Tournament: GSU | Round: 1 | Opponent: na | Judge: na

Prolif

The NPT Rev Con was insufficient: divisions that threaten the collapse of the NPT remain – steps towards disarmament are required

Ogilvie-White and Santoro 11 (Tanya Ogilvie-White, and David Santoro, "Disarmament and Non-proliferation: Towards More Realistic Bargains," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 53, Issue 3, 2011, pages 101-118) DOI:10.1080/00396338.2011.586194
Although the disarmament steps the current administration has taken have so far been relatively small
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the need to make progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. 

Proliferation breakouts are set to occur now – regulation of nuclear trade key

Albright et al. 7/29 (David Albright, founder of the non-governmental Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), its current president, and author of several books on proliferation of atomic weapons. Albright holds a Master of Science in physics from Indiana University and a M.Sc. inmathematics from Wright State University. He has taught physics at George Mason University in Virginia.  Andrea Stricker, Senior Policy Analyst at Institute for Science and International Security, MA in Security Policy Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and a BA in Political Science and French, certificate in Middle Eastern Studies, from the University of Arizona, Houston Wood, Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Virginia. He earned his B.A. and M.S. degrees in mathematics from Mississippi State University, and his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the University of Virginia, He was Visiting Scientist at Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique, Saclay, France in 1996 and at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN in 2004. From July – December 2007, he was Visiting Research Scholar at Princeton University in the Woodrow Wilson School and the Program on Science and Global Security, Institute for Science and International Security, 7/29/13, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2013/Full20Report_DTRA-PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf)
As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, several additional
AND
. One key part of this effort will remain smuggling of nuclear commodities. 

NFU boosts NPT credibility by restoring the grand bargain – allows controls on nuclear technology

Korb and Rothman 12 (Lawrence J. Korb,  senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, and Alexander H. Rothman,  special assistant with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress, "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(2) 34–42, 2012) DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
A US decision to declare a no-first-use policy would have benefits
AND
original policy and thereby improve stability between the South Asian nuclear weapons states.

The aff rallies non-nuclear NPT states– saves the NPT

Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, "The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
Finally, because NFU would be an important departure from the past six decades of
AND
. commitment to Article 6 as an excuse not to vigorously support nonproliferation. 

Prolif causes nuclear war – new proliferants are uniquely unstable – deterrence won’t save us

Kroenig 12 (Matthew Kroenig, Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2012, "The history of proliferation optimism: does it have a future?" http://npolicy.org/article_file/The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism.pdf)
Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear
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three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the
nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis
AND
that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. 

Specifically a nuclear breakout poised to occur in Asia – NFU policy deescalates and prevents proliferation

Clarke 12 (Michael Clarke, Director General of the Royal United Services Institute,  Visiting Professor of Defence Studies at Kings College London, "Nuclear non-proliferation trends in the Asia-Pacific: the dilemmas of regime stasis, strategic flux and market expansion," Australian Journal of International Affairs Volume 66, Issue 5, 2012) DOI:10.1080/10357718.2011.570241
Despite the recent surge in both governmental and academic advocacy of nuclear disarmament, including
AND
in a region whose strategic environment could change significantly in the immediate future. 

Escalates to global nuclear war

Cirincione, 2000 – Director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Spring 2000, Joseph, Foreign Policy, "The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain", JStor)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already
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, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945. 

China

China nuclear modernization is occurring primarily because of US nuclear doctrine – they’ll switch away from minimal deterrence

Blumenthal and Mazza 11 (Dan Blumenthal,  M.A., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Mazza, M.A., international relations (strategic studies and international economics), Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, program manager for AEI’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy, "China’s Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The PLA’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine and Force Posture," 4/6/11) http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Strategic_Forces.pdf
When it comes to its development and deployment of nuclear weapons-China first tested
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United States, its public airing was ill-received by the Chinese.

Some modernization is inevitable but US first use policies make it worse

Perkovich and Lefever 2k (George Perkovich and Ernest W. Lefever, "Loose Nukes: Arms Control Is No Place for Folly," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2000), pp. 162-167)
The thousands of American nuclear weapons under a first-use doctrine will also eventually
AND
a "private" visit to his American alma mater, Cornell University. 

Doctrine shifts risk accidental or authorization nuclear launch

Saunders and Yuan 2000, Phillip C Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monteray Institute of International Studies, July 2000, "China’s Strategic Force Modernization: Issues and Implications," http://www.emergingfromconflict.org/readings/saunders.pdf
A doctrinal shift from minimum to limited deterrence could also trigger a major increase in
AND
only a few DF-31 and DF-41 systems were available. 

Crisis between the US and China are likely – Seas, Taiwan

Goldstein 13 (Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, "First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations" International Security Spring 2013, Vol. 37, No. 4, Pages 49-89)
U.S.-China Crises: More Likely Than War; More Than Just
AND
and her suggestion that multilateral forums could be useful in this regard.20 

A First use posture makes these crises unstable – creates the incentive for launch

Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, "The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
On the other hand, if states do believe that the United States might use
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choose to use nuclear weapons at an early point in the conºict.104 

Miscalculation is the most probable scenario for nuclear use

Goldstein 13 (Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, "First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations" International Security Spring 2013, Vol. 37, No. 4, Pages 49-89)
Two concerns have driven much of the debate about international security in the post–
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nuclear forces indicates why escalation resulting from crisis instability remains a devastating possibility. 

Scenario 2 is India

China and India aren’t engaged in an arms race now – but a shift in doctrine could spiral out of control

Cunninham and Medcalf 11 (Fiona Cunningham, Research Associate at the International Security Program of the Lowy Institute, and Rory Medcalf, Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute, "The Dangers of Denial: Nuclear Weapons in China-India Relation," October 2011)
China’s reluctance to thus acknowledge India as a nuclear peer rankles the Indian strategic community
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improve and if dissatisfaction with the doctrine increases in the Chinese strategic community. 

Modernization has a spillover effect – causes an arms race with India and Pakistan and risks Sino-India and Indopak nuclear conflict

Blumenthal and Mazza 11 (Dan Blumenthal,  M.A., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Mazza, M.A., international relations (strategic studies and international economics), Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, program manager for AEI’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy, "China’s Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The PLA’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine and Force Posture," 4/6/11) http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Strategic_Forces.pdf
The Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is, however, much more complicated. India
AND
enter a period of flux, with potentially destabilizing consequences for the region.

Indopak war likely – it will spread and draw in China and the US

Korb and Rothman 12 (Lawrence J. Korb,  senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, and Alexander H. Rothman,  special assistant with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress, "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(2) 34–42, 2012) DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
In the twenty-first century, the Indian subcontinent has surpassed Europe as the
AND
no guarantees that it would choose to restrain itself after another such incident. 

NFU puts pressure on other nuclear states to do the same – decreases risk of nuclear conflict in South Asia

Korb and Rothman 12 (Lawrence J. Korb, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, and Alexander H. Rothman,  special assistant with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress, "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(2) 34–42, 2012) DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
No-first-use and the global nonproliferation regime Given the volatile situation in
AND
least denounce the use of nuclear weapons against all but an existential threat. 

A US NFU is specifically influential in India – gets modeled and decreases likelihood of use

Sagan 9 (Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Co-Director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, "The Case for No First Use", Survival vol. 51 no. 3 June–July 2009 pp. 163–182)
US officials have long claimed that US nuclear declaratory policy and posture have no influence
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have at least some positive influence in pushing India in the opposite direction. 

Even without modeling a US NFU contains the conflict

Korb and Rothman 12 (Lawrence J. Korb,  senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, and Alexander H. Rothman,  special assistant with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress, "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(2) 34–42, 2012) DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
In the event of a conflict on the Indian subcontinent, a no-first
AND
Russia, if it agreed to a no-first-use policy.) 

Plan

The United States Congress should prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons without congressional approval.

Solvency

Presidential first use has no advantage – requiring congressional approval solves

Stone 76 (Director of the Federation of American, Jeremy I. Stone, First use deserves more than one decision-maker, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Mar 1976, Vol. 32 Issue 3, p 56-57)
(do not endorse gendered language used in the article)
The time has come to investigate the political controls over the use of nuclear weapons
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ones, there is the time for such involvement of more than one. 

Planning committee is goldilocks – flexibility to use first in unlikely circumstances, ability to signal, but shows restraint

Stone 84 (Jeremy J. Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists, "Presidential First Use Is Unlawful," Foreign Policy, No. 56 (Autumn, 1984))
The proposal for a planning committee has a number of practical advantages as well as
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for a system in which Congress gets the right to encourage first use. 

Requiring congressional authorization is equivalent to a No First Use policy

Ullman 72 – (Richard H. Ullman, Professor of International Relations, Princeton University, "NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS," Foreign Affairs, July 1972 vol. 50)
An alternative to a fiat "no-first-use" declaration, at
AND
nuclear weapon in a manner which inflicts no damage but nevertheless conveys resolve.

Tournament: NDT | Round: 1 | Opponent: Wayne State LM | Judge: S Lundeen, Friend, Hingstman
Ethics are good – Our understanding of life is as both biological and existential. The Aff’s project of survival of others, allowing the agency to work, play, struggle and desire free from the destruction of their biological life is crucial
Fassin (James D. Wolfensohn Professor in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, as well as directeur d’études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris.) 10
(Didier,ETHICS OF SURVIVAL: A DEMOCRATIC APPROACH TO THE POLITICS OF LIFE, http://www.humanityjournal.org/humanity-volume-1-issue-1/ethics-survival-democratic-approach-politics-life)
"Long before the experience of survival that I am presently facing, I wrote
AND
remain impervious to being educated in the wisdom of knowing how to die."
However, beyond the emergency of this "shrinking time of reprieve" (which
AND
is not simply what remains; it is the most intense life possible."
I want to show that Derrida’s conception of life as survival, in its polysemy
AND
that the genome is often said to be the "code of life."
In other words, these two readings present life as what can be put to
AND
the hope of "surviving" through the traces left for the living.
There is, I believe, in this revelation much more than the last testimony
AND
the humanities and social sciences: or so I want to argue here.

The affirmation of survival is the condition for all value and any ability to respond to suffering
Hagglund 8
(Martin, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life, pg. 203-4)
The first consequence of a radically atheist thinking of politics, then, is that
AND
no suffering and hate (since one would not be threatened by anything). 

passive nihilism —- it assumes that life is valueless and death holds the ultimate value. Even if we cannot create a new value to life we can affirm a multiplicity of values.
Critchley 1997
/Simon, Hans Jonas Professor of Philosophy at the New School, Very Little…Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature, Routledge: London, pg. 25-27/
However, if the response to nihilism in philosophical modernity centres on the question of
AND
Beckett is a node of uncolonizable nonidentity in the life-world.32

Taking particular action against wrong you perceive in the world is necessary to overcome ressentiment
Connolly 11
(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)
A set of pertinent skills and dispositions to the enterprise of theory can be distilled
AND
world neither providential in the last instance nor susceptible to consummate human mastery.

The force of communication/capital/whatever is not a reason to turn away from the world – their fear of the fundamental terms of human existence is ressentiment
Connolly 11
(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)
During a time when the expansion of capital, inter territory media communication,
AND
to intra individual, micro  and macro assemblages of desire.

*Acting in a world of becoming is life affirming – taking on the role of the seer is powerful
Connolly 11
(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)
Today, however, it is important for more people to hone some of the
AND
 fields, and marked by small and large moments of real creativity.

Can’t authentically accept extinction
Kennedy, 2k7 (Greg, PhD U of Ottowa, An Ontology of Trash, pg. 170-1)
The phenomenon of extinction is the technological ersatz for death. But our being-
AND
time, the extermination, that is, the detemporalization of human being.

Tournament: NDT | Round: 1 | Opponent: Wayne State LM | Judge: S Lundeen, Friend, Hingstman
No prior questions—we get to weigh the plan
David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton,  Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7
Commenting on the ’philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ’~a~
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clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitme
nts. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice
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the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

DEBATE OVER THE DETAILS OF NUCLEAR POLICY IS CRITICAL TO PREVENT STATE MANIPULATION—ADVANCING CONCRETE POLICY OPTIONS KEY
NOLAN 1989
(Janne, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and has worked as a national security specialist in both the Senate and Executive Branch, Guardians of the Arsenal, 282-284)
To many, the idea that nuclear war planning is subject to bureaucratic politics,
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a major moral problem on his hands with his command and combat crews.

You can’t solve the root cause of war – deterrence key to empirically reduce its likelihood
Moore 4 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, 26 Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2.
a) A useful framework in thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the
AND
three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence.
Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is
AND
altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.I5
VI
Testing the Hypothesis
Theory without truth is but costly entertainment.
HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than
AND
in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

War is the root of gender violence—it’s more productive to focus on preventing war
Goldstein 01( Professor of Int’l Relations, Joshua American University, War and Gender, p. 412 http://books.google.com/books?hl=en26lr=lang_en26id=KXs_LS5g57MC26oi=fnd26pg=PR726sig=XcekADFl52pV1S8F0MQ8WbGBFUo26dq=Joshua+Goldstein+2001+22War+and+Gender22+PAGE+14226prev=http://scholar.google.com/scholar3Fq3DJoshua2BGoldstein2B20012B2522War2Band2BGender25222BPAGE2B14226num3D2026hl3Den26lr3Dlang_en26safe3Doff)

 First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and
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on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

Perm: Do both – if gendered then should restrict? Aff can believe the importance of challenging gendered assumption of war powers

Combine with particular governmental reasoning
Ferguson, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, 11
(The Uses of Neoliberalism, Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184)
If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do,
AND
some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

Multiple causes relevant frames – consider all
Caprioli, 04  ("Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis" Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076.) AK
The derision with which many conventional feminists view feminist quantitative studies persists to the detriment
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anomalies, for such a focus does not add to feminist IR theories.

Political path is necessary, perm best and alt fails
Blight in ’86
James G. Blight, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.  "How Might Psychology Contribute to Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War?". Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1986. JSTOR.

The roster of interactionists contains many of the most eminent American psychiatrists and psychologists,
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constituents of any process of change equal to the requirements of the interactionists.

Only rearticulating the public discourse through debating the plan creates political change and allows us to avoid nuclear war
Solomon ’88
Solomon, Professor of English at CSU-Northridge, 1988 ~J. Fisher, Discourse and Reference in the Nuclear Age, p. 268-275~
But in spite of the guerilla critic’s categorical rejection of all totalizing categories, he
AND
possibility for compromise, because it is in no one’s interest to fight a
nuclear war—no matter which side of the debate one is on. "
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over which we can conjecture, debate, and maybe even agree.3

Tournament: NDT | Round: 1 | Opponent: Wayne State LM | Judge: S Lundeen, Friend, Hingstman

Prolif

The NPT Rev Con was insufficient: divisions that threaten the collapse of the NPT remain – steps towards disarmament are required
Ogilvie-White and Santoro 11 (Tanya Ogilvie-White, and David Santoro, "Disarmament and Non-proliferation: Towards More Realistic Bargains," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 53, Issue 3, 2011, pages 101-118) DOI:10.1080/00396338.2011.586194
Although the disarmament steps the current administration has taken have so far been relatively small
AND
the need to make progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. 

Proliferation breakouts are set to occur now – regulation of nuclear trade key
Albright et al. 7/29 (David Albright, founder of the non-governmental Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), its current president, and author of several books on proliferation of atomic weapons. Albright holds a Master of Science in physics from Indiana University and a M.Sc. in mathematics from Wright State University. He has taught physics at George Mason University in Virginia.  Andrea Stricker, Senior Policy Analyst at Institute for Science and International Security, MA in Security Policy Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and a BA in Political Science and French, certificate in Middle Eastern Studies, from the University of Arizona, Houston Wood, Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Virginia. He earned his B.A. and M.S. degrees in mathematics from Mississippi State University, and his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the University of Virginia, He was Visiting Scientist at Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique, Saclay, France in 1996 and at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN in 2004. From July – December 2007, he was Visiting Research Scholar at Princeton University in the Woodrow Wilson School and the Program on Science and Global Security, Institute for Science and International Security, 7/29/13, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2013/Full20Report_DTRA-PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf)
As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, several additional
AND
. One key part of this effort will remain smuggling of nuclear commodities. 

Specifically an NFU policy deescalates tensions and prevents the nuclear breakout
Clarke 12 (Michael Clarke, Director General of the Royal United Services Institute,  Visiting Professor of Defence Studies at Kings College London, "Nuclear non-proliferation trends in the Asia-Pacific: the dilemmas of regime stasis, strategic flux and market expansion," Australian Journal of International Affairs Volume 66, Issue 5, 2012) DOI:10.1080/10357718.2011.570241
Despite the recent surge in both governmental and academic advocacy of nuclear disarmament, including
AND
in a region whose strategic environment could change significantly in the immediate future. 

NFU boosts NPT credibility by restoring the grand bargain – allows controls on nuclear technology
Korb and Rothman 12 (Lawrence J. Korb, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, and Alexander H. Rothman, special assistant with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress, "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(2) 34–42, 2012) DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
A US decision to declare a no-first-use policy would have benefits
AND
original policy and thereby improve stability between the South Asian nuclear weapons states.

The aff rallies non-nuclear NPT states– saves the NPT
Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, "The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
Finally, because NFU would be an important departure from the past six decades of
AND
. commitment to Article 6 as an excuse not to vigorously support nonproliferation. 

Prolif bad – nuclear war
Kroenig 14  (Matthew Kroenig, Associate Professor Department of Government Georgetown University, Nonresident Senior Fellow Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security The Atlantic Council, "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?" Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming)
Why Nuclear Proliferation Is a Problem The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of
AND
the steps necessary to combat the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons. 

NPT collapse matters – vital to the nonproliferation norm
Rublee 8 - Professor of Government and World Affairs @ University of Tampa ~Maria Rost Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness," International Studies Review, 22 Aug 2008, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 420-450WileyInterScience~
By all recent indications, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) seems to have
AND
to social conformity and identi?cation. Understanding the Mechanisms of the International Social Environment

China

China nuclear modernization is occurring primarily because of US nuclear doctrine – they’ll switch away from minimal deterrence
Blumenthal and Mazza 11 (Dan Blumenthal,  M.A., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Mazza, M.A., international relations (strategic studies and international economics), Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, program manager for AEI’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy, "China’s Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The PLA’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine and Force Posture," 4/6/11) http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Strategic_Forces.pdf
When it comes to its development and deployment of nuclear weapons-China first tested
AND
United States, its public airing was ill-received by the Chinese.

Some modernization is inevitable but US first use policies make it worse
Perkovich and Lefever 2k (George Perkovich and Ernest W. Lefever, "Loose Nukes: Arms Control Is No Place for Folly," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2000), pp. 162-167)
The thousands of American nuclear weapons under a first-use doctrine will also eventually
AND
a "private" visit to his American alma mater, Cornell University. 

Doctrine shifts risk accidental or authorization nuclear launch
Saunders and Yuan 2000, Phillip C Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monteray Institute of International Studies, July 2000, "China’s Strategic Force Modernization: Issues and Implications," http://www.emergingfromconflict.org/readings/saunders.pdf
A doctrinal shift from minimum to limited deterrence could also trigger a major increase in
AND
only a few DF-31 and DF-41 systems were available. 

Crisis between the US and China are likely – Seas, Taiwan
Goldstein 13 (Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, "First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations" International Security Spring 2013, Vol. 37, No. 4, Pages 49-89)
U.S.-China Crises: More Likely Than War; More Than Just
AND
and her suggestion that multilateral forums could be useful in this regard.20 

A First use posture makes these crises unstable – creates the incentive for launch
Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, "The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
On the other hand, if states do believe that the United States might use
AND
choose to use nuclear weapons at an early point in the conºict.104 

Miscalculation is the most probable scenario for nuclear use
Goldstein 13 (Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, "First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations" International Security Spring 2013, Vol. 37, No. 4, Pages 49-89)
Two concerns have driven much of the debate about international security in the post–
AND
nuclear forces indicates why escalation resulting from crisis instability remains a devastating possibility. 

Scenerio 2 is India

China and India aren’t engaged in an arms race now – but a shift in doctrine could spiral out of control
Cunninham and Medcalf 11 (Fiona Cunningham, Research Associate at the International Security Program of the Lowy Institute, and Rory Medcalf, Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute, "The Dangers of Denial: Nuclear Weapons in China-India Relation," October 2011)
China’s reluctance to thus acknowledge India as a nuclear peer rankles the Indian strategic community
AND
improve and if dissatisfaction with the doctrine increases in the Chinese strategic community. 

Modernization has a spillover effect – causes an arms race with India and Pakistan and risks Sino-India and Indopak nuclear conflict
Blumenthal and Mazza 11 (Dan Blumenthal,  M.A., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Mazza, M.A., international relations (strategic studies and international economics), Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, program manager for AEI’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy, "China’s Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The PLA’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine and Force Posture," 4/6/11) http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Strategic_Forces.pdf
The Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is, however, much more complicated. India
AND
enter a period of flux, with potentially destabilizing consequences for the region.

Plan

The United States Congress should prohibit the first use of nuclear forces without congressional approval.

Solvency

Presidential first use has no advantage – requiring congressional approval solves
Stone 76 (Director of the Federation of American, Jeremy I. Stone, First use deserves more than one decision-maker, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Mar 1976, Vol. 32 Issue 3, p 56-57)
(do not endorse gendered language used in the article)
The time has come to investigate the political controls over the use of nuclear weapons
AND
ones, there is the time for such involvement of more than one. 

Planning committee is goldilocks – flexibility to use first in unlikely circumstances, ability to signal, but shows restraint
Stone 84 (Jeremy J. Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists, "Presidential First Use Is Unlawful," Foreign Policy, No. 56 (Autumn, 1984))
The proposal for a planning committee has a number of practical advantages as well as
AND
for a system in which Congress gets the right to encourage first use. 

Requiring congressional authorization is equivalent to a No First Use policy
Ullman 72 – (Richard H. Ullman, Professor of International Relations, Princeton University, "NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS," Foreign Affairs, July 1972 vol. 50)
An alternative to a fiat "no-first-use" declaration, at
AND
nuclear weapon in a manner which inflicts no damage but nevertheless conveys resolve.

Tournament: NDT | Round: 8 | Opponent: OU LM | Judge: Johnson, Shook, Spring
PROLIF

The NPT Rev Con was insufficient: divisions that threaten the collapse of the NPT remain – steps towards disarmament are required
Ogilvie-White and Santoro 11 (Tanya Ogilvie-White, and David Santoro, “Disarmament and Non-proliferation: Towards More Realistic Bargains,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 53, Issue 3, 2011, pages 101-118) DOI:10.1080/00396338.2011.586194
Although the disarmament steps the current administration …a range of other states that have become more vocal about the need to make progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. 

Proliferation breakouts are set to occur now – regulation of nuclear trade key
Albright et al. 7/29 (David Albright, founder of the non-governmental Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), its current president, and author of several books on proliferation of atomic weapons. Albright holds a Master of Science in physics from Indiana University and a M.Sc. in mathematics from Wright State University. He has taught physics at George Mason University in Virginia.  Andrea Stricker, Senior Policy Analyst at Institute for Science and International Security, MA in Security Policy Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and a BA in Political Science and French, certificate in Middle Eastern Studies, from the University of Arizona, Houston Wood, Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Virginia. He earned his B.A. and M.S. degrees in mathematics from Mississippi State University, and his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the University of Virginia, He was Visiting Scientist at Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique, Saclay, France in 1996 and at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN in 2004. From July – December 2007, he was Visiting Research Scholar at Princeton University in the Woodrow Wilson School and the Program on Science and Global Security, Institute for Science and International Security, 7/29/13, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2013/Full20Report_DTRA-PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf)
As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, several …One key part of this effort will remain smuggling of nuclear commodities. 

Specifically an NFU policy deescalates tensions and prevents the nuclear breakout
Clarke 12 (Michael Clarke, Director General of the Royal United Services Institute,  Visiting Professor of Defence Studies at Kings College London, “Nuclear non-proliferation trends in the Asia-Pacific: the dilemmas of regime stasis, strategic flux and market expansion,” Australian Journal of International Affairs Volume 66, Issue 5, 2012) DOI:10.1080/10357718.2011.570241
Despite the recent surge in both governmental and academic …environment could change significantly in the immediate future. 

The aff rallies non-nuclear NPT states– saves the NPT
Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, “The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
Finally, because NFU would be an important departure from the past six …Article 6 as an excuse not to vigorously support nonproliferation. 

Prolif bad – nuclear war
Kroenig 14  (Matthew Kroenig, Associate Professor Department of Government Georgetown University, Nonresident Senior Fellow Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security The Atlantic Council, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies, forthcoming)
Why Nuclear Proliferation Is a Problem …of the world’s most dangerous weapons. 

MISCALC

The retention of counterforce policies just motivates the threats it tries to address – puts weapons on high alert and makes nuclear war more likely
Kristensen et al 9 (Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, Robert S. Norrisis,  senior research associate with the Natural Resources Defense Council nuclear program and director of the Nuclear Weapons Databook project, Ivan Oelrich,  vice president for Strategic Security Programs at the Federation of American Scientists, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” 2009)http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.pdf
The second nuclear-only mission is a first …constraint on missile numbers, payload, and MIRVing will be easier. 

A first use posture makes crises fundamentally unstable – creates the incentive for launch
Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, “The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
On the other hand, if states do believe that the …nuclear weapons at an early point in the conºict.104 

In addition nuclear first use threats create commitment traps that increase the probability of deliberate use
Huntley 6 (Wade L. Huntley, “Threats All the Way Down: US Strategic Initiatives in a Unipolar World,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Jan., 2006), pp. 49-67)
As noted earlier, the idea of using nuclear threats to deter…, but the problem of the 'commitment trap' becomes much more salient as well. 

NFU solves crisis stability – most credible and effective nuclear posture
Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, “The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
For the United States and its allies, NFU has several military and political benefits. First, and most important, NFU would enhance crisis stability. A credible NFU policy will help decrease an opponent’s trepidations about a U.S. first strike, thereby decreasing the possibility that nuclear weapons are used accidentally, inadvertently, or deliberately in a severe crisis. Second, by removing the option to use nuclear weapons first, the United States would have a consistent and inherently credible nuclear policy. Although some states might question U.S. political resolve to use nuclear weapons first—in which case the NPR’s decision to retain the option in many circumstances does not contribute to deterrence—current and potential adversaries cannot dismiss the possibility of a nuclear response after U.S. interests have been attacked with nuclear weapons.105 The threat to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack is highly credible, and it is a threat that U.S. political leaders should want to execute if deterrence fails. In fact, NFU could further strengthen the credibility of nuclear deterrence by signaling that the United States retains nuclear forces only for retaliation to a nuclear attack, which, in the mind of the adversary, could increase the likelihood that nuclear retaliation would indeed come if it crosses the nuclear threshold.106 An NFU declaration would be a kind of commitment tactic that would increase the credibility of nuclear deterrence by seemingly binding U.S. decisionmakers to use nuclear weapons for the one mission they have been assigned in the event of a nuclear attack.107 

PLAN

The United States Congress should prohibit the first use of nuclear forces without congressional approval.

SOLVENCY

Presidential first use has no advantage – requiring congressional approval solves
Stone 76 (Director of the Federation of American, Jeremy I. Stone, First use deserves more than one decision-maker, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Mar 1976, Vol. 32 Issue 3, p 56-57)
(do not endorse gendered language used in the article)
The time has come to investigate the political …nuclear ones, there is the time for such involvement of more than one. 

Planning committee is goldilocks – flexibility to use first in unlikely circumstances, ability to signal, but shows restraint
Stone 84 (Jeremy J. Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists, “Presidential First Use Is Unlawful,” Foreign Policy, No. 56 (Autumn, 1984))
The proposal for a planning committee has a number …right to encourage first use. 

Requiring congressional authorization is equivalent to a No First Use policy
Ullman 72 – (Richard H. Ullman, Professor of International Relations, Princeton University, “NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,” Foreign Affairs, July 1972 vol. 50)
An alternative to a fiat "no-first-use" declaration, at least for the United States, might come through congressional legislation stipulating that the President, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, may not initiate the use of nuclear weapons without receiving prior congressional authorization. Congress now has before it so-called War Powers legislation stipulating that in the absence of a formal declaration of war the President may not engage the armed forces in military operations for more than 30 days without specific congressional authorization. This draft legislation is premised upon the assumption that the "collective judgment" of Congress and the President should apply to the "initiation" and the "continuation" of hostilities. Senator Fulhright, Congressman Dellums, and others (including the Federation of American Scientists, one of the most active lobhying groups in the arms-control area) have pointed out that just as Congress should be concerned to limit the power of the President to sustain hostilities without its approval, so it should also limit his power to escalate them across the threshold from conventional to nuclear weapons. They are seeking to amend the War Powers legislation to that effect." In many respects the effects of this proposed legislation would be similar to those of an orthodox commitment to "no first use." Nuclear threats would be inappropriate. Force deployments might reflect the assumption that the United States would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Just as in the case of a "nofirst-use" commitment, U.S. ability to respond to a nuclear attack, and therefore the efficacy of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, would be undiminished. The granting of congressional authorization, should it take place, would be equivalent to a formal announcement rescinding a prior "no-first-use" commitment, unilateral or multilateral. Such authorization (or the rescinding of a prior "no-first-use" commitment) would, in fact, constitute in itself an important diplomatic instrument. It would convey to an adversary the seriousness with which Washington viewed a threat, and its willingness to risk nuclear war in response. In this respect congressional authorization (or the public rescinding of "no first use") would be akin to the "demonstration use" which figures in some war-fighting scenarios, when one party to a conflict explodes a nuclear weapon in a manner which inflicts no damage but nevertheless conveys resolve. 

ADDITIONAL PROLIF CARD
NPT collapse matters – vital to the nonproliferation norm
Rublee 8 - Professor of Government and World Affairs @ University of Tampa Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, 22 Aug 2008, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 420-450WileyInterScience
By all recent indications, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT…. Understanding the Mechanisms of the International Social Environment

It would be internationally credible – huge costs to going back on it
Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, “The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
The second argument against NFU …in an attempt to deter future U.S. nuclear attacks. 

Debate over the details of nuclear policy is good
Nolan 89
(Janne, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and has worked as a national security specialist in both the Senate and Executive Branch, Guardians of the Arsenal, 282-284)
To many, the idea that nuclear war planning...would have a major moral problem on his hands with his command and combat crews.

Restrictions on first use would be effective – a president couldn’t just ignore them
Stone 84 (Jeremy J. Stone, president of the Federation of American Scientists, “Presidential First Use Is Unlawful,” Foreign Policy, No. 56 (Autumn, 1984))
Some will argue that such constraints will…," which is what Acheson had explicated.