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#### The affirmatives description of war is a disembodied one. This is bad – war is a visceral event that is always dependent on the body. Their faulty ontology means all their evidence is suspect, and their failure to accurately describe war causes ontological violence.

McSorley 13

Kevin McSorley is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Portsmouth. He convened the War and the Body conference at the Imperial War Museum in June 2010, and co-­ organized the accompanying War and the Body exhibition at Blackall Studios, London. His expertise includes contemporary social and cultural theory; technology and the body; the sociology of war and violence. He has recently edited a special issue of the Journal of War and Culture Studies on ‘War and Embodiment: Military and Cultural Practices’. He is currently conducting ethnographic research on the global arms trade and working on the monograph Violence, War and Society. McSorley, Kevin (Editor). War, Politics and Experience : War and the Body : Militarisation, Practice and Experience. Pg. 10 BSHIZZLE

This book places the body at the centre of critical thinking about war, giving embodiment and bodily issues an analytic recognition they have often been denied in the annals and ontology of conventional war scholarship. The reality of war is not just politics by any other means but politics incarnate, politics written on and experienced through the thinking, feeling bodies of men and women. From steeled combatants to abject victims, from the grieving relative to the exhausted aid worker, war occupies innumerable bodies in a multitude of ways, profoundly shaping lives and ways of being human. The opening description of war provides one vivid illustration of how war ‘makes sense’ at a fundamentally embodied and affective level. For the young Mozambican narrator, war is an anticipatory nervousness that constantly ‘lives inside’ her, a somatic knowing that underpins her every thought and move. As Nordstrom (1998: 108) argues, something ‘far more complex, multifaceted and enduring than the formal boundaries of war demarcated in military cultures takes root in the quotidian life of a country at war’. It is this ontology of war that the scholarship in this book seeks to elucidate and explore – the countless affective, sensory and embodied ways through which war lives and breeds. 1 Shaw (2005: 40– 1) argues that ‘the defect of most social theory of war and militarism is . . . that it has not considered war as practice, i.e. what people actually do in war’. This book aims to address that omission via an explicit focus upon the embodied practices, structures of feeling and lived experiences through which war and militarism take place. While this will include the examination of specific modes of embodying force and practices of ‘warfighting’, the analysis extends both temporally and spatially to consider the bodily preparations for, and the corporeal aftermaths of, war – both within militaries and beyond. Indeed, an analytic focus upon the body tends to render any clear demarcation of discrete war zones and times problematic, 2 emphasising instead the enactment and reproduction of war through affective dispositions, corporeal careers, embodied suffering and somatic memories that endure across time and space. 3 Furthermore, it is not just the bodies of combatants and victims that are produced by and central to war, but the bodies of veterans, witnesses, pacifists, patriots and many others. Given the global nature of contemporary economic, migratory and media flows, few in today’s interconnected world remain completely isolated from war’s touch (Sylvester 2011). While in post-­ conscription Western states with increasingly professionalised and privatised militaries, there may be less direct disciplinary engagement with civilian bodies – leading some commentators to have proposed the existence of ‘post-­ military society’ (Shaw 1991) and ‘post-­ heroic warfare’ (Luttwak 1995) – many such states have been marked by a profound re-­ militarisation at a wider political and cultural level in recent decades, a mobilisation that has often been intensely embodied and emotional. Ó Tuathail (2003: 859), for example, describes the political channelling of ‘the affective tsunami unleashed by the terrorist attacks of 2001’. He argues that 9/11 was processed by many Americans in a fundamentally visceral manner, becoming a ‘somatic marker’ – effectively a ‘gut instinct’ shaping perception and judgement below the threshold of rational, deliberative discussion – that would subsequently be appropriated to legitimate the military invasion of Iraq in 2003. Stahl (2010) relatedly understands the inculcation of contemporary consumers into the burgeoning interactive culture of ‘militainment’ in terms of affective and kinaesthetic entrainment, a seduction whose pleasures are ultimately felt at the expense of developing any other critical capacities to engage with matters of military might. It is through such mundane cultural practices that the legitimacy of having vast military force – what the anthropologist Catherine Lutz (2009) refers to as the ‘military normal’ – assumes an implicitness, becomes something not thought but routinely felt in everyday life. Such examples point to the need to think about the reproduction of war, and war readiness, in terms of a militarisation of sensation, affect and the body that operates over time and across multiple and broad constituencies. 4 The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on exploring the relative neglect of embodiment in many conventional discussions of war and the increasingly problematic and paradoxical status of the body in recent Western wars.

#### This disembodiment also creates epistemological and ontological violence – the body is the source and the shape for all knowledge and relation.

Creal 1999 (Lee Davis, “THE "DISABILITY OF THINKING"

THE "DISABLED" BODY”, Course Paper for Ambiguous Bodies: Studies in Contemporary Sexuality, York University, http://www.broadreachtraining.com/advocacy/artcreal.htm)

In "Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and the Flesh," Elizabeth Grosz cites the work of Merleau-Ponty in her discussion of corporeal phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty, she says, seeks to understand the relationship between consciousness and nature and between interiority and exteriority. He reorients the tradition of the question "how can there be a world for a subject?" by locating subjectivity not in mind or consciousness but in the body; he argues that the mind and body are not separate entities but interrelated and that the mind is based on corporeal and sensory relations. The body, according to Merleau-Ponty, is a phenomenon experienced by the one who lives in it and it (the body) is the location which places one in the world and makes possible relationships between oneself and other objects and subjects. We understand and know our body only by living in it. It is a subject and lived reality for oneself and an object for others but it is never simply object nor simply subject. Merleau-Ponty says the body is "sense-bestowing" and "form-giving," and is "my being-to-the-world and as such is the instrument by which all information and knowledge is received and meaning is generated" (Grosz: 87). This resonates with Lennard Davis who says the body is not only a physical object but is "a way of organizing through the realm of the senses the variations and modalities of physical existence as they are embodied into being through a larger social/political Matrix" (Davis: 14).

#### The alternative is to vote negative to recognize the paradox of war.

McSorley 13

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For Elaine Scarry, the key paradox that constitutes the structure of war is that ‘while the central fact of war is injuring and the central goal of war is to out-­ injure the opponent, the fact of injuring tends to be absent from strategic and political descriptions of war’ (1985: 12). Although war is ‘the most radically embodying event in which human beings ever collectively participate’ (p. 71), the conventions of strategic, military and political discussions of war are nonetheless often marked by a profound disavowal and transference of this embodied nature and the bodily mutilation at its heart. For Scarry then, the continuing domination of warfare ‘requires both the reciprocal infliction of massive injury and the eventual disowning of the injury so that its attributes can be transferred elsewhere, as they cannot be permitted to cling to the original site of the wound, the human body’ (p. 64). The idioms and metaphors of strategic thought, such as describing armies as a single combatant or machine, mean that real human injury becomes no longer recognisable or interpretable in such discussions. As Scarry recognises, such abstraction may seem appropriate for a mode of strategic thinking whose key didactic goal is to propose universal, scientific laws of warfare which will inform how future wars can be waged to secure political advantage most effectively, a position traditionally associated with the founding figure of strategic thought, Carl von Clausewitz. 5 Nonetheless, this instrumental common sense of strategic discourse – war as a form of policy-­ making – rules other concerns and ways of knowing out of court. Carol Cohn’s (1987) ethnographic study of nuclear defence strategists vividly illustrates the ways in which one such hermetically sealed, techno-­ strategic discourse – of ‘limited nuclear war’ – radically excludes the asking of certain questions and the expression of certain values. Claims to legitimacy within this rational world came from technical expertise and ‘the disciplined purging of emotional valences that might threaten objectivity’ (p. 717). For Cohn, it was ‘not only impossible to talk about humans in this language, it also becomes in some sense illegitimate to ask the paradigm to reflect human concerns . . . no one will claim that the questions are unimportant, but they are inexpert, unprofessional, irrelevant to the business at hand’ (pp. 711– 12). 6 For Martin Shaw (2003), although war may be conceived as strategy it is always experienced as slaughter: ‘War is both the rational, purposive activity that strategic thought guides and the necessarily unpredictable, uncontrollable, irrationally destructive clash of opposing wills that combatants and victims experience – and humanist critics emphasize’ (p. 271). However, it is not just that abstract strategic thinking does not tell us much about this embodied experience of slaughter that is central to war, but Shaw argues that it is also complicit, that in the twentieth century ‘strategy has come to contribute to slaughter on a scale unimaginable even in the bloody era on which Carl von Clausewitz reflected’ (p. 269). Following Bauman’s (1990) analysis of the dehumanising tendencies of modern thought and state power – particularly the atrophy of the moral imagination in bureaucratic systems – Shaw argues that modernity deeply reinforced the tendencies of ‘rational’ strategy to produce ‘irrational’ outcomes. Barbarity has been the outcome, rather than the antithesis of, strategic thinking and planning in modern war. The fundamentally dual character of war was most salient in the tendency of the industrialised total wars of the twentieth century to become degenerate not only in their treatment of soldiers’ bodies as ‘cannon fodder’, as human materiel for the industrial war machine, but also in their increasing targeting and killing of civilians as well as enemy combatants (Shaw 2005). Total social mobilisation and total destruction were crucially linked in the industrialised mode of warfare, as the supply side and civilian morale became seen as legitimate targets, particularly for the strategic yet indiscriminate area bombing of airpower. Given the enormity of the death tolls even winning seemed scant redemption at times, the mechanised slaughter so barbarous as to challenge the very belief in the utility of war itself (Coker 2001; Kassimeris 2006). Such degeneracy continued in many of the wars of decolonisation during the post-­ Second World War decades. However, as these wars began to fail, and particularly when Western casualties began to seem disproportionate to their outcomes, public opinion in the West increasingly turned against them. Vietnam in particular marked a watershed in post-­ Second World War warfighting, the images of US soldiers in body bags and the burned, naked body of the young Vietnamese girl Pan Thj Kim Phuc fleeing a napalm bombing cementing a verdict of the war as illegitimate and inhumane. For Shaw (2005: 6), ‘the use of napalm . . . came to represent the inhumanity of airpower’. Napalm clung to the original site of the wound, the human body, burning beneath the skin, fatally undermining the war’s sense of morality and purpose.

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#### The affirmative never come to grip with the precarity of life – there is no way they can solve for indefinite detention within the frame of traditional policy making

Judith Butler, 09- “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?” Judith Butler is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Pg. 10-11

The frame that seeks to contain, convey, and determine¶ what is seen (and sometimes, for a stretch, succeeds in doing¶ precisely that) depends upon the conditions of reproducibility¶ in order to succeed. And yet, this very reproducibility entails¶ a constant breaking from context, a constant delimitation¶ of new context, which means that the "frame" does not¶ quite contain what it conveys, but breaks apart every time¶ it seeks to give definitive organization to its content. In¶ other words, the frame does not hold anything together in¶ one place, but itself becomes a kind of perpetual breakage,¶ subject to a temporal logic by which it moves from place¶ to place. As the frame constantly breaks from its context,¶ this self-breaking becomes part of the very definition. This¶ leads us to a different way of understanding both the frame's¶ efficacy and its vulnerability to reversal, to subversion, even¶ to critical instrumentalization. What is taken for granted¶ in one instance becomes thematized critically or even¶ incredulously in another. This shifting temporal dimension of the frame constitutes the possibility and trajectory of¶ its affect as well. Thus the digital image circulates outside¶ the confines of Abu Ghraib, or the poetry in Guantanamo¶ is recovered by constitutional lawyers who arrange for its¶ publication throughout the world. The conditions are set for¶ astonishment, outrage, revulsion, admiration, and discovery,¶ depending on how the content is framed by shifting time¶ and place. The movement of the image or the text outside of¶ confinement is a kind of "breaking out," so that even though¶ neither the image nor the poetry can free anyone from prison,¶ or stop a bomb or, indeed, reverse the course of the war, they¶ nevertheless do provide the conditions for breaking out of¶ the quotidian acceptance of war and for a more generalized¶ horror and outrage that will support and impel calls for justice¶ and an end to violence. Earlier we noted that one sense of "to be framed" means¶ to be subject to a con, to a tactic by which evidence is¶ orchestrated so to make a false accusation appear true.¶ Some power manipulates the terms of appearance and¶ one cannot break out of the frame; one is framed, which¶ means one is accused, but also judged in advance, without¶ valid evidence and without any obvious means of redress.¶ But if the frame is understood as a certain "breaking¶ out," or "breaking from," then it would seem to be more¶ analogous to a prison break. This suggests a certain¶ release, a loosening of the mechanism of control, and¶ with it, a new trajectory of affect. The frame, in this sense,¶ permits-even requires-this breaking out. This happened¶ when the photos of Guantanamo prisoners kneeling and¶ shackled were released to the public and outrage ensued; it¶ happened again when the digital images from Abu Ghraib¶ were circulated globally across the internet, facilitating a¶ widespread visceral tum against the war. What happens at¶ such moments? And are they merely transient moments¶ or are they, in fact, occasions when the frame as a forcible¶ and plausible con is exposed, resulting in a critical and¶ exuberant release from the force of illegitimate authority? How do we relate this discussion of frames to the¶ problem of apprehending life in its precariousness? It¶ may seem at first that this is a call for the production of¶ new frames and, consequently, for new kinds of content.¶ Do we apprehend the precariousness of life through the¶ frames available to us, and is our task to try to install¶ new frames that would enhance the possibility of that¶ recognition? The production of new frames, as part of the¶ general project of alternative media, is clearly important,¶ but we would miss a critical dimension of this project if¶ we restricted ourselves to this view. What happens when¶ a frame breaks with itself is that a taken-for-granted¶ reality is called into question, exposing the orchestrating¶ designs of the authority who sought to control the¶ frame. This suggests that it is not only a question of¶ finding new content, but also of working with received¶ renditions of reality to show how they can and do break¶ with themselves. As a consequence, the frames that, in¶ effect, decide which lives will be recognizable as lives¶ and which will not, must circulate in order to establish¶ their hegemony. This circulation brings out or, rather,¶ is the iterable structure of the frame. As frames break¶ from themselves in order to install themselves, other¶ possibilities for apprehension emerge. When those frames¶ that govern the relative and differential recognizability of¶ lives come apart-as part of the very mechanism of their¶ circulation-it becomes possible to apprehend something¶ about what or who is living but has not been generally¶ "recognized" as a life. What is this specter that gnaws at¶ the norms of recognition, an intensified figure vacillating¶ as its inside and its outside? As inside, it must be expelled¶ to purify the norm; as outside, it threatens to undo the¶ boundaries that limn the self. In either case, it figures¶ the collapsibility of the norm; in other words, it is a sign¶ that the norm functions precisely by way of managing¶ the prospect of its undoing, an undoing that inheres in¶ its doings.

#### Russia is stable and the impact is empirically denied

Zavinovsky 12 (2-7-12-[ Konstantin Zavinovsky is editor of "Geopolitics" magazine and researcher at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences (ISAG) "Political And Economic Stability In Russia Will Attract Foreign Investment" Claims Institute; ROME, February 7, 2012 /PRNewswire/ -- <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/political-and-economic-stability-in-russia-will-attract-foreign-investment-claims-institute-138864439.html>]

Konstantin Zavinovsky of the Institute of Advanced Studies in Geopolitics and Auxiliary Sciences, has said that relative economic growth in Russia in recent years has improved the quality of life in Russia, and the prospect of foreign direct investment into the country. Zavinovsky said: "The Russian economy in the last decade has seen a steady growth. After the economic crisis in the late 90s, starting from 2000 GDP per capita in Russia increased steadily rising from about $ 7600 in 2000 to nearly $ 17000 in 2011. This means that the index more than doubled in 10 years. The growth was interrupted only for a year because of the 2008 financial crisis which produced a slight decline in GDP per capita in 2009. But already next year, in 2010, this index started to grow and almost reached pre-crisis level. According to the forecasts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the index will grow steadily over the next year to nearly $ 22000 in 2016. We should add that in the same period inflation in the country declined from 20.78% in 2000 to 8.8% in 2011 (6.1%, according to the Russian Ministry of Finance - Minfin) and according to the forecast of the IMF inflation in Russia is to diminish in future and will reach 6.64% in 2014 (4.5%, according to Minfin). "With the rise of income the quality of life of Russian citizens in recent years has improved considerably. And thus the image of Russians in the world has also changed. For example, in Italy 10 years ago the Russians were seen as a backward people, rather poor and far away from European civilization, now the Russians have become a symbol of wealth and economic well-being. Russian customers are very appreciated in Italy both by small traders on the narrow streets of Rome, Florence andVenice and by the great Italian fashion designers such as Salvatore Ferragamo, who believes Russians to be "customers number one in Europe". Precisely for this reason at the end of last year the Michele Norsa CEO announced that "over the next five years we expect to double sales volume in Russia, where the growth will be +20% annually over the past 24 months". Dirk Bikkemberg also stated that Russian clients are the target of extreme importance because thanks to them flagship store in Milan, considered by many as a loss, not only got in balance with the accounts but also opened 47 new stores in 2011. Italian newspapers say that due to purchases of Russian clients sales of the Italian outlets in contrast to the general crisis. The most important Italian financial newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore suggested making investments in the Russian ruble bacause Russia has a high economic growth and its national debt is very low. The tourism industry that made Italy famous also makes plans with a focus on the Russian customers. The examples are numerous and cover many sectors, while news of this kind are discussed widely in the Italian press. This shows that currently the Italian business world has confidence in the Russian market and is ready to invest in it. "So in only 10 years, Russia managed to change her image in Italy (in Europe and the world). Today it appears as a stable country, a country with an economic growth and with many investment opportunities. This change wasn't an easy one and required great efforts from the Russian government in 2000 when Russia was economically weak - in 2000 GDP was almost half of that of 1992. Today Russia's GDP is nearly 7 times bigger than that of 2000 and amounts to nearly 2 trillion dollars. According to IMF, this figure is expected to rise and in 2016 GDP will amount to 3 trillion. The increase of Russia's prestige in the eyes of the Europeans and the strong economic growth were possible thanks to political and economic stability of the country which was a merit of politicians who led Russia in recent years. The political destabilization of Russia would lead to distrust of the future of the Russian market and foreign capitals would flee from the country. So Russia should continue to move in the same direction of political stability if it wants to preserve and enhance the economic well-being and thus to remain an attractive country for foreign investment."

#### The Aff’s Discourse of Hegemonic Integration Rehashes The Geographies of Exclusion and Barbarism in Nicer Term - The Discourse of “Global Instability” Versus a Stable US Confirm the Hierarchy of Dominant US Identity.

David Campbell et. al. 7, Prof. of Geography @ Durham, ‘7 [*Political Geography* 26, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy,” p. Wiley]

The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both **Kagan and Barnett,** issimilarly at the heart of the current administration's foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered: Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in Lemann, 1 April 2002, emphasis added). That the US **is no longer** prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own democratic values and practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers to change their policies and behaviours to fit the American modus operandi, is not without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor does the differently imagined geography of integration replace completely previous Manichean conceptions of the world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather, the proliferation of new terms of antipathy such as ‘axis of evil’, ‘rogue states’, and ‘terror cities’ demonstrate how **integration goes hand in hand with – and is mutually constitutive of – new forms of division.** Barnett's divide between the globalised world and the non-integrating gap is reflected and complemented by Kagan's divide in ways of dealing with this state of affairs. Much of this imagined geography pivots on the idea of ‘the homeland’. Indeed, in the imaginations of the security analysts we highlight here, there is a direct relationship and tension between securing the homeland's borders and challenging the sanctity of borders elsewhere (see Kaplan, 2003: 87). Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US strategy. Since September 11th 2001 the US government and military have issued a number of documents outlining their security strategy. Each recites, reiterates and resignifies both earlier strategic statements as well each other, **creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of the world**. Initially there was The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002), and then the much broader scope National Security Strategy (The White House, 2002b; see Der Derian, 2003). These were followed by the “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” and particular plans for Military Strategy, Defense Strategy and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” (Department of Defense, 2005a, Department of Defense, 2005b, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004 and The White House, 2002a). These are seen as an interlocking whole, where “the National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS)” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” builds “upon the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy” (Department of Defense, 2005b: iii; see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy (The White House, 2006) presents a further re-elaboration and re-stating of these principles. As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key elements of these strategies pre-date September 11. Significant in this continuity is the link between the Bush administration's strategic view and the 1992 “Defense Planning Guidance” (DPG). Written for the administration of George H. W. Bush by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, the DPG was the first neoconservative security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in which the US had to be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise of a hegemonic competitor (Tyler, 8 March 1992; see Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212). Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and were rewritten with input from then Defense Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell (Tyler, 24 May 1992). Nonetheless, Cheney's version still declared that, “we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role” (Cheney, 1993: 2). What we find in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of George W. Bush, reworked through the Clinton period by such organizations as PNAC (discussed above). The assemblage of individuals and organizations – both inside and outside the formal state structures – running from the DPG, through PNAC to the plethora of Bush administration security texts cited above (all of which draw upon well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War II era) demonstrates the performative infrastructure through which certain ontological effects are established, and through which certain performances are made possible and can be understood. As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy. It is telling that Bush's claim of “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward binary, as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but with us, a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush's most enthusiastic supporters, “shoulder to shoulder” (Blair, 2001; see White & Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: “If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state” (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004) about the significance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush's notorious ‘axis of evil’ speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, but suggested that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of the like, alongside the “with the terrorists” is actually a more complicated approach to the choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited. Simple binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and the policy of integration. These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal ‘representative’ democracy and market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an American-centric world. The place of US allies in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reflection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe's “Old” and “New” – a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPG – the dissent of (even some) Europeans is a problem for the US in its world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2005). It is not surprising, then, that following his re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a “bridge-building” tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but “the great alliance of freedom” that unites the United States and Europe (Bush, 2005). For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global scenario, its “right” – and the right of its moral-political “mission” of spreading “freedom and justice” – relies on its amplification and support by allies. The construction of the United States' world role relies also on the selective placement and representation of other international actors who are “**hailed” into specific subject positions** (see Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, & Duvall, 1999). Of course, different actors are granted different roles and different degrees of agency in the global script: the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the peripheral and semi-peripheral states that make part of the “coalition of the willing”. Both, however, are vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared world of values and ideals. Indeed, the ‘lone superpower’ has little influence in the absence of support. Another important dimension of integration as the key strategic concept is its dissolution of the inside/outside spatialization of security policy. The concluding lines of the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” are particularly telling. It contends that the Department of Defense can “no longer think in terms of the ‘home’ game and the ‘away’ game. There is only one game” (Department of Defense, 2005b: 40). In part this is directed at the previous failure to anticipate an attack from within: indeed, the Strategy remarks that the September 11th 2001 attacks “originated in US airspace and highlighted weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air defense coordination” (2005b: 22). In other words, the US needs to ensure the security of its homeland from within as much as without, to treat home as away. In part, however, such rhetoric also reflects a continuity with and reiteration of broader understandings with a much longer history, promoted by a range of US “intellectuals of statecraft” since the end of the Cold War: understandings that specified increasingly hard **territorialisations of security and identity** both at home and abroad **to counter the “geopolitical vertigo**” (see Ó Tuathail, 1996) of the post-bipolar era. It is important to note here, moreover, that the 2002 National Security Strategy's affirmation that “today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing” (The White House, 2002b: 30) also involves the US treating away as a home, or at least, as a concern. From this we can see how the pursuit of integration enables the territorial integrity of other sovereign states to be violated in its name, as specific places are targeted to either ensure or overcome their exclusion (see Elden, 2005). As an example, consider this statement, which recalls the late 1970s enunciation of an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Afghanistan: “There exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 5). In his foreword to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush declared that “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent” (Bush, 2002b: i). This notion of extension is crucial in understanding the explicitly spatial overtones of this strategy of integration: more than merely about values, democracy and capitalism, it is about a performative geopolitics. Put crudely, it is about specifying the geographies of world politics; it is about specifying “the ways the world (now) is” – a presumably descriptive “geopolitical exercise” but that, as all such exercises, also implicitly contains the prescription for putting the world “right”. Imaginative geographies and popular geopolitics As we have tried to argue, such elaborations of security rely upon the affirmation of certain understandings of the world within the context of which the strategies and understandings advanced by them are rendered believable. What is more, we have tried to highlight how such performances invoke earlier articulations, even as their reiteration changes them. More broadly, we stressed how such articulations provide the conditions of possibility for current – and future – action. Integration thus marks a new performative articulation in US security strategy, but it reworks rather than replaces earlier formulations. One of the ways in which this operates is that the ideal of integration, as we have seen, **necessarily invokes the** idea of exclusion. The imagined divide between the US ‘homeland’ and the threatening ‘frontier’ lands within the circle of Barnett's ‘Non-Integrating Gap’ thus **recalls earlier iterations of ‘barbarism’** even if their identity and spatiality are produced by more than a simple self/other binary. In the final section of this essay, we will make some brief remarks regarding the disjuncture between the theory and the practice of the enactment of such imaginations. First, however, we would like to highlight some other ways in which these deployments of categories of inclusion and incorporation, on the one hand, and exclusion and targeting, on the other, are also performed in the popular geopolitical work done by a wide range of textual, visual, filmic and electronic media supportive of the ‘war on terror’ at home and abroad. These cultural practices resonate with the idea of fundamentally terrorist territories, whilst, at the same time rendering the ‘homeland’ zone of the continental US as a homogenous and virtuous ‘domestic’ community. Such wide-ranging and diffuse practices that are nonetheless imbricated with each other are further indications that we are dealing with performativity rather than construction in the production of imaginative geographies.

#### Appeals to human rights are inextricably tied to broader arrangements of American imperialism – they obscure the violence caused by colonial expansion.

Denike 10 [Margaret, Human Rights Program, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University, Homonormative Collusions and the Subject of Rights: Reading Terrorist Assemblages Feminist Legal Studies Volume 18, Number 1 / April, 2010 85-100]

For Wendy Brown, human rights discourses and activism are generally presented as an apolitical and other-oriented inquiry—“a pure defence of the innocent and powerless against…immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic conflict, tribalism, patriarchy and other mobilisations or instantiations of collective power” (2004, p. 453). Expressed as moral discourses that are centred on pain and suffering, they are often **tethered to specific objectives**—such as global capitalism and American imperialism, alibied as the pursuit of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’—and to a specific view of justice that **marks bodies**, that produces certain subjects and ways of being (Brown 2004, p. 453), including allies and enemies of the state. As a late modern project of the “regulatory multicultural liberal democracies”, the liberal ethos of tolerance that underlies human rights advocacy has been reframed since 9/11, through political rhetorics of “Islam, nationalism, fundamentalism, culture, and civilisation” to **legitimate forms of imperialism** (Brown 2006, p. 6). In this way, Brown notes, tolerance becomes part of a “civilisational discourse” wherein Western societies are identified as the arbiters and bearers of tolerance, and non-liberal societies and practices are marked as candidates for an **intolerable barbarism** that is itself signalled by the putative intolerance ruling these societies (2006, p. 6).

### Bioweapons

#### The failure to examine the body in relation to bioweapons causes serial policy failure. The description of bioweapons in the 1AC is disconnected from reality – this masks ongoing structural medical violence.

Finnegan 11 [Cara A., Associate Professor in the Departments of Speech Communication and Art History at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Quarterly Journal of Speech Volume 97, Issue 2, 2011 Review Essay: Addressing the Epidemic of Epidemics: Germs, Security, and a Call for Biocriticism View full text Download full text Full access DOI:10.1080/00335630.2011.565785 Cara A. Finnegan pages 224-244 Available online: 29 Apr 2011]

Second, **the proliferation of risk discourses surrounding contagion demands ongoing rhetorical analysis.** Price-Smith, Wald, and Klotz and Sylvester suggest in varying degrees that inaccurate risk perception fuels germ panic that can disrupt economic and social relations. By contrast, the essays in Biosecurity Interventions and Dread stress the mismatch between planning for imagined risks and the empirical data detailing actual infections and known killers. For instance, since 9/11 the US government has spent more than $50 billion on civilian biodefense, representing $2 billion for each known victim of bioterrorism.32 By contrast, tens of thousands of our citizens die each year from medical mistakes and other preventable conditions.33 Given that germ discourses chiefly are configured in terms of risk with tangible personal, political, and economic outcomes, rhetoricians should be playing a greater role in demonstrating the underlying logics, deployments, and outcomes of the discourses of risk—and in disentangling their economic, political, and cultural stakes. By tracking risk constructions surrounding both real and envisioned epidemics, rhetoricians can show how the “communicability” of risks **influences policy** and practice. The anticipatory and imagined aspects of biosecurity planning, with their ubiquitous role plays and risk modeling, simulations and speculations, deserve special scrutiny because these modes of rhetorical invention **drive future political and scientific action.**34 Here, rhetoricians and communication scholars can build on the theoretical work on risk by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Joost Van Loon, and Barbara Adam, and add to the rhetorical scholarship of Jeffrey Grabill and Michele Simmons, Robert Danisch, J. Blake Scott, and Beverly Sauers, by tracing the constitution, contestation, elaboration, and consequences of our rhetorics of pathogenic risk.35

### Solvency

#### Judicial review fail – courts generally defer to the president in foreign affairs, which means the president essentially has no check on his power

**Bradley and Morrison 2013** – \*William Van Alstyne Professor of Law, Duke Law School, \*\*Liviu Librescu Professor of Law, Columbia Law School (May, Curtis and Trevor, Columbia Law Review, “PRESIDENTIAL POWER, HISTORICAL PRACTICE, AND LEGAL CONSTRAINT”, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1097, Lexis)

If courts routinely reviewed contested issues of presidential power, they could decide whether and when to credit historical practice in this area. They could also decide whether novel presidential assertions of authority were justified, before such assertions became established practice. But judicial review in this area is anything but routine. Courts obviously do review issues of presidential power in some instances, especially when individual rights are perceived to be at stake, as both Youngstown and the series of Supreme Court decisions concerning the "war on terror" illustrate. n49 When individual rights are not directly implicated, [\*1110] however, courts often abstain from addressing questions surrounding the allocation of authority between Congress and the President. Judicial abstention is particularly common in the foreign affairs area. Consider, for example, the question of whether the President is constitutionally required to obtain congressional authorization before initiating military hostilities. Despite numerous presidential initiations of hostilities without congressional authorization in the post-World War II period, courts have generally refused to consider the issue. n50 Courts have similarly avoided addressing whether Presidents must obtain congressional or senatorial approval before terminating a treaty, n51 and whether and to what extent Presidents may use executive agreements in lieu of treaties. n52 Courts invoke a variety of doctrines in support of this abstention. They enforce general standing requirements strictly, and, at least since the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd, n53 they typically find that individual members of Congress lack standing to challenge presidential action. n54 Some lower courts also invoke ideas of "political ripeness," pursuant to which they will not intervene in interbranch disputes until the affected branch has exhausted its own political resources to address the purported problem, a requirement that is rarely if ever satisfied. n55 Another potential barrier to judicial review is the political question [\*1111] doctrine, which the lower courts apply with some frequency in the foreign affairs area. n56 Academic defenders of this judicial abstention have argued either that the political branches have adequate resources to protect their interests, n57 or that the courts lack sufficient competence to resolve separation of powers issues, especially in the foreign affairs and national security areas. n58 Other scholars have bemoaned this abstention as an abdication of the judicial role and have blamed it for contributing to what they perceive to be an undesirable growth in executive power in the modern era. n59 The bottom line is that many issues of presidential power are resolved, if at all, outside the courts. Moreover, even when the courts do intervene, they are likely to give significant deference to patterns of governmental practice, especially if the patterns are longstanding and appear to reflect interbranch agreement. n60 [\*1112] C. Skepticism About Legal Constraint The general posture of judicial abstention in this area raises questions about whether presidential power is truly subject to legal constraints. It is often easier - or at least more familiar - to talk meaningfully about law if there is a reasonable prospect that the actions in question will face judicial review. Because the courts are unlikely to intervene in many con-troversies relating to presidential power - and because any such intervention is likely to be deferential to the actions of the political branches - some scholars are inclined to say that Presidents face (or will soon face) virtually no constraints at all. Part of the concern here is that Congress by itself often seems either unable or unwilling to provide adequate checks on executive power. Compounding the problem, in the view of some scholars, is that institutional arrangements within the executive branch are not able to constrain presidential decisionmaking. Bruce Ackerman, for example, claims to identify a range of developments in "politics and communications, bureaucratic and military organization," as well as "executive constitutionalism," that threaten to turn the presidency into "a vehicle for demagogic populism and lawlessness." n61