” Kazakhstani analyst Marat Shibutov adds that “Uzbekistan’s land forces are already one and a half times greater than ours. With the receipt of arms, it’s possible that the advantage will be double.” (He noted, though, that conflict between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was much less likely than it would be between Uzbekistan and either Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan.)In another piece on CentrAsia.ru, analyst Andrei Grozin says that Tashkent’s aims vis-a-vis American military aid is less about gaining means of repression against the population of Uzbekistan and more about regional hegemony,” and that “arming the regimes of Central Asia, the US is laying a landmine which could blow up the entire region.” (In a nice poetic — if not necessarily militarily relevant — touch, Grozin ends by quoting the famous Chekhov line: “If a gun is hanging on the wall in the first act, it has to be fired in the last act.”)¶ What to make of all this? It’s worth noting that while the U.S. is being fairly careful to not give Uzbekistan tools with which it can repress its population — the standard concern in the West — exacerbating regional tension has seemed less of a worry. Tactical drones, night vision, GPS and body armor would be of limited utility in putting down another Andijan-style protest. But they would be very useful in a border conflict with a neighbor.¶ It also should be noted that all of the above analysis of increasing regional tension dovetails with Russia’s perception of U.S. policy in the region. The Kremlin is alarmed at Uzbekistan’s attempts to remove itself from Russia’s sphere of influence, notably by withdrawing from Russia’s key security project in the region, the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russian officials have framed their huge military aid packages to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in terms of the need to counter the U.S-Uzbekistan axis. So it can’t be excluded that Russia may be intentionally fanning this threat of tension. Still, the mistrust of Uzbekistan by its neighbors is very real and doesn’t necessarily need any encouragement from the Kremlin. And conversely, Uzbekistan’s mistrust of Russia is a large part of why it feels that it needs closer military ties with the U.S. and NATO — a situation which certainly isn’t helped by a massive Russian rearmament of its unfriendly neighbors. So all of this is creating a vicious circle of mistrust and tension. What may result, no one knows.

#### Nuke War

Victor Baranez, military commentator, 12-27-2011, “Who and Where Russia Threatens” Komsomolskaya Pravda, <http://www.kp.ru/daily/25812/2790454> (translated from Russian)

And yet, where, in your opinion, could erupt war in which Russia will have to use not only conventional, but also nuclear weapons?¶ - For example, begins to break one of the post-Soviet states, say Ukraine. Russia can not remain on the sidelines, because in this area there are millions of our people effectively. West (read: the U.S.) intervenes to "stop Russian aggression" or "does not prevent the recurrence of the empire." Western coalition strikes against the contingent of the Armed Forces of Russia, Russia is also responsible blows, there is an uncontrolled escalation - and there is already a matter of time, as soon as the nuclear weapons will be put to use by any party. Most likely - the weakest party, that is Russian. When conventional weapons do not bring the desired result in the battle on the arena there are more powerful - nuclear.¶ - There are other scenarios?¶ - Yes, there is. And much more realistic. For example, the Western forces leave Afghanistan, and to the authorities in this country are returned by the Taliban, who are beginning to expand into Central Asia. The Central Asian states are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and Russia has committed itself to support them in case of need military aid. Thus, we may be involved in a conflict with an opponent of up to 30 - 40 thousand people. And the war against such an enemy will be more severe than the August 2008 conflict with Georgia.¶ In August 2008, the Russian army gave a fitting rebuff to the Georgian aggressors. But Saakashvili's army with the help of NATO again pumps up "muscles" and saber rattling.¶ LAST ARGUMENT¶ - And yet, why Makarov mentioned is nukes? That, without it, our army will not be able to do, say, there is a "non-nuclear" general-purpose forces?¶ - It's no secret that the military potential of Russia today is many times inferior to the military power of the U.S. and NATO, and China too. Suffice it to say that the total military expenditures of NATO countries in 2010 were about $ 1.1 trillion. (25 times more than Russia), and the total number of regular armed forces - about 3.6 million people (3.5 times larger than that of Russia). The military budget of China ($ 90 billion) and the number of regular armed forces (about 2.3 million) is more than double the Russian indices.¶ - But with all that we try to maintain a "nuclear parity" with the West ...¶ - For the Russian nuclear weapons advocates the "great equalizer" of its military capabilities with the United States and NATO. Therefore, the probability of use in case of a military crisis of nuclear weapons to deter or defeat a superior military power on the western enemy is far from zero. All the more so now Russian military doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons in such a case.¶ FIRE STARTS WITH SPARKS¶ - What do you think, armed conflict over territorial claims to Russia, our local or regional war with or without the use of nuclear weapons could turn it into the world?¶ - Any serious military conflict between Russia and the U.S. (and NATO) is inevitable in a very short time to grow into an exchange of nuclear strikes first single, followed by an escalation to full implementation of the entire nuclear capability of both sides. That is, any war between Russia and the U.S. (and NATO) will inevitably develop into a global war with a global impact. Actually, as long as the understanding by both parties and this makes any military conflict between the parties unlikely. Since the mechanism of nuclear deterrence.

#### Unrestricted drone strikes collapses Pakistani democracy

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf

The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few days—directly contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the capacity and legitimacy of the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. These political effects come about because drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible. The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its territory can be crippling to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic rivals to challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territo - rial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani Presi - dent Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’ 75 Similarly, the Pakistani High Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a resolu - tion against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory. 76 The appearance of powerlessness in the face of drones is corrosive to the appearance of competence and legitimacy of the Pakistani government. The growing perception that the Pakistani civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks is particularly dangerous in a context where 87 per cent of all Pakistanis are dissatis - fied with the direction of the country and where the military, which has launched coups before, remains a popular force. 77 The political effects of this signal are powerful and lasting even when the reality of the relationship between the perpetrator and the targeted state is more complex. For example, the government of Pakistan has been ambivalent about drone strikes, condemning them in some cases but applauding their results in others. 78 Much has been made of the extent to which the Pakistani government has offered its ‘tacit consent’ for the US drone strikes on its territory. 79 The US has been willing to provide details on drone strikes after the fact, but has refrained from providing advance warning of an attack to the Pakistani government for fear that the information might leak. Pakistan has been operationally compliant with drone strikes and has not ordered its air force to shoot down drones in Pakistani airspace. Despite official denials, it has been revealed that the Pakistani govern - ment has permitted the US to launch drones from at least one of its own airbases. 80 Whatever the complexity of its position and the source of its ambivalence over drone strikes, the political effects of allowing them to escalate to current levels are increasingly clear. The vast expansion of drone warfare under the Obama administration has placed enormous pressure on Pakistan for its complicity with he US, multiplied the enemies that its government faces and undermined parts of the social fabric of the country. By most measures, Pakistan is more divided and unstable after the Obama administration’s decision to ramp up the tempo and scale of drone attacks than it was during the Bush administration. 81

#### Creates factional conflict and empowers the military

M.W. Aslam, PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Leeds, 2011, “A critical evaluation of American drone strikes in Pakistan: legality, legitimacy and prudence,” Vol 4 no 3, T and F Online

As in some other tribally based societies of the world, the tribal areas of Pakistan are structured on a patriarchal basis in which clans and their chieftains are responsible for each member's safety and security. This is how peace was maintained in these areas before the foreign and Pakistani government's involvement in the area following the onset of the war on terrorism. The territory of FATA does not have the equivalent of police, and law and order has mainly been guaranteed by the tribal chiefs relying on the help of loosely constituted tribal militias (see Abbas 2007b). However, in the current scenario, the drone attacks have caused a number of casualties without the tribal chiefs or the Pakistani government being able to protect civilians. This, in turn, has resulted in the alienation of local people (Harrison 2007) whose help is considered significant in the success of the current war on terrorism – not an encouraging consequence of the policy of using drones. According to Pakistan's Prime Minister, the drone attacks sometimes end up uniting the tribesmen and militants. Addressing the National Assembly of Pakistan, Gilani (quoted in Times of India 2011) said: Under a well thought out strategy, we had separated the tribesmen from militants. Whenever a drone attack is carried out, it unites the militants and the tribal people. This creates problems for the government because no war is won without the support of the people. The drone strikes have also played an instrumental role in bringing together diverse groups of militants against their common enemy, the United States and its ally Pakistan (Fishman 2010, p. 16); they would certainly not be so united in the absence of the attacks (Jones 2009, p. 41). Fishman (2010, p. 16) recounts how drone strikes were instrumental in the formation of an alliance between the leaders of three militant groups in 2009 that included Mullah Nazir, Baitullah Mehsud and Hafiz Gul Bahadur to fight against the Pakistan army. Mullah Nazir specifically mentioned that ‘drone strikes in South Waziristan were an important reason he had turned on the Pakistani government’ (Fishman 2010, p. 16). Thus, the effects of drone attacks can in no way be said to be contributing to the stated American objective of the country's involvement in that region: to tackle terrorism emanating from there. The use of drone strikes is one of the reasons behind an increase in the number of terrorist attacks against Pakistani civilians and security forces throughout the country. Some of the more active militants engaged against the Pakistani army have cited the drone attacks as a reason for ‘bouts of violence against the Pakistani state’ (Fishman 2010, p. 10). Pakistani society has been under constant attack by militants who are trained and equipped in FATA (Raja 2011). Indeed, hundreds of drone strikes have taken place over many years, but the insurgency in FATA and in southern Afghanistan does not seem to be getting weaker (Bergen and Tiedemann 2011). Faisal Shehzad, recently apprehended after attempting to bomb Times Square in New York City, explicitly stated that his action was a revenge for American drone attacks (see Leonard 2010). His claims and attempted attack underscore the radicalising effect of this policy. The drone attacks and the Pakistani government's inability to prevent them have implications for the stability of the institution of Pakistan army as well. According to Harrison (2007), former President Musharraf faced serious opposition from the Pashtun generals in the army for his alignment with America and his heavy-handed approach in dealing with militancy in the country's tribal areas. The continuation of the current approach is likely to lead to tensions within the army and any future break-up of the army could quite possibly bring about dissolution of the country itself. In such a situation, there will be no possibility of guaranteeing that Pakistan's conventional and nuclear arms remain in safe hands (Lieven 2010). In yet another unintended consequence of the strikes, as they are only focused on the tribal areas of Pakistan, militants have been able to avoid them by moving to settled parts of the country. In other words, these attacks are literally helping in spreading militancy across Pakistan. As Byman (2009) notes, ‘al Qaeda and the Taliban have been able to relocate parts of their apparatus further inside Pakistan, which may work to actually widen the zone of instability’– hardly a desirable consequence of this policy. President Obama entered the White House with the goals of focusing on the war in Afghanistan and of helping Pakistan to become a stable and democratic sovereign state. To highlight his approach towards Pakistan, Obama (quoted in CFR 2009) argued: To avoid the mistakes of the past, we must make clear that our relationship with Pakistan is grounded in support for Pakistan's democratic institutions and the Pakistani people. And to demonstrate through deeds as well as words a commitment that is enduring, we must stand for lasting opportunity. However, one major consequence of the drone strikes has been to undermine that very goal of America's Pakistan policy. These attacks have often been criticised by the civilian leaders of Pakistan and on 14 May 2011, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed a resolution stating that the ‘unilateral actions … [including] the continued drone attacks on the territory of Pakistan, are not only unacceptable but also constitute violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and humanitarian norms and such drone attacks must be stopped forthwith’ (NA 2011). This resolution was passed after an 11-hour session discussing the issue of American attacks on Pakistani territory including the raid that led to the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden (Rodriguez 2011). However, within barely 48 hours of the passage of that resolution, a drone attack was conducted that led to the deaths of nine people (Cloughley 2011). Regardless of whether that particular attack and others that came afterwards ended up targeting militants, the episode has had major symbolic implications by revealing Pakistan's sheer helplessness concerning the matter of drone strikes on its own territory. The Obama administration may have claimed its ongoing support for democracy in Pakistan through its words but the consequences of its actions have not always contributed to the aim of supporting Pakistan's key democratic institution, its National Assembly (Cloughley 2011).

#### Signature strikes prevent local cooperation – destroys social fabric and causes instability

ICG, International Crisis Group, 5-21-2013, “Drones: Myths and Reality in Pakistan,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/247-drones-myths-and-reality-in-pakistan.pdf

Residents in FATA also believe that informants possibly provide false information and exploit their position to settle vendettas with local rivals.78 The U.S. targeting policy is problematic because of its reported reliance on so-called “signature strikes” targeting groups of men based on behaviour patterns that may be associated with terrorist activity rather than known identities.79 Some legal scholars claim that the signature strikes approach impedes FATA’s cultural and conflict-resolution activities, for example by leading to the targeting of tribal jirgas (councils of elders). It is contended that tribal elders now fear convening such meetings, and communities have even become reluctant to hold funerals lest they attract drone strikes.80 For instance, in the 17 March 2011 drone attack on a jirga in North Waziristan’s Datta Khel town, only four out of 40 men killed are believed to have been militants; the rest are thought to have been maliks (tribal leaders) and other tribesmen.81 These reported strikes, by fuelling local alienation, likely do far more harm than good. However, the Pakistani military and militants, each in their own way, and not drone strikes, are primarily responsible for distorting FATA’s cultural and social fabric, as discussed later in this report.

#### Indiscriminate strikes delegitimize the civilian government

James Cavallaro et al, founding director of Stanford Law School’s International Human Rights and Conflcit Resolution Clinic and professor of law there, Stephan Sonnenberg, Clinical Lecturer in the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford, Sarah Knuckey, professor of international law at NYU’s Global Justice Clinic in the NYU Law School, initially published by IHRCRC, Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at the Stanford Law School, and GJC, Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, with a long list of student researchers in addition, September 2012, “Living Under Drones: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN,” http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf

The focus on drones also risks undermining Pakistan’s development by incentivizing undemocratic decision-making and fostering instability. In 2009, Anne Patterson, US Ambassador to Pakistan, discussed the risks of the US drone strategy in a cable sent to the Department of State. She noted, “Increased unilateral operations in these areas risk destabilizing the Pakistani state, alienating both the civilian government and military leadership, and provoking a broader governance crisis within Pakistan without finally achieving the goal [of eliminating the Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership].”766 Pakistan High Commissioner to the United Kingdom Wajid Shamsul Hasan told The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ): What has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is, that you have rather directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government– when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament, and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.767 The US strikes have also contributed to the delegitimization of NGOs that are perceived as Western, or that receive US aid, including those providing much-needed services, such as access to water and education, and those administering the polio vaccine; this perception has been exploited by Taliban forces.768

#### Democratic institutions check external conflict and war – statistics prove

Seabn Lynn-Jones, Editor for International Security, March 1998, “Why the United States Should Spread Democracy,” Belfer Center @ Harvard.

In addition to improving the lives of individual citizens in new democracies, the spread of democracy will benefit the international system by reducing the likelihood of war. Democracies do not wage war on other democracies. This absence-or near absence, depending on the definitions of "war" and "democracy" used-has been called "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations."51 One scholar argues that "the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."52 If the number of democracies in the international system continues to grow, the number of potential conflicts that might escalate to war will diminish. Although wars between democracies and nondemocracies would persist in the short run, in the long run an international system composed of democracies would be a peaceful world. At the very least, adding to the number of democracies would gradually enlarge the democratic "zone of peace." 1. The Evidence for the Democratic Peace Many studies have found that there are virtually no historical cases of democracies going to war with one another. In an important two-part article published in 1983, Michael Doyle compares all international wars between 1816 and 1980 and a list of liberal states.53 Doyle concludes that "constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another."54 Subsequent statistical studies have found that this absence of war between democracies is statistically significant and is not the result of random chance.55 Other analyses have concluded that the influence of other variables, including geographical proximity and wealth, do not detract from the significance of the finding that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another.56

#### That’s key to prevent genocide

Seabn Lynn-Jones, Editor for International Security, March 1998, “Why the United States Should Spread Democracy,” Belfer Center @ Harvard.

Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.27 These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J. Rummel. Rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0.14% of their populations (on average) die annually in internal violence. The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% and for totalitarian regimes 1.48%.28 Rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People''s Republic of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge. Democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. The American and British bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war that followed U.S. colonization of the Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.29 There are two reasons for the relative absence of civil violence in democracies: (1) Democratic political systems-especially those of liberal democracies constrain the power of governments, reducing their ability to commit mass murders of their own populations. As Rummel concludes, "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely ... The more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects."30 (2) Democratic polities allow opposition to be expressed openly and have regular processes for the peaceful transfer of power. If all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents.31

#### Democracy solves ethnic conflict

Morton Halperin et al, Senior Vice President of the Center for American Progress and Director of the Open Society Policy Center, 2005, The Democracy Advantage, p. 96-97

Democracies’ capacity to avoid conflict appears to be particularly im­portant in ethnically diverse societies. Democratic governments generally manage social conflicts by channeling them into conventional politics. When divisive ethnic issues surface in democracies, they usually are ex­pressed in protest rather than rebellion and often culminate in reformist policies.’7 Similarly, whereas ethnic diversity reduces growth by up to three percentage points in dictatorships, it has no adverse effects on economic growth in democracies.’8 Evidently, democracies are better able to incorpo­rate the competing interests of diverse societies than are autocracies. The latter, by relying on a narrow political, economic, and military base of power, tend to direct a disproportionate share of benefits to a single or lim­ited number of ethnic groups. Indeed, this is a central mechanism by which they ensure the loyalty and discipline needed to maintain their hold on power. However, the exclusivity and disenfranchisement of this system stirs resentment and violent opposition.

#### Now key – Pakistan is falling apart

Arif Rafiq, adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and president of Vizier Consulting, 8-22-2013, “A Dream Gone Sour,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/22/a\_dream\_gone\_sour\_pakistan\_terrorism\_nawaz\_sharif?page=0,1

In an allusion to Pakistan's growing sectarian strife, the army chief's address was preceded by the recitation of select verses from the Quran that were originally directed at warring Arabian tribes. These verses call on Muslims to stand together and avoid division, reminding them: "You were on the verge of falling headlong into the abyss of fire, but God saved you." For Pakistan, the abyss of fire is indeed near. Tens of thousands of Pakistanis have been killed by terrorists and insurgents since the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States -- and the scourge of terror shows no signs of abating. Despite a number of relatively successful counterinsurgency operations, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) remain capable of hitting most Pakistani urban centers. And the threat has only increased since the new federal government came into power in June. In a little more than 70 days since Nawaz Sharif assumed the premiership for the third time, Pakistan has seen around 70 terrorist attacks claiming more than 350 lives. Over the past two months, moreover, there has been a major jihadist prison break; an attack on a regional office of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's top intelligence agency; numerous attacks on mosques, Shiite congregations, and funerals; and various political assassinations.

### Solvency

#### Individualized targeting solves due process and ends signature strikes

Jennifer Daskal, fellow and adjunct professor at Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law at Georgetown University law Center, April 2013, “The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside of the ‘Hot’ Conflict Zone,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, ln

The law of international armed conflict permits the detention and killing of members of the enemy force based on a legitimate expectation that individuals who are part of a formal, hierarchical enemy state army will be called upon to fight and thereby pose an ongoing threat. By comparison, the broad definition of "functional membership" put forth by the Executive and endorsed by the courts serves as a poor proxy for assessing threat in a conflict with a non-state actor. n139 Even assuming, arguendo, that the functional membership test provides an appropriate standard for detention and targeting within a zone of active hostilities, it is too permissive a standard outside such zones, for the reasons described in Part II. Outside of a zone of active hostilities, an individualized threat finding is needed to ensure that law-of-war detention and lethal targeting are employed in those situations in which the target actually poses an ongoing threat, consistent with the underlying rationale for the permissive use of force and detention without charge. n140 Of course, there are a number of possible ways to define the threat. For lethal targeting, I suggest two such categories: (1) those involved in the active planning or operationalization of specific, imminent, and externally focused attacks, regardless of their relative hierarchical position in the organization; and (2) operational leaders who present a significant, ongoing, and externally focused threat, even if they are not implicated in the planning of a specific, imminent attack. n141 The first definition is a conduct-based test that prohibits [\*1211] the use of lethal force absent a specific, imminent, and significant threat. The second definition encompasses those who pose a continuous and significant threat given their leadership roles within an organization. n142 Whether an individual meets this threat requirement depends on the individual's role within the organization, his capacity to operationalize an attack, and the degree to which the threat is externally focused. For example, an al Shabaab operational leader, whose attacks are focused on the internal conflict between al Shabaab and Somalia's Transnational Federal Government, would not qualify as a legitimate target in the separate conflict between the United States and al Qaeda, even if he had demonstrated associations with al Qaeda. He might, however, be a legitimate target if he were involved in the planning of externally focused attacks and had demonstrated the capacity and will to operationalize the attacks. n143 Such restrictions serve the important purpose of limiting state authority to target and kill to instances in which the individual poses an active, ongoing, and significant threat. The low-level foot soldier who is found thousands of miles from the hot conflict zone could not be targeted unless involved in the planning or preparation of a specific, imminent attack. Even mid-level operatives, such as the prototypical terrorist recruiter, would be off-limits, unless they were plotting, or recruiting for, a specific, imminent attack. n144 Such recruiters could, however, be prosecuted for providing material support to a terrorist organization. n145 [\*1212] An individualized threat requirement also prohibits so-called "signature strikes," in which anonymous groups of alleged al Qaeda members are targeted based on their pattern of activities without an individualized assessment of the threat posed by each of the targets. n146

#### Ending signature strikes solves blowback and establishes international norms – doing it publicly is key

Michael Boyle, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs vol 89 no 1, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_1/89\_1Boyle.pdf

In his second term, President Obama has an opportunity to reverse course and establish a new drones policy which mitigates these costs and avoids some of the long-term consequences that flow from them. A more sensible US approach would impose some limits on drone use in order to minimize the political costs and long-term strategic consequences. One step might be to limit the use of drones to HVTs, such as leading political and operational figures for terrorist networks, while reducing or eliminating the strikes against the ‘foot soldiers’ or other Islamist networks not related to Al-Qaeda. This approach would reduce the number of strikes and civilian deaths associated with drones while reserving their use for those targets that pose a direct or imminent threat to the security of the United States. Such a self-limiting approach to drones might also minimize the degree of political opposition that US drone strikes generate in states such as Pakistan and Yemen, as their leaders, and even the civilian population, often tolerate or even approve of strikes against HVTs. Another step might be to improve the levels of transparency of the drone programme. At present, there are no publicly articulated guidelines stipulating who can be killed by a drone and who cannot, and no data on drone strikes are released to the public. 154 Even a Department of Justice memorandum which authorized the Obama administration to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, remains classified. 155 Such non-transparency fuels suspicions that the US is indifferent to the civilian casualties caused by drone strikes, a perception which in turn magnifies the deleterious political consequences of the strikes. Letting some sunlight in on the drones programme would not eliminate all of the opposition to it, but it would go some way towards undercutting the worst conspiracy theories about drone use in these countries while also signalling that the US government holds itself legally and morally accountable for its behaviour.

#### Lack of practical debate about war powers causes the worst abuses

Janet Cooper Alexander, Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, 2012, “John Yoo’s War Powers: The Law Review and the World”, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1742-alexanderjohn-yoos-war-powers

Yoo’s professional experience was largely in academic or political contexts where he was free to espouse controversial views, and he had great confidence in those views. Stephen Bradbury, who became head of OLC in 2005, told investigators for the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) during its investigation into the “torture memos” that “part of the problem with Yoo’s work on the Commander-in-Chief section was his entrenched scholarly view of the subject.”168 In his view, Yoo had a deeply ingrained view of the operative principles. And to the extent there were sources that reflect that view, he may bring them in and cite them. . . . And if a court here or a court there or a commentator here or a commentator there takes a different view, that’s almost of secondary importance because he had such a firmly held view of what the principles were.169 Such views could be given freer rein because the questions had seldom arisen in a practical context and the raw material of scholarship was correspondingly sparse. Yet, in the words of Alberto Mora, general counsel of the Navy during Yoo’s tenure, Yoo’s analysis “spots some of the legal trees, but misses the constitutional forest.” Yoo’s inclination to march to his own drummer was intensified by the lack of supervision from more experienced lawyers in the office as well as the security restrictions that severely limited the number of people outside the OLC who had knowledge of his memos. The OLC opinions, as well as documents and information relevant to them, were classified and the Bush administration was parsimonious in granting clearances.171 The Joint Chiefs and State Department were not involved in formulating the opinions, and when they did learn of OLC’s advice, their objections were disregarded or suppressed.172 Nor were any experienced FBI or military interrogators involved in formulating interrogation policy. Instead, the policy reflected folk wisdom about the efficacy of harsh treatment and torture. The OPR Report noted that drafts of the opinions were not circulated to national security experts in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, or to the State Department.

156

#### Drones are inevitable – establishing procedure is key

Jennifer Daskal, fellow and adjunct professor at Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law at Georgetown University law Center, April 2013, “The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside of the ‘Hot’ Conflict Zone,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, ln

The objections to such a proposal are many. In the context of proposed courts to review the targeting of U.S. citizens, for example, some have argued that such review would serve merely to institutionalize, legitimize, and expand the use of targeted drone strikes. n177 But this ignores the reality of their continued use and expansion and imagines a world in which targeted [\*1222] killings of operational leaders of an enemy organization outside a zone of active conflict is categorically prohibited (an approach I reject n178). If states are going to use this extraordinary power (and they will), there ought to be a clear and transparent set of applicable standards and mechanisms in place to ensure thorough and careful review of targeted-killing decisions. The formalization of review procedures - along with clear, binding standards - will help to avoid ad hoc decisionmaking and will ensure consistency across administrations and time.

#### Only statutory restrictions solve CIA operations – they comply with the letter of the law

Naureen Shah et al, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, 2012, “The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions,” Center for Civilians in Conflict, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The\_Civilian\_Impact\_of\_Drones\_w\_cover.pdf

As the CIA’s role in drone strikes has gained increasing prominence and notoriety, CIA and Obama Administration officials have repeatedly offered assurances that the agency complies with the law and seeks to avoid civilian casualties in drone strikes (see The Civilian Toll). While we cannot prove and do not necessarily believe that the CIA routinely and knowingly violates US law or disregards civilian life—to the contrary, it may have set up procedures and rules related to civilian harm— the CIA does not have an ethos or culture that promotes substantial engagement with legal questions or larger discussions of civilian protection. Moreover, while the threat of public or congressional scrutiny would traditionally provide the CIA incentive to act with caution about the law, in the context of covert drone strikes these incentives are substantially reduced or altogether absent. The most generous interpretation of the CIA’s relationship to the law is that it is formalistic: the agency may conform to the strictures of the law, but there is no indication that the CIA has developed an ethos that would independently motivate adherence to the norms and values underlying the law, including those that motivate steps to reduce civilian harm. In a series of addresses in 2011 and 2012, CIA General Counsel Stephen Preston described the agency’s relationship to the law as like that of a tightly regulated business.302 At the American Bar Association Preston explained: All intelligence activities of the Agency must be properly authorized pursuant to and conducted in accordance with the full body of national security law that has been put in place over the six plus decades since the Agency was founded. All such activities are also subject to strict internal and external scrutiny. In short, the Agency is at least as rule-bound and closely watched as businesses in the most heavily regulated industries.303 Although intended to provide assurance, the analogy to business regulation is disconcerting. It suggests that rather than seeing itself as duty-bound to the law and culturally invested in its rationales, the agency relates to the law as a constraint that may undermine the agency’s goals if not carefully managed, and perhaps, in some cases, circumvented. Even in accounts favorable to the CIA, the CIA’s relationship to the law is discussed only in terms of avoiding liability and political fall-out for actions that might, if revealed, be perceived as illegal even if technically legal. There is no allusion to a concern for whether actions, though technically legal, might offend the purposes and values of the law, or brush up too closely to their limits to be appropriate. For example, Jack Goldsmith, former lawyer in the Bush administration, writes that the CIA’s 150 or so lawyers “help operators sort through the cognitive dissonance that arises from the twin injunctions to violate some laws and norms but not others.” According to Goldsmith, these lawyers “provide comfort that whatever other fallout might occur from their CIA activities, operators needn’t worry about violating what to them often felt like bewildering US legal restrictions.” In any event, “everyone in the CIA knows that trouble follows from violating US law” and people “are watching for violations and can impose various types of legal or political punishment if they find one.”304 Likewise, former CIA lawyer Afsheen John Radsan conjectures that the CIA has sought legal approval for its drone strikes because “[t]he CIA, we know is accustomed to checking off the boxes in its paperwork” and is “[m]indful of their potential legal exposure on targeted killing.”305 To be sure, recent accounts of the CIA’s torture and secret detention programs under the Bush administration reflect that CIA personnel are deeply concerned with liability and public perception. CIA personnel aggressively sought clearance from agency lawyers and others in the Bush administration for the detention and torture programs—and, for the most part, received approval. John Rizzo, a leading CIA lawyer at the time, reportedly advised the CIA to tell as many people as possible about the programs to minimize political fall-out and maximize political support.306 In internal debates at the CIA, Rizzo notes: “I never heard— and I think I would have heard—any dissent, any moral objection,” to the programs.307

#### Legislation is key to reign in endless war

Alan W. Dowd, writer on National Defense, Foreign Policy, and International Security, Winter-Spring 2013, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring\_2013/1\_Article\_Dowd.pdf

Thanks to drones, as Miller’s question suggests, “endless war” is quite possible. In this regard, it’s worth noting that the drone war is an outgrowth of Washington’s post-9/11 campaign against terrorist organizations and regimes—a campaign authorized by the Use of Force Resolution of 18 September 2001. That measure directed the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”34 That final clause referring to “future acts of international terrorism” creates a loophole larger than a Reaper ground-attack drone—with a wingspan of some 66 feet—a loophole that should be tightened through legislation focusing on threats beyond Afghanistan. After all, it would be a stretch to say that the 18 September measure authorized—11-plus years later—an autopilot war against targets in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and beyond. Those targets may indeed be enemies of, and threats to, the United States. But few of the drone war’s intended targets today—not to mention the unfortunates simply in the wrong place at the wrong time—“planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.” Underscoring this point, The Washington Post recently reported that a growing number of drone strikes in Yemen have targeted “lower-level figures who are suspected of having links to terrorism operatives but are seen mainly as leaders of factions focused on gaining territory in Yemen’s internal struggle.”35 (Emphasis added.) Yet the drone war goes on, largely because there are no Americans in harm’s way—at least not directly.

#### Congress can oversee drones

Naureen Shah et al, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, 2012, “The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions,” Center for Civilians in Conflict, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The\_Civilian\_Impact\_of\_Drones\_w\_cover.pdf

Though hampered in many ways, the oversight committees have sufficient authority to impact the CIA’s activities. Congress controls the CIA’s budget and can thus influence programs, seek changes, or get answers to inquiries.326 One study found that every staffer surveyed recalled at least one instance when an intelligence committee member “threatened to statutorily withhold funding as a lever for sharing of information that would not otherwise have been forthcoming.”327 Congressional staffers can also visit CIA stations and other sites to get facts on the ground, though whether this is possible with regard to the drone program is unknown. Some information about CIA activities is provided only to congressional leaders who are part of the “Gang of Eight”328—leading members of the House and Senate. Many individuals, including members of Congress, have criticized this practice as preventing the intelligence committees from exercising effective oversight.329 Congressional oversight committees reportedly receive extensive briefings from the CIA. According to Senator Diane Feinstein, chair of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee: We receive notification with key details shortly after every strike, and we hold regular briefings and hearings on these operations. Committee staff has held 28 monthly in-depth oversight meetings to review strike records and question every aspect of the program including legality, effectiveness, precision, foreign policy implications and the care taken to minimize noncombatant casualties.330 House and Senate intelligence committee staff reportedly travel monthly to CIA headquarters in Virginia to review drone video and intelligence used to justify strikes.331 Asked about drone strikes in January 2012, Feinstein stated: “[T]here’s no issue that receives more attention and oversight from this committee...than counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”332

#### Theory isn’t sufficient – you need a mechanism to translate theory into practice

Richard Wyn Jones, 1999, “Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory,” ciao

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond grandiose statements of intent. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible account of the mechanisms by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a fatally flawed enterprise.

#### This is uniquely true in the case of the Middle East – policy engagement solves Bush 3.0 – scholars need to speak the language of policy makers – key to public engagement, new perspectives, and peace

Zachary Lockman is Chair of the Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at New York University 2005 “Critique from the Right The Neo-conservative Assault on Middle East Studies” CR: The New Centennial Review 5.1 (2005) 63-110

It may be too soon to tell, but from the vantage point of the first years of the twenty-first century it would seem that area studies has weathered the storms of the immediate post–Cold War period. In large part this may have been because these fields, including Middle East studies as practiced in the United States, were by the 1990s not what they had been 30 years earlier. The sharp decline (within academia, at least) of once dominant paradigms like a cultural-essentialist Orientalism and modernization theory resulted in the dissipation of the intellectual coherence that had characterized the field in its first decades. But the kind of intellectual fragmentation that had come to characterize Middle East studies was the norm across a great many other fields and disciplines and was counterbalanced, probably even outweighed, by the fact that many Middle East specialists, perhaps especially younger scholars, were now not only well versed in the theoretical and methodological issues and debates of their own disciplines but also routinely engaged with innovative work that cut across or transcended disciplinary boundaries. They could thus increasingly manage, without any great difficulty, to participate in productive scholarly conversations not only with their disciplinary colleagues (fellow historians, political scientists, anthropologists, literature specialists, etc.) but also with scholars from other disciplines interested in this part of the world and in others as well. Moreover, because so many scholars working on the Middle East were participants in the scholarly conversations and debates that had transformed broad segments of the humanities and the social sciences in recent decades, Middle East studies had to a considerable extent overcome its [End Page 73] insular and rather backward character and was now much more open to, and engaged with, the wider intellectual world than had once been the case. The developments of the last two or three decades, including the critiques of Orientalism and modernization theory; the broad range of new work on colonialism; innovative approaches to historical, social, and cultural analysis influenced by critical anthropology; and, more broadly, heightened interaction among disciplines and fields had given many within Middle East studies a new set of common languages that facilitated productive intellectual exchange.3 This was also a much more intellectually and politically self-aware and self-critical field than was once the case. As a result, the best of the new work in this field was by the beginning of the twenty-first century very much on a par with the best produced in other area studies fields, and scholars specializing in the Middle East were being read and listened to by scholars specializing in other parts of the world as never before.4 In conjunction with a generally higher level of mastery of relevant languages and the use of innovative theoretical and methodological approaches, scholars in the field were by the late twentieth century also making use of a broader range of sources than in the past. A case in point is work on the history of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. Students and scholars with a command of both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish made increasing use not only of the vast Ottoman imperial archives in Istanbul but also of local Islamic court records and family papers, along with more traditional sources like the writings of European consuls and travelers, to produce portraits of social, political, economic, and cultural life in these lands in the last four hundred years of Ottoman rule of unprecedented depth and complexity.5 These studies helped to undermine what was once conventional wisdom in late Ottoman history, that these lands were economically, socially, and culturally stagnant before Napoleon's army landed in Egypt in 1798; that they were uniformly characterized by despotism, the oppressive and retrograde imposition of Islamic law, and the rigorous segregation and subordination of non-Muslims; and that all real change was induced by contact with the West. Instead, the newer scholarship began to elucidate indigenous sources and dynamics of change while also showing how this [End Page 74] region was part of the broader sweep of world history long before the nineteenth century and the onset of westernization or modernization as conventionally understood. As a result of these scholarly advances, Ottoman historians often came to have much broader and more fully comparative perspectives than historians of early modern Europe, many of whom had only recently come to understand that they needed to overcome their own provincialism by addressing the ways in which developments in Europe were not utterly sui generis but often were bound up with larger patterns and dynamics of change that affected large stretches of Eurasia. Scholars and the State If the preceding assessment is accurate, it is fair to say that the changes that transformed Middle East studies in the United States over the last several decades of the twentieth century made it a more intellectually productive and interesting scholarly field. However, this development was accompanied by a growing gap between academics studying the Middle East and the officials, agencies, and institutions of the U.S. government, and a corresponding decline in the influence of university-based scholars on the shaping of foreign policy and on the media, the main purveyor of information, images, and attitudes about the region to the broad public. For one, a good many (though by no means all) students and scholars in this field were less than happy with U.S. government policies toward the Middle East in the 1980s and beyond. Hard evidence is lacking, but it is probably safe to suggest that much of the membership of the Middle East Studies Association, the field's main professional organization, was not enthusiastic about U.S. support for Saddam Hussein's regime in its war against Iran in the 1980s, the U.S.-led Gulf War of 1991, the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq thereafter, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, or, more broadly, the extent to which successive U.S. administrations countenanced Israel's ongoing occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem; its continuing implantation of Jewish settlements there; and its rejection of a Palestinian state in those territories as endorsed by virtually the entire international community. There was a widespread (though never universal) [End Page 75] sense that the policies pursued by the United States in the Middle East were hindering, rather than contributing to, peace, democracy, human rights, development, and progress in the region. This disaffection from official policy and the premises that underpinned it did not mean that U.S.-based scholars studying the Middle East were unwilling to share their perspectives on, and try to influence, U.S. policy toward the region. In fact, many devoted a great deal of time and effort to trying to educate the broader public through informal meetings, lectures, articles, op-ed pieces, radio and television interviews, and the like, and to convey their views to elected officials; not a few were also quite willing to meet with State Department and intelligence agency personnel. It is rather that the shared vision of the world, and of the place of the United States within it, that had once linked the world of academia with the world of policymaking had faded, and many scholars no longer spoke the same language as policymakers. Adding to this sense of distance and alienation was a new and much more critical understanding of the proper relationship between scholars and the state—not a surprising development in the aftermath of a period in which the pernicious ends to which scholarly knowledge could be put had been made all too visible, in Vietnam but elsewhere as well. In the first decades of the Cold War a good many scholars in this as in other area studies fields, especially social scientists working on contemporary issues, saw no problem with conducting research on behalf of the government and cooperating with intelligence agencies because they were all part of the good fight against Communism. By the 1980s those who were assuming the leadership in U.S. Middle East studies were by and large much more wary about their sources of funding and the ends to which their training and research, and that of their students, might be put. Fewer scholars were willing to allow what they knew about the region to be used in the service of a state about whose policies they were often at least dubious, for example, by conducting research for agencies like the CIA or by encouraging promising students to enter government service. There developed a widespread sense that to allow one's research agenda to be determined by the needs of the state or to serve potentially pernicious ends was not only a betrayal of one's [End Page 76] integrity as a scholar but might also compromise one's ability to conduct research in the Middle East, where by the 1980s real or alleged CIA connections had gotten Americans and others denounced, kidnapped, or worse. At issue was not government funding per se: since the passage of the National Defense Education Act in 1958, a great many students and scholars working on the Middle East had happily made use of NDFL/FLAS and other government fellowships for language training, graduate study, and research. A large proportion of the budgets of the centers for Middle East studies at universities around the country also came from the federal government. But because this individual and institutional funding came through the U.S. Department of Education it was deemed ethically and politically acceptable even by those who most vociferously disagreed with U.S. government policies in the Middle East. Similarly, additional government funding for graduate student and faculty research on the Middle East first made available by the 1992 Near and Middle East Research and Training Act—originally channeled through the Social Science Research Council and later through the Council of American Overseas Research Centers—was not seen as posing a problem because the funding was allocated first through the U.S. Information Agency and then through the State Department budget. The real issue was which part of the U.S. government was supplying the funding, for what ends, and with what conditions. As early as 1985 the Middle East Studies Association had asked "university-based international studies programs to refrain from responding to requests for research contract proposals from the Defense Academic Research Support Program [established by the Defense Department to fund academic research on issues of interest to the military] or from other intelligence entities and call[ed] upon its members to reflect carefully upon their responsibilities to the academic profession prior to seeking or accepting funding from intelligence sources."6 Some years later MESA also criticized the new National Security Education Program (NSEP), created by the National Security Education Act of 1991. The NSEP sought to bolster the teaching of "less commonly taught" languages (including Arabic, Persian, and Turkish), thereby enabling (as the [End Page 77] program's website put it) "the nation to remain integrally involved in global issues related to U.S. National Security" as well as to "develop a cadre of professionals with more than the traditional knowledge of language and culture who can use this ability to help the U.S. make sound decisions on and deal effectively with global issues related to U.S. National Security" (see the NSEP website at http://www.iie.org/programs/nsep/nsephome.htm). Unlike other programs funding research and training on the Middle East, the NSEP was housed in the Department of Defense, intelligence agency officials sat on its oversight board, and recipients of the funding it offered were required to work for a government agency involved in national security affairs after their fellowship or scholarship was completed. In a 1993 resolution endorsed by a referendum of its membership, MESA joined with the African Studies Association and the Latin American Studies Association to "deplore the location of responsibility in the U.S. defense and intelligence community for a major foreign area research, education, and training program. . . . This connection can only increase the existing difficulties of gaining foreign governmental permissions to carry out research and to develop overseas instructional programs. It can also create dangers for students and scholars by fostering the perception of involvement in military or intelligence activities, and may limit academic freedom." MESA called on the government to establish a peer and merit review process for funding applications that would be independent of military, intelligence, and foreign policy agencies and to broaden the service requirement so that it would include a much wider range of jobs, including those outside government service. Until its concerns were met, MESA urged that "its members and their institutions not seek or accept program or research funding from NSEA...." Three years later MESA adopted yet another resolution reiterating its rejection of NSEP because the law appropriating funding for the program now required that all fellowship recipients agree to work for the Defense Department or some intelligence agency for at least two years or else repay the cost of their fellowship (see the NSEP website, as well as the MESA resolutions site at http://w3fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/resolutions.htm). (This last requirement was later relaxed somewhat so that recipients who [End Page 78] could not find employment with a national security agency despite a "good faith effort" to do so could fulfill the service requirement by working in higher education.) MESA would voice the same concerns about other outgrowths of the NSEP, for example, the 2002 National Flagship Language Initiative–Pilot Program (NFLI-P), launched to address what were seen as America's extraordinary deficiencies in languages critical to national security. Many (though by no means all) Middle East studies faculty adopted MESA's perspective on this issue, declining to seek NSEP funding for themselves or their institutions. The disinclination by MESA and many of its individual and institutional members to cooperate with the government in ways that had been common in the 1950s and 1960s was certainly not shared by everyone in the field. Yet it is instructive that when in the 1980s reports surfaced of questionable links between academics and intelligence agencies, the most vocal response among scholars in the field was condemnation. A case in point is the scandal surrounding Nadav Safran, a political scientist whose first book set forth an analysis of modern Egyptian history informed by modernization theory and who by the mid-1980s was director of Harvard University's Center for Middle Eastern Studies. The scandal erupted when it became known that Safran had taken $45,700 from the Central Intelligence Agency to fund a major international conference he was hosting at Harvard on "Islam and Politics in the Contemporary Muslim World"—a hot topic at the time and one of obvious interest to the CIA. Not only had Safran secretly used CIA funding for this conference, he had not told the invitees, a number of whom were coming from the Middle East, that the CIA was picking up the tab. It then came out that Safran had also received a $107,430 grant from the CIA for the research project that led to his 1985 book Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Request for Security. Safran's contract with the CIA stipulated that the agency had the right to review and approve the manuscript before publication and that its role in funding the book would not be disclosed. And indeed, the book as published made no mention of the fact that the research for it had been partially funded by the CIA. When the scandal broke, about half the invitees to Safran's conference withdrew, and many of the faculty and students associated with Harvard's [End Page 79] Center for Middle Eastern Studies publicly expressed their opposition to Safran's actions. A month later the Middle East Studies Association censured Safran on the grounds that his actions had violated its 1982 resolution calling on scholars to disclose their sources of research funding. Safran intimated that his critics were motivated by anti-Semitism, but after an internal investigation at Harvard he agreed to step down as center director at the end of the academic year.7 Safran was surely not the only academic to have secretly or openly solicited or accepted funding from an intelligence agency for his research in this period, and no doubt such relationships persisted long after this scandal, but the reaction to it—unimaginable in the early decades of U.S. Middle East studies—does indicate how the relationship between academia and the state had changed. Think Tanks and Talking Heads But there was a price to be paid for the gap that had opened up between the world of Middle East scholarship and the world of policymaking. If many college- and university-based academics no longer entirely shared the worldview that prevailed in Washington or no longer felt the need to shape their research agenda so that it was relevant to the policies that flowed from that worldview, there were others who stood ready to meet the demand for knowledge that would serve the state. Many of these were based not in institutions of higher education but in the host of think tanks that had proliferated from the 1970s onward—privately funded institutions oriented toward the production and dissemination of knowledge designed to inform and influence public policy, for our purposes mainly the foreign policy of the United States. Some of these institutions and organizations went back a long way. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for example, was founded in 1910 to advance international cooperation, while the Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of the influential journal Foreign Affairs, was established in 1921, originally as a sort of elite dinner club. The liberal Brookings Institution was established in 1927, supported by Carnegie and Rockefeller funding, while the conservative American Enterprise Institute was founded [End Page 80] in 1943 to promote "limited government," "free enterprise," and a "strong foreign policy and national defense." After the Second World War, contractors like the huge RAND Corporation entered the field to produce or fund research for the military and intelligence and other government agencies concerned with foreign policy. Another wave beginning in the 1960s had witnessed the establishment of a large number of what one observer called "advocacy" think tanks, like the Center for Strategic and International Studies (1962), the Heritage Foundation (1973), and the Cato Institute (1977), which combined "policy research with aggressive marketing techniques" as they struggled to secure funding and influence in an increasingly competitive marketplace. There are now also many "legacy-based" institutions, like the Carter Center in Atlanta and the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom in Washington, D.C. By the end of the twentieth century there were an estimated 2,000 organizations engaged in policy analysis based in the United States, a substantial proportion of them focused on foreign policy and international relations.8 The 1970s also witnessed the establishment of what Lisa Anderson called "a new generation of professional graduate schools of public policy," many of whose graduates went on to work for policy-oriented think tanks rather than in colleges and universities (Anderson 2000, 21). The Middle East was a relative backwater for the think tank industry until the 1980s. The Middle East Institute, founded in 1946, published a journal and organized conferences but exercised relatively little political clout. By contrast, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), founded in 1985, quickly achieved a much higher profile and much greater influence. Describing itself as "a public educational foundation dedicated to scholarly research and informed debate on U.S. interests in the Middle East,"9 WINEP emerged as the leading pro-Israel think tank in Washington. Its founding director, Martin Indyk, had previously worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), founded in 1959 and by the 1970s by far the most well-funded, visible, and effective pro-Israel lobbying organization.10 Indyk and his colleagues at WINEP worked hard to strengthen Israel's standing in Washington as the key U.S. ally in the Middle East and to ensure [End Page 81] that U.S. policy in the region coincided with the policies and strategies of the Israeli government. During the late 1980s and early 1990s this meant trying to foil U.S. recognition of the PLO and U.S. pressure on Israel to halt settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza and enter serious negotiations. In the 1990s WINEP expanded its purview to encompass the entire Middle East, but its focus always remained on Israel, for which it tried to build support by arguing that Israel and the United States faced a common threat from Islamic radicalism and terrorism, defined rather broadly to encompass virtually all of Israel's enemies, state and nonstate. Various other think tanks also began or stepped up research and advocacy on Middle East issues in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These included the Haim Saban Center for Middle East Policy, launched by the Brookings Institution in 2002, and the conservative American Enterprise Institute. During the Clinton administration a substantial number of WINEP alumni served in key foreign policy positions, including Martin Indyk himself, appointed as special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council and, later, as U.S. ambassador to Israel. They and other Clinton administration officials promulgated the policy of "dual containment," whereby the United States would seek to isolate, and if possible eliminate, the governments of both Iraq and Iran, not coincidentally perceived as two of Israel's most serious enemies. By the late 1990s, however, WINEP would itself be outflanked by newer rivals that unlike WINEP openly aligned themselves with the stances of the Israeli right (or even far right) and argued for aggressive U.S. action against Israel's enemies, including the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The policies these and other explicitly right-wing think tanks advocated during the Clinton years, when they were in the political wilderness, were initially regarded as extreme and outlandish. But many of them would eventually be adopted by the George W. Bush administration, in which their architects assumed key posts. Among them were Vice President Richard Cheney; Defense Policy Board member (and for a time chair) Richard Perle, a key advocate of war against Iraq; Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; Undersecretary of State John Bolton; and Undersecretary [End Page 82] of Defense Douglas Feith. Before assuming power these (people) men and their colleagues had, through such right-wing organizations as the Project for a New American Century and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, called for the use of U.S. military power to dominate the world, massive increases in military spending, and unequivocal support for the policies of the Israeli right.11 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush openly embraced much of their agenda, tacitly supporting Israel's effort to crush the Palestinian uprising by force and in March-April 2003 invading and occupying Iraq. The first years of the twenty-first century thus witnessed an unprecedented convergence in positions of supreme power in Washington of right-wing (and in some cases Christian fundamentalist) zealots and neo-conservative American Jews united by a common vision of securing permanent and unchallengeable U.S. global hegemony, with a strong focus on the Middle East and a close embrace of Israel, a vision to be achieved by military force if necessary. The war against Iraq was in a sense the pilot project for this radical vision. As Michael Ledeen, in 2003 "resident scholar in the Freedom Chair" at the American Enterprise Institute and long a fixture among right-wing foreign-policy activists, was reported to have put it, crudely but not inaccurately: "Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business" (Goldberg 2002). More specifically, a reconstructed, oil-rich Iraq was seen as a valuable new base for U.S. power in the Middle East, enabling the United States to terminate its problematic relationship with Saudi Arabia and compel the Arabs (including the Palestinians) to make peace with Israel on the latter's terms. That the vast majority of the international community, including a great many Americans, vehemently rejected the use of military force to achieve this vision made no difference whatsoever to its advocates.12 There were certainly voices raised, in academia, the think tank world, and elsewhere, in opposition to this agenda and the understanding of the world that underpinned it, as there had been voices offering alternative views about U.S. policy toward the Middle East at other critical junctures. But during the 1980s, 1990s, and early years of the twenty-first century [End Page 83] these voices received relatively little attention, and university-based scholars seemed to play a decreasing role in influencing foreign policy. Critics of U.S. foreign policy also found it difficult to make themselves heard through the mass media. It is striking that the great bulk of the "talking heads" who appeared on television to offer their opinions on the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, on the 2003 Iraq war, and on other issues relating to the Middle East and U.S. policy toward it seemed to come not from academia but from professional pundits, from people associated with think tanks or with one of the public policy schools, and from retired military personnel. Whatever their knowledge (or lack thereof) of the languages, politics, histories, and cultures of the Middle East, these people spoke the language and shared the mindset of the Washington foreign policy world in a way few university-based scholars did. They were also used to communicating their perspective in effective sound bites, whereas academics were often put off by the ignorance and political conformism of much (though by no means all) of American mass media journalism and its tendency to crudely oversimplify complex issues and transform everything (even war) into a form of entertainment. This helped bring about a considerable narrowing of the perspectives available to the public and the consolidation of a powerful, indeed almost impenetrable, consensus about the Middle East that encompassed most of the political class and the punditocracy. Republicans and Democrats argued mainly over how best to maintain U.S. hegemony in the region, leaving very little room for those who envisioned a fundamentally different foreign policy founded on peace, democracy, human rights, mutual security, multilateral disarmament, nonintervention, and respect for international law. It is, however, worth noting that despite the virtual absence of such views in the mass media, they were embraced by a good many Americans, as evidenced by the massive demonstrations that preceded the U.S. attack on Iraq in March 2003 and the polls that indicated substantial public opposition to war, partly because of the new modes and channels of communication and organizing made possible by the Internet. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of September 11th, critical (and even moderate) voices were largely drowned out by the right, which quickly and effectively moved to implement its global agenda by exploiting public [End Page 84] outrage against the Islamist extremists who had perpetrated the September 11th attacks. They succeeded in "selling" first military intervention in Afghanistan (justified by the fact that the Taliban regime had allowed al-Qa'ida to operate in that country and refused to hand over those responsible for organizing the September 11th attacks) and then war against Iraq, even though no one was able to produce any credible evidence that the regime of Saddam Hussein had had anything to do with the September 11th attacks or still possessed weapons of mass destruction. In this effort conservative scholars like Bernard Lewis played a significant part, graphically illustrating their continuing, even enhanced, clout in right-wing policymaking circles long after their standing in scholarly circles had declined, as well as the durability and power of some very old Orientalist notions many had mistakenly thought dead as a doornail.

#### Technical solutions good – arms control proves we don’t need to have total political change to solve problems

Steven F. Hayward, the F. K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow at AEI, 10-16-2006, “The Fate of the Earth in the Balance,’ AEI, http://www.aei.org/article/society-and-culture/the-fate-of-the-earth-in-the-balance/

\ Today, climate change is said to threaten the same things, only more slowly. It is remarkable how similarly the leading advocates for these two problems understand and conceptualize them. In the case of both the arms race then and climate change today, we are told that the issue is ultimately philosophical in nature, and that wholesale changes in our philosophical perspective must necessarily precede political and policy remedies to the problem. Should this perspective be taken seriously? What can it really mean? The Fate of the Earth in the Balance The peculiarity of this approach to major global problems is best seen by comparing the two leading popular books on each issue, Jonathan Schell’s 1982 bestseller The Fate of the Earth, and Al Gore’s 1991 bestseller Earth in the Balance (whose main arguments reappear in truncated form in An Inconvenient Truth). It is not just the titles that are strikingly similar; a close reading reveals the two books to be identical in their overarching philosophy.[5] In both, mankind is poised on the abyss, facing, in Gore’s words, “the most serious threat that we have ever faced,”[6] or “the nearness of extinction,”[7] to use only one of Schell’s many apocalyptic formulations. (An index entry--“despair; see also futility”[8]--conveys the mood better than any quotation from the main text.) In fact, if one substitutes “global warming” for “nuclear weapons” in the text of Fate of the Earth, the result is so shockingly close to Earth in the Balance that one could almost make out a case for plagiarism on Gore’s part. Perhaps some publisher will have the wit to meld the two books into one: The Fate of the Earth in the Balance. But such a combination is not necessary. The two books directly intersect in several places. Gore writes, for example, that: the political will that led to mass protests against escalating the arms race during the early 1980s came from a popular awareness that civilization seemed to be pulled toward the broad lip of a downslope leading to a future catastrophe--nuclear war--that would crush human history forever into a kind of black hole. . . . This is not unlike the challenge we face today in the global environmental crisis. The potential for true catastrophe lies in the future, but the downslope that pulls us toward it is becoming recognizably steeper with each passing year.[9] In this, Gore was only returning the favor to Schell, who occasionally paused long enough from his lament over nuclear catastrophe to include a few nods to ecocatastrophe. For his part, Schell mentions “global heating through an increased ‘greenhouse effect,’” adding: The nuclear peril is usually seen in isolation from the threats to other forms of life and their ecosystems, but in fact should be seen as the very center of the ecological crisis--as the cloud-covered Everest of which the more immediate, visible kinds of harm to the environment are the mere foothills. Both the effort to preserve the environment and the effort to save the species from extinction by nuclear arms would be enriched and strengthened by this recognition.[10] Both books display an affectation for gilding their arguments with lots of brief references to major thinkers from a wide variety of disciplines. Consider Schell on Heisenberg: The famous uncertainty principle, formulated by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg, has shown that our knowledge of atomic phenomena is limited because the experimental procedures with which we must carry out our observations inevitably interfere with the phenomena that we wish to measure. Schell applies Heisenberg’s scientific insight to all forms of human investigation, writing that “a limit to our knowledge is fixed by the fact that we are incarnate beings, not disembodied spirits.”[11] The supposed separation from nature implied by Heisenberg’s idea limits our appreciation for both nature and our predicament. Gore follows down the same track: Earlier this century, the Heisenberg Principle established that the very act of observing a natural phenomenon can change what is being observed. Although the initial theory was limited in practice to special cases in subatomic physics, the philosophical implications were and are staggering. It is now apparent that since Descartes reestablished the Platonic notion and began the scientific revolution, human civilization has been experiencing a kind of Heisenberg Principle writ large. . . . [T]he world of intellect is assumed to be separate from the physical world.[12] Gore opens his hit movie and companion book An Inconvenient Truth with an homage to the famous photo of the Earth taken from the moon by the Apollo 8 astronauts in 1968. This image, he tells us, played a key role in galvanizing the world’s environmental consciousness, underscoring the fragility of the planet. As he put it fulsomely in Earth in the Balance: Those first striking pictures taken by the Apollo astronauts of the earth floating in the blackness of space were so deeply moving because they enabled us to see our planet from a new perspective--a perspective from which the preciousness and fragile beauty of the earth was suddenly clear.[13] Schell uses the same trope: As it happens, our two roles in the nuclear predicament have been given visual representation in the photographs of the earth that we have taken with the aid of another technical device of our time, the spaceship. These pictures illustrate, on the one hand, our mastery over nature, which has enabled us to take up a position in the heavens and look back on the earth as though it were just one more celestial body, and, on the other, our weakness and frailty in the face of that mastery, which we cannot help feeling when we see the smallness, solitude, and delicate beauty of our planetary home.[14] These are only a few of the many examples that can be drawn of both books’ derivative and allusive nature. Both authors offer up references to Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Francis Bacon, Einstein, Descartes, and Hannah Arendt in what might be called, to paraphrase Arendt, the banality of promiscuous allusion, all to bolster a superficial philosophical or anthropological point that is far distant from the politics and policy of either issue. Most troubling is that both authors depict dissent from their point of view to be a pathology of some kind, foreclosing that there could be any rational basis for a different point of view. Gore compares dissenters to his view of our environmental predicament to garden-variety substance abusers, arguing that people who are oblivious to our “collision” with nature are “enablers” who are “helping to ensure that the addictive behavior continues. The psychological mechanism of denial is complex, but again addiction serves as a model.”[15] Elsewhere Gore compares our “dysfunctional civilization” to dysfunctional families, whose members suffer from “a serious psychological disorder.” While Gore begins this discussion by saying that family dysfunctionality is a metaphor, he ends by applying the concept literally: “The model of the dysfunctional family has a direct bearing on our ways of thinking about the environment.”[16] Schell is close aboard: “A society that systematically shuts its eyes to an urgent peril to its physical survival and fails to take any steps to save itself cannot be called psychologically well.”[17] Both authors call for making their particular issue the paramount global priority in the same terms. Gore argues that “we must make the environment the central organizing principle [emphasis added] for civilization. . . . [T]he tide in this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join in an all-out effort.”[18] Schell wrote, “If we felt the peril for what it is--an urgent threat to our whole human substance--we would let it become the organizing principle [emphasis added] of our global collective existence: the foundation on which the world was built.”[19] Having laid the groundwork for a wholesale change in our priorities, both Schell and Gore are surprisingly light on the social and political architecture of their alternative world. This is explicitly so in Schell’s case: “I have not sought to define a political solution to the nuclear predicament. . . . I have left to others those awesome, urgent tasks.”[20] Gore’s approach is better supported; he offers a laundry list of specific policy recommendations mostly on energy and resource use, but it falls far short of his desired “wrenching transformation” of civilization. If the broader solution to our predicament is not clear even in outline, it is because neither author fully grasps the magnitude of the critique he is making, such that a political solution--at least, a solution that is compatible with liberal democracy--is impossible. Neither man understands why. The Real Source for The Fate of the Earth in the Balance Despite the parade of quotes and references from Plato and Arendt, there is one thinker conspicuously absent from both Schell and Gore’s numerous citations but whose spirit is present on almost every page of both books: Martin Heidegger. Perhaps the absence of a reference to Heidegger is due to reticence or discretion, given Heidegger’s dubious and complicated association with Nazism. Nothing derails an argument faster than playing the reductio ad Hitlerum card. More likely it is the abstruse and difficult character of Heidegger’s arguments; Gore and Schell may not realize how closely the core of their argument about the technological alienation of man from nature tracks Heidegger’s more thorough account in his famous 1953 essay “The Question Concerning Technology.”[21] Heidegger asks, “What is modern technology?” His understanding of technology is sometimes rendered in translation as “technicity” to convey a defective way of knowing about phenomena, and to distinguish the term from its more common usage to mean mere scientific instrumentality (think gadgets). Heidegger believed that our mode of objectifying nature alienates mankind from perceiving and contemplating pure “Being.” Whatever this may mean--and even Heidegger’s followers admit it is obscure (Heidegger himself wrote that “we are asking about something which we barely grasp”[22])--Heidegger suggests that philosophy has been asking the wrong questions since the very beginning, and the culmination of this wrong track is modern technology, which completes the alienation of man from nature. This is where Heidegger prepares the way for Gore. Modern technology, according to Heidegger, puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. . . . The earth now reveals itself as a coal-mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears different from how it did when to set in order still meant to take of and maintain. . . . But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [italics in original] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use.[23] Here are Gore’s parallel passages: [O]ur civilization is holding ever more tightly to its habit of consuming larger and larger quantities every year of coal, oil, fresh air and water, trees, topsoil, and the thousand other substances we rip from the crust of the earth. . . . We seem increasingly eager to lose ourselves in the forms of culture, society, technology, the media, and the rituals of production and consumption, but the price we pay is a loss of our spiritual lives.[24] And: Our seemingly compulsive need to control the natural world . . . has driven us to the edge of disaster, for we have become so successful at controlling nature than we have lost our connection to it.[25] It is possible to compile a long inventory of close parallels between Heidegger and Gore. For example, Heidegger told interviewers in 1966: [T]echnicity increasingly dislodges man and uproots him from the earth. . . . The last 30 years have made it clearer that the planet-wide movement of modern technicity is a power whose magnitude in determining [our] history can hardly be overestimated.[26] Heidegger also found the earth-from-space photos as affecting as Gore and Schell: I don’t know if you were shocked, but [certainly] I was shocked when a short time ago I saw the pictures of the earth taken from the moon. We do not need atom bombs at all [to uproot us]--the uprooting of man is already here. All our relationships have become merely technical ones. It is no longer upon an earth than man lives today.[27] Gore likes to cite the supposed proverb that the Chinese symbol for “crisis” also means “opportunity.” Heidegger was fond of quoting a line from the German poet Hölderlin: “Where danger lies, there too grows the chance for salvation.” And is it necessary to mention that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle also shows up for duty in Heidegger’s essay on technology? Heidegger is often said to have advocated a return to pre-Socratic philosophy, though in fact he was skeptical that there was any philosophical solution to the problem he perceived. Gore follows Heidegger closely when he criticizes Plato and the Western philosophic tradition for preparing the ground for modern man’s estrangement from nature: The strange absence of emotion, the banal face of evil so often manifested by mass technological assaults on the global environment, is surely a consequence of the belief in an underlying separation of intellect from the physical world. At the root of this belief lies a heretical understanding of humankind’s place in the world as old as Plato, as seductive in its mythic appeal as Gnosticism, as compelling as the Cartesian promise of Promethean power--and it has led to tragic results.[28] Political Implications Assuming for the purposes of discussion that Gore’s Heideggerian analysis is correct, can a reconnection of intellect and the physical world be accomplished through politics--or led by politicians? Heidegger did not think so, which is why he said it would be impossible for him to write an ethical or political treatise.[29] He doubted democracy offered any hope. In an interview late in life, Heidegger said, “For me today it is a decisive question as to how any political system--and which one--can be adapted to an epoch of technicity. I know of no answer to this question. I am not convinced that it is democracy.”[30] Heidegger was contemptuous of postwar democratic reforms--calling them “halfway measures”--including individual constitutional rights, because: I do not see in them any actual confrontation with the world of technicity, inasmuch as behind them all, according to my view, stands the conception that technicity in its essence is something that man holds within his own hands. Heidegger thought American democracy was the most hopeless of all, in words that sound in substance exactly like Gore’s complaint: [Americans] are still caught up in a thought that, under the guise of pragmatism, facilitates the technical operation and manipulation [of things], but at the same time blocks the way to reflection upon the genuine nature of modern technicity.[31] (Separately, Heidegger wrote that America epitomized “the emerging monstrousness of modern times.”[32]) From here it is possible to comprehend more dispassionately Heidegger’s attraction to the Nazi movement in the 1930s. He had no brief for fascism in general or National Socialism in particular, nor was he an anti-Semite.[33] What he expressed in his famous “Rector’s Address”[34] in 1934 was that the “inner truth and greatness” of the Nazi movement was its potential “encounter between technicity on the planetary level and modern man,” and that it “casts its net in these troubled waters of ‘values’ and ‘totalities,’” or, as he put it a 1948 letter to Herbert Marcuse, “a spiritual renewal of life in its entirety.”[35] In other words, the “wrenching transformation” of Germany that the Nazi revolution set in motion held the potential for reconnecting humankind with the essence of Being in a primal, pre-Socratic way. Heidegger’s moral blindness to the phenomenon in front of him exposes the hazard of an excessively abstract approach to human existence. As Heidegger’s example shows, the idea of transforming human consciousness through politics is likely an extremist--and potentially totalitarian--project. Reviewing the fundamentally Heideggerian understanding of our environmental predicament in Gore’s thought throws new light on the deeper meaning of Gore’s call for a “wrenching transformation” of civilization on the level of thought. Gore would no doubt be sincerely horrified at the suggested parallel between his themes and Heidegger’s moral blindness toward political extremism, and rightly reject it as the implication of his views. He is, thankfully, too imbued with the innate American democratic tradition to embrace any such extremism.[36] But it is fair to ask whether he has fully thought through the implications of his ambitious critique. In the case of both Gore and Schell before him, the Heideggerian approach reveals a certain cast of mind: deeply pessimistic, but utopian at the same time. Our salvation demands submitting to the moral authority of their “vision” to change our “consciousness.” After all, one aspect of Plato that Heidegger approves of is the view that mankind will suffer unremitting disaster until either rulers become philosophers or philosophers become rulers. (Indeed it was the failure of intellectuals to guide the Nazi movement that led to its ruin, Heidegger thought.) Gore seems to be making a round trip, looking to end up on either end of this potentiality, envisioning himself either as a ruler who has become a philosopher or as a philosopher who may yet (again) become a ruler. Is it so farfetched to suggest that this has some problematic, if unintended, political implications? One of Gore’s sound and important arguments in Earth in the Balance and An Inconvenient Truth is that it is a profound error to suppose that the earth’s environment is so robust that there is little or nothing that mankind could do to damage it seriously. He is right, as was Heidegger, to point out the immense earthshaking power of modern technology. But there is a symmetrical observation to be made of Gore’s metaphysical approach to the problem, which is that it is an equally profound error to suppose that the environment of human liberty is so robust that there is no political intervention on behalf of the environment that could not damage liberty in serious ways, especially if the environment is elevated to the central organizing principle of civilization. Implicit in this goal is downgrading human liberty as the central organizing principle of civilization. There are no index entries in Earth in the Balance for “liberty,” “freedom,” or “individualism.” Heidegger believed the liberal conceptions of these great terms were meaningless or without foundation. There is no acknowledgement in Gore’s book that this is even a serious consideration. Gore’s one discussion of the matter is not reassuring: In fact, what many feel is a deep philosophical crisis in the West has occurred in part because this balance [between rights and responsibilities] has been disrupted: we have tilted so far toward individual rights and so far away from any sense of obligation that it is now difficult to muster an adequate defense of any rights vested in the community at large or the nation--much less rights properly vested in all humankind or in posterity.[37] But Is It Necessary? Is Gore’s high-level metaphysical analysis necessary in the first place? Do we really have to resolve or unwind the problem of Platonic idealism and Cartesian dualism to address the problem of climate change? The example of the previous case in point--the arms race--suggests an answer. The arms race did not require a revolution in human consciousness or a transformation of national and global political institutions to bring about rapid and favorable changes. The kind of grandiose, pretentious thinking exemplified in Fate of the Earth played little or no role in these shifts. The problem turned out to be much simpler. The acute problem of the superpower arms race was mostly a moral problem--not a metaphysical problem--arising from the character of the irreconcilable regimes. As was frequently pointed out, the United States never worried about British or French nuclear weapons. Once the United States and the Soviet Union were able to establish a level of trust and common interest, unwinding the arms race became a relatively easy matter. Nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear proliferation in unsavory regimes (Iran, North Korea) is still around today, but the acute existential threat of the arms race has receded substantially. In the early 1980s, The Fate of the Earth became the Bible for the nuclear freeze movement--the simplistic idea brought to you by the same people who thought Ronald Reagan was a simpleton. To his credit, then representative and later senator Gore opposed the nuclear freeze. Nowadays Gore has started to call for an immediate freeze on greenhouse-gas emissions, which he must know is unrealistic. His explanation in a recent speech shows that he missed entirely the lesson from that earlier episode: An immediate freeze [on CO2 emissions] has the virtue of being clear, simple, and easy to understand. It can attract support across partisan lines as a logical starting point for the more difficult work that lies ahead. I remember a quarter century ago when I was the author of a complex nuclear arms control plan to deal with the then rampant arms race between our country and the former Soviet Union. At the time, I was strongly opposed to the nuclear freeze movement, which I saw as simplistic and naive. But, three-quarters of the American people supported it--and as I look back on those years I see more clearly now that the outpouring of public support for that very simple and clear mandate changed the political landscape and made it possible for more detailed and sophisticated proposals to eventually be adopted.[38] The irony of this statement is that since the moral and political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union could not be resolved diplomatically, the way to move relations forward was to convert relations into a technical problem (i.e., negotiations over the number and specifications of weapons systems). Gore remained firmly within the technocratic arms-control community throughout this period, even as Schell and others tried to moralize the arms-control problem with the nuclear freeze proposal. But the moral confusion (some critics said the premise of moral equivalence) of the freeze idea made it a sideshow at best and a hindrance at worst. On the contrary, President Reagan’s resistance to the freeze, as well as the conventions of the arms-control process to which Gore held, were crucial to his strategy for changing the dynamic of the arms race.

#### We need to evaluate consequences

Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, Spring 2002, Dissent, vol. 49, no. 2

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

#### Pragmatism is the best lens for evaluating policies – evaluate the goodness of an advocacy through experimentation and practice, not abstract theoretical criteria

Joel Mintz, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law Center; Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation, 2004, “Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a Guide to Environmental Protection,” 31 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, Lexis.

Philosophical pragmatism, as initially articulated by William James and other early twentieth century academics, is, in one sense, an attitude or method of thought. n4 It emphasizes a focus on facts and consequences, as opposed to theories and principles. n5 As James explained it, pragmatism stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save for its method. . . . It lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man writing an atheistic volume; in the next some one on his knees praying for faith and strength; in a third a chemist investigating a body's properties. In a fourth a system of idealistic metaphysics is being excogitated; in a fifth the impossibility of metaphysics is being shown. But they all own the corridor, and all must pass through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of their respective rooms. n6 In addition to being a method of thought--with sufficient flexibility to appeal to individuals who have divergent views in many respects, as noted above--philosophical pragmatism is also distinguished by its experiential, provisional, and pluralistic notion of truth. n7 In William James's words: Pragmatism . . . asks its usual question. "Grant an idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?" The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those that we can not. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as. n8 [\*4] Richard Rorty takes a relatively similar view. n9 In his introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty states that "a pragmatist theory about truth . . . says that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory about. For pragmatists, 'truth' is just the name of a property which all true statements share." n10 Rorty believes that there is little of significance to be said about this common property of true statements. n11 He thus feels that the Platonic tradition, with its emphasis on fixed, a priori notions of Truth and Goodness, has "outlived its usefulness." n12 John Dewey, another highly influential pragmatist, expressed his theory of truth in like fashion. n13 Dewey wrote, "Truth is a collection of truths; and these constituent truths are in the keeping and testing as to matters-of-fact." n14 For Dewey as well, knowledge was to be grasped from the concrete particulars of experience, rather than logically deduced by abstract reasoning or transcendentally revealed. n15 Another closely related common feature of philosophical pragmatism is its firm rejection of rigid canons and dogmatic beliefs. n16 As James put it, as an intellectual approach pragmatism is "a mediator and a reconciler. . . . She has, in fact, no prejudices whatever, no obstructive dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof. She is completely genial. She will entertain any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence." n17 In keeping with this doctrinal flexibility, philosophical pragmatism puts considerable emphasis upon indeterminacy and the limitations of human understanding. n18 As Kelly A. Parker has noted, for the pragmatist "there is an irreducible pluralism in the world we encounter. There is [also] the idea (supported by contemporary physics) that indeterminacy and chance are real features of the world. Change, development and novelty are everywhere the rule." n19 [\*5] Pragmatic notions of ethics also emphasize change, development, and pluralism. n20 Pragmatists generally reject universally valid ethical theories. n21 Pragmatists believe that as the world evolves, and human societies grow and change, new kinds of ethical dilemmas emerge. n22 To solve them, people need to develop new methods of understanding what is right and wrong. n23 As Kelly Parker has written: Pragmatism maintains that no set of ethical concepts can be the absolute foundation for evaluating the rightness of our actions. . . . [Instead,] the aim of ethics is not perfect rightness . . . but rather creative mediation of conflicting claims to value, aimed at making life on the planet relatively better than it is. n24 Pragmatic ideas regarding ethics are further manifested in the area of social and political thought. n25 For John Dewey and other pragmatists, social and political institutions exist (or should exist) to provide for the needs of individuals. n26 The worth of projects is to be judged by the extent of their conformity to social needs. n27 Moreover, since human needs and social circumstances are frequently in flux, social institutions need frequent reform. n28 This can be best accomplished where diverse individuals participate actively and regularly in public affairs, so that society as a whole may take advantage of their diverse experience and intelligence. n29 Finally, in its social outlook and elsewhere, philosophical pragmatism places an especially high value on experimentation. n30 For pragmatists, "because the public consists of a vast plurality of people and things valued, and because the world is changing at every moment, the ways and means of best providing for the individual and common good have to be experimentally determined." n31 Rather than being measured [\*6] against some objective, impersonal set of abstract criteria, social projects are to be tested by their human consequences and their fulfillment of practical social needs. n32 What works is what benefits people; what benefits people can often be determined by thoughtful experimentation with new and untried social institutions and arrangements. n33