Tournament: Ndt | Round: 2 | Opponent: Idaho State Doty-Ivanovic | Judge: Cooper, Ortiz, Woodward
As Petra Kuppers explains, language and words have no objective meaning and sound different to different audiences. Suspend you identity in favor of entering cripple country. Cross the river Styx because here be dragons. Use your ballot to chart the uncharted territories of life, death, disability, sexuality, race, class, gender, and all other aspects of identity. Become the queer cripple and rejoice in the music we can make.

Petra Kuppers Associate Professor English, Theatre, Women's Studies
Disability Studies Quarterly Fall 2006, Volume 26, No. 4 Disability Culture Poetry: The Sound of the Bones. A Literary Essay

Tournament: Shirley | Round: 1 | Opponent: Michigan Colella-Hirn | Judge: Koch
K

The affirmatives description of war is a disembodied one. This is bad – war is a visceral event that is always dependent on the body. Their faulty ontology means all their evidence is suspect, and their failure to accurately describe war causes ontological violence.
McSorley 13
Kevin McSorley is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Portsmouth. He convened the War and the Body conference at the Imperial War Museum in June 2010, and co-­ organized the accompanying War and the Body exhibition at Blackall Studios, London. His expertise includes contemporary social and cultural theory; technology and the body; the sociology of war and violence. He has recently edited a special issue of the Journal of War and Culture Studies on ‘War and Embodiment: Military and Cultural Practices’. He is currently conducting ethnographic research on the global arms trade and working on the monograph Violence, War and Society. McSorley, Kevin (Editor). War, Politics and Experience : War and the Body : Militarisation, Practice and Experience. Pg. 10 BSHIZZLE

This book places the body at the centre of critical thinking about war, giving embodiment and bodily issues an analytic recognition they have often been denied in the annals and ontology of conventional war scholarship. The reality of war is not just politics by any other means but politics incarnate, politics written on and experienced through the thinking, feeling bodies of men and women. From steeled combatants to abject victims, from the grieving relative to the exhausted aid worker, war occupies innumerable bodies in a multitude of ways, profoundly shaping lives and ways of being human. The opening description of war provides one vivid illustration of how war ‘makes sense’ at a fundamentally embodied and affective level. For the young Mozambican narrator, war is an anticipatory nervousness that constantly ‘lives inside’ her, a somatic knowing that underpins her every thought and move. As Nordstrom (1998: 108) argues, something ‘far more complex, multifaceted and enduring than the formal boundaries of war demarcated in military cultures takes root in the quotidian life of a country at war’. It is this ontology of war that the scholarship in this book seeks to elucidate and explore – the countless affective, sensory and embodied ways through which war lives and breeds. 1 Shaw (2005: 40– 1) argues that ‘the defect of most social theory of war and militarism is . . . that it has not considered war as practice, i.e. what people actually do in war’. This book aims to address that omission via an explicit focus upon the embodied practices, structures of feeling and lived experiences through which war and militarism take place. While this will include the examination of specific modes of embodying force and practices of ‘warfighting’, the analysis extends both temporally and spatially to consider the bodily preparations for, and the corporeal aftermaths of, war – both within militaries and beyond. Indeed, an analytic focus upon the body tends to render any clear demarcation of discrete war zones and times problematic, 2 emphasising instead the enactment and reproduction of war through affective dispositions, corporeal careers, embodied suffering and somatic memories that endure across time and space. 3 Furthermore, it is not just the bodies of combatants and victims that are produced by and central to war, but the bodies of veterans, witnesses, pacifists, patriots and many others. Given the global nature of contemporary economic, migratory and media flows, few in today’s interconnected world remain completely isolated from war’s touch (Sylvester 2011). While in post-­ conscription Western states with increasingly professionalised and privatised militaries, there may be less direct disciplinary engagement with civilian bodies – leading some commentators to have proposed the existence of ‘post-­ military society’ (Shaw 1991) and ‘post-­ heroic warfare’ (Luttwak 1995) – many such states have been marked by a profound re-­ militarisation at a wider political and cultural level in recent decades, a mobilisation that has often been intensely embodied and emotional. Ó Tuathail (2003: 859), for example, describes the political channelling of ‘the affective tsunami unleashed by the terrorist attacks of 2001’. He argues that 9/11 was processed by many Americans in a fundamentally visceral manner, becoming a ‘somatic marker’ – effectively a ‘gut instinct’ shaping perception and judgement below the threshold of rational, deliberative discussion – that would subsequently be appropriated to legitimate the military invasion of Iraq in 2003. Stahl (2010) relatedly understands the inculcation of contemporary consumers into the burgeoning interactive culture of ‘militainment’ in terms of affective and kinaesthetic entrainment, a seduction whose pleasures are ultimately felt at the expense of developing any other critical capacities to engage with matters of military might. It is through such mundane cultural practices that the legitimacy of having vast military force – what the anthropologist Catherine Lutz (2009) refers to as the ‘military normal’ – assumes an implicitness, becomes something not thought but routinely felt in everyday life. Such examples point to the need to think about the reproduction of war, and war readiness, in terms of a militarisation of sensation, affect and the body that operates over time and across multiple and broad constituencies. 4 The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on exploring the relative neglect of embodiment in many conventional discussions of war and the increasingly problematic and paradoxical status of the body in recent Western wars.

Additionally, The Performance of the 1AC assumes an able-bodied standpoint. It is impossible to separate our discussions and our encounters from our relationship to disability.
Boys 2008 (Jos, “challenging the 'normal': towards new conceptual frameworks”, http://www.sowhatisnormal.co.uk/challenging)
This shifts the inquiry from representations (on the body, in the space) to relationships, processes and contexts. Any encounter is necessarily mediated by who is there, who is not, why they are there (or why not), what they bring to the situation and w hat they take away. Such events involve meanings-in-the-making through a process in space and over time. Importantly encounters are not just a space of sharing and recognition but also of conflict, differentiation and negotiation. They involve interpretations, talk, gestures, bodily relationships, and actions. So how do encounters work? In each case we now have two questions which allow the exploration of disability beyond being a stereotypical marker of identity or difference. What embodied knowledge and experience do we the participants bring to the encounter? What are the routine social and spatial practices which frame the encounter? Here, disabled and ‘non-disabled’ participants are not separated out; all have parity in the space of the encounter itself. But the impact of framing disabled people in ways not of their making remains central to the investigation. As Davis writes: Disability is not so much the lack of a sense or the presence of a physical or mental impairment as it is the reception and construction of that difference. Davis 2002 p50

The Impact is epistemological and ontological destruction. The body is the source and the shaping force of all knowledge and meaning.
Creal 1999 (Lee Davis, “THE "DISABILITY OF THINKING"
THE "DISABLED" BODY”, Course Paper for Ambiguous Bodies: Studies in Contemporary Sexuality, York University, http://www.broadreachtraining.com/advocacy/artcreal.htm)
In "Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and the Flesh," Elizabeth Grosz cites the work of Merleau-Ponty in her discussion of corporeal phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty, she says, seeks to understand the relationship between consciousness and nature and between interiority and exteriority. He reorients the tradition of the question "how can there be a world for a subject?" by locating subjectivity not in mind or consciousness but in the body; he argues that the mind and body are not separate entities but interrelated and that the mind is based on corporeal and sensory relations. The body, according to Merleau-Ponty, is a phenomenon experienced by the one who lives in it and it (the body) is the location which places one in the world and makes possible relationships between oneself and other objects and subjects. We understand and know our body only by living in it. It is a subject and lived reality for oneself and an object for others but it is never simply object nor simply subject. Merleau-Ponty says the body is "sense-bestowing" and "form-giving," and is "my being-to-the-world and as such is the instrument by which all information and knowledge is received and meaning is generated" (Grosz: 87). This resonates with Lennard Davis who says the body is not only a physical object but is "a way of organizing through the realm of the senses the variations and modalities of physical existence as they are embodied into being through a larger social/political Matrix" (Davis: 14).

Case

The 1ac rests on a distinction of american losses are prevented at all cost while the rest of the world can be exterminated with no recourse
Butler 4 – PhD, Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School
Judith, 2004, “Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence” p. XIV-XV. http://butlerphile.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/butler_judith_-_precarious_lif.pdf
The second piece “Violence, Mourning, Politics,” takes up a psychoanalytic understanding of loss to see why aggression sometimes seems so quickly to follow. The essay pursues the problem of a primary vulnerability to others, one that one cannot will away without ceasing to be human. It suggests as well that contemporary forms of national sovereignty constitute efforts to overcome an impressionability and violability that are ineradicable dimensions of human dependency and sociality. I also consider there how certain forms of grief become nationally recognized and amplified, whereas other losses become unthinkable and ungrievable. I argue that a national melancholia, understood as a disavowed mourning, follows upon the erasure from public representations of the names, images, and narratives of those the US has killed. On the other hand, the US’s own losses are consecrated in public obituaries that constitute so many acts of nation-building. Some lives are grieveable, and others are not; the differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must be grieved, and which kind of subject must not, operates to produce and maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human: what counts as livable life and a grievable death? 

The impact is unending warfare, fueled by the naked worship of violence that is american politics. Everything other counts as sub-human and liable to destruction
Kaustuv Roy, 08- “Neighborhoods of the Plantation: War, Politics and Education”. Professor of social and political theory in the College of Education at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/683-neighborhoods-of-the-plantation.pdf
In this context, one State document worth studying is the National Security Strategy of 2002 announced by the current U.S. regime which must take credit as the most aggressive and supremacist documents ever put out by a democratic nation as a statement of its foreign policy. The U.S. administration openly declares its war on the world: It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge...To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of US forces. (United States, 2002, p. 29, emphasis added) This vindicates Benjamin’s assertion earlier that one need not be amazed at the naked worship of violence, but understand it as basic to the organization of state power. The word “defenses” is an obvious euphemism for offensive capacity to carry on the endless war that began in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the US took on the mantle of global policeman, all the way through the Cold War and up to the most recent proposed “missile shields” in Poland and the Czech Republic announced in 2007 that is widely seen as the beginning of a new arms race. 14 Chomsky notes: There is a new norm for the use of military force. This new norm was articulated in general terms by the White House in September 2002 when it announced the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The report proposed an unusually extreme doctrine on the use of force in the world... a doctrine that doesn’t begin to have any grounds in international law, namely, preventive war. That is, the United States will rule the world by force, and if there is any challenge to its domination?whether it is perceived in the distance, invented, imagined, or whatever?then the United States will have the right to destroy that challenge... (Chomsky, 2005, pp. 1-2) Read closely, the security document is a new Romanus Pontifex, a declaration of war against one and all in the establishment of a world order in the service of the western political and financial elite and its plantations all over the world. We have seen its immediate application and consequence in the invasion and erasure of Iraq. The intentionality, or the confluence of the discourses of freedom/progress/rationality/terror, keeps the world gripped in a dialectic of violence with increasing stakes that is needed to maintain the world-as-estate. 15 Let us go back once more to the National Security Strategy document. Some of the key phrases are the “essential role” of the military and the necessity of its establishment “beyond challenge.” It is here that the writers of the official manifesto betray their intentionality in terms of the absolutist horizon that has little relation to the historical basis of the democratic state; here we see the military as the rational-pragmatic arm of the absolute State or the State of terror. 16 To rule an empire America had to maintain a vast military machine and institutions such as the CIA and the NSA which operated under a blanket of secrecy. The public was increasingly excluded from the decision-making process.... The pernicious feature in all this was not only the expansion of military influence into civilian areas... but the injection of the militarist élan throughout our society?a constant pressure directing American life toward the reactionary. As defined by a conservative expert, Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard, military values are exactly the opposite of ‘the Lockeian liberalism...’ Whereas the nation was built on the philosophical ‘ideals of liberty, democracy, equality, and peace,’ the basic military principles are ‘authority, hierarchy, obedience, force, and war’. (Lens, 1987, p. 22) Once again we see the operation of the dyarchy. Vast secret organizations such as the CIA, whose operations are exempt from public scrutiny and who therefore become the terror arm of the political oligarchy, are unleashed upon the world in the name of national security in order to maintain servility and compliance on the global plantation. Declassified documents show the role of the CIA, for example, in the overthrow as well as assassinations of political leaders around the world who refused to tow Washington’s line (see Chomsky, 2003 and 2005). When “democracies” are run by means of secret organizations they become despotisms. Besides, if democracy is taken to mean the primacy of the constitutive role of the collective then militarism has little place in it. Militarism, instead, trumps democracy insisting on the primacy of the State and its commissars in the life of the people. The uncrowned monarchs parade military glory in a desperate bid to hide the real bankruptcy and fragility of the social condition. The message is that if the killing machine is state-of-the-art then society is safe. Nothing of course could be more ridiculous and untrue: the endless concern with death and mechanisms of death is what Agamben (2000) has called “thanatopolitics,” a breakdown so profound that it cannot be detected easily. Militarist despotism is the prime vehicle by means of which the State legitimizes itself convening violence and terror while maintaining a silence on real issues of livability. The more the need for that silence grows, the more the people must be banned from the public sphere, that is, from true political participation, and decisions must be taken by the ruling cabal in secrecy reinforcing the formalism of the State and the mystification of power. The security state thus becomes shrouded in secrecy; all relevant information on the basis of which informed decisions can be made is kept from the public as state secret. This is the state of diarchy; parallel processes are set up, one for the rulers and another for the governed, the separation yielding the necessary room for limitless violence. 

Obama will lie, secrecy prevents any checks
Branfman 13  Fred, Director of Project Air War, interviewed the first Lao refugees brought down to Vientiane from the Plain of Jars in northern Laos, visited U.S. airbases in Thailand and South Vietnam, talking with U.S. Embassy officials. 6/9
Whatever his personal beliefs prior to becoming President Mr. Obama, as the Executive's titular leader, has necessarily signed up to support the secrecy, lying, and disinformation it employs to enjoy maximum flexibility from democratic oversight in order to pursue its policies of overt and covert violence. Two important new books - Jeremy Scahill's Dirty Wars and Mark Mazzetti's The Way of the Knife - describe how, in near-total secrecy, the U.S. Executive is a world of its own. Over the last 12 years, Executive officials have unilaterally and secretly launched, escalated or deescalated wars; installed and supported massively corrupt governments, savage warlords, or local paramilitary forces, and overthrown leaders that have displeased it; created the first unit of global American assassins and fleets of machines waging automated war; engaged in vicious turf wars for more money and budget; spied on Americans including the media and activists on a scale unmatched in U.S. history; compiled 3 different sets of global "kill lists" independently operated by the White House, CIA and Pentagon/JSOC; used police-state tactics while claiming to support democracy, e.g. when it fed retina scans, facial recognition features and fingerprints of over 3 million Iraqi and Afghani males into a giant data base; incarcerated and tortured, either directly or indirectly, tens of thousands of people without evidence or trial; and much more. All of these major activities are conducted entirely by the Executive Branch, without meaningful Congressional oversight or the knowledge of the American people. The foundational principle of the U.S. Constitution is that governments can only rule with the "informed consent" of the people. But the U.S. Executive Branch has not only robbed its people of this fundamental right. It has prosecuted those courageous whistleblowers who have tried to inform them. The U.S. mass media, dependent upon the Executive for their information and careers, and run by corporate interests benefiting from Executive largesse, predominately convey Executive Branch perspectives on an hourly basis to the American people. Even on the relatively few occasions when they publish information the Executive wishes to keep secret, it has little impact on Executive policies while maintaining the illusion that the U.S. has a "free press". The U.S. Executive is essentially free to conduct its activities as it wishes. In future articles in this space we will explore three key features of the U.S. Executive Branch: (1) Evil - If evil consists of murdering, maiming, and making homeless the innocent, and/or waging the “aggressive war” judged the “supreme international crime” at Nuremberg, the U.S. Executive Branch is today clearly the world’s most evil institution. It has killed, wounded or made refugees of an officially-estimated 21 million people in Iraq and Indochina alone, far more than any other institution since the time of Stalin and Mao. President Obama is the first U.S. President to acknowledge, in his recent "counterterrorism" speech, that this number has included killing "hundreds of thousands" of civilians in Vietnam whom it officially claimed it was trying to protect. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put the total number of Vietnamese killed at 3.4 million. 38 (2) Lawlessness - If illegality consists of refusing to obey the law, the Executive is clearly the most lawless institution in the world. It routinely violates even timid legislative attempts to control its unilateral war-making. And no nation on earth has signed fewer international laws, and so failed to observe even those it has signed. These include measures like those intended to clean up the tens of millions of landmines and cluster bombs 39 with which it has littered the world, refused to clean up, and which continue to murder and maim tens of thousands of innocent people until today. (3) Authoritarianism - And if "authoritarianism" consists of a governing body acting unilaterally, regularly deceiving its own citizenry, neutering its legislature ,and prosecuting those who expose its lies, the U.S. Executive is clearly the most undemocratic institution in America. Indeed its deceiving its own people - keeping its activities secret and then lying about and covering them up when caught - throws its very legitimacy into question.

The Aff’s Discourse of Hegemonic Integration Rehashes The Geographies of Exclusion and Barbarism in Nicer Term - The Discourse of “Global Instability” Versus a Stable US Confirm the Hierarchy of Dominant US Identity.
David Campbell et. al. 7, Prof. of Geography @ Durham, ‘7 Political Geography 26, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy,” p. Wiley
The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both Kagan and Barnett, is similarly at the heart of the current administration's foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered:      Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in Lemann, 1 April 2002, emphasis added).  That the US is no longer prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own democratic values and practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers to change their policies and behaviours to fit the American modus operandi, is not without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor does the differently imagined geography of integration replace completely previous Manichean conceptions of the world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather, the proliferation of new terms of antipathy such as ‘axis of evil’, ‘rogue states’, and ‘terror cities’ demonstrate how integration goes hand in hand with – and is mutually constitutive of – new forms of division. Barnett's divide between the globalised world and the non-integrating gap is reflected and complemented by Kagan's divide in ways of dealing with this state of affairs. Much of this imagined geography pivots on the idea of ‘the homeland’. Indeed, in the imaginations of the security analysts we highlight here, there is a direct relationship and tension between securing the homeland's borders and challenging the sanctity of borders elsewhere (see Kaplan, 2003: 87).  Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US strategy. Since September 11th 2001 the US government and military have issued a number of documents outlining their security strategy. Each recites, reiterates and resignifies both earlier strategic statements as well each other, creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of the world. Initially there was The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002), and then the much broader scope National Security Strategy (The White House, 2002b; see Der Derian, 2003). These were followed by the “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” and particular plans for Military Strategy, Defense Strategy and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” (Department of Defense, 2005a, Department of Defense, 2005b, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004 and The White House, 2002a). These are seen as an interlocking whole, where “the National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS)” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” builds “upon the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy” (Department of Defense, 2005b: iii; see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy (The White House, 2006) presents a further re-elaboration and re-stating of these principles.  As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key elements of these strategies pre-date September 11. Significant in this continuity is the link between the Bush administration's strategic view and the 1992 “Defense Planning Guidance” (DPG). Written for the administration of George H. W. Bush by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, the DPG was the first neoconservative security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in which the US had to be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise of a hegemonic competitor (Tyler, 8 March 1992; see Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212).  Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and were rewritten with input from then Defense Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell (Tyler, 24 May 1992). Nonetheless, Cheney's version still declared that, “we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role” (Cheney, 1993: 2).  What we find in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of George W. Bush, reworked through the Clinton period by such organizations as PNAC (discussed above). The assemblage of individuals and organizations – both inside and outside the formal state structures – running from the DPG, through PNAC to the plethora of Bush administration security texts cited above (all of which draw upon well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War II era) demonstrates the performative infrastructure through which certain ontological effects are established, and through which certain performances are made possible and can be understood.  As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy. It is telling that Bush's claim of “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward binary, as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but with us, a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush's most enthusiastic supporters, “shoulder to shoulder” (Blair, 2001; see White and Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: “If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state” (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004) about the significance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush's notorious ‘axis of evil’ speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, but suggested that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of the like, alongside the “with the terrorists” is actually a more complicated approach to the choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited. Simple binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and the policy of integration.  These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal ‘representative’ democracy and market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an American-centric world. The place of US allies in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reflection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe's “Old” and “New” – a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPG – the dissent of (even some) Europeans is a problem for the US in its world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz and Minca, 2005). It is not surprising, then, that following his re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a “bridge-building” tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but “the great alliance of freedom” that unites the United States and Europe (Bush, 2005).  For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global scenario, its “right” – and the right of its moral-political “mission” of spreading “freedom and justice” – relies on its amplification and support by allies. The construction of the United States' world role relies also on the selective placement and representation of other international actors who are “hailed” into specific subject positions (see Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, 1999). Of course, different actors are granted different roles and different degrees of agency in the global script: the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the peripheral and semi-peripheral states that make part of the “coalition of the willing”. Both, however, are vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared world of values and ideals. Indeed, the ‘lone superpower’ has little influence in the absence of support.  Another important dimension of integration as the key strategic concept is its dissolution of the inside/outside spatialization of security policy. The concluding lines of the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” are particularly telling. It contends that the Department of Defense can “no longer think in terms of the ‘home’ game and the ‘away’ game. There is only one game” (Department of Defense, 2005b: 40). In part this is directed at the previous failure to anticipate an attack from within: indeed, the Strategy remarks that the September 11th 2001 attacks “originated in US airspace and highlighted weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air defense coordination” (2005b: 22). In other words, the US needs to ensure the security of its homeland from within as much as without, to treat home as away. In part, however, such rhetoric also reflects a continuity with and reiteration of broader understandings with a much longer history, promoted by a range of US “intellectuals of statecraft” since the end of the Cold War: understandings that specified increasingly hard territorialisations of security and identity both at home and abroad to counter the “geopolitical vertigo” (see Ó Tuathail, 1996) of the post-bipolar era.  It is important to note here, moreover, that the 2002 National Security Strategy's affirmation that “today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing” (The White House, 2002b: 30) also involves the US treating away as a home, or at least, as a concern. From this we can see how the pursuit of integration enables the territorial integrity of other sovereign states to be violated in its name, as specific places are targeted to either ensure or overcome their exclusion (see Elden, 2005). As an example, consider this statement, which recalls the late 1970s enunciation of an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Afghanistan: “There exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 5).  In his foreword to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush declared that “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent” (Bush, 2002b: i). This notion of extension is crucial in understanding the explicitly spatial overtones of this strategy of integration: more than merely about values, democracy and capitalism, it is about a performative geopolitics. Put crudely, it is about specifying the geographies of world politics; it is about specifying “the ways the world (now) is” – a presumably descriptive “geopolitical exercise” but that, as all such exercises, also implicitly contains the prescription for putting the world “right”. Imaginative geographies and popular geopolitics  As we have tried to argue, such elaborations of security rely upon the affirmation of certain understandings of the world within the context of which the strategies and understandings advanced by them are rendered believable. What is more, we have tried to highlight how such performances invoke earlier articulations, even as their reiteration changes them. More broadly, we stressed how such articulations provide the conditions of possibility for current – and future – action. Integration thus marks a new performative articulation in US security strategy, but it reworks rather than replaces earlier formulations. One of the ways in which this operates is that the ideal of integration, as we have seen, necessarily invokes the idea of exclusion. The imagined divide between the US ‘homeland’ and the threatening ‘frontier’ lands within the circle of Barnett's ‘Non-Integrating Gap’ thus recalls earlier iterations of ‘barbarism’ even if their identity and spatiality are produced by more than a simple self/other binary. In the final section of this essay, we will make some brief remarks regarding the disjuncture between the theory and the practice of the enactment of such imaginations. First, however, we would like to highlight some other ways in which these deployments of categories of inclusion and incorporation, on the one hand, and exclusion and targeting, on the other, are also performed in the popular geopolitical work done by a wide range of textual, visual, filmic and electronic media supportive of the ‘war on terror’ at home and abroad. These cultural practices resonate with the idea of fundamentally terrorist territories, whilst, at the same time rendering the ‘homeland’ zone of the continental US as a homogenous and virtuous ‘domestic’ community. Such wide-ranging and diffuse practices that are nonetheless imbricated with each other are further indications that we are dealing with performativity rather than construction in the production of imaginative geographies.

Norms

Ignoring the stories of drone victims and focusing only on the view from capital hill leads to even worse politics – Oversight of targeting killings causes a shift to signature strikes
Jens David Ohlin 13, Professor at Cornell Law School, http://www.liebercode.org/2013/02/would-federal-district-court-for-drones.html

One of the more interesting recent proposals for curing the "due process" deficit in the Administration's targeted killings program is for Congress to create a federal court to approve drone strikes.  Senator Dianne Feinstein, among others, is championing this strategy. I don't think it will work. Here's why. First, the court would be modeled after the super-secret FISA court for approving government requests for surveillance in terrorism cases. Such courts impose a form of judicial review, yes, but there is little transparency and no adversarial process. But there are bigger problems. As some of my colleagues have already explained, it is unlikely and improbable that such a court could authorize specific operational strikes. That would be difficult to implement in real time, and might even be unconstitutional for infringing on the Executive Branch's commander-in-chief power. Rather, such a court would approve the administration's decision to place an individual's name on an approved target list. A court would review the legitimacy of this decision with the power to remove the name if the individual does not meet the standard for being a functional member of al-Qaeda. Although this is more plausible, I still don't think it will work. In the end, I think it would just push the administration to avoid targeted killings and would have the opposite effect.It would increase, not decrease, collateral damage. Let me explain. Suppose the government has previously used the kill list to govern the selection procedure for targeted killings. The list serves as a clearinghouse for debates and ultimately conclusions about who is a high-value target. If the administration decides that the individual should be pursued, he is placed on the list. If the administration decides that the individual is of marginal or no value, he is removed from the list or never placed on it to begin with. Now imagine that a court is requiring that the list be approved by a judicial process. Why would the administration have any incentive at all to keep adding names to the list? Why not stop using it entirely? It could then rely exclusively on signature strikes-- an important legal development well documented by Kevin Heller in his forthcoming JICJ article on the subject. Such strikes would not be banned by the court because the US would not know exactly who it is bombing. (I'm assuming for the sake of argument that the US is still engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the AUMF or some other statutory authorization for the President's pursuit of the conflict would still be in place.) Essentially, this would be a case of willful blindness -- a concept well known to criminal law scholars. The real benefit of targeted killings is that the administration knows the exact threat and only targets one individual. That has changed warfare tremendously. But the court system would push the military back towards the old system: target groups of individuals who are known terrorists or enemy combatants -- but you don't know exactly who they are. You just know they are the enemy. That's the system that reigned in all previous conflicts. And there would be a disincentive to ever acquire more specific information. Why have a drone hover over an area with known terrorists in order to determine, through surveillance, the exact identity of the individual's there? That would only trigger the jurisdiction of the drone court. So ignorance would maintain the legality of the strike. I don't think that is what Congressional staffers have in mind.

Tournament: Shirley | Round: 4 | Opponent: Minnesota Crunkilton-Ehrlich | Judge: Hennigan
K
The affirmatives description of war is a disembodied one. This is bad – war is a visceral event that is always dependent on the body. Their faulty ontology means all their evidence is suspect, and their failure to accurately describe war causes ontological violence.
McSorley 13
Kevin McSorley is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Portsmouth. He convened the War and the Body conference at the Imperial War Museum in June 2010, and co-­ organized the accompanying War and the Body exhibition at Blackall Studios, London. His expertise includes contemporary social and cultural theory; technology and the body; the sociology of war and violence. He has recently edited a special issue of the Journal of War and Culture Studies on ‘War and Embodiment: Military and Cultural Practices’. He is currently conducting ethnographic research on the global arms trade and working on the monograph Violence, War and Society. McSorley, Kevin (Editor). War, Politics and Experience : War and the Body : Militarisation, Practice and Experience. Pg. 10 BSHIZZLE

This book places the body at the centre of critical thinking about war, giving embodiment and bodily issues an analytic recognition they have often been denied in the annals and ontology of conventional war scholarship. The reality of war is not just politics by any other means but politics incarnate, politics written on and experienced through the thinking, feeling bodies of men and women. From steeled combatants to abject victims, from the grieving relative to the exhausted aid worker, war occupies innumerable bodies in a multitude of ways, profoundly shaping lives and ways of being human. The opening description of war provides one vivid illustration of how war ‘makes sense’ at a fundamentally embodied and affective level. For the young Mozambican narrator, war is an anticipatory nervousness that constantly ‘lives inside’ her, a somatic knowing that underpins her every thought and move. As Nordstrom (1998: 108) argues, something ‘far more complex, multifaceted and enduring than the formal boundaries of war demarcated in military cultures takes root in the quotidian life of a country at war’. It is this ontology of war that the scholarship in this book seeks to elucidate and explore – the countless affective, sensory and embodied ways through which war lives and breeds. 1 Shaw (2005: 40– 1) argues that ‘the defect of most social theory of war and militarism is . . . that it has not considered war as practice, i.e. what people actually do in war’. This book aims to address that omission via an explicit focus upon the embodied practices, structures of feeling and lived experiences through which war and militarism take place. While this will include the examination of specific modes of embodying force and practices of ‘warfighting’, the analysis extends both temporally and spatially to consider the bodily preparations for, and the corporeal aftermaths of, war – both within militaries and beyond. Indeed, an analytic focus upon the body tends to render any clear demarcation of discrete war zones and times problematic, 2 emphasising instead the enactment and reproduction of war through affective dispositions, corporeal careers, embodied suffering and somatic memories that endure across time and space. 3 Furthermore, it is not just the bodies of combatants and victims that are produced by and central to war, but the bodies of veterans, witnesses, pacifists, patriots and many others. Given the global nature of contemporary economic, migratory and media flows, few in today’s interconnected world remain completely isolated from war’s touch (Sylvester 2011). While in post-­ conscription Western states with increasingly professionalised and privatised militaries, there may be less direct disciplinary engagement with civilian bodies – leading some commentators to have proposed the existence of ‘post-­ military society’ (Shaw 1991) and ‘post-­ heroic warfare’ (Luttwak 1995) – many such states have been marked by a profound re-­ militarisation at a wider political and cultural level in recent decades, a mobilisation that has often been intensely embodied and emotional. Ó Tuathail (2003: 859), for example, describes the political channelling of ‘the affective tsunami unleashed by the terrorist attacks of 2001’. He argues that 9/11 was processed by many Americans in a fundamentally visceral manner, becoming a ‘somatic marker’ – effectively a ‘gut instinct’ shaping perception and judgement below the threshold of rational, deliberative discussion – that would subsequently be appropriated to legitimate the military invasion of Iraq in 2003. Stahl (2010) relatedly understands the inculcation of contemporary consumers into the burgeoning interactive culture of ‘militainment’ in terms of affective and kinaesthetic entrainment, a seduction whose pleasures are ultimately felt at the expense of developing any other critical capacities to engage with matters of military might. It is through such mundane cultural practices that the legitimacy of having vast military force – what the anthropologist Catherine Lutz (2009) refers to as the ‘military normal’ – assumes an implicitness, becomes something not thought but routinely felt in everyday life. Such examples point to the need to think about the reproduction of war, and war readiness, in terms of a militarisation of sensation, affect and the body that operates over time and across multiple and broad constituencies. 4 The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on exploring the relative neglect of embodiment in many conventional discussions of war and the increasingly problematic and paradoxical status of the body in recent Western wars.

This disembodiment also creates epistemological and ontological violence – the body is the source and the shape for all knowledge and relation.
Creal 1999 (Lee Davis, “THE "DISABILITY OF THINKING"
THE "DISABLED" BODY”, Course Paper for Ambiguous Bodies: Studies in Contemporary Sexuality, York University, http://www.broadreachtraining.com/advocacy/artcreal.htm)
In "Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and the Flesh," Elizabeth Grosz cites the work of Merleau-Ponty in her discussion of corporeal phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty, she says, seeks to understand the relationship between consciousness and nature and between interiority and exteriority. He reorients the tradition of the question "how can there be a world for a subject?" by locating subjectivity not in mind or consciousness but in the body; he argues that the mind and body are not separate entities but interrelated and that the mind is based on corporeal and sensory relations. The body, according to Merleau-Ponty, is a phenomenon experienced by the one who lives in it and it (the body) is the location which places one in the world and makes possible relationships between oneself and other objects and subjects. We understand and know our body only by living in it. It is a subject and lived reality for oneself and an object for others but it is never simply object nor simply subject. Merleau-Ponty says the body is "sense-bestowing" and "form-giving," and is "my being-to-the-world and as such is the instrument by which all information and knowledge is received and meaning is generated" (Grosz: 87). This resonates with Lennard Davis who says the body is not only a physical object but is "a way of organizing through the realm of the senses the variations and modalities of physical existence as they are embodied into being through a larger social/political Matrix" (Davis: 14).

The alternative is to vote negative to recognize the paradox of war.
McSorley 13
Kevin McSorley is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Portsmouth. He convened the War and the Body conference at the Imperial War Museum in June 2010, and co-­ organized the accompanying War and the Body exhibition at Blackall Studios, London. His expertise includes contemporary social and cultural theory; technology and the body; the sociology of war and violence. He has recently edited a special issue of the Journal of War and Culture Studies on ‘War and Embodiment: Military and Cultural Practices’. He is currently conducting ethnographic research on the global arms trade and working on the monograph Violence, War and Society. McSorley, Kevin (Editor). War, Politics and Experience : War and the Body : Militarisation, Practice and Experience. Pg. 10 BSHIZZLE

For Elaine Scarry, the key paradox that constitutes the structure of war is that ‘while the central fact of war is injuring and the central goal of war is to out-­ injure the opponent, the fact of injuring tends to be absent from strategic and political descriptions of war’ (1985: 12). Although war is ‘the most radically embodying event in which human beings ever collectively participate’ (p. 71), the conventions of strategic, military and political discussions of war are nonetheless often marked by a profound disavowal and transference of this embodied nature and the bodily mutilation at its heart. For Scarry then, the continuing domination of warfare ‘requires both the reciprocal infliction of massive injury and the eventual disowning of the injury so that its attributes can be transferred elsewhere, as they cannot be permitted to cling to the original site of the wound, the human body’ (p. 64). The idioms and metaphors of strategic thought, such as describing armies as a single combatant or machine, mean that real human injury becomes no longer recognisable or interpretable in such discussions. As Scarry recognises, such abstraction may seem appropriate for a mode of strategic thinking whose key didactic goal is to propose universal, scientific laws of warfare which will inform how future wars can be waged to secure political advantage most effectively, a position traditionally associated with the founding figure of strategic thought, Carl von Clausewitz. 5 Nonetheless, this instrumental common sense of strategic discourse – war as a form of policy-­ making – rules other concerns and ways of knowing out of court. Carol Cohn’s (1987) ethnographic study of nuclear defence strategists vividly illustrates the ways in which one such hermetically sealed, techno-­ strategic discourse – of ‘limited nuclear war’ – radically excludes the asking of certain questions and the expression of certain values. Claims to legitimacy within this rational world came from technical expertise and ‘the disciplined purging of emotional valences that might threaten objectivity’ (p. 717). For Cohn, it was ‘not only impossible to talk about humans in this language, it also becomes in some sense illegitimate to ask the paradigm to reflect human concerns . . . no one will claim that the questions are unimportant, but they are inexpert, unprofessional, irrelevant to the business at hand’ (pp. 711– 12). 6 For Martin Shaw (2003), although war may be conceived as strategy it is always experienced as slaughter: ‘War is both the rational, purposive activity that strategic thought guides and the necessarily unpredictable, uncontrollable, irrationally destructive clash of opposing wills that combatants and victims experience – and humanist critics emphasize’ (p. 271). However, it is not just that abstract strategic thinking does not tell us much about this embodied experience of slaughter that is central to war, but Shaw argues that it is also complicit, that in the twentieth century ‘strategy has come to contribute to slaughter on a scale unimaginable even in the bloody era on which Carl von Clausewitz reflected’ (p. 269). Following Bauman’s (1990) analysis of the dehumanising tendencies of modern thought and state power – particularly the atrophy of the moral imagination in bureaucratic systems – Shaw argues that modernity deeply reinforced the tendencies of ‘rational’ strategy to produce ‘irrational’ outcomes. Barbarity has been the outcome, rather than the antithesis of, strategic thinking and planning in modern war. The fundamentally dual character of war was most salient in the tendency of the industrialised total wars of the twentieth century to become degenerate not only in their treatment of soldiers’ bodies as ‘cannon fodder’, as human materiel for the industrial war machine, but also in their increasing targeting and killing of civilians as well as enemy combatants (Shaw 2005). Total social mobilisation and total destruction were crucially linked in the industrialised mode of warfare, as the supply side and civilian morale became seen as legitimate targets, particularly for the strategic yet indiscriminate area bombing of airpower. Given the enormity of the death tolls even winning seemed scant redemption at times, the mechanised slaughter so barbarous as to challenge the very belief in the utility of war itself (Coker 2001; Kassimeris 2006). Such degeneracy continued in many of the wars of decolonisation during the post-­ Second World War decades. However, as these wars began to fail, and particularly when Western casualties began to seem disproportionate to their outcomes, public opinion in the West increasingly turned against them. Vietnam in particular marked a watershed in post-­ Second World War warfighting, the images of US soldiers in body bags and the burned, naked body of the young Vietnamese girl Pan Thj Kim Phuc fleeing a napalm bombing cementing a verdict of the war as illegitimate and inhumane. For Shaw (2005: 6), ‘the use of napalm . . . came to represent the inhumanity of airpower’. Napalm clung to the original site of the wound, the human body, burning beneath the skin, fatally undermining the war’s sense of morality and purpose.

Heg

The affirmative never come to grip with the precarity of life – there is no way they can solve for indefinite detention within the frame of traditional policy making
Judith Butler, 09- “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Pg. 10-11
The frame that seeks to contain, convey, and determine¶ what is seen (and sometimes, for a stretch, succeeds in doing¶ precisely that) depends upon the conditions of reproducibility¶ in order to succeed. And yet, this very reproducibility entails¶ a constant breaking from context, a constant delimitation¶ of new context, which means that the "frame" does not¶ quite contain what it conveys, but breaks apart every time¶ it seeks to give definitive organization to its content. In¶ other words, the frame does not hold anything together in¶ one place, but itself becomes a kind of perpetual breakage,¶ subject to a temporal logic by which it moves from place¶ to place. As the frame constantly breaks from its context,¶ this self-breaking becomes part of the very definition. This¶ leads us to a different way of understanding both the frame's¶ efficacy and its vulnerability to reversal, to subversion, even¶ to critical instrumentalization. What is taken for granted¶ in one instance becomes thematized critically or even¶ incredulously in another. This shifting temporal dimension of the frame constitutes the possibility and trajectory of¶ its affect as well. Thus the digital image circulates outside¶ the confines of Abu Ghraib, or the poetry in Guantanamo¶ is recovered by constitutional lawyers who arrange for its¶ publication throughout the world. The conditions are set for¶ astonishment, outrage, revulsion, admiration, and discovery,¶ depending on how the content is framed by shifting time¶ and place. The movement of the image or the text outside of¶ confinement is a kind of "breaking out," so that even though¶ neither the image nor the poetry can free anyone from prison,¶ or stop a bomb or, indeed, reverse the course of the war, they¶ nevertheless do provide the conditions for breaking out of¶ the quotidian acceptance of war and for a more generalized¶ horror and outrage that will support and impel calls for justice¶ and an end to violence. Earlier we noted that one sense of "to be framed" means¶ to be subject to a con, to a tactic by which evidence is¶ orchestrated so to make a false accusation appear true.¶ Some power manipulates the terms of appearance and¶ one cannot break out of the frame; one is framed, which¶ means one is accused, but also judged in advance, without¶ valid evidence and without any obvious means of redress.¶ But if the frame is understood as a certain "breaking¶ out," or "breaking from," then it would seem to be more¶ analogous to a prison break. This suggests a certain¶ release, a loosening of the mechanism of control, and¶ with it, a new trajectory of affect. The frame, in this sense,¶ permits-even requires-this breaking out. This happened¶ when the photos of Guantanamo prisoners kneeling and¶ shackled were released to the public and outrage ensued; it¶ happened again when the digital images from Abu Ghraib¶ were circulated globally across the internet, facilitating a¶ widespread visceral tum against the war. What happens at¶ such moments? And are they merely transient moments¶ or are they, in fact, occasions when the frame as a forcible¶ and plausible con is exposed, resulting in a critical and¶ exuberant release from the force of illegitimate authority? How do we relate this discussion of frames to the¶ problem of apprehending life in its precariousness? It¶ may seem at first that this is a call for the production of¶ new frames and, consequently, for new kinds of content.¶ Do we apprehend the precariousness of life through the¶ frames available to us, and is our task to try to install¶ new frames that would enhance the possibility of that¶ recognition? The production of new frames, as part of the¶ general project of alternative media, is clearly important,¶ but we would miss a critical dimension of this project if¶ we restricted ourselves to this view. What happens when¶ a frame breaks with itself is that a taken-for-granted¶ reality is called into question, exposing the orchestrating¶ designs of the authority who sought to control the¶ frame. This suggests that it is not only a question of¶ finding new content, but also of working with received¶ renditions of reality to show how they can and do break¶ with themselves. As a consequence, the frames that, in¶ effect, decide which lives will be recognizable as lives¶ and which will not, must circulate in order to establish¶ their hegemony. This circulation brings out or, rather,¶ is the iterable structure of the frame. As frames break¶ from themselves in order to install themselves, other¶ possibilities for apprehension emerge. When those frames¶ that govern the relative and differential recognizability of¶ lives come apart-as part of the very mechanism of their¶ circulation-it becomes possible to apprehend something¶ about what or who is living but has not been generally¶ "recognized" as a life. What is this specter that gnaws at¶ the norms of recognition, an intensified figure vacillating¶ as its inside and its outside? As inside, it must be expelled¶ to purify the norm; as outside, it threatens to undo the¶ boundaries that limn the self. In either case, it figures¶ the collapsibility of the norm; in other words, it is a sign¶ that the norm functions precisely by way of managing¶ the prospect of its undoing, an undoing that inheres in¶ its doings.

Russia is stable and the impact is empirically denied
Zavinovsky 12 (2-7-12- Konstantin Zavinovsky is editor of "Geopolitics" magazine and researcher at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences (ISAG) "Political And Economic Stability In Russia Will Attract Foreign Investment" Claims Institute; ROME, February 7, 2012 /PRNewswire/ -- http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/political-and-economic-stability-in-russia-will-attract-foreign-investment-claims-institute-138864439.html

Konstantin Zavinovsky of the Institute of Advanced Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences, has said that relative economic growth in Russia in recent years has improved the quality of life in Russia, and the prospect of foreign direct investment into the country. Zavinovsky said: "The Russian economy in the last decade has seen a steady growth. After the economic crisis in the late 90s, starting from 2000 GDP per capita in Russia increased steadily rising from about $ 7600 in 2000 to nearly $ 17000 in 2011. This means that the index more than doubled in 10 years. The growth was interrupted only for a year because of the 2008 financial crisis which produced a slight decline in GDP per capita in 2009. But already next year, in 2010, this index started to grow and almost reached pre-crisis level. According to the forecasts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the index will grow steadily over the next year to nearly $ 22000 in 2016. We should add that in the same period inflation in the country declined from 20.78 in 2000 to 8.8 in 2011 (6.1, according to the Russian Ministry of Finance - Minfin) and according to the forecast of the IMF inflation in Russia is to diminish in future and will reach 6.64 in 2014 (4.5, according to Minfin). "With the rise of income the quality of life of Russian citizens in recent years has improved considerably. And thus the image of Russians in the world has also changed. For example, in Italy 10 years ago the Russians were seen as a backward people, rather poor and far away from European civilization, now the Russians have become a symbol of wealth and economic well-being. Russian customers are very appreciated in Italy both by small traders on the narrow streets of Rome, Florence andVenice and by the great Italian fashion designers such as Salvatore Ferragamo, who believes Russians to be "customers number one in Europe". Precisely for this reason at the end of last year the Michele Norsa CEO announced that "over the next five years we expect to double sales volume in Russia, where the growth will be +20 annually over the past 24 months". Dirk Bikkemberg also stated that Russian clients are the target of extreme importance because thanks to them flagship store in Milan, considered by many as a loss, not only got in balance with the accounts but also opened 47 new stores in 2011. Italian newspapers say that due to purchases of Russian clients sales of the Italian outlets in contrast to the general crisis. The most important Italian financial newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore suggested making investments in the Russian ruble bacause Russia has a high economic growth and its national debt is very low. The tourism industry that made Italy famous also makes plans with a focus on the Russian customers. The examples are numerous and cover many sectors, while news of this kind are discussed widely in the Italian press. This shows that currently the Italian business world has confidence in the Russian market and is ready to invest in it. "So in only 10 years, Russia managed to change her image in Italy (in Europe and the world). Today it appears as a stable country, a country with an economic growth and with many investment opportunities. This change wasn't an easy one and required great efforts from the Russian government in 2000 when Russia was economically weak - in 2000 GDP was almost half of that of 1992. Today Russia's GDP is nearly 7 times bigger than that of 2000 and amounts to nearly 2 trillion dollars. According to IMF, this figure is expected to rise and in 2016 GDP will amount to 3 trillion. The increase of Russia's prestige in the eyes of the Europeans and the strong economic growth were possible thanks to political and economic stability of the country which was a merit of politicians who led Russia in recent years. The political destabilization of Russia would lead to distrust of the future of the Russian market and foreign capitals would flee from the country. So Russia should continue to move in the same direction of political stability if it wants to preserve and enhance the economic well-being and thus to remain an attractive country for foreign investment."

The Aff’s Discourse of Hegemonic Integration Rehashes The Geographies of Exclusion and Barbarism in Nicer Term - The Discourse of “Global Instability” Versus a Stable US Confirm the Hierarchy of Dominant US Identity.
David Campbell et. al. 7, Prof. of Geography @ Durham, ‘7 Political Geography 26, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy,” p. Wiley
The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both Kagan and Barnett, is similarly at the heart of the current administration's foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered:      Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in Lemann, 1 April 2002, emphasis added).  That the US is no longer prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own democratic values and practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers to change their policies and behaviours to fit the American modus operandi, is not without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor does the differently imagined geography of integration replace completely previous Manichean conceptions of the world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather, the proliferation of new terms of antipathy such as ‘axis of evil’, ‘rogue states’, and ‘terror cities’ demonstrate how integration goes hand in hand with – and is mutually constitutive of – new forms of division. Barnett's divide between the globalised world and the non-integrating gap is reflected and complemented by Kagan's divide in ways of dealing with this state of affairs. Much of this imagined geography pivots on the idea of ‘the homeland’. Indeed, in the imaginations of the security analysts we highlight here, there is a direct relationship and tension between securing the homeland's borders and challenging the sanctity of borders elsewhere (see Kaplan, 2003: 87).  Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US strategy. Since September 11th 2001 the US government and military have issued a number of documents outlining their security strategy. Each recites, reiterates and resignifies both earlier strategic statements as well each other, creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of the world. Initially there was The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002), and then the much broader scope National Security Strategy (The White House, 2002b; see Der Derian, 2003). These were followed by the “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” and particular plans for Military Strategy, Defense Strategy and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” (Department of Defense, 2005a, Department of Defense, 2005b, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004 and The White House, 2002a). These are seen as an interlocking whole, where “the National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS)” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” builds “upon the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy” (Department of Defense, 2005b: iii; see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy (The White House, 2006) presents a further re-elaboration and re-stating of these principles.  As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key elements of these strategies pre-date September 11. Significant in this continuity is the link between the Bush administration's strategic view and the 1992 “Defense Planning Guidance” (DPG). Written for the administration of George H. W. Bush by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, the DPG was the first neoconservative security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in which the US had to be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise of a hegemonic competitor (Tyler, 8 March 1992; see Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212).  Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and were rewritten with input from then Defense Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell (Tyler, 24 May 1992). Nonetheless, Cheney's version still declared that, “we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role” (Cheney, 1993: 2).  What we find in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of George W. Bush, reworked through the Clinton period by such organizations as PNAC (discussed above). The assemblage of individuals and organizations – both inside and outside the formal state structures – running from the DPG, through PNAC to the plethora of Bush administration security texts cited above (all of which draw upon well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War II era) demonstrates the performative infrastructure through which certain ontological effects are established, and through which certain performances are made possible and can be understood.  As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy. It is telling that Bush's claim of “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward binary, as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but with us, a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush's most enthusiastic supporters, “shoulder to shoulder” (Blair, 2001; see White and Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: “If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state” (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004) about the significance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush's notorious ‘axis of evil’ speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, but suggested that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of the like, alongside the “with the terrorists” is actually a more complicated approach to the choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited. Simple binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and the policy of integration.  These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal ‘representative’ democracy and market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an American-centric world. The place of US allies in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reflection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe's “Old” and “New” – a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPG – the dissent of (even some) Europeans is a problem for the US in its world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz and Minca, 2005). It is not surprising, then, that following his re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a “bridge-building” tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but “the great alliance of freedom” that unites the United States and Europe (Bush, 2005).  For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global scenario, its “right” – and the right of its moral-political “mission” of spreading “freedom and justice” – relies on its amplification and support by allies. The construction of the United States' world role relies also on the selective placement and representation of other international actors who are “hailed” into specific subject positions (see Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, 1999). Of course, different actors are granted different roles and different degrees of agency in the global script: the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the peripheral and semi-peripheral states that make part of the “coalition of the willing”. Both, however, are vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared world of values and ideals. Indeed, the ‘lone superpower’ has little influence in the absence of support.  Another important dimension of integration as the key strategic concept is its dissolution of the inside/outside spatialization of security policy. The concluding lines of the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” are particularly telling. It contends that the Department of Defense can “no longer think in terms of the ‘home’ game and the ‘away’ game. There is only one game” (Department of Defense, 2005b: 40). In part this is directed at the previous failure to anticipate an attack from within: indeed, the Strategy remarks that the September 11th 2001 attacks “originated in US airspace and highlighted weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air defense coordination” (2005b: 22). In other words, the US needs to ensure the security of its homeland from within as much as without, to treat home as away. In part, however, such rhetoric also reflects a continuity with and reiteration of broader understandings with a much longer history, promoted by a range of US “intellectuals of statecraft” since the end of the Cold War: understandings that specified increasingly hard territorialisations of security and identity both at home and abroad to counter the “geopolitical vertigo” (see Ó Tuathail, 1996) of the post-bipolar era.  It is important to note here, moreover, that the 2002 National Security Strategy's affirmation that “today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing” (The White House, 2002b: 30) also involves the US treating away as a home, or at least, as a concern. From this we can see how the pursuit of integration enables the territorial integrity of other sovereign states to be violated in its name, as specific places are targeted to either ensure or overcome their exclusion (see Elden, 2005). As an example, consider this statement, which recalls the late 1970s enunciation of an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Afghanistan: “There exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 5).  In his foreword to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush declared that “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent” (Bush, 2002b: i). This notion of extension is crucial in understanding the explicitly spatial overtones of this strategy of integration: more than merely about values, democracy and capitalism, it is about a performative geopolitics. Put crudely, it is about specifying the geographies of world politics; it is about specifying “the ways the world (now) is” – a presumably descriptive “geopolitical exercise” but that, as all such exercises, also implicitly contains the prescription for putting the world “right”. Imaginative geographies and popular geopolitics  As we have tried to argue, such elaborations of security rely upon the affirmation of certain understandings of the world within the context of which the strategies and understandings advanced by them are rendered believable. What is more, we have tried to highlight how such performances invoke earlier articulations, even as their reiteration changes them. More broadly, we stressed how such articulations provide the conditions of possibility for current – and future – action. Integration thus marks a new performative articulation in US security strategy, but it reworks rather than replaces earlier formulations. One of the ways in which this operates is that the ideal of integration, as we have seen, necessarily invokes the idea of exclusion. The imagined divide between the US ‘homeland’ and the threatening ‘frontier’ lands within the circle of Barnett's ‘Non-Integrating Gap’ thus recalls earlier iterations of ‘barbarism’ even if their identity and spatiality are produced by more than a simple self/other binary. In the final section of this essay, we will make some brief remarks regarding the disjuncture between the theory and the practice of the enactment of such imaginations. First, however, we would like to highlight some other ways in which these deployments of categories of inclusion and incorporation, on the one hand, and exclusion and targeting, on the other, are also performed in the popular geopolitical work done by a wide range of textual, visual, filmic and electronic media supportive of the ‘war on terror’ at home and abroad. These cultural practices resonate with the idea of fundamentally terrorist territories, whilst, at the same time rendering the ‘homeland’ zone of the continental US as a homogenous and virtuous ‘domestic’ community. Such wide-ranging and diffuse practices that are nonetheless imbricated with each other are further indications that we are dealing with performativity rather than construction in the production of imaginative geographies.

Appeals to human rights are inextricably tied to broader arrangements of American imperialism – they obscure the violence caused by colonial expansion.
Denike 10 Margaret, Human Rights Program, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University, Homonormative Collusions and the Subject of Rights: Reading Terrorist Assemblages Feminist Legal Studies Volume 18, Number 1 / April, 2010 85-100
For Wendy Brown, human rights discourses and activism are generally presented as an apolitical and other-oriented inquiry—“a pure defence of the innocent and powerless against…immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic conflict, tribalism, patriarchy and other mobilisations or instantiations of collective power” (2004, p. 453). Expressed as moral discourses that are centred on pain and suffering, they are often tethered to specific objectives—such as global capitalism and American imperialism, alibied as the pursuit of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’—and to a specific view of justice that marks bodies, that produces certain subjects and ways of being (Brown 2004, p. 453), including allies and enemies of the state. As a late modern project of the “regulatory multicultural liberal democracies”, the liberal ethos of tolerance that underlies human rights advocacy has been reframed since 9/11, through political rhetorics of “Islam, nationalism, fundamentalism, culture, and civilisation” to legitimate forms of imperialism (Brown 2006, p. 6). In this way, Brown notes, tolerance becomes part of a “civilisational discourse” wherein Western societies are identified as the arbiters and bearers of tolerance, and non-liberal societies and practices are marked as candidates for an intolerable barbarism that is itself signalled by the putative intolerance ruling these societies (2006, p. 6).

Bioweapons

The failure to examine the body in relation to bioweapons causes serial policy failure. The description of bioweapons in the 1AC is disconnected from reality – this masks ongoing structural medical violence.
Finnegan 11 Cara A., Associate Professor in the Departments of Speech Communication and Art History at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign  Quarterly Journal of Speech  Volume 97, Issue 2, 2011  Review Essay: Addressing the Epidemic of Epidemics: Germs, Security, and a Call for Biocriticism  View full text Download full text Full access DOI:10.1080/00335630.2011.565785 Cara A. Finnegan pages 224-244  Available online: 29 Apr 2011
Second, the proliferation of risk discourses surrounding contagion demands ongoing rhetorical analysis. Price-Smith, Wald, and Klotz and Sylvester suggest in varying degrees that inaccurate risk perception fuels germ panic that can disrupt economic and social relations. By contrast, the essays in Biosecurity Interventions and Dread stress the mismatch between planning for imagined risks and the empirical data detailing actual infections and known killers. For instance, since 9/11 the US government has spent more than $50 billion on civilian biodefense, representing $2 billion for each known victim of bioterrorism.32 By contrast, tens of thousands of our citizens die each year from medical mistakes and other preventable conditions.33 Given that germ discourses chiefly are configured in terms of risk with tangible personal, political, and economic outcomes, rhetoricians should be playing a greater role in demonstrating the underlying logics, deployments, and outcomes of the discourses of risk—and in disentangling their economic, political, and cultural stakes. By tracking risk constructions surrounding both real and envisioned epidemics, rhetoricians can show how the “communicability” of risks influences policy and practice. The anticipatory and imagined aspects of biosecurity planning, with their ubiquitous role plays and risk modeling, simulations and speculations, deserve special scrutiny because these modes of rhetorical invention drive future political and scientific action.34 Here, rhetoricians and communication scholars can build on the theoretical work on risk by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Joost Van Loon, and Barbara Adam, and add to the rhetorical scholarship of Jeffrey Grabill and Michele Simmons, Robert Danisch, J. Blake Scott, and Beverly Sauers, by tracing the constitution, contestation, elaboration, and consequences of our rhetorics of pathogenic risk.35

Solvency

Judicial review fail – courts generally defer to the president in foreign affairs, which means the president essentially has no check on his power
Bradley and Morrison 2013 – *William Van Alstyne Professor of Law, Duke Law School, Liviu Librescu Professor of Law, Columbia Law School (May, Curtis and Trevor, Columbia Law Review, “PRESIDENTIAL POWER, HISTORICAL PRACTICE, AND LEGAL CONSTRAINT”, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097, Lexis)
If courts routinely reviewed contested issues of presidential power, they could decide whether and when to credit historical practice in this area. They could also decide whether novel presidential assertions of authority were justified, before such assertions became established practice. But judicial review in this area is anything but routine. Courts obviously do review issues of presidential power in some instances, especially when individual rights are perceived to be at stake, as both Youngstown and the series of Supreme Court decisions concerning the "war on terror" illustrate. n49 When individual rights are not directly implicated, *1110 however, courts often abstain from addressing questions surrounding the allocation of authority between Congress and the President. Judicial abstention is particularly common in the foreign affairs area. Consider, for example, the question of whether the President is constitutionally required to obtain congressional authorization before initiating military hostilities. Despite numerous presidential initiations of hostilities without congressional authorization in the post-World War II period, courts have generally refused to consider the issue. n50 Courts have similarly avoided addressing whether Presidents must obtain congressional or senatorial approval before terminating a treaty, n51 and whether and to what extent Presidents may use executive agreements in lieu of treaties. n52 Courts invoke a variety of doctrines in support of this abstention. They enforce general standing requirements strictly, and, at least since the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd, n53 they typically find that individual members of Congress lack standing to challenge presidential action. n54 Some lower courts also invoke ideas of "political ripeness," pursuant to which they will not intervene in interbranch disputes until the affected branch has exhausted its own political resources to address the purported problem, a requirement that is rarely if ever satisfied. n55 Another potential barrier to judicial review is the political question *1111 doctrine, which the lower courts apply with some frequency in the foreign affairs area. n56 Academic defenders of this judicial abstention have argued either that the political branches have adequate resources to protect their interests, n57 or that the courts lack sufficient competence to resolve separation of powers issues, especially in the foreign affairs and national security areas. n58 Other scholars have bemoaned this abstention as an abdication of the judicial role and have blamed it for contributing to what they perceive to be an undesirable growth in executive power in the modern era. n59 The bottom line is that many issues of presidential power are resolved, if at all, outside the courts. Moreover, even when the courts do intervene, they are likely to give significant deference to patterns of governmental practice, especially if the patterns are longstanding and appear to reflect interbranch agreement. n60 *1112 C. Skepticism About Legal Constraint The general posture of judicial abstention in this area raises questions about whether presidential power is truly subject to legal constraints. It is often easier - or at least more familiar - to talk meaningfully about law if there is a reasonable prospect that the actions in question will face judicial review. Because the courts are unlikely to intervene in many con-troversies relating to presidential power - and because any such intervention is likely to be deferential to the actions of the political branches - some scholars are inclined to say that Presidents face (or will soon face) virtually no constraints at all. Part of the concern here is that Congress by itself often seems either unable or unwilling to provide adequate checks on executive power. Compounding the problem, in the view of some scholars, is that institutional arrangements within the executive branch are not able to constrain presidential decisionmaking. Bruce Ackerman, for example, claims to identify a range of developments in "politics and communications, bureaucratic and military organization," as well as "executive constitutionalism," that threaten to turn the presidency into "a vehicle for demagogic populism and lawlessness." n61

Tournament: Shirley | Round: 5 | Opponent: Kansas Bevens-Miller | Judge: Marty
K

Even if you reduce the overt racism present in the current nuclear regime, you have done nothing to resolve the foundations of civil society and the destruction and enslavement of the black body - whiteness has found itself another handy deferment tactic, this one the empty acknowledgement of privilege without an equal reaction to that privilege. Your acknowledgement is empty words until it changes the way you act in the world. Your humanism is birthed from the murder of the slave.
Wilderson ’10 Frank, Associate Professor at UC Irvine’s Department of Drama and African American Studies, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pp. 21-23

Again, what is important for us to glean from these historians is that the preColumbian period, the Late Middle Ages, reveals no archive of debate on these three questions as they might be related to that massive group of Black-skinned people south of the Sahara. Eltis suggests that there was indeed massive debate which ultimately led to Britain taking the lead in the abolition of slavery, but he reminds us that that debate did not have its roots in the late Middle Ages, the post-Columbian period of the 1500s or the Virginia Colony period of the 1600s. It was, he asserts, an outgrowth of the mid- to late-18th century emancipatory thrust—intra-Human disputes such as the French and American Revolutions—that swept through Europe. But Eltis does not take his analysis further than this. Therefore, it is important that we not be swayed by his optimism of the Enlightenment and its subsequent abolitionist discourses. It is highly conceivable that the discourse that elaborates the justification for freeing the slave is not the product of the Human being’s having suddenly and miraculously recognized the slave. Rather, as Saidiya Hartman argues, emancipatory discourses present themselves to us as further evidence of the Slave’s fungibility: “The figurative capacities of blackness enable white flights of fancy while increasing the likelihood of the captive’s disappearance…” (Scenes…22). First, the questions of Humanism were elaborated in contradistinction to the human void, to the African-quachattel (the 1200s to the end of the 17th century). Then, as the presence of Black chattel in the midst of exploited and un-exploited Humans (workers and bosses, respectively) became a fact of the world, exploited Humans (in the throes of class conflict with un-exploited Humans) seized the image of the slave as an enabling vehicle that animated the evolving discourses of their emancipation, just as un-exploited Humans had seized the flesh of the Slave to increase their profits. Without this gratuitous violence, a violence that marks everyone experientially until the late Middle Ages when it starts to mark the Black ontologically, the so-called great emancipatory discourses of modernity—marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, sexual liberation, and the ecology movement—political discourses predicated on grammars of suffering and whose constituent elements are exploitation and alienation, might not have developed.vi Chattel slavery did not simply reterritorialize the ontology of the African. It also created the Human out of culturally disparate entities from Europe to the East. I am not suggesting that across the globe Humanism developed in the same way regardless of region or culture; what I am saying is that the late Middle Ages gave rise to an ontological category—an ensemble of common existential concerns—which made and continues to make possible both war and peace, conflict and resolution, between the disparate members of the human race, east and west. Senator Thomas Hart Benton intuited this notion of the existential commons when he wrote that though the “Yellow race” and its culture had been “torpid and stationary for thousands of years… Whites and Asians must talk together, and trade together, and marry together. Commerce is a great civilizer—social intercourse as great—and marriage greater” (The Congressional Globe. May 28, 1846). David Eltis points out that as late as the 17th century, “prisoners taken in the course of European military action…could expect death if they were leaders, or banishment if they were deemed followers, but never enslavement…Detention followed by prisoner exchanges or ransoming was common” (1413). “By the seventeenth century, enslavement of fellow Europeans was beyond the limits” (1423) of Humanism’s existential commons, even in times of war. Slave status “was reserved for non-Christians. Even the latter group however…had some prospect of release in exchange for Christians held by rulers of Algiers, Tunis, and other Mediterranean Muslim powers” (emphasis mine 1413). But though the practice of enslaving the vanquished was beyond the limit of intra-West wars and only practiced provisionally in East-West conflicts, the baseness of the option was not debated when it came to the African. The race of Humanism (White, Asian, South Asian, and Arab) could not have produced itself without the simultaneous production of that walking destruction which became known as the Black. Put another way, through chattel slavery the world gave birth and coherence to both its joys of domesticity and to its struggles of political discontent; and with these joys and struggles, the Human was born, but not before it murdered the Black, forging a symbiosis between the political ontology of Humanity and the social death of Blacks. In his essay “To ‘Corroborate Our Claims’: Public Positioning and the Slavery Metaphor in Revolutionary America,” Peter Dorsey (in his concurrence with cultural historians F. Nwabueze Okoye and Patricia Bradley) suggests that, in mid- to late-18th century America, Blackness was such a fungible commodity that it was traded as freely between the exploited (workers who did not “own” slaves) as it was between the unexploited (planters who did). This was due to the effective uses to which Whites could put the Slave as both flesh and metaphor. For the Revolutionaries, “slavery represented a ‘nightmare’ that white Americans were trying to avoid” (359). Dorsey’s claim is provocative, but not unsupported: he maintains that had Blacks-as-Slaves not been in the White field of vision on a daily basis that it would have been virtually impossible for Whites to transform themselves from colonial subjects into Revolutionaries: Especially prominent in the rhetoric and reality of the Revolutionary era, the concepts of freedom and slavery were applied to a wide variety of events and values and were constantly being defined and redefined…Early understandings of American freedom were in many ways dependent on the existence of chattel slavery…We should see slavery in revolutionary discourse, not merely as a hyperbolic rhetorical device but as a crucial and fluid fungible concept that had a major impact on the way early Americans thought about their political future…The slavery metaphor destabilized previously accepted categories of thought about politics, race, and the early republic. (355) Though the idea of “taxation without representation” may have spoken concretely to the idiom of power that marked the British/American relation as being structurally unethical, it did not provide metaphors powerful and fungible enough for Whites to meditate and move on when resisting the structure of their own subordination at the hands of “unchecked political power” (354). The most salient feature of Dorsey’s findings is not his understanding of the way Blackness, as a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society, impacts and destabilizes previously accepted categories of intra-White thought, but rather his contribution to the evidence that, even when Blackness is deployed to stretch the elasticity of civil society to the point of civil war, that expansion is never elastic enough to embrace the very Black who catalyzed the expansion. In fact, Dorsey, building on Patricia Bradley’s historical research, asserts that just the opposite is true. The more the political imagination of civil society is enabled by the fungibility of the slave metaphor, the less legible the condition of the slave becomes: “Focusing primarily on colonial newspapers…Bradley finds that the slavery metaphor ‘served to distance the patriot agenda from the antislavery movement.’ If anything, Bradley states, widespread use of the metaphor ‘gave first evidence that the issue of real slavery was not to have a part in the revolutionary messages’” (359). And David Eltis believes that this philosophical incongruity between the image of the Slave and freedom for the Slave begins in Europe and pre-dates the American Revolution by at least one hundred years: The European countries least likely to enslave their own had the harshest and most sophisticated system of exploiting enslaved non-Europeans. Overall, the English and Dutch conception of the role of the individual in metropolitan society ensured the accelerated development of African chattel slavery in the Americas…because their own subjects could not become chattel slaves or even convicts for life…There may be something to be said for expanding a variation of Edmund Morgan’s argument to cover the whole of the British Atlantic, in the sense that the celebration of British liberties—more specifically, liberties of Englishmen—depended on African slavery. (Emphasis mine 1423) The circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g. the French, English, and American Revolutions), produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore. Black Slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’s ontics because “freedom” is the hub of Humanism’s infinite conceptual trajectories. But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from… some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized. The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (for example, taxation without representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on. What I am suggesting is that first, political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations. Why would anyone do this? Why would anyone start off with, quite literally, an earth-shattering ontologic and, in the process of meditating on it and acting through it, reduce it to an earth reforming experience? Why do Humans take such pride in self-adjustment, in diminishing, rather than intensifying, the project of liberation (how did we get from ’68 to the present)? Because, I contend, in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one’s Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die. For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question. There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression. The kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom. Rather, the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic— though no less true—and ultimately untenable: i.e., freedom from the world, freedom from humanity, freedom from everyone (including one’s Black self). Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism’s hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave.

This debate begs the question of what it means to be political. Traditional definitions are based in Whiteness; they are attempts to preserve civil society built on the back of the slave, with borders defined by the ontological death of the black population. We play a stick up artist to the world, demanding all that it cannot give. The destruction of the world as we know it is the only road to freedom.
Wilderson 2010 (Frank Wilderson - Associate professor of African American Studies, Percy Howard – Psychotherapist asking questions of FW, “Frank Wilderson, Wallowing in the Contradictions, Part 1” http://percy3.wordpress.com/2010/07/09/frank-b-wilderson-E2809Cwallowing-in-the-contradictionsE2809D-part-1/)
FW Reparations suggests a conceptually coherent loss. The loss of land, the loss of labor power, etc. In other words, there has to be some form of articulation between the party that has lost and the party that has gained for reparations to make sense. No such articulation exists between Blacks and the world. This is, ironically, precisely why I support the Reparations Movement; but my emphasis, my energies, my points of attention are on the word “Movement” and not on the word “Reparation.” I support the movement because I know it is a movement toward the end of the world; a movement toward a catastrophe in epistemological coherence and institutional integrity—I support the movement aspect of it because I know that repair is impossible; and any struggle that can act as a stick up artist to the world, demanding all that it cannot give( which is everything ), is a movement toward something so blindingly new that it cannot be imagined. This is the only thing that will save us. PH As a Psychotherapist, I was very interested to see your contrasting Frantz Fanon and Lacan concerning their conceptualizations of potential paths to “emancipation in the libidinal economy”, as you put it. I am ashamed to admit that I have never read Fanon, but have read Lacan. Please illuminate  your idea that the stark difference in their conceptualizations of conflict/antagonism differ are based on the fact that Lacan would  still see Blacks as fundamentally situated in personhood, but that Fannon (and yourself) see Blacks as “situated a priori in absolute dereliction”. FW This is a big question, too big for a concise answer—I think I take about thirty to forty pages to try and get my head around this in the book. But the key to the answer lies in the concept of “contemporaries.” Fanon rather painfully and meticulously shows us how the human race is a community of “contemporaries.” In addition, this community vouchsafes its coherence (it knows its borders) through the presence of Blacks. If Blacks became part of the human community then the concept of “contemporaries” would have no outside; and if it had no outside it could have no inside. Lacan assumes the category and thus he imagines the analysand’s problem in terms of how to live without neurosis among ones contemporaries. Fanon interrogates the category itself. For Lacan the analysands suffer psychically due to problems  extant within the paradigm of contemporaries. For Fanon, the analysand   suffers due to the existence of the contemporaries themselves and the fact that s/he is a stimulus for anxiety for those who have contemporaries. Now, a contemporary’s struggles are conflictual—that is to say, they can be resolved because they are problems that are of- and in the world. But a Blacks problems are the stuff of antagonisms: struggles that cannot be resolved between parties but can only be resolved through the obliteration of one or both of the parties. We are faced—when dealing with the Black—with a set of psychic problems that cannot be resolved through any form of symbolic intervention such as psychoanalysis—though addressing them psychoanalytically we can begin to explain the antagonism (as I have done in my book, and as Fanon does), but it won’t lead us to a cure. 

Thus the Alternative: Give Turtle Island Back to the “Savage.” Give life itself back to the Slave.
Wilderson ’10 Frank, Associate Professor at UC Irvine’s Department of Drama and African American Studies, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pp. 2-4

What are we to make of a world that responds to the most lucid enunciation of ethics with violence? What are the foundational questions of the ethico-political? Why are these questions so scandalous that they are rarely posed politically, intellectually, and cinematically— unless they are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident? Give Turtle Island back to the “Savage.” Give life itself back to the Slave. Two simple sentences, fourteen simple words, and the structure of U.S. (and perhaps global) antagonisms would be dismantled. An “ethical modernity” would no longer sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been promoted to the level of antagonisms, such as class struggle, gender conflict, and immigrants’ rights. One cannot but wonder why questions that go to the heart of the ethico-political, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides, and even socially and politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clear—if the filmographies of socially and politically engaged directors, the archive of progressive scholars, and the plethora of left-wing broadsides are anything to go by—is that what can so easily be spoken is now (500 years and 250 million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that these two simple sentences, these fourteen words not only render their speaker “crazy” but become themselves impossible to imagine. Soon it will be forty years since radical politics, left-leaning scholarship, and socially engaged feature films began to speak the unspeakable. In the 1960s and early 1970s the questions asked by radical politics and scholarship were not Should the United States be overthrown? or even Would it be overthrown? but when and how—and, for some, what would come in its wake. Those steadfast in their conviction that there remained a discernable quantum of ethics in the United States writ large (and here I am speaking of everyone from Martin Luther King Jr. prior to his 1968 shift, to the Tom Hayden wing of Students for Democratic Society, to the Julian Bond and Marion Barry faction of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, to Bobby Kennedy Democrats) were accountable, in their rhetorical machinations, to the paradigmatic zeitgeist of the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the Weather Underground. Radicals and progressives could deride, reject, or chastise armed struggle mercilessly and cavalierly with respect to tactics and the possibility of “success,” but they could not dismiss revolution-as-ethic because they could not make a convincing case—by way of a paradigmatic analysis—that the United States was an ethical formation and still hope to maintain credibility as radicals and progressives. Even Bobby Kennedy (as a U.S. attorney general) mused that the law and its enforcers had no ethical standing in the presence of Blacks. One could (and many did) acknowledge America’s strength and power. This seldom rose to the level of an ethical assessment, however, remaining instead an assessment of the “balance of forces.” The political discourse of Blacks, and to a lesser extent Indians, circulated too widely to wed the United States and ethics credibly. The raw force of COINTEL put an end to this trajectory toward a possible hegemony of ethical accountability. Consequently, the power of Blackness and Redness to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all—retreated as did White radicals and progressives who “retired” from the struggle. The question lies buried in the graves of young Black Panthers, AIM warriors, and Black Liberation Army soldiers, or in prison cells where so many of them have been rotting (some in solitary confinement) for ten, twenty, or thirty years, and at the gates of the academy where the “crazies” shout at passersby. Gone are not only the young and vibrant voices that effected a seismic shift on the political landscape, but also the intellectual protocols of inquiry, and with them a spate of feature films that became authorized, if not by an unabashed revolutionary polemic, then certainly by a revolutionary zeitgeist.
Case

The 1AC epitomizes anti-nuclear imperialism. Reducing our nuclear weapons only serves to bolster U.S. imperialism and has the perverse effect of creating support for military intervention against would-be proliferators--

BondGraham 2009 Darwin, Ph.D. Candidate at UC Santa Barbara, "Anti-Nuclear Imperialism: The New Face of Nuclear Armed Empire is Quickly Taking Shape," http://darwinbondgraham. blogspot.com/
2009/09/anti-nuclear- imperialism-new-face-of.html

Many of the foreign policy elite, especially those who feel most adamantly that the Bush years were wasted and that they actually imperiled the imperial project, see many of these recent developments in the US as an immense possibility to turn the corner and implement a smart, far-reaching US nuclear strategy, one complimentary to the extension of US hegemony. While they're still being digested by politicians, military leaders, and weaponeers, it does appear that an emerging new majority is coalescing around what can only be described as a policy of anti-nuclear imperialism. Anti-nuclear imperialism is a possible solution to the core contradiction of empire in the nuclear age: the need to maintain and threaten use of nuclear weapons (ultimate power), but the simultaneous and opposite need to prevent rivals from attaining parity, and lesser states from acquiring this form of power themselves, and finally to prevent the possibility of nuclear attack by a non-state agent, a terrifying asymmetrical threat. Anti-nuclear imperialism begins with the use of strong, moralizing disarmament rhetoric by leaders of the imperial power. Based on this, the imperial state then must take steps to create at least the perception among as many states as possible that it is restraining its own nuclear arsenal and working with the other great powers to dismantle weapons systems, all ostensibly moving toward disarmament. This in turn is meant to facilitate and legitimate any and all means to prevent most other states from acquiring nuclear weapons or even the capability to produce nuclear weapons. By de-emphasizing nuclear arms, these strategists hope to actually boost the overall military superiority of the US, far above and beyond its current powers, which ironically have become constrained in some ways by its continuing possession of these weapons in the post-Cold War era. The end goal is to maintain a balance of power under US hegemony and to tighten the ring of control around nuclear technologies and fissile materials. 

Arms reductions such as the plan mask the contradiction in US nuclear weapons policy which then makes preemptive violence acceptable - error replication becomes inevitable
Darwin BondGraham, 2009. “The “Nuclear Threat,” and Other Mystical Approaches of Arms Control”
http://www.uweb.ucsb.edu/~darwin/NuclearThreatandOtherMystFINAL10k.pdf Accessed November 8, 2009

The conceptual splitting of horizontal and vertical proliferation, as though they are distinct happenings in the world system, is synonymous with a contradiction that severely affects the geopolitical goals of the United States, and to a lesser extent the other major nuclear powers. The contradiction is simple: the United States, because of its imperial goals, cannot accept the possibility of certain states acquiring nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran would undermine the power projection capabilities of the US and its allies in the Persian Gulf, the single most important reservoir of hydrocarbon energy.xlvi It would be a serious blow to the US imperial project in that region. This single reason may very well be necessary and sufficient to explain the US nuclear posture.xlvii The same can be said with the prospect of a nuclearized North Korea and the impediments this would create for further consolidation of Asia within US and Japanese spheres of control. To prevent the emergence of these and other nascent deterrent conditions against superpower's extension, the US has threatened (and in some cases used) preemptive war, economic sanctions, covert action, diplomacy, “democracy promotion,” and more.xlviii So far these have proven insufficient. One of the key stumbling blocks for the US is that it cannot square this nonproliferation goal with its continuing reliance on its own nuclear arsenal which it needs to project imperial power (the nuclear threat statement). Thus, the US must, to some extent, actually carry out limited arms reductions initiatives and constrain its immense nuclear weapons complex from pursuing obviously provocative programs. It must deemphasize its own nuclear powers, while at the same time maintaining its nuclear weapons arsenal, perhaps even enhancing some of its capabilities, all the while disarming other nations of nuclear weapons in the name of nonproliferation and against the singular nuclear threat. The United States is now almost two decades into this crisis and it is not clear if a solution can be smoothly formulated. The pitfalls are many. Most arms control scholars are hard at work assisting in the ideological formulation of a nonproliferation regime that will neutralize this contradiction and find a way forward for the US neo-imperial project. As the Arms Control Association's executive director puts it; "In the age of terrorism, nuclear weapons are more of a liability than an asset.”xlix Figuring out the balance where nuclear weapons remain a net asset, while preventing horizontal proliferation is the goal. 

The nuclear proposals of the foreign policy elite are like those of the Aff—a process utopia where we see disarm as a utopian goal or “top of the mountain” combined with so-called “pragmatic” steps towards that goal
BondGraham 2009
(Darwin, Ph.D. Candidate at UC Santa Barbara, "Anti-Nuclear Imperialism: The New Face of Nuclear Armed Empire is Quickly Taking Shape," http://darwinbondgraham. blogspot.com/2009/09/anti-nuclear- imperialism-new-face-of.html)

Sam Nunn has laid these plans out clearly in various speeches, and through the George W. Bush years his NTI organization incubated the ideology and practice of anti-nuclear imperialism. The election of Obama portends the adoption of anti-nuclear imperialism as the official state policy. Nuclear disarmament, which Nunn identifies as a “distant mountaintop,” is the rhetorical goal that must be committed toby US leaders if intrusive and ultimately belligerent actions are to be justified under the pre-text of thwarting “nuclear threats” to “civilization.” The concrete and immediate steps that receive the bulk of attention and resources under this strategy will involve aggressive actions to prevent any game changing developments such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran which could challenge US and European control over the indispensable hydrocarbon reserves of the Persian Gulf region, to say nothing of the ongoing status quo in Palestine where a nuclear armed Israel, backed by the US, and with the complicity of most Arab monarchies, ignores the majority of world opinion with indifference.¶William Perry, in his Chairman's Preface to the freshly printed Congressional Commission on America's Strategic Posture writes that;¶“...the ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a fundamental change in geopolitics. Indeed, if the vision of nuclear elimination isthough of as the “top of the mountain,” it is clear that it cannot be seen at this time. But I believe that we should be heading up the mountain to a “base camp” that would be safer than where we are today. I also believe that getting the international political support necessary to move to this base cap will be greatly facilitated if the United States is seen as working for the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons .... The base camp concept serves as an organizing principle for my own thinking about our strategic posture, since it allows theUnited States to both lead and hedge.”¶If history is any guide, the “base camp” is the actual goal to be achieved by pursuing an anti-nuclear imperialist strategy, while the “distant mountaintop” might forever remain a perpetually receding dream. Steeling themselves for the hike to this base camp, Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn gathered with President Obama at the White House on May 19 where Obama aptly vouched their trusted responsibility saying “I don't think anybody would accuse these four gentlemen of being dreamers.” Obama praised them as “hard-headed, tough defenders of American interests and American security.” and credited them with helping to “inspire the policies” of his administration with respect to nuclear weapons. The men adjourned following an affirmation of elite unity from Schultz on the White House lawn. Schultz told the press, “we think the effort is of such and nature and such an importance that it kind of rises above what ought to be partisan in nature. There's plenty to argue about and plenty to study and work on, but let's do it on the merits of the subject, on a non-partisan basis.” After two decades of stumbling against a seemingly insurmountable contradiction in American empire, Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, Nunn, Obama, and many more seem to believe that they are forging a new majority around a new nuclear strategy. That they have been able to neutralize and even enjoin the support of many antinuclear organizations in this clever imperial strategy is all more reason they might succeed.

Solvency

Constraints make Presidents more assertive
Barilleaux and Kelley 2010 Ryan J. , Professor of Political Science at Miami, OH; and Christopher S. , Lecturer (Political Science) at Miami, OH, The Unitary Executive and the Modern Presidency, Texas AandM Press, p. 225-226, 2010 wyo-sc
Congress, following the logic of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's "Iron Law of Emulation" (which holds that what one branch of government does will be emulated by another), responded to the enlargement of the presidency and its powers by undertaking a number of actions in the 1970s to enable itself to be a more active and assertive player in the making of national policy.11 It gave itself a large professional staff, reformed its budget process, developed tools for more oversight of the executive, passed legislation to gain more information about the conduct of foreign policy and influence over it (the Case-Zablocki Act, the War Powers Resolution, and other laws), and at times acted aggressively to challenge presidential policy (in the mid-1970s and again in the late 1990s and after the 2006 midterm elections). In less than forty years, Congress has moved toward impeaching one president (Nixon, whom it ultimately drove from office), legislated an end to the Vietnam War, prohibited American intervention in the civil war in Angola (1975), impeached another president (Clinton), shut down the government in a duel with the White House over the federal budget (1995), investigated the Iran-Contra affair and other incidents, passed a bill to require a timetable for withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq (2007), tried several times to bring the president to heel on the use of force, and balked when the Bush administration tried to have its first financial industry bailout plan passed summarily in 2008. These and other incidents have made the legislature a full player in the separated system of American government, but they have also stimulated presidents to seek greater autonomy from legislative constraints. The unilateral presidency is the result of this stimulation. Barack Obama follows in this line of presidents seeking to accomplish something in office and feeling the urgency of their task. In his victory speech on election night in 2008, he told the assembled crowd that "this is our time—to put our people back to work and open doors of opportunity for our kids; to restore prosperity and promote the cause of peace; to reclaim the American Dream and reaffirm that fundamental truth—that out of many, we are one; that while we breathe, we hope, and where we are met with cynicism, and doubt, and those who tell us that we can't, we will respond with that timeless creed that sums up the spirit of a people: Yes We Can."12 There is no reason to think that he or any subsequent president will be passive in the conduct of office. Congressional responses to executive unilateralism will be too late and too strong and will in turn stimulate a new round of executive assertiveness. In the 1960s and 1970s Congress bridled at the growth of presidential power but acquiesced to it until legislators finally decided that they had seen enough. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Congress reacted with a spate of president-curbing legislation (the War Powers Resolution, the CaseZablocki Act, the Budget and Impoundment Act), the near-impeachment of Richard Nixon, a legislated end to the Vietnam War, an investigation of the CIA, and other actions to restrict presidential autonomy. The consequence, to some extent described in this volume, was the rise of executive unilateralism as a way to circumvent Congress. 

Their restriction is a smokescreen and will not be enforced
Nzelibe 7—Professor of Law @ Northwestern University Jide Nzelibe, “Are Congressionally Authorized Wars Perverse?” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 59, 2007

These assumptions are all questionable. As a preliminary matter, there is not much causal evidence that supports the institutional constraints logic. As various commentators have noted, Congress's bark with respect to war powers is often much greater than its bite. Significantly, skeptics like Barbara Hinckley suggest that any notion of an activist Congress in war powers is a myth and members of Congress will often use the smokescreen of "symbolic resolutions, increase in roll calls and lengthy hearings, and addition of reporting requirements" to create the illusion of congressional participation in foreign policy.' 0 Indeed, even those commentators who support a more aggressive role for Congress in initiating conflicts acknowledge this problem," but suggest that it could be fixed by having Congress enact more specific legislation about conflict objectives and implement new tools for monitoring executive behavior during wartime. 12
Yet, even if Congress were equipped with better institutional tools to constrain and monitor the President's military initiatives, it is not clear that it would significantly alter the current war powers landscape. As Horn and Shepsle have argued elsewhere: "Neither specificity in enabling legislation ... nor participation by interested parties is necessarily optimal or self-fulfilling; therefore, they do not ensure agent compliance. Ultimately, there must be some enforcement feature-a credible commitment to punish ....Thus, no matter how much well-intentioned and specific legislation Congress passes to increase congressional oversight of the President's military initiatives, it will come to naught if members of Congress lack institutional incentives to monitor and constrain the President's behavior in an international crisis.
Various congressional observers have highlighted electoral disincentives that members of Congress might face in constraining the President's military initiatives. 14 Others have pointed to more institutional obstacles to congressional assertiveness in foreign relations, such as collective action problems. 15 Generally, lawmaking is a demanding and grueling exercise. If one assumes that members of Congress are often obsessed with the prospect of reelection, 16 then such members will tend to focus their scarce resources on district-level concerns and hesitate to second-guess the President's response in an international crisis. 17 Even if members of Congress could marshal the resources to challenge the President's agenda on national issues, the payoff in electoral terms might be trivial or non-existent. Indeed, in the case of the President's military initiatives where the median voter is likely to defer to the executive branch's judgment, the electoral payoff for members of Congress of constraining such initiatives might actually be negative. In other words, regardless of how explicit the grant of a constitutional role to Congress in foreign affairs might be, few members of Congress are willing to make the personal sacrifice for the greater institutional goal. Thus, unless a grand reformer is able to tweak the system and make congressional assertiveness an electorally palatable option in war powers, calls for greater congressional participation in war powers are likely to fall on deaf ears. Pg. 912-913

Tournament: Shirley | Round: 7 | Opponent: Arizona State Rajan-Vered | Judge: Murillo
K

The affirmative positions freedom as a question of reclaiming humanity and participation – this view cannot take into account the gratuitous violence enacted on the slave. Expanding the inclusionary circle of civil society can never include Blackness because it is founded in contradistinction to it – their humanism is birthed from the murder of the slave.
Wilderson ’10 Frank, Associate Professor at UC Irvine’s Department of Drama and African American Studies, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pp. 21-23

Again, what is important for us to glean from these historians is that the preColumbian period, the Late Middle Ages, reveals no archive of debate on these three questions as they might be related to that massive group of Black-skinned people south of the Sahara. Eltis suggests that there was indeed massive debate which ultimately led to Britain taking the lead in the abolition of slavery, but he reminds us that that debate did not have its roots in the late Middle Ages, the post-Columbian period of the 1500s or the Virginia Colony period of the 1600s. It was, he asserts, an outgrowth of the mid- to late-18th century emancipatory thrust—intra-Human disputes such as the French and American Revolutions—that swept through Europe. But Eltis does not take his analysis further than this. Therefore, it is important that we not be swayed by his optimism of the Enlightenment and its subsequent abolitionist discourses. It is highly conceivable that the discourse that elaborates the justification for freeing the slave is not the product of the Human being’s having suddenly and miraculously recognized the slave. Rather, as Saidiya Hartman argues, emancipatory discourses present themselves to us as further evidence of the Slave’s fungibility: “The figurative capacities of blackness enable white flights of fancy while increasing the likelihood of the captive’s disappearance…” (Scenes…22). First, the questions of Humanism were elaborated in contradistinction to the human void, to the African-quachattel (the 1200s to the end of the 17th century). Then, as the presence of Black chattel in the midst of exploited and un-exploited Humans (workers and bosses, respectively) became a fact of the world, exploited Humans (in the throes of class conflict with un-exploited Humans) seized the image of the slave as an enabling vehicle that animated the evolving discourses of their emancipation, just as un-exploited Humans had seized the flesh of the Slave to increase their profits. Without this gratuitous violence, a violence that marks everyone experientially until the late Middle Ages when it starts to mark the Black ontologically, the so-called great emancipatory discourses of modernity—marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, sexual liberation, and the ecology movement—political discourses predicated on grammars of suffering and whose constituent elements are exploitation and alienation, might not have developed.vi Chattel slavery did not simply reterritorialize the ontology of the African. It also created the Human out of culturally disparate entities from Europe to the East. I am not suggesting that across the globe Humanism developed in the same way regardless of region or culture; what I am saying is that the late Middle Ages gave rise to an ontological category—an ensemble of common existential concerns—which made and continues to make possible both war and peace, conflict and resolution, between the disparate members of the human race, east and west. Senator Thomas Hart Benton intuited this notion of the existential commons when he wrote that though the “Yellow race” and its culture had been “torpid and stationary for thousands of years… Whites and Asians must talk together, and trade together, and marry together. Commerce is a great civilizer—social intercourse as great—and marriage greater” (The Congressional Globe. May 28, 1846). David Eltis points out that as late as the 17th century, “prisoners taken in the course of European military action…could expect death if they were leaders, or banishment if they were deemed followers, but never enslavement…Detention followed by prisoner exchanges or ransoming was common” (1413). “By the seventeenth century, enslavement of fellow Europeans was beyond the limits” (1423) of Humanism’s existential commons, even in times of war. Slave status “was reserved for non-Christians. Even the latter group however…had some prospect of release in exchange for Christians held by rulers of Algiers, Tunis, and other Mediterranean Muslim powers” (emphasis mine 1413). But though the practice of enslaving the vanquished was beyond the limit of intra-West wars and only practiced provisionally in East-West conflicts, the baseness of the option was not debated when it came to the African. The race of Humanism (White, Asian, South Asian, and Arab) could not have produced itself without the simultaneous production of that walking destruction which became known as the Black. Put another way, through chattel slavery the world gave birth and coherence to both its joys of domesticity and to its struggles of political discontent; and with these joys and struggles, the Human was born, but not before it murdered the Black, forging a symbiosis between the political ontology of Humanity and the social death of Blacks. In his essay “To ‘Corroborate Our Claims’: Public Positioning and the Slavery Metaphor in Revolutionary America,” Peter Dorsey (in his concurrence with cultural historians F. Nwabueze Okoye and Patricia Bradley) suggests that, in mid- to late-18th century America, Blackness was such a fungible commodity that it was traded as freely between the exploited (workers who did not “own” slaves) as it was between the unexploited (planters who did). This was due to the effective uses to which Whites could put the Slave as both flesh and metaphor. For the Revolutionaries, “slavery represented a ‘nightmare’ that white Americans were trying to avoid” (359). Dorsey’s claim is provocative, but not unsupported: he maintains that had Blacks-as-Slaves not been in the White field of vision on a daily basis that it would have been virtually impossible for Whites to transform themselves from colonial subjects into Revolutionaries: Especially prominent in the rhetoric and reality of the Revolutionary era, the concepts of freedom and slavery were applied to a wide variety of events and values and were constantly being defined and redefined…Early understandings of American freedom were in many ways dependent on the existence of chattel slavery…We should see slavery in revolutionary discourse, not merely as a hyperbolic rhetorical device but as a crucial and fluid fungible concept that had a major impact on the way early Americans thought about their political future…The slavery metaphor destabilized previously accepted categories of thought about politics, race, and the early republic. (355) Though the idea of “taxation without representation” may have spoken concretely to the idiom of power that marked the British/American relation as being structurally unethical, it did not provide metaphors powerful and fungible enough for Whites to meditate and move on when resisting the structure of their own subordination at the hands of “unchecked political power” (354). The most salient feature of Dorsey’s findings is not his understanding of the way Blackness, as a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society, impacts and destabilizes previously accepted categories of intra-White thought, but rather his contribution to the evidence that, even when Blackness is deployed to stretch the elasticity of civil society to the point of civil war, that expansion is never elastic enough to embrace the very Black who catalyzed the expansion. In fact, Dorsey, building on Patricia Bradley’s historical research, asserts that just the opposite is true. The more the political imagination of civil society is enabled by the fungibility of the slave metaphor, the less legible the condition of the slave becomes: “Focusing primarily on colonial newspapers…Bradley finds that the slavery metaphor ‘served to distance the patriot agenda from the antislavery movement.’ If anything, Bradley states, widespread use of the metaphor ‘gave first evidence that the issue of real slavery was not to have a part in the revolutionary messages’” (359). And David Eltis believes that this philosophical incongruity between the image of the Slave and freedom for the Slave begins in Europe and pre-dates the American Revolution by at least one hundred years: The European countries least likely to enslave their own had the harshest and most sophisticated system of exploiting enslaved non-Europeans. Overall, the English and Dutch conception of the role of the individual in metropolitan society ensured the accelerated development of African chattel slavery in the Americas…because their own subjects could not become chattel slaves or even convicts for life…There may be something to be said for expanding a variation of Edmund Morgan’s argument to cover the whole of the British Atlantic, in the sense that the celebration of British liberties—more specifically, liberties of Englishmen—depended on African slavery. (Emphasis mine 1423) The circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g. the French, English, and American Revolutions), produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore. Black Slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’s ontics because “freedom” is the hub of Humanism’s infinite conceptual trajectories. But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from… some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized. The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (for example, taxation without representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on. What I am suggesting is that first, political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations. Why would anyone do this? Why would anyone start off with, quite literally, an earth-shattering ontologic and, in the process of meditating on it and acting through it, reduce it to an earth reforming experience? Why do Humans take such pride in self-adjustment, in diminishing, rather than intensifying, the project of liberation (how did we get from ’68 to the present)? Because, I contend, in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one’s Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die. For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question. There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression. The kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom. Rather, the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic— though no less true—and ultimately untenable: i.e., freedom from the world, freedom from humanity, freedom from everyone (including one’s Black self). Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism’s hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave.

This debate begs the question of what it means to be political. Traditional definitions are based in Whiteness; they are attempts to preserve civil society built on the back of the slave, with borders defined by the ontological death of the black population. We play a stick up artist to the world, demanding all that it cannot give. The destruction of the world as we know it is the only road to freedom.
This is Wilderson in 2010 (Frank Wilderson - Associate professor of African American Studies, Percy Howard – Psychotherapist asking questions of FW, “Frank Wilderson, Wallowing in the Contradictions, Part 1” http://percy3.wordpress.com/2010/07/09/frank-b-wilderson-E2809Cwallowing-in-the-contradictionsE2809D-part-1/)
FW Reparations suggests a conceptually coherent loss. The loss of land, the loss of labor power, etc. In other words, there has to be some form of articulation between the party that has lost and the party that has gained for reparations to make sense. No such articulation exists between Blacks and the world. This is, ironically, precisely why I support the Reparations Movement; but my emphasis, my energies, my points of attention are on the word “Movement” and not on the word “Reparation.” I support the movement because I know it is a movement toward the end of the world; a movement toward a catastrophe in epistemological coherence and institutional integrity—I support the movement aspect of it because I know that repair is impossible; and any struggle that can act as a stick up artist to the world, demanding all that it cannot give( which is everything ), is a movement toward something so blindingly new that it cannot be imagined. This is the only thing that will save us. PH As a Psychotherapist, I was very interested to see your contrasting Frantz Fanon and Lacan concerning their conceptualizations of potential paths to “emancipation in the libidinal economy”, as you put it. I am ashamed to admit that I have never read Fanon, but have read Lacan. Please illuminate  your idea that the stark difference in their conceptualizations of conflict/antagonism differ are based on the fact that Lacan would  still see Blacks as fundamentally situated in personhood, but that Fannon (and yourself) see Blacks as “situated a priori in absolute dereliction”. FW This is a big question, too big for a concise answer—I think I take about thirty to forty pages to try and get my head around this in the book. But the key to the answer lies in the concept of “contemporaries.” Fanon rather painfully and meticulously shows us how the human race is a community of “contemporaries.” In addition, this community vouchsafes its coherence (it knows its borders) through the presence of Blacks. If Blacks became part of the human community then the concept of “contemporaries” would have no outside; and if it had no outside it could have no inside. Lacan assumes the category and thus he imagines the analysand’s problem in terms of how to live without neurosis among ones contemporaries. Fanon interrogates the category itself. For Lacan the analysands suffer psychically due to problems  extant within the paradigm of contemporaries. For Fanon, the analysand   suffers due to the existence of the contemporaries themselves and the fact that s/he is a stimulus for anxiety for those who have contemporaries. Now, a contemporary’s struggles are conflictual—that is to say, they can be resolved because they are problems that are of- and in the world. But a Blacks problems are the stuff of antagonisms: struggles that cannot be resolved between parties but can only be resolved through the obliteration of one or both of the parties. We are faced—when dealing with the Black—with a set of psychic problems that cannot be resolved through any form of symbolic intervention such as psychoanalysis—though addressing them psychoanalytically we can begin to explain the antagonism (as I have done in my book, and as Fanon does), but it won’t lead us to a cure. 

Get it right – The policing of the black body is the sine qua non of modern policing. Aggressive US hegemonic practices don’t just exist out of the blue; the only reason we go to war is because of the pretext of chattel slavery.
Sexton 2006 (Jared, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Associate Professor of Film and Media Studies and one third of The Trifecta of Tough, “Race, Nation, and Empire in a Blackened World,” Radical History Review Issue 95)

In the United States, homegrown white supremacists, and the lion’s share of their more moderate neighbors, have long considered black people to be weapons of mass destruction. Racial profiling, the hallmark of Homeland Security’s dreadful encroachments, cut its fearsome teeth several years prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. Prior, as well, to the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) “Driving while Black” campaign in the late 1990s; priorto the launch of President Ronald Reagan’s infamous war on drugs in the early 1980s, and even to President Richard Nixon’s earlier consolidation of the first truly nationwide police apparatus in the late 1960s. In fact, the genealogy of this nefarious police practice is properly charted beyond the twentieth century, reaching back, with stunningly little modification, to the ethos of the colonial slave patrols of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Given this line of descent, it is not unreasonable to say that racial profiling is the sine qua non of modern policing. In the consternated deliberations of national security, official and unofficial, from the founding of the republic to the trumpeting of the new world order, thesocial control and crisis management of the black population has always figured centrally, even or perhaps especially when matters of emancipation or racial equality have by no means enjoyed the focus of debate. Across the sweep of U.S. history, policing the color line has required no credible threat of invasion, no evidence of insurrectionary design, no proven stockpile of illicit chemical agents or radioactive material, no particular breach of domestic or international law, no sensational moral or ethical transgression (though all of these items, real or imagined, have factored in the relevant discourses, public and private). It has only required the presence — within the polity, economy, culture, and society — of a so-called problem people, dwelling as the absence of human presence. We can note further that the institution of transatlantic racial slavery — whose political and economic relations constitute, present tense, the social fabric of Western modernity in general, of the Americas in particular, and of the United States most acutely — cannot be explained (away) by the acquisition of fixed capital, the minimization of variable capital, or the maximization of profits, much less by the dictates of gunboat diplomacy, the expansion of strategic overseas military installations, or the idiosyncrasies of the White House. It may seem so at times, but only insofar as contemporary observers, or our historical counterparts, fundamentally misrecognize the nature of racial slavery: as a brutal regime of labor exploitation; as the atrocious adjunct to land conquest and the extermination, containment, and/or forced assimilation of indigenous peoples; or as an endeavor functional to, rather than in excess of and at times at odds with, the advent and maturation of Eurocentric capitalism. Of course, all of these procedures have been important to the history of racial slavery (and vice versa), but none is essential to its origins, its development and, above all, its pernicious afterlife.1 Rather, enslavement — the inaugural enterprise for the age of Europe, the precondition for the American century and its coveted sequel— is enabled by and dependent on the most basic of operations: symbolic and material immobilization, the absolute divestment of sovereignty at the site of the black body: its freedom of movement, its conditions of labor, its physical and emotional sustenance, its social and sexual reproduction, its political and cultural representation. Beyond its economic utility, this rendering of the black as the object of dispossession par excellence — object of accumulation, prototypical commodity, captive flesh — structures indelibly the historical proliferation of modern conceptions of sovereignty that now dominate political and legal discourse globally and provide the crucial frames of intelligibility foar both imperialism and anti-imperialism, empire and its discontents. With blacks barred by definition from the very notion of the sovereign (whatever their nominal legal status, wherever their tentative place of residence), those not marked by the material and symbolic stigma of slavery have the exclusive and positive capacity to debate about sovereignty: to trivialize its importance and rationalize its violation or to struggle in its defense, to name and lament its loss, and wage war for its recovery. Blacks, then, suffer a peculiar relation to the U.S. empire in the historic instance: neither its subjects (certainly not its authors or beneficiaries) nor its objects (at least not in the most direct sense). This peculiarity was underscored dramatically during the notorious U.S. war in Southeast Asia (1965 – 75) wherein black soldiers, overwhelmingly conscripted, were not only disproportionately offered up as cannon fodder (after long being segregated and retained in noncombat functions, depicted as cowardly and inept, denied access to the social capital of military heroism, etc. — all components of the typical critique of the racism internal to the armed forces) but were also differentiated by the enemies of the U.S. military invasion and occupation. Racially targeted propaganda appealed to the cruel ironies of black military service (ironies already well known and articulated by mid-century) and offered ideological support to the struggle for freedom, justice, and equality that was, at the time, intensifying and mutating stateside as it raised the galvanizing cry of Black Power. More important, I think, were the notable combat tactics of Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army soldiers, which frequently targeted white soldiers for ambush and sniper attacks while leaving unharmed (if at all possible) contingents of black soldiers on hand, a veritable racial partition of attack. In this circumscribed domain, the campaign of Vietnamese guerrilla fighters sought to exploit — in parts strategically, in parts earnestly — the living legacy of antiblackness among U.S. fighting forces not only by suggesting a political affinity between blacks and Asians as victims of white supremacy (whether European colonialism or U.S. imperialism) but also by enacting a displacement of the racially distributed vulnerability to violence that otherwise slated blacks for gratuitous assault without recourse. Muhammad Ali’s famous 1966 statement, “I ain’t got no quarrel with them Viet-Cong. No Viet-Cong ever called me nigger,” takes on added weight in this light. Black troops, for their part, contributed actively to this antagonistic milieu with, among other things, hundreds of fraggings of white junior officers, the repeated refusal of high-risk assignments, and, on several occasions, open rebellion and riot against the system of overseas military policing and prisons in which they were, predictably, overrepresented as captives. In the contemporary theater of operations in occupied Iraq, this historical discrepancy — which has hardly been mitigated, even if it is newly mediated — promised to reassert itself briefly with the fragging incident involving U.S. Army Sergeant Asan Akbar, a native-born black.2 But the racial politics of U.S. militarism, so prominent at the height of black political movement and social upheaval in the 1960s and 1970s, have been consistently and unsurprisingly convoluted by the combined effects of corporate media machinations and the marked disarray of black politics domestically.3 The global antiwar movement, while eloquent on the menace of the former, has missed the latter point almost entirely. In its drive for popular (if not populist) appeal, a drive fueled by the euphoria of mass demonstrations on the eve of the U.S. invasion, political opposition to the war on terror across the global North has borrowed freely from the rhetorical repertoire of black freedom struggle in and beyond the United States, but it has displayed a striking disinterest in either the political energies or the lived experience of actually existing black communities.

Thus the Alternative: Give Turtle Island Back to the “Savage.” Give life itself back to the Slave. This is a form of revolutionary suicide – well probably die in the revolution but some things are more important
Wilderson ’10 Frank, Associate Professor at UC Irvine’s Department of Drama and African American Studies, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pp. 2-4

What are we to make of a world that responds to the most lucid enunciation of ethics with violence? What are the foundational questions of the ethico-political? Why are these questions so scandalous that they are rarely posed politically, intellectually, and cinematically— unless they are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident? Give Turtle Island back to the “Savage.” Give life itself back to the Slave. Two simple sentences, fourteen simple words, and the structure of U.S. (and perhaps global) antagonisms would be dismantled. An “ethical modernity” would no longer sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been promoted to the level of antagonisms, such as class struggle, gender conflict, and immigrants’ rights. One cannot but wonder why questions that go to the heart of the ethico-political, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides, and even socially and politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clear—if the filmographies of socially and politically engaged directors, the archive of progressive scholars, and the plethora of left-wing broadsides are anything to go by—is that what can so easily be spoken is now (500 years and 250 million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that these two simple sentences, these fourteen words not only render their speaker “crazy” but become themselves impossible to imagine. Soon it will be forty years since radical politics, left-leaning scholarship, and socially engaged feature films began to speak the unspeakable. In the 1960s and early 1970s the questions asked by radical politics and scholarship were not Should the United States be overthrown? or even Would it be overthrown? but when and how—and, for some, what would come in its wake. Those steadfast in their conviction that there remained a discernable quantum of ethics in the United States writ large (and here I am speaking of everyone from Martin Luther King Jr. prior to his 1968 shift, to the Tom Hayden wing of Students for Democratic Society, to the Julian Bond and Marion Barry faction of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, to Bobby Kennedy Democrats) were accountable, in their rhetorical machinations, to the paradigmatic zeitgeist of the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the Weather Underground. Radicals and progressives could deride, reject, or chastise armed struggle mercilessly and cavalierly with respect to tactics and the possibility of “success,” but they could not dismiss revolution-as-ethic because they could not make a convincing case—by way of a paradigmatic analysis—that the United States was an ethical formation and still hope to maintain credibility as radicals and progressives. Even Bobby Kennedy (as a U.S. attorney general) mused that the law and its enforcers had no ethical standing in the presence of Blacks. One could (and many did) acknowledge America’s strength and power. This seldom rose to the level of an ethical assessment, however, remaining instead an assessment of the “balance of forces.” The political discourse of Blacks, and to a lesser extent Indians, circulated too widely to wed the United States and ethics credibly. The raw force of COINTEL put an end to this trajectory toward a possible hegemony of ethical accountability. Consequently, the power of Blackness and Redness to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all—retreated as did White radicals and progressives who “retired” from the struggle. The question lies buried in the graves of young Black Panthers, AIM warriors, and Black Liberation Army soldiers, or in prison cells where so many of them have been rotting (some in solitary confinement) for ten, twenty, or thirty years, and at the gates of the academy where the “crazies” shout at passersby. Gone are not only the young and vibrant voices that effected a seismic shift on the political landscape, but also the intellectual protocols of inquiry, and with them a spate of feature films that became authorized, if not by an unabashed revolutionary polemic, then certainly by a revolutionary zeitgeist.

There’s no progress away from slavery in civil society. Law is the plantation – While it exists freedom is an illusion. We must burn the 1AC.

Farley 5 – Boston College
(Anthony, “Perfecting Slavery”, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028andcontext=lsfp)

What is to be done? Two hundred years ago, when the slaves in Haiti rose up, they, of necessity, burned everything: They burned San Domingo flat so that at the end of the war it was a charred desert. Why do you burn everything? asked a French officer of a prisoner. We have a right to burn what we cultivate because a man has a right to dispose of his own labour, was the reply of this unknown anarchist. The slaves burned everything because everything was against them. Everything was against the slaves, the entire order that it was their lot to follow, the entire order in which they were positioned as worse than senseless things, every plantation, everything. “Leave nothing white behind you,” said Toussaint to those dedicated to the end of white-over-black. “God gave Noah the rainbow sign. No more water, the fire next time.” The slaves burned everything, yes, but, unfortunately, they only burned everything in Haiti. Theirs was the greatest and most successful revolution in the history of the world but the failure of their fire to cross the waters was the great tragedy of the nineteenth century. At the dawn of the twentieth century, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, “The colorline belts the world.” Du Bois said that the problem of the twentieth century was the problem of the colorline. The problem, now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century is the problem of the colorline. The colorline continues to belt the world. Indeed, the slave power that is the United States now threatens an entire world with the death that it has become and so the slaves of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, those with nothing but their chains to lose, must, if they would be free, if they would escape slavery, win the entire world. We begin as children. We are called and we become our response to the call. Slaves are not called. What becomes of them? What becomes of the broken-hearted? The slaves are divided souls, they are brokenhearted, the slaves are split asunder by what they are called upon to become. The slaves are called upon to become objects but objecthood is not a calling. The slave, then, during its loneliest loneliness, is divided from itself. This is schizophrenia. The slaves are not called, or, rather, the slaves are called to not be. The slaves are called unfree but this the living can never be and so the slaves burst apart and die. The slaves begin as death, not as children, and death is not a beginning but an end. There is no progress and no exit from the undiscovered country of the slave, or so it seems. We are trained to think through a progress narrative, a grand narrative, the grandest narrative, that takes us up from slavery. There is no up from slavery. The progress from slavery to the end of history is the progress from white-over-black to white-over-black to white-over-black. The progress of slavery runs in the opposite direction of the past-present-future timeline. The slave only becomes the perfect slave at the end of the timeline, only under conditions of total juridical freedom. It is only under conditions of freedom, of bourgeois legality, that the slave can perfect itself as a slave by freely choosing to bow down before its master. The slave perfects itself as a slave by offering a prayer for equal rights. The system of marks is a plantation. The system of property is a plantation. The system of law is a plantation. These plantations, all part of the same system, hierarchy, produce white-over-black, white-over-black only, and that continually. The slave perfects itself as a slave through its prayers for equal rights. The plantation system will not commit suicide and the slave, as stated above, has knowing non-knowledge of this fact. The slave finds its way back from the undiscovered country only by burning down every plantation. When the slave prays for equal rights it makes the free choice to be dead, and it makes the free choice to not be. Education is the call. We are called to be and then we become something. We become that which we make of ourselves. We follow the call, we pursue a calling. Freedom is the only calling—it alone contains all possible directions, all of the choices that may later blossom into the fullness of our lives. We can only be free. Slavery is death. How do slaves die? Slaves are not born, they are made. The slave must be trained to be that which the living cannot be. The only thing that the living are not free to be is dead. The slave must be trained to follow the call that is not a call. The slave must be trained to pursue the calling that is not a calling. The slave must be trained to objecthood. The slave must become death. Slavery is white-over-black. White-over-black is death. White-over-black, death, then, is what the slave must become to pursue its calling that is not a calling. 

Case

Shutting down detention leads a shift to drones and alternative rendition. Comparatively worse and kills intel gathering.
Chensney 11 (Robert M. Chesney, 5/1/2011, Prof at U Texas Law School, served on Detention Task Force with the Justice Department, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol52/iss3/2/ ‘Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens’)

The convergence thesis describes one manner in which law might respond to the cross-cutting pressures associated with the asymmetric warfare phenomenon—i.e., the pressure to reduce false positives (targeting, capture, or detention of the wrong individual) while also ensuring an adequate capacity to neutralize the non-state actors in question. One must bear in mind, however, that detention itself is not the only system of government action that can satisfy that latter interest. Other options exist, including the use of lethal force; the use of rendition to place individuals in detention at the hands of some other state; the use of persuasion to induce some other state to take custody of an individual through its own means; and perhaps also the use of various forms of surveillance to establish a sort of constructive, loose control over a person (though for persons located outside the United States it is unlikely that surveillance could be much more than episodic, and thus any resulting element of “control” may be quite weak).210 From the point of view of the individual involved, all but the last of these options are likely to be far worse experiences than U.S.-administered detention. In addition, all but the last are also likely to be far less useful for purposes of intelligence-gathering from the point of view of the U.S. government.211 Nonetheless, these alternatives may grow attractive to the government in circumstances where the detention alternative becomes unduly restricted, yet the pressure for intervention remains. The situation is rather like squeezing a balloon: the result is not to shrink the balloon, but instead to displace the pressure from one side to another, causing the balloon to distend along the unconstrained side. So too here: when one of these coercive powers becomes constrained in new, more restrictive ways, the displaced pressure to incapacitate may simply find expression through one of the alternative mechanisms. On this view it is no surprise that lethal drone strikes have increased dramatically over the past two years, that the Obama administration has refused to foreswear rendition, that in Iraq we have largely (though not entirely) outsourced our detention operations to the Iraqis, and that we now are progressing along the same path in Afghanistan.212 Decisions regarding the calibration of a detention system—the management of the convergence process, if you will—thus take place in the shadow of this balloon-squeezing phenomenon. A thorough policy review would take this into account, as should any formal lawmaking process. For the moment, however, our formal law-making process is not directed at the detention-scope question. Instead, clarification and development with respect to the substantive grounds for detention takes place through the lens of habeas corpus litigation.

Even if they win one court makes an effective decision, they do not solve in long-term or spill over because of a decentralization of the judiciary
Posner and Vermeule, 10 - *professor of law at the University of Chicago AND professor of law at Harvard (Eric and Adrian, The Executive Unbound, p. 29-30)
Information asymmetries The gap between the executive and the judiciary, in information and expertise, is even wider than between the executive and Congress. Whereas many legislators have a narrowly defined field of policy expertise, particularly in the House of Representatives, federal judges are mostly generalists, barring a few specialized courts. Furthermore, the partial insulation from current politics that federal judges enjoy, by virtue of life tenure and salary protection, brings with it a kind of informational impoverishment.25 Legislators, who must please other people at least some of the time, interact with the outside world far more systematically than generalist judges, whose main sodurce of information is the briefs and arguments of litigants. When the executive says that resolving a plaintiff’s claim would require disclosure of “state secrets,” with dangerous consequences for national security, judges know that either an ill-motivated or a well-motivated executive might be making the claim and that they have no easy means to assess whether the claim is credible. Collective action problems and decentralization If congressional monitoring of executive discretion is hampered by collective action problems, judicial monitoring is hampered by a similar condition, the decentralized character of the federal judiciary. The judiciary too is a “they,” not an “it,” and is decentralized along mainly geographic lines. Different judges on different courts have different views of the costs and benefits of oversight and of the appropriate level of monitoring. The Supreme Court is incapable of fully resolving these structural conflicts. Because the Court presides over a large institutional system and lacks the capacity to review more than a fraction of cases submitted to it, its role is restricted by necessity to the declaration of general principles of law and episodic, ad hoc intervention in the system. The legitimacy deficit In the federal system, appointed judges are not overtly partisan, though they are sometimes covertly so. The very condition that enables this relative lack of overt politicization—that federal judges are, at least in one familiar conception, legal technocrats appointed for their expertise rather than elected on a partisan basis—also creates a serious legitimacy deficit for the judiciary, understanding legitimacy in a strictly sociological sense.26 Aroused publics concerned about issues such as national security may have little tolerance for robust judicial oversight of executive discretion, which can always be condemned as “activism” by “unelected judges.” This charge sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails, but for the judges it is always a concern that acts as a drag on attempts to monitor executive behavior.

The affirmative's reliance on the law is misplaced faith - they cannot articulate any linkage between their prescriptions and practical effects
SCHLAG, PROFESSOR OF LAW@ UNIV. COLORADO, 1990 (PIERRE, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, NOVEMBER, PAGE LEXIS)

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it.  For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle   n31 into effect, or to restructure  *179  the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates?
Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse.  It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves.  Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

Their rhetorical performance is premised on the idea of a rational subject with free will who can act upon the law - this is how they access solvency - but this model is false and empty, its essential meaning is pain and death

SCHLAG, PROFESSOR OF LAW@ UNIV. COLORADO, 1990 (PIERRE, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, NOVEMBER, PAGE LEXIS)
All of this can seem very funny.  That's because it is very funny.  It is also deadly serious.  It is deadly serious, because all this normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a field of pain and death.   n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right.  Yet as it takes place, normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death.  To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death.  However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers.  What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of pain and death.
And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation.  Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field.  It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death.  This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness.
All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal  *188  thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field.   n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained.  It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines.  Rather, it is more the case that normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death.   n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought.
The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate.  The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way.  It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene.   n59Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise.  In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise.

Judicial decision legitimate the existing legal order
Schegel '01

Henry Schegel, Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2001 (CARDOZO LAW REVIEW, March, pp. 1067-8)

From the judge's perspective, any legal dispute is a "disequilibriation" or a breakdown in the system of normal social relations that must be set right. The judge sets things right by generating a conceptual analysis that embodies the presupposed norm that inheres in the reified system of social relations. To accomplish this task, the judge reifies "legitimating concepts" drawn from the presupposed norm so that "it will appear that the functioning of the system is simply the factual activity of the legitimating concepts, thereby representing the system itself as legitimate a priori." This method affirms the status quo. Then, the judge reverses the movement of thought so as to generate "a process of re-experiencing the event itself as that event is signified through legitimating concepts." The point of this process is that it is a way of continuing the denial of the illegitimacy and  disconnectedness of social relations as they are experienced under capitalism by depicting the unalienated group in its imaginary form as a part of political theory.

Rights rhetoric masks oppression and demobilizes social movements
Roithmayr '01
Daria Roithmayr, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois, 2001 (CARDOZO LAW REVIEW, CRITICAL LEGAL POLITICS: LEFT VS. MPM: LEFT OVER RIGHTS, March, p. 114-5) 

In addition, CLS theorists like Gabel argued that rights legitimized the exercise of power. Rights rhetoric made the government appear as if it were resolving disputes fairly and objectively under the rule of law, when in fact the government was exercising conservative political power in ways that oppressed the disempowered. Moreover, rights discourse made mass political resistance unlikely because rights discourse disguised the role of coercive state power in creating material inequalities in wealth, opportunities, and resources.

THEIR RHETORICAL PERFORMANCE SHIELDS US FOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUR OWN CONTRIBUTIONS TO MATERIAL PAIN AND SUFFERING-
DELGADO IN 1991 (RICHARD, COLORADO LAW PROFESSOR, 139 PA. L. REV. 933, APRIL)
But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges?  Are normativos better than other people?  Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners?  Pierre Schlag, for example, has described normativity as a zero -- as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all  *954  form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself.   n82 This description may be too generous.  Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles.

1.  Permission to Ignore Suffering
   The history of organized religion shows that intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition.   n83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior.  In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative.  In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the sidewalk.   n84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan.  The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general.  The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people.   n85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion.  We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question.  And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid.   n86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem.
   Normativity thus enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us.  In the legal system, the clearest  *955  examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claims.

Tournament: Vanderbilt | Round: 4 | Opponent: Wake Forest Stirrat-Sullivan | Judge: Montee
Wilderson
The affirmative positions freedom as a question of reclaiming humanity and participation – this view cannot take into account the gratuitous violence enacted on the slave. Expanding the inclusionary circle of civil society can never include Blackness because it is founded in contradistinction to it – their humanism is birthed from the murder of the slave.
Wilderson ’10 Frank, Associate Professor at UC Irvine’s Department of Drama and African American Studies, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pp. 21-23

Again, what is important for us to glean from these historians is that … infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave.
This debate begs the question of what it means to be political. Traditional definitions are based in Whiteness; they are attempts to preserve civil society built on the back of the slave, with borders defined by the ontological death of the black population. We play a stick up artist to the world, demanding all that it cannot give. The destruction of the world as we know it is the only road to freedom.
This is Wilderson in 2010 (Frank Wilderson - Associate professor of African American Studies, Percy Howard – Psychotherapist asking questions of FW, “Frank Wilderson, Wallowing in the Contradictions, Part 1” http://percy3.wordpress.com/2010/07/09/frank-b-wilderson-E2809Cwallowing-in-the-contradictionsE2809D-part-1/)
FW Reparations suggests a conceptually … intervention such as psychoanalysis—though addressing them psychoanalytically we can begin to explain the antagonism (as I have done in my book, and as Fanon does), but it won’t lead us to a cure. 

Get it right – The policing of the black body is the sine qua non of modern policing. Aggressive US hegemonic practices don’t just exist out of the blue; the only reason we go to war is because of the pretext of chattel slavery.
Sexton 2006 (Jared, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Associate Professor of Film and Media Studies and one third of The Trifecta of Tough, “Race, Nation, and Empire in a Blackened World,” Radical History Review Issue 95)

In the United States, homegrown white supremacists, and the lion’s share of their more moderate neighbors, …the political energies or the lived experience of actually existing black communities.
Thus the Alternative: Give Turtle Island Back to the “Savage.” Give life itself back to the Slave.
Wilderson ’10 Frank, Associate Professor at UC Irvine’s Department of Drama and African American Studies, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pp. 2-4

What are we to make of a world that responds to … then certainly by a revolutionary zeitgeist.
There’s no progress away from slavery in civil society. Law is the plantation – While it exists freedom is an illusion. We must burn the 1AC.

Farley 5 – Boston College
(Anthony, “Perfecting Slavery”, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028andcontext=lsfp)

What is to be done? Two hundred years ago, … White-over-black, death, then, is what the slave must become to pursue its calling that is not a calling.

Capitalism
Their appeal to human rights justifies the continued repression of social groups through a neoliberal capitalist ideology
Sakellaropoulos 08 (Spyros, Assistant Professor in the Social Policy Department of the Panteion University, specializing in the subject State and Political Theory, American Foreign Policy as Modern Imperialism: From Armed Humanitarianism to Preemptive War, http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2andhid=12andsid=2a83c715-08ec-4e2a-a643-194b21de665e40sessionmgr11) 

But there is also another important aspect in the … they paved the way for current imperialist bellicosity.
The logic of capitalism is inherently calculative—this makes all life expendable and open to extermination
Dillon 99 (Michael, Prof of Politics + Int'l Relations @ Lancaster Univ., Political Theory, p. 164-165)

Quite the reverse.  The subject was never a firm foundation … integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.
C. Our alternative-Vote Neg- We must abandon capital in the everyday-this is the only strategy for breaking free
Herod  04
James Herod author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968 Getting Free 2004 http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm 

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, …cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world. 

Case
Islam is framed as pre-modern, legitimating the destruction of countless individuals
Judith Butler, 09- “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Pg. 125
If the Islamic populations destroyed in recent …grieving.
The aff’s portrayal of certain lives as threats to liberal democracy allows the systematic devaluation and destruction of all lives
Judith Butler, 09- “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Pg. 52-53
If we accept the insight that our very survival … condition of sociality and survival alike.
The violence done by the u.s. has created an endless threat- elite discourse turns individuals into a resource to be disposed of in the name on continuing global warfare
Kaustuv Roy, 08- “Neighborhoods of the Plantation: War, Politics and Education”. Professor of social and political theory in the College of Education at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/683-neighborhoods-of-the-plantation.pdf

And therefore as security-violence or …. Without confrontation of the ban, the subject becomes a pure availability. 

Human Rights Cred
Incorporating CIL locks in outdated crisis response---political branch involvement is key to prevent mission creep that makes WMD crisis inevitable
John O. McGinnis 7, Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.  Ilya Somin  Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL INFLUENCE ON U.S. JURISPRUDENCE: Should International Law Be Part of Our Law? 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1175
D. The Democracy Deficit of Classical Customary International Law
The democracy deficit of classical customary law is more subtle. … rogue states did not have easy access to weapons of mass destruction. n168
International law can’t prevent conflict
Cassese 2001 Antonio Cassese, Professor at the University of Florence and member of I'Institut de droit international, 2001 (International Law) pg. 348
Over the years the 'authorization regime' … 1511 (2003) and, even more, in resolution 1546 (2004) (see for instance 9-14), both on Iraq.
Extinction by disease is impossible
Gregg Easterbrook (a senior fellow at The New Republic) July 2003 “We're All Gonna Die!” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1andtopic=andtopic_set=
Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological …But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.
Can’t solve warming
Jonathan M. Gitlin, January 27, 2009, “Study: too late to turn back the clock on climate change,” http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2009/01/study-too-late-to-turn-back-the-clock-on-climate-change.ars
This week's PNAS brings with it some bad news on the … least the next thousand years.

Afghanistan
Bribery will make modeling fail
Eviatar 12 - Senior counsel in the Law and Security Program of Human Rights First Daphne Eviatar, “U.S. must aid Afghan judicial system,” Politico, March 13, 2012 09:38 PM EDT, pg. http://tinyurl.com/cmvkfkv
Afghanistan’s justice system, meanwhile… resulting from torture. It also needs to be able to ensure the safe and humane treatment of detainees.
India and Pakistan will never go to war
Tepperman 2009 (Jonathan Tepperman, Deputy Editor at Newsweek Magazine and former Deputy Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, September 14, 2009, Newsweek, September 14, 2009, Lexis Academic)
The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: …. did what they had to do to avoid it.
Afghan collapse won’t spill over
Silverman 9 (Jerry Mary, Ph.D. in International Relations and Project Specialist – Ford Foundatoin, “Sturdy Dominoes”, The National Interest, 11-19, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22512)

Many advocates of continuing or racheting up our presence …. and victims of violence changed, the level of violence eventually declined.

Tournament: Vanderbilt | Round: 5 | Opponent: Samford Kimball-Sessions | Judge: Grace
Wilderson
The affirmative positions freedom as a question of reclaiming humanity and participation – this view cannot take into account the gratuitous violence enacted on the slave. Expanding the inclusionary circle of civil society can never include Blackness because it is founded in contradistinction to it – their humanism is birthed from the murder of the slave.
Wilderson ’10 Frank, Associate Professor at UC Irvine’s Department of Drama and African American Studies, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pp. 21-23

Again, what is important for us to glean from these historians is that the preColumbian period, the Late Middle Ages, reveals no archive of debate on these three questions as they might be related to that massive group of Black-skinned people south of the Sahara. Eltis suggests that there was indeed massive debate which ultimately led to Britain taking the lead in the abolition of slavery, but he reminds us that that debate did not have its roots in the late Middle Ages, the post-Columbian period of the 1500s or the Virginia Colony period of the 1600s. It was, he asserts, an outgrowth of the mid- to late-18th century emancipatory thrust—intra-Human disputes such as the French and American Revolutions—that swept through Europe. But Eltis does not take his analysis further than this. Therefore, it is important that we not be swayed by his optimism of the Enlightenment and its subsequent abolitionist discourses. It is highly conceivable that the discourse that elaborates the justification for freeing the slave is not the product of the Human being’s having suddenly and miraculously recognized the slave. Rather, as Saidiya Hartman argues, emancipatory discourses present themselves to us as further evidence of the Slave’s fungibility: “The figurative capacities of blackness enable white flights of fancy while increasing the likelihood of the captive’s disappearance…” (Scenes…22). First, the questions of Humanism were elaborated in contradistinction to the human void, to the African-quachattel (the 1200s to the end of the 17th century). Then, as the presence of Black chattel in the midst of exploited and un-exploited Humans (workers and bosses, respectively) became a fact of the world, exploited Humans (in the throes of class conflict with un-exploited Humans) seized the image of the slave as an enabling vehicle that animated the evolving discourses of their emancipation, just as un-exploited Humans had seized the flesh of the Slave to increase their profits. Without this gratuitous violence, a violence that marks everyone experientially until the late Middle Ages when it starts to mark the Black ontologically, the so-called great emancipatory discourses of modernity—marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, sexual liberation, and the ecology movement—political discourses predicated on grammars of suffering and whose constituent elements are exploitation and alienation, might not have developed.vi Chattel slavery did not simply reterritorialize the ontology of the African. It also created the Human out of culturally disparate entities from Europe to the East. I am not suggesting that across the globe Humanism developed in the same way regardless of region or culture; what I am saying is that the late Middle Ages gave rise to an ontological category—an ensemble of common existential concerns—which made and continues to make possible both war and peace, conflict and resolution, between the disparate members of the human race, east and west. Senator Thomas Hart Benton intuited this notion of the existential commons when he wrote that though the “Yellow race” and its culture had been “torpid and stationary for thousands of years… Whites and Asians must talk together, and trade together, and marry together. Commerce is a great civilizer—social intercourse as great—and marriage greater” (The Congressional Globe. May 28, 1846). David Eltis points out that as late as the 17th century, “prisoners taken in the course of European military action…could expect death if they were leaders, or banishment if they were deemed followers, but never enslavement…Detention followed by prisoner exchanges or ransoming was common” (1413). “By the seventeenth century, enslavement of fellow Europeans was beyond the limits” (1423) of Humanism’s existential commons, even in times of war. Slave status “was reserved for non-Christians. Even the latter group however…had some prospect of release in exchange for Christians held by rulers of Algiers, Tunis, and other Mediterranean Muslim powers” (emphasis mine 1413). But though the practice of enslaving the vanquished was beyond the limit of intra-West wars and only practiced provisionally in East-West conflicts, the baseness of the option was not debated when it came to the African. The race of Humanism (White, Asian, South Asian, and Arab) could not have produced itself without the simultaneous production of that walking destruction which became known as the Black. Put another way, through chattel slavery the world gave birth and coherence to both its joys of domesticity and to its struggles of political discontent; and with these joys and struggles, the Human was born, but not before it murdered the Black, forging a symbiosis between the political ontology of Humanity and the social death of Blacks. In his essay “To ‘Corroborate Our Claims’: Public Positioning and the Slavery Metaphor in Revolutionary America,” Peter Dorsey (in his concurrence with cultural historians F. Nwabueze Okoye and Patricia Bradley) suggests that, in mid- to late-18th century America, Blackness was such a fungible commodity that it was traded as freely between the exploited (workers who did not “own” slaves) as it was between the unexploited (planters who did). This was due to the effective uses to which Whites could put the Slave as both flesh and metaphor. For the Revolutionaries, “slavery represented a ‘nightmare’ that white Americans were trying to avoid” (359). Dorsey’s claim is provocative, but not unsupported: he maintains that had Blacks-as-Slaves not been in the White field of vision on a daily basis that it would have been virtually impossible for Whites to transform themselves from colonial subjects into Revolutionaries: Especially prominent in the rhetoric and reality of the Revolutionary era, the concepts of freedom and slavery were applied to a wide variety of events and values and were constantly being defined and redefined…Early understandings of American freedom were in many ways dependent on the existence of chattel slavery…We should see slavery in revolutionary discourse, not merely as a hyperbolic rhetorical device but as a crucial and fluid fungible concept that had a major impact on the way early Americans thought about their political future…The slavery metaphor destabilized previously accepted categories of thought about politics, race, and the early republic. (355) Though the idea of “taxation without representation” may have spoken concretely to the idiom of power that marked the British/American relation as being structurally unethical, it did not provide metaphors powerful and fungible enough for Whites to meditate and move on when resisting the structure of their own subordination at the hands of “unchecked political power” (354). The most salient feature of Dorsey’s findings is not his understanding of the way Blackness, as a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society, impacts and destabilizes previously accepted categories of intra-White thought, but rather his contribution to the evidence that, even when Blackness is deployed to stretch the elasticity of civil society to the point of civil war, that expansion is never elastic enough to embrace the very Black who catalyzed the expansion. In fact, Dorsey, building on Patricia Bradley’s historical research, asserts that just the opposite is true. The more the political imagination of civil society is enabled by the fungibility of the slave metaphor, the less legible the condition of the slave becomes: “Focusing primarily on colonial newspapers…Bradley finds that the slavery metaphor ‘served to distance the patriot agenda from the antislavery movement.’ If anything, Bradley states, widespread use of the metaphor ‘gave first evidence that the issue of real slavery was not to have a part in the revolutionary messages’” (359). And David Eltis believes that this philosophical incongruity between the image of the Slave and freedom for the Slave begins in Europe and pre-dates the American Revolution by at least one hundred years: The European countries least likely to enslave their own had the harshest and most sophisticated system of exploiting enslaved non-Europeans. Overall, the English and Dutch conception of the role of the individual in metropolitan society ensured the accelerated development of African chattel slavery in the Americas…because their own subjects could not become chattel slaves or even convicts for life…There may be something to be said for expanding a variation of Edmund Morgan’s argument to cover the whole of the British Atlantic, in the sense that the celebration of British liberties—more specifically, liberties of Englishmen—depended on African slavery. (Emphasis mine 1423) The circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g. the French, English, and American Revolutions), produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore. Black Slavery is foundational to modern Humanism’s ontics because “freedom” is the hub of Humanism’s infinite conceptual trajectories. But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from… some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized. The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (for example, taxation without representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on. What I am suggesting is that first, political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations. Why would anyone do this? Why would anyone start off with, quite literally, an earth-shattering ontologic and, in the process of meditating on it and acting through it, reduce it to an earth reforming experience? Why do Humans take such pride in self-adjustment, in diminishing, rather than intensifying, the project of liberation (how did we get from ’68 to the present)? Because, I contend, in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one’s Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die. For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question. There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression. The kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom. Rather, the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic— though no less true—and ultimately untenable: i.e., freedom from the world, freedom from humanity, freedom from everyone (including one’s Black self). Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism’s hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave.
This debate begs the question of what it means to be political. Traditional definitions are based in Whiteness; they are attempts to preserve civil society built on the back of the slave, with borders defined by the ontological death of the black population. We play a stick up artist to the world, demanding all that it cannot give. The destruction of the world as we know it is the only road to freedom.
This is Wilderson in 2010 (Frank Wilderson - Associate professor of African American Studies, Percy Howard – Psychotherapist asking questions of FW, “Frank Wilderson, Wallowing in the Contradictions, Part 1” http://percy3.wordpress.com/2010/07/09/frank-b-wilderson-E2809Cwallowing-in-the-contradictionsE2809D-part-1/)
FW Reparations suggests a conceptually coherent loss. The loss of land, the loss of labor power, etc. In other words, there has to be some form of articulation between the party that has lost and the party that has gained for reparations to make sense. No such articulation exists between Blacks and the world. This is, ironically, precisely why I support the Reparations Movement; but my emphasis, my energies, my points of attention are on the word “Movement” and not on the word “Reparation.” I support the movement because I know it is a movement toward the end of the world; a movement toward a catastrophe in epistemological coherence and institutional integrity—I support the movement aspect of it because I know that repair is impossible; and any struggle that can act as a stick up artist to the world, demanding all that it cannot give( which is everything ), is a movement toward something so blindingly new that it cannot be imagined. This is the only thing that will save us. PH As a Psychotherapist, I was very interested to see your contrasting Frantz Fanon and Lacan concerning their conceptualizations of potential paths to “emancipation in the libidinal economy”, as you put it. I am ashamed to admit that I have never read Fanon, but have read Lacan. Please illuminate  your idea that the stark difference in their conceptualizations of conflict/antagonism differ are based on the fact that Lacan would  still see Blacks as fundamentally situated in personhood, but that Fannon (and yourself) see Blacks as “situated a priori in absolute dereliction”. FW This is a big question, too big for a concise answer—I think I take about thirty to forty pages to try and get my head around this in the book. But the key to the answer lies in the concept of “contemporaries.” Fanon rather painfully and meticulously shows us how the human race is a community of “contemporaries.” In addition, this community vouchsafes its coherence (it knows its borders) through the presence of Blacks. If Blacks became part of the human community then the concept of “contemporaries” would have no outside; and if it had no outside it could have no inside. Lacan assumes the category and thus he imagines the analysand’s problem in terms of how to live without neurosis among ones contemporaries. Fanon interrogates the category itself. For Lacan the analysands suffer psychically due to problems  extant within the paradigm of contemporaries. For Fanon, the analysand   suffers due to the existence of the contemporaries themselves and the fact that s/he is a stimulus for anxiety for those who have contemporaries. Now, a contemporary’s struggles are conflictual—that is to say, they can be resolved because they are problems that are of- and in the world. But a Blacks problems are the stuff of antagonisms: struggles that cannot be resolved between parties but can only be resolved through the obliteration of one or both of the parties. We are faced—when dealing with the Black—with a set of psychic problems that cannot be resolved through any form of symbolic intervention such as psychoanalysis—though addressing them psychoanalytically we can begin to explain the antagonism (as I have done in my book, and as Fanon does), but it won’t lead us to a cure.
Thus the Alternative: Give Turtle Island Back to the “Savage.” Give life itself back to the Slave.
Wilderson ’10 Frank, Associate Professor at UC Irvine’s Department of Drama and African American Studies, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, pp. 2-4

What are we to make of a world that responds to the most lucid enunciation of ethics with violence? What are the foundational questions of the ethico-political? Why are these questions so scandalous that they are rarely posed politically, intellectually, and cinematically— unless they are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident? Give Turtle Island back to the “Savage.” Give life itself back to the Slave. Two simple sentences, fourteen simple words, and the structure of U.S. (and perhaps global) antagonisms would be dismantled. An “ethical modernity” would no longer sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been promoted to the level of antagonisms, such as class struggle, gender conflict, and immigrants’ rights. One cannot but wonder why questions that go to the heart of the ethico-political, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides, and even socially and politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clear—if the filmographies of socially and politically engaged directors, the archive of progressive scholars, and the plethora of left-wing broadsides are anything to go by—is that what can so easily be spoken is now (500 years and 250 million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that these two simple sentences, these fourteen words not only render their speaker “crazy” but become themselves impossible to imagine. Soon it will be forty years since radical politics, left-leaning scholarship, and socially engaged feature films began to speak the unspeakable. In the 1960s and early 1970s the questions asked by radical politics and scholarship were not Should the United States be overthrown? or even Would it be overthrown? but when and how—and, for some, what would come in its wake. Those steadfast in their conviction that there remained a discernable quantum of ethics in the United States writ large (and here I am speaking of everyone from Martin Luther King Jr. prior to his 1968 shift, to the Tom Hayden wing of Students for Democratic Society, to the Julian Bond and Marion Barry faction of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, to Bobby Kennedy Democrats) were accountable, in their rhetorical machinations, to the paradigmatic zeitgeist of the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the Weather Underground. Radicals and progressives could deride, reject, or chastise armed struggle mercilessly and cavalierly with respect to tactics and the possibility of “success,” but they could not dismiss revolution-as-ethic because they could not make a convincing case—by way of a paradigmatic analysis—that the United States was an ethical formation and still hope to maintain credibility as radicals and progressives. Even Bobby Kennedy (as a U.S. attorney general) mused that the law and its enforcers had no ethical standing in the presence of Blacks. One could (and many did) acknowledge America’s strength and power. This seldom rose to the level of an ethical assessment, however, remaining instead an assessment of the “balance of forces.” The political discourse of Blacks, and to a lesser extent Indians, circulated too widely to wed the United States and ethics credibly. The raw force of COINTEL put an end to this trajectory toward a possible hegemony of ethical accountability. Consequently, the power of Blackness and Redness to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all—retreated as did White radicals and progressives who “retired” from the struggle. The question lies buried in the graves of young Black Panthers, AIM warriors, and Black Liberation Army soldiers, or in prison cells where so many of them have been rotting (some in solitary confinement) for ten, twenty, or thirty years, and at the gates of the academy where the “crazies” shout at passersby. Gone are not only the young and vibrant voices that effected a seismic shift on the political landscape, but also the intellectual protocols of inquiry, and with them a spate of feature films that became authorized, if not by an unabashed revolutionary polemic, then certainly by a revolutionary zeitgeist.
There’s no progress away from slavery in civil society. Law is the plantation – While it exists freedom is an illusion. We must burn the 1AC.

Farley 5 – Boston College
(Anthony, “Perfecting Slavery”, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028andcontext=lsfp)

What is to be done? Two hundred years ago, when the slaves in Haiti rose up, they, of necessity, burned everything: They burned San Domingo flat so that at the end of the war it was a charred desert. Why do you burn everything? asked a French officer of a prisoner. We have a right to burn what we cultivate because a man has a right to dispose of his own labour, was the reply of this unknown anarchist. The slaves burned everything because everything was against them. Everything was against the slaves, the entire order that it was their lot to follow, the entire order in which they were positioned as worse than senseless things, every plantation, everything. “Leave nothing white behind you,” said Toussaint to those dedicated to the end of white-over-black. “God gave Noah the rainbow sign. No more water, the fire next time.” The slaves burned everything, yes, but, unfortunately, they only burned everything in Haiti. Theirs was the greatest and most successful revolution in the history of the world but the failure of their fire to cross the waters was the great tragedy of the nineteenth century. At the dawn of the twentieth century, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, “The colorline belts the world.” Du Bois said that the problem of the twentieth century was the problem of the colorline. The problem, now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century is the problem of the colorline. The colorline continues to belt the world. Indeed, the slave power that is the United States now threatens an entire world with the death that it has become and so the slaves of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, those with nothing but their chains to lose, must, if they would be free, if they would escape slavery, win the entire world. We begin as children. We are called and we become our response to the call. Slaves are not called. What becomes of them? What becomes of the broken-hearted? The slaves are divided souls, they are brokenhearted, the slaves are split asunder by what they are called upon to become. The slaves are called upon to become objects but objecthood is not a calling. The slave, then, during its loneliest loneliness, is divided from itself. This is schizophrenia. The slaves are not called, or, rather, the slaves are called to not be. The slaves are called unfree but this the living can never be and so the slaves burst apart and die. The slaves begin as death, not as children, and death is not a beginning but an end. There is no progress and no exit from the undiscovered country of the slave, or so it seems. We are trained to think through a progress narrative, a grand narrative, the grandest narrative, that takes us up from slavery. There is no up from slavery. The progress from slavery to the end of history is the progress from white-over-black to white-over-black to white-over-black. The progress of slavery runs in the opposite direction of the past-present-future timeline. The slave only becomes the perfect slave at the end of the timeline, only under conditions of total juridical freedom. It is only under conditions of freedom, of bourgeois legality, that the slave can perfect itself as a slave by freely choosing to bow down before its master. The slave perfects itself as a slave by offering a prayer for equal rights. The system of marks is a plantation. The system of property is a plantation. The system of law is a plantation. These plantations, all part of the same system, hierarchy, produce white-over-black, white-over-black only, and that continually. The slave perfects itself as a slave through its prayers for equal rights. The plantation system will not commit suicide and the slave, as stated above, has knowing non-knowledge of this fact. The slave finds its way back from the undiscovered country only by burning down every plantation. When the slave prays for equal rights it makes the free choice to be dead, and it makes the free choice to not be. Education is the call. We are called to be and then we become something. We become that which we make of ourselves. We follow the call, we pursue a calling. Freedom is the only calling—it alone contains all possible directions, all of the choices that may later blossom into the fullness of our lives. We can only be free. Slavery is death. How do slaves die? Slaves are not born, they are made. The slave must be trained to be that which the living cannot be. The only thing that the living are not free to be is dead. The slave must be trained to follow the call that is not a call. The slave must be trained to pursue the calling that is not a calling. The slave must be trained to objecthood. The slave must become death. Slavery is white-over-black. White-over-black is death. White-over-black, death, then, is what the slave must become to pursue its calling that is not a calling.

*Anti-War movements are based in destructive behaviors of Whiteness – hinders effectiveness and reifys marginalization of people of color
Bloom et al 2003 (Steve Bloom, Jean Carey Bond, Humberto Brown , Saulo Col?n, Bhairavi Desai, Cherrene Horazuk, Randy Jackson, Hany Khalil, Ray Laforest, Ng? Thanh Nh?n, Ren? Francisco Poitevin, Merle Ratner, Liz Roberts, Juliet Ucelli, Lincoln Van Sluytman – anti-racist movement signatories of the “An Open Letter To Activists Concerning Racism In The Anti-War Movement,”)
Dear Sisters and Brothers:
We, the undersigned, are peace and justice activists in New York City. We are organizing to defeat the United States government's offensive of war, racism and repression against the people of the world, both abroad and within the borders of the U.S. We come from many communities, some of us from other nations. We are all colors, multi-generational, workers, students, unemployed, queer and straight. We are writing to you out of concern that destructive patterns of behavior are hindering the growth of the broadest possible long-term movement against war at home and abroad,and preventing the attainment of the social justice we all seek. We have urgent tasks before us: stopping a war against Iraq and others around the world, as well as preventing further attacks on people within the United States. To do this work in a principled way, in ways that address the root causes of oppression, requires that we acknowledge the connection between the forms and institutions of white supremacy embedded in U.S. society and the practice of white supremacy within our movement. As we dig in for the long haul and try to bring together the broadest possible grouping of people, we must be conscious of how our histories-organizational and personal-influence how we work together.
Background  Since the turn of the year, hundreds of activists have come together in New York City to plan anti-war actions. Along with the work being done for February 15, these gatherings will hopefully lead to more and better coalition-building in the future. However, at least two other promising coordination efforts in this city, since 9/11/2001, also began by involving diverse forces and ended badly. One series of meetings, attended by hundreds, led to the formation of the New York Coalition for Peace and Justice-but only after a disastrous split around the question of calling for the use of "international law" as an alternative to war against Afghanistan. A second series of meetings, held last Spring to plan antiwar commemorations of 9/11, produced Stand Up New York-but that coalition foundered when one group insisted on organizing a vigil "autonomously," without being responsible to the coalition as a whole. In our view, destructive racial dynamics and white supremacy are implicated in the disruption of both of these unity initiatives: Predominantly white forces failed to grasp the importance of self-determination and certain concerns in communities of color. Indeed, this was the clear perception of most activists of color who were involved in the events. The problem of racism in anti-war activism is not new. For many years, people of color and their white allies have cited its debilitating effects, to no avail. A new era of activism presents us with the opportunity to come to grips with the issues of race and anti-racism in our movement, instead of continuing to ignore them. We believe that such an accounting is crucial to the success of coalition-building among the anti-war sectors of New York City, and we offer this letter as a means of getting started.

Capitalism
Capitalism controls their dissent – they end up entrenching the very system they try so hard to subvert by becoming focused on their never ending self-fulfillment through non-conformity
Frank, 1997. Thomas, editor of The Baffler, Commodify your Dissent

Nobody wants you to think they’re serious today, least of all Time Warner. On the contrary: the Culture trust is now our leader in the Ginsbergian search for kicks upon kicks. Corporate America is not an oppressor, but a sponsor of fun, provider of lifestyle accoutrements, facilitator of carnival, our slang-speaking partner in the quest for ever-more apocalyptic orgasm. The countercultural idea has become capitalist orthodoxy, its hunger for transgression upon transgression now perfectly suited to an economic-cultural regime that runs on ever-faster cyclings of the new; its taste for self-fulfillment and its intolerance for the confines of tradition now permitting vast latitude in consuming practices and lifestyle experimentation. Consumerism is no longer about “conformity” but about “difference.” Advertising teaches us not in the ways of puritanical self-denial (a bizarre notion on the face of it), but in orgiastic, never-ending self-fulfillment. It counsels not rigid adherence to the tastes of the herd but vigilant and constantly updated individualism. We consume not to fit in, but to prove, on the surface at least, that we are rock ‘n’ roll rebels, each one of us as rule-breaking and hierarchy-defying as our heroes of the 60s, who now pitch cars, shoes, and beer. This imperative of endless difference is today the genius at the heart of American capitalism, an eternal fleeing from “sameness” that satiates our thirst for the New with such achievements of civilization as the infinite brands of identical cola, the myriad colors and irrepressible variety of the cigarette rack at 7-Eleven. An existential rebellion has become a more or less official style of Information Age capitalism, so has the countercultural notion of a static, repressive Establishment grown hopelessly obsolete. However the basic impulses of the countercultural idea may have disturbed a nation lost in Cold War darkness, they are today in fundamental agreement with the basic tenets of Information Age business theory. So close they are, in fact, that it has become difficult to understand the countercultural idea as anything more than the self-justifying ideology of the new bourgeoisie that has arisen since the 1960s, the cultural means by which this group has proven itself ever so much better skilled than its slow-moving, security-minded forebears at adapting to the accelerated, always-changing consumerism of today. The anointed cultural opponents of capitalism are now capitalism’s ideologues. The two came together in perfect synchronization in a figure like Camille Paglia, whose ravings are grounded in the absolutely noncontroversial ideas of the golden sixties. According to Paglia, American business is still exactly what it was believed to have been in that beloved decade, that is, “puritanical and desensualized.” Its great opponents are, of course, liberated figures like “the beatniks,” Bob Dylan, and the Beatles. Culture is, quite simply, a binary battle between the repressive Apollonian order of capitalism and the Dionysian impulses of the counterculture. Rebellion makes no sense without repression; we must remain forever convinced of capitalism’s fundamental hostility to pleasure in order to consume capitalism’s rebel products as avidly as we do. It comes as little surprise when, after criticizing the “Apollonian capitalist machine” (in her book Vamps and Tramps), Paglia applauds American mass culture (in Utne Reader), the preeminent product of that “capitalist machine,” as a “third great eruption” of a Dionysian “paganism.” For her, as for most other designated dissidents, there is no contradiction between replaying the standard critique of capitalist conformity and repressiveness and then endorsing its rebel products – for Paglia the car culture and Madonna – as the obvious solution: the Culture Trust offers both Establishment and Resistance in one convenient package. The only question that remains is why Paglia has not yet landed an endorsement contract from a soda pop or automobile manufacturer.
The logic of capitalism is inherently calculative—this makes all life expendable and open to extermination
Dillon 99 (Michael, Prof of Politics + Int'l Relations @ Lancaster Univ., Political Theory, p. 164-165)

Quite the reverse.  The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice.  It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything.  The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self.  The value of the subject became the standard unity of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.  They trade in it still to devastating global effect.  The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global.
Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.  Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation.  Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation.  Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing.  Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either.  There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust.  However liberating and emancipating systems of value--rights--may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable.  Counted out, the invaluable may then even lose its purchase on life.  Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable self.  For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."  But how does that necessity present itself?  Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights.  That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.
C. Our alternative-Vote Neg- We must abandon capital in the everyday-this is the only strategy for breaking free
Herod  04
James Herod author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968 Getting Free 2004 http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm 

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t imply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goal of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world. 

Case
The affirmative does not reach the root cause- post-aff the u.s. will just use more destructive means to spread domination
The News Tribune 13
The News Tribune, “Drones: Wise, maybe; constitutional, certainly”, 2/17/13,  http://www.thenewstribune.com/2013/02/17/2478932/drones-wise-maybe-constitutional.html jchen
The realistic alternative to drone strikes include kidnapping – something many of the same critics condemn – and conventional air strikes.
Bombs and cruise missiles are far less humane than Predators, though, when targeting enemies who deliberately hide themselves among civilians. By all accounts, drones – which can linger in the air until the target is reasonably identified and isolated – have drastically reduced the deaths of innocent bystanders.
Absent a total rejection of the state, the aff results in cruise missiles
The International 8/30
Josef Danczuk, The International, “Amidst diplomatic closings and terror plots, US drone strikes increase in Yemen ”, 8/30/13, http://www.theinternational.org/articles/459-amidst-diplomatic-closings-and-terror-plo jchen
However, in the short run, drone options seem like the most likely action for combating terrorism abroad. As Brooke Parker, a student of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, put it when speaking with The International, “As much as killing innocent lives is a tragedy, it’s the price we pay when entering war. Unfortunately, the alternative is manned airstrikes, which are more costly in terms of money and come with the risk of American soldiers losing their own lives.”
And Ground troops
Etzioni 13
Amitai Etzioni, professor of in- ternational relations at George Washington University and author of Hot Spots: American Foreign Pol- icy in a Post-Human-Rights World, “The Great Drone Debate”, March-April 2013, Military Review jchen
Perhaps if all or most fighting were done in a cold-blooded, push-button way, it might well have the effects suggested above. However, as long as what we are talking about are a few hundred drone drivers, what they do or do not feel has no discern- ible effects on the nation or the leaders who declare war. Indeed, there is no evidence that the introduc- tion of drones (and before that, high-level bomb- ing and cruise missiles that were criticized on the same grounds) made going to war more likely or its extension more acceptable. Anybody who followed the American disengagement in Vietnam after the introduction of high-level bombing, or the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan (and Iraq)—despite the considerable increases in drone strikes—knows better. In effect, the opposite argument may well hold: if the United States could not draw on drones in Yemen and the other new theaters of the coun- terterrorism campaign, the nation might well have been forced to rely more on conventional troops and prolong our involvement in those areas, a choice which would greatly increase our casualties and zones of warfare.
The affirmatives use of law in their project prevents subversive politics
Dennis Fox (Emeritus Associate Professor, Legal Studies University of Illinois at Springfield) 1991 “Law Against Social Change” http://www.dennisfox.net/papers/law-against.html
Well-meaning efforts by liberal psychologists to reform the law in keeping with values such as dignity, privacy, justice, and equality are often misguided because law exists to serve the status quo. Law inhibits the systemic, radical social change necessary for psychological and societal well-being. It does so through coercive power, substantive assumptions about human nature, the ideology of law's legitimacy, a preoccupation with procedure rather than substance, a focus on rational technicality rather than equity, and encouragement for limited, self-defeating legal solutions. Psycholegal scholars should arouse public dissatisfaction with law and assist social movements seeking to overcome legal impediments to social change. Summary This is a summary of part of the paper that I prepared for a class.  Psychologists often advocate legal reform because they believe that psychology and law have similar values and, consequently, that the two can be partners in efforts to improve society. Not all of us, however, are comfortable with such close ties to the status quo. A large literature within psychology presents an alternative view: that we should instead break our mainstream bonds and seek radical social change in order to create a humane, egalitarian, just society.  Since I share this alternative view, I evaluate the law differently from my liberal peers. Instead of compatibility between law and psychology, I see conflict. Instead of minor reform as reasonable, I see it too often as a hindrance to social transformation. And instead of law being a useful tool, I see it as an inevitable weapon against radical activism. Law, in short, is an an opponent rather than an ally of those seeking fundamental change.  Much psycholegal work is already relevant to the maintenance function of law. What is needed is a reexamination of this function from the perspective of an outsider rather than an insider. In my limited time today, I want to comment on six related ways that law prevents social change. 1. Heavy Handed Use of Coercive Power  The first way that law presents social change is obvious: Coercion. As Lawrence Friedman put it,      Law has its hidden persuaders--its moral basis, its legitimacy--but in the last analysis it has force, too, to back it up. Law carries a powerful stick: the threat of force. This is the fist inside its velvet glove.  Law is used directly and indirectly to hinder both legal and illegal social change efforts. Electoral challenges, for example, are deflected by state legislatures, which devise unreasonable deadlines, excessive petition requirements, and other hassles to keep third parties off the ballot. As an old anarchist slogan put it, if voting could change the system, it would be illegal.  Activists fare little better in court. Given litigation delays, costs, procedural pitfalls, and judges' backgrounds, radicals are rarely successful. The doctrines of standing, governmental immunity, and political questions, the substance of conservative legal principles, and the likelihood of reversal upon appeal limit how much even a sympathetic judge can allow activists to win. Since law is created by the powerful rather than the weak, dissident concerns are often simply dismissed as frivolous.  When activists demonstrate peacefully, they often find the law against them. Although it is no longer legitimate to arrest those who advocate change, the benign view of our "First Amendment freedoms" has a fairly short history, and has never been as absolute as many think. In the wake of the Persian Gulf War, and remembering the recent treatment given flag burners, any confidence that the public supports truly free speech is unwarranted. Surveillance, infliltration, and repression of legal activist groups continue.  Harassment of activists doesn't come just from government. Corporations often file libel and other lawsuits against people who use letters to newspapers, public statements, and similar methods to criticize corporate projects such as toxic waste dumps. More than 1000 of these "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation" have been filed within the past decade. Although most of these suits are legally "unsuccessful" in that free speech rights are upheld and the activist pays no damages, the suits serve their purposes of transforming political debates into private disputes and, more significantly, tieing up activist's time and resources, bankrupting the activist, often causing the abandonment of public advocacy.  When activists move on to direct action and civil disobedience, law's coercive force is clearest. Police infiltration and instigation of violent activities, selective prosecution, and preventive detention add to the likelihood of guilty verdicts and disproportionate sentences. Judges usually prevent defendants from presenting a necessity defense based on their motivations for breaking the law. When the jury is told the incident is a "simple trespassing case," for example, rather than a political act, the primary concern of the activist is dismissed as irrelevant. Similarly, judges in most states do not tell juries about jury nullification, which allows jurors to acquit despite the evidence. The result in both cases is that activists are likely to be convicted even if the jury is sympathetic.  In response to legal coercion, psychologists have helped defend political defendants, and this
Can’t solve- the affirmative positions the state as the referent object, prevents escape from its violence
Judith Butler, 09- “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Pg. 149
The operation of state power takes place within an ontological horizon saturated by power that precedes and exceeds state power. As a result, we cannot take account of power if we always place the state at the center of its operation. The state draws upon non-statist operations of power and cannot function without a reserve of power that it has not itself organized. Further-and this is not particularly new-the state both produces and presupposes certain operations of power that work primarily through establishing a set of "ontological givens." Among those givens are precisely notions of subject, culture, identity, and religion whose versions remain uncontested and incontestable within particular normative frameworks. So when we speak about "frameworks" in this respect, we are not simply talking about theoretical perspectives that we bring to the analysis of politics, but about modes of intelligibility that further the workings of the state and, as such, are themselves exercises of power even as they exceed the specific domain of state power.

Case does not get to the root of the problem- there is no such thing as political involvement in the status quo, it’s just a ruse to legitimate state destruction
Kaustuv Roy, 08- “Neighborhoods of the Plantation: War, Politics and Education”. Professor of social and political theory in the College of Education at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/683-neighborhoods-of-the-plantation.pdf

The presence of the ballot box within the statist process must not be mistaken for some form of active participation of the people. On the contrary, the ballot box is one feed mechanism that serves as a mode of legitimation as well as a “firewall” that maintains the mystification of power. 22 Hence what we know as politics today is the regime that is produced at the intersection of the two: the maintenance of the transcendental ban on the human and simultaneously its reduction to pure availability through violence. To recollect, this occurs along several axes. First the economy of violence produces not social becoming of the collective but formalisms of statist reason and the mystification of power in the face of which the social subject stands negated. Second, the ban together with security discourse produces the adequate climate of fear and danger in which the human subject can no longer confront the real issues of livability and becomes abandoned to the State. Third, there is loss of voice for speech does not survive the ban as well as the endless overwhelming presence of military force without being reduced to slogan or state discourse; massive military power is designed not to protect voice but to maintain the ban on the human through the coercion and distortion of the forces that shape the human. The weight of righteous violence empties language of its content and redeploys it for the enforcement of the ban. Thus the speaking subject goes into withdrawal and passivity. Fourth, the discourse of “freedom” that the State manufactures seeks ultimate “stabilization” of the world which is nothing other than the reification of life and the turning of life energies into plantation property. And finally, the abandoned human subject can no longer be creative species-being for its creative becoming is thwarted by the sheer gravity of the economy of violence. But why do we invoke the species- being? The plantation is a device, apart from everything else, that teaches us to passively accept our limits, that is, the subject of the (e)state. To break out of those limits is the task of pedagogy. The species-being or the Gattungswesen of Marx is essentially a conatus or striving, an unceasing living process of creation, deliberation, reflection, and transformation. Its labor is mutual, reciprocal, based on the radical experiential truth that all labor is collective labor. Within that endless becoming of the collective there is no “finality.” That is to say, there is no ultimate security in being human, and the belief in full security fostered by the State for its own purposes ends up negating the ontological truth of the species-being, committing the human to a false horizon. Human practice which deserves this name, is always creative. It is not at all an ideal or actual state, but an unceasing living process of alteration and transformation. However, this process is not a process destined sometime to terminate in inactivity, it is not a process meant to stop being a process, not even on account of those factual “imperfections” of modern reality which aim at a conflict-free “perfection.” It seeks to attain no ultimate and final “results,” no life of bliss in this or the other world, in paradise or some promised land....Practice is a negation of that eschatological view, which believes in the end of the world, the end of history, and the final “stabilisation” of human nature and society.” (Grli? , 1965, pp. 49-58). Contrary to the species-being of the human which is always an uncertain process of creative becoming with no teleology or notion of progress, the plantation is the land of final arrival or the grave. Instead of lived strength there is the mystification of power, instead of demonstrable truths there is mythicization through historical amnesia, and instead of political engagement there is the mendacity of formalisms. Therefore, the major political task of pedagogy coming out of all this is to focus on the intentionality, the social diagram that legitimizes violence against the human-ecological under various guises, pretexts, formalisms and reasons of state, and that operating together direct life energies in the direction of the potentates of power generating a dyarchy . The plantation is nothing other than this mode of usurpation, its schema, its general appetite, as well as the illusions of grandeur it promotes that need careful pedagogical attention and study. The abandoned human must gather the collective strength to confront the ban as well as resist the reification and commodification of the flow of existential life that belongs to no one.
Can’t solve- they still put the state at the center of the debate, preventing us from escaping its imperial gaze
Judith Butler, 09- “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Pg. 149
The operation of state power takes place within an ontological horizon saturated by power that precedes and exceeds state power. As a result, we cannot take account of power if we always place the state at the center of its operation. The state draws upon non-statist operations of power and cannot function without a reserve of power that it has not itself organized. Further-and this is not particularly new-the state both produces and presupposes certain operations of power that work primarily through establishing a set of "ontological givens." Among those givens are precisely notions of subject, culture, identity, and religion whose versions remain uncontested and incontestable within particular normative frameworks. So when we speak about "frameworks" in this respect, we are not simply talking about theoretical perspectives that we bring to the analysis of politics, but about modes of intelligibility that further the workings of the state and, as such, are themselves exercises of power even as they exceed the specific domain of state power.
We are the war- denial of individual responsibility spreads the racist violence of the current wars across our own lives. The belief that we don’t have our hands on the levers of power is de-politicizing and allows the war to take total control
Susanne Kappeler (Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University) 1995 The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour, pg. 75-76
War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war . . . And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen.5 'We are the war' - and we also 'are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility — leading to the -well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens — even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution.'7 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.
Law is in essence violent, we must begin with a pre-juridical process to break free of the state’s destructive power
Michel Foucault, 84- “The History of Sexuality”. Pg. 88-89. (we don’t endorse his use of term men’s bodies)

A tradition dating back to the eighteenth of nineteenth century has accustomed us to place absolute monarchic power on the side of the unlawful: arbitrariness, abuse, caprice, willfulness, privileges and exceptions, the traditional continuance of accomplished facts. But this is to overlook a fundamental historical trait of Western monarchies: they were constructed as systems of law, they expressed themselves through theories of law, and they made their mechanisms of power work in the form of law. The old reproach that Boulainvilliers directed at the French monarchy- that it used the law and jurists to do away with rights and to bring down the aristocracy- was basically warranted by the facts. Through the development of the monarchy and its institutions this juridico-political dimension was established. It is by no means adequate to describe the manner in which power was and is exercised, but it is the code according to which power presents itself and prescribes that we conceive of it. The history of the monarchy went hand in hand with the covering up of the facts and procedures of power by juridico-political discourse. Yet, despite the efforts that were made to disengage the juridical sphere from the monarchic institution and to free the political from the juridical, the representation of power remained caught within this system. Consider the two following examples. Criticism of the eighteenth-century monarchic institution in France was not directed against the juridico-monarchic sphere as such, but was made on behalf of a pure and rigorous juridical system to which all the mechanisms of power could conform, with no excesses or irregularities, as opposed to a monarchy which, notwithstanding its own assertions, continuously overstepped the legal framework and set itself above the laws. Political criticism availed itself, therefore, of all the juridical thinking that had accompanied the development of the monarchy, in order to condemn the latter; but it did not challenge the principle which held that law had to be the very form of power, and that power always had to be exercised in the form of law. Another type of criticism of political institutions appeared in the nineteenth century, a much more radical criticism in that it was concerned to show not only that real power escaped the rules of jurisprudence, but that the legal system itself was merely a way of exerting violence, of appropriating that violence for the benefit of the few, and of exploiting the dissymetries and injustices of domination under cover of general law. But this critique of law is still carried out on the assumption that, ideally and by nature, power must be exercised in accordance with a fundamental lawfulness. At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king. Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty (even if the latter is questioned insofar as it is personified in a collective being and no longer a sovereign individual). To conceive of power on the basis of these problems is to conceive of it in terms of a historical form that is characteristic of our societies: the juridical monarchy. Characteristic yet transitory. For while many of its forms have persisted to the present, it has gradually been penetrated by quite new mechanisms of power that are probably irreducible to the representation of law. As we shall see, these power mechanisms are, at least in part, those that, beginning in the eighteenth century, took charge of men’s existence, men as living bodies. And if it is true that the juridical system was useful for representing, albeit in a nonexhaustive way, a power that was centered primarily around deduction (Prelevement) and death, it is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus. We have been engaged for centuries in a type of society in which the juridical is increasingly incapable of coding power, of serving as its system of representation. Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law that had already begun to recede into the past at a time when the French Revolution and the accompanying age of constitutions and codes seemed to destine it for a future that was at hand. It is this juridical representation that is still at work in recent analyses concerning the relationships of power to sex. But the problem is not to know whether desire is alien to power, whether it is prior to the law as is often thought to be the case, when it is not rather the law that is perceived as constituting it. This question is beside the point. Whether desire is this or that, in any case one continues to conceive of it in relation to a power that is always juridical and discursive, a power that has its central point in the enunciation of the law. One remains attached to a certain image of power-law, of power-sovereignty, which was traced out by the theoreticians of right and the monarchic institution. It is this image that we must break free of, that is, of the theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty, if we wish to analyze power within the concrete and historical framework of its operation. We must construct an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code.