Tournament: Browning | Round: 3 | Opponent: Kansas City Kansas CC Casas-Gonzaba | Judge: Wunderlich
1AC – Heg
Plan
Plan: The United States Federal Government ought to substantially increase judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by designating District Court judges to approve or reject targeted killings involving the use of drone strikes based on a strict scrutiny test.
Solvency
Contention 1 is solvency
Authority of District Courts judges are key to solve – they’re fast and effective
Rushforth 12 Elinor June, Fall, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, There's An App For That: Implications Of Armed Drone Attacks And Personality Strikes By The United States Against Non-Citizens, 2004-2012, .D. candidate, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, Class of 2013
Regardless of the type of judicial mechanism used to ensure the lawfulness of a targeted killing, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court should designate district court judges from every region where CIA drone operators are stationed, with several in the District of Columbia. These judges will preside over courts with jurisdiction to "hear applications and grant orders," whose job would be approving or rejecting targeted killing warrants. n202 The hearings will be held expeditiously and records will be kept according to security measures "established by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence." n203¶ The application for an order approving a targeted killing will be submitted by a designated CIA official, or DOJ official in conjunction with the CIA investigative team, "in writing upon oath or affirmation" after review and *654 approval by the supervisor of the drone program at a given outpost. n204 This application will include all necessary and pertinent information needed for the judge's decision. n205 This information shall include who the target is (if known), what action or information led to this targeting, any informant information, imminent threat analysis, known links to terrorists or terrorist organization, and a distinction and proportionality analysis (if available).¶ These warrants could be made before locating a target. Once a suitable application has been assembled, the designated official may submit the application and receive a warrant that would be good for a specific period. If the target is not found within that period, a renewal request may be made by adding an addendum to the above described application with any new and pertinent information. n206 An expedited process would also apply to newly acquired targets by which the CIA official could make an emergency application. Further, an authorization made by the President, through the Attorney General, could bypass this application process in appropriate exigent circumstances. There would also be a semi-annual report to Congress from CIA officials on targeted killing application procedures. An act creating this court would also address sanctions and liabilities, likely monetary fines or professional sanctions, of CIA and DOJ officials who do not comply with the procedures. Although any judicial action that encroaches on the Executive's autonomy in the national security realm will likely face pushback, judicial review is an important check on the Executive's power. To assuage the separation of powers issues that could arise in the creation of this court on targeted killing and drone strike operations, the legislative and judicial branches will have to ensure they are not unconstitutionally restricting the President's authority.
Plan is the best policy for drones – Strict Scrutiny requires evidence based verification and definitional restraint to limit civilian casualties and reestablish credibility
Guiora, 12 Amos, Professor of Law, SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, author of numerous books dealing with military law and national security including Legitimate Target: A Criteria-Based Approach to Targeted Killing, “Drone Policy: A Proposal Moving Forward,” http://jurist.org/forum/2013/03/amos-guiora-drone-policy.php, ALB
Targeted killing sits at the intersection of law, morality, strategy and policy. I am a proponent of targeted killing because it enables the state to protect its innocent civilian population. However, my support for targeted killing is conditioned on the process being subject to rigorous standards, criteria and guidelines.¶ My advocacy of both targeted killing and criteria-based decision-making rests largely on 20 years of experience with a "seat at the table" of operational counterterrorism. The dangers inherent in the use of state power are enormous. On the opposite side of the equation, however, is the terrible cost of terrorism; after all, terrorists deliberately target innocent civilians.¶ However, broad definitions of imminence combined with new technological capabilities drastically affect the implementation of targeted killing predicated on legal and moral principles. The recently released US Department of Justice (DOJ) "white paper" regarding the Obama administration's drone policy defines "imminence" so expansively there need not be clear evidence of a specific attack to justify the killing of an individual, including US citizens. This extraordinary broadness creates a targeted killing paradigm akin to interrogation excesses under the Bush administration that followed in the wake of the Bybee Memo.¶ The solution to this search for an actionable guideline is adoption of a strict scrutiny standard which would enable operational engagement of a non-state actor predicated on intelligence information subject to admissibility standards akin to a court of law. Such intelligence would have to be reliable, material and probative.¶ To re-phrase, this strict scrutiny test seeks to strike a balance by enabling the state to act sooner but subjecting that action to significant restrictions. This paradigm would be predicated on narrow definitions of imminence and legitimate targets. Rather than enabling the consequences of the DOJ memo, the strict scrutiny test would ensure implementation of person-specific operational counterterrorism. That is the essence of targeted killing conducted in accordance with the rule of law and morality in armed conflict.¶ This proposal is predicated on the understanding that, while nation states need to engage in operational counterterrorism, mistakes regarding the correct interpretation and analysis of intelligence information can lead to tragic mistakes. Adopting admissibility standards akin to criminal law minimizes operational error.¶ Rather than relying on the executive branch to make decisions in a "closed world" devoid of oversight and review, the intelligence information justifying the proposed action must be submitted to a court that would ascertain the information's admissibility. The discussion before the court would necessarily be conducted ex parte; however, the process of preparing and submitting available intelligence information to a court would significantly contribute to minimizing operational error that otherwise would occur.¶ The logistics of this proposal are far less daunting than might seem — the court before which the executive would submit the evidence is the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court), established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Presently, FISA Court judges weigh the reliability of intelligence information in determining whether to grant government ex parte requests for wire-tapping warrants. Under this proposal, judicial approval is necessary prior to undertaking a counterterrorism operation predicated solely on intelligence information. The standard the court would adopt in determining the information's reliability is the same applied in the traditional criminal law paradigm.¶ The court would cross-examine the representative of the executive branch and subsequently rule as to the information's admissibility. While some may suggest that the FISA Court is largely an exercise in "rubber-stamping," the importance of this proposal is in requiring the government to present the available information to an independent judiciary as a precursor to engaging in operational counterterrorism.¶ While this proposal explicitly calls for changing the nature of the relationship between the executive and the judicial branches of the government, it would serve to minimize collateral damage in drone attacks predicated on narrow definitions of legitimate target.¶ This proposal does not limit the state's fundamental right to self-defense. Rather, it creates a process seeking to objectify counterterrorism by seeking to establish standards for determining the reliability of intelligence information that is the backbone of targeted killing decision-making.¶ The practical impact? A drone policy predicated on the rule of law and morality rather than the deeply troubling paradigm established by the Obama administration in the DOJ white paper.
Strict scrutiny undoubtedly prevents errors
Guiora 12 (Amos, Professor of Law, SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, author of numerous books dealing with military law and national security including Legitimate Target: A Criteria-Based Approach to Targeted Killing, 2012, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 45 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 235, “Presidential Powers and Foreign Affairs: Rendition and Targeted Killings of Americans: Targeted Killings: When Proportionality Gets All Out of Proportion”)
The unitary executive theory aggressively articulated, and implemented, by the Bush Administration has been adopted in toto by the Obama Administration. While the executive clearly prefers to operate in a vacuum, the question whether that most effectively ensures effective operational counterterrorism is an open question. The advantage of institutionalized, process-based input into executive action prior to decision implementation is worthy of discussion in operational counterterrorism. The solution to this search for an actionable guideline is the strict scrutiny standard. What is strict scrutiny, and how is it to be implemented in the context of operational counterterrorism? Why is there a need, if at all, for an additional standard articulating self-defense? The strict scrutiny standard would enable operational engagement of a non-state actor predicated on intelligence information that would meet admissibility standards akin to a court of law. The strict scrutiny test seeks to strike a balance enabling the state to act sooner but subject to significant restrictions. The ability to act sooner is limited, however, by the requirement that intelligence information must be reliable, viable, valid, and corroborated. The strict scrutiny standard proposes that for states to act as early as possible in order to prevent a possible terrorist attack the information must meet admissibility standards similar to the rules of evidence. The intelligence must be reliable, material, and probative. *240 The proposal is predicated on the understanding that while states need to engage in operational counterterrorism, mistakes regarding the correct interpretation and analysis of intelligence information can lead to tragic mistakes. Adopting admissibility standards akin to the criminal law minimizes operational error. Rather than relying on the executive branch making decisions in a "closed world" devoid of oversight and review, the intelligence information justifying the proposed action must be submitted to a court that would ascertain the information's admissibility. The discussion before the court would necessarily be conducted ex parte; however, the process of preparing and submitting available intelligence information to a court would significantly contribute to minimizing operational error that otherwise would occur.
Legal restraints work – exception theory is self-serving and wrong
William E. Scheuerman 6, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, Constellations, Volume 13, Issue 1
Yet this argument relies on Schmitt’s controversial model of politics, as outlined eloquently but unconvincingly in his famous Concept of the Political. To be sure, there are intense conflicts in which it is naïve to expect an easy resolution by legal or juridical means. But the argument suffers from a troubling circularity: Schmitt occasionally wants to define “political” conflicts as those irresolvable by legal or juridical devices in order then to argue against legal or juridical solutions to them. The claim also suffers from a certain vagueness and lack of conceptual precision. At times, it seems to be directed against trying to resolve conflicts in the courts or juridical system narrowly understood; at other times it is directed against any legal regulation of intense conflict. The former argument is surely stronger than the latter. After all, legal devices have undoubtedly played a positive role in taming or at least minimizing the potential dangers of harsh political antagonisms. In the Cold War, for example, international law contributed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts which otherwise might have exploded into horrific violence, even if attempts to bring such conflicts before an international court or tribunal probably would have failed.22¶ Second, Schmitt dwells on the legal inconsistencies that result from modifying the traditional state-centered system of international law by expanding protections to non-state fighters. His view is that irregular combatants logically enjoyed no protections in the state-centered Westphalian model. By broadening protections to include them, international law helps undermine the traditional state system and its accompanying legal framework. Why is this troubling? The most obvious answer is that Schmitt believes that the traditional state system is normatively superior to recent attempts to modify it by, for example, extending international human rights protections to individuals against states. 23 But what if we refuse to endorse his nostalgic preference for the traditional state system? Then a sympathetic reading of the argument would take the form of suggesting that the project of regulating irregular combatants by ordinary law must fail for another reason: it rests on a misguided quest to integrate incongruent models of interstate relations and international law. We cannot, in short, maintain core features of the (state-centered) Westphalian system while extending ambitious new protections to non-state actors.¶ This is a powerful argument, but it remains flawed. Every modern legal order rests on diverse and even conflicting normative elements and ideals, in part because human existence itself is always “in transition.” When one examines the so-called classical liberal legal systems of nineteenth-century England or the United States, for example, one quickly identifies liberal elements coexisting uneasily alongside paternalistic and authoritarian (e.g., the law of slavery in the United States), monarchist, as well as republican and communitarian moments. The same may be said of the legal moorings of the modern welfare state, which arguably rest on a hodgepodge of socialist, liberal, and Christian and even Catholic (for example, in some European maternity policies) programmatic sources. In short, it is by no means self-evident that trying to give coherent legal form to a transitional political and social moment is always doomed to fail. Moreover, there may be sound reasons for claiming that the contemporary transitional juncture in the rules of war is by no means as incongruent as Schmitt asserts. In some recent accounts, the general trend towards extending basic protections to non-state actors is plausibly interpreted in a more positive – and by no means incoherent – light.24¶ Third, Schmitt identifies a deep tension between the classical quest for codified and stable law and the empirical reality of a social world subject to permanent change: “The tendency to modify or even dissolve classical legal concepts…is general, and in view of the rapid change of the world it is entirely understandable” (12). Schmitt’s postwar writings include many provocative comments about what contemporary legal scholars describe as the dilemma of legal obsolescence. 25 In The Partisan, he suggests that the “great transformations and modifications” in the technological apparatus of modern warfare place strains on the aspiration for cogent legal norms capable of regulating human affairs (17; see also 48–50). Given the ever-changing character of warfare and the fast pace of change in military technology, it inevitably proves difficult to codify a set of cogent and stable rules of war. The Geneva Convention proviso that legal combatants must bear their weapons openly, for example, seems poorly attuned to a world where military might ultimately depends on nuclear silos buried deep beneath the surface of the earth, and not the success of traditional standing armies massed in battle on the open field. “Or what does the requirement mean of an insignia visible from afar in night battle, or in battle with the long-range weapons of modern technology of war?” (17).¶ As I have tried to show elsewhere, these are powerful considerations deserving of close scrutiny; Schmitt is probably right to argue that the enigma of legal obsolescence takes on special significance in the context of rapid-fire social change.26 Unfortunately, he seems uninterested in the slightest possibility that we might successfully adapt the process of lawmaking to our dynamic social universe. To be sure, he discusses the “motorization of lawmaking” in a fascinating 1950 publication, but only in order to underscore its pathological core.27 Yet one possible resolution of the dilemma he describes would be to figure how to reform the process whereby rules of war are adapted to novel changes in military affairs in order to minimize the danger of anachronistic or out-of-date law. Instead, Schmitt simply employs the dilemma of legal obsolescence as a battering ram against the rule of law and the quest to develop a legal apparatus suited to the special problem of irregular combatants.
Hegemony
Contention 2 is hegemony
The Plan is key to accountable and legitimate targeted killings
Guiora also makes the credibility argument
Key to prevent people from wrecking the drone program
Adelsberg 12 (Samuel, J.D. – Yale Law School, “Bouncing the Executive's Blank Check: Judicial Review and the Targeting of Citizens,” Harvard Law and Policy Review, Summer, 6 Harv. L. and Pol'y Rev. 437, Lexis)
The relevance of these precedents to the targeting of citizens is clear: the constitutional right to due process is alive and well--regardless of geographic location. We now turn to what type of process is due. III. BRING IN THE COURTS: BRINGING JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY TO TARGETED KILLINGS The function of this Article is not to argue that targeted killing should be removed from the toolbox of American military options. Targeted killing as a military tactic is here to stay. n34 Targeting strikes have robust bipartisan political support and have become an increasingly relied upon weapon as the United States decreases its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. n35 The argument being asserted here, therefore, is that in light of the protections the Constitution affords U.S. citizens, there must be a degree of inter-branch process when the government targets such individuals. The current intra-executive process afforded to U.S. citizens is not only unlawful, but also dangerous. n36 Justice O'Connor acknowledged the danger inherent in exclusively intra-branch process in Hamdi when she asserted that an interrogator is not a neutral decision-maker as the "even purportedly fair adjudicators are disqualified by their interest in the controversy." n37 In rejecting the government's argument that a "separation of powers" analysis mandates a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in these circumstances, Justice O'Connor contended that, in times of conflict, the Constitution "most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake." n38 Similarly, Justice Kennedy was unequivocal in Boumediene about the right of courts to enforce the Constitution even in times of war. Quoting Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, n39 Kennedy argued that holding "that the political branches may switch the constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime in which they, not this Court, say 'what the law is.'" n40 This sentiment is very relevant to our targeted killing analysis: in the realm of targeted killing, where the deprivation is of one's life, the absence of any "neutral decision-maker" outside the executive branch is a clear violation of due process guaranteed by the Constitution. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are pointing to a dangerous institutional tension inherent in any intra-executive process regime. Targeting decisions are no different; indeed, the goal of those charged with targeting citizens like al-Awlaki is not to strike a delicate balance between security *444 and liberty but rather, quite single-mindedly, to prevent attacks on the United States. n41 In describing the precarious nature of covert actions, James Baker, a distinguished military judge, noted, "the twin necessities of secrecy and speed may pull as they do against the competing interests of deliberate review, dissent, and informed accountable decision-making." n42 While Judge Baker concluded that these risks "magnify the importance of a meaningful process of ongoing executive appraisal," he overlooked the institutional tension, seized upon by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, which would preclude the type of process that he was advocating. n43 Although there may be a role for Congress in such instances, a legislative warrant for specific cases would likely be cumbersome, carry significant security risks, and may violate the spirit of the Bill of Attainder Clause, which prohibits the legislature from performing judicial or executive functions. The current inter-branch process for covert actions, in which the President must make a finding and notify the leaders of Congress and the intelligence committees, is entirely ex post and also has not been proven to provide a meaningful check on executive power. n44 Moreover, most politicians are unqualified to make the necessary legal judgments that these situations require. Solutions calling for the expatriation of citizens deemed to be terrorists are fraught with judicial complications and set very dangerous precedents for citizenship revocation. n45 Any post-deprivation process, such as a Bivens-style action, for a targeted attack would also be problematic. n46 Government officials charged with carrying out these attacks might be hesitant to do so if there were a threat of prosecution. Moreover, post-deprivation process for a target would be effectively meaningless in the wake of a successful attack. *445 Rather, as recognized by the Founders in the Fourth Amendment, balancing the needs of security against the imperatives of liberty is a traditional role for judges to play. Two scholars of national security law recently highlighted the value of judicial inclusion in targeting decisions: "Judicial control of targeted killing could increase the accuracy of target selection, reducing the danger of mistaken or illegal destruction of lives, limbs, and property. Independent judges who double-check targeting decisions could catch errors and cause executive officials to avoid making them in the first place." n47 Judges are both knowledgeable in the law and accustomed to dealing with sensitive security considerations. These qualifications make them ideal candidates to ensure that the executive exercises constitutional restraint when targeting citizens. Reforming the decision-making process for executing American citizens to allow for judicial oversight would restore the separation of powers framework envisioned by the Founders and increase democratic legitimacy by placing these determinations on steadier constitutional ground. For those fearful of judicial encroachment on executive war-making powers, there is a strong argument that this will actually strengthen the President and empower him to take decisive action without worrying about the judicial consequences. As Justice Kennedy put it, "the exercise of executive powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch." n48 Now, we will turn to what this judicial involvement would look like.
Judicial review is key – makes drones more effective – executive targeting decisions are flawed – empirics prove
Ahmad Chehab 12, Georgetown University Law Center, “RETRIEVING THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TARGETED KILLINGS CONTEXT: A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW,” March 30 2012, abstract available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031572
The practical, pragmatic justification for the COAACC derives largely from considering social psychological findings regarding the skewed potential associated with limiting unchecked decision-making in a group of individuals. As an initial point, psychologists have long pointed out how individuals frequently fall prey to cognitive illusions that produce systematic errors in judgment.137 People simply do not make decisions by choosing the optimal outcome from available alternatives, but instead employ shortcuts (i.e., heuristics) for convenience.138 Cognitive biases like groupthink can hamper effective policy deliberations and formulations.139 Groupthink largely arises when a group of decision-makers seek conformity and agreement, thereby avoiding alternative points of view that are critical of the consensus position.140 This theory suggests that some groups—particularly those characterized by a strong leader, considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfidence, and a shared world view or value system—suffer from a deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis.141 Many factors can affect such judgment, including a lack of crucial information, insufficient timing for decision-making, poor judgment, pure luck, and/or unexpected actions by adversaries.142 Moreover, decision-makers inevitably tend to become influenced by irrelevant information,143 seek out data and assessments that confirm their beliefs and personal hypotheses notwithstanding contradictory evidence,144 and “irrationally avoid choices that represent extremes when a decision involves a trade-off between two incommensurable values.”145 Self-serving biases can also hamper judgment given as it has been shown to induce well-intentioned people to rationalize virtually any behavior, judgment or action after the fact.146 The confirmation and overconfidence bias, both conceptually related to groupthink, also result in large part from neglecting to consider contradictory evidence coupled with an irrational persistence in pursuing ideological positions divorced from concern of alternative viewpoints.147¶ Professor Cass Sunstein has described situations in which groupthink produced poor results precisely because consensus resulted from the failure to consider alternative sources of information.148 The failures of past presidents to consider alternative sources of information, critically question risk assessments, ensure neutral-free ideological sentiment among those deliberating,149 and/or generally ensure properly deliberated national security policy has produced prominent and devastating blunders,150 including the Iraq War of 2003,151 the Bay of Pigs debacle in the 1960’s,152 and the controversial decision to wage war against Vietnam.153¶ Professor Sunstein also has described the related phenomenon of “group polarization,” which includes the tendency to push group members toward a “more extreme position.”154 Given that both groupthink and group polarization can lead to erroneous and ideologically tainted policy positions, the notion of giving the President unchecked authority in determining who is eligible for assassination can only serve to increase the likelihood for committing significant errors.155 The reality is that psychological mistakes, organizational ineptitude, lack of structural coherence and other associated deficiencies are inevitable features in Executive Branch decision-making.¶ D. THE NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY CHECKS¶ To check the vices of groupthink and shortcomings of human judgment, the psychology literature emphasizes a focus on accountability mechanisms in which a better reasoned decision-making process can flourish.156 By serving as a constraint on behavior, “accountability functions as a critical norm-enforcement mechanism—the social psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on the other.”157 Such institutional review can channel recognition for the need by government decision-makers to be more self-critical in policy targeted killing designations, more willing to consider alternative points of view, and more willing to anticipate possible objections.158 Findings have also shown that ex ante awareness can lead to more reasoned judgment while also preventing tendentious and ideological inclinations (and political motivations incentivized and exploited by popular hysteria and fear).159¶ Requiring accounting in a formalized way prior to engaging in a targeted killing—by providing, for example, in camera review, limited declassification of information, explaining threat assessments outside the immediate circle of policy advisors, and securing meaningful judicial review via a COAACC-like tribunal—can promote a more reliable and informed deliberation in the executive branch. With process-based judicial review, the COAACC could effectively reorient the decision to target individuals abroad by examining key procedural aspects—particularly assessing the reliability of the “terrorist” designation—and can further incentivize national security policy-makers to engage in more carefully reasoned choices and evaluate available alternatives than when subject to little to no review.
Better drone use maintains hegemony – prevents escalation
Bruntstetter 12 Daniel, Assistance Professor of Political Science at the School of Social Sciences at the University of California, "Drones: The Future of Warfare?", April 10, www.e-ir.info/2012/04/10/drones-the-future-of-warfare/
Since President Obama took office, the use of and hype surrounding drones has greatly increased. Obama has conducted more than three times as many drone strikes per year compared to his predecessor in the White House.1 The increase use of drones points to a potential revolution in warfare, or at least a shift in the perspective of how wars will be fought in the future. As robotics expert P.W. Singer argues, “the introduction of unmanned systems to the battlefield doesn’t change simply how we fight, but for the first time changes who fights at the most fundamental level. It transforms the very agent of war, rather than just its capabilities.”2 The three major reasons drones are seen as the future of warfare are: they remove the risk to our soldiers, they make fewer mistakes than other weapons platforms, and technology will continue to improve such that drones become even more precise, efficient, and infallible in the future, thus rendering less precise, efficient and fallible human forms of war obsolete. Drones are thus seen as marking “a step forward in humanitarian technology,” and viewed as “a weapon of choice for future presidents, future administrations, in future conflicts and circumstances of self-defense and vital national security of the United States.”3 Yet, there has been much criticism of these assertions. Journalists challenge the claim that there are diminished civilian deaths from drone strikes, while just war scholars suggest that drones loosen the moral restraints on the use of force and legal scholars grapple with the relation between drones and international law.4 Notwithstanding these ethical and legal challenges, and despite what advocates say about their place in the future of armed combat, drones are, like any weapons platform, inherently limited in what they can do. In this brief article, I make three claims to contextualize the idea that drones are the future of war to shed light on the circumscribed role they might play in the foreseeable future. First, that drones are an improvement – in terms of providing surveillance capabilities and satisfying the rules of war – compared to previous technology. Their technical advantages (loitering capacity, removal of risk to pilots, and precision) make them an important addition to any military arsenal. Second, however, drones are nevertheless limited in their potential. While perhaps the best option to fight Al Qaeda, they will not, due to their technical and tactical limitations, fully replace weapons with greater destructive and evasive capabilities because they are not equipped to respond to all scenarios within the subset of international crises. Third, the extent to which drones are the weapon of the future, they will not, despite the imagination of some pundits, remove entirely the human element from the future of war. Rather, humans, despite the hype surrounding drones, remain an essential piece of the future of war, and are subject to the inevitable risks associated with war. Technical Advantages of Drones The advantages of drones compared to other military options are well publicized, and fall into two categories.5 In terms of surveillance, drones are capable of slipping across international borders with relative ease without putting human personnel at risk. Their ability to loiter over targets allows them to observe “patterns of life” to provide surveillance data 24/7, identify and track potential targets, and determine the best time to strike to avoid civilian casualties.6 This leads to the second advantage: drones are claimed to be highly effective at satisfying the rules of war. In terms of lethal use of force, the pinpoint accuracy of their missiles and computer software that models the blast area of each proposed strike greatly reduces collateral damage compared to other weapons systems, and potentially could even eliminate it. In the words of one proponent, drones provide a “limited, pinprick, covert strike” in order “to avoid a wider war.”7 Moreover, the removal of pilots from the zone of combat – drones are operated from a facility well removed from where the fighting takes place –arguably eliminates the threat to our soldiers and allows drone operators to make better targeting decisions because they do not fear for their own safety. All of this adds up to considerably diminished number of civilian casualties. According to one scholar, these advantages lead to an “ethical obligation” to employ drones instead of other more risky tactics. 8 These advantages have, thus far, dictated the use of drones by the United States. Despite a UN Special Committee Review on drones in 2009, and two hearings hosted by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2010 to discuss the moral and legal implications of drones, they have been the weapon of choice in Obama’s “war on Al Qaeda.” Yet, it is important to remember that this success in fighting terrorism should not be taken as evidence of drone effectiveness in all situations.
Unrestricted drones independently crush hegemony
Boyle 13 Michael J., Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf, ALB
If the US fails to take these steps, its unchecked pursuit of drone technology will ¶ have serious consequences for its image and global position. Much of American ¶ counterterrorism policy is premised on the notion that the narrative that sustains ¶ Al-Qaeda must be challenged and eventually broken if the terrorist threat is to ¶ subside over the long term. The use of drones does not break this narrative, but ¶ rather confirms it. It is ironic that Al-Qaeda’s image of the United States—as ¶ an all-seeing, irreconcilably hostile enemy who rains down bombs and death on ¶ innocent Muslims without a second thought—is inadvertently reinforced by ¶ a drones policy that does not bother to ask the names of its victims. Even the ¶ casual anti-Americanism common in many parts of Europe, the Middle East and ¶ Asia, much of which portrays the US as cruel, domineering and indifferent to the ¶ suffering of others, is reinforced by a drones policy which involves killing foreign ¶ citizens on an almost daily basis. A choice must be made: the US cannot rely on ¶ drones as it does now while attempting to convince others that these depictions ¶ are gross caricatures. Over time, an excessive reliance on drones will deepen the ¶ reservoirs of anti-US sentiment, embolden America’s enemies and provide other ¶ governments with a compelling public rationale to resist a US-led international order which is underwritten by sudden, blinding strikes from the sky. For the ¶ United States, preventing these outcomes is a matter of urgent importance in a ¶ world of rising powers and changing geopolitical alignments. No matter how it ¶ justifies its own use of drones as exceptional, the US is establishing precedents ¶ which others in the international system—friends and enemies, states and non-state ¶ actors—may choose to follow. Far from being a world where violence is used ¶ more carefully and discriminately, a drones-dominated world may be one where ¶ human life is cheapened because it can so easily, and so indifferently, be obliterated ¶ with the press of a button. Whether this is a world that the United States wants to ¶ create—or even live in—is an issue that demands attention from those who find it ¶ easy to shrug off the loss of life that drones inflict on others today.
Current drone usage causes allied backlash that undermines hegemony
Streeter ‘13 (Devin C, Director of Activities, Public Relations, and Recruitment at Liberty University Strategic Intelligence Society, “US Drone Policy: Tactical Success and Strategic Failure,” http://www.academia.edu/3523639/U.S._Drone_Policy_Tactical_Success_and_Strategic_Failure, April 19, 2013)
The first category of nations, while not targeted by drone strikes, is intimidated by their capabilities. India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and over 40 other nations have announced intentions to acquire drones. 27 The main producers of unmanned aerial vehicles are the United States, Israel, and China. 28 The United States, while the leader in drone use and production 29 , must deal with “American export controls.” 30 Israel, however, has fewer restrictions, considering China’s acquisition of drone technology by buying an “anti-radar attack drone” 31 from the small nation. China in turn has offered to sell lower grade drones to the international community. 32 It is unlikely that drone technology will go unshared for long. 33 In essence, the United States has sparked a miniature arms race and has intimidated nations with the threat of a new, superior technology. Governments that have begun pursuing their own UAV programs have shown a notable bitterness to the United States for its unchecked use of drones. 34 Nations such as China, Japan, Russia, and Brazil all disapprove of United States drone policies by over 30 percentage points. 35 To them, the United States seems heavy handed and brutish; holding back technology while indiscriminately using it against our enemies. The lack of consideration and cooperation is a negative influence on world leaders. At the same time, other nations feel that drones violate their airspace and are used without approval from the international community. 36 The majority of these nations fall within the boundaries of the European Union, and while their disapproval is not as notable as the first group, it often reaches the double digits rate. 37 Germany, Great Britain, Poland, and other European Union members do not understand the ‘fire from the hip’ mentality of drone strikes. 38 The European Council on Foreign Relations noted “it United States seems to interpret the concept of imminence in a rather more permissive way than most Europeans would be comfortable with.” 39 The European Union fully supports drones in combat support and reconnaissance roles, but has issues with the concept of targeted killings, which often result in collateral damage. 40 European leaders desire an international consensus on how drones should be operated, before more civilians become casualties. 41 The European Council on Foreign Relations further notes: The Obama administration has so far chosen to operate by analogy with inter-state war, but in an era marked by the individualization of conflict, this seems like an outdated approach. 42 Europe does not share the mentality of drone strikes with "acceptable" collateral damage and apolicy that is not accountable to the international community. As a result, relations with Europe have reached a critical point. 43 European nations, alienated by the Obama administration’s progressive dialogue but aggressive drone policy, 44 are ready to try and take the lead in international relations. 45 Germany in particular will be a key nation as it increases in prominence among European states. 46 Hans Kundnani, a well-known journalist and political pundit, notes, “Obama is extremely popular in Germany, but Berlin’s deeply-held views on the use of military force… have the potential to create a Europe-America split.” 47 Kundnani also states, “A ‘special relationship’ is developing between China and Germany.” 48 Because of anti-drone sentiment, long-time U.S. allies grow increasingly distant, to the point of forming new relationships with China. This is a direct threat to the United States’ place in international relations and a direct challenge to its hegemony. If the relations with Europe are to be fixed, a change in drone protocol is needed.
The Plan is key to restoring legitimacy
Kennedy, 13 (“Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism”, Greg Kennedy is a Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy at the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, in Shrivenham, Parameters 42(4)/43(1) Winter-Spring 2013)
The exponential rise in the use of drone technology in a variety of military and non-military contexts represents a real challenge to the framework of established international law and it is both right as a matter of principle, and inevitable as a matter of political reality, that the international community should now be focusing attention on the standards applicable to this technological development, particularly its deployment in counterterrorism and counter-insurgency initiatives, and attempt to reach a consensus on the legality of its use, and the standards and safeguards which should apply to it.4 deliver deadly force is taking place in both public and official domains in the United States and many other countries.5 The four key features at the heart of the debate revolve around: who is controlling the weapon system; does the system of control and oversight violate international law governing the use of force; are the drone strikes proportionate acts that provide military effectiveness given the circumstances of the conflict they are being used in; and does their use violate the sovereignty of other nations and allow the United States to disregard formal national boundaries? Unless these four questions are dealt with in the near future the impact of the unresolved legitimacy issues will have a number of repercussions for American foreign and military policies: “Without a new doctrine for the use of drones that is understandable to friends and foes, the United States risks achieving near-term tactical benefits in killing terrorists while incurring potentially significant longer-term costs to its alliances, global public opinion, the war on terrorism and international stability.”6 This article will address only the first three critical questions. The question of who controls the drones during their missions is attracting a great deal of attention. The use of drones by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to conduct “signature strikes” is the most problematic factor in this matter. Between 2004 and 2013, CIA drone attacks in Pakistan killed up to 3,461—up to 891 of them civilians.7 Not only is the use of drones by the CIA the issue, but subcontracting operational control of drones to other civilian agencies is also causing great concern.8 Questions remain as to whether subcontractors were controlling drones during actual strike missions, as opposed to surveillance and reconnaissance activities. Nevertheless, the intense questioning of John O. Brennan, President Obama’s nominee for director of the CIA in February 2013, over drone usage, the secrecy of their controllers and orders, and the legality of their missions confirmed the level of concern America’s elected officials have regarding the legitimacy of drone use. Furthermore, perceptions and suspicions of illegal clandestine intelligence agency operations, already a part of the public and official psyche due to experiences from Vietnam, Iran-Contra, and Iraq II and the weapons of mass destruction debacle, have been reinforced by CIA management of drone capability. Recent revelations about the use of secret Saudi Arabian facilities for staging American drone strikes into Yemen did nothing to dissipate such suspicions of the CIA’s lack of legitimacy in its use of drones.9 The fact that the secret facility was the launching site for drones used to kill American citizens Anwar al-Awlaki and his son in September 2011, both classified by the CIA as al-Qaeda-linked threats to US security, only deepened such suspicions. Despite the fact that Gulf State observers and officials knew about American drones operating from the Arabian peninsula for years, the existence of the CIA base was not openly admitted in case such knowledge should “ . . . damage counter-terrorism collaboration with Saudi Arabia.”10 The fallout from CIA involvement and management of drone strikes prompted Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, to suggest the need for a court to oversee targeted killings. Such a body, she said, would replicate the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which oversees eavesdropping on American soil.11 Most importantly, such oversight would go a long way towards allaying fears of the drone usage lacking true political accountability and legitimacy. In addition, as with any use of force, drone strikes in overseas contingency operations can lead to increased attacks on already weak governments partnered with the United States. They can lead to retaliatory attacks on local governments and may contribute to local instability. Those actions occur as a result of desires for revenge and frustrations caused by the strikes. Feelings of hostility are often visited on the most immediate structures of authority—local government officials, government buildings, police, and the military.12 It can thus be argued that, at the strategic level, drone strikes are fuelling anti-American resentment among enemies and allies alike. Those reactions are often based on questions regarding the legality, ethicality, and operational legitimacy of those acts to deter opponents. Therefore, specifically related to the reaction of allies, the military legitimacy question arises if the use of drones endangers vital strategic relationships.13 One of the strategic relationships being affected by the drone legitimacy issue is that of the United States and the United Kingdom. Targeted killing, by drone strike or otherwise, is not the sole preserve of the United States. Those actions, however, attract more negative attention to the United States due to its prominence on the world’s stage, its declarations of support for human rights and democratic freedoms, and rule-of-law issues, all which appear violated by such strikes. This complexity and visibility make such targeted killings important for Anglo-American strategic relations because of the closeness of that relationship and the perception that Great Britain, therefore, condones such American activities. Because the intelligence used in such operations is seen by other nations as a shared Anglo-American asset, the use of such intelligence to identify and conduct such killings, in the opinion those operations.14 Finally, the apparent gap between stated core policies and values and the ability to practice targeted killings appears to be a starkly hypocritical and deceitful position internationally, a condition that once again makes British policymakers uncomfortable with being tarred by such a brush.15 The divide between US policy and action is exacerbated by drone technology, which makes the once covert practice of targeted killing commonplace and undeniable. It may also cause deep-rooted distrust due to a spectrum of legitimacy issues. Such questions will, therefore, undermine the US desire to export liberal democratic principles. Indeed, it may be beneficial for Western democracies to achieve adequate rather than decisive victories, thereby setting an example of restraint for the international order.16 The United States must be willing to engage and deal with drone-legitimacy issues across the entire spectrum of tactical, operational, strategic, and political levels to ensure its strategic aims are not derailed by operational and tactical expediency.
The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable, sustainable, and prevents great power war
Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 13 – *Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College (“Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement”, January/February 2013, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138468/stephen-g-brooks-g-john-ikenberry-and-william-c-wohlforth/lean-forward)
Hotspots, 60 years, sustainable
Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.
No offense – decline makes the US uncooperative and desperate – leads to hegemonic wars
Goldstein 07 - Professor of Global Politics and International Relations @ University of Pennsylvania, Avery Goldstein, “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume30, Issue 4 and 5 August 2007, pages 639 – 682
Two closely related, though distinct, theoretical arguments focus explicitly on the consequences for international politics of a shift in power between a dominant state and a rising power. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin suggested that peace prevails when a dominant state’s capabilities enable it to ‘govern’ an international order that it has shaped. Over time, however, as economic and technological diffusion proceeds during eras of peace and development, other states are empowered. Moreover, the burdens of international governance drain and distract the reigning hegemon, and challengers eventually emerge who seek to rewrite the rules of governance. As the power advantage of the erstwhile hegemon ebbs, it may become desperate enough to resort to theultima ratio of international politics, force, to forestall the increasingly urgent demands of a rising challenger. Or as the power of the challenger rises, it may be tempted to press its case with threats to use force. It is the rise and fall of the great powers that creates the circumstances under which major wars, what Gilpin labels ‘hegemonic wars’, break out.13 Gilpin’s argument logically encourages pessimism about the implications of a rising China. It leads to the expectation that international trade, investment, and technology transfer will result in a steady diffusion of American economic power, benefiting the rapidly developing states of the world, including China. As the US simultaneously scurries to put out the many brushfires that threaten its far-flung global interests (i.e., the classic problem of overextension), it will be unable to devote sufficient resources to maintain or restore its former advantage over emerging competitors like China. While the erosion of the once clear American advantage plays itself out, the US will find it ever more difficult to preserve the order in Asia that it created during its era of preponderance. The expectation is an increase in the likelihood for the use of force – either by a Chinese challenger able to field a stronger military in support of its demands for greater influence over international arrangements in Asia, or by a besieged American hegemon desperate to head off further decline. Among the trends that alarm those who would look at Asia through the lens of Gilpin’s theory are China’s expanding share of world trade and wealth(much of it resulting from the gains made possible by the international economic order a dominant US established); its acquisition of technology in key sectors that have both civilian and military applications (e.g., information, communications, and electronics linked with to forestall, and the challenger becomes increasingly determined to realize the transition to a new international order whose contours it will define. the ‘revolution in military affairs’); and an expanding military burden for the US (as it copes with the challenges of its global war on terrorism and especially its struggle in Iraq) that limits the resources it can devote to preserving its interests in East Asia.14 Although similar to Gilpin’s work insofar as it emphasizes the importance of shifts in the capabilities of a dominant state and a rising challenger, the power-transition theory A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler present in The War Ledger focuses more closely on the allegedly dangerous phenomenon of ‘crossover’– the point at which a dissatisfied challenger is about to overtake the established leading state.15 In such cases, when the power gap narrows, the dominant state becomes increasingly desperate. Though suggesting why a rising China may ultimately present grave dangers for international peace when its capabilities make it a peer competitor of America, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory is less clear about the dangers while a potential challenger still lags far behind and faces a difficult struggle to catch up. This clarification is important in thinking about the theory’s relevance to interpreting China’s rise because a broad consensus prevails among analysts that Chinese military capabilities are at a minimum two decades from putting it in a league with the US in Asia.16 Their theory, then, points with alarm to trends in China’s growing wealth and power relative to the United States, but especially looks ahead to what it sees as the period of maximum danger – that time when a dissatisfied China could be in a position to overtake the US on dimensions believed crucial for assessing power. Reports beginning in the mid-1990s that offered extrapolations suggesting China’s growth would give it the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP aggregate, not per capita) sometime in the first few decades of the twentieth century fed these sorts of concerns about a potentially dangerous challenge to American leadership in Asia.17 The huge gap between Chinese and American military capabilities (especially in terms of technological sophistication) has so far discouraged prediction of comparably disquieting trends on this dimension, but inklings of similar concerns may be reflected in occasionally alarmist reports about purchases of advanced Russian air and naval equipment, as well as concern that Chinese espionage may have undermined the American advantage in nuclear and missile technology, and speculation about the potential military purposes of China’s manned space program.18 Moreover, because a dominant state may react to the prospect of a crossover and believe that it is wiser to embrace the logic of preventive war and act early to delay a transition while the task is more manageable, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory also provides grounds for concern about the period prior to the possible crossover.19 pg. 647-650
Two-thousand years of history prove
William Wohlforth 08 Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest
Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. The clearest empirical implication of the theory is that status competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: "The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity."39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.
War is at its lowest level in history because of US primacy---best statistical studies prove
Globalization resolved conflict, sustainable growth, democracy
John M. Owen 11, Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/
Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us?¶ Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological.¶ Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A.¶ But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another.¶ Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now.¶ Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries).¶ These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars.¶ We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony.¶ A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant.¶ There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world.¶ How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history.¶ The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth.¶ Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.¶ The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.
No risk of heg bad – US engagement and reintervention are inevitable – it’s only a question of making it effective
Robert Kagan 11 is a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. "The Price of Power" Jan 24 Vol 16 No18 www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3
In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. ¶ Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 and 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present¶ That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. ¶ The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit. ¶ Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.¶ To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure. ¶ Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. ¶ So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. ¶ Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. ¶ Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? ¶ Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?¶ Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate?¶ The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.
Our in-round discourse of supporting hegemony is critical to future leadership
Eyago 05 Political Commentary – Sound Politics Reporter 7/8, http://www.soundpolitics.com/archives/004721.html, Sound Commentary on Current Events in Seattle, Puget Sound and Washington State
Discourse good
Finally, I am angry at those who undermine our efforts to conduct this war. I am angry at people, who through their words, and efforts contribute to the injury and death of our soldiers, who provide encouragement to the enemy, who weaken our efforts and prolong the war, who, for political gain put our soldiers, our people, and our nation at greater risk. There is a LOT of anger going on. Many times it is inappropriately acted upon. Islamists are angry, so they blow up people. Conservatives are angry so they advocate indiscriminate retaliation. Liberals are angry so they advocate undermining the war. All this anger is misdirected. We can see how the killing of innocents is wrong, but sometimes we cannot see how allowing innocents to be killed is wrong. One should seriously consider the impacts of certain types of dissention in this country before embarking on said dissentious course. I have many issues with the war in Iraq, but I will focus on just a couple. When President Bush pronounced to the world that he would defeat terrorism, he made a promise. He promised that he would not only pursue the terrorists wherever they may be, but he promised to go after the countries that enable those terrorists. When the UN made resolution after resolution against Iraq those too were promises. The difference comes in whether one follows up a promise or not. You see, no one embarks on a major undertaking with the expectation of losing. The choices any person or group are almost always predicated on the fact that the reward exceeds the price or risk. Hitler would not have invaded Czechoslovakia unless he though he could get away with it. He would not have invaded Poland unless he though he could get away with it. The success of those events and reaction of Europe convinced him that he could press on and take all of Europe. Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait unless he thought he could get away with it. He would not have defied the UN unless he though he could get away with it. In those cases, the acting party decided that they could attain their goals using the methods employed. The same thing goes for the terrorists. They methods they employ are based on the expectation of ultimate success. The methods they employ are also based on their own capabilities, capabilities that stem from the support of governments both passive and active, the support of moneyed benefactors, and the support of powerful influencers such as media and high profile personalities. This brings me back to promises made. Part of the reason these terrorists became so bold is that there were few significant reprisals for their actions. In the same way Hitler moved on Poland and Hussein defied the UN, Al Qaeda flew planes into our buildings. Ultimately it was because they could and that the reprisals had insufficient deterrent effect. Now, when President Bush announced that he would pursue the nations that supported terrorism, he basically set the stage for action. The choice was, rattle the saber and hope it is enough, or draw the saber and demonstrate our commitment to living up to our promises. It is fair to debate whether Iraq was the best choice for an operation, but the stage had also been set there as well. With promises being made at the UN, the choice was to continue to prove that promises meant nothing or to prove that they did. I believe that the lack of consequences in the past was a key factor in the terrorist activity leading up to and including 9/11. Without the resolve to back up our promises, our enemies will be emboldened to act. It does not get any simpler than that. Iraq was a promise kept. Now, some people want us to renege on that promise and others. That is a dangerous position to be advocating. The thing is, the debate about Iraq belongs BEFORE we took action. And that debate DID occur. It occurred BEFORE the war. And the result was overwhelmingly in FAVOR of action. The congress granted President Bush the authority to act. The fact that they did not like his decision is moot. If they did not trust his ability to act, they were wrong to have given him the authority to do so. NOW they are wrong for challenging his decision after the fact. That brings us back to the concept of one's expectation of the results of one's actions. In many cases throughout history, the winner of a conflict was not always the one with the bigger army, the better equipment, and the best trained, or any of those factors. The winner quite often was the one with the greater will to win. Wars are won by will in far greater weight then in anything else. I would say that will is THE determining factor in success in any conflict. Obviously will is not enough. A greater force can sap the will of another army, but not always. The revolutionary war was won by will, not by military might. Vietnam was lost by will not by military might. And, Iraq will be won or lost by will alone. The consequences of this outcome will have long lasting impacts on the security of our nation. At this point, it does not matter whether we should have gone into Iraq. The fact is we are there now. We either complete the job and fulfill our promises to rebuild that nation and leave it with a stable and free society or we cut and run and have the world know with certainty that our word is null and void and that we have no resolve. That is the stakes. That is the goal of the terrorists: to prove they have resolve, to prove that we do not. Their victory will ensure increased attacks on all nations because the terrorists will have unimpeachable proof that their tactics will ultimately succeed. Bombings, beheadings, gross atrocities will be the weapons of choice in the future. Tactics that have been proven to bring down the mighty. If will is the factor that determines the outcome, then will is the place where we must consider here and now. As far as our enemy is concerned, we MUST make them believe that they cannot succeed. We MUST make them sure that WE will prevail. We MUST prove to them that their tactics are ineffectual. There is a down side to that. Once an enemy realizes their tactics are not succeeding, they will change them. With an enemy of this nature, that could result in greater atrocities than we have yet seen. Yet, even then we must prevail. We must continue to demonstrate OUR resolve and OUR willingness to see this to the end and DEFEAT them. Since they have shown little regard for decency and life, since they have shown that our very existence is provocation to them, no amount of diplomacy or concessions will achieve an end satisfactory to our nation. The only solution is the demonstration of our willingness to defeat them despite their tactics. Our goal is to defeat the will of the enemy. His goal is to defeat ours. Any indication that the enemy's will is faltering will bolster our own will. However, the opposite is true as well. Any indication that our will is faltering will embolden the enemy's will. Unfortunately, from the very first minute of this conflict, parts of our country have shouted from the very mountain tops just how little will they have to win the war. They demonstrate clearly for our enemies that we don't want to fight. They give clear indication that enemy tactics are successful. In effect, they give aid and comfort to the enemy and spur them on to continued fighting because they tell the enemy in clear messages that if they continue in their tactics, the United States will be defeated. As I said before, the debate about whether we go to war is over. We are now at war, and the ONLY debate we should have is on what tactics are most appropriate for prosecuting that war. It is marginally fair to state that you are unhappy about our decision to go to war, but beyond that, anything else will embolden the enemy. Think very long and about what is at stake here. It is almost IMPOSSIBLE to be pro America while actively dissenting on ongoing conflict. It is bordering on treason for a public official to undermine the war effort, the Commander in Chief and the military publicly for all the world to see. We have started down this path, and there are but two choices: to win or to lose. There is no "suing for peace" with this enemy. Now, that does not mean you have to become militaristic and be a war monger. You can be a peacenik, but you need to consider that unless you want to see the United States harmed, you should cease criticism of the war itself until after it is won. There is plenty of time to castigate the people who made what you perceive as errors AFTER we have finished the job. However, if you persist in presenting disunity and a weakened resolve to the enemy, you take direct responsibility for the lives of all Americans, Iraqis and foreign terrorists that will die subsequently. The quickest way to end the war is to be united, to demonstrate unshakable resolve, and to have the enemy surrender. Or, YOU can surrender to the enemy. Anything else will just prolong the killing. This goes infinitely more so for our public leaders. What they do for political gain is completely unconscionable.
The 1AC’s policy simulation was good and productive – inculcates effective decision-making
Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206
note: SSI = socioscientific issues
The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in developing the skills, attitudes, and values that will enable them to take control of their lives, cooperate with others to bring about change, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the knowledge that is likely to promote sociopolitical action and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) scientific and technological knowledge that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the desirability of those outcomes. Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. It is essential that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and political system(s) that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how decisions are made within local, regional, and national government and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the mechanisms by which decisions are reached, intervention is not possible. Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson 2009b for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which sociopolitical action depends is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the establishment of policy.
And it’s not role-playing, just policy-analysis – that’s effective and productive
Shulock 99 Nancy, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY --- professor of Public Policy and Administration and director of the Institute for Higher Education Leadership and Policy (IHELP) at Sacramento State University, The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, No. 2, 226–244 (1999)
In my view, none of these radical changes is necessary. As interesting as our politics might be with the kinds of changes outlined by proponents of participatory and critical policy analysis, we do not need these changes to justify our investment in policy analysis. Policy analysis already involves discourse, introduces ideas into politics, and affects policy outcomes. The problem is not that policymakers refuse to understand the value of traditional policy analysis or that policy analysts have not learned to be properly interactive with stakeholders and reflective of multiple and nontechnocratic perspectives. The problem, in my view, is only that policy analysts, policymakers, and observers alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. Policy analysis has changed, right along with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the discourse that shapes citizen preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political environment. Regardless of what the textbooks say, there does not need to be a client in order for ideas from policy analysis to resonate through the policy environment.10¶ Certainly there is room to make our politics more inclusive. But those critics who see policy analysis as a tool of the power elite might be less concerned if they understood that analysts are only adding to the debate—they are unlikely to be handing ready-made policy solutions to elite decisionmakers for implementation. Analysts themselves might be more contented if they started appreciating the appropriation of their ideas by the whole gamut of policy participants and stopped counting the number of times their clients acted upon their proposed solutions. And the cynics disdainful of the purported objectivism of analysis might relax if analysts themselves would acknowledge that they are seeking not truth, but to elevate the level of debate with a compelling, evidence-based presentation of their perspectives. Whereas critics call, unrealistically in my view, for analysts to present competing perspectives on an issue or to “design a discourse among multiple perspectives,” I see no reason why an individual analyst must do this when multiple perspectives are already in abundance, brought by multiple analysts. If we would acknowledge that policy analysis does not occur under a private, contractual process whereby hired hands advise only their clients, we would not worry that clients get only one perspective.¶ Policy analysis is used, far more extensively than is commonly believed. Its use could be appreciated and expanded if policymakers, citizens, and analysts themselves began to present it more accurately, not as a comprehensive, problem-solving, scientific enterprise, but as a contributor to informed discourse. For years Lindblom 1965, 1968, 1979, 1986, 1990 has argued that we should understand policy analysis for the limited tool that it is—just one of several routes to social problem solving, and an inferior route at that. Although I have learned much from Lindblom on this odyssey from traditional to interpretive policy analysis, my point is different. Lindblom sees analysis as having a very limited impact on policy change due to its ill-conceived reliance on science and its deluded attempts to impose comprehensive rationality on an incremental policy process. I, with the benefit of recent insights of Baumgartner, Jones, and others into the dynamics of policy change, see that even with these limitations, policy analysis can have a major impact on policy. Ideas, aided by institutions and embraced by citizens, can reshape the policy landscape. Policy analysis can supply the ideas.
This is especially true in the context of war powers –
Ewan E. Mellor 13, European University Institute, Political and Social Sciences, Graduate Student, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs”, http://www.academia.edu/4175480/Why_policy_relevance_is_a_moral_necessity_Just_war_theory_impact_and_UAVs
This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37¶ Kelsay argues that:¶ The criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . in the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38¶ He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms.¶ Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to¶ demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis.¶ Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “we are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51
Heg decreases structural violence – alternatives are worse
Thomas P.M. Barnett 11, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis and Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, September 12, 2011, “The New Rules: The Rise of the Rest Spells U.S. Strategic Victory,” World Politics Review, online: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9973/the-new-rules-the-rise-of-the-rest-spells-u-s-strategic-victory
Structural violence- rooted in pessismism
First the absurdity: A few of the most over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did indeed promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty concept today. But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ Meanwhile, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be. So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But the "evil" of the Washington Consensus only yielded the most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, and their record on economic development was painfully transparent: Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- after millennia of mere sustenance. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but the historical sequence is undeniable: With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place. ¶ That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s after the Soviet threat disappeared. It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements, including al-Qaida, but we made the effort because, in our heart of hearts, we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of the War on Terror is that its operational requirements actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era.¶ But, of course, that can all be tossed into the dumpster if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China, whose growing strength upsets us so much, then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come. ¶ As always, the choice is ours.
