# Drones – Terrorism

# Terrorism

**The Advantage is Terrorism**

**Unrestricted drone strikes are strengthening AQAP in Yemen**

Jacqueline Manning 12, Senior Editor of International Affairs Review, December 9 2012, “Free to Kill: How a Lack of Accountability in America’s Drone Campaign Threatens U.S. Efforts in Yemen,” http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/450

Earlier this year White House counter-terrorism advisor, John Brennan, named al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen the greatest threat to the U.S. Since 2009, the Obama administration has carried out an estimated 28 drone strikes and 13 air strikes targeting AQAP in Yemen, while the Yemeni Government has carried out 17 strikes, and another five strikes cannot be definitively attributed to either state . There is an ongoing debate over the effectiveness of targeted killings by drone strikes in the fight against al-Qaeda. However, what is clear is that the secrecy and unaccountability with which these drone strike are being carried out are undermining U.S. efforts in Yemen.¶ The drone campaign in Yemen is widely criticized by human rights activists, the local population and even the United Nations for its resulting civilian casualties. It is also credited with fostering animosity towards the U.S. and swaying public sentiment in Yemen in favor of AQAP. The long-term effects, as detailed by a 2012 report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict, seem to be particularly devastating. The resulting loss of life, disability, or loss of property of a bread-winner can have long-term impacts, not just on an individual, but on an entire family of dependents.¶ The effectiveness of drone technology in killing al-Qaeda militants, however, cannot be denied. Targeted killings by drone strikes have eliminated several key AQAP members such as Anwar al-Awlaki, Samir Khan, Abdul Mun’im Salim al Fatahani, and Fahd al-Quso . Advocates of the counterterrorism strategy point out that it is much less costly in terms of human lives and money than other military operations.¶ While there are strong arguments on both sides of the drone debate, both proponents and critics of targeted killings of AQAP operatives by drones agree that transparency and accountability are needed.¶ Authorizing the CIA to carry out signature strikes is of particular concern. In signature strikes, instead of targeting individual Al Qaeda leaders, the CIA targets locations without knowing the precise identity of the individuals targeted as long as the locations are linked to a “signature” or pattern of behavior by Al Qaeda officials observed over time. This arbitrary method of targeting often results in avoidable human casualties.¶ Secrecy surrounding the campaign often means that victims and families of victims receive no acknowledgement of their losses, much less compensation. There are also huge disparities in the reported number of deaths. In addition, according to The New York Times, Obama administration officials define “militants” as “all military-age males in a strike zone...unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent” This definition leads to a lack of accountability for those casualties and inflames anti-American sentiment.¶ In a report submitted to the UN Human Rights Council, Ben Emmerson, special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, asserted that, "Human rights abuses have all too often contributed to the grievances which cause people to make the wrong choices and to resort to terrorism….human rights compliant counter-terrorism measures help to prevent the recruitment of individuals to acts of terrorism." There is now statistical evidence that supports this claim. A 2010 opinion poll conducted by the New America Foundation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, where U.S. drone strikes have been carried out on a much larger scale, shows an overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes coupled with a majority support for suicide attacks on U.S. forces under some circumstances.¶ It is clear that the drone debate is not simply a matter of morality and human rights; it is also a matter of ineffective tactics. At a minimum the U.S. must implement a policy of transparency and accountability in the use of drones. Signature strikes take unacceptable risks with innocent lives. Targets must be identified more responsibly, and risks of civilian casualties should be minimized. When civilian casualties do occur, the United States must not only acknowledge them, but also pay amends to families of the victims.

The plan is crucial to prevent an escalating backlash against future drone use

Zenko 13 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, “U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial coun- terterrorism practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and inter- national humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers; and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total number of strikes would significantly decrease). The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping. Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage, and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S. support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 per- cent to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S. drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gun- ships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forc- ing the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making signifi- cant investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships, conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allow- ing downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks on the ground that are critical for identifying targets. According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resis- tance—such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones— is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attack- ing Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place, political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region. To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.

Public backlash will destroy the drone program

Jack Goldsmith 12, Harvard Law School Professor, focus on national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, and conflict of laws, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense, Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, March 2012, Power and Constraint, P. 199-201

For the GTMO Bar and its cousin NGOs and activists, however, the al-Aulaqi lawsuit, like other lawsuits on different issues, was merely an early battle in a long war over the legitimacy of U.S. targeting practices—a war that will take place not just in the United States, but in other countries as well. When the CCR failed to achieve what it viewed as adequate accountability for Bush administration officials in the United States in connection with interrogation and detention practices, it started pursuing, and continues to pursue, lawsuits and prosecutions against U.S. officials in Spain, Germany, and other European countries. "You look for every niche you can when you can take on the issues that you think are important," said Michael Ratner, explaining the CCR's strategy for pursuing lawsuits in Europe. Clive Stafford Smith, a former CCR attorney who was instrumental in its early GTMO victories and who now leads the British advocacy organization Reprieve, is using this strategy in the targeted killing context. "There are endless ways in which the courts in Britain, the courts in America, the international Pakistani courts can get involved" in scrutinizing U.S. targeting killing practices, he argues. "It's going to be the next 'Guantanamo Bay' issue."' Working in a global network of NGO activists, Stafford Smith has begun a process in Pakistan to seek the arrest of former CIA lawyer John Rizzo in connection with drone strikes in Pakistan, and he is planning more lawsuits in the United States and elsewhere against drone operators." "The crucial court here is the court of public opinion," he said, explaining why the lawsuits are important even if he loses. His efforts are backed by a growing web of proclamations in the United Nations, foreign capitals, the press, and the academy that U.S. drone practices are unlawful. What American University law professor Ken Anderson has described as the "international legal-media-academic-NGO-international organization-global opinion complex" is hard at work to stigmatize drones and those who support and operate them." This strategy is having an impact. The slew of lawsuits in the United States and threatened prosecutions in Europe against Bush administration officials imposes reputational, emotional, and financial costs on them that help to promote the human rights groups' ideological goals, even if courts never actually rule against the officials. By design, these suits also give pause to current officials who are considering controversial actions for fear that the same thing might later happen to them. This effect is starting to be felt with drones. Several Obama administration officials have told me that they worry targeted killings will be seen in the future (as Stafford Smith predicts) as their administration's GTMO. The attempted judicial action against Rizzo, the earlier lawsuits against top CIA officials in Pakistan and elsewhere, and the louder and louder proclamations of illegality around the world all of which have gained momentum after al-Aulaqi's killing—are also having an impact. These actions are rallying cries for protest and political pushback in the countries where the drone strikes take place. And they lead CIA operators to worry about legal exposure before becoming involved in the Agency's drone program." We don't know yet whether these forces have affected actual targeting practices and related tactics. But they induce the officials involved to take more caution. And it is only a matter of time, if it has not happened already, before they lead the U.S. government to forgo lawful targeted killing actions otherwise deemed to be in the interest of U.S. national security.

**Drones are key to defeating AQAP in Yemen – won’t cause blowback**

**Emker 13** (By Stacey Emker second year Master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations January 14, 2013 Analyzing the US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/)

When direct action is taken, drone strikes are conducted in concert with the Yemeni government to avoid civilian casualty. President Hadi publicly endorsed U.S. drone strikes in September 2012, making Yemen a reliable counterterrorism partner. This factor is crucial when assessing the effectiveness of drones in Yemen under former President Saleh compared to President Hadi. While former President Saleh pledged Yemen’s support to the U.S. in the “war on terror,” U.S. officials and Yemeni experts questioned Saleh’s commitment and saw him as an unreliable partner and source of intelligence. John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, has made frequent public visits to Yemen over the past year. When speaking of President Hadi’s counterterrorism efforts, Brennan has stated that “the cooperation has been more consistent, more reliable and with a more committed and determined focus.” With this, the information provided by the Yemeni government under President Hadi has greatly improved the efficacy of the drone campaign, and helped in avoiding catastrophic mistakes.¶ The conventional understanding of drones and collateral damage is not a sufficient or systematic explanation of recruitment within the domestic context of Yemen. Christopher Swifts’ interviews with tribal leaders, Islamic Politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources all revealed that AQAP recruitment is not motivated solely by U.S. drone strikes, but driven by economic desperation. AQAP insurgents lure young Yemeni men with the promise of a rifle, a car, and a salary of four-hundred dollars a month, which is a fortune when half the population is living on less than two dollars a day. AQAP has employed a soft power approach by fulfilling social needs in order to build networks of mutual dependency.¶ Despite the general antipathy for drone strikes, a majority of the Yemeni’s interviewed expressed that AQAP posed a serious threat to their country and had a pragmatic view of the U.S. drone campaign. As long as drones target legitimate terrorists, Yemenis grudgingly acknowledge their utility. With this, it is important to note Yemen’s religious majority and nationalism. The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, made up of Zaydis and Shaf’is. Zaydis are found mostly in North and Northwest Yemen and belong to a branch of Shi’a Islam. Zaydis form the the Huthi insurgent movement, and AQAP statements in Inspire have connected the movement to threats posed by Shi’a in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Since AQAP has attacked two Huthi processions in 2010 and threatened supporters, Zaydi Yemenis do not represent practical recruitment options for AQAP. On the hand, the majority of Yemenis are Shafi’is making up the South and East. The Shafi’is school follows one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence and is considered a relatively moderate form of Islam. While Islamic radicalism is prevalent within the country, Shafi’is is culturally very different and is not exactly fertile breeding grounds for extremist ideology. As a result, the Al-Qaeda ideology does not go hand-in-hand with the majority of the Yemeni people.¶ Analysis of AQAP’s history suggests that the group’s resiliency within Yemen is due to a group of local Yemeni leaders who understand the local language, tribal customs, and developed relationships with prominent sheiks. Unlike predecessor jihadist groups in Yemen, AQAP has exercised strategic discipline in creating coherent, but nuanced propaganda. The group assimilates broadly popular grievances into a single narrative proposing international jihad as the only solution. The group exploits common malcontent with the Yemeni government over injustices including corruption, the absence of public services and political reform, and unequal distribution of profits from oil. In addition, AQAP has not explicitly called for the outright dissolution of tribal identity like AQAM in Afghanistan Somalia, Iraq, and Pakistan. Within Yemen, AQAP targets Western interests, Yemeni security officials, and economic sectors such as oil and tourism. The group has specifically avoided Yemeni civilian casualties in bombings and suicide attacks. Also, AQAP has avoided potentially divisive American and European targets, such as the many Western-language students, foreign aid, and medical workers who remained in Yemen until 2010. With this, AQAP leaders recognized the importance of managing perceptions in order to sustain legitimacy and have even denied responsibility for terrorist attacks that did not fit with its narrative. The most direct way to reduce AQAP’s viability in Yemen, while simultaneously limiting its capacity to attack the US, requires the removal of its local leadership through drone strikes who are responsible for the group’s strategic guidance.¶ With this, it important to note that drone strikes represent only one tool in the U.S.’s comprehensive policy towards Yemen. The costs of U.S. drone strikes correspond with three distinct forms of blowback that have helped to strengthen AQAP’s narrative and increased recruitment and sympathy for Al-Qaeda linked militants. However, the costs do not outweigh the utility of drone strikes against AQAP within the domestic context. While the U.S. acted more unilaterally in Yemen under President Saleh, the Obama Administration is now working in concert with the transitional government of President Hadi. With this, the relationship between the U.S. and Yemen has transformed into a working partnership in the fight against AQAP. As a partnership, this counterterrorism policy is beneficial for both Yemeni and international support.¶ While Yemen is facing a number of issues, debilitating AQAP represents the first step in improving the overall security situation. By targeting AQAP’s local leadership, the U.S. can eliminate the individuals who are most responsible for maintaining the group’s coherency and strategic guidance. Furthermore, it can be presumed that the AQAP members next in line will be less skilled and will be more prone to violence in order to consolidate power. The leadership will make more mistakes, such as targeting Yemeni civilians, and undermine the group’s legitimacy within Yemen.

**Drones are crucial – prevent safe havens**

**Johnston 12** (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)

Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida's leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud at a funeral in the Tribal Areas. That strike reportedly killed 60 civilians attending the funeral, but not Mehsud. He was killed later by another drone strike in August 2009. His successor, Hakimullah Mehsud, developed a relationship with the foiled Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, who cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm's way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has **prevented numerous attacks** by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida's senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida's central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan's Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden's letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military's footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.

**AQAP in Yemen is powerful and is a threat – prefer our case studies**

**Zimmerman 9-18**-13(AQAP's role in the al Qaeda network, [Katherine Zimmerman](http://www.aei.org/scholar/katherine-zimmerman/) is a senior analyst and the al Qaeda and Associated Movements Team Lead for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. Her work has focused on al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Gulf of Aden region and associated movements in western and northern Africa. She specializes in the Yemen-based group, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab. Katherine has testified in front of Congress and briefed Members and congressional staff, as well as members of the defense community. She has written analyses of U.S. national security interests related to the threat from the al Qaeda network for the Weekly Standard, National Review Online, and the Huffington Post, among others. Katherine graduated with distinction from Yale University with a B.A. in Political Science and Modern Middle East Studies, | [Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security](http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/zimmerman-testimony-aqaps-role-al-qaeda-network-september-18-2013), September 18, 2013, <http://www.aei.org/speech/foreign-and-defense-policy/terrorism/al-qaeda/aqaps-role-in-the-al-qaeda-network/>)

**Case Study**: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula The most direct threat to the U.S. homeland today emanates from AQAP, which has attempted to attack the United States homeland at least three times since its establishment in January 2009. The affiliate is also behind the threat stream that prompted the unprecedented closure of over twenty American diplomatic posts across the Middle East and North Africa. AQAP’s prominence in the al Qaeda network should not be interpreted to mean that AQAP has risen to replace the core group in Pakistan or that it is directing the network in some way. It must be interpreted within the broader context of the al Qaeda network. AQAP is an extremely capable terrorist group that is a member of a network of other groups all operating in similar manners. Its prominence is a reflection of its capabilities and its prioritization of conducting attacks against the U.S., not the subordination of other groups to AQAP. *Background* A January 2009 video announced the establishment of AQAP as a merger between al Qaeda’s Yemeni and Saudi branches. The video identified four AQAP leaders: two former Guantanamo detainees (Said al Shihri and Mohamed al Awfi) and two escaped Yemeni prisoners (Nasser al Wahayshi and Qasim al Raymi). Saudi al Qaeda operatives, including at least five former Guantanamo detainees who had gone through Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation program, had fled to Yemen in the late 2000s to escape the crackdown on al Qaeda in the Kingdom. They began operating with al Qaeda in Yemen, which was on the path to being reconstituted after having been essentially neutralized in 2002-2004. The February 2006 escape of 23 al Qaeda operatives from a Sana’a prison, including Wahayshi and Raymi, revitalized al Qaeda in Yemen. AQAP’s rapid ascendancy in Yemen profited from the expertise of individuals who had been active in the al Qaeda network for years and from the relatively free environment in which these individuals could operate. The senior echelon of AQAP’s leadership structure had decades of combined experience. Many of the senior leaders had trained at al Qaeda’s al Farouq training camp or elsewhere in Afghanistan, some were members of Osama bin Laden’s direct human network, and nearly all had been active in the al Qaeda network before the 9/11 attacks. Yemen’s weak central government, then headed by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, did not exert direct control over its territory and in August 2009 dedicated scarce security resources to fighting the sixth iteration of a rebellion in the north. The Yemeni government also prioritized putting down a rising secessionist movement in the south over counterterrorism operations against AQAP. The permissive security environment along with the leadership’s experience facilitated al Qaeda’s full reconstitution in Yemen in 2009. The group continued the small-scale attacks that al Qaeda in Yemen had been carrying out. But it also began to focus on external operations against Saudi and American targets. AQAP’s first major external operation targeted the Saudi deputy interior ministry in August 2009. Ibrahim al Asiri, the group’s top bombmaker, designed an explosive device that was concealed as a suppository in his brother’s body. The remotely detonated bomb failed to kill the Saudi official. A second plot to hit Saudi targets failed in October when a firefight with Saudi border patrolmen killed Yousef al Shihri and Raed al Harbi, who were smuggling explosives in to Saudi Arabia. AQAP became the first affiliate to target the U.S. homeland in December that year. Asiri modified the design for Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who conducted the December 2009 attack. Asiri concealed Abdulmutallab’s bomb in his underwear. The device passed successfully through airport security, but failed to detonate. The attack shone a spotlight on the al Qaeda affiliate and within a month, the U.S. designated AQAP, Wahayshi and Shihri under Executive Order 13224. The al Qaeda affiliate was capable of maintaining two lines of operations by 2010. It continued to pursue attacks on American targets, evidenced by the October 2010 parcel plot. It also increased its focus on fighting the Saleh government, which, under U.S. and international pressure, had begun to intensify its operations against AQAP. The retraction of the Yemeni central state into the capital, Sana’a, due to the political unrest in winter 2011 opened up space for AQAP. The group fielded an insurgent arm operating under the name “Ansar al Sharia” in spring 2011 that seized and held territory in south Yemen. AQAP briefly governed in certain areas, but more significantly, expanded its area of operations outside of its historical terrain. AQAP continues to have a presence in many of these regions, though it has not held territory since spring 2012. Its operatives have also regularly targeted Yemeni political and military officials for assassination, a strategy employed in 2010 and resumed as of 2012. AQAP poses the most direct threat to the U.S. homeland out of the al Qaeda network. It incorporated lessons learned from the experience of al Qaeda in Iraq in building popular support when its insurgent arm, Ansar al Sharia, tried its hand at governance in 2011 and 2012 (though it ultimately failed). It has responded to shifting conditions on the ground and has attempted to appeal to Yemen’s various anti-government groupings. It has innovated in the design of its explosive devices and repeatedly attempted, with success, to penetrate American national security defenses. Though the affiliate is extremely capable in its own right, it must be examined in the context of the entire al Qaeda network. *New Model for al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates* A major inflection point for the al Qaeda network occurred with the establishment of AQAP. The Yemen-based affiliate created a new model for the role of groups in the al Qaeda network by the end of 2009. The previous model held that groups in the network were subordinated to a “core” group. That core group, which was the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, maintained command and control over its regional affiliates and directed external operations. AQAP is the first known example of an affiliate or an associate directing an attack against the U.S. homeland, an effort the group has continued to prioritize. It also provided training and shared resources with al Qaeda associates in a manner characteristic of bin Laden’s group in the 1990s and early 2000s. The new model indicates that the network is no longer centrally organized or directed, but continued relations between the “core” and AQAP indicate a continued advisory role for the central group. The December 2009 attack on Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines Flight 253 was the first attack from the al Qaeda network on the U.S. homeland directed by an affiliate, as previously mentioned. U.S. court documents related to the case against the underwear bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, provide the details of the plot. Abdulmutallab sought out Yemeni-American cleric and AQAP senior operative Anwar al Awlaki in Yemen, and, after getting in touch through an intermediary and submitting a letter to Awlaki, spent three days with the cleric. Awlaki connected him to the bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, who explained the plan. Abdulmutallab received specialized training on the explosive device and basic military training at one of AQAP’s training camps. He then received orders from Awlaki to detonate the bomb over U.S. airspace and Asiri provided him with the bomb itself. Osama bin Laden mentioned the AQAP-directed attack in a message directed at President Barack Obama, but did not claim credit for it. AQAP’s deputy leader, Said al Shihri, claimed credit for the attack in February 2010. **The Yemen-based affiliate has attempted to attack the U.S. homeland** at least two more times since December 2009. It shipped two explosive devices disguised as printer cartridges in October 2010. The bombs were only discovered with the assistance of Saudi intelligence. AQAP tried again in May 2012 when it innovated on the underwear-bomb design. That plot was uncovered and thwarted by American and foreign intelligence agencies. It is likely that AQAP leadership still seeks to attack the U.S. homeland. AQAP has fostered relations with other groups in the al Qaeda network. (See figure 1.) It has an established relationship with al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia. It provided explosives and basic military training to at least one al Shabaab operative in 2010 and 2011. AQAP also facilitated al Shabaab’s communications with al Qaeda “core,” though al Shabaab also appeared to have a line of communications that ran outside of Yemen as well. Multiple sources document the movement of fighters across the Gulf of Aden. The Arab Spring presented AQAP with the opportunity to develop additional relationships. It purportedly supported the establishment of an al Qaeda-linked cell in Egypt under the leadership of Mohamed Jamal Abu Ahmed by sending him fighters and funding. Mohamed Jamal, a former member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, knew AQAP leaders Nasser al Wahayshi, Adil al Abab, and Qasim al Raymi. The Wall Street Journal reported that Jamal’s group was connected to the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya. Nasser al Wahayshi, AQAP’s emir, was also in direct contact with Abdelmalek Droukdel, AQIM’s emir, and the al Qaeda core leadership in Pakistan, in addition to al Shabaab’s leadership. Two separate letters recovered in a document cache in Timbuktu, Mali, reveal Wahayshi’s counsel to Droukdel. In his first letter, dated May 21, 2012, Wahayshi congratulated Droukdel on his progress in Mali and compared AQIM’s relationship with Ansar al Din (an ethnically Tuareg militant Islamist group) with AQAP’s Ansar al Sharia. He advised Droukdel that AQIM could generate support by providing basic services and fulfilling daily needs, like food and water. In his second letter, dated August 6, 2012, Wahayshi explained AQAP’s loss in south Yemen against the Yemeni security forces and cautioned Droukdel against declaring an emirate when he would not be able to fulfill the role of a state. Wahayshi also mentioned he held communications from the core group for Droukdel. Today, AQAP continues to seek to attack the United States and to nurture lateral connections with other groups in the al Qaeda network. It is believed that a credible threat stream from the Arabian Peninsula, where AQAP operates, instigated the closure of diplomatic posts across North Africa and the Middle East. Like other groups in the al Qaeda network, AQAP preferenced its local fight against the Yemeni government during the Arab Spring, but it was also able to sustain a second operational line devoted to attacking the United States. Other al Qaeda groups follow the model established by AQAP today, though many have yet to develop the capabilities to conduct an attack against the U.S. and to support such efforts.

**Internal documents prove the threat is real – they’ve said they’re going to attack us**

**Gertz 13** (Bill has been a media fellow at the [Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hoover_Institution_on_War%2C_Revolution_and_Peace) at [Stanford University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanford_University), He has also written for [National Review](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Review), [The Weekly Standard](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Weekly_Standard) and Air Force Magazine. He has lectured on defense, national security, and media issues at the [Defense Department’s](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Defense) National Security Leadership Program, [Johns Hopkins University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johns_Hopkins_University) School of Advanced International Studies, the [FBI National Academy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI_National_Academy), the [National Defense University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Defense_University), and the [CIA](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA), Jan 30, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/30/inside-the-ring-new-al-qaeda-threat/?page=all>)

A jihadist website posted a new threat by [**al Qaeda**](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/al-qaeda/) this week that **promises to conduct “shocking” attacks on the U**nited **S**tates and the West. The posting appeared on the Ansar al Mujahidin network Sunday and carried the headline, “Map of [al Qaeda](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/al-qaeda/) and its future strikes.” The message, in Arabic, asks: “Where will the next strike by [al Qaeda](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/al-qaeda/) be?” A translation was obtained by Inside the Ring. “The answer for it, in short: The coming strikes by [al Qaeda](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/al-qaeda/), with God’s Might, will be in the heart of the land of nonbelief, America, and in [France](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/france/), [Denmark](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/denmark/), other countries in Europe, in the countries that helped and are helping [France](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/france/), and in other places that shall be named by [al Qaeda](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/al-qaeda/) at other times,” the threat states. **The attacks will be “strong, serious, alarming, earth-shattering, shocking and terrifying.”** Under a section of the post on the method of the attacks, the unidentified writer said the strikes would be “group and lone-wolf operations, in addition to the use of booby-trapped vehicles.” “All operations will be recorded and published in due time,” the message said. “Let [France](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/france/) be prepared, and let the helpers of [France](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/france/) be prepared, for it is going to be a long war of attrition.” The reference to [France](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/france/) appears linked to the group’s plans for retaliation against the French-led military strikes in northern [Mali](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/mali/) in operations to oust [al Qaeda](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/al-qaeda/) terrorists from the North African country. The Ansar al-Mujahidin network is a well-known jihadist forum that in the past has published reliably accurate propaganda messages from [al Qaeda](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/al-qaeda/) and its affiliates. U.S. counterterrorism actions over the past 10 years have prevented [al Qaeda](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/al-qaeda/) from conducting major attacks. However, U.S. officials warn that the group continues to be dangerous, despite the killing of its top leaders in drone strikes and special operations. A U.S. official said the threat is being taken seriously by the [U.S. government](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/us-government/).

Major Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Now

Schneidmiller 12(Chris, deputy editor at Global Security Newswire for five years, leads a team reporting on nonproliferation and weapons of mass destruction,, August 1, 2012, “Nuclear Smuggling Shows Terrorist WMD Threat Persists: State Department,” Global Security Newswire, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/state-report/)

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. State Department on Tuesday said the attempted smuggling of nuclear arms-grade uranium in recent years illustrates a continued risk that terrorists could acquire the ingredients for a weapon of mass destruction (see GSN, Aug. 19, 2011).¶ The department's Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 touts as "largely successful" multilateral programs aimed at locking down chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials around the globe.¶ However, "the illicit trafficking of these materials persists, including instances involving highly enriched uranium in 2010 and 2011," according to a chapter titled "The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism."¶ "These examples suggest that caches of dangerous material may exist on the black market and that we must complement our efforts to consolidate CBRN materials and secure facilities with broader efforts to detect, investigate, and secure CBRN materials that have fallen outside of proper control," the report says. "We must remain vigilant if we hope to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining the means and methods for generating CBRN weapons."¶ The document does not cite specific examples of HEU smuggling from the last two years and the State Department on Wednesday did not provide additional detail.¶ Authorities in Georgia and nearby nations in recent years have reported breaking up attempts to sell illicit nuclear and radiological materials (see GSN, April 16). A June 2011 case in Moldova was said to involve 2.2 pounds of uranium 235 (see GSN, May 25).¶ Violent extremists have made known their desire to obtain and employ nuclear and other unconventional arms materials, the report says. The danger is heightened by the potential for such a weapon to produce significant casualties and destruction, along with the wide access to information on those systems. There are also complications inherent in attempting to control equipment and materials that can be used for either good or ill purposes, the department said.¶ The State report cites a number of multilateral programs aimed at preventing the spread of unconventional weapons materials.¶ These include the Proliferation Security Initiative, under which 100 nations have pledged to take necessary measures to interdict potential illegal transport of WMD materials. The State and Defense departments in 2011 conducted a number of exercises and workshops with participating nations such as Canada, Colombia Italy and Mongolia, the report says.¶ Other initiatives include the U.S.-Russian-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which now encompasses 83 countries, and the National Nuclear Security Administration's Second Line of Defense program that deploys radiation detection technology to partner countries.¶ "Organizations and initiatives concerned with chemical and biological weapons use international conventions and regulations to reduce stockpiles of material, regulate the acquisition of dual-use technology, and eliminate trade of specific goods," the department said. "Nuclear and radiological initiatives and programs focus on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear material and energy, safeguarding against diversion, and countering the smuggling of radioactive and nuclear material. U. S. participation within, and contribution to, these groups is vital to ensure our continued safety from the CBRN threat."¶ The 2011 deaths of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden and other operatives placed the terrorist organization "on a path of decline that will be difficult to reverse," the State Department said. However, it noted the increasing prominence of al-Qaida branches such as the Yemen-based al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.¶ "We are very concerned about the growth of the affiliates," Daniel Benjamin, the State Department counterterrorism coordinator, said at a press briefing on Tuesday. "We are working closely with partner nations around the world. In the case of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, which is I think everyone agrees is the most dangerous of the affiliates, that’s a group that benefited from the long political transition, the turmoil that was going on in Yemen."¶ He said, though that new Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi is "a very committed, very reliable partner now. And our work with Yemen is going very, very well. So while the group did exploit that period of uncertainty, we think the trend lines are going in the right direction now in Yemen."¶ More than 12,500 people died last year in more than 10,000 terrorist strikes spanning 70 nations, Benjamin said. That figure represents a 12 percent reduction from the previous year.¶ Foggy Bottom continues to list Cuba, Iran, Sudan and the embattled Assad regime in Syria as state sponsors of terrorism.¶ "Iran is and remains the pre-eminent state sponsor of terrorism in the world," Benjamin said. "We are deeply concerned about Iran’s activities on its own through the [Iranian Revolutionary Guard]-Quds Force. And also, together with Hezbollah, as they pursue destabilizing activities around the globe, we are firmly committed to working with partners and allies to counter and disrupt Iranian activities and to prevent Iran from sponsoring new acts of [terror]. And we think that the international community is increasingly alert to this threat and will resist it."

Generic defense doesn’t apply AQAP is the key to global Al-Qaeda

Cilluffo and Watts 11

Frank J. Cilluffo Director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at The George Washington University, and Clinton Watts, Principal consultant at PA Consulting Group and a Senior Fellow at the Homeland Security Policy Institute and a former U.S. Army Officer and former Special Agent with the FBI, 2011 6/24 “Yemen & Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Exploiting a Window of Counterterrorism Opportunity”

AQAP is the only al Qaeda affiliate to attempt multiple high profile attempts against the U.S. mainland since 2001, nearly succeeding in its 2009 Christmas Day airliner bomb plot and paralyzing the air cargo industry in 2010 through the use of sophisticated bombs embedded in computer printers. AQAP’s potency arises from its hybrid organizational structure uniting long-time veterans of al Qaeda with the most talented members of its new generation. Nasir al Wahayshi, a former personal secretary to Bin Laden, and Said al-Shihri, a Guantanamo detainee released in 2007, lead AQAP. These two jihadists combine long established ties to al Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan and a sustained penchant for attacking American targets. For the U.S., AQAP’s Foreign Operations Unit is of greatest concern. The unit was described by Dr. Thomas Hegghammer as a small cell, “which specializes in international operations and keeps a certain distance to the rest of the organization.” Anwar al-Awlaki, an American born cleric, allegedly leads this group, steadily morphing his role from an Internet ideologue to full-blown operational planner. Awlaki’s online sermons, recruitment of U.S.-based Americans and production of AQAP’s English-language jihadi magazine Inspire with Samir Khan (another American AQAP member) have inspired lone wolf attacks on Americans. Ibrahim Hassan Asiri, AQAP’s talented bomb maker, transforms the Foreign Operations Unit’s threats into sophisticated attacks. Asiri and his well-trained bombmaking protégés have demonstrated their capabilities repeatedly by devising undetectable devices that nearly killed Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in 2009, almost brought down an airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, and halted air cargo shipments from Yemen in 2010. The Foreign Operations Unit’s special knowledge of the U.S. and unique destructive capabilities make AQAP an immediate threat to the U.S. AQAP appears well positioned to sustain and grow al Qaeda’s influence regionally and globally. AQAP’s Saudi leadership and Middle East proximity will likely garner increased donations from wealthy Gulf contributors looking for a new cause after Bin Laden’s death. Moreover, AQAP acts as a critical conduit for regional AQ activities linking al Shabab and other East Africa-based AQ operatives with sustained resources and foreign fighters- some of whom were recruited from Europe and North America. Al Shabab’s consolidation of power, leadership, homicide/suicide bombing tactics and targets are likely indicative of AQAP’s regional influence. Perhaps most troubling is Al Shabab’s growing international ambitions as evidenced by recent attacks in Kenya and Uganda and complete alignment of their goals with those of Al Qaeda’s. Elimination of key AQAP members, especially those in the Foreign Operations Unit, would immediately increase U.S. security. Removal of Wahayshi, al-Shihri, Awlaki, Asiri or any other key AQAP leaders could short-circuit AQAP’s operational capability and disrupt their regional coordination of AQ efforts. As Dr. Hegghammer noted, “AQ in Yemen is short on this type of human capital,” suggesting targeted leadership decapitation would seriously weaken AQAP’s proven international terrorism capability. Yemen’s shift from under- to un-governed state: an opportunity to mitigate AQAP’s immediate threat The U.S. must act to counter AQAP now. Pursuing the status quo, by waiting for the Yemeni governance situation to solidify and then build a strategy through a weak host-nation partner, provides AQAP an exceptional amount of time to plan, prepare and execute an attack on the U.S. -- an attack likely accelerated by the opportunity to rise in stature after Bin Laden’s death. Yemen’s under-governed regions have provided al Qaeda operatives safe haven for more than a decade. Weak, under-governed states, in many ways, prove more vexing from a counterterrorism perspective than failed, un-governed states. While failed (un-governed) states provide al Qaeda safe haven, weak (under-governed) state sovereignty restricts and usually distorts U.S. counterterrorism options. Yemen’s persistent under-governance has provided AQAP safe haven and created significant operational constraints on the U.S. U.S. counterterrorism funding and support through President Saleh’s regime often had the effect of exacerbating rather than ameliorating the threat of AQAP. Saleh predominantly used U.S. counterterrorism funding to expand his military capability and counter the Houthi and Secessionist insurgencies in his country while lightly pursuing AQAP. Saleh’s strategy, supported by American dollars, created two adverse consequences. First, Yemenis saw U.S. aid to the Saleh regime as America supporting a corrupt regime against an oppressed people, further enhancing Yemeni popular support for AQAP vis-à-vis the U.S. Second, counterterrorism aid and military support actually encouraged Saleh’s regime to maintain a persistent low level of AQAP activity in Yemen to justify sustained U.S. counterterrorism funding. Saleh’s removal presents the U.S. with a unique opportunity to target AQAP. Saleh’s absence effectively shifts Yemen’s AQAP safe haven from an under-governed state to an un-governed status. While the ungoverned security vacuum of Southern Yemen provides AQAP an opportunity to expand and secure its safe haven, this same vacuum also allows the U.S. greater flexibility of counterterrorism options and maneuverability. Yemeni limitations on direct U.S. counterterrorism operations, created by the Saleh regime, are less of an issue today. For the first time, the U.S. can pursue AQAP targets in Yemen without being embroiled in Yemeni government politics and trapped in Yemen’s dual insurgencies. What are the options? Yemen’s current situation makes long-term diplomatic and whole of government strategies entirely infeasible for countering the immediate threat posed by AQAP. First, arming, training and assisting Yemeni security forces will not adequately address the most clear and present danger facing the U.S. Any financial aid or military support provided through the Yemeni government will undoubtedly be used to quell the country’s dual insurgencies. This approach further empowers AQAP’s recruitment narrative with the Yemeni populace and solidifies the terrorist group’s sanctuary. Second, diplomatic and other “soft power” strategies to tackle AQAP lack sufficient partners and will be far too slow to prevent AQAP from executing future attacks. The U.S. does not have the needed military security structure, trained Yemeni cultural advisor cadre, or host nation partnerships to implement a Yemeni tribal engagement strategy similar in fashion to those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tribal engagement strategies take years to mature and provide AQAP significant operational space to execute an attack in the short-term. Additionally, eliminating AQAP leaders through tribal engagement entices tribes to harbor AQ members. As seen in Afghanistan and Pakistan, tribes realize that slowly bartering AQ operatives while maintaining a low-level of AQ presence will result in sustained resources from the U.S. over time. Tribes know the loss of an AQ presence means the end of U.S. support. Third, a large-scale military deployment to Yemen is infeasible. Large-scale counterinsurgency operations have proven to be an expensive, time-consuming and indirect approach to eliminating a terrorist organization numbering in the hundreds or thousands. And given that the U.S. already has two wars and a half-dozen uprisings to contend with, a significant commitment of troops and materiel to Yemen is likely not possible. Fourth, Saudi partners will likely assist in countering AQAP. However, aligning our hopes for disrupting AQAP in the short-term will likely result in counterproductive Saudi alliances hindering long-run options in Yemen. With none of these options realistic or sufficient, we now consider one that has the most potential for success. Drones and SOF: Our Best and Only Option Light-footprint drone and special operations force (SOF) missions specifically focused on short-term tactical counterterrorism objectives can help avoid the long-term quagmire of Yemeni insurgencies while immediately degrading AQAP’s ability to strike the U.S. Increasing drones and SOF operations now is the best and only sufficient U.S. option for several reasons. First, AQAP presents an immediate threat to all Americans. AQAP’s recent safe haven expansion in Yemen allows for unmitigated attack planning and operational movement. Second, targeted attacks on AQ’s leadership in Pakistan severely disrupted the terror group’s ability to plan and execute terror attacks abroad. Information recovered from the Bin Laden raid details how drone operations, “frustrated Bin Laden indicating that he could no longer direct terrorist attacks by lieutenants who feared for their own lives.” Third, the fall of the Saleh regime and the lack of a host nation partner provide the U.S. a unique opportunity to increase its security without being constrained by weak state sovereignty. Fourth, as described above, all other available options appear infeasible for eliminating AQAP’s immediate threat capability. Fifth, eliminating AQAP’s terrorist leadership in the near term through drone and SOF operations allows the U.S. to lay the groundwork and move toward a long-term Yemen strategy unencumbered by the immediate terrorist threat of AQAP. Maintaining a light footprint Successfully implementing a drone and SOF approach in Yemen requires a light military footprint accompanied by integrated intelligence and a deliberate information operations campaign. Precisely eliminating AQAP’s senior leadership while minimizing civilian causalities requires interagency intelligence assets leading the effort and appropriately transitioning direct military action to SOF as needed. As evidenced in the Bin Laden raid, seamless coordination between these two elements can maximize the effectiveness and minimize the costs of this strategy. Additionally, the drone and SOF program should utilize a dedicated information campaign consistent with counterinsurgency doctrine signaling to Yemeni tribes that removal of AQAP members from their territories will bring an end to U.S. engagements. Don’t create seams in our fight against a seamless enemy. Debates over the legality of pursuing AQAP in Yemen through drones and SOF create unnecessary seams in our nation’s fight against a seamless terrorist enemy. The threat environment we face today predicates the further synchronization of the military and intelligence community. This evolution in the operational environment demands that the authorities under Title 10 (legal basis for the military services and the department of defense) and Title 50 (procedures for covert actions) be equally synchronized and coordinated. The many corridors inside the Beltway must not stymie operational performance in the field. The U.S. State Department officially designated AQAP a Foreign Terrorist Organization in January 2010 and most of AQAP’s leaders are now Specially Designated Global Terrorists under Executive Order. Under this legal designation, the U.S. should use all available assets to eliminate the immediate threat of AQAP. Conclusion Increased use of drone and SOF strike missions is not without risks – yet the ratio of possible risks to potential benefits is far better than any other viable option. Leaning forward and seizing this window of opportunity with such a policy will provide the U.S. time to develop a strong, long-term relationship with Yemen’s successor government that addresses the persistent threat of AQAP and jihadi radicalization in the country. Pursuing this approach will also provide the U.S. an additional litmus test for creating a new long-run counterterrorism strategy in a post-bin Laden world. However, the present window of opportunity will close quickly – the U.S. must act now to prevent an inevitable attack from AQAP.

**Nuclear terrorism causes extinction**

-this evidence cites multiple peer-reviewed studies as well as terrorist group statements

-answers defense based on means – there’s lots of unsafe material around the world and a lot of providers

-answers defense based on motives – terrorists have an incentive to spur retaliation because it create chaos

**Jaspal 12**– Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan 12 (Zafar Nawaz, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dualuse nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does not eliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth. Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a“religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: “Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred” (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187) Since taking office, President Obama has been reiterating that “nuclear weapons represent the ‘gravest threat’ to United States and international security.” While realizing that the US could not prevent nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks singlehandedly, he launched 47an international campaign to convince the international community about the increasing threat of nuclear/ radiological terrorism. He stated on April 5, 2009: “Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5).” He added: “One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe” (Remarks by President Barack Obama, 2009, April 5). In July 2009, at the G-8 Summit, President Obama announced the convening of a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 to deliberate on the mechanism to “secure nuclear materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and prevent nuclear terrorism” (Luongo, 2009, November 10). President Obama’s nuclear/radiological threat perceptions were also accentuated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 (2009). The UNSC expressed its grave concern regarding ‘the threat of nuclear terrorism.” It also recognized the need for all States “to take effective measures to prevent nuclear material or technical assistance becoming available to terrorists.” The UNSC Resolution called “for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.” (UNSC Resolution, 2009) The United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) document revealed on April 6, 2010 declared that “terrorism and proliferation are far greater threats to the United States and international stability.” (Security of Defence, 2010, April 6: i). The United States declared that it reserved the right to“hold fully accountable” any state or group “that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts (Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010, April: 12)”. This declaration underscores the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire fissile material from the rogue states.

**And even an unsuccessful nuclear attack results in retaliation, which leads to extinction**

**Ayson 10** (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions, InformaWorld)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

# Solvency

#### Absent Successful Drone Strikes All Alternative Methods Fail

By Daniel Green 13 Soref fellow at The Washington Institute and a military veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq. January 24, 2013 Al-Qaeda's Soft Power Strategy in Yemen http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/01/24/al-qaedas\_soft\_power\_strategy\_in\_yemen\_100502-full.html

Learning from jihadist mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has become adept at aligning with local political movements and building popular support in Yemen. In doing so, it has morphed into an insurgency while retaining its roots as a terrorist group. To counter the group's political, legal, and social-welfare efforts in areas outside the capital, the Yemeni and U.S. governments must supplement their counterterrorism campaign by expanding services to the provinces in a decentralized fashion.¶ BACKGROUND¶ Since its founding in January 2009, AQAP has repeatedly attacked the United States and its interests. Washington has responded by significantly expanding its drone strikes in Yemen and bolstering the government's ability to fight AQAP itself through additional military aid and training.¶ When the Arab Spring began to sweep the region in 2011, a political crisis emerged in Yemen between then president Ali Saleh, who had ruled for over thirty years, and opponents who criticized the regime's corruption, lack of services, and leadership. As the crisis unfolded, Yemeni security forces became involved in political struggles in Sana, with many units moving from the south to the capital. Sensing a vacuum, AQAP launched a series of raids throughout the south that year, using conventional tactics to overrun large swathes of territory, including many districts and a provincial capital.¶ HEARTS AND MINDS CAMPAIGN¶ After seizing control of various southern Yemeni towns and districts, AQAP moved beyond its terrorist focus, adopting the characteristics of an insurgency and holding territory in order to create a nascent government. Its ability to do so was based not only on its enhanced military capabilities and the departure of government security forces, but also on its effective community engagement strategy.¶ Capitalizing on longstanding southern grievances regarding insufficient education, healthcare, security, rule of law, political representation, and economic development, AQAP sought to replicate the central government's functions throughout the region. Its political agents established a form of stability based on Islamic law, convening regular meetings with community leaders, solving local problems, and attempting to replace chaotic tribal feuds with a more ordered and religiously inspired justice system. This effort included mitigating tribal conflicts, protecting weaker tribes from stronger rivals, and creating opportunities for some ambitious locals, including weaker tribal factions, to rise beyond their social position and seize power in their communities. AQAP also provided humanitarian assistance such as fresh water and food for the indigent, basic healthcare, and educational opportunities (albeit only Quranic teachings).¶ Many of these efforts appealed to the population, not only because they were better than what the local government had provided, but also because many tribal sheiks had previously been discredited for not living up to their responsibilities. Additionally, Quran-based engagement was highly appealing to communities in which that book was often the only text residents knew.¶ Al-Qaeda's strategy in Yemen reflects many of the lessons it learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it frequently alienated locals through the brutality of its rule. In addition, Yemeni tribal structures are far stronger than in those two countries, and tribal leaders are much more adept at governing their traditional areas of control. AQAP has therefore pursued a softer approach not simply because it wants to, but because it must, since the tribes have far greater power than it currently wields.¶ AQAP has also been effective at joining its cause with local political movements in Yemen, as it did in Iraq with Sunni Arab nationalists. To date, it has aligned its interests with southern elements seeking greater autonomy from the central government or complete independence from Yemen (though it is probably not working with the longstanding Southern Mobility Movement).¶ ¶ ¶ Finally, al-Qaeda does not have as strong a foreign character in Yemen as it did in previous conflicts. This reduces Washington and Sana's ability to separate the population from the terrorist group by using national pride, ethnic/tribal differences, or simple xenophobia to rebuff AQAP's advances.¶ REPULSED BUT NOT REJECTED¶ Last year, in response to AQAP's gains, the Yemeni military launched widespread operations against the group's forces in the south. Although these efforts were largely successful in pushing AQAP out of areas it overran in 2011, the group continues to pose a threat. Having retreated to its traditional safe havens in the interior, al-Qaeda has since undertaken a concerted assassination campaign against Yemeni security, military, and intelligence officials as it reconstitutes its forces.¶ In addition, the group still commands sympathy and influence in the south. To be sure, AQAP eventually reverted to harsh rule in many communities once it consolidated power there, alienating many locals and spurring the exodus of thousands from areas under its sway. Yet many others remain sympathetic to the group, not just for religious or culturally conservative reasons, but also out of a general feeling that al-Qaeda, with all its imperfections, is still a better alternative than the Yemeni government.¶ Although relief efforts for war refugees did much to improve Sana's image among southerners, only a sustained governance and development initiative -- one highly synchronized with military clearing and holding operations against AQAP -- will consolidate support for the central government. Yet this sort of initiative will not come naturally to Sana or Washington. The lack of such efforts following last year's clearing operations is already undermining popular support, creating another opportunity for a chastened but resilient AQAP to leverage the south against the central government. The group is already adapting its community engagement strategy by apologizing for the excesses of its recent rule and making overtures to key local leaders to lay the groundwork for reasserting control.

#### That makes boots on the ground inevitable

Vladislav Gulevich 11 Geopolitical Dimension of the Rebellion in Yemen. Oriental Review.Org < http://orientalreview.org/2011/03/08/geopolitical-dimension-of-the-rebellion-in-yemen/>

The Shia insurgency can trigger unrest in the neighboring Oman, where the Shiites are politically under-represented. A conflict of such proportions has a potential to translate into destabilization across the entire Arabian Peninsula, to erode the US dominance in the region, and to empower Iran as a result. The US is worried about possibly ceding control over the Gulf of Aden to Iran which has already built a naval base in Eritrea, just across the Red Sea, and is backing Shia protests in Bahrain which hosts a US naval base and the US 5th Navy command. US and French soldiers are deployed in Djibouti which shares a border with Eritrea. Iran is not Washington’s only headache in the region — China is also in the spotlight. The US cherishes control over Yemen’s Aden seaport which it can use to seal off the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb serving as China’s main commercial inlet to the Red Sea. The stakes running high, the US establishment is increasingly audible about a military intervention in Yemen. Congressman J. Lieberman said Iraq was yesterday’s war, Afghanistan — today’ war, and Yemen would be tomorrow’s war if the US showed enough foresight. It seems that Washington is trying to, massively dispatching intelligence operatives and military instructors to Yemen. US pilots disguised as local air force staff are known to have bombed the positions of the Shia insurgents. US drones and the technicians taking care of them are coming to Yemen, Djibouti, and Kenya in large numbers. The impression is that for the US Saleh is a discounted figure. Even if he manages to hold out till the 2013 elections, his more distant political future hardly stands a chance.

#### That would be net worse for blowback – massively increases AQAP recruitment pools

By Stacey Emker 13 second year Master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations January 14**,** 2013 Analyzing the US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/

On the other hand, drone strikes in Yemen have been beneficial in the fight against AQAP. As previously stated, AQAP is plotting terrorist attacks against U.S. targets and maintains the capability to attack within U.S. borders. Compared to other military objectives in the “war on terror,” there are no troops on the ground in Yemen, reducing the cost of military intervention and anti-American resentment through occupation. In addition, military pressure on AQAP through occupation would likely inflict far more civilian casualties on the Yemeni population than collateral damage from drone strikes. From this standpoint, drones are seen as an efficient tool to gather intelligence and target AQAP members.

**War doesn’t have a single cause – ignoring it allows structural violence to continue and worsen**

**Goldstein 01, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, (Joshua, , 2001, War and Gender, p. 412)**

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, "if you want peace, work for justice." Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars' outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.' So, "if you want peace, work for peace." Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enine suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to "reverse women's oppression." The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book's evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate."'

# Assumptions

**Contention 3 is Our Assumptions**

#### This education is uniquely important because post 9-11 responses to terrorism makes some government violence inevitable – the only way to ensure that violence doesn’t escalate out of control is by rejecting the impulse of utopianism and learning to debate about the consequences of political adoption

Michael Ignatieff 04, Carr professor of human rights at Harvard, Lesser Evils p. 18-19

To insist that justified exercises of coercion can be defined as a lesser evil is to say that evil can be qualified. If two acts are evil, how can we say that one is the lesser, the other the greater? Qualifying evil in this way would seem to excuse it. Yet it is essential to the idea of a lesser evil that one can justify resort to it without denying that it is evil, justifiable only because other means would be insufficient or unavailable. Using the word evil rather than the word harm is intended to highlight the elements of moral risk that a liberal theory of government believes are intrinsic to the maintenance of order in any society premised upon the dignity of individuals. Thus even in times of safety, liberal democracies seek to limit the use of force necessary to their maintenance. These limits seek to balance the conflict between the commitments to individual dignity incarnated in rights and the commitments to majority interest incarnated in popular sovereignty. In times of danger, this conflict of values becomes intense. The suppression of civil liberties, surveillance of individuals, targeted assassination, torture, and preemptive war put liberal commitments to dignity under such obvious strain, and the harms they entail are so serious, that, even if mandated by peremptory majority interest, they should be spoken of only in the language of evil. In a war on terror, I would argue, the issue is not whether we can avoid evil acts altogether, but whether we can succeed in choosing lesser evils and keep them from becoming greater ones. We should do so, I would argue, by making some starting commitments—to the conservative principle (maintaining the free institutions we have), to the dignity principle (preserving individuals from gross harms)—and then reasoning out the consequences of various courses of action, anticipating harms and coming to a rational judgment of which course of action is likely to inflict the least damage on the two principles. When we are satisfied that a coercive measure is a genuine last resort, justified by the facts as we can understand them, we have chosen the lesser evil, and we are entitled to stick to it even if the price proves higher than we anticipated. But not indefinitely so. At some point—when we "have to destroy the village in order to save it"—we may conclude that we have slipped from the lesser to the greater. Then we have no choice but to admit our error and reverse course. In the situation of factual uncertainty in which most decisions about terrorism have to be taken, error is probably unavoidable. It is tempting to suppose that moral life can avoid this slope simply by avoiding evil means altogether. But no such angelic option may exist. Either we fight evil with evil or we succumb. So if we resort to the lesser evil, we should do so, first, in full awareness that evil is involved. Second, we should act under a demonstrable state of necessity. Third, we should chose evil means only as a last resort, having tried everything else. Finally, we must satisfy a fourth obligation: we must justify our actions publicly to our fellow citizens and submit to their judgment as to their correctness.

#### An effective and accountable approach to terrorism prevents the death of politics and the annihilation of the value to life

Michael Ignatieff 04, Carr professor of human rights at Harvard, *Lesser Evils* p. 152-5

It is a commonplace of presidential and prime ministerial rhetoric to insist that their democracies cannot lose in a war on terror. My own analysis thus far has confirmed that no democracy has ever been toppled by a terrorist campaign, unless other factors, like economic collapse or military defeat, were present too. But faced with terrorism that deploys weapons of mass destruction, we cannot be as certain that the historical pattern, argued for in this book, would prevail in the future. In other words, we could lose. What would defeat look like? It would not be like invasion, conquest, or occupation, of course, but rather would entail the disintegration of our institutions and way of life. A succession of mass casualty attacks, using weapons of mass destruction, would leave behind zones of devastation sealed off for years and a pall of mourning, anger, and fear hanging over our public and private lives. Such attacks would destroy the existential security on which democracy depends. Recurrent attacks with weapons of mass destruction might not just kill hundreds of thousands of people. We might find ourselves living within a national security state on permanent alert, with sealed borders, constant identity checks, and permanent detention camps for suspicious aliens and recalcitrant citizens. A successful attack would poison the wellsprings of trust among strangers that make the relative liberty of liberal democracy possible. Our police forces might descend to torturing suspects in order to prevent future attacks, and our secret security forces might engage in direct assassination of perpetrators or mere suspects as well. Our military might itself use weapons of mass destruction against terrorist enemies. If our institutions were unable to stop the attacks, the state's monopoly of force might even break down, as citizens took the law into their own hands seeking to defend themselves against would-be perpetrators. Vigilantes would patrol blighted and deserted streets. This is what the face of defeat might look like. We would survive, but we would no longer recognize ourselves or our institutions. We would exist but lose our identity as free peoples. So what can be done? What resources do we possess? As the threat of terrorism targets our political identity as free peoples, our essential resource has to be that identity itself. We cannot fight and prevail against an enemy unless we know who we are and what we wish to defend at all costs. If the automatic response to mass casualty terrorism is to strengthen secret government, it is the wrong response. The right one is to strengthen open government. Democratic peoples will not lend assistance to authorities unless they believe in the system they are defending. No strategy against terror is sustainable without public assistance and cooperation, without eyes that detect risks, ears that hear threats, and the willingness to report them to authorities. As two world wars have shown, a democratic people mobilized by fear and led by hope can prove a formidable foe. Despite their checks and balances, democratic systems do not have to be less decisive than authoritarian ones, and democratic institutions have the advantage of marshaling the wisdom, experience, and talent of the citizens as a whole rather than relying on the shallow pool of a closed elite. Faith in democracy need not make us blind to its faults. Indeed, our democracies are not doing as well as they could in dealing with conventional threats, and it is to be feared that they will do still worse with weapons of mass destruction. So far, information about risk has been doctored for public consumption. Media, with more concern for market share than for the public interest, have colluded in disinforming the public. Judges have accorded excessive deference to government actions. Legislatures have lacked the courage to subject the facts of risk to clear-eyed scrutiny. Government departments have abridged the liberties of aliens and minorities, safe in the knowledge that the victims lack the voice to make injustice heard. The public has gone along, unable or unwilling to force their elected officials to serve them better. When democratic institutions malfunction in this way, bad public policy is the result. Legislatures have crafted legislation that provides the police with powers they do not need; the public lends its support to measures that do not increase its security; the secret services, observing a deceived public and a deceiving leadership, may take the law into their own hands. A war on terror thus waged by secret and unaccountable agents, working on or beyond the margins of the law, on behalf of depoliticized and demobilized citizens who remain in the dark about what is being done in their name, may end up damaging democracy forever. We do not want a war on terror fought on behalf of free peoples who are free only in name. What we need is a reinvigoration of the institutions of freedom—government by checks and balances, by open forms of adversarial justification in courts, legislatures, and the press. Reinvigoration means simply that our institutions need to do the job that they were designed to do. We need to understand what they are there for, trust in them, and make them work.

**Debating about war powers is important – makes possible checks on excessive presidential authority – college students are key**

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

**And our impact is true – successful terrorist attacks flip the decision-making of states – it makes violent backlash and crackdowns more likely**

**Bostrom 08, Ackerman and Potter** (Nick-Director of the future of humanity institute at oxford university, specializes in probability theory, scientific method, and risk analysis- former expert consultant for european commission in Brussels and the CIA, Gary- research director of the national consortium for START and Director of the center for terrorism and intelligence studies, and William- Institute professor and director of the center for nonproliferation studies on numerous committees of the national academy of science, “Global Catastrophic Risks”, Oxford University Press, p.430-31)

Unlike the more tangible physical and economic effects of nuclear terrorism, it is almost impossible to model the possible psychological, social, and political consequences of nuclear terrorism, especially in the long term and following multiple incidents. One is therefore forced to rely on proxy data from the effects of previous cases of large-scale terrorism, a variety of natural disasters and past nuclear accidents such as the Chernobyl meltdown. The psychological, social and political effects of nuclear terrorism are likely to extend far beyond the areas affected by blast or radiation, although many of these effects are likely to be more severe closer to ground zero. It can be expected that the initial event will induce a number of psychological symptoms in victims, responders, and onlookers. In an age of instantaneous global communication, the last category might rapidly encompass most of the planet. The constellation of possible symptoms might include anxiety, grief, helplessness, initial denial, anger, confusion, impaired memory, sleep disturbance and withdrawal (Alexander and Klein, 2006). Based on past experience with terrorism and natural disasters, these symptoms will resolve naturally in the majority of people, with only a fraction going on to develop persistent psychiatric illness such as post-traumatic stress disorder. However, the intangible, potentially irreversible, contaminating, invasive and doubt provoking nature of radiation brings with it a singular aura of dread and high levels of stress and anxiety. Indeed, this fear factor is one of the key reasons why some terrorists might select weapons emitting radiation. In addition to significant physical casualties, a nuclear terrorism event would most likely result in substantially greater numbers of unexposed individuals seeking treatment, thereby complicating medical responses. In the 1987, radiological incident in Goiania, Brazil, up to 140,000 unexposed people flooded the health care system seeking treatment (department of homeland security, 2003, p.26). Although genuine panic – in the sense of maladaptive responses such as freezing – is extremely rare (jones , 1995), a nuclear terrorism incident might provoke a mass exodus from cities as individuals make subjective decisions to minimize their anxiety. Following the three mile island nuclear accident in the United states in 1979, 150,000 people took to the highways – 45 people evacuated for every person advised to leave (becker, 2003). Were nuclear terrorism to become a repeating occurrence, the question would arise regarding whether people would eventually be able to habituate to such events, much as the Israeli public currently manages to maintain a functional society despite continual terrorist attacks. While desensitization to extremely high levels of violence is possible, multiple cases of nuclear terrorism over an extended period of time might prove to be beyond the threshold of human tolerance. Even a single incidence of nuclear terrorism could augur negative social changes. While greater social cohesion is likely in the immediate aftermath of an attack (department of homeland security, 2003, p.38), over time feelings of fear, anger and frustration could lead to widespread anti-social behavior, including the stigmatization of those exposed to radiation and the scapegoating of population groups associated with the perceived perpetrators of the attack. This reaction could reach the level of large-scale xenophobia and vigilantism. Repeated attacks on major cities might even lead to behaviors encouraging social reversion and the general deterioration of civil society , for example, if many people adopt a survivalist attitude and abandon populated areas. There is, of course, also the possibility that higher mortality salience might lead to positive social effects, including more constructive approaches to problem-solving (Calhoun and Tedeschi, 1998). Yet higher morality could just as easily lead to more pathological behaviors. For instance, during outbreaks of the black death plague in the middle ages, some groups lost all hope and descended into a self-destructive epicureanism. A nuclear terrorist attack, or series of attacks, would almost certainly alter the fabric of politics (Becker, 2003). The use of a nuclear weapon might trigger a backlash against current political or scientific establishments for creating and failing to prevent the threat. Such attacks might paralyze an open or free society by causing the government to adopt draconian methods (Stern, 1999, pp.2-3), or massively restrict movement and trade until all nuclear material can be accounted for, an effort that would take years and which could never be totally complete. The concomitant loss of faith in governing authorities might eventually culminate in the fulfillment of John Herz’s initial vision of the atomic age, resulting in the demise of the nation-state as we know it (1957).

Mutually assured destruction has made interstate war obsolete, nuclear terrorism is the only scenario that triggers nuclear escalation by states

Caplow 07 (Theodore- commonwealth professor of sociology emeritus at the univ. of virginia, Forbidden Wars, University Press of America, p.97-98)

Nuclear weapons, which are only useful if never used, have created a geopolitical world that looks much more dangerous than it is. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the threat of a nuclear war went from orange (with tinges of red) to bright green, or whatever color signifies safety, and there it remains today. But the American public, which lived quite comfortably with a plausible threat of nuclear war for forty years, now quakes at the thought of nuclear weapons in the hands of North Koreans or Iranians. During the cold war, both superpowers deployed thousands of nuclear warheads on hair trigger alert. Washington and Moscow took for granted the unrelenting hostility between them and the real possibility of having to absorb the first strike. Each understood that the first strike might be launched by accident or with deadly purpose, with equally catastrophic results. Nothing like that looms over us today. The Russian federation is a “strategic partner” of the United States although not always a comfortable one. The nuclear rules guarantee the immunity of nuclear-armed states from hostile national forces. The nuclear taboo remains unbroken and has just now, in the summer of 2006, survived a major test as the Bush administration backed away from a plan to use nuclear blockbusters in an attack on irans nuclear installations. The five major nuclear weapon states- the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, China- have no serious quarrels among themselves. The five proliferators or would be proliferators – Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran – show not the slightest disposition to attack any of the major nuclear-weapons states. The classic problem of abolishing international wars is nearly solved, although nobody seems to notice. What formerly seemed to call either for a world government or for a peacekeeping federation much more powerful than the United Nations, has yielded to the nuclear rules. For the first time in history, major geopolitical goals are being reached by international consensus with no application or threat of force. A striking example is the European Union, which has effectively abolished international war on the European Continent, the historic theater of so many wars. Another is the voluntary adherence of nearly all the world governments to the non-proliferation regime, along with the voluntary abandonment of nuclear weapons programs by Libya, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. Compliance with the limited test ban treaty has been nearly perfect, and the only resistance of the United States and a handful of other holdouts have so far prevented its more comprehensive successor from coming into effect. What all this signifies is that nuclear weapons have changed the normal relationships of sovereign states in a fundamental way. The nuclear weapons states, being militarily invulnerable, have little to gain by going to war. Under the Nuclear Rules, they may not fight each other and their security is not enhanced by warring with non-nuclear states. Only the United States has chosen to do so, ostensibly, it must be remembered, to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons and as of this writing, the United States government is threatening war against Iran for the same reason, although with less precipitation and more limited military resources. If nuclear weapons could be wielded only by national governments, the present condition of the commonwealth of nations might well be celebrated as approaching the fulfillment of an age-old utopian dream, the abolition of international war. True, there are two kinds of international war that the nuclear rules permit: a conflict between non-nuclear states that have no nuclear guarantors and an attack on a non-nuclear state that lacks a nuclear guarantor by a nuclear state. There are only a handful of potential conflicts in the former category while the latter category contains only the United States and its axis-of-evil targets. Of course, as the incidence of international war has declined toward extinction, the focus of fear has shifted to the possible use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and insurgents. Indeed, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was promoted as a precautionary measure against the possible transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists by saddam Hussein. Never mind that the Baathists and Jihadists had very different programs or that any such transaction might have invited a nuclear reprisal against the donor. The same concern is raised, with possibly more justification wit regard to North Korea. Pakistan, which has many more nuclear warheads than north korea and with many jihadists in official positions, is seldom mentioned in this context, but the thought is there. It would be foolish to deny the plausibility of the nightmare scenario in which a nuclear device transferred from a proliferator to a terrorist group is used to attack an American city. That would, ofcourse, break the nuclear taboo and it would also unleash the full fury of an American nuclear reprisal against the suspected donor. So it may not happen. Another scenario would involve the transfer of a nuclear device to an insurgent group in latin America or Africa. That too would break the nuclear taboo but would be less likely to provoke a nuclear response.

**Our definition terrorism makes crucial distinctions – it prevents others from exploiting the War on Terror and increases our ability to combat such violence by shifting the activities to alternate courses, reducing the scope of international terrorism**

**Ganor 01** (Boaz Ganor, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 2001 (Defining Terrorism: "Is One Man's Terrorist Another Mail's Freedom Fighter?")

We face an essential need to reach a definition of terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement, thus enabling international operations against terrorist organizations. A definition of this type must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars between organization and a state. The definition of terrorism will be the basis and the operational tool for expanding the international community's ability to combat terrorism. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in. or supporting terrorism, and will allow the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerrilla activities). Finally, the operative use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral or utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims. thus reducing the scope of international terrorism. The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as me "politically correct" one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible goal, and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition. The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better.

#### Military drones are a statistical outlier in tech development – resistance movements will model military tech developments and use them to dismantle power structures

Kevin Carson 13 is a senior fellow of the Center for a Stateless Society (c4ss.org) and holds the Center's Karl Hess Chair in Social Theory Feb 4, 2013 Bring on the Drones! http://c4ss.org/content/16916

Most analysis of drone technology from libertarian futurists these days is pretty pessimistic. They’re generally treated as part of a larger techno-fascist scenario, like the U.S. global hegemony (enforced by orbital lasers and remote-controlled UN teletroopers) depicted in Ken Macleod’s Fall Revolution novels.¶ That’s an understandable temptation. After all, drones (combined with mobile operations like the assassination of bin Laden in May 2011) seem to have given the United States an unprecedented ability to take out the leadership and many of the rank-and-file of networked resistance movements like al Qaeda, far more cheaply than the old model of counter-insurgency warfare.¶ Extrapolating from this, it’s not hard to imagine the United States government, as a full-blown techno-fascist regime fighting to stave off the collapse of corporate power in a few years, using drones and remote-controlled soldiers to shut down web servers in Iceland that host Wikileaks or Mega, kill M15 and Syntagma organizers on the Continent (and Occupy organizers in Oakland), take out garage factories producing knockoffs of GE’s patented goods, etc., or just flat-out assassinate political dissidents based on wiretaps from Ft. Meade.¶ Even John Robb, my favorite writer on networked resistance and asymmetric warfare, seems to take a dark view of the long-term effect of drones. The main advantage of his resilient communities, as he sees them, is that they’re too small, decentralized and hardened to present high-profile targets to states in their death throes.¶ But that’s far too pessimistic an assessment, in my opinion. The apparent spectacular successes of drone warfare in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen are actually just early adopter advantages accruing to the first powerful states to put drones to use. This says absolutely nothing about the overall effect of drone technology as we move down the cost curve — any more than we could have predicted the institutional effects of cybernetics and the Internet based on the enormous vacuum tube mainframe computers of the late 1940s.¶ It’s a fair guess that increasingly sophisticated, autonomous hunter-killer drones will be governed by an exponential rate of cost reduction comparable to that described in Moore’s Law. In a few years time, we can expect remote-controlled or autonomous armed drones available as open-source, off-the-shelf technology that networked resistance movements can churn out with cheap tabletop CNC machines in their own garage factories.**¶** When that happens, and the “World’s Sole Remaining Superpower” loses its early-adopter advantage, drone technology will work to the advantage of the side with the most decentralized, distributed organizational infrastructure, and the most widely dispersed and hardened end-points. And it will disproportionately hurt the side with the most centralized, hierarchical form of organization and the most concentrated target profile. Anyone want to venture a guess as to which respective sides fit those descriptions?¶ Imagine, if you will, a world in which drones are cheap and widely available. Then stop and think about the target profile of the Empire and the corporate interests it serves. Imagine how easy it would be to get targeting information on the homes, churches and country clubs of the senior management and directors of the aerospace companies that make American drones. The Boardrooms and C-Suites themselves. The factories. The whole South Asian chain of command, from CINC CENTCOM down to battalion and flight headquarters. The logistical tail of the drones, including the control centers at every airbase from which drones are staged. Begin to get the picture?¶ Even as it is, the current American advantage in drones is just an outlier in the general trend toward cheap area-denial technologies (carrier-killing Sunburn missiles, mines, etc.). In fact the panic in U.S. ruling circles is so extreme that the latest U.S. Defense Guidance document was centered on the need to prevent the United States losing its regional power projection capabilities to such technologies — the 21st century equivalent of the most powerful army in the world being defeated by a guerrilla army using punji sticks and a bicycle-borne logistical tail.¶ In every conceivable way — agility, resilience, feedback/reaction loop — the emerging networked successor society runs circles around the old hierarchical corporate and state dinosaurs it’s replacing. As I’ve said many times, the twentieth century was the age of the large, hierarchical institution. By the end of the 21st, there won’t be enough left of them to bury.

#### Prefer our specific evidence over generic overarching claims – that’s critical to rethinking

Rosato and Schuessler 11 –Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame AND Assistant Professor of Strategy and International Security at the Air War College

(Sebastian and John, “A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States”, Perspectives on Politics December 2011 Vol. 9 No. 4)

One reason for this attitude is that political scientists tend to shy away from policy relevant work. According to Joseph Nye, “scholars are paying less attention to questions about how their work relates to the policy world.” 6 Why academics have withdrawn to the ivory tower is an open question, but the profession’s attitude toward policy work—ranging from indifference to hostility—is at least partially to blame. “In many departments,” notes Nye, “a focus on policy can hurt one’s career.” 7 Walt reaches the same conclusion: “Policy relevance is simply not a criterion that the academy values. Indeed, **there is a** clear bias **against it**.” 8 Similarly, Bruce Jentleson and Ely Ratner declare that “academia’s dominant organizational culture . . . devalues **policy relevance**.” 9 Our own position is that **political scientists** can **and** should **contribute to policy debates**. The reason that political scientists can make a valuable contribution is simple, but cannot be repeated enough: **theory and policy are** inextricably linked. Although they may not be self-conscious in their use of theory, policy makers ﬁgure out what events or factors to focus on and what policies to pursue based on the theories they ﬁnd most convincing. As Walt points out, theory is indispensable **to policy**—to the extent that it helps decision makers to diagnose their problems, to anticipate events, to formulate prescriptions for action, and to evaluate the results of their policies. 10 Thus, **we have a** responsibility as scholars **to** **foster a robust debate** **about our preferred theories** and their competitors. After all, wise policy choices depend on a vigorous marketplace of ideas. 11 Political scientists should contribute to these debates as scholars, which is to say that t**hey must be attentive to** logic and evidence. As PatrickThaddeus Jackson and Stuart Kaufman explain, if we want to remain “on the scientiﬁc side of the thin line separating science from politics,” the key issue is “whether, given our assumptions, our conclusions follow rigorously from the evidence and logic we provide.” 12 In the case at hand, this involves two tasks. First, we must take a handful of plausible assumptions and logically deduce a set of foreign policy prescriptions. Second, we must show— through a detailed examination of the historical record— that had states adhered to these prescriptions, they would likely have enhanced their security without going to war and, conversely, that their embrace of alternative theories of action led them down the path to war.

**The War on Terrorism is not constructed, nor can it be deterred. Our criticisms of the government won't deter those who are ready to strike us. This is analogous to how the reactions to post-WWI did not inevitably produce Nazism, it was a group of people taking over state power independently.**

**Elshtain 03** (Jean Betlike Elshtain, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics, University of Chicago Divinity School, 2003 (Just War Against Terrorism)

Certain critical events in the past remind us of this mordant fact- Looking back on twentieth-century fascism, we do not wring our hands and blame everyone but the Nazis for their murderous policies. Of course, it is important for historians and political analysts to take account of the political, social, and economic milieu out of which National Socialism emerged. But the difficulty and desperation of post— World War I conditions—runaway inflation, a war-torn economy, and war reparations, all of which Germany faced—do not add up to the inevitability of the evil that was Nazism, To claim such is to set in motion an exculpatory strategy that, whether intentionally or inadvertently, rationalizes political pathology. The overriding truth and most salient fact of National Socialism is simply stated: A group of people took over state power, aimed to expand an Aryan Empire through ruthless force, and, as dictated by their ideology of biological racism, murdered whole categories of people not because of anything they had done but because of who they were. Why, then, in the context of America's war against terrorism, do so many tick off a list of American "failures" or even insist that America brought the horrors of September 11. 2001. on herself? Let me be clear that I exempt from this mode of argument the ludicrous claims that have arisen since that day, such as the slander that Israel carried out the attacks after having first warned Jews who worked in New York's World Trade Center towers to stay home that day, or the preposterous charge that American officials, up to and including the president of the United States, engineered the attacks to bolster their popularity. This sort of inflammatory madness exists outside the boundary of political debate and festers instead in the fever swamps of conspiracy theory. Conducted within the boundary of reasonable political debate, however, are those arguments that an international "war on poverty and despair," or a change in the direction of U.S. Middle Eastern policy, or a different U.S. policy toward Iraq will stay the hands of murderous terrorists in the future. Certainly these arguments deserve a hearing. Pushing more programs that deal with poverty and despair or rethinking American foreign policy, including our approach to Iraq, may have desirable outcomes. But no such change, either singly or together. will deter Osama bin Laden and those like him. To believe such is to plunge headfirst into the strategy of denial characteristic of the citizens of Oran in Camus's novel. We could do everything demanded of us by those who are critical of America, both inside and outside our boundaries, but Islamist fundamentalism and the threat it poses would not be deterred.