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# 1nc

#### Let us be poets of Cripples. Steal away with us to the Country called disabled. Claim disability as an identity, forget what you think you know, and join us in our journey to find the old gods that are crippled.

#### As Petra Kuppers explains, language and words have no objective meaning and sound different to different audiences. Suspend you identity in favor of entering cripple country. Cross the river Styx because here be dragons. Use your ballot to chart the uncharted territories of life, death, disability, sexuality, race, class, gender, and all other aspects of identity. Become the queer cripple and rejoice in the music we can make.

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Let me be a poet of cripples,

of hollow men and boys groping

to be whole, of girls limping toward

womanhood and women reaching back,

all slipping and falling toward the cavern

we carry within, our hidden void,

a place for each to become full, whole,

room of our own, space to grow in ways

unimaginable to the straight

and the narrow, the small and similar,

the poor, normal ones who do not know

their poverty. Look with care, look deep.

Know that you are a cripple too.

I sing for cripples; I sing for you.

Sitting in that restaurant at the edge of the ocean, we listened to this poem as a song rushing out over a landscape of forces, of ups and downs, expansions and contractions, of contour lines, moving out from the central lines of 'place', 'room', and 'space'. As we talked about the poem, we charted those spaces, followed them along and over lines, trying to find the territory.

I shared that to me, the poem sings over a landscape of caverns and rivers: it sings like Orpheus sings, mourning for limping Eurydice left behind in the hollow tunnels of the underworld, Eurydice who reaches back— for the living. Limping like Oedipus, groping like Tiresias, below ground like Persephone in her cavern, reaching towards mysteries: reading this poem in a writerly way, opening it up to my sense-world, this poem invokes the time of singers, bards upon the land. As I read the lines, I see different 'spaces to grow' layered over each other: Dantean rings and Olympian terraces, full of gods and demi-gods of the Greek world, with their mythological impairments. They are crips we can call into our circle if we try hard enough, if we willfully wish for our history to come forth and emerge from tunnels and hiding places.

Look deep: deep under, below, is the underworld, the under-lit world of institutions of any kind, the wards and waiting rooms of hospitals, crypts, asylums— and the institutions of gendered, embodied difference much too quickly ordered into valid/invalid. In this void within, difference can flourish: that is the hopeful message I take from the poem. The space for growth is in the hollow itself, in the delicious absence that creates the echoing chamber: in the o's of 'whole', the expansiveness and breathy rolling of the 'room's oo, in sharp contrast with the sibilants of the straight, the small, the similar that narrow toward my tongue's roof, call me to tighten up. That hollow, that absence is for me the enabler of longing: the piece missing from wholeness which keeps tumbling humanity in motion. I remember that in the Lover's Discourse, the poet of criticism, Roland Barthes, writes about what sustains longing: this sigh, the breath, that enables sound to emerge from the hollow pipe and rush away: "the two halves of the androgyne sigh for each other, as if each breath, being incomplete, sought to mingle with the other" (15).

The poem sings to me of Greek halves, longing to be united, moving aimlessly and disoriented, teetering, groping. In the Symposium, Plato explains that Zeus divided the three wholenesses (man/man, woman/woman, and man/woman) in his jealousy. This origin myth of human sexuality does not condemn any love, and puts homosexual love on an equal rolling path with heterosexual desire. Round, full, o's rolling, moving, with the full abandon of breath roaring out in lusty oratory— no small straightness, whose narrowed poverty is in a loneliness that is so old that it is forgotten. A cripple: that's what becomes of human love after Zeus's violence. But a breath remains, and remembers, and seeks to mingle— sending out sound, song, on its journey.

And Zeus threatens - if humans do not swallow their pride, he might split them further, leaving one leg, one eye— surely a vision not alien to crip culture. As I read on from the force of the poem's draw, it celebrates a pride, a humanity in those cripples: it is an ode to the fierceness and survival of longing.

The poem offers up other references, too, and, while sipping our wine, the students remembered half-forgotten literature classes. In Eliot's Hollow Men, we can find those denizens of Ferris's landscape:

We are the hollow men

We are the stuffed men

Leaning together

Waiting and leaning, drawn, they stand in that

Shape without form, shade without colour,

Paralysed force, gesture without motion;

flaccid in the face of waiting, purgatory, like straw men. They are those that have not crossed yet, 'Gathered on this beach of the tumid river' — they have not shipped over with the ferryman, or followed the river Styx to their lover's resting place, as Orpheus did. They know not the mystery of death, the fullness of abandon, and even the echoing and painful passion of the wounded Fisher King.

'This is the way the world ends

Not with a bang but a whimper.'

That whimper runs out, off, ending in dactylic feet shuffling off into nowhere. These hollow men know that they are not full— and yet, the whimpering closure of Eliot's poem allows me to mouth back the words of Ferris's version, where those hollow men, slipping in the fashion of The Wizard of Oz's scarecrow, on Eliot's 'crossed staves' like crutches, move on. Breathing, and breathed, they move, with a second step always following in the trochee of the cripple, with the line running over, enjambed.[4]

If Eliot has to use paralysis ('paralysed force') as a negative image, a being held in place (on the river's edge), then crip culture can un-maroon these sounds, mobilize them differently— for these words do sound differently when spoken in our world, where paralysis does not need to mean death. Recognizing the erotics of non-normate limbs configured to question any notion of 'natural' bodies, cripples might be those who feel the void inside move, call, sing, drawing them on.

And this, then, was the question my students in the disability culture class posed: whom does this sonnet address? Who is sung to here? Who is asked for permission to 'let me be the poet of cripples' - members of crip culture, addressed by their singer who knows the weight of words on our lives, or 'the mainstream', addressed by an Orphic poet who, like Eliot, uses the crippling metaphor for the human condition, the Fisher King's wound, the fallen step, those hollow men?

This question points to the conundrum at the heart of mythic language: to be specific and general, to open up to different scales, and to hold ambivalent meaning in all of them. Poetry lives in and on our bones. To dismiss its musical sounds as mere metaphor is doing it injustice: for cannot a line in a poem clasp a heart, and press it?

So if we acknowledge that power, we need also address the sway our larger words, our myth-fragments, can hold over our bodily imaginations. As a writerly reader of poetry, I want to reclaim the whimpering 'cripple', and let it move, rather then stand like a forceful crip. For while my bodily being engages in the breath of reading, and makes sense through my personal experience, I am also moved out on that precipice where no word holds meaning, and my singularity opens up 'toward the cavern/we carry within, our hidden void'. And thus I can claim no safe ground, no river's edge: I teeter, a cripple.

In The Pleasure of the Text, Roland Barthes looks for that teetering, unsure footing, and distinguishes between the "text of pleasure," which confirms "the consistency of [our] selfhood," and the "text of bliss (jouissance)": "the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that . . . unsettles the reader's historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories, brings to a crisis his relation with language" (14). Reading poetry and weaving myself into myth rehearses these pleasures of texts for me, and allows me to breathe: an undoing and doing that binds me to a story, to a people, to a land. In that land, I can lose myself, unbind and gather again.

Making spaces of words our own, fitting our bodily hollows to them as resonating chambers: that's the labor of poetry. And just as Virgina Woolf had to call for a room of our (female) own, crips continue to have to fight for rooms of their own, motion of their own, control over movement, access and expansion. To call out an I is to raise that bar up in the flow of history, stemming the tide: 'I sing... I sing'. Those I's gather up the energy of hollows, allowing connections, making a space, an 'o': I's, cripples, and 'you'— reaching across, closing the circle the poem makes, firmly, with its final rhyme: 'Know that you are a cripple too/I sing for cripples; I sing for you'.

'Let me be': the poem becomes a song ritual of space-making, allowing the hollow to vibrate and reach out. Celebrating the song of cripples, boundaries between experiences and selfhoods can become labile.

Walt Whitman sings in Song of Myself:

I celebrate myself, and sing myself,

And what I assume you shall assume,

For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you.

Whitman is at pains to tell us a few lines later that he is in perfect health — well, good for him, but I might be mean to read against the grain. There is such sadness in that joy, in that embracing, bounded clasping ('myself...myself') that repetition and rhythm make out of a celebration of unboundedness. Sounds mitigate against the commingling, the dissolution, the joint ownership of the body electric— and yet, the longing moves against these borders, is enabled by them.

In Ferris's poem, the world 'cripple' provides the borders and shapes that constrain: that awful word which we are only slowly reclaiming, that word that holds too much pain, too much disgust to be whitewashed, whitefaced, the word many of us made hip into 'crip'. And yet, 'cripple', rippling with a wave through my mouth, setting off explosions on my curling tongue, can become resonant in that old search for connection in song— for the breath. Poetry can rename a word, making it anew, crippling ripples of white water, liquid in my mouth. In the void, breath can bloom, and sound like the hollow reed of antiquity, Pan's flute.

Poet of Cripples finds a space in the old metaphors, so alive with physical and sensory difference and yet often so cruelly devoid of the lived experience of disabled people. The poem's voice does not reach out towards a political correctness that would stifle the poetic material that shapes Western thought patterns, police it, and set it in narrow tracks. Instead, I read it as finding spaces within, hollows from which to nourish ourselves and give us a different vocabulary of beauty, a beauty that emerges out of connection and movement.

That evening of the poetry banquet, around the table, my students and I discussed this word that vexes me and thrills me, 'cripple', and how it echoes so differently to disabled and non-disabled audiences— an issue often on the table in our shared time, and one that provides much exciting material for discussion. The language-skills of my bones, as well as others in our class community who identify as disabled, read a halting step meter differently than those of someone who strides out straight and full, and we found often that members of crip culture are attuned to the small shifts of pain breath, or fluttering fingers, or a furrow building between the eyes.

In Angel of Healing, Welsh poet laureate Gwyneth Lewis gives voice to a form of the old dicta of ars poetica, of making meaning. Her angel, another mythological figure of poetry, speaks: 'Every disease is a work of art/if you play it rightly:'

She teases out the implications:

'By this he meant: whatever the form

Imposed by arthritis, or by the gout.

Your job's to compose yourself around about

Its formal restrictions, and make that sing,

Even to death [...]'

And yes, the poet's body as the source of a poem's breath shapes the specific alignment of contour ridges and experiences that make sound. Her own sound lilts strongly on my tongue, a tongue that got used and familiar to English sounds in the bilingual valleys of Wales. Lewis's Welsh-English tones are still so much closer to home to me than American poetry. But while I share that kinship with her, crip culture offers me another land and language. To go beyond the individual form, tensely just on the limit, self and non-self, communicating-just-about: that is the trajectory of poetic force. To give a poem a home in the country called disabled, as American poet Neil Marcus does in Disabled Country, means to stake out a claim that goes beyond one's individual body:

If there was a country called disabled,

I would be from there.

I live disabled culture, eat disabled food,

make disabled love, cry disabled tears,

climb disabled mountains and tell disabled stories.

To claim disability as an identity, rather than a shape for an individual body, means struggle, submission, elation, comradeship and a location. The form around which a body of work composes itself is no longer the tension between the abstraction of language and the specificity of one's individual bodily being. Instead, a third can enter: a way of knowing, of feeling, of being in community that does not subsume the individual, but can provide a different baseline, one in which 'the disease' or 'difference' has a different register, and where some things can be left unsaid, implicit, homely— a shared myth. Marcus ends his poem:

In my life's journey

I am making myself

At home in my country

To make oneself at home: to find stories, fit old ones to new landscapes, invent traditions, give birth to language. When American poet Mary Oliver visits the The River Styx, Ohio, and stands at that riverbank, she finds some tenuous connections with her mother and grandmother, but no land to live in:

Dim with arthritis, time, the muddied seasons,

Grandmother poised in the back seat again,

Counting the cows. My mother's tightening fingers

Scratched at the roads that would take us home. On the wheel

I tensed my knuckles, felt the first stab of pain.

I am moved by these lines, by the women's journey, the reach towards connection and touch, and by the weight of that stab in the fingers, holding a pen or moving a keyboard. But my experiences of Styx are more variant, more open, as are my pains after a brief stop by a river. Neither darkness nor claws are 'natural' associates of that pain to me, and what I should enjoy as good poetry riles me, instead. But, Reader, I am not looking for poetry that speaks of thin veils of crystals wrapping themselves around joints, crumbly cartilage in a bloody desert, or plaster casts that break my back. I am not looking to find my own personal imaginary mirrored in crip culture poetry. What I am looking for is the complexity of imagination, the drive towards death and life, and how to find shape and heft that sustains.

Publishing in the UK mental health system survivor journal Poetry Express, Wilma Kenny writes in her poem Odyssey, 'Like a reptile/I clung to a tree of normality', and again, it is myth that gives shape to that which can hardly be spoken, and only painfully heard, as Odysseus, lashed to the mast after stopping up his sailors ears, endures the songs of the sirens. Scavenging on ancient wanderings provide the building materials for shape-shifting habitations. Here, chameleons can find tenuous purchase, a claspings of vowels and consonants that offer a hold.

That land, disabled country, has many shapes, forces and myths— and the Greek myths are some of the building stones, some of the books, that those who claim disabled country can use. We can build contradictory homes, with different keys for different people, make people think of their limbs and their senses, their breath, as they enter our world.

One of the citizens of disabled country is Philip Dowd, an Australian poet. In his poem New/Unnamed, he rides on a different river, catches a different wave, finds and lives a different breath. He also acknowledges access issues in disability culture poetry: an asterisk opens up meaning and explanation, asking me to bring different sensibilities to poetry appreciation, to look beyond a poem's shape on a page. I read and honor this gesture as a commentary on the histories of exclusion crip culture people have faced in education and beyond.

New/Unnamed

By Philip Dowd

Cerebral palsy moves as in tides

Sometimes high, sometimes low,

And I must follow.

Tidally something cosmic

Moves through me

The comic

The forge

Haphaestus.\*

My body changes

Patterns

Become

Shifting

Desert like

The sand and time.

Born again

With each muscular contraction,

The excitement

The challenge

The new me.

begins

\*Greek god of fire and Volcanism was the artisan of

the gods and perceived disabled.

This poem opens me onto a land of contradiction, of watery dryness, tidal burn. Here is a desert forge, a dry basin that is old and new. The lines are short, condensing as they go, to the 'begins'— open-ended, a new sentence, pushing forward. An 'I' appears belated, entering the land of the poem after the conditions of being, those tides— beholden to some other star, or moon, or something that exerts its force. What could be elegiac, long-flowing - an acknowledgment of a control elsewhere, a surrender in romantic verse— is precise, specific, condensing downwards into individual words: 'Haphaestus' and 'begins'. To read this poem, I gasp, quickly, as the lines chop across my breath, making me weigh the length of each syllable, the cost of the word. The intake and outflow of breath are audible to me as I read, again and again, following the punctuations into pauses. Again, a different bodily being presses against my ear, onto my tongue, into my windpipe. I sing a new rhythm into my bones, and enjoy the ride.

Is Dowd singing himself into being, like Whitman did, willing connection—or is he sung? Who sings, and how do Haphaestus's anvil and hammer strike sparks out of movement? The forge is at the heart here: the heat of creation, of coming into being. Hephaestus is the maker-god, the anvil-god, the one who makes nice playthings (like the first woman, Pandora) for the other inmates of Olympus. He is the craftsmen of the gods, who can create out of nothing: poesis. Vulcan in his Roman guise, this god remembers the material of his body. He doesn't just hasten away, unthinking -- for he limps, and better thinks through where he's going. His foot is an undefined mass, yet-to-be-shapen (like Byron's, the devil, the fallen angels) -- always a draw with the poets. He is also Venus's husband, horned a few times, but game for a laugh about it, it seems, if one reads Ovid.

I can hear that hammer coming down, hammering matter into fiery shape, in each breath drilling the lines of the poem, the New/Unnamed, that can be made by the god of cripples. The weight of the hammer, 'a muscular contraction': words are heavy, and create a new beginning. The 'I' of the poem is wrenched between forces of astral bodies, god-bodies, but can withstand the heat, and spreads itself out, 'like sand and time' across a new land, a new body, a new breath. What 'I' this 'begins' will point to, mould and sing, is not fixed yet.

Would a non-crip culture reader read differently? Would the first two words of this poem, 'cerebral palsy' paralyze the reading, would the chopped breath become the in-take of the breath of fear, or worse, of pity? I do not know, since I live by the by-laws and rules of my land, disabled country, even if I rally against them from time to time. I like my insider-status, even if it gives me no more insight into Dowd than my German passport gives me into another citizen there. Tourists are always despised, and there's fun to be had in the crip culture game, where I can suspend the attack of 'palsy', 'paralysed', 'cripple', and 'limp', and riff around their wordy sound.

Poetry, and this skillful rearrangement of words and myths into new countries to live in, can add much to crip culture, measure its width and depth, turn our faces away for moments, at least, from the sub-cultural paradigm that requires us to bravely grin as we grope towards pride. Poetry offers a respite, a site of contradiction, a land uncharted: here be dragons. Indeed, poetry is one of our favorite genres, and many websites, anthologies and performance events speak to the vitality of a form in which structure and freedom can dance around one another for the length of a breath.

# 2nc

### Solvency

**The poetic break redefines the relationship to language. It is impossible to inscribe absolute meaning to any of the poems in the 1NC because they always exist outside of societal laws.**

**Land 92** ( Nick, Lecturer in Continental Philosophy at the University of Warwick, Thirst for Annihilation, Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism, pg 140-141)

Fascism is not so much a symptom of political desperation, as of libidino-religious numbness, a kind of anti-poetry on the streets. Like all policy-obsessed behaviour patterns it is rooted in the humanist dead-end characterized by hysterical struggle for autonomy: self-determination, national self-management, master-races, autarky…all attempts to seal the blister from within, to hide from the ocean. The thought that there might be a political response to fascism makes me laugh. Shall we set our little fascism against their big one? Organize ourselves, become disciplined, maybe we could make ourselves some smart uniforms and stomp about in the street? **Politics is the last great sentimental indulgence of mankind, and it has never achieved anything except a deepened idiocy, more work, more repression**, more pompous ass-holes demanding obedience. Quite naturally we are bored of it to the point of acute sickness. I have no interest at all in groping at power in the blister. What matters is burning a hole through the wall. Bataille was not immune to the political charade, but even his short period of reality-process politicking during 1935-6—when he was deeply involved with the journal Contre-Attaque and its project of radicalizing the Popular Front—is mapped in the labyrinth. The Contre-Attaque mobilization into militant action against fascism, militarism, and capitalism, the ‘Popular Front in the Street’ [I 402], stumbles in a maze of composition and decomposition. War with Germany is a futility because ‘[t]he process of decomposition which has been slow during the course of the last war will begin in France from the beginning of the next’ [I 330]. In his 1933 essay on The Psychological Structure of Fascism Bataille outlines a reemergent theological impulse in which the heterogeneous or decompositional element is deployed paradoxically as an operator of social integration, tending to the fascist state as a secularized divine order. The quasi-fascist undertow of his own politicized work—which he laments in a text from 1958—has less to do with the exultation of violence, than with its concession to counterdiscipline: What decides social destiny today is the organic creation of a vast composition of forces, disciplined, fanatical, capable of exercising an implacable authority in the day to come. Such a composition of forces must group together all those who do not accept the course to the abyss—to ruin and to war—of a capitalist society without head and without eyes…[I 380]. Capital is a headless lurch into the abyss, an acephalic catastrophe. What Bataille recoils from at this moment is not the claustrophobic managerial profanity of capital, but its psychotic flow into ruin: We see that the masses of humanity remain at the disposal of blind forces which dedicate them to inexplicable hecatombs… [I 402]. The vocabulary of such writings does not jar against the deep currents of his slide into the sacred, but its evaluative impulse is almost wholly reactive; a tawdry Leninist voluntarism fixated upon control. I think of these 1930s texts as parodic, they are humorous and lively, a definite advance upon the austere preachings so prevalent on the left. They are, in any case, at best a joke. Who is more attentive than Bataille to the vacuity of manifestos, programmes, policy statements, declarations of commitment? **The destruction of language is not my act [fait] but does not have a place in me except by destroying me, like the act of the moment which has suppressed me (I speak now but in vain**) [IV 167]. ‘The impossible is the basis of being’ [III 41]. To write is poverty and captivity if it is not wreckage upon the impossible, because the impossible is not a margin, a fissure, a border-zone, but an immensity compared to which the possible shrivels to the edge of nothing. ‘I even believe that in a sense my stories clearly attain the impossible’ [III 101], and that is why they matter, why The Blue of Noon is of immeasurably greater importance than the Contre-Attaque posturings, why in contrast to Sade—who sought ‘an impossible freedom’ [IX 242]—Lenin is a ranting dwarf.‘—IMPOSSIBLE! she cried’ [IV 51], ‘read or work? it was impossible’ [IV 59]. The Hatred for Poetry, renamed The Impossible, exempts Baudelaire and Rimbaud from the complacency of words that resign themselves to the cramped box of the possible. Insipid lyricism vaunts itself as another possible type of language, a type that is elevated, beautiful, ethereal. True poetry is outside laws. But poetry, in the end, accepts poetry’ [III 218]. Bataille vomits, but the ‘poetry of Baudelaire—or that of Rimbaud—never inspires that hatred in me’ [III 513], and from the start Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche insists that—unlike the language of fascism—Nietzsche’s texts are labyrinths, with no hint of the directive, no politics [I 450-2], only the voyage into the impossible, the will to chance. Utter confusion. ‘Those moments, he said, where everything is divine, because everything is impossible. (Impossible above all to explain, to speak)’ [IV 146]. Only when human relationships collapse in darkness and pain is there worth. ‘Between her and me there was never anything possible’ [IV 233]. At first, death surrounds us with an endless silence as an island is surrounded by water. But there, precisely, is the unsalable. What importance have words which do not pierce this silence[?] What importance in speaking of ‘moment of the tomb’ [moment de tombe], when each word is nothing for as long as it has not attained the beyond of words[?]

Bayliss 09 (Phil Bayliss School of Education and Lifelong Learning, University of Exeter Against Interpretosis: Deleuze, Disability, and Difference Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies)

The space of what Deleuze and Guattari call the arborescent—determined through prescribing pathways of development—Others the child as different deficient, disordered (the alterity of the body creates difference). Othering is conditioned by the stratum (discursive practices), which inscribes the face. This Othering, created by Foucauldian hierarchical observation, normalizing judg- ment, and examination, restricts and normalizes. Once normalized, the child has a face and becomes Other through the operation of: an inspecting gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorizing to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself. A superb formula: power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be minimal cost. (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 155) The child becomes content—not understood as child—but expressed through the signifiance of special educational need, the disabled. These generic categor- ies lie on the stratum (outside the child), but through faciality and inscription, the content is written on the body of the child. The school as the main (arborescent) discipline for creating Other disrupts the engagement of the child with lines of flows within an (unordered) smooth space that lies outside of the discipline of docile bodies, on the plane of consist- ency. Todd May shows how Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate that the norma- tive government of practice is located in the Socius. If we conceive of social networks as ordered (arborescent), these seem to be consistent with a concept of what Tonnies calls Gesellschaft, where the idea of community (the Socius) is predicated on common interest (the commonal- ity of faces— does your face fit?). Through Othering and faciality/signifiance, the individual disabled child is pre-figured (as disordered) and through Ges- ellschaft, is outside. The arborescent, transcendental, pre-figured community, defines membership and is disrupted by the broken body—it is difficult for the disabled child to become a member. In contrast to the arborescent, Deleuze and Guattari postulate the rhizomatic: A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences and social struggles. A semi- otic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, cognitive: there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, patois, slangs and specialized lan- guages. There is no ideal speaker-listener, any more than there is an homogeneous linguistic community. (Plateaus 7) The rhizomatic chimes with what Kristeva describes as poetics: Only in poetic language is found the practical realization of the “totality” (though we prefer the term “infinity”) of the code at man’s (sic) disposition. In this perspective, literary practice is revealed to be the discovery and the explorations of the possibilities of language; an activity that frees man from certain linguistic (psychical, social) net- works; a dynamism that breaks the inertia of language-habits and offers the linguist a unique opportunity to study the becoming of the signification of signs (signifiance). (28) Poetics constitute a semiotic of infinite possibilities embedded within ordinary language, which escape significance, through exploring signifiance. Signifiance allows for the development of creative transgressive meaning, while a level of signification presumes a socially instituted and socially controlled meaning. Poetry, in Kristeva’s sense of signifiance, allows for transgressive readings of disability.2 If we challenge the arborescent and deterritorialize and reterritorialize on poetic networks these are predicated on Gemeinschaft (Tonnies, community based on blood or kinship) and also sharing. Jean-Luc Nancy, in The Inopera- tive Community, argues for a concept of community, which only comes into being through the enactment (performance) of sharing/community. In Nancy’s terms, a community is not prefigured or signified: the act of sharing the com- munity comes into being as a coming into presence. The psychological or tran- scendental perspective (interpretosis) inscribes community as sharing post hoc: a principle is established which both requires and defines membership that pre- constitutes both the individual and the principle of being-in-the-community. This is a form of totalitarianism. However, sharing in Nancy’s sense, does not pre-figure or totalize that sharing: it is an action (performance), not a state for which principles can be adduced a priori, i.e., performance is not an order-word. Sharing co-constitutes both individual and community. In some cultures (e.g., Mongolian nomadic society), sharing underpins survival and, in the sense I am writing here, brotherhood, which transcends the subject-as-individual, is shar- ing. This idea of sharing and its relationship to community allows for reflection within either an arborescently structured Socius, or one that is unstructured rhizomatically. Is the Socius a striated or smooth space? In Mongolian culture, nomadism (the rhizomatic) is co-terminous and contiguous with sedentary culture: the arborescent (Moses and Halkovic). In Deleuze and Guattari’s writing, nomadism is a metaphor for escape (deterrito- rialization). Stanley Stewart, in his history of the Mongol Empire and the revision of Chingiss Khan’s reputation as a great leader of the largest empire the world has known, shows that when Chingiss died his broken body was revered and thewar machine went to a lot of trouble to guard both his body and his spirit. The broken body here (for Chingiss) is not ordered on a stratum, which belongs to the sedentary (facialized as Other/disabled), instead the brotherhood of the war machine ensured sharing and maintained a spirit, which overcame the body. Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadology and the nomadic war machine consti- tutes the war-band (the outside minorities) through sharing; the immanent projective narratives of minoritarian fictions create and enable the war-band; they bring it in to being, they do not disable it. The war machine rejects the sedentary. If the sharing can be maintained through epic (oral) poetry and myth, then stories create the war machine, they also create the projective narrative of what it means to share in the community, by performing community. The minoritarian fictions of community (in Nancy’s sense of the shared com- munity) follow poetics, not interpretosis. The mythic (following Kristeva) offers forms of expression and enunciation, which does not abstract content, and counteracts the imperialism of language. The use of poetics allows transgressive meanings to be developed by both the self (as the possibility of writing the self/projective (auto)biography) and the audience. The potential transgressive meanings are not dictated by the author; a poetics offers alternative linguistic networks, which offer counter-cultural narrative possibilities. Self (or identity) is no longer dependent on Battersby’s grand narratives, but is rather an emergent property between self and audience, as Nicholas Abercrombie and Brian Longhurst demonstrate in Audiences. Such emergence is locational and temporal. Giles Perring, in writing about performance and people with learning dif- ficulties, argues that: an objective (of counter-cultural narratives is one) that challenges mainstream cultur- al and aesthetic precepts and views about disability. It often flows from a perception of the value of transgressive and nonnormative qualities in learning-disabled people creating a concern for addressing their marginalisation and institutionalisation. (186)

School destroys fictions by replacing them with eternal truths that must be learned—these, following Walter Ong, are a property of literacy, as opposed to oracy, and are not created. The projective narrative of disability sees impair- ment as the defining characteristic of facialized bodies. Challenging faciality, the storied-self moves between the episodic and the narrative self, between the oral and the literate, between the ordered and the disordered. We under- stand broken bodies from stories of the war-band, not the universal (totalizing) discourses of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM–IV) and the Inter-national Classification of Disability, Impairments and Handicaps (ICIDH–2). The movement between the ordered and the disordered symbolizes a land- scape and the writings of Deleuze and Guattari conjure images of nomads, who occupy smooth space: Smooth (vectorial, projective, or topological) space and ... striated space: in the first case “space is occupied without being counted” and in the second case “space is count- ed in order to be occupied” ... the nomad has a territory; he follows customary paths he goes from one point to another; he is not ignorant of points ... But the question is what in nomad life is a principle and what is only a consequence. To begin with, although the points determine paths, they are strictly subordinated to the paths they determine, the reverse of what happens with the sedentary. ... Second, even though the nomadic trajectory may follow trails or customary routes, it does not fulfill the function of the sedentary road, which is to parcel out a closed space to people, assigning each person a share and regulating the communication between shares. The nomadic trajectory does the opposite: it distributes people or animals in an open space, one that is indef- inite and noncommunicating. (Plateaus 362–363, 380) Outcomes-based education, the sociology of health, the programmes of the carcereal, all these define the arborescent, the sedentary, the measurable. They allocate closed spaces; they define both the destination and the road (‘travelling through the landscape’). The final destination (solution?) denies the journey to the DSM–IV’ed child and the diagnosed body. They cannot keep up, they cannot make it… Physical journeys along roads need bodies, eyes, and minds. Nomadic journeys in the landscape need none of these.

Bayliss 09 (Phil Bayliss School of Education and Lifelong Learning, University of Exeter Against Interpretosis: Deleuze, Disability, and Difference Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies)

Deleuze and Guattari exhort us to escape, to deterritorialize: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities, segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times …, experiment, living-in-itself; connect, conjugate, continue: a “whole diagram,” as opposed to still signifying and subjective programmes. (Plateaus 161) Fiction, poetics, and performance offer the experiment of transgressive texts. The increasing use of video media (YouTube) by, for example, Mat Fraser, Amanda Baggs, Bill Shannon, and, in the UK, Channel 4: The Comedy Lab, and many others use the transactions among text, audience, and performer (author) to challenge the faciality of disability. Rosenblatt, in her book The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the Literary Work, reassigns the relationship of the author and the audience, where these two co-constitute each other. A poem is what happens when text is brought into the reader’s mind and the words begin to function aesthetically, creating the landscape. It is the act of reading that creates the meaning of the text. In this sense a text is not authored. Petra Kuppers in her engagement with poetry demonstrates the necessity of a poetic imagination in reconfiguring crip culture—something that is hard and personal: In many ways, I think ... poems and their performance of meaning clasp something of crip culture’s force. I, and you, and we want to know what it is like to live, and to live like that, and want to tell, but the telling is hard, difficult, personal, made impossible by the slip of the knife in a word, and the word gabbling on the page. And the force of connection denied can throw us momentarily, but never for ever: that’s life, and I just have to try again. (“Performing Determinism” 103) The nomadic landscape evades the spatialization from which arborescent pro- grammes spring. If my reading of Deleuze and Guattari is correct, facialization is natural (a function of what it means to be human, to belong to a tribe). This is to suggest that if we challenge interpretosis, we do not eradicate facialization. Transgressive cultural actions do not remove faces, but replace them. An aes- thetic based on poetics creates different faces. Further, in her conversation with Neil Marcus, Kuppers concludes: Disabled lives cannot just be celebrated, represented in affirming positive images. By focusing your explorations on sexuality, you speak to the insecurities all people share, to thoughts about isolation, desire, despair, body image, connection. And you speak to the ordinariness of connection: not (necessarily) grand love, the opera of romance, but the small acts of connection that sustain and nourish people. I see performance as a machine that produces difference: as a poetry machine that makes people and words, metaphors and stories, bodies and breaths touch each other. In performance, we can create a hundred words for “disabled.” (“Contact/Disability Performance” 151) Here, disability is located in the normal (in the sense of the everyday, not in the sense of the normal/abnormal distinction). As a concept it ceases to be thing, but asserts itself as relationship. Disabled people are people—through performance we can create a hundred words for people. Performance, based on challenging existing faciality, challenges narrative prostheses. The narrative performances of Amanda Baggs and Bill Shannon, and others, do not stand as metaphors for the Socius; instead they deterritorialize the concept of dis- ability away from broken bodies and reterritorialize it on the concept of per- son and the lived experience of difference. Goodchild states that a Deleuzian “renounces life in opinion and representation in the hope of finding life in experience” and “Deleuzean ethics counterpose affirmation to judgement: they restore encounter. Ethics concern relations rather than representations” (207). Creativity and experiment—through media-based and narrative texts, through transformation of logos into mythos—is based on encounter. The development of counter-cultural narratives disrupts ableism, through affirming difference, not judging it.

#### Static Goals – The 1ac has set forth a particular strategy for liberation that is contingent on specific demands of the system. Deleuze and Guattari 1972 (Gilles and Felix; Anti-Oedipus) 167-169

Victor Turner gives a remarkable example of such a cure among the Ndembu. The example is the more striking-to our perverted eyes for the fact that, at first glance, everything appears Oedipal. Effeminate, insufferable, vain, failing at everything he tries, the sick K is preyed upon by the ghost of his maternal grandfather, who cruelly reproaches him. Although the Ndembu are matrilineal and must live with their maternal kin, K has stayed an exceptionally long time in the matrilineage of his father, whose favorite he was, and has entered into marriage with paternal cousins. But with the death of his father he is driven away, and returns to the maternal village. There his house expresses his situation well, being wedged between two sectors, the houses of the members of the paternal group and those belonging to his own matrilineage. How does the divination, responsible for indicating the cause of the illness, proceed, and the medical cure responsible for treating it? The teeth are the cause, the two top incisors of the ancestor hunter, contained in a sacred pouch, but which can escape from the pouch and penetrate the body of the sick man. In order to diagnose and ward off the effects of the incisor, the soothsayer and the medicine man launch into a social analysis concerning the territory and its environs, the chieftainship and its subchieftainships, the lineages and their segments, the alliances and the filiations: they constantly bring to light desire in its relations with political and economic units-the very point on which, moreover, the witnesses try to mislead them. "Divination becomes a form of social analysis in the course of which hidden struggles between individuals and factions are brought to light, in such a way that they can be treated by traditional ritual methods ... , the vague nature of mystical beliefs allowing them to be manipulated in relation to a great number of social situations." It seems that the pathological incisor is indeed mainly that of the maternal grandfather. But the latter was a great chief; his successor, the "real chief," had had to relinquish the throne for fear of being bewitched, and his would-be heir, intelligent and ambitious, does not exercise the power; the actual chief is not the real chief; as for the sick K, he has not been able to assume the role of mediator that could have made him a candidate for chief. Everything becomes complicated because of the colonizer-colonized relations: the English have not recognized the chieftainship; the impoverished village is falling into decrepitude (the two sectors of the village result from a fusion of two groups that have fled the English; the elders bemoan the current decadence). The medicine man does not organize a sociodrama, but a veritable group analysis centering on the sick individual. Giving him potions, attaching horns to his body for drawing up the incisor, making the drums beat, the medicine man proceeds with a ceremony interrupted by halts and fresh departures, flows of all sorts, flows of words and breaks: the members of the village come to talk, the sick subject talks, the ghost is invoked, the medicine man explains, everything recommences, drums, chants, trances. It is not only a question of discovering the preconscious investments of a social field by interests, but-more profoundly-its unconscious investments by desire, such as they pass by way of the sick person's marriages, his position in the village, and all the positions of a chief lived in intensity within the group.

We said that the point of departure seemed Oedipal. It was only the point of departure for us, conditioned to say Oedipus every time someone speaks to us of father, mother, grandfather. In fact, the Ndembu analysis was never Oedipal: it was directly plugged into social organization and disorganization; sexuality itself, through the women and the marriages, was just such an investment of desire; the parents played the role of stimuli in it, and not the role of group organizers (or disorganizers)-the role held by the chief and his personages. Rather than everything being reduced to the name of the father, or that of the maternal grandfather, the latter opened onto all the names of history. Instead of everything being projected onto a grotesque hiatus of castration, everything was scattered in the thousand breaks-flows of the chieftainships, the lineages, the relations of colonization. The whole interplay of races, clans, alliances, and filiations, this entire historical and collective drift: exactly the opposite of the Oedipal analysis, when it stubbornly crushes the content of a delirium, when it stuffs it with all its might into "the symbolic void of the father." Or rather, if it is true that the analysis doesn't even begin as Oedipal, except to our way of seeing, doesn't it become Oedipal nevertheless, in a certain way-and in what way? Yes, it becomes Oedipal in part, under the effect of colonization. The colonizer, for example, abolishes the chieftainship, or uses it to further his own ends (and he uses many other things besides: the chieftainship is only a beginning). The colonizer says: your father is your father and nothing else, or your maternal grandfather-don't mistake them for chiefs; you can go have yourself triangulated in your corner, and place your house between those of your paternal and maternal kin; your family is your family and nothing else; sexual reproduction no longer passes through those points, although we rightly need your family to furnish a material that will be subjected to a new order of reproduction. Yes, then, an Oedipal framework is outlined for the dispossessed primitives: a shantytown Oedipus. We have seen, however, that the colonized remained a typical example of resistance to Oedipus: in fact, that's where the Oedipal structure does not manage to close itself, and where the terms of the structure remained stuck to the agents of oppressive social reproduction, either in a struggle or in a complicity: the White Man, the missionary, the tax collector, the exporter of goods, the person with standing in the village who becomes the agent of the administration, the elders who curse the White Man, the young people who enter into a political struggle, etc. Both are true: the colonized resists oedipalization, and oedipalization tends to close around him again. To the degree that there is oedipalization, it is due to colonization, and it is necessary to add oedipalization to all the methods that Jaulin was able to describe in La paix blanche. "The condition of the colonized can lead to a reduction in the humanization of the universe, so that any solution that is sought will be a solution on the scale of the individual and the restricted family, with, by way of consequence, an extreme anarchy or disorder at the level of the collective: an anarchy whose victim will always be the individual-with the exception of those who occupy the key positions in such a system, namely the colonizers, who, during this same period when the colonized reduce the universe, will tend to extend it."\* Oedipus is something like euthanasia within ethnocide. The more social reproduction escapes the members of the group, in nature and in extension, the more it falls back on them, or reduces them to a restricted and neuroticized familial reproduction whose agent is Oedipus.

#### Borderz - The affirmative constructs a world of borders, spaces wherein bodies can be classified and categorized by the sovereign. This categorization allows for infinite colonial violence against the Other, as bodies are partitioned into categories and controlled.

**Conley in 2006** (Verena Andermatt, professor of literature at Harvard, “Borderlines; Deleuze and the Contemporary World, 95-100)

 Over the last few decades, decolonisation, transportation, and electronic revolutions have transformed the world. They have led to financial and population flows. Financial flows seem to be part of a borderless world. Today, human migrations occur on all continents. They are producing multiple crossings of external borders that in many places have resulted in local resistance and, in reaction, to the erection of more internal borders that inflect new striated spaces in the form of racism and immigration policy. The ultimate goal for the utopian thinker espousing the cause of rhizomatic thinking is smooth space that would entail the erasure of all borders and the advent of a global citizenry living in ease and without the slightest conflict over religion or ideology. In the transitional moment in which we find ourselves arguing for smooth space can easily lead to a non-distinction between alternative spaces in which goods and currencies circulate to the detriment of the world at large.To account for the transformation specifically of the state and its subjects in a global world, I will argue by way of recent writings by Etienne Balibar for the continued importance of rhizomatic connectivity and also for a qualified notion of smooth space. Striated spaces will have to be continually smoothed so that national borders would not simply encircle a territory. Borders would have to be made more porous and nationality disconnected from citizenship so as to undo striated space inside the state by inventing new ways of being in common. Such a rethinking of borders would lead to further transformations by decoupling the nation from the state. It would open possibilities of – rhizomatic – connections and new spaces. It would produce new hybrids everywhere without simply a ‘withering away of the state’ as advocated by Deleuze and Guattari. Currently, subjects (defined as humans who are *asseuttis* [subjected] to paternal state power)also want to be citizens (who can individually and collectively define the qualities of their *habitus* or environment). Yet, the latter are still part of the state. They are not yet entirely global, transnational citizens or cyber-citizens. While information networks seem to operate like rhizomes, it is of continued importance to retain the notion of state but to define it with more porous, connective borderlines so as ultimately to **disconnect citizens from nationality**. Deleuze and Guattari figure with other philosophers, anthropologists or sociologists who, following 1968, pay renewed attention to space. Their focus on space reappears at the very time Cartesian philosophies undergo radical changes due to the acceleration of new technologies and rapid globalisation. Many thinkers – Henri Lefebvre, Michel de Certeau, Jean Baudrillard, Paul Virilio – condemn what they perceive as the increasing encroachment of technologies that quickly replace more traditional ways of being in the world. People who find themselves out of synch with their environment urge recourse to the body and new ways of using language. Deleuze and Guattari insert themselves into that line of thinking. Their criticism of the static order is twofold. They criticise an inherited spatial model defined by vertical orderings that has dominated the West. In that model, space was considered to be pre-existing. It became a simple décor for human action. Deleuze and Guattari propose not only a criticism of the static model but also invent an entirely new way of thinking space. They propose a more horizontal – and, paradoxically, if seemingly two-dimensional, even more spatial – thinking of the world in terms of rhizomatic lines and networks. In accordance with Deleuze and Guattari’s way of thinking through connections, the two regimes always coexist in an asymmetrical relation. They can never be entirely separated or opposed. In ‘Rhizome’, first published in French in 1976 and translated into English as ‘On the Line’, Deleuze and Guattari claim that for several hundred years it was believed that the world was developing vertically in the shape of a tree (Deleuze and Guattari 1983). The choice of a tree limits possibilities. The mature tree is already contained in the seed. There is some leeway as to form and size, but the seed will become nothing more than the tree that it is destined to be. In lieu of the tree, Deleuze and Guattari propose an adventitious network, a mobile structure that can be likened to underground filaments of grass or the mycelia of fungi. A rhizome moves horizontally and produces offshoots from multiple bifurcations at its meristems. It changes its form by connecting and reconnecting. It does not have a finite or ultimate shape. Space does not pre-exist the rhizome; rather, it is created through and between the proliferating lines. Rhizomes connect and open spaces in-between which, in the rooted world of the tree, an inside (the earth) is separated from an outside (the atmosphere). Unlike the tree, the rhizome can never be fixed or reduced to a single point or radical core. Its movement is contrasted with the stasis of the arborescent model. In ‘Rhizome’ the vertical, arborescent model contributes to the creation of striated spaces. In the ebullient imagination of the two authors it appears that the latter slow down and even prevent movement of the kind they associate with emancipation and creativity. Instead of imitating a tree, Deleuze and Guattari exhort their readers to make connections by following multiple itineraries of investigation, much as a rhizome moves about the surface it creates as it goes. Rhizomes form a territory that is neither fixed nor bears any clearly delimited borders. In addition to this novel way of thinking, rhizomatically, the philosophers make further distinctions between smooth and striated spaces. Smooth spaces allow optimal circulation and favour connections. Over time, however, smooth spaces tend to become striated. They lose their flexibility. Nodes and barriers appear that slow down circulation and reduce the number of possible connections. Writing *Anti-Oedipus* in a post-1968 climate, Deleuze and Guattari propose rhizomatic connections that continually rearticulate smooth space in order not only to criticise bourgeois capitalism with its institutions – the family, **school**, church, **the medical establishment** (especially psychiatry) – but also to avoid what they see as a deadened or zombified  state of things. They criticise the state for erecting mental and social barriers and for creating oppositions instead of furthering connections.Institutions and the state are seen as the villains that control and immobilize people from the top down. They argue that when the family, the church or the ‘psy’ instill guilt in a child, mental barriers and borders are erected. The child’s creativity, indeed its mental and physical mobility are diminished in the process. Such a condition cripples many adults who have trees growing in their heads. Deleuze and Guattari cite the example of Little Hans, a child analysed by Freud and whose creativity, they declare, was blocked by adults who wrongly interpreted his attempts to trace lines of flight within and through the structure of the family into which he had been born (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 14). The state, too, functions by ordering, organizing and arresting movement, by creating relations of inclusion and exclusion. The state facilitates the creation of rigid and often ossified institutions. It enacts laws of inclusion and exclusion that order the family and the social in general. It tries to immobilize and dominate the social world. Yet the social cannot be entirely dominated. The organising régime of the order-word is never stable. It is constantly being transformed. Lines detach themselves from fuzzy borders and introduce variations in the constant of the dominant order. These variations can lead to a break and produce lines of flight that bring about entirely new configurations. Of importance in the late 1960s and 1970s is the doing away with institutions and the state that represses subjects. In *Anti-Oedipus*, the philosophers show how institutions like the family and psychiatry repress sexuality and desire in order to maximize their revenue. They argue for the creation of smooth spaces where desire can circulate freely. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, the bourgeois state ordered by the rules of capitalism is criticised. Deleuze and Guattari rarely contexualise the ‘state’ in any specific historical or political terms. Constructing a universal history of sorts, the philosophers note that the state apparatus appears at different times and in different places. This apparatus is always one of capture. It appropriates what they call a ‘nomadic war machine’ that never entirely disappears. The nomadic war machine eludes capture and traces its own lines of flight. It makes its own smooth spaces. Here Deleuze and Guattari have faith in ‘subjects’ who undermine control by creating new lines of flight. These subjects deviate from the dominant order that uses ‘order-words’ to obtain control. Order-words produce repetitions and reduce differences. They produce molar structures and aggregates that make it more difficult for new lines to take flight. Yet something stirs, something affects a person enough to make her or him deviate from the prescriptive meanings of these words. Deleuze and Guattari would say that the subject molecularises the molar structures imposed by the state. People continually trace new maps and invent lines of flight that open smooth spaces. Deleuze and Guattari call it a ‘becoming-revolutionary’ of the people. In 1980, the philosophers also claim that humans inaugurate an age of becoming-minoritarian. The majority, symbolized by the 35-year-old, white, working male, they declare, no longer prevails. A new world is opening, a world of becoming-minoritarian in which women, Afro-American, post-colonial and queer subjects of all kinds put the dominant order into variation. Changes of this nature occur at the limit of mental and social territories, from unstable borders without any clearly defined division between inside and outside. They occur in and through affects, desire and language. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-minoritarian must be accompanied by a withering of the state and its institutions without which any generalized transformation would be impossible. Thought they make clear in ‘Rhizome’ that the connections they advocate are different from those of computers that function according to binary oppositions, the philosophers keep open the possibilities of transformations of subjectivities by means of technologies (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 475).Deleuze and Guattari are keenly aware both of the ways that technologies transform subjectivities *and* of writing in a postcolonial, geopolitical context. Nonetheless, they write about the state in a rather general and even monolithic way without specifically addressing a given ‘nation-state’. It is as if the real villain were a general European concept of state inherited from the romantic age. The institutional apparatus of the state dominates and orders its subjects, preventing them from being creative or pursuing their desires. It keeps them from making revolutionary connections (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 473). To construct rhizomes and create smooth spaces for an optimal circulation of desire, the state, armed with its ‘order-words’, has to be fought until, finally, it withers away and, in accord with any and every utopian scenario, all identity is undone.

#### Thus we must refuse the notion of foreignness, the notion

**Billig 1995 –** prof of social sciences at U of Loughborough. (Michael, “Banal Nationalism.” Sage publications. p. 80-82) CMR \*Italics in original\*

Nationalists live in an international world, and their ideology is itself an international ideology. Without constant observation of the world of other nation, nationalists would be unable to claim that their nations meet the universal codes of nationhood. Nor would they have ready access to stereotyped judgments about foreigners. Even the most extreme and unbanal of nationalists do not shut out the outside world from consciousness, but often show an obsessive concern with the lives and outlooks of foreigners. Hitler’s *Table-Talk* is filled with speculations about the characters of different nations. One illustrative example, taken from 1942, can be given. Martin Bormann had apparently lent his Fuhrer a book entitled *Juan in America*, itself an indicative action. Hitler opines lengthily, while his admirers listen:

The British swallow everything they are told … [Americans] have the brains of a hen … the German Reich has two hundred and seventy opera houses – a standard of cultural existence of which they have no conception … Spaniards and Americans simply cannot understand each other … the Americans live like sows. (1988, pp. 604-5)

And so on. Hitler speaks a continuing stream of stereotypes, as he surveys the rest of the world from his camp at Rastenburg.

Social psychologists frequently assume that narrow, bigoted thinking is characterized by the use of stereotypes. If the imagining of foreignness is an integral part of the theoretical consciousness of nationalism, then **foreignness is not an undifferentiated sense of ‘Otherness’** (McDonald, 1993). Obsessively fine distinctions can be made between different grounds of foreigners. Indeed, debates and controversies can arise about how similar or how different various groups of foreigners are to ‘us.’ In one of the earliest studies of stereotyping, Katz and Braly (1935) showed the extend to which white, American college students used conventional labels to characterize different ethnic and national groups: Jews were mercenary, Turks were cruel, Germans efficient, etc. Later studies have indicated a decline in respondents’ willingness to use such generalizing stereotypes (Gilbert, 1951; Karlins et al., 1969). The stereotypes of other nations tend not to be uniformly scornful. Some foreigners are presumed to be more meritorious than others. Thus, Katz and Brly found that some foreign national types, such as the Germans, were praised in ways which others, especially non-European nations, were not.

Stereotypes are shared, cultural descriptions of social groups. Even respondents, who might themselves claim to be skeptical about the truths of the stereotypes, recognize a culturally shared scale of valuations (Devine, 1989). Some foreigners are identified as being stereotyped as more admirable, and more like ‘us’ than others. (Hagendoorn, 1993a; Hagendoorn and Hraba, 1987; Hagendoorn and Kleinpenning, 1991). Inglehart (1991), examining the national attitudes of members of European nations, found that, with the exception of Italians, members of all nations rated their own nation as the must trustworthy. However, not all foreigners were rated equally untrustworthy. Members of small, non-Mediterranean European nations, such as Danes, Swiss and Dutch, tended to be rated more trustworthy, even by Mediterranean respondents. In short, it is commonplace that stereotyped distinctions are made between different sorts of foreigners.

Public opinion polls suggest that there is nothing static in the stereotyped judgements. Foreign stocks can rise and fall, in accord with the movements of political crises. The favourable stereotypes of Germans, which Katz and Braly (1935) found, declined as the United States prepared to enter the Second World War (Harding et al., 954). Most dramatic was the change in American judgments of the Russians, who, in 1945, switched from being heroic allies to bitterest rivals (Yatani and Bramel, 1989). With the collapse of Soviet communism, the American public has been presented with new enemies – whether Libyans, Iraqis or Arabs in general. With prolonged conflicts, a ‘siege mentality’ can develop, in which stereotypes become rigid, and the enemy is demonized with regular ferocity (Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990; Silverstein and Flamenbaum, 1989(. Sudden crises can produce quickly sharpened stereotypes, as, for eample, the emergency of ‘the ARgie’ in the British media during the Falklands War (Harris, 1985). The quickly summoned stereotype will build upon older cultural myths, although there might be some initial uncertainty how these should be combined. One member of the British war cabinet was reported as wondering whether the Argentinians would actually go to war, given their half-Italian and half-Spanish ancestry. “There’s no precedent”, he said, because “if the Spanish half is uppermost, they’ll fight, if the Italian, they won’t” (quoted in Young, 1993, p. 278).

Stereotypes are often means of distinguishing ‘them’ from ‘us’, thereby contributing to ‘our’ claims of a unique identity. In the eighteenth century, Britain developed many of its modern symbols of nationhood in conscious contradictions to French styles of nation-making (Cannadine, 1983; Colley, 1992). English writers debated whether there should be an English Academy, but the idea was rejected as being too French (Haugen, 1966a). The first recorded cartoon, depicting John Bull as an ‘Englishman’, also shows a Frenchman, as thin and meager as Bull is fat and generous (Surel, 1989). In this case, the iconographic stereotype of ‘us’ was created in contrastive differentiation from the stereotype of ‘them’. The point is not merely a historical one, but there is an implicit contrast in the stereotyped judgment of ‘them’ (McCauly et al., 1980; Stangor and Ford, 1992). Typically, people ascribe more stereotypic traits to outgroups than to ingroups; ‘we’ often assume ‘ourselves’ as the standard, or the unmarked normality, against which ‘their’ deviations appear notable (Quattrone, 1986). If ‘they, the French’ are stereotyped as ‘emotional’, it is with implicit reference to ‘our’ presumed, non-emotional standards. Or conversely another group might be stereotyped as ‘cold’, whereas ‘we’ will be neither ‘cold’ (too cold) nor ‘emotional’ (too emotional).

There is always the possibility of projection, as Kristeva realized in her descriptions of ‘foreignness’. ‘We’ can claim that ‘they’ possess the qualities, which ‘we’ deny in ‘ourselves’. In Western democracies, ‘our’ tolerance is much praised by ‘ourselves’. Journalists and politicians, especially when arguing for immigration restrictions, cite ‘our’ tolerance, and ‘their’ intolerance, as a reason for excluding ‘them’, the foreigners (Barker, 1981; Van Dijk, 1991, 1992, 1993). The rhetoric denies ‘our’ prejudice and in condenses an argumentative structure, which attributes intolerance to ‘them’; ‘our’ tolerance is threatened by ‘their’ presence; ‘they’ are either intolerant or cause intolerance; thus, ‘**we’ seek to exclude ‘them’**, not because ‘we’ are intolerant but, quite the reverse, because ‘we’ are tolerant (Billig, 1991; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). In **conditions of the ‘siege mentality’**, it is always the ‘other’ who breaks faith, acts dishonestly and starts aggressive spirals: ‘our’ actions are justified by circumstance, but ‘theirs’ are said to reflect a deficiency of character, indeed the very deficiencies which ‘we’ deny in ‘ourselves (Pettigrew, 1979; Rothbard and Hallmark, 1988).

#### The University – by positioning themselves as radical teaches within the institution of the classroom, the affirmative has foreclosed the possibility of a queer cripple. Who has access to the classroom, who get taught radical prision abolition? Certainly not the crippled child who education has to special.

### A2 Churchill

**The poetic break redefines the relationship to language. It is impossible to inscribe absolute meaning to any of the poems in the 1NC because they always exist outside of societal laws.**

**Land 92** ( Nick, Lecturer in Continental Philosophy at the University of Warwick, Thirst for Annihilation, Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism, pg 140-141)

Fascism is not so much a symptom of political desperation, as of libidino-religious numbness, a kind of anti-poetry on the streets. Like all policy-obsessed behaviour patterns it is rooted in the humanist dead-end characterized by hysterical struggle for autonomy: self-determination, national self-management, master-races, autarky…all attempts to seal the blister from within, to hide from the ocean. The thought that there might be a political response to fascism makes me laugh. Shall we set our little fascism against their big one? Organize ourselves, become disciplined, maybe we could make ourselves some smart uniforms and stomp about in the street? **Politics is the last great sentimental indulgence of mankind, and it has never achieved anything except a deepened idiocy, more work, more repression**, more pompous ass-holes demanding obedience. Quite naturally we are bored of it to the point of acute sickness. I have no interest at all in groping at power in the blister. What matters is burning a hole through the wall. Bataille was not immune to the political charade, but even his short period of reality-process politicking during 1935-6—when he was deeply involved with the journal Contre-Attaque and its project of radicalizing the Popular Front—is mapped in the labyrinth. The Contre-Attaque mobilization into militant action against fascism, militarism, and capitalism, the ‘Popular Front in the Street’ [I 402], stumbles in a maze of composition and decomposition. War with Germany is a futility because ‘[t]he process of decomposition which has been slow during the course of the last war will begin in France from the beginning of the next’ [I 330]. In his 1933 essay on The Psychological Structure of Fascism Bataille outlines a reemergent theological impulse in which the heterogeneous or decompositional element is deployed paradoxically as an operator of social integration, tending to the fascist state as a secularized divine order. The quasi-fascist undertow of his own politicized work—which he laments in a text from 1958—has less to do with the exultation of violence, than with its concession to counterdiscipline: What decides social destiny today is the organic creation of a vast composition of forces, disciplined, fanatical, capable of exercising an implacable authority in the day to come. Such a composition of forces must group together all those who do not accept the course to the abyss—to ruin and to war—of a capitalist society without head and without eyes…[I 380]. Capital is a headless lurch into the abyss, an acephalic catastrophe. What Bataille recoils from at this moment is not the claustrophobic managerial profanity of capital, but its psychotic flow into ruin: We see that the masses of humanity remain at the disposal of blind forces which dedicate them to inexplicable hecatombs… [I 402]. The vocabulary of such writings does not jar against the deep currents of his slide into the sacred, but its evaluative impulse is almost wholly reactive; a tawdry Leninist voluntarism fixated upon control. I think of these 1930s texts as parodic, they are humorous and lively, a definite advance upon the austere preachings so prevalent on the left. They are, in any case, at best a joke. Who is more attentive than Bataille to the vacuity of manifestos, programmes, policy statements, declarations of commitment? **The destruction of language is not my act [fait] but does not have a place in me except by destroying me, like the act of the moment which has suppressed me (I speak now but in vain**) [IV 167]. ‘The impossible is the basis of being’ [III 41]. To write is poverty and captivity if it is not wreckage upon the impossible, because the impossible is not a margin, a fissure, a border-zone, but an immensity compared to which the possible shrivels to the edge of nothing. ‘I even believe that in a sense my stories clearly attain the impossible’ [III 101], and that is why they matter, why The Blue of Noon is of immeasurably greater importance than the Contre-Attaque posturings, why in contrast to Sade—who sought ‘an impossible freedom’ [IX 242]—Lenin is a ranting dwarf.‘—IMPOSSIBLE! she cried’ [IV 51], ‘read or work? it was impossible’ [IV 59]. The Hatred for Poetry, renamed The Impossible, exempts Baudelaire and Rimbaud from the complacency of words that resign themselves to the cramped box of the possible. Insipid lyricism vaunts itself as another possible type of language, a type that is elevated, beautiful, ethereal. True poetry is outside laws. But poetry, in the end, accepts poetry’ [III 218]. Bataille vomits, but the ‘poetry of Baudelaire—or that of Rimbaud—never inspires that hatred in me’ [III 513], and from the start Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche insists that—unlike the language of fascism—Nietzsche’s texts are labyrinths, with no hint of the directive, no politics [I 450-2], only the voyage into the impossible, the will to chance. Utter confusion. ‘Those moments, he said, where everything is divine, because everything is impossible. (Impossible above all to explain, to speak)’ [IV 146]. Only when human relationships collapse in darkness and pain is there worth. ‘Between her and me there was never anything possible’ [IV 233]. At first, death surrounds us with an endless silence as an island is surrounded by water. But there, precisely, is the unsalable. What importance have words which do not pierce this silence[?] What importance in speaking of ‘moment of the tomb’ [moment de tombe], when each word is nothing for as long as it has not attained the beyond of words[?]

Any attempts to act without the disavowal of claims to “know” is the death of “politics.” Not that it ever lived.

**Dillon and Reed 2k 000** [Michael, Professor of Politics at Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at Kings College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, Complex Emergency,” in *Alternatives* 25:1]

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, **where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power**. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, **in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled**, selected, organised and redistributed **by a certain number of procedures whose role is to** ward off its powers and dangers, **to gain mastery over** its **chance events**, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. **Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers**. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. **In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized.** All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. **Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy**, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. **Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation.** There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And **there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions.** **Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet** **serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed**.[ 35] **Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate.** As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[ 36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

### A2: Rodriguiez

Microfacism is the ultimate impact. The Desire of the Ego necessitates control of all things outside the Self

**Seem 83** (Mark, Intro to Anti-Oedipus, xvii)

To be anti-oedipal is to be anti-ego as well as anti-homo, willfully attacking all reductive psychoanalytic and political analyses that remain caught within the sphere of totality and unity, in order to free the multiplicity of desire from the deadly neurotic and Oedipal yoke. For Oedipus is not a mere psychoanalytic construct, Deleuze and Guattari explain. Oedipus is the figurehead of imperialism, "colonization pursued by other means, it is the interior colony, and we shall see that even here at home ... it is our intimate colonial education." This internalization of man by man, this "oedipalization," creates a new meaning for suffering, *internal suffering,* and a new tone for life: the depressive tone. Now depression does not just come about one fine day, *Anti-Oedipus* goes on, nor does Oedipus appear one day in the Family and feel secure in remaining there. Depression and Oedipus are agencies of the State, agencies of paranoia, agencies of power, long before being delegated to the family. Oedipus is the figure of power as such, just as neurosis is the result of power on individuals. Oedipus is everywhere.

For anti-oedipalists the ego, like Oedipus, is "part of those things we must dismantle through the united assault of analytical and political forces."4 Oedipus is belief injected into the unconscious, it is what gives us faith as it robs us of power, *it* is what teaches us to desire our own repression. Everybody has been oedipalized and neuroticized at home, at school, at work. Everybody wants to be a fascist. Deleuze and Guattari want to know how these beliefs succeed in taking hold of a body, thereby silencing the productive machines of the libido. They also want to know how the opposite situation is brought about, where a body successfully wards off the effects of power. Reversing the Freudian distinction between neurosis and psychosis that measures everything against the former, *Anti-Oedipus* concludes**: the neurotic is the one on whom the Oedipal imprints take, whereas the psychotic is the one incapable of being oedipalized, even and especially by psychoanalysis.**

The first task of the revolutionary, they add, is to learn from the psychotic how to shake off the Oedipal yoke and the effects of power, in order to initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all beliefs. Such a politics dissolves the mystifications of power through the kindling, on all levels, of anti-oedipal forces-the schizzes-flows-forces that escape coding, scramble the codes, and flee in all directions: *orphans* (no daddy-mommy-me), *atheists* (no beliefs), and *nomads* (no habits, no territories).

A schizoanalysis schizophrenizes in order to break the holds of power and institute research into a new collective subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of mankind. For we are sick, so sick, of our *selves!*

# 1nr

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### Claiming Cripple

#### Disidentification is key to solve- this kills solvency and functionality of the perm

**Schalk ‘13**

Sami Schalk. “Coming to Claim Crip: Disidentification With/In Disability Studies.” Disability Studies Quarterly, 33.2 (2013).

I am primarily using disidentification as elucidated by José Esteban Muñoz (1999) in Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics. He defines disidentification as a strategic survival strategy of identification for/of/by those with multiple intersecting marginal identities whom Muñoz refers to as minoritarian subjects. Muñoz's theorization of disidentification relies upon Michel Pecheux's reworking of Louis Althusser's theory of interpellation in which **disidentification is defined as a third identification stance in relation to dominant ideology that refuses to either fully conform or fully resist**. Muñoz uses disidentification similarly to understand how queers of color relate and/or respond to dominant representations, particularly through performance. For example, Muñoz opens the book with a description of Marga Gomez's performance piece, Marga Gomez Is Pretty, Witty, and Gay, in which Gomez sees lesbians on television for the first time and is captivated by their mysterious allure because the women are all depicted wearing raincoats, wigs, and sunglasses to hide their identities. Muñoz uses this as an example of a minoritarian subject negotiating and reinterpreting a mainstream image intended as negative. He insists that the act of **disidentification is neither assimilationist nor anti-assimilationist**, but rather, **it's an alternative political resistance strategy that works with and against dominant ideology** at the same time **for the performative and political purposes of minoritarian subjects**. In Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique, Roderick A. Ferguson (2004) makes similar claims about the possibilities of disidentification regarding queer of color critique's disidentification with historical materialism. Ferguson writes that **to disidentify means to take up with revisions, to determine "the silences and ideologies that reside within critical terrains"** (p. 5) **and refuse to** take up or **extend** legacies of **racism, sexism, or homophobia** in theory and research. 10 Disidentification is therefore a way to locate one's self within, take up and (re)use representations and theories in ways that were not originally intended. Disidentification is not, however, the only useful minoritarian political strategy and may not be appropriate or effective for all subjects or situations (Muñoz, 1999). Despite the fact that both Ferguson and Muñoz focus on queers of color (minoritarian subjects) disidentifying with dominant (majoritarian) representations and theories, both indirectly suggest that disidentification can be used by minoritarian subjects in relation to other minoritarian representations. For example, Muñoz suggests that a queer woman might disidentify with the work of Frantz Fanon (2004), being critical of its sexist and homophobic moments while still finding and revising useful aspects of the text. Fanon, a black psychiatrist and postcolonial philosopher, is not a majoritarian subject, however, he is privileged on multiple fronts and his discussions of women and homosexuals in Black Skins, White Masks, for example, adheres to majoritarian ideology in regard to these other minoritarian subjects. As documented by intersectionality scholars such as Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991), Lisa Duggan (2002), and Jasbir Puar (2007), different subjects can simultaneously resist certain hegemonic ideologies while being complicit in others. Taking up this adapted understanding of disidentification, **I find myself**, a minoritarian subject, **disidentifying with disability studies**, a minoritarian field of research, because although the field's resistance to the pathologization of non-normative bodies appeals to me as a nondisabled, fat, black, queer woman, **the shortage of** substantive **race analysis** within the field **and the** relatively **minor attention given to** issues of **class and sexuality trouble me deeply** and disallow me any direct Good Subject 11 identification. The whiteness of disability studies has already been noted by Chris Bell (2006) in his essay "Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal." However, the ubiquitous citation of this essay as the reference for disability studies scholars attempting to acknowledge race in relation to disability simply underscores the need for more critical scholarship on race in the field at this time. 12 While this lack of a substantial amount of research on race and disability does not necessarily mean there are also no people of color within the field (because people of color do not necessarily do research on race), the racial diversity of the disability studies researcher population that I've witnessed is minimal. The continued conspicuous presence of my racialized body at disability studies conferences and events disconcerts me and makes me wary of being tokenized. These emotions further facilitate my disidentification with/in disability studies. Following Ferguson and Muñoz, because this collection of theories and practices do not seem originally intended for me, **as a researcher I must take up and revise disability theories and scholarship while refusing to extend its legacy of whiteness and racism**. Despite the disjuncture I experience in the field as it currently exists, I still have a deeply personal, emotional affinity with disability studies scholar and activist communities. This affinity is what facilitates my coming to claim and identify with crip. Note here, that there are a few key differences between disidentification and identifying with as I am using them. Disidentification is primarily in respect to representations, ideologies, and theories which have important, useful aspects that the disidentifying subject takes up, uses, or revamps while leaving behind or being critical of other problematic or damaging elements. **To identify with**, as I will explain more below, **is to** personally and politically **align oneself with a group one may or may not belong to, but with which one feels a positive connection**. I discuss these concepts separately in order to distinguish my relationship to the field of disability studies from my relationship to the concept of crip, not to claim one form of identification is more positive or useful than the other. In fact, disidentification and identifying with have important areas of overlap and intersection. Crip is a term many people within disability studies and activist communities use not only in reference to people with disabilities, but also to the intellectual and art culture arising from such communities. **Crip is shorthand for** the word **"cripple"** which has been (and is) used as an insult toward people with disabilities, but **which has been re-appropriated as an intra-group term of empowerment and solidarity**. Thus, crip "is a term which has much currency in disability activism and culture but still might seem harsh to those outside those communities" (Kafer, 2013, p. 15). An early proponent of crip's social and political potential, Carrie Sandahl (2003) describes crip as a "fluid and ever-changing" term which "expanded to include not only those with physical impairments but those with sensory or mental impairments as well" (p. 27). In a footnote to her use of the term, Sandahl recognizes the still-developing state of disability studies and writes: "If I had my druthers, I would replace the term disability studies with crip theory or crip studies to represent its radical edge" (p. 53; original emphasis). Robert McRuer (2006), however, proposes that crip theory is not a one-to-one replacement for disability studies, but rather, **crip theory has "a** similar **contestatory relationship to disability studies and identity that queer theory has to LGBT** studies and identity, [although] crip theory does not—perhaps paradoxically—seek to dematerialize disability identity" (p. 35). This move away from the postmodern dematerialization of identity positions is a key connection between crip theory and queer of color critique by scholars such as Cathy Cohen (2005), Lawrence La Fountain-Stokes (2009), and others who have actively resisted such moves, insisting that to move entirely away from identity and identity politics is not a viable option for those who are multiply marginalized and who need such identity positions for survival and collective action. As Roderick Ferguson (2004) writes, queer of color critique rethinks categories, but does not discard them. Related to Ferguson's rethinking of categories, Alison Kafer (2013) argues that crip theory expands and enriches disability studies by departing from the social model's assumption that "disabled" and "nondisabled" are discrete, self-evident categories, choosing instead to explore the creation of such categories and the moments in which they "fail to hold" (p. 10). Sandahl, McRuer and Kafer all emphasize the relationship of crip and queer. Sandahl (2003) insists that like queer, crip is not only a noun and adjective, but also a verb: to "crip" means to spin "mainstream representations or practices to reveal able-bodied assumptions and exclusionary effects […to] expose the arbitrary delineation between normal and defective and the negative social ramifications of attempts to homogenize humanity" (p. 37). Crip as verb can therefore be understood as a specific form of disidentification. Making further connections between crip and queer, Sandahl writes: As a pejorative, the term queer was originally targeted at gays and lesbians, yet its rearticulation as a term of pride is currently claimed by those who may not consider themselves homosexual, such as the transgendered, transsexuals, heterosexual sex radicals, and others. […Although] I have never heard a nondisabled person seriously claim to be crip (as heterosexuals have claimed to be queer), I would not be surprised by this practice. The fluidity of both terms makes it likely that their boundaries will dissolve (p. 27). This specific aspect of the relationship between queer and crip, **the possibility of these terms** referring to or **being claimed by people not previously referenced by them, is critical to** the current direction of **crip theory** and to my own identification with the term. Kafer (2013) writes that crip, or crip affiliation, could include both "those who lack a 'proper' (read: medically acceptable, doctor-provided, and insurer-approved) diagnosis for their symptoms" and, more complexly, "people identifying with disability and lacking not only a diagnosis but any 'symptoms' of impairment" (p. 12-13). In a related vein, McRuer (2006) writes that although one must be "attuned to the dangers of appropriation," it is both theoretically and politically "important to raise issues about what it means, for the purposes of solidarity, to come out as something you are—at least in some ways—not" (p. 37). I align myself with McRuer's "coming out crip" and Kafer's "crip affiliation" by claiming crip and declaring myself a crip-identified, fat, black, queer woman. Kafer writes: **Claiming crip can be a way of acknowledging that we all have bodies and minds with shifting abilities**, and that such shifts have political and social meanings and histories. It can be a way of **imagining multiple futures, claiming crip as a** desired and **desirable location, regardless of one's own embodiment** or mental/psychological processes… thinking through what nondisabled claims to crip might entail will require exploring whether such claims might be more available, more imaginable, to some people than others (and on what basis) (pp. 13). I argue that my particular relationship to racial, gender, and sexuality systems of oppression and privilege is what makes claiming crip available to me. The ways in which my fat, black, queer, woman's body/mind/desire/behavior is constantly read and reacted to as non-normative, sometimes excessively so, makes me feel particularly akin to those who identify as disabled and/or crip, people whose bodies/minds/desires/behaviors are also outside the social norm. In this way, I argue that I am similarly situated in regard to many vectors of power as people with disabilities and that interrogation into the processes which have so situated us are needed in order to develop coalitional theory and political solidarity. It is important to emphasize that I am **calling myself crip-identified**, meaning that **I identify with not as crip**, a distinction McRuer (2006) suggests in his work, but does not make sufficiently clear. I use identify with to mean having acknowledged and prioritized political and personal connections to a group with which one does not identify as a member. To identify with means to feel implicated by the culture and politics of another group and seek to better understand this link. While to identify with could be understood as analogous to being an ally, I contend that there is something more personal, sustained, and affective about it. **Identifying with is a careful, conscious joining**—a standing/sitting **among rather than** by or **behind a group—which seeks to reduce separation while acknowledging differences in privileges and oppression. I connect identifying with to** Cathy Cohen's (2005) call for **a radical politics of shared resistance built on identities as they are impacted by and invested with different degrees of normative power. Identifying with is particularly important in the case of disability which**, as many have noted, **is the only identity category which one can join at any moment without intent**. I use crip-identified as something different than disability ally because it is an almost-not-quite-yet identification. **I am crip-identified not** only **because my body/mind/desire/behavior is non-normative** in terms of race, gender, sexuality, and size, **but** also **because of its precarious relationship to disability** as this term is currently culturally understood. [Continues] **I know that my body/mind/desire/behavior** (and the culture which interprets it) **is not fixed. I am crip-identified because I am not afraid of this instability**. I am not afraid of this instability because I am crip-identified. My identification with crip is neither simply personal nor purely academic. It is both of these things as well as highly political and **it is this politics of claiming crip as a nondisabled**, fat, black, queer woman **that** I believe **has the most value for the future of disability studies**. My identification with crip is not a cure-all for the problems of race, class, and sexuality within the field of disability studies. It also certainly does not fix the problem of disability being left out of intersectional analyses in race and ethnic studies, queer and sexuality studies, and women's and gender studies. However, I believe **being crip-identified is an enactment of solidarity which can be beneficial politically, socially, and academically for multiple minoritarian groups**. I want disability studies scholars not only to consider how to bring disability to, for example, black studies or to bring blackness to disability studies, but also consider how we as disability studies scholars and activists might disidentify with people of color, women, queers, or gender non-conforming people. How can we identify with social categories we don't identify as and how can this benefit us all? **What are the** similar, but not same, **aspects of the lived experiences of people of color** and people **with disabilities? We would do well to ask those who identify as both, but the burden of proof should not lie with them alone**. Disability studies has a long history of borrowing from work in other fields and civil rights movements, but this borrowing tends to emphasize the difference or exceptionality of disability 19 rather than its similarities or overlap—the places where disidentification across/between/among minoritarian subjects could occur. This coalitional politics through minoritarian subjects disidentifying with other minoritarian subjects, representations, theories or practices need not, however, be for political or intellectual purposes alone. It can also be, like my coming to claim crip, deeply personal and affective.

### Starting Point

#### Disability and cripple politics are a prerequisite to debate – mean that there is a starting point question that proves mutually exlusivity.

Berube 2003 (Michael, “Citizenship and Disability: Disability is a matter of civil rights, even if the Supreme Court doesn't seem to agree.”, http://www.alternet.org/story/15809/citizenship\_and\_disability)

Imagine a building in which political philosophers are debating, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the value and the purpose of participatory parity over against forms of authoritarianism or theocracy. Now imagine that this building has no access ramps, no Braille or large-print publications, no American Sign Language interpreters, no elevators, no special-needs paraprofessionals, no in-class aides. Contradictory as such a state of affairs may sound, it's a reasonably accurate picture of what contemporary debate over the meaning of democracy actually looks like. How can we remedy this? Only when we have fostered equal participation in debates over the ends and means of democracy can we have a truly participatory debate over what "participatory parity" itself means. That debate will be interminable in principle, since our understandings of democracy and parity are infinitely revisable, but lest we think of deliberative democracy as a forensic society dedicated to empyreal reaches of abstraction, we should remember that debates over the meaning of participatory parity set the terms for more specific debates about the varieties of human embodiment. These include debates about prenatal screening, genetic discrimination, stem-cell research, euthanasia, and, with regard to physical access, ramps, curb cuts, kneeling buses, and buildings employing what is now known as universal design. Leftists and liberals, particularly those associated with university humanities departments, are commonly charged with being moral relativists, unable or unwilling to say (even after September 11) why one society might be "better" than another. So let me be especially clear on this final point. I think there's a very good reason to extend the franchise, to widen the conversation, to democratize our debates, and to make disability central to our theories of egalitarian social justice. The reason is this: a capacious and supple sense of what it is to be human is better than a narrow and partial sense of what it is to be human, and the more participants we as a society can incorporate into the deliberation of what it means to be human, the greater the chances that that deliberation will in fact be transformative in such a way as to enhance our collective capacities to recognize each other as humans entitled to human dignity. As Jamie reminds me daily, both deliberately and unwittingly, most Americans had no idea what people with Down syndrome could achieve until we'd passed and implemented and interpreted and reinterpreted a law entitling them all to a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. I can say all this without appealing to any innate justification for human dignity and human rights, and I can also say this: Without a sufficient theoretical and practical account of disability, we can have no account of democracy worthy of the name. Perhaps some of our fellow citizens with developmental disabilities would not put the argument quite this way; even though Jamie has led me to think this way, he doesn't talk the way I do. But those of us who do participate in political debates, whether about school funding in a specific district or about the theory and practice of democracy at its most abstract, have the obligation to enhance the abilities of our children and our fellow citizens with disabilities to participate in the life of the United States as political and moral equals with their nondisabled peers-both for their own good, and for the good of democracy, which is to say, for the good of all of us.

### Assimilation DA

Adding the affirmative makes the alt compatible with anything. Creates a politics of contradictions and nihilism and wrecks alt solvency

Seem ’73 (Mark D. “Liberation of Difference: Toward a Theory of Antiliterature,” 1973, Jstor)

**When Hegel speaks of the resolution of contradictions**, of the negation of differences in order to rise above them **he is at the same time refer[s]ring to the religious concept of union: “Here is union, in which the differences of these characteristics are done away with** . . . .” Who can deny the fundamentally religious (faithful) nature of Hegel’s dialectics? For him, **resolution of contradictious** (differences) **seems to be achieved in a religious way**, through worship (mediation). Essentially, then, **is it not indeed possible that the whole notion of resolving contradictions** (those annoying differences!) **in order to reach a synthesis**—above differences—**and to reach the totality of the ALL is, in its most profound regious, nothing less than the nihilistic representation of** the Christian movement of **the negation of differences** (as in the Trinity, and especially the contradictory status of the Son, Christ, who cannot achieve a unition with God except by this won negation—through death!), **a negation brought about by the totalizing action of faith**? The ruse of Christianity, which is also Hegel’s ruse takes the form of a mathematical “miracle”: make ONE out of THREE, rise above DIFFERENCES to UNITY! If such be the case, is it not also possible that all dialectics, by their own form, beat the weight of the religious stamp—the stamp of FAITH in the totality above multiplicity, singularities, and differences? **To combat this nihilistic faith, one needs a thought of intensity and multiplicity, a thought which, instead of looking for a common denominator under or above differences, thinks differences “differentially**.”

### Style/Content

#### Using the affirmative as a foundation destroys the political potential of the permutation

**Braidotti 94**. [Rosi Braidotti. Nomadic Subjectivities: Embodiment and Sexual difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory. Pg 35]

Not only are foundations not required for effective political agency- very often they are also of hindrance to the flights of nomadic consciousness. Just consider that very settled, anchored, sedentary people are amongst the least empathic, the least easily moved, the most selfconsciously "apolitical." The French film-maker Agnes Varda shows the indifference of rooted people in her remarkable coverage of teen-age runaways, Sans toit ni foi, where French homes are presented as unwelcoming bourgeois fortresses, shutting the roofless oir! out. How many of todav's homeless people have personally experienced this utter lack of interest, let alone emphatic understanding? By contrast, the nomadic subject functions as a relay team: s/he connects, circulates, moves on; s/he does not form identifications but keeps on coming back at regular intervals. The nomad is a transgressive identity, whose transitory nature is precisely the reason why s/he can make connections at all. Nomadic politics is a matter of bonding, of coalitions, of interconnections.

#### Style and form cannot be separated from political choices. Phallogocentric speech reinforces the patriarchal intellectual hegemony.

**Braidotti 94.** [Rosi Braidotti. Nomadic Subjectivities: Embodiment and Sexual difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory. Pg 15]

The nomadic polyglot practices an aesthetic style based on compassionfor the incongruities, the repetitions, the arbitrariness of the languagess/he deals with. Writing is, for the polyglot, a process of undoing theillusory stability of fixed identities, bursting open the bubble of ontologicalsecurity that comes from familiarity with one linguistic site. Thepolyglot exposes this false security: s/he is Christa Cassandra:"Sofar, everything that has befallen me has struck an answering chord. Thisis the secret that encircles me and holds me together: there is somethingof everyone in me, so I have belonged completely to no one, and I haveeven understood their hatred of me."'Writing in this mode is aboutdisengaging the sedentary nature of words, destabilizing commonsensicalmeanings, deconstructing established forms of consciousness.In this respect, writers can be polyglots within the same language;you can speak English and write many different Englishes. What else didthe great modernists such as Virginia Woolf, Gertrude Stein, or-myleast favorite-James Joyce do, but invent a new English dialect? Whatelse are Alice Walker and Toni Morrison doing but redesigning theboundaries of the citadel that was English? Becoming a polyglot in yourownmother tongue: that's writing. Francoise Collin, the Belgian-Frenchfeminist theorist and writer now based in Paris, has coined the expression"I'immigree blanche" -the white immigrant-to describe the conditionof people who are in transit within their most familiar tongue; inher case, between the French language of Belgium and that of Continental France. The sense of singularity if not of aloneness, of the white immigrants can be immense. This fascination with the solitude of the empty spaces may appearaffected and it may even smack of radical chic. I do maintain, however,that this kind of nomadic aesthetics is the counterpart of the politicsof peripheral resistance to new hegemonic formations. In other words,I do not believe you can separate the question of style from politicalchoices. Part and parcel of accepting the postmodem transnationaleconomy we live in is the elaboration of styles and forms of representationthat are suitable to our historical situation.