# International Norms

# Pakistan

**Drones cause a coup – undermines their government**

**Woods 12** (Chris Woods writes at the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 8-5-12, <http://www.juancole.com/2012/08/us-drone-strikes-undermining-pakistan-democracy-woods.html>)

One of Islamabad’s most senior diplomats has told the Bureau of Investigative Journalism that ongoing CIA drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas are weakening democracy, and risk pushing people towards extremist groups. He also claims that some factions of the US government still prefer to work with ‘just one man’ rather than a democratically-elected government, and accuses the US of ‘talking in miles’ when it comes to democracy but of ‘moving in inches.’ As High Commissioner to London, Wajid Shamsul Hasan is one of Pakistan’s top ambassadors. Now four years into his second stint in the post, he is [no stranger to controversy](http://archives.dawn.com/archives/23427). In an extended interview with the Bureau, Ambassador Hasan argues that US drone strikes risk significantly weakening Pakistan’s democratic institutions: ‘What has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is, that you have rather directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government – when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament, and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.’

# Solvency

**Courts won’t rule for executive anymore – also takes out flex**

Skinner 8/23/2013, (Professor of Law at Willamette, Gwynne, Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now Clearly Dead: The 'Political Question Doctrine' in Cases Arising in the Context of Foreign Affairs, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2315237)

Lower federal courts often erroneously cite the “political question doctrine” to dismiss as nonjusticiable individual rights claims arising in foreign or military affairs contexts, a trend that has increased since the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr. Similarly, lower courts have begun citing “special factors counselling hesitation” when dismissing constitutional claims (“Bivens claims”) in similar contexts, inappropriately treating “special factors” as a nonjusticiability doctrine. Lower federal courts should not cite either doctrine as a reason to avoid adjudicating individual rights claims arising **in the context of foreign or military affairs**. Rather, lower federal **courts should adjudicate these claims** on their merits **by deciding whether the political branch at issue had the power under the Constitution to act as it did. Doing so is consistent with the manner in which the Supreme Court has approached these types of cases for over 200 years. The Court affirmed this approach in the 2012 case of Zivotofsky v. Clinton, a case in which the Court once and for all rung the death knell for the application of the “political question doctrine”** as a nonjusticiability doctrinein cases involving individual rights – even those arising **in a foreign policy context.** In fact, **a historical review of Supreme Court cases demonstrates that the Supreme Court has never applied the** so-called “**political question doctrine**” as a true nonjusticiable doctrine **to dismiss individual rights claims** (and arguably, not to any claims at all), **even those arising in the context of foreign or military affairs**. This includes the seminal “political question” case of Marbury v. Madison. Rather, **the Supreme Court has almost always rejected the “political question doctrine” as a basis to preclude adjudication of individual rights claims, even in the context of foreign or military affairs**. Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently admonished lower courts regarding the importance of the judiciary branch’s adjudication of individual rights claims, even in such contexts.13 That is not to say that from time to time the Court has not cited a “political question doctrine” in certain of its cases. However, a close review of those cases demonstrates that rather than dismissing such claims in those cases as “nonjusticiable,” the Court in fact adjudicated the claims by finding that either the executive or Congress acted constitutionally within their power or discretion. Moreover, **the post-9/11 Supreme Court cases of Hamdi** v. Rumsfeld, **Rasul** v. Bush, **and** Bush v. **Boumediene, in which the Supreme Court consistently found that the political branches overstepped their constitutional authority, clarified that the doctrine should not be used to dismiss** individual rights claims as nonjusticiable**, even those arising in a foreign or military affairs context. In case there remained any doubt, the Supreme Court in Zivotofsky rejected the “political question doctrine**” as a nonjusticiability doctrine, at least in the area individual rights, if not altogether. The Court found the case, involving whether the parents of a boy born in Jerusalem had the right to list Israel as his place of birth pursuant to a Congressional statute, was justiciable.17 The Court addressed the real issue, which was whether Congress had the authority to trump the President over whether Israel could be listed as the country of birth on passports where a person was born in Jerusalem, notwithstanding the President’s sole authority to recognize other governments. 18 In ruling as it did, the Court stayed true to many of its earlier cases involving “political questions” by adjudicating the claim through deciding whether one of the political branches took action that was within its constitutional authority. **In the case, the Court showed its willingness to limit the power of the President in the area of foreign affairs** rather than finding the claim nonjusticiable.

Courts already ruled against states secrecy doctrines for drones – spills over

Warren Richey 13, staff writer, 3/15/13 [“Drone documents case: federal appeals court rules against CIA,” http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/0315/Drone-documents-case-federal-appeals-court-rules-against-CIA]

A federal appeals court on Friday ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to respond to a Freedom of Information Act request seeking documents related to the use of drone aircraft in targeted killings overseas.¶ The CIA had initially responded to the Jan. 2010 FOIA request by stating that it would neither confirm not deny the existence of any documents at the agency related to the secret program.¶ A federal judge accepted the argument and dismissed the FOIA request in Sept. 2011.¶ The American Civil Liberties Union, which filed the request, appealed.¶ **The appeals court decision sends the case back to federal court where the CIA will be** required to present a list of documents **potentially relevant to the ACLU’s request**. ¶ The decision doesn’t mean the ACLU will necessarily gain access to any or all documents.¶ **But the decision is significant in a broader way**.¶ “This is an important victory. **It requires the government to retire the absurd claim that the CIA’s interest in the targeted killing program is a secret, and it will make it more difficult for the government to deflect questions about the program’s scope and legal basis**,” ACLU Deputy Legal Director Jameel Jaffer said, in statement.¶ **“It also means that the CIA will have to explain what records it is withholding, and on what grounds it is withholding them**,” Mr. Jaffer said.¶ The ACLU request for information was made in an effort to shed light on America’s lethal drone program. The lawyers want the agency to reveal when and where drones are being used, and who is being targeted.¶ They are also seeking information about how the government is guaranteeing compliance with international law against extrajudicial killings.¶ In its decision on Friday, the three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the CIA’s argument that it was under no obligation to reveal the existence of drone-related documents at the agency.¶ Government lawyers had said that since no CIA or executive branch official had disclosed whether the CIA “has an interest in drone strikes,” there was no basis for the agency to respond in any way to the FOIA request. The agency maintained that any response – either confirming or denying – would reveal sensitive information.¶ **Writing for the panel, Chief Judge Merrick Garland dismissed the CIA’s position as “neither logical nor plausible**.”¶ He noted that President Obama, then-counter terrorism adviser John Brennan, and then-CIA Director Leon Panetta had all given public statements acknowledging the drone program.¶ “Given these official acknowledgments that the United States has participated in drone strikes, it is neither logical nor plausible for the CIA to maintain that it would reveal anything not already in the public domain to say that the Agency at least has an intelligence interest in such strikes,” Judge Garland wrote.¶ “The defendant is, after all, the Central Intelligence Agency. And it strains credulity to suggest that an agency charged with gathering intelligence affecting the national security does not have an ‘intelligence interest’ in drone strikes, even if that agency does not operate the drones itself,” the judge said.¶ Officials at the ACLU praised the decision.¶ “We hope that **this ruling will encourage the Obama administration to fundamentally reconsider the secrecy surrounding the targeted killing program,”** Jaffer said. “The program has already been responsible for the deaths of more than 4,000 people in an unknown number of countries. The public surely has a right to know who the government is killing, and why, and in which countries, and on whose orders,” he said.¶ “**The Obama administration**, which **has repeatedly acknowledged the importance of government transparency**, should give the public the information it needs in order to fully evaluate the wisdom and lawfulness of the government’s policies,” Jaffer said.

#### Courts would impose tougher standards – not remove the doctrine

Bazzle 12 (Tom – J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2011, “Shutting the Courthouse Doors: Invoking the State Secrets Privilege to Thwart Judicial Review in the Age of Terror”, 2012, 23 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 29, lexis)

 [\*65] The most direct approach would be to impose higher standards on agencies seeking to dismiss cases at the pleading stage based on purported state secrets. As the Plaintiffs argued in their certiorari petition for Jeppesen Dataplan, the growing trend for courts to grant pre-discovery dismissal on state-secrets grounds raises significant due process concerns. n218 Others have argued that the judicial decision about whether to examine allegedly privileged materials ex parte and in camera should be controlled by the more demanding "clear and convincing" standard than the deferential "reasonable danger" standard articulated in Reynolds. n219 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court convolutedly framed its "reasonable danger" standard as follows: When the court determines that there is a "reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which ... should not be divulged," the court will not "jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers." n220 In other words, if there is a "reasonable danger" that the documents would reveal privileged and injurious information, judges must refrain from examining the documents to determine if in fact the allegedly injurious information actually exists in the documents.

# Executive Restraint CP

### 2AC Executive Restraint CP

#### 1AC Guiora evidence says we’re key to rule of law – that prevents extinction

**IEER 03** (“Rule of Power or Rule of Law?”, <http://www.lcnp.org/pubs/exesummary.pdf>)The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system established by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty based international legal system because they fear infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. When the United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance. Undermining the international system of treaties is likely to have particularly significant consequences in the area of peace and security. Even though the United States is uniquely positioned as the economic and military sole superpower, unilateral actions are insufficient to protect the people of the United States. For example, since September 11, prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an increasing priority. The United States requires cooperation from other countries to prevent and detect proliferation, including through the multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation treaties. No legal system is foolproof, domestically or internationally. While violations do occur, “the dictum that most nations obey international law most of the time holds true today with greater force than at any time during the last century.” And legal systems should not be abandoned because some of the actors do not comply. In the international as in the domestic sphere, enforcement requires machinery for deciding when there has been a violation, namely verification and transparency arrangements. Such arrangements also provide an incentive for compliance under ordinary circumstances. Yet for several of the treaties discussed in this report, including the BWC, CWC, and CTBT, one general characteristic of the U.S. approach has been to try to exempt itself from transparency and verification arrangements. It bespeaks a lack of good faith if the United States wants near-perfect knowledge of others’ compliance so as to be able to detect all possible violations, while also wanting all too often to shield itself from scrutiny. While many treaties lack internal explicit provisions for sanctions, there are means of enforcement. Far more than is generally understood, states are very concerned about formal international condemnation of their actions. A range of sanctions is also available, including withdrawal of privileges under treaty regimes, arms and commodity embargoes, travel bans, reductions in international financial assistance or loans, and freezing of state or individual leader assets. Institutional mechanisms are available to reinforce compliance with treaty regimes, including the U.N. Security Council and the International Court of Justice. Regarding the latter, however, the United States has withdrawn from its general jurisdiction. One explanation for increasing U.S. opposition to the treaty system is that the United States is an “honorable country” that does not need treaty limits to do the right thing. This view relies on U.S. military strength above all and assumes that the U.S. actions are intrinsically right, recalling the ideology of “Manifest Destiny.” This is at odds with the very notion that the rule of law is possible in global affairs. If the rule of power rather than the rule of law becomes the norm, especially in the context of the present inequalities and injustices around the world, security is likely to be a casualty. International security can best be achieved through coordinated local, national, regional and global actions and cooperation. Treaties, like all other tools in this toolbox, are imperfect instruments. Like a national law, a treaty may be unjust or unwise, in whole or in part. If so, it can and should be amended. But without a framework of multilateral agreements, the alternative is for states to decide for themselves when action is warranted

in their own interests, and to proceed to act unilaterally against others when they feel aggrieved. This is a recipe for the powerful to be police, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one. It is a path that cannot but lead to the arbitrary application and enforcement of law. For the United States, a hallmark of whose history is its role as a progenitor of the rule of law, to embark on a path of disregard of its international legal obligations is to abandon the best that its history has to offer the world. To reject the system of treaty-based international law rather than build on its many strengths is not only unwise, it is extremely dangerous. It is urgent that the United States join with other countries in implementing existing global security treaties to meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century and to achieve the ends of peace and

#### Executive check fails and leads to rubber stamping-Strict scrutiny through the courts is preferable. Prefer our COMPARATIVE and SPECIFIC evidence

Somin, 13 [Ilya, Professor of Law, George Mason University, “Hearing on Drone Wars: the Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing,” <http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13SominTestimony.pdf>, Testimony Before the United States Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 4/23, ALB]

Alternatively, one can envision some kind of more extensive due process within the **¶** executive branch itself, as advocated by Neal Katyal of the Georgetown University Law ¶ Center.But any internal executive process has the flaw that it could always be overriden by ¶ the president, and possibly other high-ranking executive branch officials. Moreover, lower level executive officials might be reluctant to veto drone strikes supported by their superiors, ¶ either out of careerist concerns, or because administration officials are naturally likely to **¶** share the ideological and policy priorities of the president. An external check on targeting ¶ reduces such risks. External review might also enhance the credibility of the target-selection **¶** process with informed opinion both in the United States and abroad. ¶ Whether targeting decisions are made with or without judicial oversight, there is also an ¶ important question of burdens of proof. How much evidence is enough to justify classifying ¶ you or me as a senior Al Qaeda leader? The administration memo does not address that ¶ crucial question either. ¶ Obviously, it is unrealistic to hold military operations to the standards of proof normally ¶ required in civilian criminal prosecutions. But at the same time, we should be wary of giving ¶ the president unfettered power to order the killing of citizens simply based on his assertion ¶ that they pose a threat. Amos Guiora suggests that an oversight court should evaluate **¶** proposed strikes under a “strict scrutiny standard” that ensures that strikes are only ordered ¶ based on intelligence that is “reliable, material and probative.” It is difficult for me to say ¶ whether this standard of proof is the best available option. But the issue is a crucial one that **¶** deserves further consideration. Ideally, we need a standard of proof rigorous enough to **¶** minimize reckless or abusive use of targeted killing, but not so high as to preclude its ¶ legitimate use.

#### CP will get rolled back by future presidents

Friedersdorf 13

(CONOR FRIEDERSDORF, staff writer, “Does Obama Really Believe He Can Limit the Next President's Power?” MAY 28 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/does-obama-really-believe-he-can-limit-the-next-presidents-power/276279/>, KB)

Obama doesn't seem to realize that his legacy won't be shaped by any perspicacious limits he places on the executive branch, if he ever gets around to placing any on it. The next president can just undo those "self-imposed" limits with the same wave of a hand that Obama uses to create them. His influence in the realm of executive power will be to expand it. By 2016 we'll be four terms deep in major policy decisions being driven by secret memos from the Office of Legal Counsel. The White House will have a kill list, and if the next president wants to add names to it using standards twice as lax as Obama's, he or she can do it, in secret, per his precedent.

### DOD Plank

**DOD Plank doesn’t solve – military has less oversight**

**Feeney 13** (Matthew, March 20, “[It Looks Like Shifting the CIA's Drone Program to the Pentagon Won't Change Much](http://reason.com/blog/2013/03/20/looks-like-shifting-the-cias-drone-progr)”, <http://reason.com/blog/2013/03/20/looks-like-shifting-the-cias-drone-progr>)

But that’s not to say that there will necessarily be more transparency of the military’s drone programs. Much depends on congressional prerogative, rather than institutional requirements. A summary offered by a former Special Operations Command lawyer [last year](http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol.-3_Wall1.pdf) (.pdf), piggybacking off one from a former CIA lawyer, was: “If the activity is defined as a military activity (‘Title 10′) there is no requirement to notify Congress, while intelligence community activities (‘Title 50′) require presidential findings and notice to Congress.” (For a good overview of how how the military can compartmentalize and limit access to information on its activities, including to Congress, read [this blog post from Robert Caruso](http://robertandrewcaruso.tumblr.com/post/12604690718/time-sensitive-targeting-the-crush-on-drones-and-the).) “Moving lethal drone operations exclusively to DOD might bring benefits. But DOD’s lethal operations are no less secretive than the CIA’s, and congressional **oversight of DOD** ops **is significantly weaker**,” former Justice Department lawyer Jack Goldsmith tells Klaidman. Mieke Eoyang, a former House intelligence committee staffer, tells Danger Room that oversight “depends on the the level of interest of the committee chairman on the Title 10 [military] side. It depends on how detailed he wants to get, down in the weeds.”

### Links to Obama Good

**Counterplan links to politics – causes Republicans to freak out**

Zengerle and Spetalnick 13 [Patricia and Matt, writers for Reuters, “Obama wants to end War on Terror but Congress balks,” Reuters, May 24, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/24/us-usa-obama-speech-idUSBRE94M04Y20130524>] CPO

(Reuters) - President Barack Obama wants to roll back some of the most controversial aspects of the U.S. "war on terror," but efforts to alter the global fight against Islamist militants will face the usual hurdle at home: staunch opposition from Republicans in Congress.¶ In a major policy speech on Thursday, Obama narrowed the scope of the targeted-killing drone campaign against al Qaeda and its allies and announced steps toward closing the Guantanamo Bay military prison in Cuba.¶ He acknowledged the past use of "torture" in U.S. interrogations, expressed remorse over civilian casualties from drone strikes, and said Guantanamo "has become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law."¶ After launching costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is tiring of conflict. While combating terrorism is still a high priority, polls show Americans' main concerns are the economy and other domestic issues such as healthcare.¶ Conservative opponents said they would try to block the closure of Guantanamo and rejected Obama's call to repeal the Authorization for Use of Military Force, passed in September 2001 and the legal basis for much of the "war on terror."¶ "We have 166 prisoners remaining (at Guantanamo) ... the meanest, nastiest people in the world. They wake up every day seeking to do harm to America and Americans. And if they are released, that's exactly what they are going to do," Republican Senator Saxby Chambliss said in an address to constituents on Friday.¶ Obama called for an end to a "boundless global war on terror" but Republicans warned against being too quick to declare al Qaeda a spent force.¶ "To somehow argue that al Qaeda is quote ‘on the run,' comes from a degree of unreality that to me is really incredible. Al Qaeda is expanding all over the Middle East from Mali to Yemen and all the places in between," scoffed Republican Senator John McCain after Obama's speech.¶ While Obama largely has a free hand as commander in chief to set U.S. drone policy, Congress has used its power of the purse to block him from closing Guantanamo.¶

### Caucasus

#### Unrestricted drone use causes nuclear war in the Caucasus

Clayton 12 (Nick Clayton, Worked in several publications, including the Washington Times the Asia Times and Washington Diplomat. He is currently the senior editor of Kanal PIK TV's English Service (a Russian-language channel), lived in the Caucuses for several years,10/23/2012, "Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war", www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war)

Armenia and Azerbaijan could soon be at war if drone proliferation on both sides of the border continues. In a region where a fragile peace holds over three frozen conflicts, the nations of the South Caucasus are buzzing with drones they use to probe one another’s defenses and spy on disputed territories. The region is also host to strategic oil and gas pipelines and a tangled web of alliances and precious resources that observers say threaten to quickly escalate the border skirmishes and airspace violations to a wider regional conflict triggered by Armenia and Azerbaijan that could potentially pull in Israel, Russia and Iran. To some extent, these countries are already being pulled towards conflict. Last September, Armenia shot down an Israeli-made Azerbaijani drone over Nagorno-Karabakh and the government claims that drones have been spotted ahead of recent incursions by Azerbaijani troops into Armenian-held territory. Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, said in a briefing that attacks this summer showed that Azerbaijan is eager to “play with its new toys” and its forces showed “impressive tactical and operational improvement.” The International Crisis Group warned that as the tit-for-tat incidents become more deadly, “there is a growing risk that the increasing frontline tensions could lead to an accidental war.” “Everyone is now saying that the war is coming. We know that it could start at any moment.” ~Grush Agbaryan, mayor of Voskepar With this in mind, the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have long imposed a non-binding arms embargo on both countries, and both are under a de facto arms ban from the United States. But, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), this has not stopped Israel and Russia from selling to them. After fighting a bloody war in the early 1990s over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been locked in a stalemate with an oft-violated ceasefire holding a tenuous peace between them. And drones are the latest addition to the battlefield. In March, Azerbaijan signed a $1.6 billion arms deal with Israel, which consisted largely of advanced drones and an air defense system. Through this and other deals, Azerbaijan is currently amassing a squadron of over 100 drones from all three of Israel’s top defense manufacturers. Armenia, meanwhile, employs only a small number of domestically produced models. Intelligence gathering is just one use for drones, which are also used to spot targets for artillery, and, if armed, strike targets themselves. Armenian and Azerbaijani forces routinely snipe and engage one another along the front, each typically blaming the other for violating the ceasefire. At least 60 people have been killed in ceasefire violations in the last two years, and the Brussels-based International Crisis Group claimed in a report published in February 2011 that the sporadic violence has claimed hundreds of lives. “Each (Armenia and Azerbaijan) is apparently using the clashes and the threat of a new war to pressure its opponent at the negotiations table, while also preparing for the possibility of a full-scale conflict in the event of a complete breakdown in the peace talks,” the report said. Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Institute in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, said that the arms buildup on both sides makes the situation more dangerous but also said that the clashes are calculated actions, with higher death tolls becoming a negotiating tactic. “This isn’t Somalia or Afghanistan. These aren’t independent units. The Armenian, Azerbaijani and Karabakh armed forces have a rigid chain of command so it’s not a question of a sergeant or a lieutenant randomly giving the order to open fire. These are absolutely synchronized political attacks,” Iskandaryan said. The deadliest recent uptick in violence along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the line of contact around Karabakh came in early June as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was on a visit to the region. While death tolls varied, at least two dozen soldiers were killed or wounded in a series of shootouts along the front. The year before, at least four Armenian soldiers were killed in an alleged border incursion by Azerbaijani troops one day after a peace summit between the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian presidents in St. Petersburg, Russia. “No one slept for two or three days [during the June skirmishes],” said Grush Agbaryan, the mayor of the border village of Voskepar for a total of 27 years off and on over the past three decades. “Everyone is now saying that the war is coming. We know that it could start at any moment." Azerbaijan refused to issue accreditation to GlobalPost’s correspondent to enter the country to report on the shootings and Azerbaijan’s military modernization. Flush with cash from energy exports, Azerbaijan has increased its annual defense budget from an estimated $160 million in 2003 to $3.6 billion in 2012. SIPRI said in a report that largely as a result of its blockbuster drone deal with Israel, Azerbaijan’s defense budget jumped 88 percent this year — the biggest military spending increase in the world. Israel has long used arms deals to gain strategic leverage over its rivals in the region. Although difficult to confirm, many security analys

ts believe Israel’s deals with Russia have played heavily into Moscow’s suspension of a series of contracts with Iran and Syria that would have provided them with more advanced air defense systems and fighter jets. Stephen Blank, a research professor at the United States Army War College, said that preventing arms supplies to Syria and Iran — particularly Russian S-300 air defense systems — has been among Israel’s top goals with the deals. “There’s always a quid pro quo,” Blank said. “Nobody sells arms just for cash.” In Azerbaijan in particular, Israel has traded its highly demanded drone technology for intelligence arrangements and covert footholds against Iran. In a January 2009 US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, a US diplomat reported that in a closed-door conversation, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev compared his country’s relationship with Israel to an iceberg — nine-tenths of it is below the surface. Although the Jewish state and Azerbaijan, a conservative Muslim country, may seem like an odd couple, the cable asserts, “Each country finds it easy to identify with the other’s geopolitical difficulties, and both rank Iran as an existential security threat.” Quarrels between Azerbaijan and Iran run the gamut of territorial, religious and geo-political disputes and Tehran has repeatedly threatened to “destroy” the country over its support for secular governance and NATO integration. In the end, “Israel’s main goal is to preserve Azerbaijan as an ally against Iran, a platform for reconnaissance of that country and as a market for military hardware,” the diplomatic cable reads. But, while these ties had indeed remained below the surface for most of the past decade, a series of leaks this year exposed the extent of their cooperation as Israel ramped up its covert war with the Islamic Republic. In February, the Times of London quoted a source the publication said was an active Mossad agent in Azerbaijan as saying the country was “ground zero for intelligence work.” This came amid accusations from Tehran that Azerbaijan had aided Israeli agents in assassinating an Iranian nuclear scientist in January. Then, just as Baku had begun to cool tensions with the Islamic Republic, Foreign Policy magazine published an article citing Washington intelligence officials who claimed that Israel had signed agreements to use Azerbaijani airfields as a part of a potential bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear sites. Baku strongly denied the claims, but in September, Azerbaijani officials and military sources told Reuters that the country would figure in Israel’s contingencies for a potential attack against Iran. "Israel has a problem in that if it is going to bomb Iran, its nuclear sites, it lacks refueling," Rasim Musabayov, a member of the Azerbiajani parliamentary foreign relations committee told Reuters. “I think their plan includes some use of Azerbaijan access. We have (bases) fully equipped with modern navigation, anti-aircraft defenses and personnel trained by Americans and if necessary they can be used without any preparations." He went on to say that the drones Israel sold to Azerbaijan allow it to “indirectly watch what's happening in Iran.” According to SIPRI, Azerbaijan had acquired about 30 drones from Israeli firms Aeronautics Ltd. and Elbit Systems by the end of 2011, including at least 25 medium-sized Hermes-450 and Aerostar drones. In October 2011, Azerbaijan signed a deal to license and domestically produce an additional 60 Aerostar and Orbiter 2M drones. Its most recent purchase from Israel Aeronautics Industries (IAI) in March reportedly included 10 high altitude Heron-TP drones — the most advanced Israeli drone in service — according to Oxford Analytica. Collectively, these purchases have netted Azerbaijan 50 or more drones that are similar in class, size and capabilities to American Predator and Reaper-type drones, which are the workhorses of the United States’ campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. Although Israel may have sold the drones to Azerbaijan with Iran in mind, Baku has said publicly that it intends to use its new hardware to retake territory it lost to Armenia. So far, Azerbaijan’s drone fleet is not armed, but industry experts say the models it employs could carry munitions and be programmed to strike targets. Drones are a tempting tool to use in frozen conflicts, because, while their presence raises tensions, international law remains vague at best on the legality of using them. In 2008, several Georgian drones were shot down over its rebel region of Abkhazia. A UN investigation found that at least one of the drones was downed by a fighter jet from Russia, which maintained a peacekeeping presence in the territory. While it was ruled that Russia violated the terms of the ceasefire by entering aircraft into the conflict zone, Georgia also violated the ceasefire for sending the drone on a “military operation” into the conflict zone. The incident spiked tensions between Russia and Georgia, both of which saw it as evidence the other was preparing to attack. Three months later, they fought a brief, but destructive war that killed hundreds. The legality of drones in Nagorno-Karabakh is even less clear because the conflict was stopped in 1994 by a simple ceasefire that halted hostilities but did not stipulate a withdrawal of military forces from the area. Furthermore, analysts believe that all-out war between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be longer and more difficult to contain than the five-day Russian-Georgian conflict. While Russia was able to quickly rout the Georgian army with a much superior force, analysts say that Armenia and Azerbaijan are much more evenly matched and therefore the conflict would be prolonged and costly in lives and resources. Blank said that renewed war would be “a very catastrophic event” with “a recipe for a very quick escalation to the international level.” Armenia is militarily allied with Russia and hosts a base of 5,000 Russian troops on its territory. After the summer’s border clashes, Russia announced it was stepping up its patrols of Armenian airspace by 20 percent. Iran also supports Armenia and has important business ties in the country, which analysts say Tehran uses as a “proxy” to circumvent international sanctions. Blank said Israel has made a risky move by supplying Azerbaijan with drones and other high tech equipment, given the tenuous balance of power between the heavily fortified Armenian positions and the more numerous and technologically superior Azerbaijani forces. If ignited, he said, “[an Armenian-Azerbaijani war] will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of.”

# Damages CP

### 2AC Ex-Post CP

#### Ex post review fails to solve legitimacy or set up a legal framework

Crandall 12 (Carla, Law Clerk – Supreme Court of Missouri, “Ready…Fire…Aim! A Case for Applying American Due Process Principles Before Engaging in Drone Strikes,” Florida Journal of International Law, April, 24 Fla. J. Int'l L. 55, Lexis)

Despite the expanded use of drones, however, the legitimacy of these attacks remains unclear. Most commentators who have addressed the legitimacy of more general targeted killings have examined the issue within the framework of either international humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law (IHRL). n6 Those limited few who have [\*57] analyzed the subject through the lens of American due process have limited their scrutiny to the absence of post-deprivation rights. n7 They suggest, for instance, that the United States should implement some sort of Bivens-type action as a remedy for the survivors of erroneous drone strikes. n8 As this Article explains, however, none of these approaches yield wholly satisfactory answers as to which framework should govern the use of drones within the context of the war on terror. And though the idea that American due process principles ought to be applied ex post represents a significant contribution to the debate, it too ultimately falls flat. Indeed, such an approach unduly narrows the obligation of U.S. officials to the standard of readying, firing, and then aiming- requiring them to perform a detailed review of the strikes only after the fact. Instead, this Article argues that the United States ought to be held to a higher, ex ante standard-that of "aiming" before firing-and posits that such a standard is practically attainable. In doing so, the Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the capabilities and current employment of drones and explains why resolving the legitimacy of their use is so critical. Specifically, it highlights that, despite the unsettled nature of the law in this area, targeted killings by drone strikes have increased exponentially in recent years-in some instances against arguably questionable targets. Part III examines current attempts to address the legitimacy of drone assaults and explains why they fail to adequately govern the use of these weapons. While this Part explores the applicability of IHRL and IHL, it does not undertake to resolve the debate as to which regime does or ought to apply to these operations. To the contrary, it argues that limitations within each framework have prevented consensus from forming around the applicability of either. Accordingly, U.S. officials [\*58] must arguably look to other sources to find guiding principles to legitimize targeted killings via drones. Though it is admittedly not entirely clear whether constitutional guarantees apply in the foreign locales where these strikes occur-or to the foreign nationals who are often their target-this Part proposes that American due process principles nevertheless ought to be invoked before such strikes occur,

because failing to do so allows the executive to act with impunity in a legal void. Part IV argues that, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld n9 and Boumediene v. Bush, n10 the Supreme Court signaled the process that may be due before drones are used to eliminate known terrorist targets. In extending the Hamdi and Boumediene analysis to targeted killings by drones, this Part also begins the inquiry into the procedural protections that due process may demand before U.S. officials engage in such actions. Part V concludes.

#### Bivens sucks

George D. Brown 9, Robert Drinan Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, “'Counter-Counter-Terrorism Via Lawsuit' - The Bivens Impasse,” Southern California Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 5, 2009, lexis

 [\*848] In the end, one must ask whether Bivens suits are the best method of responding to the constitutional questions that the war on terror litigation brings before the courts. This is a hard question. The Bivens action is a valuable component of the legal order, even if it is used sparingly under the prudential-deferential model. This Article contends that precedent and policy argue for a generally negative answer in the war on terror context. This context provides a strong example of the need for judicial deference to the political branches and judicial recognition of the danger of a situation that Benjamin Wittes describes as "one in which legalisms pervasively hamper governmental pursuit of a goal that nearly all Americans support." n24 My rejection of a broad role for Bivens also rests on the view that war on terror litigation cannot just be shoehorned into the "law enforcement" model, in which a Bivens action looks like a typical police misconduct case. The issues raised by these actions must be viewed through the lenses of the intelligence and military models as well. n25 On the other hand, I recognize that there is a real risk that constitutional violations will not be redressed. Furthermore, the judiciary's checking function will be circumscribed in an area where it may be essential.

This is the Bivens impasse that confronts the courts and that the courts may not be able to resolve. One approach would be for Congress to pass legislation to provide non-Bivens relief to those aggrieved by actions against them as terrorism suspects. n26 Indeed, the ultimate impact of Bivens suits may be to prod Congress into actions that reflect its view on how best to strike the balance between individual liberty and national security and that represent a more assertive congressional role in the war on terror. Wittes writes that Congress "has sat on its hands and refused to assert its own proper role in designing a coherent legal structure for the war; to this day, America's national legislature continues to avoid addressing the questions only it can usefully answer." n27 Wittes views both the executive and the judiciary as incapable of developing "a stable long-term architecture for a war that defies all of the usual norms of war. The only institution capable of delivering such a body of law is the Congress of the [\*849] United States ... ." n28

# Flex DA

And Syria outweighs the link

David Rothkoph 13, CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy, 8/3/13, The Gamble, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/31/the\_gamble?page=full

Obama has reversed decades of precedent regarding the nature of presidential war powers -and whether you prefer this change in the balance of power or not, **as a matter of quantifiable fact** he is transferring greater responsibility for U.S. foreign policy to a Congress that is more divided, more incapable of reasoned debate or action, and more dysfunctional than any in modern American history. Just wait for the Rand Paul filibuster or similar congressional gamesmanship. The president's own action in Libya was undertaken without such approval. So, too, was his expansion of America's drone and cyber programs. Will future offensive actions require Congress to weigh in? How will Congress react if the president tries to pick and choose when this precedent should be applied? At best, the door is open to further acrimony. At worst, the paralysis of the U.S. Congress that has given us the current budget crisis and almost no meaningful recent legislation will soon be coming to a foreign policy decision near you. Consider that John Boehner was instantly more clear about setting the timing for any potential action against Syria with his statement that Congress will not reconvene before its scheduled September 9 return to Washington than anyone in the administration has been thus far. Perhaps more importantly, what will future Congresses expect of future presidents? If Obama abides by this new approach for the next three years, will his successors **lack the ability to act quickly** and on their own? While past presidents have no doubt abused their War Powers authority to take action and ask for congressional approval within 60 days, we live in a volatile world; sometimes security requires swift action. The president still legally has that right, but Obama's decision may have done more -for better or worse -to **dial back the imperial presidency** than anything his predecessors or Congress have done for decades. 5. America's international standing will likely suffer. As a consequence of all of the above, even if the president "wins" and persuades Congress to support his extremely limited action in Syria, the perception of America as a nimble, forceful actor on the world stage and that its president is a man whose word carries great weight is **likely to be diminished**. Again, like the shift or hate it, **foreign leaders can do the math.**Not only is post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan America less inclined to get involved anywhere, but when it comes to the use of U.S. military force (our one indisputable source of superpower strength) **we just became a whole lot less likely to act** or, in any event, act quickly. Again, good or bad, that is a stance that is likely to **figure into the calculus of those who once feared provoking the United S**

**tates**.A final consequence of this is that it seems ever more certain that Obama's foreign policy will be framed as so anti-interventionist and **focused on disengagement from world affairs** that **it will have major political consequences in 2016**. The dialectic has swung from the interventionism of Bush to the leaning away of Obama. Now, the question will be whether a centrist synthesis will emerge that restores the idea that the United States can have a muscular foreign policy that remains prudent, capable of action, and respects international laws and norms. Almost certainly, that is what President Obama would argue he seeks. But I suspect that others, including possibly his former secretary of state may well seek to define a different approach. Indeed, we may well see the divisions within the Democratic Party on national security emerge as key fault lines in the Clinton vs. Biden primary battles of 2016. And just imagine Clinton vs. Rand Paul in the general election.

#### Restrictions inevitable – the aff prevents haphazard ones which are worse

Benjamin Wittes 09, senior fellow and research director in public law at the Brookings Institution, is the author of Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror and is also a member of the Hoover Institution's Task Force on National Security and Law, “Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform”, November 3, Book, p. 17

A new administration now confronts the same hard problems that plagued its ideologically opposite predecessor, and its very efforts to turn the page on the past make acute the problems of institutionalization. For while the new administration can promise to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay and can talk about its desire to prosecute suspects criminally, for example, it cannot so easily forswear noncriminal detention. While it can eschew the term "global war on terror," it cannot forswear those uses of force—Predator strikes, for example—that law enforcement powers would never countenance. Nor is it hastening to give back the surveillance powers that Congress finally gave the Bush administration. In other words, its very efforts to avoid the Bush administrations vocabulary have only emphasized the conflicts hybrid nature—indeed- emphasized that the United States is building something new here, not merely applying something old.¶ That point should not provoke controversy. The evidence that the United States is fumbling toward the creation of hybrid institutions to handle terrorism cases is everywhere around us. U.S. law, for example, now contemplates extensive- probing judicial review of detentions under the laws of war—a naked marriage of criminal justice and wartime traditions. It also contemplates warrantless wiretapping with judicial oversight of surveillance targeting procedures—thereby mingling the traditional judicial role in reviewing domestic surveillance with the vacuum cleaner-type acquisition of intelligence typical of overseas intelligence gathering. Slowly but surely, through an unpredictable combination of litigation, legislation, and evolutionary developments within executive branch policy, the nation is creating novel institutional arrangements to authorize and regulate the war on terror. The real question is not whether institutionalization will take place but whether it will take place deliberately or haphazardly, whether the United States will create through legislation the institutions with which it wishes to govern itself or whether it will allow an endless sequence of common law adjudications to shape them.¶ The authors of the chapters in this book disagree about a great many things. They span a considerable swath of the U.S. political spectrum, and they would no doubt object to some of one another's policy prescriptions. Indeed, some of the proposals are arguably inconsistent with one another, and it will be the very rare reader who reads this entire volume and wishes to see all of its ideas implemented in legislation. What binds these authors together is not the programmatic aspects of their policy prescriptions but the belief in the value of legislative action to help shape the contours of the continuing U.S. confrontation with terrorism. That is, the authors all believe that Congress has a significant role to play in the process of institutionalization—and they have all attempted to describe that role with reference to one of the policy areas over which Americans have sparred these past several years and will likely continue sparring over the next several years.

#### Flexibility is irrelevant in the hegemonic era—rule-breaking is a greater risk

Knowles 09 (Robert, Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring 2009, "American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution" Arizona State Law Journal, Lexis)

The hegemonic model also reduces the need for executive branch flexibility, and the institutional competence terrain shifts toward the courts. The stability of the current U.S.-led international system depends on the ability of the U.S. to govern effectively. Effective governance depends on, among other things, predictability. n422 G. John Ikenberry analogizes America's hegemonic position to that of a "giant corporation" seeking foreign investors: "The rule of law and the institutions of policy making in a democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and [\*155] accountability." n423 Stable interpretation of the law bolsters the stability of the system because other nations will know that they can rely on those interpretations and that there will be at least some degree of enforcement by the United States. At the same time, the separation of powers serves the global-governance function by reducing the ability of the executive branch to make "abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states." n424 The Bush Administration's detainee policy, for all of its virtues and faults, was an exceedingly aggressive departure from existing norms, and was therefore bound to generate intense controversy. It was formulated quickly, by a small group of policy-makers and legal advisors without consulting Congress and over the objections of even some within the executive branch. n425 Although the Administration invoked the law of armed conflict to justify its detention of enemy combatants, it did not seem to recognize limits imposed by that law. n426 Most significantly, it designed the detention scheme around interrogation rather than incapacitation and excluded the detainees from all legal protections of the Geneva Conventions. n427 It declared all detainees at Guantanamo to be "enemy combatants" without establishing a regularized process for making an individual determination for each detainee. n428 And when it established the military commissions, also without consulting Congress, the Administration denied defendants important procedural protections. n429 In an anarchic world characterized by great power conflict, one could make the argument that the executive branch requires maximum flexibility to defeat the enemy, who may not adhere to international law. Indeed, the precedents relied on most heavily by the Administration in the enemy combatant cases date from the 1930s and 1940s - a period when the international system was radically unstable, and the United States was one of several great powers vying for advantage. n430 But during that time, the executive branch faced much more exogenous pressure from other great powers to comply with international law in the treatment of captured enemies. If the United States strayed too far from established norms, it would risk retaliation upon its own soldiers or other consequences from [\*156] powerful rivals. Today, there are no such constraints: enemies such as al Qaeda are not great powers and are not likely to obey international law anyway. Instead, the danger is that American rule-breaking will set a pattern of rule-breaking for the world, leading to instability. n431 America's military predominance enables it to set the rules of the game. When the U.S. breaks its own rules, it loses legitimacy.

#### Unique link turn – Drone program collapses now without more accountability

Zenko 13, CFR Fellow (Micah, is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)., “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers; and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total number of strikes would significantly decrease). The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping. Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage, and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S. support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 percent to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S. drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Gree

ce (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gunships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forcing the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making significant investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships, conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allowing downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks on the ground that are critical for identifying targets. According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resistance— such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones— is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attacking Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place, political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region. To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.

#### Pilot shortage thumps

RT 13 RT Network, “US drone pilot demand outstrips supply”, 8/13, <http://rt.com/usa/us-running-out-drone-pilots-765/>

The US Air Force is now facing a shortage in the number of pilots able to operate the military’s quickly expanding drone fleet, according to a new report published by a top Washington, DC, think tank. According to Air Force Colonel Bradley Hoagland, who contributed to a recent report on the Air Force’s drone program prepared by the Brookings Institution, it is quickly hitting a wall in the number of operators for its 159 Predators, 96 Reapers and 23 Global Hawks. Although the US military aimed to train 1,120 ‘traditional’ pilots along with 150 specialized drone pilots in 2012, it proved unable to meet the latter, owing to a lack of RPA (or remotely piloted aircraft) volunteers. A recent report by AFP placed the Air Force’s current drone pilot wing at 1,300, about 8.5 percent of the air corps’ pilots. Still, an increasing number of uses for America’s drone fleet, including recently-revealed plans by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for drones able to operate from naval vessels, have quickly exceeded the Air Force’s ability to train personnel to train and pilot unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

#### Court rules against executive now – triggers spillover link

Wong 13 -- PhD dissertation in Government to Georgetown University (U Jin, 4/22/2013, "THE BLANK CHECK: SUPREME COURT DECISION - MAKING IN NATIONAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND DURING WARTIME," http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/558286/Wong\_georgetown\_0076D\_12276.pdf?sequence=1)

This study started out with two questions. The first was: ?Does war influence judicial decision - making?? The second was: ?Do national security claims influence judicial decision - making?? The answer to the first question is: In a general hypothetical s ignificant war, there is a statistically significant finding of voting against the government. In the models run using the Spaeth database where the government is a party, the influence of all significant wars on judicial decision - making generally was to vote against the government. Presidential approval ratings are statistically significant only in wartime, but with a positive coefficient. Outside of wartime, presidential approval ratings are not statistically likely to influence Supreme Court behavior. This result suggests that while Courts vote strategically and support a popular president, they are still statistically likely to find against the government in a significant war. These findings altogether suggest that that the Supreme Court votes strat egically with an eye towards the popularity of the president, but revert to skepticism of government‘s wartime claims as the war progresses. The answer to the second question is: National security claims brought by the government achieve a statistically significant likelihood that the Supreme Court will vote against the government. National security claims were statistically significant with a negative signifier. This finding is consistent across all the major wars as well as peacetime. It also suggest s that the Supreme Court generally is not predisposed to defer to the executive branch‘s arguments when it comes to national security claims

#### Unrestricted drones cause terror

Poling 13 – Foreign Policy Initiative 1-16-13 (Caitlin, “The U.S. Needs a More Broad-Based Strategy to Combat Al Qaeda in Yemen,” <http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/us-needs-more-broad-based-strategy-combat-al-qaeda-yemen>, Mike)

For most of the past decade, Yemen has remained on the periphery of American national security policy. During this time, officials in the administration, Department of Defense, State Department, and Intelligence Community have been unable to devote as much attention as needed to Yemen due to American engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the Arab Spring uprisings that began in 2011 along with the September 2012 protests and embassy attacks in response to an American-made anti-Muslim video have demonstrated the importance of security in states like Yemen. Our nation’s continued involvement in Yemen is an important component of our national security. Despite all of the other challenges our country currently faces worldwide, our commitment in Yemen should be strengthened. Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), the Al Qaeda (AQ) node based out of Yemen, is widely believed to be the most lethal of the AQ affiliates, and has attempted on several occasions to attack the United States directly and harbored, until his killing in September 2011, Anwar al Alwaki, a U.S. citizen and extremist cleric responsible for the radicalization of the Fort Hood shooter and the 2009 Detroit Christmas Day bomber. The Arab Spring, and resulting uprising in Yemen that began in January 2011, as well as an ongoing Houthi rebellion in the north and secessionist movement in the south, have diverted the attention of the Yemeni security forces from counterterrorism efforts, and at the same time, restricted U.S. forces’ ability to operate on the ground. As a result, AQAP has gained strength and operating room amidst the power vacuum. According to April 2012 estimates by White House counter-terrorism advisor and nominee for CIA Director John Brennan, AQAP has more than a thousand members in Yemen and close ties to al Qaeda Core in Pakistan. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, testified in early 2011 that AQAP remains the AQ node most likely to conduct a transnational attack. Yemen is a fragile and challenged nation, but it is not yet failed – there are concrete steps our country can take to help stabilize Yemen, strengthen its capacity for countering AQAP, and prevent it from becoming another Afghanistan or Somalia. The Obama Administration’s Yemen Strategic Plan is a good start, focused on combating AQAP in the short term, increasing development assistance to meet long term challenges, and building international support in order to maximize global efforts to stabilize Yemen. However, the continued excessive use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) airstrikes remains an unaddressed issue. Policymakers should conduct a full assessment of their impact on the Yemeni population and altering their use. The use of airstrikes conducted by UAVs, colloquially known as ‘drones,’ has rapidly expanded during the past decade. However, little has been done to study their long-term effects on populations and American objectives in Yemen. Although touted as “cost-effective,” the true cost of drone strikes among target populations is not adequately taken into account. Drone strikes create a number of problems hindering our objectives – including providing propaganda material for terrorist groups, fueling hostility, increasing retaliatory attacks by AQAP and other extremist groups, and undermining the authority of the already fragile Yemeni government. President Obama authorized at least 42 strikes in Yemen in 2012, a dramatic increase from years prior. Drone strikes have been successful in targeting and eliminating AQAP leadership; however, American drones have killed twelve times more low-level fighters than mid-to-high level AQ leaders since 2008. Killing low-level militants by drone rather than attempting to capture can lead to a loss of potential intelligence. Despite the success in targeting AQ members, drones alone do not suffice as an American counterterrorism strategy in Yemen. As American drone strikes have increased in frequency, so have retaliatory attacks from AQAP. On September 11, 2012 AQAP attempted to assassinate Yemen’s defense minister via car bomb, killing seven bodyguards and five civilians in the heart of Sana’a. This attack was viewed as a direct response to the American drone strike that took out top AQAP operative Said al-Shehri earlier that month. Even more alarmingly, AQAP has now offered a bounty for the killing of the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, Geral Feierstein, or any American soldiers in Yemen. While there is no easy solution to the ongoing instability and AQAP presence in Yemen, the U.S. should avoid a drone-centric counterterrorism policy in Yemen. The current American policy, while avoiding risk for Americans on the ground, ignores the very real potential for blowback in the long-term. Instead, the administration should limit drone strikes to only targeting high value individuals; use drone strikes as part of a wider strategy that attempts to address some of the Yemen-specific grievances that are the root causes of terrorism; restore American and allied Special Forces presence in Yemen from the pre-2011 unrest; and work towards building effective Yemeni security forces that can pursue AQAP targets on the ground. A combination of limited high value target drone strikes, increased non-military aid and training of Yemeni forces for counterterrorism efforts are more likely to achieve our nation’s goal of a secure and stable Yemen.

# Farm Bill Politics DA

#### No link – we’re the courts

Whittington 05 Keith E., Cromwell Professor of Politics – Princeton University, ““Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court”, American Political Science Review, 99(4), November, p. 585, 591-592

There are some issues that politicians cannot easily handle. For individual legislators, their constituents may be sharply divided on a given issue or overwhelmingly hostile to a policy that the legislator would nonetheless like to see adopted. Party leaders, including presidents and legislative leaders, must similarly sometimes manage deeply divided or cross-pressured coalitions. When faced with such issues, elected officials may actively seek to turn over controversial political questions to the courts so as to circumvent a paralyzed legislature and avoid the political fallout that would come with taking direct action themselves. As Mark Graber (1993) has detailed in cases such as slavery and abortion, elected officials may prefer judicial resolution of disruptive political issues to direct legislative action, especially when the courts are believed to be sympathetic to the politician’s own substantive preferences but even when the attitude of the courts is uncertain or unfavorable (see also, Lovell 2003). Even when politicians do not invite judicial intervention, strategically minded courts will take into account not only the policy preferences of well-positioned policymakers but also the willingness of those potential policymakers to act if doing so means that they must assume responsibility for policy outcomes. For cross-pressured politicians and coalition leaders, shifting blame for controversial decisions to the Court and obscuring their own relationship to those decisions may preserve electoral support and coalition unity without threatening active judicial review (Arnold 1990; Fiorina 1986; Weaver 1986). The conditions for the exercise of judicial review may be relatively favorable when judicial invalidations of legislative policy can be managed to the electoral benefit of most legislators. In the cases considered previously, fractious coalitions produced legislation that presidents and party leaders deplored but were unwilling to block. Divisions within the governing coalition can also prevent legislative action that political leaders want taken, as illustrated in the following case.

Drone debates now – triggers the link

Bennett 13 (John T, Senior Congressional Reporter at Defense News, 5/6/2013, "Drones, Sequester Flexibility to Drive 2014 NDAA Debates", www.defensenews.com/article/20130506/DEFREG02/305060006/Drones-Sequester-Flexibility-Drive-2014-NDAA-Debates)

WASHINGTON — US Lawmakers are expected to battle over armed drones, softening the blow of military budget cuts and a controversial missile defense shield as they craft Pentagon policy legislation for fiscal 2014. Mirroring the political climate in Washington, work on the past several national defense authorization acts (NDAAs) has, at times, turned bitterly partisan. Longtime defense insiders say the new tone likely is here to stay for some time. Indeed, the issues expected to dominate the NDAA build this spring and summer in the House and Senate Armed Services committees — and then will spill onto the chamber floors — sharply divide most Democrats and Republicans. From whether to leave President Barack Obama’s drone-strike program under the CIA’s control or shift to the Pentagon, to closing the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, facility that houses terrorism suspects, to a proposal to build an East Coast missile shield, the 2014 NDAA process is shaping up to be a partisan kerfuffle. “I see a couple of bigger policy issues this year,” House Armed Services Committee (HASC) member Rep. Rick Larsen, D-Wash., told Defense News. “And one of those will be the proper use of drones.” Lawrence Korb, a former Pentagon official now at the Center for American Progress, added to that list of problems with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, the Pentagon’s likely DOA plan to close military bases in the US and whether to keep building Army tanks in Michigan, home state of Democratic Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Chairman Sen. Carl Levin. Drones The simmering debate about the White House’s consideration of moving the drone program from the CIA to the military is shaping up to be a turf war among congressional panels. But not political parties. On one side are powerful pro-military lawmakers such as Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., a senior Senate Armed Services Committee member. On the other are influential pro-CIA members such as Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee. Many pro-military House Democrats, such as HASC member Rep. Hank Johnson, D-Ga., and Larsen favor giving the Pentagon full ownership.

**Farm bill won’t pass and Obama’s not investing pol cap – Nutrition debate proves**

**Hopkinson 11-14** [Jenny, Politico, “Tom Vilsack: More than agriculture at stake in farm bill,” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/pro-agriculture-launch-99874.html>, ALB]

But reaching an agreement will be difficult as lawmakers continue to tussle over contentious provisions, the biggest of which is language to cut the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. While the House bill would cut almost $40 billion from the food aid program over 10 years, the Senate version only calls for a $4 billion reduction over that period.¶ Vilsack declined to provide a dollar figure that the administration would be happy with, saying only, “There’s too much fascination and focus on numbers in this town, I think we need to focus on the policy.”¶ The administration’s silence on SNAP is not sitting well with some lawmakers, however.¶ Speaking on a panel during the Pro launch event, Rep. Jim McGovern (D-Mass) said the nutrition program is key to passing the farm bill.¶ “The White House ought to take some leadership on this issue,” said McGovern, a strong proponent of the program.¶ It’s unlikely, however, that the lead negotiators on the farm bill have made progress on the nutrition title of the bill, which includes SNAP, said Rep. Steve King (R-Iowa) during the event.¶ Many of the less controversial issues are addressed first, and just by staff, before lawmakers are brought in to tackle the bigger issues, King said. The nutrition title will be the most difficult issue to resolve, “and at this point I don’t think there is progress made on nutrition.”¶ The lack of progress on the nutrition title does not bode well for the completion of the bill by Thanksgiving, which lawmakers have set as the time frame needed to get the measure through Congress by the end of the year.

#### Alt cause to no passage- Farm Safety Net-Also means you don’t have an internal link

Ellis, 11/15 [Stu, FarmGate Blog, “Farm Bill: When and How Will It Be Completed?,” <http://www.cattlenetwork.com/cattle-news/latest/Farm-bill-When-and-how-will-it-be-completed-232067501.html>, ALB]

Zulauf and Coppess say options 1 and 2 could both happen, but they have about the same chance of happening. Option three would not be good, but has a slim chance of passage. Options 2 and 3 would not typically be scenarios resulting in a Farm Bill but most of the politics surrounding the Farm Bill is keyed upon cutting spending. And they say if the conference committee meeting on the budget is quickly able to allocate funding for agriculture that may dictate when it included and not included in the Farm Bill. Zulauf and Coppess say another possibility would be elimination of the crop safety net programs. They report that while the popular belief is the disagreement over food stamps (SNAP), but they are quick to say the agreement over the Farm Safety net may be a major point of contention. They think there is a distinct possibility of the Budget committee striking first and telling the agriculture committee conference how much money they could spend.

#### The health care debacle has sent your politics DA to the emergency room

**Milbank, 11/15** [Dana, MSNBC, “Does the health-care fumble mean game over for Obama,?” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-does-health-care-fumble-mean-game-over-for-obama/2013/11/15/77dc0b0a-4dfa-11e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4_allComments.html>, ALB]

¶ But on the broader question of whether Obama can rebuild an effective presidency after this debacle, it’s starting to look as if it may be game over.¶ ¶ The record for recent second-term presidents is not good: Reagan had Iran-contra, Clinton had impeachment and Bush had Katrina and Iraq. Once a president suffers a blow such as Obama is now suffering with his health-care law — in which the public not only disapproves of a president’s actions but starts to take a negative view of him personally — it is difficult to recover.¶ ¶ This week’s Quinnipiac University poll found Obama’s job-approval rating at its lowest ever, 39 percent. More ominous: Only 44 percent say Obama is honest and trustworthy, while 52 percent say he is not; that’s the first time more thought him untrustworthy than trustworthy. Polls show Obama’s personal favorability rating has dropped in tandem.¶ ¶ We have seen this before. After the flubbed response to Katrina in 2005, George W. Bush’s honest-and-trustworthy rating fell below 50 percent for the first time, and it never returned. Bill Clinton began his second term with 42 percent calling him honest and trustworthy; he soon slipped into the 20s in Post polling and stayed there.¶ ¶ The loss of trust will make even harder the already uphill effort to persuade Congress to enact other items on his agenda, such as immigration reform and a comprehensive budget deal. House Speaker John Boehner this week dashed hopes of immigration legislation getting through Congress anytime soon, saying the House wouldn’t even negotiate with the Senate over an immigration bill that chamber had passed.¶ ¶ Also this week, House and Senate conferees meeting to discuss the budget they have been assigned to produce acknowledged they had given up hope for a far-reaching agreement.¶ ¶ “As someone who’s been naive enough to believe that we could actually do a larger deal,” Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.) told his fellow conferees, “at least getting something done for a year or two would, I think, have an extraordinarily positive effect.”¶ ¶ Obama, in his Thursday news conference, spoke of regaining his clout as part of the game. His game plan: “My intention in terms of winning back the confidence of the American people is just to work as hard as I can, identify the problems that we’ve got, make sure that we’re fixing them.”¶ ¶ “There are going to be ups and downs during the course of my presidency,” Obama said. “I think I said early on when I was running, I am not a perfect man and I will not be a perfect president.”¶ ¶ He didn’t seem to consider that this may not be part of the usual ups and downs. And though he deserves credit for his apologies — seven times during his news conference, he said the problems with Obamacare are “on us” or “on me” — it’s not likely that the public’s loss of trust will be repaired no matter how often or how genuinely he says “my bad.”¶ ¶ Even as he accepted responsibility for the debacle, he couldn’t resist transferring some blame to the assembled press (“the things that go right, you guys aren’t going to write about”) and to Republicans (“repeal, repeal, let’s get rid of this thing”).¶ ¶ But Obama seemed genuinely puzzled by the notion that his leadership may have been the cause. He dismissed a question about whether his administration may be too insular (“I meet with an awful lot of folks”).¶ ¶ And, he said, “when I do some Monday-morning quarterbacking on myself,” he concludes that maybe he should have been “breaking the mold” with the rollout earlier because “the federal government has not been good at this stuff in the past.”¶ ¶ Wait a minute: Monday-morning quarterbacking? Maybe the president does understand that the game is over. Every presidency faces a moment when reality catches up to perception in a bad way, particularly in second terms. The furor over the botched health care law is President Barack Obama’s moment.\

#### Farm bill fails

Heidi Moore, 5-27-13 (Guardian's US finance and economics editor. Formerly, she was New York bureau chief and Wall Street correspondent for Marketplace, from American Public Media , “The New Farm Bill is an Economic Disaster”, Guardian)

The US Congress, its approval rating still near all-time lows, is reinforcing its own record of stupefyingly short-sighted lawmaking with what may be the most harmful piece of economic legislation in America in years: the $1tn 2013 farm bill.**¶** It should be called the 2012 farm bill – or, officially, the Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2012 – because the habitually sluggish group of lawmakers in Washington were too busy in 2012 to pass it. Campaigning for office and ginning up the fake fiscal cliff crisis occupied a lot of time, so lawmakers passed an extension of the $650bn 2008 farm bill for another year. That set an expiration date of September 30 this year. The delayed timing, however, is the least of the problems with it.¶ As members of Congress have negotiated over various amendments and riders to the bill, they've set an impressively consistent trend: they mix good ideas and bad ideas and combine them to create the absolutely worst possible policies. Elements of the farm bill, as it stands, will cut food stamps to the poor and the previously incarcerated, thus increasing poverty and possibly crime; add to the growing obesity crisis by encouraging chemical sugar substitutes; push genetically modified food at the expense of public health with the so-called "Monsanto Protection Act"; and support factory farming at the expense of sustainable food production with abusive crop subsidies.**¶** That's quite a lot of damage to wreak with a single law, but this Congress certainly seems up to the challenge.¶ The farm bill will set US food policy for 2014 to 2023, encompassing everything from agriculture to food stamps. The food stamps show the worst decision-making. Conservatives are apparently annoyed that Americans are using more food stamps. That much is true. Food stamp usage has grown by at least 70% since the financial crisis in 2008, with a record 47.8 million people relying on food stamps in order to afford their weekly grocery bills. This is costing the government $74.6bn.¶ Members of Congress - whose average pay is $174,000 a year are outraged by this. As they enjoy over $4.6bn in subsidized healthcare, travel and other government perks subsidized by taxpayers, these lawmakers bemoan the waste of government spending on the poor. They pledge fiscal discipline – pinching every taxpayer penny – on the backs of people living below the poverty level, as the lawmakers themselves count on up to $1.2bn in retirement benefits.¶ So it is that these beacons to financial restraint, surrounded by a $6bn bubble of government-subsidized comfort, have succeeded in cutting food stamp help to the poor by about $20.5bn in this bill. They've also planned to eliminate food stamps – for life – for anyone who was ever convicted of a crime, which will disproportionately hurt the urban poor (pdf). Some lawmakers argued the SNAP, or food stamp, program should be cut because of the trend of food stamp users buying things like energy drinks – a trend that continues, not incidentally, due to the low availability of fresh and healthy food in poor areas.¶ Ironically, while they cut the government help to the poor, some of these lawmakers are the personal beneficiaries, to the tune of thousands of dollars, of government farm subsidies.¶ Yet they still ask: why do we need food stamps at all? There is an economic recovery, some lawmakers argue, why aren't more people buying their own food?¶ This is perhaps the most damaging and revealing idea of all. The "recovery" so far consists primarily of vaporous paper money – inflated stock prices and bounding home prices that provide a "wealth effect" but don't actually fatten anyone's bank accounts or pay anyone's bills.¶ In fact, the rise in food stamp use is neither anomalous nor abusive. It makes perfect sense. Poverty goes up in recessions and in weak recoveries like this one. About 12 million people are out of work. Only about 58% of the population is employed, which is around the lows of the early 1980s recession, and which also has not changed appreciably for around three years.¶ Long-term unemployment is a persistent problem, with 40% of all unemployed people out of work for six months or longer – at which point many employers arbitrarily deem them unemployable. Poverty has been rising steadily since 2008 – just like the use of food stamps.¶ Partially responsible for this mess, by the way, is the notably counterproductive fiscal policy decisions made in Congress to support damaging austerity, as even the chairman of the Federal Reserve said last week.¶ The ability to ignore its own part in the widespread and continuing economic crisis in America is more evidence that Congress, esconced in its marble halls and subsidized cafeterias, has absolutely no idea what is happening in the rest of America, and why so many previously middle-class families have trouble making ends meet.¶ It would be really something if those grousing lawmakers recognized that more Americans are using food stamps, for instance, because Congress has let them down. While Congress bickered over fake crises – deficits that aren't pressing and taxes that don't matter – we have real economic crises. The poverty crisis. The unemployment crisis. The inequality crisis. All of those have gone completely unaddressed by any kind of substantive legislation.¶ Though food stamp legislation is the biggest embarrassment in the farm bill, it is hardly the only one. Another testament to craven lawmaking is the rider that opponents dubbed The Monsanto Protection Act, for its chief corporate beneficiary. Companies including Monsanto sell genetically modified seeds, which dominate the US farm and food supply. These seeds are laboratory-created to survive being sprayed with powerful and harmful pesticides, which not coincidentally are also sold by Monsanto and its rivals.¶ The percentage of US soybeans, cotton and corn that come from genetically modified crops hovers between 80% and 90% depending on the crop. Currently, these companies have to wait for the US Department of Agriculture to test the seeds for potential harm to humans. The Monsanto Protection Act would allow big agriculture companies to sell genetically modified seeds before they are tested, and prevent the USDA from interfering with the sale of the seeds even if they are proven to be harmful to humans.¶ That is self-evidently a total capitulation to corporate interests at the expense of consumers and the American food supply; it's only recently, however, that opposition has been raised by senators including Jeff Merkley of Oregon, based on opposition from his state's farmers.¶ Small farmers rarely win. Right now, big factory farming rules the country. Around 12% of American farms have sales over $250,000; those same wealthy farms account for 84% of the production value in the country according to a useful, if right-leaning, primer from the Heritage Foundation. This is a loss to consumers as larger farms tend to hurt local water supplies due to greater runoff from pesticides and fertilizers. These larger farms also tend to give more power to buyers who buy in bulk, fueling a corporate rather than a consumer market.¶ Then there is the problem with sugar in the bill. US sugar is expensive – 50% higher than sugar on the world market from 2008 to 2012, according to price data from ICE Futures US obtained by the Wall Street Journal. That's because the US sets a minimum price for sugar, which, in turn leads to scrapes like the one we're in now. According to the Wall Street Journal, the USDA may have to buy 400,000 tons of sugar at an estimated loss of $80mn in taxpayer dollars just to keep the price of U.S. sugar artificially inflated.¶ The farm bill sets a minimum price for sugar, mainly US-grown sugar from beets leading to criticism that the country is fueling "Big Sugar" through loans to farmers and import restrictions from cane-sugar-producing countries like Central America and the Caribbean. Naturally companies that make sweet products, including Hershey's and Coca-Cola, oppose this.¶ To a consumer, high sugar prices may seem like a boon, but they're not. Since sugar is in nearly everything, many supermarket products

 will cost more when sugar prices rise. And, as long as sugar prices are high, food companies will continue to favor chemical sugar substitutes and products like high-fructose corn syrup, which is derived from heavily subsidized corn instead. Health advocates have criticized high-fructose corn syrup as a potentially harmful contributor to the obesity crisis.¶ This is a litany of economic and public health disasters from just one bill. The only good thing the farm bill will do is end direct payments; those are subsidies paid to support farmers, regardless of the price or fruitfulness of those crops. Even that move is long overdue.

**US not key to world economy.**

**Mastanduno 09, Prof Government @ Dartmouth**

Michael, System Maker and Privilege Taker, World Politics, 61.1

Further, the U.S. market is no longer the sole, indispensable engine of global economic growth. Europe’s growth relies increasingly on the integrated European Union market, one that is now larger than that of the United States. The growth of domestic demand in Asia is less well recognized but equally important. Both Japan and China are in transition [End Page 151] from export-led to domestically generated growth strategies. Asia is now a significant engine of the world economy, accounting for over half of global growth between 2001 and 2006.81 Trade within Asia by 2005 was more important than trade between particular Asian countries and the United States. Japan’s exports to Asia increased from 27 percent of total exports to 38 percent between 1991 and 2001, and exports to the United States dropped from 34 percent to 29 percent. By 2004 Japan accounted for China’s imports at twice the rate of the United States, and China exported as much to South Korea and Japan together as to the United States. Between 2001 and 2006 the U.S. share of total Asian exports fell from 25 percent to 20 percent.82

#### US economic collapse imminent now

Jeff Shjarback 9-6 (MBA, Digital Marketing Consultant for finance professionals) September 6, 2013 “U.S. economy showing signs of imminent financial collapse” <http://wallstreetsectorselector.com/2013/09/is-a-financial-collapse-imminent-for-u-s-economy/>

The American government and economy is in rather dire circumstances due to an overwhelming series of decisions which are shaping our entire country for the next few decades and likely beyond.¶ As we take a look at the overall track record of our economy, we find that a financial collapse is more than just likely – it may be highly imminent.¶ But why? Why is our government, as massive and established as it is, finding itself in a downward trajectory with little to stop it? Since 1776, we have continuously built up efforts towards being a global powerhouse, and circa-1944 around the close of World War II, we arguably achieved it. Reinstating Israel. Destroying the Nazis. Rebuilding Japan. The United States became the heartfelt center of our entire world.¶ However, politics continued and finances became less stable, causing inflation to rise to astounding rates. Our financial collapse could be quite imminent and three core trends lead us to this theory.¶ Billionaires Dumping Their Stocks¶ A financial collapse would undoubtedly consist of billionaires unloading their stocks in droves. Unfortunately, this is already occurring. On the surface, the stock market (NYSEARCA:DIA) is surfacing from an ugly few years. Numbers are steadily rising, and the stability in the stock market is starting to be set once again.¶ But this trickle-down effect applies in the market. Arguably, the greatest stock investor is Warren Buffet. For better or worse, millions follow his steps because he is so unbelievably successful, and billionaire stock investors follow his investment moves. So when Warren Buffet sells $19 million worth of stock in Johnson & Johnson (NYSE:JNJ) and 21% of his overall stock in consumer spending, others follow suit with the same general strategies. Billionaire, John Paulson, also unloaded 14 million shares in JPMorgan Chase (NYSE:JPM), as reported at Money News.¶ The overall predictions state that the stock market may witness a 90% overall collapse. Though many are aghast at the numbers, those who predicted this have been notoriously accurate in the past. Robert Weidemer, PHD is open about this prediction. His acclaimed team predicted the sub prime mortgage crisis and consumer spending collapse a few years earlier.¶ The World is Suffering Financially¶ When the financial system collapses, other countries will follow suit with their own level of disaster. Unfortunately, again, this is already occurring at alarming rates. Greece has been essentially bankrupt for close to five years running. According to Simon Black of the Economic Collapse Blog, the situation is dire in the country. ‘There are roughly 11 million people in this country. 3.4 million of them are employed, of which roughly one third work for the government.’¶ These unemployment rates are shocking. Italy is no better off. The country’s unemployment rate is currently 12.2%, the highest in 35 years. Furthermore, Italy witnesses 134 retail closings each and every day. Doing the math, one can calculate close to 1,000 employees are becoming not-so-much employed every single day.¶ Investment Bank Over-Loaning and Over-Spending¶ This specific situation is astonishingly convoluted, and would take a series of books and essays and documentaries to even scratch the surface. But in its purest form, the investment banking companies are simply spending money they do not have. Due to excessive loan expenditures in the last decade plus, banks found they were not earning the income back. This, of course, caused the massive mortgage crisis th

at almost ended the country financially, however, the banks are not out of the situation yet.¶ They still spend more than what is being brought in, and their overall closing of the doors for loans is destroying small business. Furthermore, Jim Willie, popular economist, is reporting that Deutsche Bank is on the brink of a full collapse. Considering their magnitude in the financial sphere, this could send momentous shockwaves throughout the economy.¶ There is a light at the end of the tunnel, if we take serious steps immediately to rectify the situation. However, with each passing day, the light closes and we are further left in the dark emptiness of financial ruin if we continue on this path.

**No impact to the economy**

**Brandt and Ulfelder 11**—\*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. \*\*Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is an American political scientist whose research interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict. [April, 2011, “Economic Growth and Political Instability,” Social Science Research Network]

These statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008–2010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries’ political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime breakdown.

Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries’ economic growth rates strongly affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical analysis

, and evidence from social science research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups d’etat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to have **hardly been studied in recent years**, as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression.

This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability in countries worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, ours is the first statistical study of this relationship **to simultaneously address** the **possibility of nonlinearity and problems of endogeneity**. As such, we believe this paper offers what is probably the most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to date.

As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest that the relationship between economic growth and political stability is neither as uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think these findings also help explain why the global recession of 2008–2010 has failed thus far to produce the wave of coups and regime failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent uptick in social unrest associated with the crisis.