Status quo administration policy delineates between geographic zones, but our legal justification for war everywhere remains in place Anthony Dworkin 13, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, "Drones And Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position", July, http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf
Two further points are worth noting. First, the administration has acknowledged that in AND the plans and capabilities of al-Qaeda and its associated forces".27 However, the details that have emerged about US targeting practices in the past few AND set an expansive precedent that is damaging to the international rule of law. Obama’s new policy on drones It is against this background that Obama’s recent counterterrorism speech and the policy directive he AND appeared to say that it might continue for 10 to 20 years.30 Second, the day before his speech, Obama set out regulations for drone strikes AND "near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed". In some respects, these standards remain unclear: the president did not specify how AND strikes will continue in the Pakistani tribal areas for the time being.33 However, the impact of the new policy will depend very much on how the AND that the level of attacks is hardly diminishing under the new guidelines.35 It is also notable that the new standards announced by Obama represent a policy decision AND to serve as a precedent for other states that wish to claim it.
The proliferation of drone technology has moved well beyond the control of the United States AND unmanned aerial vehicles. Not toys or models, but real flying machines. It’s a classic and common phase in the life cycle of a military innovation: AND the United States; it’s a precedent Washington does not want anyone following. America, the world’s leading democracy and a country built on a legal and moral framework unlike any other, has adopted a war-making process that too often bypasses its traditional, regimented, and rigorously overseen military in favor of a secret program never publicly discussed, based on legal advice never properly vetted. The Obama administration has used its executive power to refuse or outright ignore requests by congressional overseers, and it has resisted monitoring by federal courts. To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the AND -states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order. Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out AND learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention AND uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation. THE WRONG QUESTION The United States is the indisputable leader in drone technology and long-range strike AND billions of dollars that have gone into establishing and maintaining such a capability. That level of superiority leads some national security officials to downplay concerns about other nations’ AND the unparalleled intelligence-collection and data-analysis underpinning the aircraft’s mission. "There is what I think is just an unconstrained focus on a tool as AND who are interpreting the information that’s coming off the sensors on the aircraft." The analysts are part of the global architecture that makes precision strikes, and targeted AND ) outweigh the reward (judged by the value of the threat eliminated). "Is that a shovel or a rifle? Is that a Taliban member or AND . We can orbit long enough to be pretty sure about our target." Other countries, groups, and even individuals can and do fly drones. But no state or group has nearly the sophisticated network of intelligence and data analysis that gives the United States its strategic advantage. Although it would be foolish to dismiss the notion that potential U.S. adversaries aspire to attain that type of war-from-afar, pinpoint-strike capability, they have neither the income nor the perceived need to do so. That’s true, at least today. It’s also irrelevant. Others who employ drones are likely to carry a different agenda, one more concerned with employing a relatively inexpensive and ruthlessly efficient tool to dispatch an enemy close at hand. "It would be very difficult for them to create the global-strike architecture AND long-duration surveillance and potentially strike inside and right on its border." And that’s a NATO ally seeking the capability to conduct missions that would run afoul AND uses the aircraft to strike Lashkar-e-Taiba militants near Kashmir? "We don’t like other states using lethal force outside their borders. It’s destabilizing. It can lead to a sort of wider escalation of violence between two states," said Micah Zenko, a security policy and drone expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. "So the proliferation of drones is not just about the protection of the United States. It’s primarily about the likelihood that other states will increasingly use lethal force outside of their borders." LOWERING THE BAR Governments have covertly killed for ages, whether they maintained an official hit list or AND American security experts point to Russia as well, although Moscow disputes this. In the 1960s, the U.S. government was involved to differing levels AND late as 2001, Washington’s stated policy was to oppose Israel’s targeted killings.) When America adopted targeted killing again—first under the Bush administration after the September 11 attacks and then expanded by President Obama—the tools of the trade had changed. No longer was the CIA sending poison, pistols, and toxic cigars to assets overseas to kill enemy leaders. Now it could target people throughout al-Qaida’s hierarchy with accuracy, deliver lethal ordnance literally around the world, and watch the mission’s completion in real time. The United States is smartly using technology to improve combat efficacy, and to make AND , defense hawks and spendthrifts alike would criticize it if it did not. "If you believe that these folks are legitimate terrorists who are committing acts of AND Do we have the debate if an aircraft pilot drops a particular bomb?" But defense analysts argue—and military officials concede—there is a qualitative difference AND States would not have pursued an equivalent number of manned strikes in Pakistan. And what’s true for the United States will be true as well for other countries that own and arm remote piloted aircraft. "The drones—the responsiveness, the persistence, and without putting your personnel at risk—is what makes it a different technology," Zenko said. "When other states have this technology, if they follow U.S. practice, it will lower the threshold for their uses of lethal force outside their borders. So they will be more likely to conduct targeted killings than they have in the past." The Obama administration appears to be aware of and concerned about setting precedents through its targeted-strike program. When the development of a disposition matrix to catalog both targets and resources marshaled against the United States was first reported in 2012, officials spoke about it in part as an effort to create a standardized process that would live beyond the current administration, underscoring the long duration of the counterterrorism challenge. Indeed, the president’s legal and security advisers have put considerable effort into establishing rules AND lead somebody to be subject for an engagement by the United States government." BEHIND CLOSED DOORS The argument against public debate is easy enough to understand: Operational secrecy is necessary AND public debate, which is going to be a hard one to win." But by keeping legal and policy positions secret, only partially sharing information even with congressional oversight committees, and declining to open a public discussion about drone use, the president and his team are asking the world to just trust that America is getting this right. While some will, many people, especially outside the United States, will see that approach as hypocritical, coming from a government that calls for transparency and the rule of law elsewhere. "I know these people, and I know how much they really, really AND would be giving you a different rendering, and much more uncertain rendering." That’s only part of the problem with the White House’s trust-us approach. AND ) an imminent threat of violent attack 5) against the United States. But that’s not who is being targeted. Setting aside the administration’s redefining of "imminence" beyond all recognition, the majority AND States (another precedent that might be eagerly seized upon in the future). U.S. defense and intelligence officials reject any suggestion that the targets are AND new Secretary of State John Kerry criticized during his confirmation hearing this year. Human-rights groups might be loudest in their criticism of both the program and AND by principles and rules of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights." PEER PRESSURE Obama promised in his 2013 State of the Union to increase the drone program’s transparency AND of the legal memos the Justice Department drafted in support of targeted killing. But, beyond that, it’s not certain Obama will do anything more to shine light on this program. Except in situations where leaks help it tell a politically expedient story of its skill at killing bad guys, the administration has done little to make a case to the public and the world at large for its use of armed drones. Already, what’s become apparent is that the White House is not interested in changing AND largely off the table now, according to intelligence officials and committee members. Under discussion within the administration and on Capitol Hill is a potential program takeover by AND provide no guarantee of greater transparency for the public, or even Congress. And if the administration is not willing to share with lawmakers who are security-cleared to know, it certainly is not prepared to engage in a sensitive discussion, even among allies, that might begin to set the rules on use for a technology that could upend stability in already fragile and strategically significant places around the globe. Time is running out to do so. "The history of technology development like this is, you never maintain your lead very long. Somebody always gets it," said David Berteau, director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "They’re going to become cheaper. They’re going to become easier. They’re going to become interoperable," he said. "The destabilizing effects are very, very serious." Berteau is not alone. Zenko, of the Council on Foreign Relations, has AND angles on this question are why you see them in conflict right now." That’s in part a symptom of the "technological optimism" that often plagues the U.S. security community when it establishes a lead over its competitors, noted Georgetown University’s Kai-Henrik Barth. After the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States was sure it would be decades before the Soviets developed a nuclear-weapon capability. It took four years. With drones, the question is how long before the dozens of states with the AND nations have gone down the pathway of first only surveillance and then arming." The opportunity to write rules that might at least guide, if not restrain, AND —to be closer to certain that their target is the right one. But even without raising standards, tightening up drone-specific restrictions in the standing AND , or 15 years—might find helpful in arguing against another’s actions. A not-insignificant faction of U.S. defense and intelligence experts, AND some weapons, including land mines, blinding lasers, and nuclear bombs. Arguably more significant than spotty legal regimes, however, is the behavior of the AND policy that it did most recently on "enhanced interrogation" of terrorists. The case against open, transparent rule-making is that it might only hamstring AND operations manual for other nations but a legal and moral one as well.
Geographic restrictions are key Rosa Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation, 4/23/13, The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf
Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn now to the legal framework applicable AND requirements as the use of other lawful means and methods of warfare.28 But if drones used in traditional armed conflicts or traditional self-defense situations present no "new" legal issues, some of the activities and policies enabled and facilitated by drone technologies pose significant challenges to existing legal frameworks. As I have discussed above, the availability of perceived low cost of drone technologies AND traditional or "hot" battlefields that their use challenges existing legal frameworks. Law is almost always out of date: we make legal rules based on existing AND is on the verge of doing significant damage to the rule of law. A. The Rule of Law At root, the idea of "rule of law" is fairly simple, AND processes and rules that reflect basic notions of justice, humanity and fairness. Precisely what constitutes a fair process is debatable, but most would agree that at AND Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a party. In ordinary circumstances, this bundle of universally acknowledged rights (together with international law AND States government called this an act of murder—an unlawful political assassination. B. Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict Of course, sometimes the "ordinary" legal rules do not apply. In AND the principles of necessity, humanity, proportionality,29 and distinction.30 It is worth briefly explaining these principles. The principle of necessity requires parties to AND in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Finally, the principle of discrimination or distinction requires that parties to a conflict direct their actions only against combatants and military objectives, and take appropriate steps to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.31 This is a radical oversimplification of a very complex body of law.32 But AND by military necessity34 — but there are far fewer constraints on state behavior. Technically, the law of war is referred to using the Latin term "lex specialis" – special law. It is applicable in—and only in — special circumstances (in this case, armed conflict), and in those special circumstances, it supersedes "ordinary law," or "lex generalis," the "general law" that prevails in peacetime. We have one set of laws for "normal" situations, and another, more flexible set of laws for "extraordinary" situations, such as armed conflicts. None of this poses any inherent problem for the rule of law. Having one body of rules that tightly restricts the use of force and another body of rules that is far more permissive does not fundamentally undermine the rule of law, as long as we have a reasonable degree of consensus on what circumstances trigger the "special" law, and as long as the "special law" doesn’t end up undermining the general law. To put it a little differently, war, with its very different rules, AND , and between places where there’s war and places where there’s no war. Let me return now to the question of drones and targeted killings. When all AND Libyan military targets is no more controversial than the use of manned aircraft. That is because our core rule of law concerns have mostly been satisfied: we AND in the event of error or abuse (the various governments involved).35 Once you take targeted killings outside hot battlefields, it’s a different story. The AND any time — with regard to any person the administration deems a combatant. The trouble is, no one outside a very small group within the US executive AND of the time, the US will not even officially acknowledge targeted killings. This leaves all the key rule-of-law questions related to the ongoing AND determinations, and what is the precise chain of command for such decisions? I think the rule of law problem here is obvious: when "armed conflict AND are they, as some human rights groups have argued, unlawful murder? C. Targeted Killing and the International Law of Self-Defense When faced with criticisms of the law of war framework as a justification for targeted AND that the defensive force used is otherwise consistent with law of war principles. Like law of war-based arguments, this general principle is superficially uncontroversial: if someone overseas is about to launch a nuclear weapon at New York City, no one can doubt that the United States has a perfect right (and the president has a constitutional duty) to use force if needed to prevent that attack, regardless of the attacker’s nationality. But once again, the devil is in the details. To start with, what constitutes an "imminent" threat? Traditionally, both international law and domestic criminal law understand that term narrowly: 37 to be "imminent," a threat cannot be distant or speculative.38 But much like the Bush Administration before it, the Obama Administration has put forward an interpretation of the word "imminent" that bears little relation to traditional legal concepts. According to a leaked 2011 Justice Department white paper39—the most detailed legal justification that has yet become public— the requirement of imminence "does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future." This seems, in itself, like a substantial departure from accepted international law definitions of imminence. But the White Paper goes even further, stating that "certain members of al AND identity or status (a familiar part of the law of armed conflict). That concept of imminence has been called Orwellian, and although that is an overused epithet, in this context it seems fairly appropriate. According to the Obama Administration, "imminent" no longer means "immediate," and in fact the very absence of clear evidence indicating specific present or future attack plans becomes, paradoxically, the basis for assuming that attack may perpetually be "imminent." The 2011 Justice Department White Paper notes that the use of force in self-defense must comply with general law of war principles of necessity, proportionality, humanity, and distinction. The White Paper offers no guidance on the specific criteria for determining when an individual is a combatant (or a civilian participating directly in hostilities), however. It also offers no guidance on how to determine if a use of force is necessary or proportionate. From a traditional international law perspective, this necessity and proportionality inquiry relates both to AND American citizen abroad — or against non-citizens, for that matter? As I have noted, it is impossible for outsiders to fully evaluate US drone strikes, since so much vital information remains classified. In most cases, we know little about the identities; activities or future plans of those targeted. Nevertheless, given the increased frequency of US targeted killings in recent years, it seems reasonable to wonder whether the Administration conducts a rigorous necessity or proportionality analysis in all cases. So far, the leaked 2011 Justice Department White Paper represents the most detailed legal AND citizens are less exacting than those the Administration views as applicable to citizens. Defenders of administration targeted killing policy acknowledge that the criteria for determining how to answer these many questions have not been made public, but insist that this should not be cause for concern. The Administration has reportedly developed a detailed "playbook" outlining the targeting criteria and procedures,40, and insiders insist that executive branch officials go through an elaborate process in which they carefully consider every possible issue before determining that a drone strike is lawful.41 No doubt they do, but this is somewhat cold comfort. Formal processes tend to further normalize once-exceptional activities — and "trust us" is a rather shaky foundation for the rule of law. Indeed, the whole point of the rule of law is that individual lives and freedom should not depend solely on the good faith and benevolence of government officials. As with law of war arguments, stating that US targeted killings are clearly legal under traditional self-defense principles requires some significant cognitive dissonance. Law exists to restrain untrammeled power. It is no doubt possible to make a plausible legal argument justifying each and every U.S. drone strike — but this merely suggests that we are working with a legal framework that has begun to outlive its usefulness. The real question isn’t whether U.S. drone strikes are "legal." The real question is this: Do we really want to live in a world in which the U.S. government’s justification for killing is so malleable? 5. Setting Troubling International Precedents Here is an additional reason to worry about the U.S. overreliance on AND human rights records, such as Russia and China—are taking notice. Right now, the United States has a decided technological advantage when it comes to AND for how to foment instability and –literally — get away with murder. Take the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been a core concept of the AND or in self-defense "in the event of an armed attack." The 2011 Justice Department White Paper asserts that targeted killings carried out by the United AND unable" to suppress that threat, the logic is in fact circular. It goes like this: The United States — using its own malleable definition of AND posed by Person X and the use of force again presents no problem. This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty, AND them to justify the killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities?
Turkey follows US precedent to strike the PKK – collapses negotiations and Erdogan’s presidency Stein 13 (Aaron, Ph.D candidate at King’s College, London and the Nonproliferation Program Director at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies an independent think tank in Istanbul, "Turkey’s Negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Armed Drones" February 26, 2013, Turkey Wonk Blog)
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently re-intiated peace talks with Abdullah Ocalan AND backlash from Turkish nationalists (An important AKP voting bloc by the way). The talks, despite having made some progress, broke down after President Abdullah Gul AND end of the talks and the re-militarization of the Kurdish issue. This time around, Erdogan has opted to publicize the talks, which has, AND Union reforms and deepening the country’s democratic system (Both AKP campaign themes). Erdogan, I am assuming, is betting that if he solves the PKK problem AND the recent attack, see this blog post by the excellent Frederike Geerdink). The AKP, however, receives a tremendous amount of political support from nationalists. AND penalty and the need to open chapters for Turkey’s stalled European Union bid. However, because the AKP has shown an incredible ability to set Turkey’s political agenda – using coordinated leaks, trial balloons, and speeches, which are framed by overarching themes like justice and development (The translation of the AKP’s name) – I believe that the AKP is capable of keeping its coalition together and ending the conflict with the PKK. (The PKK also has a lot to with this, but that is the subject for another blog post.) However, as I explain in my current piece on Foreign Policy, Ankara has AND candidate country, one would assume Turkey would try and figure this out). Moreover, if the drone is used in the southeast to attack PKK militants, AND , one need not look any further than the Uludere tragedy for confirmation). If Ankara presses ahead with its armed drone program (and it will), the AND the perspective of AKP political operatives, help them grow their voter base.
Key to Turkish model —- solves Middle East instability Kiri?ci 8/15/13 (Kemal Kiri?ci is the TÜS?AD senior fellow and director of the Center on the United States and Europe’s Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies, " The Rise and Fall of Turkey as a Model for the Arab World " August 15, 2013, Brookings Institution)
As the Arab Spring spread from Tunisia to the rest of the Middle East early AND so dramatically? Are there any prospects for Turkey to reclaim these credentials? For a long time, Turkish schoolchildren were taught how the 1923 establishment of the AND and some even feared that this could undermine Turkey’s national identity and secularism. The Arab Spring brought about a different context. This time it seemed that it AND EU and its prospects of membership also attracted considerable positive attention and appreciation. Turkey’s popularity was also strengthened by the "zero problems with neighbors" policy of AND the Arab street even if it did raise some eyebrows in diplomatic circles. However, this positive climate did not last very long and, as a result AND this dramatic transformation in Turkish foreign policy as "zero neighbors without problems." Secondly, the brutal police repression used against the anti-government protests in Istanbul AND for Tunisia’s transformation and taken a critical view of Erdo?an’s own democratic credentials. Is this then the end of the road for Turkey as a model for the AND East rather than an inspiration for pluralist democracy, consensus building and tolerance.
And, Turkish intervention goes nuclear Snyder 11 (Michael T. Snyder is a graduate of the McIntire School of AND see-a-war-between-syria-and-turkey)
In recent days, there have been persistent rumors that we could potentially be on AND us just hope that World War III does not erupt as a result.
And so does the Middle East James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ’9 (Spring) "Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East" IFRI, Proliferation Papers, ~2326, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) AND the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.
Drones cause SCS and ECS conflict – US precedent is key Bodeen 13 (Christopher, Beijing correspondent for The Associated Press, 5/3/2013, "China’s Drone Program Appears To Be Moving Into Overdrive", www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/03/china-drone-program_n_3207392.html)
Chinese aerospace firms have developed dozens of drones, known also as unmanned aerial vehicles AND rapidly and on the cusp of widespread use for surveillance and combat strikes. "My sense is that China is moving into large-scale deployments of UAVs," said Ian Easton, co-author of a recent report on Chinese drones for the Project 2049 Institute security think tank. China’s move into large-scale drone deployment displays its military’s growing sophistication and could challenge U.S. military dominance in the Asia-Pacific. It also could elevate the threat to neighbors with territorial disputes with Beijing, including Vietnam, Japan, India and the Philippines. China says its drones are capable of carrying bombs and missiles as well as conducting reconnaissance, potentially turning them into offensive weapons in a border conflict. China’s increased use of drones also adds to concerns about the lack of internationally recognized standards for drone attacks. The United States has widely employed drones as a means of eliminating terror suspects in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. "China is following the precedent set by the U.S. The thinking is that, `If the U.S. can do it, so can we. They’re a big country with security interests and so are we’," said Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the arms transfers program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, or SIPRI. "The justification for an attack would be that Beijing too has a responsibility for the safety of its citizens. There needs to be agreement on what the limits are," he said. Though China claims its military posture is entirely defensive, its navy and civilian maritime services have engaged in repeated standoffs with ships from other nations in the South China and East China seas. India, meanwhile, says Chinese troops have set up camp almost 20 kilometers (12 miles) into Indian-claimed territory. It isn’t yet known exactly what China’s latest drones are capable of, because, like most Chinese equipment, they remain untested in battle. The military and associated aerospace firms have offered little information, although in an interview last month with the official Xinhua News Agency, Yang Baikui, chief designer at plane maker COSIC, said Chinese drones were closing the gap but still needed to progress in half a dozen major areas, from airframe design to digital linkups. Executives at COSIC and drone makers ASN, Avic, and the 611 Institute declined to be interviewed by The Associated Press, citing their military links. The Defense Ministry’s latest report on the status of the military released in mid-April made no mention of drones, and spokesman Yang Yujun made only the barest acknowledgement of their existence in response to a question. "Drones are a new high-tech form of weaponry employed and used by many militaries around the world," Yang said. "China’s armed forces are developing weaponry and equipment for the purpose of upholding territorial integrity, national security and world peace. It will pose no threat to any country." Drones are already patrolling China’s borders, and a navy drone was deployed to the western province of Sichuan to provide aerial surveillance following last month’s deadly earthquake there. They may also soon be appearing over China’s maritime claims, including Japanese-controlled East China Sea islands that China considers its own. That could sharpen tensions in an area where Chinese and Japanese patrol boats already confront each other on a regular basis and Japan frequently scrambles fighters to tail Chinese manned aircraft.
SCS conflict causes extinction Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace 26 Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. AND —destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
Senkaku conflict causes extinction Baker 12 (Kevin R., Member of the Compensation Committee of Calfrac, Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee, served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Century Oilfield Services Inc. from August 2005 until November 10, 2009, when it was acquired by the Corporation. He also has served as the President of Baycor Capital Inc., 9/17/2012, "What Would Happen if China and Japan Went to War?", http://appreviews4u.com/2012/09/17/what-would-happen-if-china-and-japan-went-to-war/)
China is not an isolationist country but it is quite nationalistic. Their allies include, Russia, which is a big super power, Pakistan and Iran as well as North Korea. They have more allies than Japan, although most relations have been built on economic strategies, being a money-centric nation. Countries potentially hostile toward China in the event of a Japan vs. China war include Germany, Britain, Australia and South Korea. So even though Japan does not outwardly build relationships with allies, Japan would have allies rallying around them if China were to attack Japan. The island dispute would not play out as it did in the UK vs. Argentina island dispute, as both sides could cause massive damage to each other, whereas the UK was far superior in firepower compared to Argentina. Conclusion Even though China outweighs Japan in numbers, the likelihood that a war would develop into a nuclear war means that numbers don’t really mean anything anymore. The nuclear capabilities of Japan and China would mean that each country could destroy each other many times over. The island dispute would then escalate to possible mass extinction for the human race. The nuclear fall out would affect most of Asia and to a certain extent the AND maybe 20 years at best, if there are ample supplies of course.
Terrorism
CONTENTION THREE: TERRORISM
The plan is key to prevent an escalating public backlash against future drone use Zenko 13 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, "U.S. Drone Strike Policies", i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf?)
In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: "Where force AND if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.
Public backlash culminates in a legal crackdown that hemorrhages the targeted killing program Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School Professor, focus on national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, and conflict of laws, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense, Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, March 2012, Power and Constraint, P. 199-201
For the GTMO Bar and its cousin NGOs and activists, however, the al AND said Michael Ratner, explaining the CCR’s strategy for pursuing lawsuits in Europe. Clive Stafford Smith, a former CCR attorney who was instrumental in its early GTMO AND hard at work to stigmatize drones and those who support and operate them." This strategy is having an impact. The slew of lawsuits in the United States AND deemed to be in the interest of U.S. national security.
Support for the legality of global war against al-Qaeda is collapsing Robert Chesney, University of Texas School of Law Professor, 8/29/12, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138623
The drawdown in Afghanistan, combined with the expansion of the shadow war model, AND instead increasingly be rooted in other locations, such as Yemen and Somalia. It does not follow that LOAC accordingly will be irrelevant to future instances of detention AND provides a good example of an area ripe for such an analysis.190 But even in those cases, the very nature of the shadow war approach is AND a borderless armed conflict governed by LOAC wherever the parties may be found. The borderless-conflict position at first blush appears nicely entrenched in the status quo AND forward when new cases arise, as they are sure to do.192 Making matters worse, the U.S. government’s position on the relevance of AND provides a useful illustration, or perhaps more accurately, a cautionary tale.
* Though widely perceived at the time as a period of great legal controversy and uncertainty AND /11 decade will witness far more serious legal disputes as a result.
The plan is key to allied coop on counterterrorism David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the U.S. Department of Justice from March 2009 to March 2011, 6/15/2011, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/01_David-Kris.pdf
On the other side of the balance, certainly most of our friends in Europe AND the help of our allies, we need to work with them.77 More generally, we need to recognize the practical impact of our treatment of the AND cooperation from our allies and easier for the terrorists to find new recruits. This is not simply abstract philosophy. It is an important reality in our military’s AND hostilities, while we abandon those tools here in the United States.84
CNN should not have been surprised. Neither the Bush nor Obama administrations received blanket permission to transit Algerian airspace with surveillance planes or drones; instead, they received authorization only on a case-by-case basis and with advance notice. According to Washington Post journalist Craig Whitlock, the U.S. military relies AND .S. armed drones cannot be launched and recovered from naval platforms. According to Hollywood movies or television dramas, with its immense intelligence collection and military strike capabilities, the United States can locate, track, and kill anyone in the world. This misperception is continually reinvigorated by the White House’s, the CIA’s, and the AND doing a public opinion poll by virtue of giving me some good ideas." Similarly, as of November there were at least 10 movies about the Navy SEALs in production or in theaters, which included so much support from the Pentagon that one film even starred active-duty SEALs. The Obama administration’s lack of a military response in Algeria reflects how sovereign states routinely AND nations have complete discretion in regulating or prohibiting flights within their national airspace." Though not sexy and little reported, deploying CIA drones or special operations forces requires constant behind-the-scenes diplomacy: with very rare exceptions - like the Bin Laden raid - the U.S. military follows the rules of the world’s other 194 sovereign, independent states. These rules come in many forms. For example, basing rights agreements can limit AND assure that the United States did not violate its highly restrictive basing agreement. As Algeria is doing presently, the denial or approval of overflight rights is a AND the government has conducted an intermittent counterinsurgency against the Ogaden National Liberation Front.
Drones are effective and alternatives are worse—the plan prevents criticism Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, "Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington’s Weapon of Choice", www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)
Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, AND indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.
AQ leadership is down but not out Simpson 8/17—national affairs columnist with The Globe and Mail, a Canadian newspaper (2013, Jeffrey, "The long war against al-Qaeda isn’t over," lexis)
Just how serious is the al-Qaeda threat? Informed people can disagree, but the Canadian Security Intelligence Service did everyone a favour by convening a workshop on "The Future of al-Qaeda" and then publishing the results, including three possible scenarios. They ranged from al-Qaeda in decline, as the State Department suggested, to al-Qaeda growing incrementally, to al-Qaeda gaining rapidly in strength. The incremental growth scenario emerged as the most likely. If that is correct, the organization will remain a threat for a very long time. Al-Qaeda has morphed or sprung offshoots to Saharan Africa and parts of Southeast Asia. It remains resilient in Pakistan and some countries in the Middle East. Its fighters are now very much involved in the Syrian war, hoping to assist in the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and replace it with a militant Sunni alternative. And, of course, it has followers and sleeper cells in Western countries who remain a threat, witness to which were the recent arrests of men alleged to have been plotting to blow up a train between Toronto and New York. This very loose network of affiliates persists, despite U.S. drone attacks AND the borderlands of Pakistan, southern Thailand, northern Nigeria or northern Mali. CSIS published four papers delivered at the conference, but kept the authors’ names confidential. The longest paper, dealing with al-Qaeda Central and al-Qaeda in Iraq, is the most comprehensive and sobering. It concludes that "the long-established nucleus of the al-Qaeda organization has proven itself to be as resilient as it is formidable." Al-Qaeda’s core leadership, the author wrote, "has withstood arguably the AND in Lebanon, both enemies of the Sunni jihadis in al-Qaeda.
Drones solve safe havens – prevents an attack in the US Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida’s leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm’s way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida’s senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida’s central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan’s Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden’s letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military’s footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
Decapitation works—-studies Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He wrote this article while he was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Stanford University and at the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., Spring 2012, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47–79, "Does Decapitation Work?", www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076)
Conclusion Targeting militant leaders is now a centerpiece of U.S. strategy in AND from the battlefield to the shadows, this trend will likely remain true.
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, "Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence" SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
Causes US-Russia miscalc – extinction Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor 26 Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
Ebola has capabilities of biological weaponization with catastrophic consequences, especially due to the fact AND stream into the possible risk of bioterrorism during diagnostic research and procedures.
Bioterror causes extinction Mhyrvold ’13 Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action," Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2 – 2013
As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the AND be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.
The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may well be the AND would be more than just a possibility, whatever promises had been made."
Plan
Plan: The United States Federal Government should restrict executive authority for targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
Solvency
CONTENTION FOUR: SOLVENCY
Congressional action sends a clear signal the US abides by laws of armed conflict Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Member of its Task Force on National Security and the Law, 3/18/10, Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War, digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=100226context=pub_disc_cong
• First, the United States government urgently needs publicly to declare the legal rationale behind its use of drones, and defend that legal rationale in the international community, which is increasingly convinced that parts, if not all, of its use is a violation of international law. • Second, the legal rationale offered by the United States government needs to take AND future reasons for using force that have no relationship to the current situation. • Third, the proper legal rationale for the use of force in drone operations in special, sometimes covert, operations outside of traditional zones of armed conflict is the customary international law doctrine of self-defense, rather than the narrower law of armed conflict. • Fourth, Congress has vital roles to play here, mostly in asserting the AND civilian CIA using drones is per se an unlawful act of extrajudicial execution. The Multiple Strategic Uses of Drones and Their Legal Rationales 4. Seen through the lens of legal policy, drones as a mechanism for AND uniformed military in ordinary battle but also use by the covert civilian service. 5. Although well-known, perhaps it bears re-stating the when AND discussion because they are not at issue in current debates over UA Vs.) 6. Drones on traditional battlefields. The least legally complicated or controversial use of AND for assessing the lawfulness of the target and anticipated collateral damage are identical. 7. Drones used in Pakistan’s border region. Drones used as part of the AND legally special about UAVs that would distinguish them from other standoff weapons platforms. 8. Drones used in Pakistan outside of the border region. The use of AND the law of armed conflict as a basis and justification for drone strikes. 9. Drones used against Al Qaeda affiliates outside of AfPak – Somalia, Yemen AND failed to respond effectively to a demand that the attacks be stopped."2 10. The United States might assert in these cases that the armed conflict goes AND . The three main contending legal views at this point are as follows: • One legal view (the traditional view and that presumably taken by the Obama AND a combatant, other things being equal, surely cannot be at issue. • A second legal view directly contradicts the first, and says that the legal AND some place where, to some extent, it is protected against attack. • A third legal view (to which I subscribe) says that armed conflict AND do not rise to the sustained levels of fighting that legally define hostilities. • Why is self-defense the appropriate legal doctrine for attacks taking place away AND the law’s threshold definition – but instead the law of self-defense. • Is self-defense law simply a standardless license wantonly to kill? This AND of war, and in some cases the standards should be still higher.
The United States government seems, to judge by its lack of public AND quite undeclared – presumption that the armed conflict goes wherever the combatants go. 12. Thus, for example, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial execution, AND that are not obviously by the military in obvious battlespaces is increasingly problematic. 13. Drones used in future circumstances by future presidents against new non-state AND " full-on – as a strategic description, this is apt. 14. This blunt description suggests, however, that it is a profound mistake AND of their use, including both their use and their limits in law.
Plan’s mechanism is key to consensus-building on targeted killing norms Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
Legal scholars, policymakers, and state actors are embroiled in a heated debate about AND to govern intrastate conflicts) provides the answers that are so desperately needed. The zone approach proposed by this Article fills the international law gap, effectively mediating AND respond to grave threats to its security, wherever those threats are based. The United States has already adopted a number of policies that distinguish between zones of AND , and foreign policy gains make acceptance of this framework a worthy endeavor.
The plan is administration policy but just needs to be formalized—-triggers your DAs Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
One might be skeptical that a nation like the United States would ever accept such constraints on the exercise of its authority. There are, however, several reasons why doing so would be in the United States’ best interest. First, as described in Section II.B, the general framework is largely consistent with current U.S. practice since 2006. The United States has, as a matter of policy, adopted important limits on its use of out-of-battlefield targeting and law-of-war detention suggesting an implicit recognition of the value and benefits of restraint. Second, while the proposed substantive and procedural safeguards are more stringent than those that AND detention without charge and targeted killing can yield legitimacy and security benefits. n218 Third, limiting the exercise of these authorities outside zones of active hostilities better accommodates AND development of an international consensus as to the rules that ought to apply. Fourth, such self-imposed restrictions are more consistent with the United States’ long-standing role as a champion of human rights and the rule of law a role that becomes difficult for the United States to play when viewed as supporting broad-based law-of-war authority that gives it wide latitude to employ force as a first resort and bypass otherwise applicable human rights and domestic law enforcement norms. Fifth, and critically, while the United States might be confident that it will AND American citizen, the United States would have few principled grounds for objecting.
What Should Congress Do? Does this analysis offer any practical policy prescriptions for Congress and the administration? The AND already seen by many as a legal non-starter under international law. Before addressing what Congress should do in this regard, we might ask from a AND Obama Administration. Perhaps it is better to let sleeping political dogs lie. These questions require difficult political calculations. However, the sources cited above suggest that AND when its sovereign prerogatives are challenged by the international soft-law community. The deeper issue here is not merely a strategic and political one about targeted killing AND a general approach of overt legislation that removes ambiguity is to be preferred. The single most important role for Congress to play in addressing targeted killings, therefore, is the open, unapologetic, plain insistence that the American understanding of international law on this issue of self-defense is legitimate. The assertion, that is, that the United States sees its conduct as permissible for itself and for others. And it is the putting of congressional strength
behind the official statements of the executive branch as the opinio juris of the United States, its authoritative view of what international law is on this subject. If this statement seems peculiar, that is because the task—as fundamental as it is—remains unfortunately poorly understood. Yet if it is really a matter of political consensus between Left and Right that AND as a very powerful, very important, and very legitimate sovereign state. Intellectually, continuing to squeeze all forms and instances of targeted killing by standoff platform AND itself a certain deformation of the IHL concept of hostilities and armed conflict.
*2AC*
A2: Backlash Inevitable – Public
Anderson 13 (Kenneth Anderson is a professor of international law at American University and a member of the Task Force on National Security and Law at the Hoover Institution, June 2013, "The Case for Drones", https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-case-for-drones/)
Without a hardheaded effort on the part of Congress and the executive branch to make AND and Jack Goldsmith have repeatedly warned, they might well be miscalculating now.
Moving the drone program from the CIA to the Department of Defense is thus being AND the world, wherever a possible or even supposed threat can be identified.
There are several ways in which the EU has an interest in the elaboration of AND to work against the spread of a practice that it has previously opposed.
Meanwhile, European governments are increasingly acquiring armed drones for their own military forces and AND developing a clearer European line about when lethal strikes against individuals are permissible. Armed drones are proliferating (and developing in sophistication) rapidly beyond Europe. Perhaps AND if it fails to define its own position more clearly at this point.
Reviewing the transatlantic relationship and the potential to develop it in the area of democracy AND , there could be potential for renewed energy in transatlantic support to democracy.
No impact Leonard 12 (Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, the first pan-European think tank., 7/24/2012, "The End of the Affair", www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/24/the_end_of_the_affair)
But Obama’s stellar personal ratings in Europe hide the fact that the Western alliance has AND for both sides to wake up and realize just what is at stake.
Analysts say the Afghan war has been a blow to NATO’s psyche, with countries AND noting that the vast majority of conflicts around the world involved irregular forces.
The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law AND full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official ("TopOff") exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the AND focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge AND and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem AND student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the AND that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and AND giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal ~1 AND Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount AND execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise AND but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution AND , generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – AND simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) AND many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize AND to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the AND exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during AND , while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop AND uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account AND weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might AND through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts AND , giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to AND relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives ( AND , or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law AND releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, AND the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students AND opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who AND concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the AND both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, AND greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national AND to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, AND in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model AND undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.
5) Debating the law teaches us how to make it better – rejection is worse Todd Hedrick, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University, Sept 2012, Democratic Constitutionalism as Mediation: The Decline and Recovery of an Idea in Critical Social Theory, Constellations Volume 19, Issue 3, pages 382–400
Habermas’ alleged abandonment of immanent critique, however, is belied by the role that AND more reflective of generalizable interests, occurring amidst class stratification and cultural pluralism. A constitution’s status as positive law is also of importance for fundamentally Hegelian reasons relating AND of continuous rearticulation, through reflection and contestation, of its constitutional project. Habermas explicitly conceives of the democratic legal order in this way when, in the context of considering the question of how a constitution that confers legitimacy on ordinary legislation could itself be thought to be democratically legitimate, he writes: I propose that we understand the regress itself as the understandable expression of the future-oriented character, or openness, of the democratic constitution: in my view, a constitution that is democratic – not just in its content but also according to its source of legitimation – is a tradition-building project with a clearly marked beginning in time. All the later generations have the task of actualizing the still-untapped normative substance of the system of rights.59 A constitutional order and its interpretive history represent a community’s attempt to render the terms AND enter the community and as new circumstances, problems, and perspectives emerge. The stakes involved in sustaining a broad and inclusive constitutional discourse turn out to be AND role of citizens as legislators of the order to which they are subject. ~Dignity~ can be established only within the framework of a constitutional state, something that never emerges of its own accord. Rather, this framework must be created by the citizens themselves using the means of positive law and must be protected and developed under historically changing conditions. As a modern legal concept, human dignity is associated with the status that citizens assume in the self-created political order.62 Although the implications of invoking dignity (as opposed to, say, autonomy) as the normative core of democratic constitutionalism are unclear,63 plainly Habermas remains committed to strongly intersubjective conceptions of democratic constitutionalism, to an intersubjectivity that continues to be legally and politically mediated (a dimension largely absent from Honneth’s successor theory of intersubectivity). What all of this suggests is a constitutional politics in which citizens are empowered to AND rearticulation of basic norms is necessary for the very emergence of generalizable interests. Despite offering an admirably systematic synthesis of radical democracy and the constitutional rule of law AND administration of constitutional issues as it exists in the United States and Germany. This is evident in Habermas’ embrace of figures from liberal constitutional theory. He does AND placing vast decision-making powers in the hands of the judiciary.7 There is more than a little here that should make Habermas uncomfortable. Firstly, AND of law through technical interpretation and rational intuition into a fixed moral order. Also puzzling is the degree of influence exercised by civil society in the development of AND conception of constitutionalism could unlock greater democratic freedom and rationally integrated social identities. Given these problems in Habermas’ theory, the innovations that Benhabib makes to his conception AND as-use theories, emphasizes how meaning is inevitably transformed through repetition: In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply AND its dissolution as the original and its preservation through its continuous deployment.80 Recalling the reciprocal relationship that Hegel hints at between the narrow "political" constitution AND events and has the tendency to have a destabilizing effect on authority.82 It is telling, however, that Benhabib’s examples of democratic iterations are exclusively centered AND with questions of moral rights and collective identities without subordinating or conflating them. 4.?Conclusion Some readers may find the general notion of reinvigorating a politics of constitutionalism quixotic. AND to aim at recapturing while critiquing more legalistic and authoritarian models of law. This is not to deny the possibility that democratic iterations themselves may be regressive or AND , without the triumphalist pretension of ever being able to fully do so.
6) Legal interventions work and the alt is worse Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf 11, Joe is a law prof at Northwestern, Hope is a lecturer at Yale Law, "Terrorizing Academia", Journal of Legal Education, Volume 60, Number 3 (February 2011)
From the vantage of 2010, it appears the interventionist position—our position— AND of the complicated tendency of narratives to generate backlash and counter-narratives. But there is another tendency we must resist, and that is the impulse to AND the law should be, but how it functions and whom it serves.
7) The alt doesn’t influence legal decisionmaking and results in tyranny Paul Passavant, Ph.D., Hobart and William Smith College Associate Professor of Political Science, December 2010, Yoo’s Law, Sovereignty, and Whatever, Constellations Volume 17, Issue 4, pages 549–571
For some on the left, it has become conventional to celebrate, if not AND of language as pure means beyond a preoccupation with true or false propositions. In his best-known work, Agamben links sovereignty to the production of rightless subjects and the Nazi death camps. He urges us to rethink the very ontological basis of politics in the West, creating a human being beyond sovereignty or law, in order to avoid perilous outcomes. One key to surpassing the logic of sovereignty, according to Agamben, is whatever being’s positive relation to the singularities of life and the multiplicities of communication. Whatever being is also being outside of law. If "law" persists in this "coming community," it would be a "law" that has become deactivated and deposed from its prior purposes. "Law" will have become an object for play – something to be toyed with the way that children might come upon a disused object and play with it by putting it to uses disconnected from whatever purpose this object might once have had. Why does the fact of playful communicative possibilities lead to either more democracy or a AND this instance shows, does not lead necessarily to outcomes friendly to democracy. In this essay, I investigate how playing with the multiplicity of communicative possibilities can, contrary to Agamben’s expectations, actually facilitate aspirations for unitary sovereign power. My argument unfolds in the context of the legal arguments put forward by Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, particularly those enabling torturous interrogations. Those, like Agamben, who favor interpretive pluralism in itself rarely, if ever AND pure mediality that Agamben describes and to which he contends politics should aspire? In this paper, I describe how Yoo gestures toward pure mediality, as he AND consistently in the direction of absolute presidential decisionism to be open to whatever. Instead, Yoo’s work may capture a broader development within our society that Agamben describes AND 1974, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. In contrast, almost no one seems to have noticed that the Bush administration claimed AND constitutional "illiterates."5 Perhaps law is being deposed as Agamben suggests. Both Agamben’s and Fein’s observations may also indicate a failure of what Michel Foucault would AND in contemporary society and describes this as the decline of symbolic efficiency.8 In sum, there appears to be a phenomenon emerging in contemporary society that a AND kind of threat that whatever being poses to the state or to sovereignty. Contrary to Agamben’s contentions, I find that whatever being is no threat at all AND recalling that this was the purpose of the U.S. Constitution.
9) Bare life is a bad theory because it can’t account for the effect of legal interventions like the aff Jef Huysmans 8, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the Open University, UK, The Jargon of Exception—On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of Political Society, International Political Sociology (2008) 2, 165–183
Even if one would argue that Agamben’s framing of the current political conditions are valuable AND as the central processes through which individualized bodily resistances gain their sociopolitical signi?cance.
2AC Ban Drones
4) Can’t solve prolif – it’s like a non-nuclear state trying to convince Russia to sign an arms reduction treaty Anderson 13 Kenneth Anderson, professor of international law at Washington College of Law, American University, and visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Matthew Waxman, a professor of law at Columbia Law School and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/9/13, Law and Ethics for Autonomous weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can, http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/144241
Conclusion The incremental development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems is inevitable, and any attempt AND international-national dialogue designed to foster common standards and spread best practices. Taken as a whole, these policy proposals reflect a rather traditional approach— relying on the gradual evolution and adaptation of long-standing law of armed conflict principles—to regulate what seems to many like a revolutionary technological and ethical predicament. That is in part because the challenge of regulating apparently radical innovations in weaponry within a long-standing legal and ethical framework is hardly novel. Some view the emergence of automated and autonomous weapon systems as a crisis for the law and ethics of war. To the contrary, provided we start now to incorporate legal and ethical norms adapted to weapons that incorporate emerging technologies of automation, the incremental movement from automation to machine autonomy can be both regulated and made to serve the ends of law on the battlefield.
But that won’t be enough to get them banned. Chemical weapons and mines are banned in part because they are indiscriminate, but also because they are not very useful. Drones, on the other hand, will become steadily more capable. Accelerating computing power will drive this process, and remotely controlled and robotic systems will become better than humans at ever more tasks. A researcher on NOVA’s "Rise of the Drones" pointed out that a human takes 80 milliseconds to react, while a drone can respond to a situation in one millisecond. In many combat situations, that will decide who gets destroyed. Going forward As a result, there is almost no chance that the world’s militaries will not adopt them wholeheartedly. This need not result in a deterioration of human rights, however. These factors might help: Governments using drones and combat robots need to be told by other states and by their citizens that it matters how they are used. The international community should continue to strengthen norms about civilian casualties, for instance supporting prosecutions in the International Criminal Court; norm changes have been significant over the last 50 years. Leaders and military officers who deploy robotic systems should be held responsible for both the deployment decision and its outcomes, so that that they have concrete incentives to act responsibly.
Following up on Wells’ post, I increasingly think that the shift in drone authorities AND details here) could have large consequences for the success of any shift.
Moving the drone program from the CIA to the Department of Defense is thus being AND the world, wherever a possible or even supposed threat can be identified.
2ac Security
One speech act doesn’t cause securitization – it’s an ongoing process Ghughunishvili 10 Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf-http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf
As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance AND the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.
It’s inevitable Mearsheimer 1, Poli. Sci. Prof. @ U. Chicago, (John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics)
Great powers cannot commit themselves to the pursuit of a peaceful world order for two AND Treaty of Versailles, not sur¬prisingly, did little to promote European stability. Furthermore, consider American thinking on how to achieve stability in Europe in the early AND it led directly to the Berlin crises of 1958-59 and 1961." Second, great powers cannot put aside power considerations and work to promote international peace AND with the broader interests of the international community, invariably die at birth.
The alt fails and destroys minority rights – sectarian violence causes re-securitization Roe, Assistant Professor, International Relations and European Studies – Central European University, ’4 (Paul, "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization," Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3, September)
Aradau’s (valuable) contentions aside, what I want to emphasize here is the AND mechanisms through which the justification for emergency politics on both sides is reduced.
Solves best – management of threat construction moderates the security dilemma – maintains minority rights Roe, Assistant Professor, International Relations and European Studies – Central European University, ’6 (Paul, "Reconstructing Identities or Managing Minorities? Desecuritizing Minority Rights: A Response to Jutila," Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 3)
As Kymlicka (2002: 3–4) points out, although, as AND communitarians promote cultural unity in such a way that identity divisions are eradicated,
thus necessarily leading to the death of the minority. Quite a problem indeed AND , not managing) securitization, no, it does not determine it.
*1AR*
at: vagueness
The best academic studies validate the effective of norms – the US is key Whibley 13 (James Whibley received a M.A. in International Relations from Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand in 2012. His research is soon to be published in Intelligence and National Security., 2/6/2013, "The Proliferation of Drone Warfare: The Weakening of Norms and International Precedent", journal.georgetown.edu/2013/02/06/the-proliferation-of-drone-warfare-the-weakening-of-norms-and-international-precedent-by-james-whibley/)
In a recent article, David Wood expresses concern over the start of a drone AND may mean their adoption is more likely than other high-tech weapons. Michael C. Horowitz, in his widely praised book The Diffusion of Military Power AND terrorist groups acquiring tacit knowledge about operating them by networking with sympathising states. If drones are destined to proliferate, the more important issue may become whether American AND states, whether against rebellious populations in their own territory or enemies abroad. While drone advocates such as Max Boot argue that other countries are unlikely to follow AND the US may miss an opportunity to entrench international norms about drone operations. If countries begin to follow the precedent set by the US, there is also AND an already inhumane international system, justifying greater scrutiny of the drone program. Realism cautions scholars not to expect ethical behaviour in international politics. Yet, the AND , then surely China or Russia possessing such a program would be terrifying.
In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of AND the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them.
2. The hot battlefield standard’s already in use it’s just a matter of codifying that standard for future conflicts Robert Chesney, U-Texas School of Law Professor, 5/24/13, Does the Armed-Conflict Model Matter in Practice Anymore?, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/does-the-armed-conflict-model-matter-in-practice-anymore/
The post-9/11 claim that we are in an "armed conflict AND -defense model developed during the Reagan and Clinton years, discussed earlier. To be sure, that model was acted upon only rarely in the pre-9/11 era. There were many reasons for this, but a major one was sheer lack of practical capacity: we had little relevant intelligence when it came to tracking individual terrorist threats, and even when we obtained actionable intelligence our capacity to strike normally was limited by the multi-hour process associated with cruise missiles. Today things are quite different. The capacity for collecting the requisite intelligence has expanded AND pre-9/11 framework; we already are there in practice. Yesterday’s speech reinforces my conclusion, as it clarifies both that the long-term AND hearing from readers as to whether they think this is in fact correct.
7) A lack of geographic restrictions now leads to worse congressional restrictions in the future – also no link uniqueness Barron and Lederman ’08 (David J. Barron, Professor of Law @ Harvard Law School, and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, "THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB — FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING," Harvard Law Review, Vol.121: 689)
That there is a baseline of regulation in place concerning the war on terrorism, AND computer reservoirs of stored data, than in bunkers and on traditional battlefields. As it happens, however, in recent decades — but well before the war AND fact subject to a substantial body of legislative and treaty-based regulation. In addition, in this conflict the battlefield "lacks a precise geographic location and AND , and ensuring that residents of the United States are not detained arbitrarily.
4. No slippery slope – if things get out of hand the executive can reassert its power in critical areas Barron ’8 David, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Martin Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB — A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941 But that dramatic deviation did not come from nowhere. Rarely does our constitutional framework AND defiant actions, and impeachment is neither an easy nor an attractive remedy.
I have four main problems with his argument, however. First, in evaluating AND based on no sounder informational basis that the opposite claims of government officials. Second, we need to be concerned about terrorist strikes around the globe, not AND And data collected by the private organization MIPT show a similar upward trend.
Off
2ac Must Prohibit
"Restrictions" are on time, place, and manner – this includes geography Lobel, professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh, 2008 (Jules, "Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War," Ohio State Law Journal, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf)
Throughout American history, Congress has placed restrictions on the President’s power as Commander in AND subject to the control and oversight of Congress in the conduct of warfare.
"On" means there’s no limits disad Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/on On preposition 1.so as to be or remain supported by or suspended from: Put your package down on the table; Hang your coat on the hook. 2.so as to be attached to or unified with: Hang the picture on the wall. Paste the label on the package.
To all of this, the Obama Administration might ask a resounding "So what AND might exist legally tomorrow, we do not have a legal difficulty today. That even the Bush Administration always treated its targeted killings as the targeting of combatants AND on the definition of the crime of "aggression" in that tribunal. Some of the long term international legal pressure turns on a fundamental difference in understanding AND some treaty provision, or some genuinely accepted customary rule, prohibits it. These traditional underpinnings of international law are, however, contested in the contemporary world AND they have a way of seeping in as real constraints on American practice. The stakes are higher than American policymakers appear to realize—as even a cursory AND or prosecutor will have the overwhelming weight of international legal opinion behind him. But the problem for the United States is not limited to the possibility of criminal AND of international legal developments we are now seeing with respect to targeted killing. More broadly, there are hidden but important costs when the United States is perceived AND too, over time, will push the United States away from it. The Obama foreign policy team may assume that the world’s goodwill toward the new administration AND to confront this problem while it still has intellectual and legal maneuvering space. Legitimate Concerns The concerns that underlie all of this international law ferment—chiefly, mistaken targeting AND to standards of proportionality, discrimination in targeting, and minimizing collateral damage.
2ac Budget
1) Dem infighting kills capital Justin Sink, The Hill, 9/17/13, White House asks: What rift with left?, thehill.com/homenews/administration/322597-what-rift-with-left-asks-carney
Obama’s friction with the left has come at a crucial and dangerous period for the White House. Critics have suggested with increasing volume that the president, mired in a second-term slump, may be losing the support of the progressive base that has underpinned his electoral success. They say the president’s inability to win over his allies in Congress on arguably the biggest foreign policy and economic decisions of his second term illustrate either that Obama is a lame duck, or that his third-way neoliberalism has fallen out of vogue with the young progressives who now dominate the Democratic Party. Last week, the AFL-CIO adopted a resolution harshly critical of the way the president was implementing Obama-Care. Earlier this summer, top Democrats openly questioned why the president had doubled down on surveillance programs begun during the George W. Bush administration. Even external events, like last week’s Democratic primary victory for progressive Bill de Blasio over establishment candidates in the New York mayoral race, have been cited as evidence of shifting sands.
There are many reasons why the budget fight that will take pace over the next few weeks and months will be more difficult than any of the close-to-debacles that have occurred in recent years. The reasons include John Boehner (R-OH), who was already the weakest AND further spending reductions, standing pat at current levels or spending increases impossible. Add to this "crisis fatigue." So many actual or man-made economic and financial disasters have occurred in recent years that the kinds of things that used to scare Congress and the White House into compromising — like possible federal defaults and government shutdowns — no longer motivate them to act. But none of these admittedly depressing factors are what makes this year’s budget cliffhanger so difficult. This year the biggest complication is that the budget fight isn’t really about the budget: It’s about ObamaCare, and that makes it hard to see what kind of arrangement will garner enough votes to avoid the kind of shutdown and debt ceiling disasters that have been only narrowly averted the past few years. It’s one thing if the debate is just about coming up with a spending cap or deficit limit. If, for example, one side wants spending at 2420 and the other wants 2410, there should be some number between those two that eventually will make a deal possible. But what happens when, like now, the budget is the legislative vehicle but the real debate is over something else entirely? What that happens, there is no number that will satisfy everyone in the debate and the budget process — which is designed to compromise numbers rather than policy — becomes an incredibly in effective way to negotiate. That’s when all of the other factors I noted above kick in. If the AND supported. And that’s if a deal of some kind is even possible.
3) Whatever capital the plan costs Obama, its not relevant to the fiscal fights Ed Kilgore, Washington Monthly, 9/5/13, Obama’s Political Capital, www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal-a/2013_09/obamas_political_capital046735.php~23
An even hoarier meme than the no-win-war complaint is naturally emerging in Washington as everyone recalibrates his or her assumptions about how the year will end: Obama’s limited "political capital" that he might have used on the fiscal front will now be "spread thin" or "stretched to the breaking point" by the need to make a case for military action against Syria. Politico’s Brown and Sherman give it a full airing today: President Barack Obama faced a heavy lift in Congress this fall when his agenda included only budget issues and immigration reform. Now with Syria in the mix, the president appears ready to spend a lot of the political capital that he would have kept in reserve for his domestic priorities. A resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria won’t make it through the House or the Senate without significant cajoling from the White House. That means Obama, who struggles to get Congress to follow his lead on almost everything, could burn his limited leverage convincing Democrats and Republicans to vote for an unpopular military operation that even the president says he could carry out with or without their approval. Now this may be true with respect to congressional Democrats if Obama ultimately needs them AND he can. But he has no "political capital" to spend.
4) If a deal is reached, its because of necessity not capital Ruth Marcus, RCP, 9/20/13, On Debt Ceiling, a Different Feel, www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/09/20/on_debt_ceiling_a_different_feel_120005.html
But leaving the government unable to borrow enough money to pay the debts it has already incurred is a different matter entirely. Breaching the debt ceiling evokes words like catastrophic and unthinkable, which is why it has never happened. And why the notion that it might is so surprising. Astonishing, actually. Washington is used to government by crisis and deadline. Our creaky system is capable of rousing itself only when the train is bearing down the tracks. So my usual way of analyzing these moments is to reason backward: The debt ceiling must be raised. Therefore it will be. The situation will seem to be at an unbreakable stalemate until, suddenly, a solution appears. Everyone will breathe a sigh of relief — until the inevitable next act in our political psychodrama. Panic, solve, repeat.
5) The market has already freaked out Brett Logiurato, Business Insider, 9/17/13, It’s Time To Freak Out About The Debt Ceiling And A Government Shutdown Again, www.businessinsider.com/debt-ceiling-deadline-obama-boehner-negotiate-jack-lew-2013-9
There is perhaps less than a month to go before Congress needs to raise the AND budget crisis," Valliere wrote. "We think the answer is yes."
6) The prior Syria debate was sufficient to deplete Obama’s capital Jake Tapper, CNN, 9/12/13, Has Obama paid political price for Syria?, thelead.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/12/has-obama-paid-political-price-for-syria/
Has Obama paid political price for Syria? Political capital does not come cheap in Washington, D.C. After weeks of trying to rally Congress to support him on a fast-changing policy in Syria, President Barack Obama may have broken the bank on what political capital he has left in his second term. Congressman Steve Israel, chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, said he was surprised by how politicized the vote for military authorization in Syria has become. Several Democratic representatives, including former veterans Rep. Tammy Duckworth and Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, oppose authorization. "It’s military families like mine that are the first to bleed when our nation makes this kind of commitment," Duckworth said in a statement. But Israel said Obama is not hurting his credibility with Democratic members of the House, adding that after a Democratic caucus briefing, the party is now focused on Russia’s diplomatic proposal to disarm Syria of its stockpile of nuclear weapons. "Our focus on both sides of the aisle right now, quite honestly, is on ensuring that this is a legitimate, transparent, verifiable proposal," said Israel. But much of the Democratic caucus, people Israel helped get elected in the last cycle, are against the president. Asked if that lack of support stems from a distant relationship with the president, Israel said no, saying it is the shadow of Iraq that is driving Democrats’ doubts on authorizing a strike against Syria. "It has more to do with the concern that many of my colleagues had with intelligence in the prior administration," said Israel. There "is a sense that we’ve been down this road. We’re dubious when the intelligence community tells us that there are weapons of mass destruction. Been there done that." Moreover, Israel adds, a relationship with the president should not play a role in evaluating a vote of this nature. "The relationship actually should be put aside when you’re making decisions on whether to commit force," said Israel. "You’ve got to make a judgment not based on do I like this president, but do I believe the intelligence, and do I believe that his recommendation is the most appropriate course for the national security interests of this country?" Obama’s lack of support on Syria could cast a shadow on other legislative agendas, such as the upcoming debt ceiling debate. "The issue is not whether the President of the United States has expended his political capital. The issue is whether House Republicans are willing to spend any of theirs," said Israel.
9) Alignment means congress is down with the plan too Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 59-60
Presidents and politicos alike have long recognized Congress’s ability to reduce the political costs that AND .S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution."36
11) And its empirically proven he’ll avoid the fight William Howell and Jon Pevehouse, Associate Professors at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, 2007, When Congress Stops Wars, Foreign Affairs, EBSCO
After all, when presidents anticipate congressional resistance they will not be able to overcome AND Pace, so as to avoid a clash with Congress over his reappointment.
14) No Impact Fisher Investments 12 (Fisher Investments is an independent investment adviser serving both individual and institutional investors, 12/10/12, Debt Ceiling Worries Are Overblown: Opinion, www.thestreet.com/story/11787447/1/debt-ceiling-worries-are-overblown-opinion.html)
The debt ceiling debate seems to have returned from the dead. But as our AND done: Politick to the last moment, then raise the debt ceiling.
Economic collapse doesn’t cause war Jervis, professor of political science – Columbia University, ’11 (Robert, Force in Our Times," Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved AND times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
*1AR*
1ar counter interp
"Restrictions" control when and how operations occur Lobel, professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh, 2008 (Jules, "Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War," Ohio State Law Journal, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf)
The Framers of the Constitution intended that Congress have substantial power to control the conduct AND decide whether the President’s policies and strategies are those the nation should follow.
Restriction includes conditions on action CAA 8,COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE, DEPARTMENT A, STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JEREMY RAY WAGNER, Appellant., 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 613
P10 The term "restriction" is not defined by the Legislature for the purposes AND natural and obvious meaning, which may be discerned from its dictionary definition."). P11 The dictionary definition of "restriction" is "~a~ limitation or qualification AND dictate that the term "restriction" includes the ignition interlock device limitation.
Our definition is most legally precise Plummer 29 J., Court Justice, MAX ZLOZOWER, Respondent, v. SAM LINDENBAUM et al., Appellants Civ. No. 3724COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT100 Cal. App. 766; 281 P. 102; 1929 Cal. App. LEXIS 404September 26, 1929, Decided, lexis
The word "restriction," when used in connection with the grant of interest in AND a particular event, or the performance or nonperformance of a particular act.
"Restriction" is defined and commonly used to mean "~a~ limitation (esp. in a deed) placed on the use or enjoyment of property." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1054 (7th ed. 2000).
Restrictions qualify production Wright v. Magellan Behavioral Health, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48718 2007
In the instant case, the Court is required to interpret the word "restriction" as used by the parties in the Agreement. The parties apparently agree that the legal definition of restriction—"a limitation or qualification," Black’s Law Dictionary 1341 (8th ed. 1999)—is a good place to start. Thus, the Court must determine whether the board’s supervision requirement falls within this definition.
If President Barack Obama "shuts down" the government by vetoing a continuing resolution (CR) that funds all government operations with the exception of Obamacare, or the Senate fails to pass such a CR, crucial services will continue without interruption. That includes all services essential for national security and public safety—such as the military and law enforcement—as well as mandatory government payments such as Social Security and veterans’ benefits. The key fact, as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) itself has said, is that when there is a short-term lapse in appropriations, "the federal Government will not be truly ’shut down’…because Congress has itself provided that some activities of Government should continue." In fact, any claims that not passing a CR will result in a "shutting down" of the government "is an entirely inaccurate description" according to the DOJ.~1~ Such a lapse in funding would be neither catastrophic nor unprecedented, but it would pare down government services to those most essential for "the safety of human life or the protection of property." That would not include the hundreds of billions of dollars in the federal budget that are constantly squandered and wasted on frivolous, unnecessary, and unneeded programs.
"Given the long history of using debt limit increases to achieve bipartisan deficit reduction AND unclear if such a hike could pass in the House or the Senate.
—xt ~232 uniqueness
No solution Zachary Goldfarb, WaPo, 9/15/13, Obama and Boehner both enter upcoming domestic debates with a weakened hand, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-and-boehner-both-enter-upcoming-domestic-debates-with-a-weakened-hand/2013/09/15/c308e8e0-1d4a-11e3-82ef-a059e54c49d0_story.html
This time may prove the hardest. Democrats say they are absolutely against the main Republican demands: a delay or defunding of the health-care law, and further cuts to domestic spending. Although GOP leaders say they may be able to get just enough votes to get through the Sept. 30 deadline without a shutdown, they do not yet see a way to find agreement to raise the debt ceiling. Obama says he will not negotiate on the debt limit, and some members expect this time will be worse than previous clashes. "It’s Groundhog Day in the House, but it’s Groundhog Day coming up on default and shutdown," said Rep. Peter Welch (D-Vt.). "The House is dysfunctional. The question is whether in the next couple of weeks it will actually disintegrate." While the divisions among the Republicans run deeper and are more acrimonious, several key Democrats have significant concerns about the White House’s approach to this fall’s budget strategy. Congressional dysfunction means capital is irrelevant to the debt ceiling debate Jake Sherman, Politico, 9/15/13, House Republican leaders: Debt hike is the better fight, dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=1B7EFEA5-17D0-422A-A0FA-C95DCB5CC277
A government shutdown is looming on Oct. 1. But don’t worry about it. That’s the message the House Republican leadership and its allies are spreading as Congress moves toward a fiscal showdown with President Barack Obama and the Democrats, a clash with huge political and economic ramifications for both parties. Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.), Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) and their allies are instead privately urging rank and file to forgo a clash over government funding — and a possible government shutdown — and instead dig in against Obama and the Democratic Senate when the debt ceiling needs to be lifted sometime next month. Boehner and his top lieutenants believe that digging in for a fight over the debt ceiling gives them more leverage against Obama and Democrats. Republicans hope to take advantage of Obama’s desire to blunt 2420 billion in sequester cuts that kick in Jan. 1 to reach a broader budget deal with the White House. There’s even been chatter in and around leadership about holding a vote on a debt ceiling bill before the government funding measure — a way to satiate conservatives’ budget-cutting hunger and help avoid a government shutdown. Center stage in all of this is funding Obamacare. Roughly 30 Republicans refused to vote for a government funding bill if it provides money for the health care law. GOP leadership thought giving those lawmakers a vote on defunding the law and kicking it over the Senate would be enough. They were wrong. Now instead of leadership’s strategy of moving the fight to the Senate, Republicans are coalescing around having the battle in the House. That’s why leadership’s strategy is far from certain to work. According to internal House GOP counts, roughly two-dozen House Republicans are refusing to vote for a continuing resolution that funds Obamacare. After rejecting Cantor’s funding plan — which would’ve funded the government at the 24988 billion level while including nonbinding language defunding Obamacare — dozens of Republicans have signed on to a bill by Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), which funds the government at 24967 billion in 2014 while delaying implementation of Obamacare until 2015. Those aren’t the only challenges. House GOP leadership has acknowledged to Democrats that it has no idea how it’s going to cobble together a package to boost the debt ceiling, so urging a fight there is far from a fireproof move. Early discussions have begun over the debt ceiling, and Republicans want their opening bid to tie elements of entitlement reform to the debt ceiling, a laughable request for Democrats and the White House. But Boehner admitted to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) in a private session last week that he is not even sure he has the votes to pass a debt ceiling package with entitlement cuts. He also admitted that passing a CR will be a heavy lift.
—xt ~236 syria thumper
Syria overwhelms Ed Morrissey, Hot Air, 8/28/13, Bipartisan House coalition demands Congressional approval on Syria strike, hotair.com/archives/2013/08/28/bipartisan-house-coalition-demands-congressional-approval-on-syria-strike/
Rising discontent among members of Congress over being bypassed on Syria has a distinctly bipartisan AND . The group contains a dozen Democrats, and that number may rise: A growing bipartisan coalition in Congress is coming together to "strongly urge" President Obama "to consult and receive authorization from Congress before ordering the use of U.S. military force in Syria." In a letter that will be sent to the president later today, Rep. Scott Rigell, a second-term Republican from Virginia, joins at least 81 of his Republican and Democratic colleagues in demanding that the president first acquire consent from Congress, citing the War Powers Resolution of 1973, before responding militarily to the Syrian government’s purported use of chemical weapons on Aug. 21. "While the Founders wisely gave the Office of the President the authority to AND would violate the separation of powers that is clearly delineated in the Constitution."
Won’t go away Albert Hunt, Bloomberg, 9/15/13, Obama’s Syria Meanderings Border on Incompetence, www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-15/obama-s-syria-meanderings-border-on-incompetence.html
These convolutions didn’t build confidence in the president among politicians, the public, U AND are a waste of taxpayer dollars. But this one could be embarrassing.
9/21/13
GSU Round 7
Tournament: GSU | Round: 7 | Opponent: George Mason KwLa | Judge: Schultz, Ben
2AC
*case*
A2: Zenko – NO Resources
2) Zenko admits he underestimates Zenko 13 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, and#34;U.S. Drone Strike Policiesand#34;, PDF)
State aCtorS It is estimated that the number of states that have acquired a complete drone system AND that there have been intentionally hidden advances toward states’ development of weaponized drones.
A2: Singh – No Impact
1) Make them answer specific scenarios - these are cases where unregulated drones are more dangerous than the squo
drones key
Drones breed mistrust —- threaten the peace process Al Jazeera 13 (and#34;PKK fighters in warning to Turkish governmentand#34; May 31, 2013, Al Jazeera News)
In exclusive report, armed group tells Al Jazeera they will be back to fight if Ankara reneges on peace agreement. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters have been withdrawing from Turkey under a peace process between their jailed leader and the government. The fighters began leaving their positions in southeast Turkey on May 8 after a ceasefire declared by Abdullah Ocalan in March to end a conflict that has killed an estimated 40,000 people. The PKK has not however given up their weapons, and they have also warned that they will be back to fight, if Ankara reneges on its agreement. The group would like constitutional reforms to grant Kurds more rights in Turkey and is also calling for the release of Ocalan. Al Jazeera’s Omar Al Saleh travelled to the Turkish-Iraq border where he spoke to PKK fighters on their way to a mountain hideout. Umut Erdal, the group’s field commander, told Al Jazeera that if their demands are not met, his fighters would return to Turkey. and#34;Over the last 30 years, the Turkish military did its utmost to prevent our fighters from going in and out of Turkey,and#34; he said. and#34;Even if they put the Great Wall of China, it will not stop us because these mountains are rugged and no one can control it.and#34; ’Mistrust towards Turkey’ The PKK has been fighting the Turkish military for 30 years and it is estimated that the process of withdrawing the estimated 2,500 to 3,000 fighters left in Turkey, could take months to complete. The group has been regrouping in secret locations in Sirna, northern Iraq. While the group remains loyal to its leader and his demands, they have raised concerns about Turkey’s commitment to the agreement. Saleh said: and#34;The main point they raised was that have a mistrust towards Turkey, although they say they are obeying cause of the jailed leader Ocalan, they don’t really trust the Turkish prime minister.and#34; and#34;They made a clear warning to the military: If your military targets us, if your drones continue to monitor our movement and if we are attacked, we are ready to respond to the fire.and#34; Yusuf Kanli, a columnist with the Hurriyet Daily News in Turkey, told Al Jazeera the peace process remains fragile with mistrust towards the Turkish government. and#34;The only positive thing in this peace process over the past five months is the absence of violence, which has made us hopeful that perhaps we can achieve peace this time,and#34; he said.
T
and#34;Restrictionsand#34; are on time, place, and manner – this includes geography Lobel, professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh, 2008 (Jules, and#34;Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War,and#34; Ohio State Law Journal, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf)
Throughout American history, Congress has placed restrictions on the President’s power as Commander in AND subject to the control and oversight of Congress in the conduct of warfare.
and#34;Onand#34; means there’s no limits disad Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/on On preposition 1.so as to be or remain supported by or suspended from: Put your package down on the table; Hang your coat on the hook. 2.so as to be attached to or unified with: Hang the picture on the wall. Paste the label on the package.
War Powers DA
2. The hot battlefield standard’s already in use it’s just a matter of codifying that standard for future conflicts Robert Chesney, U-Texas School of Law Professor, 5/24/13, Does the Armed-Conflict Model Matter in Practice Anymore?, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/does-the-armed-conflict-model-matter-in-practice-anymore/
The post-9/11 claim that we are in an and#34;armed conflict AND -defense model developed during the Reagan and Clinton years, discussed earlier. To be sure, that model was acted upon only rarely in the pre-9/11 era. There were many reasons for this, but a major one was sheer lack of practical capacity: we had little relevant intelligence when it came to tracking individual terrorist threats, and even when we obtained actionable intelligence our capacity to strike normally was limited by the multi-hour process associated with cruise missiles. Today things are quite different. The capacity for collecting the requisite intelligence has expanded AND pre-9/11 framework; we already are there in practice. Yesterday’s speech reinforces my conclusion, as it clarifies both that the long-term AND hearing from readers as to whether they think this is in fact correct.
3. History disproves their impact Bradley et al ’12 Curtis A. Bradley, Sarah H. Cleveland, The Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh, Martin S. Lederman, Judith Resnik and Stephen I. Vladeck, and#34;WAR, TERROR, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS, TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFERENCE*: ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS’ SECTION ON FEDERAL COURTS PROGRAM AT THE 2012 AALS ANNUAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C.,and#34; 61 Am. U.L. Rev. 1253 So where are we? Marty mentioned a word that had not been mentioned before AND memos. So the courts are playing a role in enforcing congressional restrictions.
4. No slippery slope – if things get out of hand the executive can reassert its power in critical areas Barron ’8 David, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Martin Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB — A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941 But that dramatic deviation did not come from nowhere. Rarely does our constitutional framework AND defiant actions, and impeachment is neither an easy nor an attractive remedy.
5. Partisanship means a substantial portion of congress will always be trying to restrain the president regardless of the plan’s passage Howell ’7 William, professor of political science at U-Chicago, and Jon C. Pevehouse, professor of Political Science UW-Madison, and#34;While Dangers Gather : Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers,and#34; 2007 ed. It is of some consequence, then, that we find so much evidence that AND to communicate the nation’s foreign policy commitments to both allies and adversaries abroad.
6. The internal link story is incoherent – increases or decreases in power are always counterbalanced until they reach a stable equilibrium KRAUSE 2 - Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He earned a B.A. degree in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh in April 1988. He also earned an M.A. degree in Economics (1990), M.A. degree in Political Science (1993), and a Ph.D. degree in Political Science (1994) from West Virginia University(George A., 2002, and#34;Separated Powers and Institutional Growth in the Presidential and Congressional Branches: Distinguishing Between Short-Run versus — Long-Run Dynamics,and#34; Political Research Quarterly March 2002 vol. 55 no. 1 27-57, http://prq.sagepub.com/content/55/1/27.full.pdf+html)JCP
Rather than viewing one institution (presidential branch) dominating the other (congressional branch AND that Presidents and Congress cannot exploit one another with respect to branch building.
7) A lack of geographic restrictions now leads to worse congressional restrictions in the future – also no link uniqueness Barron and Lederman ’08 (David J. Barron, Professor of Law @ Harvard Law School, and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and#34;THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB — FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING,and#34; Harvard Law Review, Vol.121: 689)
That there is a baseline of regulation in place concerning the war on terrorism, AND computer reservoirs of stored data, than in bunkers and on traditional battlefields. As it happens, however, in recent decades — but well before the war AND fact subject to a substantial body of legislative and treaty-based regulation. In addition, in this conflict the battlefield and#34;lacks a precise geographic location and AND , and ensuring that residents of the United States are not detained arbitrarily.
QDR
Cross apply that congress is key, norms declassification solve c. Now’s the make it or break it for norm-development Kenneth Anderson 13, professor of international law at Washington College of Law, American University, and visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Matthew Waxman, a professor of law at Columbia Law School and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/9/13, Law and Ethics for Autonomous weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can, http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/144241
Where in this long history of new weapons and attempts to regulate them ethically and AND to autonomy mean, if anything, to the legal and ethical concerns? One answer to these questions is to wait and see: it is too early AND questions of law and ethics even at their current research and development stage. This is the time—before technologies and weapons development have become and#34;hardenedand#34; AND defend a framework for evaluating them that advances simultaneously strategic and moral interests. A recent and widely circulated report from the British Ministry of Defense on the future AND unintended autonomous functions (perhaps in how it interoperates with other systems).21
PTX
1) Dem infighting kills capital Justin Sink, The Hill, 9/17/13, White House asks: What rift with left?, thehill.com/homenews/administration/322597-what-rift-with-left-asks-carney
Obama’s friction with the left has come at a crucial and dangerous period for the White House. Critics have suggested with increasing volume that the president, mired in a second-term slump, may be losing the support of the progressive base that has underpinned his electoral success. They say the president’s inability to win over his allies in Congress on arguably the biggest foreign policy and economic decisions of his second term illustrate either that Obama is a lame duck, or that his third-way neoliberalism has fallen out of vogue with the young progressives who now dominate the Democratic Party. Last week, the AFL-CIO adopted a resolution harshly critical of the way the president was implementing Obama-Care. Earlier this summer, top Democrats openly questioned why the president had doubled down on surveillance programs begun during the George W. Bush administration. Even external events, like last week’s Democratic primary victory for progressive Bill de Blasio over establishment candidates in the New York mayoral race, have been cited as evidence of shifting sands.
There are many reasons why the budget fight that will take pace over the next few weeks and months will be more difficult than any of the close-to-debacles that have occurred in recent years. The reasons include John Boehner (R-OH), who was already the weakest AND further spending reductions, standing pat at current levels or spending increases impossible. Add to this and#34;crisis fatigue.and#34; So many actual or man-made economic and financial disasters have occurred in recent years that the kinds of things that used to scare Congress and the White House into compromising — like possible federal defaults and government shutdowns — no longer motivate them to act. But none of these admittedly depressing factors are what makes this year’s budget cliffhanger so difficult. This year the biggest complication is that the budget fight isn’t really about the budget: It’s about ObamaCare, and that makes it hard to see what kind of arrangement will garner enough votes to avoid the kind of shutdown and debt ceiling disasters that have been only narrowly averted the past few years. It’s one thing if the debate is just about coming up with a spending cap or deficit limit. If, for example, one side wants spending at 2420 and the other wants 2410, there should be some number between those two that eventually will make a deal possible. But what happens when, like now, the budget is the legislative vehicle but the real debate is over something else entirely? What that happens, there is no number that will satisfy everyone in the debate and the budget process — which is designed to compromise numbers rather than policy — becomes an incredibly in effective way to negotiate. That’s when all of the other factors I noted above kick in. If the AND supported. And that’s if a deal of some kind is even possible.
3) Whatever capital the plan costs Obama, its not relevant to the fiscal fights Ed Kilgore, Washington Monthly, 9/5/13, Obama’s Political Capital, www.washingtonmonthly.com/political-animal-a/2013_09/obamas_political_capital046735.php~23
An even hoarier meme than the no-win-war complaint is naturally emerging in Washington as everyone recalibrates his or her assumptions about how the year will end: Obama’s limited and#34;political capitaland#34; that he might have used on the fiscal front will now be and#34;spread thinand#34; or and#34;stretched to the breaking pointand#34; by the need to make a case for military action against Syria. Politico’s Brown and Sherman give it a full airing today: President Barack Obama faced a heavy lift in Congress this fall when his agenda included only budget issues and immigration reform. Now with Syria in the mix, the president appears ready to spend a lot of the political capital that he would have kept in reserve for his domestic priorities. A resolution authorizing the use of force in Syria won’t make it through the House or the Senate without significant cajoling from the White House. That means Obama, who struggles to get Congress to follow his lead on almost everything, could burn his limited leverage convincing Democrats and Republicans to vote for an unpopular military operation that even the president says he could carry out with or without their approval. Now this may be true with respect to congressional Democrats if Obama ultimately needs them AND he can. But he has no and#34;political capitaland#34; to spend.
4) If a deal is reached, its because of necessity not capital Ruth Marcus, RCP, 9/20/13, On Debt Ceiling, a Different Feel, www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/09/20/on_debt_ceiling_a_different_feel_120005.html
But leaving the government unable to borrow enough money to pay the debts it has already incurred is a different matter entirely. Breaching the debt ceiling evokes words like catastrophic and unthinkable, which is why it has never happened. And why the notion that it might is so surprising. Astonishing, actually. Washington is used to government by crisis and deadline. Our creaky system is capable of rousing itself only when the train is bearing down the tracks. So my usual way of analyzing these moments is to reason backward: The debt ceiling must be raised. Therefore it will be. The situation will seem to be at an unbreakable stalemate until, suddenly, a solution appears. Everyone will breathe a sigh of relief — until the inevitable next act in our political psychodrama. Panic, solve, repeat.
6) The prior Syria debate was sufficient to deplete Obama’s capital Jake Tapper, CNN, 9/12/13, Has Obama paid political price for Syria?, thelead.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/12/has-obama-paid-political-price-for-syria/
Has Obama paid political price for Syria? Political capital does not come cheap in Washington, D.C. After weeks of trying to rally Congress to support him on a fast-changing policy in Syria, President Barack Obama may have broken the bank on what political capital he has left in his second term. Congressman Steve Israel, chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, said he was surprised by how politicized the vote for military authorization in Syria has become. Several Democratic representatives, including former veterans Rep. Tammy Duckworth and Rep. Tulsi Gabbard, oppose authorization. and#34;It’s military families like mine that are the first to bleed when our nation makes this kind of commitment,and#34; Duckworth said in a statement. But Israel said Obama is not hurting his credibility with Democratic members of the House, adding that after a Democratic caucus briefing, the party is now focused on Russia’s diplomatic proposal to disarm Syria of its stockpile of nuclear weapons. and#34;Our focus on both sides of the aisle right now, quite honestly, is on ensuring that this is a legitimate, transparent, verifiable proposal,and#34; said Israel. But much of the Democratic caucus, people Israel helped get elected in the last cycle, are against the president. Asked if that lack of support stems from a distant relationship with the president, Israel said no, saying it is the shadow of Iraq that is driving Democrats’ doubts on authorizing a strike against Syria. and#34;It has more to do with the concern that many of my colleagues had with intelligence in the prior administration,and#34; said Israel. There and#34;is a sense that we’ve been down this road. We’re dubious when the intelligence community tells us that there are weapons of mass destruction. Been there done that.and#34; Moreover, Israel adds, a relationship with the president should not play a role in evaluating a vote of this nature. and#34;The relationship actually should be put aside when you’re making decisions on whether to commit force,and#34; said Israel. and#34;You’ve got to make a judgment not based on do I like this president, but do I believe the intelligence, and do I believe that his recommendation is the most appropriate course for the national security interests of this country?and#34; Obama’s lack of support on Syria could cast a shadow on other legislative agendas, such as the upcoming debt ceiling debate. and#34;The issue is not whether the President of the United States has expended his political capital. The issue is whether House Republicans are willing to spend any of theirs,and#34; said Israel.
9) Alignment means congress is down with the plan too Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 59-60
Presidents and politicos alike have long recognized Congress’s ability to reduce the political costs that AND .S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.and#34;36
11) And its empirically proven he’ll avoid the fight William Howell and Jon Pevehouse, Associate Professors at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, 2007, When Congress Stops Wars, Foreign Affairs, EBSCO
After all, when presidents anticipate congressional resistance they will not be able to overcome AND Pace, so as to avoid a clash with Congress over his reappointment.
13) Economic collapse doesn’t cause war Jervis, professor of political science – Columbia University, ’11 (Robert, Force in Our Times,and#34; Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved AND times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
1AR
and#34;Restrictionsand#34; control when and how operations occur~—-this also answers their enforcement T violation~ Lobel, professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh, 2008 (Jules, and#34;Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War,and#34; Ohio State Law Journal, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf)
The Framers of the Constitution intended that Congress have substantial power to control the conduct AND decide whether the President’s policies and strategies are those the nation should follow.
Restriction includes conditions on action CAA 8,COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE, DEPARTMENT A, STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JEREMY RAY WAGNER, Appellant., 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 613
P10 The term and#34;restrictionand#34; is not defined by the Legislature for the purposes AND natural and obvious meaning, which may be discerned from its dictionary definition.and#34. P11 The dictionary definition of and#34;restrictionand#34; is and#34;~a~ limitation or qualification AND dictate that the term and#34;restrictionand#34; includes the ignition interlock device limitation.
Context is key Haneman 59 J.A.D. is a justice of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. and#34;Russell S. Bertrand et al. v. Donald T. Jones et al.,and#34; 58 NJ Super. 273; 156 A.2d 161; 1959 N.J. Super, Lexis
HN4 In ascertaining the meaning of the word and#34;restrictionsand#34; as here employed, AND be construed as being used in the same limited fashion as and#34;zoning.and#34;
—xt ~232 uniqueness
No solution Zachary Goldfarb, WaPo, 9/15/13, Obama and Boehner both enter upcoming domestic debates with a weakened hand, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-and-boehner-both-enter-upcoming-domestic-debates-with-a-weakened-hand/2013/09/15/c308e8e0-1d4a-11e3-82ef-a059e54c49d0_story.html
This time may prove the hardest. Democrats say they are absolutely against the main Republican demands: a delay or defunding of the health-care law, and further cuts to domestic spending. Although GOP leaders say they may be able to get just enough votes to get through the Sept. 30 deadline without a shutdown, they do not yet see a way to find agreement to raise the debt ceiling. Obama says he will not negotiate on the debt limit, and some members expect this time will be worse than previous clashes. and#34;It’s Groundhog Day in the House, but it’s Groundhog Day coming up on default and shutdown,and#34; said Rep. Peter Welch (D-Vt.). and#34;The House is dysfunctional. The question is whether in the next couple of weeks it will actually disintegrate.and#34; While the divisions among the Republicans run deeper and are more acrimonious, several key Democrats have significant concerns about the White House’s approach to this fall’s budget strategy.
Congressional dysfunction means capital is irrelevant to the debt ceiling debate Jake Sherman, Politico, 9/15/13, House Republican leaders: Debt hike is the better fight, dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=1B7EFEA5-17D0-422A-A0FA-C95DCB5CC277
A government shutdown is looming on Oct. 1. But don’t worry about it. That’s the message the House Republican leadership and its allies are spreading as Congress moves toward a fiscal showdown with President Barack Obama and the Democrats, a clash with huge political and economic ramifications for both parties. Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.), Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) and their allies are instead privately urging rank and file to forgo a clash over government funding — and a possible government shutdown — and instead dig in against Obama and the Democratic Senate when the debt ceiling needs to be lifted sometime next month. Boehner and his top lieutenants believe that digging in for a fight over the debt ceiling gives them more leverage against Obama and Democrats. Republicans hope to take advantage of Obama’s desire to blunt 2420 billion in sequester cuts that kick in Jan. 1 to reach a broader budget deal with the White House. There’s even been chatter in and around leadership about holding a vote on a debt ceiling bill before the government funding measure — a way to satiate conservatives’ budget-cutting hunger and help avoid a government shutdown. Center stage in all of this is funding Obamacare. Roughly 30 Republicans refused to vote for a government funding bill if it provides money for the health care law. GOP leadership thought giving those lawmakers a vote on defunding the law and kicking it over the Senate would be enough. They were wrong. Now instead of leadership’s strategy of moving the fight to the Senate, Republicans are coalescing around having the battle in the House. That’s why leadership’s strategy is far from certain to work. According to internal House GOP counts, roughly two-dozen House Republicans are refusing to vote for a continuing resolution that funds Obamacare. After rejecting Cantor’s funding plan — which would’ve funded the government at the 24988 billion level while including nonbinding language defunding Obamacare — dozens of Republicans have signed on to a bill by Rep. Tom Graves (R-Ga.), which funds the government at 24967 billion in 2014 while delaying implementation of Obamacare until 2015. Those aren’t the only challenges. House GOP leadership has acknowledged to Democrats that it has no idea how it’s going to cobble together a package to boost the debt ceiling, so urging a fight there is far from a fireproof move. Early discussions have begun over the debt ceiling, and Republicans want their opening bid to tie elements of entitlement reform to the debt ceiling, a laughable request for Democrats and the White House. But Boehner admitted to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) in a private session last week that he is not even sure he has the votes to pass a debt ceiling package with entitlement cuts. He also admitted that passing a CR will be a heavy lift.
—xt ~233 pc irrelevant
There aren’t even talks to hammer out a compromise in21 Norm Ornstein, AEI Senior Fellow, 9/19/13, The Sequester Is a Disaster, and Congress’s Next Move May Be Worse, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/the-sequester-is-a-disaster-and-congresss-next-move-may-be-worse/279819/
As readers of my past columns know, I was not exactly optimistic as we AND majorities for anything on the spending front as the new fiscal year approaches. In a misguided attempt to mollify his radicals and avoid a government shutdown over the AND push their crusade to crush Obamacare by holding the debt-ceiling hostage. Would a Government Shutdown Really Be All That Bad for Republicans? Yes In 2011, when the intensive negotiations between Boehner and President Obama broke down, AND senators led by Bob Corker have broken down, at least for now.
9/22/13
Navy Octos
Tournament: Navy | Round: Octas | Opponent: George Mason KL | Judge: Judd Kimball Jim Lyle Andrea Reed
Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic AND affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.
By design or accident, it is increasingly clear that the centerpiece of President Barack AND that increased sanctions will force the regime to give up enrichment or collapse.
Nuclear war Edelman, distinguished fellow – Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ’11 (Eric S, "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran," Foreign Affairs, January/February)
The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and AND any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade. There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support AND particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. n-player competition Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear AND would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.
off 2
Targeted killings are strikes carried about against pre-meditated, individually designated targets—-signature strikes are distinct Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Hoover Institution visiting fellow, Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at Brookings, "Distinguishing High Value Targeted Killing and ’Signature’ Attacks on Taliban Fighters," August 29 2011, http://www.volokh.com/2011/08/29/distinguishing-high-value-targeted-killing-and-signature-attacks-on-taliban-fighters/ From the US standpoint, it is partly that it does not depend as much AND will not tell one very much without knowing what mission is at issue.
Vote neg—-signature strikes and targeted killings are distinct operations with entirely separate lit bases and advantages—-they kill precision and limits—-vote neg—-otherwise the aff will just an untopical affirmative every debate
off 3
The executive branch of the United States federal government should issue and enforce an executive order to ban signature strikes carried out by remotely-piloted vehicles and establish a bipartisan independent executive branch commission to oversee its implementation. The executive branch should establish ex ante transparency of targeted killing standards and procedures.
Solves the aff Eric Posner, The University of Chicago Law School Professor, and Adrian Vermeule, Harvard Law School Professor of Law, 2007, The Credible Executive, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 865
The Madisonian system of oversight has not totally failed. Sometimes legislators overcome the temptation AND as a breach of faith even if no other institution ever enforces it.
Transparency independently solves the aff. Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
4. Procedural Requirements Currently, officials in the executive branch carry out all such ex ante review of AND and would promote better accounting of the civilian costs of targeting operations. n198
off 4
Congressional control of targeted killing destroys war fighting and turns the case. Issacharoff ’13 Samuel Issacharoff, Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law. and Richard H. Pildes, Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law; CoDirector, NYU Program on Law and Security, "Drones and the Dilemma of Modern Warfare," PUBLIC LAW 26 LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES WORKING PAPER NO. 13-34 Star Chamber=politicized secret court from 15th century England, symbol of abuse
Procedural Safeguards As with all use of lethal force, there must be procedures in place to AND , such as the intelligence committees, to play this role effectively.65
It spills over to destabilize all presidential war powers. Heder ’10 (Adam, J.D., magna cum laude , J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, "THE POWER TO END WAR: THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER," St. Mary’s Law Journal Vol. 41 No. 3, http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/Hederreadytogo.pdf) This constitutional silence invokes Justice Rehnquist’s oftquoted language from the landmark "political question" AND Constitution in an area where the Framers themselves declined to give such guidance.
That causes nuclear war and bioterror Li ’9 Zheyao, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2009; B.A., political science and history, Yale University, 2006. This paper is the culmination of work begun in the "Constitutional Interpretation in the Legislative and Executive Branches" seminar, led by Judge Brett Kavanaugh, "War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare," 7 Geo. J.L. 26 Pub. Pol’y 373 2009 WAR POWERS IN THE FOURTH GENERATION OF WARFARE A. The Emergence of Non-State Actors Even as the quantity of nation-states in the world has increased dramatically since AND and action necessary to prevail in fourth-generational conflicts against fourthgenerational opponents.
Bioterror causes extinction Mhyrvold ’13 Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action," Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2 – 2013
As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the AND be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.
1NC—-AT: Solvency
Targeted killing regulation is impossible Alston, professor – NYU Law, ’11 (Philip, 2 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 283)
Despite the existence of a multiplicity of techniques by which the CIA might be held AND turn now to examine the feasibility and desirability of pursuing such an option.
No sig strike overuse O’Hanlon 13 (Michael — external advisory member for the CIA and senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution @ professor and lecturer at Johns Hopkins and Princeton" Obama nails it on drones" May 23, 2013, CNN World)
But one section of his speech is worth particular focus – the use of armed AND specific, and somewhat quantitative, in giving his estimates of innocent casualties.
Obama already solved the aff Tabassum Zakaria, Reuters, 5/23/13, U.S. drone guidelines could reduce ’signature strikes’, www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/24/us-usa-obama-speech-guidelines-idUSBRE94N03520130524
New U.S. guidelines for conducting armed drone operations overseas set a higher AND be striking on behalf of allies fighting their own wars," he said.
1NC—-AT: Pakistan Advantage
No risk of nuclear terror Mueller 10 (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)
Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir AND above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.
Terrorists won’t use WMD Forest 12 (James, PhD and Director of Terrorism Studies and an associate professor at the United States Military Academy, "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism," Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 5, Number 4, Article 9, Winter 2012, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=119326context=jss)NOTE—-CBRN weapon = chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapon
The terrorist group would additionally need to consider whether a WMD attack would be counterproductive AND , or the Chechen’s deliberations about attacking Russia, with such a weapon.
No Pakistan collapse and it doesn’t escalate Dasgupta 13 Sunil Dasgupta is Director of the University of Maryland Baltimore County Political Science Program at the Universities at Shady Grove and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, East Asia Forum, February 25, 2013, "How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan?", http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/
As it is, India and Pakistan have gone down to the nuclear edge four times — in 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2001–02. In each case, India responded in a manner that did not escalate the conflict. Any incursion into Pakistan was extremely limited. An Indian intervention in a civil war in Pakistan would be subject to the same limitations — at least so long as the Pakistani army maintains its integrity. Given the new US–India ties, the most important factor in determining the AND some influence in Afghanistan, especially working with elements of the Northern Alliance. India and Afghanistan already have a strategic partnership agreement in place that creates the framework for their bilateral relationship to grow, but the degree of actual cooperation will depend on how Pakistan and the Taliban react. If Indian interests in Afghanistan come under attack, New Delhi might have to pull back. The Indian government has been quite clear about not sending troops to Afghanistan. If the United States shifts its policy to where it has to choose Kabul over Islamabad, in effect reviving the demand for an independent Pashtunistan, India is likely to be much more supportive of US and Afghan goals. The policy shift, however, carries the risk of a full-fledged proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan, but should not involve the prospect of a direct Indian intervention in Pakistan itself. India is not likely to initiate an intervention that causes the Pakistani state to fail AND government or by the radicals — from taking control of the entire country. Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail AND out a Pakistani civil war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States. Signature strikes key to targeted killing effectiveness and preventing safe havens. Philip Mudd, former senior official at the CIA and the FBI. He is now director of global risk at SouthernSun Asset Management, 5/24/13, Fear Factor: In defense of Obama’s deadly signature strikes, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/fear_factor_signature_strikes?page=full
The impact of armed drones during the decade-plus of this intense global counterterrorism AND and further degrade their operational capability by engaging in savage hunts for leaks.
1NC—-AT: Norms Advantage
No SCS conflict—China can’t afford to escalate—US deterrent irrelevant Allen Carlson, Cornell University Associate Professor, 2/21/13, China Keeps the Peace at Sea, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139024/allen-carlson/china-keeps-the-peace-at-sea?page=show
At times in the past few months, China and Japan have appeared almost ready AND decision set off a wave of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. In the wake of these events, the conflict quickly reached what political scientists call AND now show glimmers of willingness to dial down hostilities and to reestablish stability. Some analysts have cited North Korea’s recent nuclear test as a factor in the countries’ AND foreign and security policy challenge where their interests are not diametrically at odds." The nuclear test, though, is a red herring in terms of the conflict over the disputed islands. In truth, the roots of the conflict — and the reasons it has not yet exploded — are much deeper. Put simply, China cannot afford military conflict with any of its Asian neighbors. It is not that China believes it would lose such a spat; the country AND , from authorizing the use of deadly force in the Diaoyu Islands theater. For over three decades, Beijing has promoted peace and stability in Asia to facilitate AND Today, China’s economy is second only to that of the United States. The fundamentals of Deng’s grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any AND thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising Chinese nationalism, although often seen AND in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan. Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power — damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China’s "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China’s commitment to "never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country’s interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others’ expense or do harm to any neighbor."
2NC
2NC—-AT: Object Fiat
This is the key academic question Sinnar, assistant professor of law at Stanford Law School, May 2013 (Shirin, "Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight," 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, Lexis) More than a decade after September 11, 2001, the debate over which institutions AND as a second-best option necessitated by congressional enfeeblement and judicial abdication.
2NC—-AT: Rollback
And executive orders have the force of law: Oxford Dictionary of English 2010 (Oxford Reference, Georgetown Library) executive order ? noun US (Law) a rule or order issued by the President to an executive branch of the government and having the force of law.
Executive orders are permanent Duncan, Associate Professor of Law at Florida A26M, Winter 2010 (John C., "A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders," 35 Vt. L. Rev. 333, Lexis)
The trajectory of the evolution of the executive power in the United States, as AND an ever more robust structure of executive orders resembles an autopoietic process. n561
2NC—-AT: Pakistan Advantage—-Solvency Run
Zenko says the practice is key AND that transparency solves—here’s a longer version of the 1ac to prove our point Micah Zenko 13, CFR Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, PhD in Political Science from Brandeis University, "Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies," CFR Special Report 65, January 2013
History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by AND in warfare in response to ground-based antiaircraft fire or aerial combat).
Rodriguez is about Obama’s commitment to scaling back RPV Rodriguez 13 Alex Rodriguez is Los Angeles Times Staff, "Obama’s drone limits may bolster ties with Pakistan," 5-24-13, articles.latimes.com/2013/may/24/world/la-fg-pakistan-drones-20130525, DOA: 7-22-13, y2k
President Obama’s commitment to scaling back the use of unmanned aircraft to kill suspected terrorists AND a role for the people in the countries where the drones are used."
2NC—-Norms Advantage—-Solvency Run
Bottom of the card says Obama example key Eviatar 12 Daphne Eviatar is a senior counsel in the law and security program of Human Rights First, "Obama’s Drone Policy Misreading International Law," 5-3-12, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/75863.html, DOA: 9-15-13, y2k
The result is that the Obama administration is claiming the authority to target — and AND drones, wherever they may be found — including in the United States.
That causes Congressional follow-on Duncan, Associate Professor of Law at Florida A26M, Winter 2010 (John C., "A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders," 35 Vt. L. Rev. 333, Lexis) Executive orders can serve the purpose of allowing the President to generate favorable publicity, AND and health." n496 This report led to the Social Security Act. n497
Cronogue is about a NEW AUMF and says restricting the president is bad… Cronogue 12 Graham Cronogue, Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2013, "A New AUMF: Defining Combatants in the War on Terror," Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol. 22:377, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1294andcontext=djcil, DOA: 9-12-13, y2k
The original AUMF was hastily passed during a time of crisis to address America’s most AND it does a better job than Representative McKeon’s of heeding President Lincoln’s warning.
Maxwell says transparency solves the aff and is about self-defense authority questions, which is obviously not them anyway Mark David Maxwell 12, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, Winter 2012, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html
Enter Congress The weakness of this theory is that it is not codified in U AND to allow it to exercise its democratic role as the people’s representative."74
2NC—-AT: Links to Politics
CP is executive action—obviously avoids Congressional fights Fine 12 Jeffrey A. Fine, assistant professor of political science at Clemson University. He has published articles in the Journal of Politics, Political Research Quarterly, and Political Behavior. Adam L. Warber is an associate professor of political science at Clemson University. He is the author of Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency, Presidential Studies Quarterly, June 2012, " Circumventing Adversity: Executive Orders and Divided Government", Vol. 42, No. 2, Ebsco
We also should expect presidents to prioritize and be strategic in the types of executive AND have a greater incentive to issue major policy orders to overcome legislative hurdles.
But if the United States is serious about working toward international standards on drone strikes AND of weapon, before the regular use of drones spreads across the globe.
The killing of the U.S.-born al-Qaeda cleric Anwar Al AND risks having its largely successful drone program become as internationally maligned as Guantanamo.
Self-interest overwhelms legal disputes Kristin Archick, Congressional Research Service Specialist in European Affairs, 9/4/13, U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent AND and new measures to strengthen external EU border controls and improve aviation security. As part of its drive to bolster its counterterrorism capabilities, the EU has also AND have been working together to curb terrorist financing and to strengthen transport security.
2NC—-O’Hanlon Extension
Assessments are long and independent Anderson 13 (Kenneth Anderson is a professor of international law at American University and a member of the Task Force on National Security and Law at the Hoover Institution, June 2013, "The Case for Drones", https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-case-for-drones/)
It can be used for a different kind of targeting altogether: against groups of AND Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership.
2NC—-Obama Solved the Aff—-Extension
More evidence Dyer 13 (Geoff – Washington correspondent to FT, "Obama rewrites rules for drone strikes in terror war" May 23, 2013, Financial Times; US Politics 26 Policy)
President Barack Obama announced new restrictions on the use of drones against suspected terrorists on AND targeted killing programme and have generated strong resistance even from within the administration.
Solves Pakistan —- restrictions are codified and reduced strikes Brown 13 (Hayes – writer @ ThinkProgress, "Report: U.S. Drops Signature Strikes In Pakistan" July 25, 2013, ThinkProgress; Security)
The United States has ended the use of so-called signature drone strikes in AND reports surfaced that control of most drones would be transferred to the Pentagon.
Their scholarship is terrible Greenwald 12 (Glenn, JD in Constitutional Law and recipient of the first annual I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism and winner of the 2010 Online Journalism Association Award and author of three New York Times Bestselling books and named as one of the 25 most influential political commentators in the nation, "The sham "terrorism expert" industry" Aug 15, 2012, Salon)
The key role played by this "terrorism expert" industry in sustaining highly damaging hysteria was highlighted in an excellent and still-relevant 2007 Washington Post Op-Ed by Zbigniew Brzezinski. In it, he described how the War on Terror has created an all-consuming Climate of Fear in the U.S. along with a systematic, multi-headed policy of discrimination against Muslim Americans based on these severely exaggerated threats, and described one of the key culprits this way: Such fear-mongering, reinforced by security entrepreneurs, the mass media and the entertainment industry, generates its own momentum.The terror entrepreneurs, usually described as experts on terrorism, are necessarily engaged in competition to justify their existence. Hence their task is to convince the public that it faces new threats. That puts a premium on the presentation of credible scenarios of ever-more-horrifying acts of violence, sometimes even with blueprints for their implementation. It’s very similar to what Les Gelb, in expressing his regret for supporting the AND lend theoretical support to U.S. militarism rather than oppose it.
2NC—-No Impact to Pakistan—-Extension
No Pakistan collapse - the military and political institutions are resilient and marginalize militant forces - thats Dasgupta - more ev Shah 11 Aqil Shah is a post-doctoral fellow at the Society of Fellows, Harvard University. He is expert on Military Politics and Democratization in South Asia, especially Pakistan, PhD from Columbia, Rhodes scholar, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, "Getting the Military Out of Pakistani Politics", http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67742/aqil-shah/getting-the-military-out-of-pakistani-politics
Pakistan is, of course, a weak state with serious political, economic, AND chaos or let its prized nuclear weapons fall into the hands of Islamists.
Relations are structurally tanked Haqqani 13 HUSAIN HAQQANI is Professor of International Relations at Boston University and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. He served as Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States in 2008-11, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2013, "Breaking Up Is Not Hard to Do", http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138845/husain-haqqani/breaking-up-is-not-hard-to-do
Washington has not had an easy time managing the U.S.-Pakistani relationship AND the other of being a terrible ally — and perhaps both are right. Pakistanis tend to think of the United States as a bully. In their view AND ally if only the United States showed more sensitivity to Islamabad’s regional concerns. On the other side, Americans see Pakistan as the ungrateful recipient of almost 24 AND of U.S. aid have simply failed to invigorate Pakistan’s economy. The May 2011 U.S. covert operation in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin AND , more likely, teach Pakistani officials the limitations of their country’s power.
No loose nukes Cohen 26 Zenko 12 (Michael and Micah, Fellow at the Century Foundation AND Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Clear and Present Safety," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, Iss. 2, EBSCO)
Pakistan represents another potential source of loose nukes. The United States’ military strategy in AND United States is "very comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons."
Many people have argued that the Mumbai attacks of 2008 created a sense of such AND in India of that will. That makes for a very dangerous situation.
2NC—-No SCS Conflict—-Extension
No miscalc impact Trefor Moss, The Diplomat, 2/10/13, 7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War, thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/?all=true
But if Shinzo Abe is gambling with the region’s security, he is at least AND in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.
Ensures macro-stability even if risk of miscalc is high Allen Carlson, Cornell University Associate Professor, 2/21/13, China Keeps the Peace at Sea, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139024/allen-carlson/china-keeps-the-peace-at-sea?page=show
However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has AND or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.
1nr
2nc impact ov
And it’s crisis magnifier – draws in great powers to small conflicts Edelman, Fellow – Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ’11 (Eric, "Edelman, Krepinevich, and Montgomery Reply," Foreign Affairs Vol. 9 Iss. 2, March/April)
Ultimately, if Tehran does cross the nuclear threshold and Israel chooses to live with AND a nuclear Iran’s influence, preserve regional stability, and prevent additional proliferation. A second important issue Adamsky raises is that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would increase AND dynamics of Iranian-Israeli relations could be prone to miscalculation and escalation. Perception of deal failure independently causes global conflict PressTV 11/13 "Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail," http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/ A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says. "If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before ~US President Barack~ Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of," senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. "The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar," Steinberg said. "So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with" their arsenals of "nuclear weapons," he warned.
What would it mean if such a regime went nuclear? Let’s assume, for AND a regime that is defined by anti-Western hatred and religious fanaticism.
Turns terror Inbar, 6 ~Efraim, Professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University and the Director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. " THE NEED TO BLOCK A NUCLEAR IRAN," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006)~
Furthermore, as the nuclear taboo is eroding at the interstate level, Iran AND terrorist groups a haven where they think they are immune to Western reach. A nuclear Iran would also enhance Iranian hegemony in the strategic energy sector, AND make Iran’s containment even more difficult and would necessarily embolden Islamic radicals everywhere.
President Barack Obama implored Democratic senators Wednesday to put off new sanctions against Iran that AND , with some GOP senators rolling out their own proposals to fight poverty. Obama has won over hawkish dems Burgess Everett, politico, 1/15 ~"Obama talks Iran with senators," http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/obama-talks-iran-with-senators-102249.html?hp=l1~~
President Barack Obama hosted Senate Democrats at White House on Wednesday in an effort to AND to negotiate a long-term deal to wind down Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Now Iran is again causing angst in Washington. Barack Obama faces acute, bipartisan AND offs, while warding off attack ads that call them soft on Iran.
The escalation of drone strikes in Yemen, presumably in response to the ongoing Al Qaeda threat, and other technology-based military options could fuel calls to re-write laws that govern such actions to give Congress greater oversight over the administration’s remote-controlled warfare. "Some of these campaigns by the administration clearly constitute an act of war," said Jonathan Turley, an attorney and professor at George Washington University Law School. To date, the administration has claimed broad latitude in its authority to launch limited military operations — including drone strikes — without congressional authorization. There’s no indication this time will be any different. A total of nine suspected drone strikes reportedly have been recorded in Yemen since late July, taking out dozens of alleged Al Qaeda operatives and other militants. The most recent strike was on Saturday. The Washington Post reported last week that the strikes were authorized by the Obama administration in connection with the ongoing terror threat. If challenged on the strikes, the president is likely to argue that the operation is contained and does not require congressional authorization. He has in the past. This debate flared during the 2011 operation in Libya, when the administration launched a series of air and drone strikes in support of the campaign against Muammar Qaddafi.
A small but growing opposition in Congress to the Obama administration’s targeted killing policies is beginning to demand hearings and accountability, after a leaked legal memo this week revealed the President’s rationale for assassinating US citizens. "It has to be in the agenda of this Congress to reconsider the scope of action of drones and use of deadly force by the United States around the world because the original authorization of use of force, I think, is being strained to its limits," said Senator Chris Coons, a Democrat. According to congressional aides the Senate Foreign Relations Committee likely will hold hearings on US drone policy in the near future. Rep. Steny Hoyer, the No. 2 Democrat in the House, said Tuesday that "it deserves a serious look at how we make the decisions in government to take out, kill, eliminate, whatever word you want to use, not just American citizens but other citizens as well." A bipartisan group of 11 senators wrote a letter to President Obama requesting he provide his administration’s official legal memos justifying the use of armed drones to kill American citizens without due process. The request was issued on Monday, the same day that NBC News published an exclusive story based on a leaked Department of Justice "white paper" that was provided to Senate committees months ago. The memo, while not the official documents the senators have repeatedly requested, laid out the government’s case for targeted assassinations of US citizens accused of being terrorists even when there is no active intelligence accusing them of carrying out a specific terrorist attack. "We ask that you direct the Justice Department to provide Congress, specifically the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, with any and all legal opinions that lay out the executive branch’s official understanding of the President’s authority to deliberately kill American citizens," the eight Democrats and three Republicans wrote. "We should be concerned when the White House is acting as judge, jury and executioner," Naureen Shah, a lecturer at Columbia Law School said. "And there’s no one outside of the White House who has real oversight over that process. What’s put forward here is there’s no role for the courts, not even after the fact." "Anyone should be concerned when the president and his lawyers make up their own interpretation of the law or their own rules," Mary Ellen O’Connell, a law professor at the University of Notre Dame and an authority on international law and the use of force told NBC News. "This is a very, very dangerous thing that the president has done," she added. The senators even suggested that they would hold up the nominations of Chuck Hagel and John Brennan if the President does not comply. "The executive branch’s cooperation on this matter will help avoid an unnecessary confrontation that could affect the Senate’s consideration of nominees for national security positions," they warned. As Marcy Wheeler points out, this is at least the 12th time this group of senators has requested the Obama administration’s legal documents on this matter. All have been met with stiff rejection. There’s no constituency for the link turn.
—a2: no prolif
A nuclear Iran makes an already volatile middle east even more conflict prone – diplomacy and pressure are key Colin H. Kahl, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security focusing on Middle East security and defense policy and Associate Professor at Georgetown SFS, 12 ~Response to Iran and the Bomb, "One Step Too Far," Foreign Affairs, Reviews and Responses, Septempber/October, pp 157-160~
Because Waltz is sanguine about the effects of Iranian nuclearization, he concludes that " AND and he argues that "the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped." Waltz is wrong. The threat from a nuclear-armed Iran might not be AND that a nuclear-armed Iran would make the world a better place.
—a2: iran blocks
Iran won’t scuttle Scott Peterson, 9/23/13, Will Iran’s charm offensive to the US be blocked - by Iran?, www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/0923/Will-Iran-s-charm-offensive-to-the-US-be-blocked-by-Iran
Could a spoiling action happen again? Not too effectively, some say, because Khamenei himself has backed Rouhani’s outreach strategy in ways that he never stood behind Khatami. That view is also a turnaround for Khamenei, who earlier this year berated the US and ruled out any direct talks. "The extremists over here have lost their teeth," says a source in Tehran who has observed Iranian politics for three decades. "Any ~spoiler~ action anyone tries like that would be cut off at the knees right away. Whoever would do that would be pretty much ending their own career." The new approach is already bearing initial fruit: In New York today, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met with EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton. That prompted an invitation to meet in coming days with foreign ministers of world powers negotiating with Iran – including US Secretary of State John Kerry. Ms. Ashton said today: "I was struck by the energy and determination on the part of the minister."
1/20/14
Navy Round 4
Tournament: Navy | Round: 4 | Opponent: United States Military Barlow-Saker | Judge: Gray
1AC
Plan
The United States federal government should limit the war power authority of the president for self-defense targeted killings to outside an armed conflict.
1AC Drones
Advantage one is Drones
Conflation of legal regimes for targeted killing results in overly constrained operations—undermines counterterrorism
Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, J.D., 10/22/11, Self-defense Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947838
At the core of the self-defense targeting theory is the assumption that the AND ad bellum legal basis for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination.77 This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention lawtriggering equation.78 Adoption AND neutralize the impact of ad bellum legality in law applicability analysis.81 This effort rapidly became the norm of international law.82 Armed conflict analysis simply AND as irrelevant when deciding what rules apply to regulate operational and tactical execution. This aspect of ad bellum/in bello compartmentalization is not called into question by AND bellum principles indicates that these principles subsume in bello conflict regulation norms.91 There are two fundamental flaws with this conflation. First, by contradicting the traditional AND of these principles is distinct within each branch of the jus belli.94 Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum principles purportedly invoked AND these consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict regulation.98
That makes future terrorist attacks inevitable
Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, 6/2/13, Corn Comments on the Costs of Shifting to a Pure Self-Defense Model, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/corn-comments-on-the-prospect-of-a-shift-to-a-pure-self-defense-model/
The President’s speech – like prior statements of other administration officials – certainly suggests that AND force) threat that will provide an analogous decisive effect in the future. It strikes me (no pun intended) that arguments – or policy choices – AND , targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America." Relying exclusively on the inherent right of self-defense would, I suggest, AND not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11." A key advantage of the armed conflict framework is that it provides the legal maneuver AND context of an existing armed conflict than in isolated self-defense actions. It may, of course, be possible to adopt an interpretation of imminence expansive AND opposed to disable, terrorist threats, because of concerns of perceived overreach. It may be that a shift to this use of force framework is not only AND administration is unlikely to be too quick to abandon reliance on the AUMF.
Drones solve safe havens – prevents a terror attack
Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida’s leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm’s way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida’s senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida’s central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan’s Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden’s letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military’s footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
Drones are operationally effective and alternatives are worse—establishing a clear strike policy solves criticism.
Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, "Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington’s Weapon of Choice", www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)
Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, AND indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.
Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html)
I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and AND the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Extinction
Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, "Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence" SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
Causes US-Russia miscalc—extinction
Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor 26 Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
1AC Legal Regimes
Advantage two is legal regimes
US targeted killing derives authority from both armed conflict (jus in bello) and self-defense (jus ad bellum) legal regimes—that authority overlap conflates the legal regimes
For the past several years, the United States has relied on both armed conflict AND the implementation of the concepts of necessity and imminence, among many others. However, equally fundamental questions arise from the use of both justifications at the same AND raises significant concerns about both current implementation and future development of the law. One overarching concern is the conflation in general of jus ad bellum and jus in AND of their cause. The result: an invitation to unregulated warfare.11
Authority overlap destroys both the self-defense and armed conflict legal regimes
In contrast, human rights law’s requirement that force only be used as a last AND therefore every attempt must be made to capture before resorting to lethal force. In the abstract, the differences in the obligations regarding surrender and capture seem straightforward AND , and tried, those are the means which should be employed.105 The Israeli Supreme Court’s finding that targeting is only lawful if no less harmful means AND ,108 it demonstrates some of the challenges of conflating the two paradigms. First, if this added obligation of less harmful means was understood to form part AND who are lawful combatants, a result not contemplated in the LOAC.109 Second, soldiers faced with an obligation to always use less harmful means may well AND conflict, a central component of the protection of all persons in wartime. From the opposing perspective, if the armed conflict rules for capture and surrender were AND as a consequence of the broadening use of force outside of armed conflict.
This degrades the entire collective security structure resulting in widespread interstate war
The United States has been engaging in this practice of using drone-mounted missile AND S. justification and in accordance with the rationales developed to support it. Some of the implications of such an adjustment in the jus ad bellum regime are AND 2(4) prohibition on the use of force would be expanded. In addition, however, the targeted killing policy threatens to create other holes in AND without being subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the IHL regime. The structure of Harold Koh’s two-pronged justification similarly implies a severance of this AND against the threat or use of force under the jus ad bellum regime. This interpretation of the justifications cannot be pressed too far on the basis of the AND use of force against the states in which the groups may be operating. While the initial use of force in jus ad bellum terms is currently understood to AND system of laws designed to govern and constrain all aspects of its operation. There is a tendency in the U.S. approach to the so- AND creating the U.N. system after the Second World War.108 The premise of my argument is not that any return to past principles is inherently AND , and international armed conflict was thus far more frequent and widespread.109 The entire debate on targeted killing is so narrowly focused on the particular problems posed AND states under the pretext of self-proclaimed armed conflict with NSAs generally. We may think about each of these innovations as being related specifically to operations against AND a threat that is much less serious in the grand scheme of things.
Robust support for the impact—legal regime conflation results in uncontrollable conflict escalation
Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, December 2009, CONTROLLING THE RECOURSE TO WAR BY MODIFYING JUS IN BELLO, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law / Volume 12
A substantial literature exists on the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. However, the consequences for the former side of the equation – the resort to war – is generally under-examined. Instead, academic commentary has focused on the effects of compliance with humanitarian rules in armed conflict and, in particular, the equality of application principle. In this section, I attempt to help correct that imbalance. In the following analysis, I use the (admittedly provocative) short-hand labels of ’desirable’ and ’undesirable’ wars. The former consists of efforts that aim to promote the general welfare of foreign populations such as humanitarian interventions and, on some accounts, peacekeeping operations. The latter – undesirable wars – include conflicts that result from security spirals that serve neither state’s interest and also include predatory acts of aggression. 4.1.1 Decreased likelihood of ’desirable wars’ A central question in debates about humanitarian intervention is whether the international community should be AND short, all ’interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ are affected. Two developments render desirable interventions less likely. First, consider implications of the Kosovo AND one would most want to incentivize to initiate and participate in humanitarian interventions. The second development shares many of these same consequences. Consider the implications of the AND disproportionately affect the very states that take international human rights obligations most seriously. Notably, in these cases, the disincentives might weigh most heavily on third parties AND the international regime should prefer to be involved in these kinds of interventions. The developments regulating jus ad bellum through jus in bello also threaten to make ’ AND result from the pressures created by Type I erosions of the separation principle. First, increasing the tax on humanitarian interventions (the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach AND language (in resolutions and the like) espousing or emphasizing humanitarian objectives. Second, the elevation of self-regarding – security and strategic – frameworks over AND international disputes exert significant influence on whether conflicts will eventually culminate in war. Third, a large body of empirical research demonstrates that states will routinely engage in AND demands for increased bellicosity, unintended security spirals, and military violence.103 Importantly, these effects may result even if one is skeptical about the power of AND states entering into disastrous military campaigns that their leaders did not initially intend.
Self-defense regime collapse causes global war—US TK legal regime key—only Congress solves international norm development
Therefore, the more likely result is that the Executive Branch, grappling with the AND prove legally fragile, destabilizing to the international political order, or both.
Effect on Domestic Law and Policy Congress’s failure to reauthorize military force would lead to bad domestic law and even worse AND be to continue to rely on the September 18, 2001, AUMF. Second, basing U.S. counterterrorism efforts on the President’s constitutional authority as AND would lack stability—confounding cooperation with allies and hindering negotiations with adversaries. There are, of course, many situations where the president’s position as Commander in AND conflict than the public might otherwise ~be~ willing to support."140 In a world without a valid AUMF, the United States could base its continued AND problems."141 Only then can the President’s efforts be sustained and legitimate. 2. Effect on the International Law of Self-Defense A failure to reauthorize military force would lead to significant negative consequences on the international AND allowing the executive to rely on a self-defense authorization alone.144 This approach also would inevitably lead to dangerous "slippery slopes." Once the President AND international law of self defense would likely lead to precisely such a result. The slippery slope problem, however, is not just limited to the United States’s AND to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos."148 Encouraging the proliferation of an expansive law of international self-defense would not only AND and rooting~ counterterrorism efforts within a more durable, legal foundation."152 Widely accepted legal arguments also facilitate cooperation from U.S. allies, especially AND , but facilitating that rationale’s destabilizing adoption by nations around the world.158
Law of armed conflict controls deterrence—collapse causes global WMD conflict
Delahunty, associate prof – U St. Thomas Law, and Yoo, law prof – UC Berkeley, ’10 (Robert and John, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 803)
Finally, the extension of IHRL to armed conflict may have significant consequences for the AND norms of distinction and the humane treatment of combatants and civilians in wartime. IHRL norms, on the other hand, may suffer from much lower rates of AND would be to adapt the legal system already specifically designed for armed conflict.
LOAC key to regulate cyber development—prevents spillover of the Stuxtnet precedent
Jeremy Richmond, J.D., March 2012, NOTE: EVOLVING BATTLEFIELDS DOES STUXNET DEMONSTRATE A NEED FOR MODIFICATIONS TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT?, 35 Fordham Int’l L.J. 842
Stuxnet almost certainly foreshadows a fundamental change in modern warfare. It demonstrates that a well-orchestrated CNA can strike a target with greater precision, greater damage to the enemy, and less collateral loss of life and property than a kinetic weapon. Will the change in warfare, ~*894~ however, be so drastic that it also necessitates a change in the LOAC? The answer appears to be both "yes" and "no." The principles of distinction, discrimination, and proportionality, when applied to Stuxnet, AND that fundamental alterations to the LOAC are not necessary to regulate cyber weapons.
Solves extinction
Guterl 12, executive editor – Scientific American, 11/28/’12 (Fred, "Armageddon 2.0," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)
The world lived for half a century with the constant specter of nuclear war and its potentially devastating consequences. The end of the Cold War took the potency out of this Armageddon scenario, yet the existential dangers have only multiplied. Today the technologies that pose some of the biggest problems are not so much military AND form the basis of our global civilization and are essential to our survival. The mistake many of us make about the darker aspects of our high-tech civilization is in thinking that we have plenty of time to address them. We may, if we’re lucky. But it’s more likely that we have less time than we think. There may be a limited window of opportunity for preventing catastrophes such as pandemics, runaway climate change, and cyber attacks on national power grids. Emerging diseases. The influenza pandemic of 2009 is a case in point. Because AND , it was already well on its way to spreading far and wide. "H1N1 caught us all with our pants down," says flu expert Robert G AND the medicines you need. Society as we know it would fall apart." Climate change. Climate is another potentially urgent risk. It’s easy to think about AND state in which the Arctic is ice-free during the summer months. Perhaps the most alarming of Lenton’s tipping points is the Indian summer monsoon. Smoke AND very different effect on the Indian summer monsoon: It makes it stronger. These two opposite influences make the fate of the monsoon difficult to predict and subject AND happens then? More than a billion people depend on the monsoon’s rains. Other tipping points may be in play, says Lenton. The West African monsoon AND change more quickly than currently projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Computer hacking. The computer industry has already made it possible for computers to handle AND currently being field tested, could hit dealer showrooms in a few years. Autonomous computers can make our lives easier and safer, but they can also make AND survive and carry out its mission even if it found itself cut off. The uranium centrifuges that Stuxnet attacked are very similar in principle to the generators that AND cause them to shake, rattle, and roll — and eventually explode. If Stuxnet-like malware were to insinuate itself into a few hundred power generators AND . Worldwide production currently amounts to only a few hundred generators per year. The consequences of going without power for months, across a large swath of the AND down, according to an analysis by Scott Borg, a cybersecurity expert.
TK self-defense norms modeled globally —- causes global war Fisk 26 Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk —- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos— PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, "Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm" 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)
Conclusion Preventive self-defense entails waging a war or an attack by choice, in AND for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, and/or precision targeting. Thus, the results of our plausibility probe provide some evidence that the global norm AND or lesser power. Research in this vein would compliment our analyses herein. With the proliferation of technology in a globalized world, it seems only a matter AND it continues to provide other states with the justification to do the same.
China models US self-defense precedent —- they’ll strike in the South China Sea Fisk 26 Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk —- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, "Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm" 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)
China Though scholars debate the strategic culture of China, the dominant view has been one AND evidence that China is buying into the norm of preventive self-defense. Indeed, a year later (in 2006), China released a national defense report AND has territorial disputes should "mentally prepare for the sounds of cannons."73 Beyond the territorial disputes, also consider the recent terrorist attacks within China and their AND though not as clear-cut as in the India and Russia cases). In each of the cases under review, the military has shifted in its orientation AND sophisticated new RMA technology, after having observed US success in this area. Alongside our analysis of state rhetoric, these changes in strategies and high-tech AND role in combat operations in Afghanistan in 2009—by borrowing American drones. Taken together, though, in terms of their position on the idea of preventive AND drones are an obvious choice for states committed to preventive self-defense.
SCS conflict causes extinction Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace 26 Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. AND —destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
1AC Solvency
Congressional limits of self-defense authority within armed conflict is necessary to resolve legal ambiguity
Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, Winter 2012, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html
In the wake of the attacks by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, AND not wise for the long-term health of the rule of law. This article traces the history of targeted killing from a U.S. perspective AND Constitution demands nothing less, but thus far, Congress’s silence is deafening. History of Targeted Killing During the Cold War, the United States used covert operations AND is declared hostile; the enemy is now targetable. Anticipatory Self-defense This paradigm shift is novel for the United States. The President’s authority to order AND , but now they are hampering its desires to target and kill terrorists. Skeptics of targeted killing admit that "~t~he decision to target specific individuals AND even some foreign governments40 is where these targeted killings can be conducted.41 According to the U.S. critics, if armed conflict between the states AND negative: the strike constituted "a clear case of extrajudicial killing."42 The Obama administration, like its predecessor, disagrees. Its legal justification for targeted AND , must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it."44 A state can act under the guise of anticipatory self-defense. This truism AND stated legal authority is self-defense? There is no clear answer. The administration is blurring the contours of the right of the state to act in Yemen under self-defense and the law of war protections afforded its soldiers when so acting. Therefore, what protections do U.S. Airmen enjoy when operating the drone that killed an individual in Yemen, Somalia, or Libya? If they are indicted by a Spanish court for murder, what is the defense AND international legal norms intersect and potentially conflict with measures stemming from domestic law.
That clarity over legal authority is necessary to solve
As noted in the introduction to this article, maintaining the separation between and independence AND of international security, and to the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. III. BLURRING THE LINES The nature of the terrorist threat the United States and other states face does indeed AND individuals by blurring the lines between the key parameters of the two paradigms. A. Location of Attacks: International Law and the Scope of the Battlefield The distinct differences between the targeting regimes in armed conflict and in self-defense AND parameters of the zone of combat in the conflict with al Qaeda.70 Traditionally, the law of neutrality provided the guiding framework for the parameters of the AND the armed conflict directly to the territory of one or more belligerent parties. The neutrality framework as a geographic parameter is left wanting in today’s conflicts with terrorist AND armies and their enemies or as police forces and their criminal adversaries.78 Simply locating terrorist groups and operatives does not therefore identify the parameters of the battlefield—the fact that the United States and other states use a combination of military operations and law enforcement measures to combat terrorism blurs the lines one might look for in defining the battlefield. In many situations, "the fight against transnational jihadi groups . . . largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield."79 Second, a look at U.S. jurisprudence in the past and today AND our country must engage if our form of government is to survive.81 In each of those cases, the United States was a belligerent in an international AND both the difference in approach and the uncertainty involved in defining today’s conflicts. The current U.S. approach of using both the armed conflict paradigm and AND and/or self-defense to cover all areas without further delineation. Second, on a broader level of legal application and interpretation, the development of AND prove detrimental in the future when it seeks sharper delineations for other purposes.
Executive "clarification" is insufficient
Laurie Blank, Emory International Humanitarian Law Clinic Director, Professor, 10/10/13, "Raid Watching" and Trying to Discern Law from Policy, today.law.utah.edu/projects/raid-watching-and-trying-to-discern-law-from-policy/
Trying to identify and understand the legal framework the United States believes is applicable to AND where does the United States believe its authority derived from this conflict reaches? On Saturday, U.S. Special Forces came ashore in Somalia and engaged AND Shabaab is a party to that armed conflict or another independent armed conflict? The reality, however, is that this latest counterterrorism operation highlights once again the conflation of law and policy that exemplifies the entire discourse about the United States conflict with al Qaeda and other U.S. counterterrorism operations as well. And that using policy to discern law is a highly risky venture. The remarkable series of public speeches by top Obama Administration legal advisors and national security AND of the conflation of law and policy and the consequences of that conflation. Policy and strategic considerations are without a doubt an essential component of understanding contemporary military operations and the application of international law. However, it is equally important to distinguish between law and policy, and to recognize when one is driving analysis versus the other. The law regarding the use of force against an individual or group outside the borders AND force is necessary and proportionate to repel or deter the attack or threat. The United States has consistently blurred these two legal justifications for the use of force AND the perspective of careful legal analysis, however, it can prove problematic. In effect, it is U.S. policy to eliminate "bad guys AND raids, capture — each situation involves its own tactical plans and twists. But do any of these specific tactical choices tell us anything in particular about whether AND and used deadly force in the process of trying to effectuate that capture. Ultimately, however, the only certain information is that the United States viewed this AND particular military mission at hand, the operational imperatives and national command policy. The fact that the operation may have had capture as its goal, if feasible AND force, but that use of force may nonetheless be robust when necessary. "Raid-watching" — trying to predict the applicable legal framework from reports AND policy for legal analysis ultimately substitutes policy’s flexibility for the law’s normative foundations.
2AC
2AC T–Prohibit
"Restrictions" are on time, place, and purpose – this includes the plan Lobel, professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh, 2008 (Jules, "Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War," Ohio State Law Journal, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf)
Throughout Amebrican history, Congress has placed restrictions on the President’s power as Commander in AND subject to the control and oversight of Congress in the conduct of warfare.
au•thor•i•ty ~uh-thawr-i-tee, uh-thor-~ Show IPA noun, plural au•thor•i•ties. 1. the power to determine, adjudicate, or otherwise settle issues or disputes; jurisdiction; the right to control, command, or determine. 2. a power or right delegated or given; authorization: Who has the authority to grant permission?
War powers authority refers to the President’s authority to execute warfighting operations—that includes self-defense justifications Manget, law professor at Florida State and formerly in the Office of the General Counsel at the CIA, No Date (Fred, "Presidential War Powers," http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-10-114-7/263-a1-27-box-10-114-7.pdf)
The President has constitutional authority to order defensive military action in response to aggression without AND acts in defense of the nation, he acts under war powers authority. 3. Protection of Life and Property The President also has the power to order military intervention in foreign countries to protect AND Navy and Air Force aircraft bombed the modern Barbary Coast nation of Libya. 4. Collective Security The President may also authorize military operations without prior congressional approval pursuant to collective security agreements such as NA TO or OAS treaties. Unilaterial presidential action under these agreements may be justified as necessary for the protection of national security even though hostilities occur overseas and involve allies.36 5. National Defense Power The President’s war powers authority is actually a national defense power that exists at all AND the national defense and the prosecution of national objectives through military means."39 Thus, the Executive Branch ’s constitutional war powers authority does not spring into existence when Congress declares war, nor is it dependent on there being hostilities. It empowers the President to prepare for war as well as wage it, in the broadest sense. It operates at all times. 6. Role of the Military The fundamental function of the armed forces is to fight or to be ready to AND type of hostility are based on constitutional war powers authority of the President.
The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law AND full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official ("TopOff") exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the AND focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge AND and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem AND student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the AND that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and AND giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal ~1 AND Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount AND execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise AND but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution AND , generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – AND simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) AND many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize AND to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the AND exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during AND , while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop AND uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account AND weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might AND through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts AND , giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to AND relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives ( AND , or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law AND releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, AND the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students AND opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who AND concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the AND both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, AND greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national AND to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, AND in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model AND undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.
Acting to help others generates meaning Todd May 5, philo prof at Clemson, "To change the world, to celebrate life", Philosophy 26 Social Criticism, vol 31, nos 5–6, 517–531
What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure AND our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it.
Global extinction risks require a revision of the politics of compassion – survival is still paramount. New risks dictate embracing our ethic DEPSITE their impacts Winchester 94 James J. Winchester teaches Philosophy at Spelman College Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Turn
As uninformed as it is to assume that there is an easy connec- tion AND is the level of interconnectedness that the technological age has pressed upon us.
2AC self-restraint
Object fiat is a voter – avoids the core question of pres powers by fiating away obama’s behavior in the squo – justifies the end war cp which means the neg wins every debate – it’s not in the lit which is key Hansen 12 (Victor, Professor of Law, New England Law, New England Law Review, Vol. 46, pp. 27-36, 2011, "Predator Drone Attacks", February 22, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009313-http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009313, PDF, ZBurdette)
Any checks on the President’s use of drone attacks must come domestically. In the domestic arena the two options are either the courts or Congress. As discussed above, the courts are institutionally unsuited and incapable of providing appropriate oversight. Congress is the branch with the constitutional authority, historical precedent, and institutional capacity to exercise meaningful and effective oversight of the President’s actions.
CP links to –
Links to politics – makes Obama a lightning rod Phillip Cooper 97, Prof of Public Administration @ Portland State, Nov 97, "Power tools for an effective and responsible presidency" Administration and Society, Vol. 29, p. Proquest Interestingly enough, the effort to avoid opposition from Congress or agencies can have the AND Quayle Commission working in concert with OIRA provides a dramatic case in point.
Executive clarification fails—not legally binding, no cred, raises expectations Sarah Knuckey, NYU Law School Project on Extrajudicial Executions Director, Special Advisor to the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, 10/1/13, Transparency on Targeted Killings: Promises Made, but Little Progress, justsecurity.org/2013/10/01/transparency-targeted-killings-promises-made-progress/
Some interpreted these efforts and the President’s speech to mark the beginning of improved transparency. But despite transparency promises and expectations, many of the same, core concerns regarding undue secrecy remain. The President’s speech, the Policy Guidance, and Holder’s letter – because of textual ambiguities within each, and combined with events since – have largely failed to address these longstanding concerns, and in some important respects aggravated them. Continuing Secrecy on Core Issues Key areas in which transparency has not yet been forthcoming include: Who can be killed, where, and on what basis. Demands for AND had "expanded the scope" of who could be targeted in Yemen).
2AC PTX
1) A slew of issues overwhelm and Boehner won’t allow controversial votes before the midterms Tim Alberta, National Journal, 1/16, "House GOP at 2014 Crossroads: Go Big, or Keep Quiet?," www.nationaljournal.com/congress/house-gop-at-2014-crossroads-go-big-or-keep-quiet-20140116
According to sources with knowledge of the deliberations, Boehner and his leadership team prefer a quiet, noncontroversial legislative session in which Republicans steer clear of mistakes and run out the clock until the November elections. This play-it-safe strategy hinges on voters turning out in droves to voice their displeasure with President Obama’s health care law and his administration’s domestic-surveillance policies, among other things. But such an approach is unacceptable to the most conservative members of the House GOP. After two weeks of private deliberations, and fresh off a mini-retreat this week organized by the Republican Study Committee, conservatives are united in their resolve to make 2014 more about Republicans’ "bold, positive vision" and less about Obama’s failures. "I’m convinced Republicans have the best vision for America’s future," Rep. Kevin Brady of Texas said outside of Wednesday’s RSC meeting. "We’ve spent a lot of time opposing the president’s policies, but it’s time to share our vision if we want to win in November." That sentiment has echoed among conservative lawmakers all week, and it ramped up during AND reform plan, a welfare-reform package, and a privacy bill. "I don’t want to play prevent defense," Scalise said, according to members in attendance. "I want to play offense." Asked to explain the remark later in an interview, Scalise said, "Usually teams that play prevent defense lose the game." But Boehner’s team doesn’t share that view. GOP leadership has done everything possible in recent months to keep the electorate’s attention on the Democrats, especially highlighting the disastrous rollout of President Obama’s health care law and Republican oversight efforts on the IRS scandal and Benghazi attacks. Leadership officials are intent on keeping the American public "talking about Obamacare" all the way until November. Besides, already fewer than 90 work days remain in the legislative session. Even if leadership officials were to embrace an ambitious agenda, they see little time to implement it. "We have to do a budget, we have to do appropriations, we have to do debt ceiling. There are a lot of issues that are hanging out there that have to be done that dominate a lot of the calendar," said Rep. James Lankford, the Republican policy chairman and a member of leadership. That said, many of the conservatives’ policy objectives for 2014 are likely dead on arrival in Cambridge anyway.
Harry Reid and Senate Dem leadership aides have been telling reporters that there are no plans for a vote on a new bill to impose sanctions on Iran — a vote the White House fears could derail diplomacy and make war more likely. Yet it may actually be even worse than this for proponents of the bill. Even Senators who support the measure are no longer pushing for any vote, and have no plans to do so for the foreseeable future, a Democratic Senator who favors the bill tells me. "At the moment, there’s no rush to put the bill on the floor," says this Senator, who asked for anonymity to be candid about the real state of play on the measure. "I’m not aware of any deadline in anyone’s head." It’s unclear whether any of the bill’s Democratic supporters are even privately pushing for a vote on it at this point, in the wake of the recent announcement that the six month deal curbing Iran’s nukes is set to move forward. One Senator who favors the bill — Richard Blumenthal — has publicly confirmed he’s having second thoughts in the wake of that announcement. And there is clearly more movement behind the scenes. The Senator who spoke to me today allowed it could become "harder" for the pro-bill forces to demand a vote down the line, in the weeks and months ahead, if negotiations are proceeding with Iran.
A bid to slap Iran with a new round of economic sanctions appears to have stalled in the Senate, after leading Democrats amplified concern about the threat such a move poses to a fragile diplomatic process. Early in the week, reports that a bill introduced by Republican Mark Kirk and Democrat Robert Menendez was within striking distance of a veto-proof majority cast a shadow over news that negotiators had finalized a temporary agreement to freeze Iran’s nuclear program, beginning Monday. New sanctions would likely kill negotiations for a final deal, the White House warned lawmakers, and increase the chances of an armed conflict with Iran. But Senate majority leader Harry Reid has given no indication that he will bring the bill up for a vote, and the pressure to do so is falling now that top Democrats have intensified opposition to the proposed legislation. The Kirk-Menendez bill gained no new endorsements this week, and even one supportive senator admitted Wednesday to a break in momentum. Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Intelligence Committee, called the sanctions bill "a AND international coalition that has enabled our sanctions to succeed in the first place." Ten committee chairs circulated a joint statement warning that "new sanctions would play into AND I want to do is impede that progress," he said on Monday. Major newspapers condemned the bill, including theNew York Times, the Los Angeles Times AND likelihood of a nuclear-armed Iran and an unnecessary and costly war."
Plan doesn’t cost capital Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 59-60
Presidents and politicos alike have long recognized Congress’s ability to reduce the political costs that AND .S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution."36
If Obama is focusing capital on _¬¬¬¬_, it disproves Obama would initiate a fight over the plan
He’ll avoid the fight William Howell and Jon Pevehouse, Associate Professors at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, 2007, When Congress Stops Wars, Foreign Affairs, EBSCO
After all, when presidents anticipate congressional resistance they will not be able to overcome AND Pace, so as to avoid a clash with Congress over his reappointment.
Negotations will fail – Iranian hardliners will get the upper hand (and U.S. sanctions are inevitable) Hibbs, senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment nuclear policy program, 12/30/2013 (Mark, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/30/year-of-too-great-expectations-for-iran/gxbv) If all goes according to plan, sometime during 2014 Iran will sign a comprehensive final agreement to end a nuclear crisis that, over the course of a decade, has threatened to escalate into a war in the Middle East. But in light of the unresolved issues that must be addressed, it would be unwise to bet that events will unfold as planned. Unrealistic expectations about the Iran deal need to be revised downward. In Geneva on November 24, Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus Germany agreed to a Joint Plan of Action. For good reason, the world welcomed this initial agreement because it squarely put Iran and the powers on a road to end the crisis through diplomacy. The deal calls for Tehran and the powers to negotiate the "final step" AND period of time. In exchange, sanctions against Iran will be lifted. An effective final deal could emerge. But Iran and the West will continue to AND fundamental differences and become partners, as some observers either hope or fear. THE CLOCK IS TICKING U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry knew what he was talking about AND to be done could delay agreement on the final step for many months. The main problem is not that Iran will refuse to implement what it agreed to AND capability to produce plutonium, which can be used for making nuclear weapons. Tehran has every incentive to comply with these measures. Were it to cheat, Iran’s adversaries, convinced that Iran cannot be trusted, would be vindicated and would gain leverage to add sanctions or use force. Iran knows this. Instead, the potential showstoppers looming before the parties concern matters that the negotiation of AND by the IAEA that point to nuclear weapons research and development by Iran. The Joint Plan of Action is deliberately vague about how to handle these issues, AND steps two and three in the original scheme left to be worked out. If the parties do not work out the two major challenges they face, the negotiation may fail. If differences result in a stalemate, Iran’s hardliners could gain the upper hand, continue pursuing unfettered nuclear development, and eventually terminate the initial accord. Alternatively, U.S. lawmakers could respond to a lack of progress by adding to Iran’s sanctions burden, which would likewise doom the negotiation. There is much at stake.
4) No chance of Iran negotiation success Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Carnegie Endowment, 12/31/13, Washington’s World in 2014, carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/31/washington-s-world-in-2014/gxda
If this six-month nuclear accord can be turned into a permanent one that replaces the imminent threat of a nuclear-armed Iran with a transparent, internationally monitored civilian nuclear program, that achievement alone is how 2013 and 2014 will deserve to be remembered. That "if" looms large, however. Unlike the key talks in the AND purpose. Deep-seated mistrust on both sides will frustrate every step. Hard as it will be in the negotiating room, the greater impediment will be AND last summer is unlikely to survive prolonged stalemate or breakup of the talks.
Expansive self-defense regime enables Israel strike on Iran —- escalates and causes World War 3 Slager 12 (Katherine, J.D. Candidate 2013, University of North Carolina School of Law, "Legality, Legitimacy and Anticipatory Self-Defense: Considering an Israeli Preemptive Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Program" Fall, 2012, 38 N.C.J. Int’l L. 26 Com. Reg. 267)
I. Introduction World War III is an event the world universally wishes to avoid. n3 Threats AND will preemptively strike Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear attack capability. n7 ~*269~ While a strike might forestall a nuclear Iran, at least AND and the international community, which must respond to this use of force. This comment assesses the legality of a potential Israeli preemptive strike against Iran’s nuclear program AND to attack Israel with nuclear weapons and the intention to do so. n307 ~*309~
Capability: Iran’s Nuclear Development Towards the end of 2011 and into the early part of 2012, world tensions AND has consistently asserted that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes. n313 The most recent round of mounting tensions was marked by a November 2011 IAEA report AND Iran could develop nuclear weapons in sixty-two days or less. n320 Following the release of the November IAEA report, the United States and Europe began AND responding "frantically, and with increasing unpredictability" to the sanctions. n326 In February 2012, the IAEA released another report. n327 This ~*311~ AND to have serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme." n331 The summer of 2012 saw an increase in concerns over the volatility of the Israel AND on Iran’s nuclear program would be legal or legitimate under modern international law. C. Analysis Under a restrictive interpretation of the U.N. Charter, Israel would not AND whether an Israeli preemptive strike would be acceptable under modern international law. n360
Customary International Law The Caroline doctrine, which underlies the customary international law analysis of anticipatory self- AND nuclear attack would meet the "necessity" requirement of the Caroline doctrine. Proportionality requires that action should not exceed what is minimally necessary to respond to a threat. n365 It would be in Israel’s diplomatic interests to respond with only the minimum required to avert the threat of nuclear attack. A preemptive strike that neutralizes Iran’s nuclear program and does not exceed the immediate threat to Israel to pursue "broader offensive or strategic goals" would satisfy the requirement of proportionality. n366 With the assumption that an Israeli preemptive strike would meet both the necessity and proportionality AND and the 1981 Israeli attack on Osirak, which was uniformly condemned. n368 As discussed in Part III.B, several threats were present in the ~* AND that seem to meet the "imminence" requirement of customary international law. Israel, taken in the light most favorable to an argument for legitimacy, may AND appear to be any further corroborations of an intention to attack Israel. n371 Developing nuclear weapons, because of their first-strike capabilities, may be tantamount AND only moderately resembles the threat posed by Egypt preceding the Six Day War. The present situation between Israel and Iran more closely resembles Israel’s attack on the Osirak AND an even stronger argument for an "imminent attack" by Iran today. The presence of these factors, without more, does not rise to the " AND weapons - should they come into Iran’s possession - against the Israeli state. While Israel may have a stronger argument for imminence today than it did in 1981, the present situation bears much stronger resemblance to the 1981 Osirak incident, where imminence was clearly not found, than to the 1967 Six Day War. As the Iranian threat against Israel does not rise to the imminence required by the Caroline doctrine, an Israeli preemptive strike against Iran would not be legal under customary international law. ~*319~ 2. Sadoff’s Framework The analytical framework proposed by David Sadoff offers an analysis of anticipatory self-defense AND be sufficiently imminent to justify an act of anticipatory self-defense. n378 First, assessing the nature and scale of an Iranian nuclear attack is fairly straightforward. Israel fears facing the threat of "first strike" nuclear attack, which would leave little or no time for Israel to respond defensively once launched. n379 Israel would likely receive little to no warning of a nuclear launch. Such an attack could decimate the entirety of the Israeli state. The nature and scale of the threat is likely the gravest threat imaginable. The "likelihood" of the attack, however, is much more ambiguous. AND any intention to attack and does not presently have the capacity to attack. The third factor in gauging the threat, timing, is interspersed with the likelihood factor. Sadoff suggests similar questions for the assessment of these two components. n387 This seems appropriate. If an attack is not very likely to occur, then it is moot to consider whether the timing of an attack is sufficiently immediate to justify a pre-emptive strike. 3. Considerations Under the analyses of both the customary international law and Sadoff’s frameworks, an Israeli AND Sadoff framework, using preemptive force to deter an attack would be justified. Also significant to the Caroline doctrine’s approach is that there are more options available to AND -defense where there is no actual imminence of a threatened attack. n394 ~*322~ Second, the rules that govern use of force must be AND that should bind, these laws lose their normative and prescriptive value. n395 Expansive overhaul of the modern international legal order is not the solution. Customary international AND law to develop at a pace with which international consensus can keep up. Incorporating legitimacy into modern international law is a priority. Legitimacy ensures the general acceptance AND and non-state actors, including the nongovernmental organizations and the press. Furthermore, the international community needs predictability and transparency in modern international law to assure AND of force, which will result in predictability and transparency in future evaluations. Under both traditional and alternative analyses, Israel would not be presently justified to preemptively AND thus foiling the trigger that would lead the world into World War III.
Solvency
2AC Circumvention
(No impact – separation of legal regimes solves even if Obama creates new zones)
No circumvention David J. Barron 8, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also AND the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.
1AR
circumvention
No circumvention David J. Barron 8, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also AND , until recently there has been almost no actual defiance of statutory limitations pred
icated on such a constitutional theory. This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential AND the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.
President believes he is constrained by statute Saikrishna Prakash 12, professor of law at the University of Virginia and Michael Ramsey, professor of law at San Diego, "The Goldilocks Executive" Feb, SSRN
We accept that the President’s lawyers search for legal arguments to justify presidential action, AND of law would trigger censure from Congress, courts, and the public.
overview
All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved Cummisky, 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)
Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and AND conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.*
AT: Roleplaying Bad ~General~
Analysis of policy is particularly empowering, even if we’re not the USFG Shulock 99 Nancy, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY —- professor of Public Policy and Administration and director of the Institute for Higher Education Leadership 26 Policy (IHELP) at Sacramento State University, The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, No. 2, 226–244 (1999)
In my view, none of these radical changes is necessary. As interesting as AND , can reshape the policy landscape. Policy analysis can supply the ideas.
perm
Predictions and scenario building are valuable for decision-making, even if they’re not perfect Garrett 12 Banning, In Search of Sand Piles and Butterflies, director of the Asia Program and Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Atlantic Council. http://www.acus.org/disruptive_change/search-sand-piles-and-butterflies
"Disruptive change" that produces "strategic shocks" has become an increasing AND respond, and our ability to see opportunities that we would otherwise miss.
may
And that requires minimizing suffering Edelglass 6 William Edelglass is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Marlboro College, "LEVINAS ON SUFFERING AND COMPASSION" Sophia, Vol. 45, No. 2, October 2006
Because suffering is a pure passivity, lived as the breach of the totality we AND is the pure passivity of suffering that menaces the freedom of the will.
The will endures pain ’as a tyranny,’ the work of a ’You, AND remove its evil while leaving the tyranny of a pain that overwhelms subjectivity.
1/18/14
Navy Round 5
Tournament: Navy | Round: 5 | Opponent: James Madison Lepp-Miller | Judge: Frappier
1AC
Plan
The United States federal government should limit the war power authority of the president for self-defense targeted killings to outside an armed conflict.
1AC Drones
Advantage one is Drones
Conflation of legal regimes for targeted killing results in overly constrained operations—undermines counterterrorism
Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, J.D., 10/22/11, Self-defense Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947838
At the core of the self-defense targeting theory is the assumption that the AND ad bellum legal basis for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination.77 This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention lawtriggering equation.78 Adoption AND neutralize the impact of ad bellum legality in law applicability analysis.81 This effort rapidly became the norm of international law.82 Armed conflict analysis simply AND as irrelevant when deciding what rules apply to regulate operational and tactical execution. This aspect of ad bellum/in bello compartmentalization is not called into question by AND bellum principles indicates that these principles subsume in bello conflict regulation norms.91 There are two fundamental flaws with this conflation. First, by contradicting the traditional AND of these principles is distinct within each branch of the jus belli.94 Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum principles purportedly invoked AND these consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict regulation.98
That makes future terrorist attacks inevitable
Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, 6/2/13, Corn Comments on the Costs of Shifting to a Pure Self-Defense Model, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/corn-comments-on-the-prospect-of-a-shift-to-a-pure-self-defense-model/
The President’s speech – like prior statements of other administration officials – certainly suggests that AND force) threat that will provide an analogous decisive effect in the future. It strikes me (no pun intended) that arguments – or policy choices – AND , targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America." Relying exclusively on the inherent right of self-defense would, I suggest, AND not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11." A key advantage of the armed conflict framework is that it provides the legal maneuver AND context of an existing armed conflict than in isolated self-defense actions. It may, of course, be possible to adopt an interpretation of imminence expansive AND opposed to disable, terrorist threats, because of concerns of perceived overreach. It may be that a shift to this use of force framework is not only AND administration is unlikely to be too quick to abandon reliance on the AUMF.
Drones solve safe havens – prevents a terror attack
Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida’s leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm’s way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida’s senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida’s central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan’s Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden’s letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military’s footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
Drones are operationally effective and alternatives are worse—establishing a clear strike policy solves criticism.
Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, "Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington’s Weapon of Choice", www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)
Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, AND indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.
Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html)
I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and AND the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Extinction
Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, "Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence" SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
Causes US-Russia miscalc—extinction
Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor 26 Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
1AC Legal Regimes
Advantage two is legal regimes
US targeted killing derives authority from both armed conflict (jus in bello) and self-defense (jus ad bellum) legal regimes—that authority overlap conflates the legal regimes
For the past several years, the United States has relied on both armed conflict AND the implementation of the concepts of necessity and imminence, among many others. However, equally fundamental questions arise from the use of both justifications at the same AND raises significant concerns about both current implementation and future development of the law. One overarching concern is the conflation in general of jus ad bellum and jus in AND of their cause. The result: an invitation to unregulated warfare.11
Authority overlap destroys both the self-defense and armed conflict legal regimes
In contrast, human rights law’s requirement that force only be used as a last AND therefore every attempt must be made to capture before resorting to lethal force. In the abstract, the differences in the obligations regarding surrender and capture seem straightforward AND , and tried, those are the means which should be employed.105 The Israeli Supreme Court’s finding that targeting is only lawful if no less harmful means AND ,108 it demonstrates some of the challenges of conflating the two paradigms. First, if this added obligation of less harmful means was understood to form part AND who are lawful combatants, a result not contemplated in the LOAC.109 Second, soldiers faced with an obligation to always use less harmful means may well AND conflict, a central component of the protection of all persons in wartime. From the opposing perspective, if the armed conflict rules for capture and surrender were AND as a consequence of the broadening use of force outside of armed conflict.
This degrades the entire collective security structure resulting in widespread interstate war
The United States has been engaging in this practice of using drone-mounted missile AND S. justification and in accordance with the rationales developed to support it. Some of the implications of such an adjustment in the jus ad bellum regime are AND 2(4) prohibition on the use of force would be expanded. In addition, however, the targeted killing policy threatens to create other holes in AND without being subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the IHL regime. The structure of Harold Koh’s two-pronged justification similarly implies a severance of this AND against the threat or use of force under the jus ad bellum regime. This interpretation of the justifications cannot be pressed too far on the basis of the AND use of force against the states in which the groups may be operating. While the initial use of force in jus ad bellum terms is currently understood to AND system of laws designed to govern and constrain all aspects of its operation. There is a tendency in the U.S. approach to the so- AND creating the U.N. system after the Second World War.108 The premise of my argument is not that any return to past principles is inherently AND , and international armed conflict was thus far more frequent and widespread.109 The entire debate on targeted killing is so narrowly focused on the particular problems posed AND states under the pretext of self-proclaimed armed conflict with NSAs generally. We may think about each of these innovations as being related specifically to operations against AND a threat that is much less serious in the grand scheme of things.
Robust support for the impact—legal regime conflation results in uncontrollable conflict escalation
Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, December 2009, CONTROLLING THE RECOURSE TO WAR BY MODIFYING JUS IN BELLO, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law / Volume 12
A substantial literature exists on the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. However, the consequences for the former side of the equation – the resort to war – is generally under-examined. Instead, academic commentary has focused on the effects of compliance with humanitarian rules in armed conflict and, in particular, the equality of application principle. In this section, I attempt to help correct that imbalance. In the following analysis, I use the (admittedly provocative) short-hand labels of ’desirable’ and ’undesirable’ wars. The former consists of efforts that aim to promote the general welfare of foreign populations such as humanitarian interventions and, on some accounts, peacekeeping operations. The latter – undesirable wars – include conflicts that result from security spirals that serve neither state’s interest and also include predatory acts of aggression. 4.1.1 Decreased likelihood of ’desirable wars’ A central question in debates about humanitarian intervention is whether the international community should be AND short, all ’interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ are affected. Two developments render desirable interventions less likely. First, consider implications of the Kosovo AND one would most want to incentivize to initiate and participate in humanitarian interventions. The second development shares many of these same consequences. Consider the implications of the AND disproportionately affect the very states that take international human rights obligations most seriously. Notably, in these cases, the disincentives might weigh most heavily on third parties AND the international regime should prefer to be involved in these kinds of interventions. The developments regulating jus ad bellum through jus in bello also threaten to make ’ AND result from the pressures created by Type I erosions of the separation principle. First, increasing the tax on humanitarian interventions (the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach AND language (in resolutions and the like) espousing or emphasizing humanitarian objectives. Second, the elevation of self-regarding – security and strategic – frameworks over AND international disputes exert significant influence on whether conflicts will eventually culminate in war. Third, a large body of empirical research demonstrates that states will routinely engage in AND demands for increased bellicosity, unintended security spirals, and military violence.103 Importantly, these effects may result even if one is skeptical about the power of AND states entering into disastrous military campaigns that their leaders did not initially intend.
Self-defense regime collapse causes global war—US TK legal regime key—only Congress solves international norm development
Therefore, the more likely result is that the Executive Branch, grappling with the AND prove legally fragile, destabilizing to the international political order, or both.
Effect on Domestic Law and Policy Congress’s failure to reauthorize military force would lead to bad domestic law and even worse AND be to continue to rely on the September 18, 2001, AUMF. Second, basing U.S. counterterrorism efforts on the President’s constitutional authority as AND would lack stability—confounding cooperation with allies and hindering negotiations with adversaries. There are, of course, many situations where the president’s position as Commander in AND conflict than the public might otherwise ~be~ willing to support."140 In a world without a valid AUMF, the United States could base its continued AND problems."141 Only then can the President’s efforts be sustained and legitimate. 2. Effect on the International Law of Self-Defense A failure to reauthorize military force would lead to significant negative consequences on the international AND allowing the executive to rely on a self-defense authorization alone.144 This approach also would inevitably lead to dangerous "slippery slopes." Once the President AND international law of self defense would likely lead to precisely such a result. The slippery slope problem, however, is not just limited to the United States’s AND to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos."148 Encouraging the proliferation of an expansive law of international self-defense would not only AND and rooting~ counterterrorism efforts within a more durable, legal foundation."152 Widely accepted legal arguments also facilitate cooperation from U.S. allies, especially AND , but facilitating that rationale’s destabilizing adoption by nations around the world.158
Law of armed conflict controls deterrence—collapse causes global WMD conflict
Delahunty, associate prof – U St. Thomas Law, and Yoo, law prof – UC Berkeley, ’10 (Robert and John, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 803)
Finally, the extension of IHRL to armed conflict may have significant consequences for the AND norms of distinction and the humane treatment of combatants and civilians in wartime. IHRL norms, on the other hand, may suffer from much lower rates of AND would be to adapt the legal system already specifically designed for armed conflict.
LOAC key to regulate cyber development—prevents spillover of the Stuxtnet precedent
Jeremy Richmond, J.D., March 2012, NOTE: EVOLVING BATTLEFIELDS DOES STUXNET DEMONSTRATE A NEED FOR MODIFICATIONS TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT?, 35 Fordham Int’l L.J. 842
Stuxnet almost certainly foreshadows a fundamental change in modern warfare. It demonstrates that a well-orchestrated CNA can strike a target with greater precision, greater damage to the enemy, and less collateral loss of life and property than a kinetic weapon. Will the change in warfare, ~*894~ however, be so drastic that it also necessitates a change in the LOAC? The answer appears to be both "yes" and "no." The principles of distinction, discrimination, and proportionality, when applied to Stuxnet, AND that fundamental alterations to the LOAC are not necessary to regulate cyber weapons.
Solves extinction
Guterl 12, executive editor – Scientific American, 11/28/’12 (Fred, "Armageddon 2.0," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)
The world lived for half a century with the constant specter of nuclear war and its potentially devastating consequences. The end of the Cold War took the potency out of this Armageddon scenario, yet the existential dangers have only multiplied. Today the technologies that pose some of the biggest problems are not so much military AND form the basis of our global civilization and are essential to our survival. The mistake many of us make about the darker aspects of our high-tech civilization is in thinking that we have plenty of time to address them. We may, if we’re lucky. But it’s more likely that we have less time than we think. There may be a limited window of opportunity for preventing catastrophes such as pandemics, runaway climate change, and cyber attacks on national power grids. Emerging diseases. The influenza pandemic of 2009 is a case in point. Because AND , it was already well on its way to spreading far and wide. "H1N1 caught us all with our pants down," says flu expert Robert G AND the medicines you need. Society as we know it would fall apart." Climate change. Climate is another potentially urgent risk. It’s easy to think about AND state in which the Arctic is ice-free during the summer months. Perhaps the most alarming of Lenton’s tipping points is the Indian summer monsoon. Smoke AND very different effect on the Indian summer monsoon: It makes it stronger. These two opposite influences make the fate of the monsoon difficult to predict and subject AND happens then? More than a billion people depend on the monsoon’s rains. Other tipping points may be in play, says Lenton. The West African monsoon AND change more quickly than currently projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Computer hacking. The computer industry has already made it possible for computers to handle AND currently being field tested, could hit dealer showrooms in a few years. Autonomous computers can make our lives easier and safer, but they can also make AND survive and carry out its mission even if it found itself cut off. The uranium centrifuges that Stuxnet attacked are very similar in principle to the generators that AND cause them to shake, rattle, and roll — and eventually explode. If Stuxnet-like malware were to insinuate itself into a few hundred power generators AND . Worldwide production currently amounts to only a few hundred generators per year. The consequences of going without power for months, across a large swath of the AND down, according to an analysis by Scott Borg, a cybersecurity expert.
TK self-defense norms modeled globally —- causes global war Fisk 26 Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk —- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos— PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, "Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm" 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)
Conclusion Preventive self-defense entails waging a war or an attack by choice, in AND for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, and/or precision targeting. Thus, the results of our plausibility probe provide some evidence that the global norm AND or lesser power. Research in this vein would compliment our analyses herein. With the proliferation of technology in a globalized world, it seems only a matter AND it continues to provide other states with the justification to do the same.
China models US self-defense precedent —- they’ll strike in the South China Sea Fisk 26 Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk —- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, "Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm" 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)
China Though scholars debate the strategic culture of China, the dominant view has been one AND evidence that China is buying into the norm of preventive self-defense. Indeed, a year later (in 2006), China released a national defense report AND has territorial disputes should "mentally prepare for the sounds of cannons."73 Beyond the territorial disputes, also consider the recent terrorist attacks within China and their AND though not as clear-cut as in the India and Russia cases). In each of the cases under review, the military has shifted in its orientation AND sophisticated new RMA technology, after having observed US success in this area. Alongside our analysis of state rhetoric, these changes in strategies and high-tech AND role in combat operations in Afghanistan in 2009—by borrowing American drones. Taken together, though, in terms of their position on the idea of preventive AND drones are an obvious choice for states committed to preventive self-defense.
SCS conflict causes extinction Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace 26 Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. AND —destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
1AC Solvency
Congressional limits of self-defense authority within armed conflict is necessary to resolve legal ambiguity
Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, Winter 2012, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html
In the wake of the attacks by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, AND not wise for the long-term health of the rule of law. This article traces the history of targeted killing from a U.S. perspective AND Constitution demands nothing less, but thus far, Congress’s silence is deafening. History of Targeted Killing During the Cold War, the United States used covert operations AND is declared hostile; the enemy is now targetable. Anticipatory Self-defense This paradigm shift is novel for the United States. The President’s authority to order AND , but now they are hampering its desires to target and kill terrorists. Skeptics of targeted killing admit that "~t~he decision to target specific individuals AND even some foreign governments40 is where these targeted killings can be conducted.41 According to the U.S. critics, if armed conflict between the states AND negative: the strike constituted "a clear case of extrajudicial killing."42 The Obama administration, like its predecessor, disagrees. Its legal justification for targeted AND , must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it."44 A state can act under the guise of anticipatory self-defense. This truism AND stated legal authority is self-defense? There is no clear answer. The administration is blurring the contours of the right of the state to act in Yemen under self-defense and the law of war protections afforded its soldiers when so acting. Therefore, what protections do U.S. Airmen enjoy when operating the drone that killed an individual in Yemen, Somalia, or Libya? If they are indicted by a Spanish court for murder, what is the defense AND international legal norms intersect and potentially conflict with measures stemming from domestic law.
That clarity over legal authority is necessary to solve
As noted in the introduction to this article, maintaining the separation between and independence AND of international security, and to the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. III. BLURRING THE LINES The nature of the terrorist threat the United States and other states face does indeed AND individuals by blurring the lines between the key parameters of the two paradigms. A. Location of Attacks: International Law and the Scope of the Battlefield The distinct differences between the targeting regimes in armed conflict and in self-defense AND parameters of the zone of combat in the conflict with al Qaeda.70 Traditionally, the law of neutrality provided the guiding framework for the parameters of the AND the armed conflict directly to the territory of one or more belligerent parties. The neutrality framework as a geographic parameter is left wanting in today’s conflicts with terrorist AND armies and their enemies or as police forces and their criminal adversaries.78 Simply locating terrorist groups and operatives does not therefore identify the parameters of the battlefield—the fact that the United States and other states use a combination of military operations and law enforcement measures to combat terrorism blurs the lines one might look for in defining the battlefield. In many situations, "the fight against transnational jihadi groups . . . largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield."79 Second, a look at U.S. jurisprudence in the past and today AND our country must engage if our form of government is to survive.81 In each of those cases, the United States was a belligerent in an international AND both the difference in approach and the uncertainty involved in defining today’s conflicts. The current U.S. approach of using both the armed conflict paradigm and AND and/or self-defense to cover all areas without further delineation. Second, on a broader level of legal application and interpretation, the development of AND prove detrimental in the future when it seeks sharper delineations for other purposes.
Executive "clarification" is insufficient
Laurie Blank, Emory International Humanitarian Law Clinic Director, Professor, 10/10/13, "Raid Watching" and Trying to Discern Law from Policy, today.law.utah.edu/projects/raid-watching-and-trying-to-discern-law-from-policy/
Trying to identify and understand the legal framework the United States believes is applicable to AND where does the United States believe its authority derived from this conflict reaches? On Saturday, U.S. Special Forces came ashore in Somalia and engaged AND Shabaab is a party to that armed conflict or another independent armed conflict? The reality, however, is that this latest counterterrorism operation highlights once again the conflation of law and policy that exemplifies the entire discourse about the United States conflict with al Qaeda and other U.S. counterterrorism operations as well. And that using policy to discern law is a highly risky venture. The remarkable series of public speeches by top Obama Administration legal advisors and national security AND of the conflation of law and policy and the consequences of that conflation. Policy and strategic considerations are without a doubt an essential component of understanding contemporary military operations and the application of international law. However, it is equally important to distinguish between law and policy, and to recognize when one is driving analysis versus the other. The law regarding the use of force against an individual or group outside the borders AND force is necessary and proportionate to repel or deter the attack or threat. The United States has consistently blurred these two legal justifications for the use of force AND the perspective of careful legal analysis, however, it can prove problematic. In effect, it is U.S. policy to eliminate "bad guys AND raids, capture — each situation involves its own tactical plans and twists. But do any of these specific tactical choices tell us anything in particular about whether AND and used deadly force in the process of trying to effectuate that capture. Ultimately, however, the only certain information is that the United States viewed this AND particular military mission at hand, the operational imperatives and national command policy. The fact that the operation may have had capture as its goal, if feasible AND force, but that use of force may nonetheless be robust when necessary. "Raid-watching" — trying to predict the applicable legal framework from reports AND policy for legal analysis ultimately substitutes policy’s flexibility for the law’s normative foundations.
2AC
Case
Specifically drones are patient and careful – we can minimize civilian deaths Zenko 13 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, "U.S. Drone Strike Policies", i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf?)
The U.S. use of armed drones has two unique advantages over manned AND more likely policy option compared to capturing suspected militants or other nonmilitary options.
T
The plan restricts armed conflict authority, which the AUMF is a subset of—we are a specific statute that applies to the AUMF—they are just a bad spec arg Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School, 9/1/2013, A Quick Primer on AUMFs, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/a-quick-primer-on-aumfs/
Via Ilya Somin at Volokh, I see that the administration has proffered its proposed AND some members of Congress surely will not support one that is that broad. An article that I wrote with Curt Bradley, which examined AUMFs throughout American history, provides a framework for understanding AUMFs. (And the Lawfare Wiki collects many historical AUMFs and declarations of war, here.) AUMFs can (as Bradley and I argued on pp. 2072 ff.) be broken down into five analytical components: (1) the authorized military resources; (2) the authorized methods of force; (3) the authorized targets; (4) the purpose of the use of force; and (5) the timing and procedural restrictions on the use of force Most AUMFs in U.S. History – for example, AUMFs for the AND the relatively broad AUMF that everyone knows, from September 18, 2001. Bradley and I summarized historical AUMFs as follows: This survey of authorizations to use force shows that Congress has authorized the President to AND exercised without specifying (at least implicitly) an enemy or a purpose. The primary differences between limited and broad authorizations are as follows: In limited authorizations AND broad purposes, and generally imposes few if any timing or procedural restrictions. The "war powers authority" of the President is his Commander-in-Chief authority Gallagher, Pakistan/Afghanistan coordination cell of the U.S. Joint Staff, Summer 2011 (Joseph, "Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication," Parameters, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011summer/Gallagher.pdf) First, consider the constitutional issue of power imbalance. Central to the Constitution is the foundational principle of power distribution and provisions to check and balance exercises of that power. This clearly intended separation of powers across the three branches of government ensures that no single federal officeholder can wield an inordinate amount of power or influence. The founders carefully crafted constitutional war-making authority with the branch most representative of the people—Congress.4 The Federalist Papers No. 51, "The Structure of Government Must Furnish the AND —those who would ultimately sacrifice their blood and treasure in the effort.
War powers authority refers to the President’s authority to execute warfighting operations—that includes self-defense justifications Manget, law professor at Florida State and formerly in the Office of the General Counsel at the CIA, No Date (Fred, "Presidential War Powers," http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-10-114-7/263-a1-27-box-10-114-7.pdf)
The President has constitutional authority to order defensive military action in response to aggression without AND acts in defense of the nation, he acts under war powers authority. 3. Protection of Life and Property The President also has the power to order military intervention in foreign countries to protect AND Navy and Air Force aircraft bombed the modern Barbary Coast nation of Libya. 4. Collective Security The President may also authorize military operations without prior congressional approval pursuant to collective security agreements such as NA TO or OAS treaties. Unilaterial presidential action under these agreements may be justified as necessary for the protection of national security even though hostilities occur overseas and involve allies.36 5. National Defense Power The President’s war powers authority is actually a national defense power that exists at all AND the national defense and the prosecution of national objectives through military means."39 Thus, the Executive Branch ’s constitutional war powers authority does not spring into existence when Congress declares war, nor is it dependent on there being hostilities. It empowers the President to prepare for war as well as wage it, in the broadest sense. It operates at all times. 6. Role of the Military The fundamental function of the armed forces is to fight or to be ready to AND type of hostility are based on constitutional war powers authority of the President.
"Restrictions" are on time, place, and purpose – this includes the plan Lobel, professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh, 2008 (Jules, "Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War," Ohio State Law Journal, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf)
Throughout Amebrican history, Congress has placed restrictions on the President’s power as Commander in AND subject to the control and oversight of Congress in the conduct of warfare.
Substantially is subjective Hopkins 9 Starting and Managing a Nonprofit Organization: A Legal Guide, p. google books Bruce R. Hopkins Senior Partner Polsinelli Shughart PC 700 West 47th Street, Suite 1000 Kansas City, Missouri (Cass, Clay, Jackson 26 Platte Cos.)
The* true* measure of substantiality remains elusive. In reports accompanying tax legislation AND law are too vague and thereby tend to encourage subjective and selective enforcement."
2AC Soft Law CP
Links to politics Jacob Gerson, U. Chicago Ast. Professor Law, Eric Posner, U. Chicago Law Professor, December 2008, Article: Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 573
But why is Congress’s statement credible? Maybe Congress does not really mean that it AND or other military interventions would do well to take note of the resolution.
Hard law is necessary to solve clarity for international legal regimes and norms Gregory Shaffer, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, and Mark Pollack, Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Chair, Temple University., Sept 2011, ARTICLE: HARD VERSUS SOFT LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 52 B.C. L. Rev 1147
This view of soft law as crystallizing into hard law has its parallels in the AND ," lex ferenda, which reflects the aspiration of law’s progressive development.56 This Article aims to deepen our understanding of the interaction of international legal instruments in AND and of the rival claimant, and ultimately accept or reject them.58 International law in this view is a process of making claims and responding to them. In our contemporary world of written instruments, the interaction of hard and soft law should be viewed in this light. With this background, we now turn to clarify the definition of hard and soft law, and elaborate the conventional depictions of their respective advantages and complementary interaction. We then turn to address the scope conditions under which states and other actors deploy hard and soft law as complements or antagonists, and the hypotheses derived from our theoretical framework. B. Defining Hard and Soft Law Along a Spectrum In our previous scholarship, we have demonstrated the complexities inherent in defining hard and AND illogical because law by definition cannot be "more or less binding."62 In the world of practice, however, actors are faced not with a binary AND an agreement a "harder" or "softer" legal character.65 Hard and soft law can thus be distinguished in terms of variation along a spectrum AND a "focal point" around which parties can reassess their positions.71 Although some scholars have questioned this characterization of law in terms of these three attributes AND particularly useful for our analyses of how hard and soft law interact.74 C. Hard and Soft Law as Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists This Section summarizes our existing argument about the three manners in which actors may deploy AND scholars in the field: the deliberate use of hard and soft law as antagonists.78
As Alternatives To effect specific policy goals, state and private actors increasingly turn to legal instruments AND the implications of the interaction of hard and soft law on each other. Hard law as an institutional form features a number of advantages. n80 Hard law AND are great but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high." n85
The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law AND full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official ("TopOff") exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the AND focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge AND and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem AND student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the AND that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and AND giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal ~1 AND Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount AND execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise AND but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution AND , generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – AND simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) AND many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize AND to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the AND exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during AND , while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop AND uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account AND weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might AND through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts AND , giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to AND relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives ( AND , or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law AND releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, AND the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students AND opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who AND concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the AND both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, AND greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national AND to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, AND in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model AND undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.
6) Method focus undermines scholarly action Jackson 11, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, ’11 (Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)
Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of "falsification" and AND Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can AND goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.
Meanwhile, exaggerated violence is accelerated in the larger society and now rules screen culture AND become normalized in a society that seems to take delight in dehumanizing itself.
Hyperviolence is a reality – we have a moral obligation to acknowledge it in all its horror and then act to prevent it Porter 6, Prof 26 head of the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, (Elisabeth, Hypatia 21.4, project muse)
I have explained what constitutes suffering and that attentiveness affirms dignity. I clarify further AND , 126). Attentive ethics in international relations is about priorities and choices.
LOAC does not legitimize violence—alternative is militarized violence Charles Kels, attorney for the Department of Homeland Security and a major in the Air Force Reserve, 12/6/12, THe Perilous Position of the Laws of War, harvardnsj.org/2012/12/the-perilous-position-of-the-laws-of-war/
The real nub of the current critique of U.S. policy, therefore AND words, an ad bellum argument cloaked in the language of in bello. Transnational terrorist networks LOAC is apolitical. Adherence to it does not legitimize an unlawful AND , LOAC is by far the best case scenario, not the worst. pose unique security problems, among them the need to apply preexisting legal rubrics to AND a bulwark against indiscriminate carnage, steeped in history and tried in battle.
1AR
circumvention
President believes he is constrained by statute Saikrishna Prakash 12, professor of law at the University of Virginia and Michael Ramsey, professor of law at San Diego, "The Goldilocks Executive" Feb, SSRN
We accept that the President’s lawyers search for legal arguments to justify presidential action, AND of law would trigger censure from Congress, courts, and the public.
nuke terror
Nuclear terrorism is feasible—-high risk of theft and attacks escalate Vladimir Z. Dvorkin 12 Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what_can_destroy_strategic_stability.html Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences AND a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.
solvency
Attempt to clarify legal regimes through soft law leads to unclear and muddy international norms Gregory Shaffer, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, and Mark Pollack, Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Chair, Temple University., Sept 2011, ARTICLE: HARD VERSUS SOFT LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 52 B.C. L. Rev 1147
This interaction of competing international hard and soft law has, in turn, affected AND , but a deliberate and persistent muddying of the international legal waters.175
On another front, the Wall Street Journal reports that House GOP leaders may bring AND who are supporting this bill, they are helping Republicans drive this wedge.
1/19/14
Round 1 Texas
Tournament: Texas | Round: 1 | Opponent: Kansas Khatri-Schile | Judge: Thompson 1AC PLAN The United States federal government should limit the war power authority of the president for self-defense targeted killings to outside an armed conflict. 1AC DRONES Advantage one is Drones Conflation of legal regimes for targeted killing results in overly constrained operations—undermines counterterrorism Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, J.D., 10/22/11, Self-defense Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947838
At the core of the self-defense targeting theory is the assumption that the AND ad bellum legal basis for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination.77 This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention lawtriggering equation.78 Adoption AND neutralize the impact of ad bellum legality in law applicability analysis.81 This effort rapidly became the norm of international law.82 Armed conflict analysis simply AND as irrelevant when deciding what rules apply to regulate operational and tactical execution. This aspect of ad bellum/in bello compartmentalization is not called into question by AND bellum principles indicates that these principles subsume in bello conflict regulation norms.91 There are two fundamental flaws with this conflation. First, by contradicting the traditional AND of these principles is distinct within each branch of the jus belli.94 Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum principles purportedly invoked AND these consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict regulation.98
That makes future terrorist attacks inevitable Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, 6/2/13, Corn Comments on the Costs of Shifting to a Pure Self-Defense Model, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/corn-comments-on-the-prospect-of-a-shift-to-a-pure-self-defense-model/
The President’s speech – like prior statements of other administration officials – certainly suggests that AND force) threat that will provide an analogous decisive effect in the future. It strikes me (no pun intended) that arguments – or policy choices – AND , targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America.” Relying exclusively on the inherent right of self-defense would, I suggest, AND not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.” A key advantage of the armed conflict framework is that it provides the legal maneuver AND context of an existing armed conflict than in isolated self-defense actions. It may, of course, be possible to adopt an interpretation of imminence expansive AND opposed to disable, terrorist threats, because of concerns of perceived overreach. It may be that a shift to this use of force framework is not only AND administration is unlikely to be too quick to abandon reliance on the AUMF.
Drones solve safe havens – prevents a terror attack Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida's leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm's way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida's senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida's central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan's Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden's letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military's footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
Drones are operationally effective and alternatives are worse—establishing a clear strike policy solves criticism. Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, “Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington's Weapon of Choice”, www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)
Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, AND indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.
Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, “Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment”, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html)
I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and AND the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Extinction Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
Causes US-Russia miscalc—extinction Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor and Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
1AC LEGAL REGIMES Advantage two is legal regimes US targeted killing derives authority from both armed conflict (jus in bello) and self-defense (jus ad bellum) legal regimes—that authority overlap conflates the legal regimes Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
For the past several years, the United States has relied on both armed conflict AND the implementation of the concepts of necessity and imminence, among many others. However, equally fundamental questions arise from the use of both justifications at the same AND raises significant concerns about both current implementation and future development of the law. One overarching concern is the conflation in general of jus ad bellum and jus in AND of their cause. The result: an invitation to unregulated warfare.11
Authority overlap destroys both the self-defense and armed conflict legal regimes Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
In contrast, human rights law’s requirement that force only be used as a last AND therefore every attempt must be made to capture before resorting to lethal force. In the abstract, the differences in the obligations regarding surrender and capture seem straightforward AND , and tried, those are the means which should be employed.105 The Israeli Supreme Court’s finding that targeting is only lawful if no less harmful means AND ,108 it demonstrates some of the challenges of conflating the two paradigms. First, if this added obligation of less harmful means was understood to form part AND who are lawful combatants, a result not contemplated in the LOAC.109 Second, soldiers faced with an obligation to always use less harmful means may well AND conflict, a central component of the protection of all persons in wartime. From the opposing perspective, if the armed conflict rules for capture and surrender were AND as a consequence of the broadening use of force outside of armed conflict.
This degrades the entire collective security structure resulting in widespread interstate war Craig Martin, Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law, 2011, GOING MEDIEVAL: TARGETED KILLING, SELF?DEFENSE AND THE JUS AD BELLUM REGIME, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1956141
The United States has been engaging in this practice of using drone-mounted missile AND S. justification and in accordance with the rationales developed to support it. Some of the implications of such an adjustment in the jus ad bellum regime are AND 2(4) prohibition on the use of force would be expanded. In addition, however, the targeted killing policy threatens to create other holes in AND without being subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the IHL regime. The structure of Harold Koh’s two-pronged justification similarly implies a severance of this AND against the threat or use of force under the jus ad bellum regime. This interpretation of the justifications cannot be pressed too far on the basis of the AND use of force against the states in which the groups may be operating. While the initial use of force in jus ad bellum terms is currently understood to AND system of laws designed to govern and constrain all aspects of its operation. There is a tendency in the U.S. approach to the so- AND creating the U.N. system after the Second World War.108 The premise of my argument is not that any return to past principles is inherently AND , and international armed conflict was thus far more frequent and widespread.109 The entire debate on targeted killing is so narrowly focused on the particular problems posed AND states under the pretext of self-proclaimed armed conflict with NSAs generally. We may think about each of these innovations as being related specifically to operations against AND a threat that is much less serious in the grand scheme of things.
Robust support for the impact—legal regime conflation results in uncontrollable conflict escalation Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, December 2009, CONTROLLING THE RECOURSE TO WAR BY MODIFYING JUS IN BELLO, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law / Volume 12
A substantial literature exists on the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. However, the consequences for the former side of the equation – the resort to war – is generally under-examined. Instead, academic commentary has focused on the effects of compliance with humanitarian rules in armed conflict and, in particular, the equality of application principle. In this section, I attempt to help correct that imbalance. In the following analysis, I use the (admittedly provocative) short-hand labels of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ wars. The former consists of efforts that aim to promote the general welfare of foreign populations such as humanitarian interventions and, on some accounts, peacekeeping operations. The latter – undesirable wars – include conflicts that result from security spirals that serve neither state’s interest and also include predatory acts of aggression. 4.1.1 Decreased likelihood of ‘desirable wars’ A central question in debates about humanitarian intervention is whether the international community should be AND short, all ‘interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ are affected. Two developments render desirable interventions less likely. First, consider implications of the Kosovo AND one would most want to incentivize to initiate and participate in humanitarian interventions. The second development shares many of these same consequences. Consider the implications of the AND disproportionately affect the very states that take international human rights obligations most seriously. Notably, in these cases, the disincentives might weigh most heavily on third parties AND the international regime should prefer to be involved in these kinds of interventions. The developments regulating jus ad bellum through jus in bello also threaten to make ‘ AND result from the pressures created by Type I erosions of the separation principle. First, increasing the tax on humanitarian interventions (the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach AND language (in resolutions and the like) espousing or emphasizing humanitarian objectives. Second, the elevation of self-regarding – security and strategic – frameworks over AND international disputes exert significant influence on whether conflicts will eventually culminate in war. Third, a large body of empirical research demonstrates that states will routinely engage in AND demands for increased bellicosity, unintended security spirals, and military violence.103 Importantly, these effects may result even if one is skeptical about the power of AND states entering into disastrous military campaigns that their leaders did not initially intend.
Therefore, the more likely result is that the Executive Branch, grappling with the AND prove legally fragile, destabilizing to the international political order, or both.
Effect on Domestic Law and Policy Congress’s failure to reauthorize military force would lead to bad domestic law and even worse AND be to continue to rely on the September 18, 2001, AUMF. Second, basing U.S. counterterrorism efforts on the President’s constitutional authority as AND would lack stability—confounding cooperation with allies and hindering negotiations with adversaries. There are, of course, many situations where the president’s position as Commander in AND conflict than the public might otherwise be willing to support.”140 In a world without a valid AUMF, the United States could base its continued AND problems.”141 Only then can the President’s efforts be sustained and legitimate. 2. Effect on the International Law of Self-Defense A failure to reauthorize military force would lead to significant negative consequences on the international AND allowing the executive to rely on a self-defense authorization alone.144 This approach also would inevitably lead to dangerous “slippery slopes.” Once the President AND international law of self defense would likely lead to precisely such a result. The slippery slope problem, however, is not just limited to the United States’s AND to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos.”148 Encouraging the proliferation of an expansive law of international self-defense would not only AND and rooting counterterrorism efforts within a more durable, legal foundation.”152 Widely accepted legal arguments also facilitate cooperation from U.S. allies, especially AND , but facilitating that rationale’s destabilizing adoption by nations around the world.158
Reverse causal and targeted killing is key - absent the plan global war is inevitable Fisk and Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk --- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos-- PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, “Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm” 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)
Conclusion Preventive self-defense entails waging a war or an attack by choice, in AND for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, and/or precision targeting. Thus, the results of our plausibility probe provide some evidence that the global norm AND or lesser power. Research in this vein would compliment our analyses herein. With the proliferation of technology in a globalized world, it seems only a matter AND it continues to provide other states with the justification to do the same.
Law of armed conflict controls deterrence—collapse causes global WMD conflict Delahunty, associate prof – U St. Thomas Law, and Yoo, law prof – UC Berkeley, ‘10 (Robert and John, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 803)
Finally, the extension of IHRL to armed conflict may have significant consequences for the AND norms of distinction and the humane treatment of combatants and civilians in wartime. IHRL norms, on the other hand, may suffer from much lower rates of AND would be to adapt the legal system already specifically designed for armed conflict.
A strong, adaptive LOAC regime is key to regulate inevitable autonomous weapons – the impact is global war Mark Gubrud 14, prof at UNC-Chapel Hill, was a research fellow at Princeton specializing in arms control, Stopping killer robots, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January/February 2014 vol. 70 no.1 32-42
Since the first lethal drone strike in 2001, the US use of remotely operated AND is now the most dynamic and destabilizing component of the global arms race. Drones and robots are enabled by embedded autonomous subsystems that keep engines in tune and antennas pointed at satellites, and some can navigate, walk, and maneuver in complex environments autonomously. But with few exceptions, the targeting and firing decisions of armed robotic systems remain tightly under the control of human operators. This may soon change. Autonomous weapons are robotic systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets AND attack on an adversary’s strategic forces. Autonomous weapons may fight each other. Just as the emergence of low-cost, high-performance information technology has been the most important driver of technological advance over the past half-century—including the revolution in military affairs already seen in the 1980s and displayed to the world during the 1991 Gulf War—so the emergence of artificial intelligence and autonomous robotics will likely be the most important development in both civilian and military technology to unfold over the next few decades. Proponents of autonomous weapons argue that technology will gradually take over combat decision making: AND fast, and the factors involved are too complex for real human comprehension.” Almost nobody favors a future in which humans have lost control over war machines. AND would cheat on agreements. This is the ideology of any arms race. Is autonomous warfare inevitable? Challenging the assumption of the inevitability of autonomous weapons and building on the work of AND The issue has been placed firmly on the global public and diplomatic agenda. Despite this impressive record of progress on an issue that was until recently virtually unknown AND , unrealized horror, one that some might hope will simply go away. Unless there is a strong push from civil society and from governments that have decided AND assumption that autonomous weapons will be programmed by humans is ultimately in doubt. Diplomats and public spokesmen may speak in one voice; warriors, engineers, and AND global arms race toward robotic arsenals that are increasingly out of human control. Humanitarian law vs. killer robots The public discussion launched by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has mostly centered on AND Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, 2012). The principle of distinction, as enshrined in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions AND expected from the attack. This is known as the principle of proportionality. “Losing Humanity” argues that technical limitations mean robots could not reliably distinguish civilians AND from now are unknown and highly controversial within both expert and lay communities. While it may not satisfy the reified principle of distinction, proponents of autonomous weapons AND to persuade many people that their use in weapons is a net benefit. Judgment of proportionality seems at first an even greater challenge, and some argue that AND this would be to degrade human judgment almost to the level of machines. On the other hand, IBM’s Watson computer (Ferruci et al., 2010) AND decisions that most people would judge as reasonable, most of the time. “Losing Humanity” also argues that robots, necessarily lacking emotion,2 would be unable to empathize and thus unable to accurately interpret human behavior or be affected by compassion. An important case of the latter is when soldiers refuse orders to put down rebellions. Robots would be ideal tools of repression and dictatorship. If robot soldiers become available on the world market, it is likely that repressive AND hands of dictators, both by restricting their availability and stigmatizing their use. Accountability is another much-discussed issue. Clearly, a robot cannot be held AND since a robot cannot be punished, it cannot be a legal combatant. These are some of the issues most likely to be discussed within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. However, US Defense Department policy (2012) preemptively addresses many of these issues by directing that “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” Under the US policy, commanders and operators are responsible for using autonomous weapons in AND -approves the immediate development, acquisition, and use of such weapons. Although the policy does not define “appropriate levels,” it applies this rubric even AND it to individual states to determine what levels of human judgment are appropriate. Demanding human control and responsibility As diplomatic discussions about killer robot regulation get under way, a good deal of time is apt to be lost in confusion about terms, definitions, and scope. “Losing Humanity” seeks to ban “fully autonomous weapons,” and Heyns’s report used the term “lethal autonomous robotics.” The US policy directive speaks of “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems,” and the distinction between these is ambiguous (Gubrud, 2013). The Geneva mandate is to discuss “lethal autonomous weapon systems.” Substantive questions include whether non-lethal weapons and those that target only matériel are within the scope of discussion. Legacy weapons such as simple mines may be regarded as autonomous, or distinguished as merely automatic, on grounds that their behavior is fully predictable by designers.3 Human-supervised autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, as defined by the United States, raise issues that, like fractal shapes, appear more complex the more closely they are examined. Instead of arguing about how to define what weapons should be banned, it may AND and a human has determined that it is an appropriate and legal target. A second principle is that a human commander must be responsible and accountable for the decision, and if the commander acts through another person who operates a weapon system, that person must be responsible and accountable for maintaining control of the system. “Responsible” refers here to a moral and legal obligation, and “accountable” refers to a formal system for accounting of actions. Both elements are essential to the approach. Responsibility implies that commanders and operators may not blame inadequacies of technological systems for any AND to prevent unintended engagements, the operator must refuse to operate the system. Accountability can be demonstrated by states that comply with this principle. They need only maintain records showing that each engagement was properly authorized and executed. If a violation is alleged, selected records can be unsealed in a closed inquiry conducted by an international body (Gubrud and Altmann, 2013).4 This framing, which focuses on human control and responsibility for the decision to use violent force, is both conceptually simple and morally compelling. What remains then is to set standards for adequate information to be presented to commanders, and to require positive action by operators of a weapon system. Those standards should also address any circumstances under which other parties—designers and manufacturers, for instance—might be held responsible for an unintended engagement. There is at least one exceptional circumstance in which human control may be applied less AND be delayed as long as possible to allow time for an override decision. The strategic need for robot arms control Principles of humanity may be the strongest foundation for an effective ban of autonomous weapons, but they are not necessarily the most compelling reason why a ban must be sought. The perceived military advantages of autonomy are so great that major powers are likely to strongly resist prohibition, but by the same token, autonomous weapons pose a severe threat to global peace and security. Although humans have (for now) superior capabilities for perception in complex environments and AND expensive, and their replacement by robots is expected to yield cost savings. While today’s relatively sparse use of drones, in undefended airspace, to target irregular AND the use of sea-based drones to attack targets inland as well. In a cold war, small robots could be used for covert infiltration, surveillance AND nuclear-capable and potentially unmanned, which would almost certainly mean autonomous. There can be no real game-changers in the nuclear stalemate. Yet the AND race would be global in scope, as the drone race already is. Since robots are regarded as expendable, they may be risked in provocative adventures. Recently, China has warned that if Japan makes good on threats to shoot down Chinese drones that approach disputed islands, it could be regarded as an act of war. Similarly, forward-basing of missile interceptors (Lewis and Postol, 2010) or other strategic weapons on unmanned platforms would risk misinterpretation as a signal of imminent attack, and could invite preemption. Engineering the stability of a robot confrontation would be a wickedly hard problem even for AND speed, the potential for events to spiral out of control is obvious. The way out Given the military significance of autonomous weapons, substantial pressure from civil society will be needed before the major powers will seriously consider accepting hard limits, let alone prohibition. The goal is as radical as, and no less necessary than, the control and abolition of nuclear weapons. The principle of humanity is an old concept in the law of war. It AND grounds and out of concern for the dangers of a new arms race. In the diplomatic discussions now under way, opponents of autonomous weapons should emphasize a AND has legal force in anticipation of an explicit law (Meron, 2000). Autonomous weapons are a threat to global peace and therefore a matter of concern under AND present major-power governments with an irresistible demand: Stop killer robots. 1AC SOLVENCY Congressional limits of self-defense authority within armed conflict is necessary to resolve legal ambiguity Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, Winter 2012, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html
In the wake of the attacks by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, AND not wise for the long-term health of the rule of law. This article traces the history of targeted killing from a U.S. perspective AND Constitution demands nothing less, but thus far, Congress’s silence is deafening. History of Targeted Killing During the Cold War, the United States used covert operations AND is declared hostile; the enemy is now targetable. Anticipatory Self-defense This paradigm shift is novel for the United States. The President’s authority to order AND , but now they are hampering its desires to target and kill terrorists. Skeptics of targeted killing admit that “the decision to target specific individuals AND even some foreign governments40 is where these targeted killings can be conducted.41 According to the U.S. critics, if armed conflict between the states AND negative: the strike constituted “a clear case of extrajudicial killing.”42 The Obama administration, like its predecessor, disagrees. Its legal justification for targeted AND , must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.”44 A state can act under the guise of anticipatory self-defense. This truism AND stated legal authority is self-defense? There is no clear answer. The administration is blurring the contours of the right of the state to act in Yemen under self-defense and the law of war protections afforded its soldiers when so acting. Therefore, what protections do U.S. Airmen enjoy when operating the drone that killed an individual in Yemen, Somalia, or Libya? If they are indicted by a Spanish court for murder, what is the defense AND international legal norms intersect and potentially conflict with measures stemming from domestic law.
Clear delineation of legal authority is key to solve Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
As noted in the introduction to this article, maintaining the separation between and independence AND of international security, and to the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. III. BLURRING THE LINES The nature of the terrorist threat the United States and other states face does indeed AND individuals by blurring the lines between the key parameters of the two paradigms. A. Location of Attacks: International Law and the Scope of the Battlefield The distinct differences between the targeting regimes in armed conflict and in self-defense AND parameters of the zone of combat in the conflict with al Qaeda.70 Traditionally, the law of neutrality provided the guiding framework for the parameters of the AND the armed conflict directly to the territory of one or more belligerent parties. The neutrality framework as a geographic parameter is left wanting in today’s conflicts with terrorist AND armies and their enemies or as police forces and their criminal adversaries.78 Simply locating terrorist groups and operatives does not therefore identify the parameters of the battlefield—the fact that the United States and other states use a combination of military operations and law enforcement measures to combat terrorism blurs the lines one might look for in defining the battlefield. In many situations, “the fight against transnational jihadi groups . . . largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield.”79 Second, a look at U.S. jurisprudence in the past and today AND our country must engage if our form of government is to survive.81 In each of those cases, the United States was a belligerent in an international AND both the difference in approach and the uncertainty involved in defining today’s conflicts. The current U.S. approach of using both the armed conflict paradigm and AND and/or self-defense to cover all areas without further delineation. Second, on a broader level of legal application and interpretation, the development of AND prove detrimental in the future when it seeks sharper delineations for other purposes.
Keeping action within the executive is the problem with the squo Laurie Blank, Emory International Humanitarian Law Clinic Director, Professor, 10/10/13, “Raid Watching” and Trying to Discern Law from Policy, today.law.utah.edu/projects/raid-watching-and-trying-to-discern-law-from-policy/
Trying to identify and understand the legal framework the United States believes is applicable to AND where does the United States believe its authority derived from this conflict reaches? On Saturday, U.S. Special Forces came ashore in Somalia and engaged AND Shabaab is a party to that armed conflict or another independent armed conflict? The reality, however, is that this latest counterterrorism operation highlights once again the conflation of law and policy that exemplifies the entire discourse about the United States conflict with al Qaeda and other U.S. counterterrorism operations as well. And that using policy to discern law is a highly risky venture. The remarkable series of public speeches by top Obama Administration legal advisors and national security AND of the conflation of law and policy and the consequences of that conflation. Policy and strategic considerations are without a doubt an essential component of understanding contemporary military operations and the application of international law. However, it is equally important to distinguish between law and policy, and to recognize when one is driving analysis versus the other. The law regarding the use of force against an individual or group outside the borders AND force is necessary and proportionate to repel or deter the attack or threat. The United States has consistently blurred these two legal justifications for the use of force AND the perspective of careful legal analysis, however, it can prove problematic. In effect, it is U.S. policy to eliminate “bad guys AND raids, capture — each situation involves its own tactical plans and twists. But do any of these specific tactical choices tell us anything in particular about whether AND and used deadly force in the process of trying to effectuate that capture. Ultimately, however, the only certain information is that the United States viewed this AND particular military mission at hand, the operational imperatives and national command policy. The fact that the operation may have had capture as its goal, if feasible AND force, but that use of force may nonetheless be robust when necessary. “Raid-watching” — trying to predict the applicable legal framework from reports AND policy for legal analysis ultimately substitutes policy’s flexibility for the law’s normative foundations.
2AC A2: SLOANE This is aff uniqueness – the plan’s delineation solves – this is the conclusion they are the intro Sloane 9 (Robert, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2009, “The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War,” Yale Journal of International law, http://www.yale.edu/yjil/files_PDFs/vol34/Sloane)
V. CONCLUSION: THE DUALISTIC AXIOM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Law can AND especially proportionality, with far more analytic rigor than it has to date. --2AC IMPACT XT Autonomous systems make war obsolete - aggression becomes too costly Arquilla 13 John Arquilla is professor of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Foreign Policy, June 19, 2013, "Could Killer Robots Bring World Peace?", http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/19/could_killer_robots_bring_world_peace?page=full
Lethal robots have been making progress in the real world as well. One of AND patch of green foliage surrounded by the most militarized turf on the planet. Clearly, 21st century military affairs are already being driven by the quest to blend AND directions at the same time -- at least in the United States military. All this means that the moratorium Christof Heyns called for is likely to be dead AND will make occasional mistakes -- just as humans always have and always will. As to Heyns's worry that war will become too attractive if it can be waged AND and sustain an edge in military robots might have the ultimate peacekeeping capability. Think of Gort and his fellow alien robots from the original Day the Earth Stood Still movie. As Klaatu, his humanoid partner, makes clear to the people of Earth, his alliance of planets had placed their security in the hands of robots programmed to annihilate any among them who would break the peace. A good use of lethal robots for a greater humane purpose. 2AC WPA/CIC The plan restricts armed conflict authority, which the AUMF is a subset of—we are a specific statute that applies to the AUMF—they are just a bad spec arg Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School, 9/1/2013, A Quick Primer on AUMFs, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/a-quick-primer-on-aumfs/
Via Ilya Somin at Volokh, I see that the administration has proffered its proposed AND some members of Congress surely will not support one that is that broad. An article that I wrote with Curt Bradley, which examined AUMFs throughout American history, provides a framework for understanding AUMFs. (And the Lawfare Wiki collects many historical AUMFs and declarations of war, here.) AUMFs can (as Bradley and I argued on pp. 2072 ff.) be broken down into five analytical components: (1) the authorized military resources; (2) the authorized methods of force; (3) the authorized targets; (4) the purpose of the use of force; and (5) the timing and procedural restrictions on the use of force Most AUMFs in U.S. History – for example, AUMFs for the AND the relatively broad AUMF that everyone knows, from September 18, 2001. Bradley and I summarized historical AUMFs as follows: This survey of authorizations to use force shows that Congress has authorized the President to AND exercised without specifying (at least implicitly) an enemy or a purpose. The primary differences between limited and broad authorizations are as follows: In limited authorizations AND broad purposes, and generally imposes few if any timing or procedural restrictions. AND—we have to meet because we specify “war power authority” The “war powers authority” of the President is his Commander-in-Chief authority Gallagher, Pakistan/Afghanistan coordination cell of the U.S. Joint Staff, Summer 2011 (Joseph, “Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication,” Parameters, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011summer/Gallagher.pdf) First, consider the constitutional issue of power imbalance. Central to the Constitution is the foundational principle of power distribution and provisions to check and balance exercises of that power. This clearly intended separation of powers across the three branches of government ensures that no single federal officeholder can wield an inordinate amount of power or influence. The founders carefully crafted constitutional war-making authority with the branch most representative of the people—Congress.4 The Federalist Papers No. 51, “The Structure of Government Must Furnish the AND —those who would ultimately sacrifice their blood and treasure in the effort.
War powers authority refers to the President’s authority to execute warfighting operations—that includes self-defense justifications Manget, law professor at Florida State and formerly in the Office of the General Counsel at the CIA, No Date (Fred, “Presidential War Powers,” http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-10-114-7/263-a1-27-box-10-114-7.pdf)
The President has constitutional authority to order defensive military action in response to aggression without AND acts in defense of the nation, he acts under war powers authority. 3. Protection of Life and Property The President also has the power to order military intervention in foreign countries to protect AND Navy and Air Force aircraft bombed the modern Barbary Coast nation of Libya. 4. Collective Security The President may also authorize military operations without prior congressional approval pursuant to collective security agreements such as NA TO or OAS treaties. Unilaterial presidential action under these agreements may be justified as necessary for the protection of national security even though hostilities occur overseas and involve allies.36 5. National Defense Power The President's war powers authority is actually a national defense power that exists at all AND the national defense and the prosecution of national objectives through military means."39 Thus, the Executive Branch 's constitutional war powers authority does not spring into existence when Congress declares war, nor is it dependent on there being hostilities. It empowers the President to prepare for war as well as wage it, in the broadest sense. It operates at all times. 6. Role of the Military The fundamental function of the armed forces is to fight or to be ready to AND type of hostility are based on constitutional war powers authority of the President. 2AC SELF-RESTRAINT Object fiat is a voter – avoids the core question of pres powers by fiating away obama’s behavior in the squo – justifies the end war cp which means the neg wins every debate – it’s not in the lit which is key Hansen 12 (Victor, Professor of Law, New England Law, New England Law Review, Vol. 46, pp. 27-36, 2011, “Predator Drone Attacks”, February 22, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009313, PDF, ZBurdette)
Any checks on the President’s use of drone attacks must come domestically. In the domestic arena the two options are either the courts or Congress. As discussed above, the courts are institutionally unsuited and incapable of providing appropriate oversight. Congress is the branch with the constitutional authority, historical precedent, and institutional capacity to exercise meaningful and effective oversight of the President’s actions.
Causes a congressional firestorm and laws in the opposite direction of the XO Hallowell 13 Billy Hallowell, staff writer, Citing William Howell, a political science professor at the University of Chicago and the author of “Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action", and citing John Woolley, co-director of the American Presidency Project at the University of California in Santa Barbara, The Blaze, February 11, 2013, "HERE’S HOW OBAMA IS USING EXECUTIVE POWER TO BYPASS LEGISLATIVE PROCESS", http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/11/heres-how-obamas-using-executive-power-to-bylass-legislative-process-plus-a-brief-history-of-executive-orders/
“In an era of polarized parties and a fragmented Congress, the opportunities to legislate are few and far between,” Howell said. “So presidents have powerful incentive to go it alone. And they do.” And the political opposition howls. Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., a possible contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, said that on the gun-control front in particular, Obama is “abusing his power by imposing his policies via executive fiat instead of allowing them to be debated in Congress.” The Republican reaction is to be expected, said John Woolley, co-director of the American Presidency Project at the University of California in Santa Barbara. “For years there has been a growing concern about unchecked executive power,” Woolley said. “It tends to have a partisan content, with contemporary complaints coming from the incumbent president’s opponents.” The power isn’t limitless, as was demonstrated when Obama issued one of his first executive orders, calling for closing the military prison at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba and trying suspected terrorists housed there in federal courts instead of by special military tribunals. Congress stepped in to prohibit moving any Guantanamo prisoners to the U.S., effectively blocking Obama’s plan to shutter the jail.
2AC COMISSIONS Defense reviews don’t lead to implementation Peter Buxbaum, International Relations and Security Network, 2010, The Pentagon’s Defense Review Trap, www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=enandid=110915
The Washington defense and contracting communities are anxiously awaiting next month's release of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn, in a speech in New York last month, promised the report would be driven by current Afghanistan and Iraq war needs, placing an emphasis on ground troops and counterinsurgency operations and less on the modernization of weapons systems. If that proves to be the case, it would amount to a Pentagon about-face since the last QDR, released in 2006, which had a rather short shelf life. The last edition was replete with proposals for spending on a laundry list of military modernization programs, much of which were to be scrapped or scaled back after the Department of Defense decided a year later to increase ground troop strength and emphasize counterinsurgency operations. The fiasco associated with the last QDR may be explainable, at least in part, on the change of leadership at the Pentagon. Donald Rumsfeld was pushed out as secretary of defense and his replacement, Robert Gates, who continues to serve in the Obama administration after having been appointed by George W Bush, emphasized planning for the wars the US was actually fighting instead the wars Rumsfeld would have liked the US to be fighting. Somewhere between strategy and reality But observers fret that a gap between strategy and reality has become embedded in the QDR process, and that the 2010 edition will be no different. The QDR was instituted in the late 1990s with the admirable purpose of institutionalizing strategic thinking among Department of Defense echelons. "QDRs help Secretaries of Defense to set out their strategic vision for the department, and better align the military posture with the strategy," Jim Thomas, vice president for strategic studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a non-partisan Washington think tank, told ISN Security Watch. But "the results of QDRs have been mixed." Why? "Past QDRs have generally done a better job of articulating strategic approaches than aligning the military posture - investments, force structure, basing - with the strategy," Thomas explained. "There are powerful institutional forces in the military, Congress and industry supporting status quo investment programs and force structures, but there are rarely strong countervailing forces for new program starts or developing new types of forces." Indeed, there is a school of thought that believes that the QDR as a strategic planning tool is doomed to failure. A report recently released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a bipartisan Washington think tank, concluded that the goals of the QDR - to serve as a means to develop new policies, capabilities and initiatives - "have so far been unrealized." The report is less than optimistic that the 2010 QDR will turn things around. "The issues the QDR must address have been greatly complicated by the Department of Defense’s past failures to develop effective plans, programs, and budgets; carry out effective systems analysis; develop credible cost estimates; and create timely and meaningful future year defense plans," the report said. "Past reviews have been decoupled from meaningful budget figures, realistic force plans, honest procurement decisions, and metrics to measure the success of their recommendations. As a result of this strategy-reality gap between concepts and resources, they have had limited practical value." ? Delay is a solvency deficit - Now’s the make it or break it for norm-development Kenneth Anderson 13, professor of international law at Washington College of Law, American University, and visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Matthew Waxman, a professor of law at Columbia Law School and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/9/13, Law and Ethics for Autonomous weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can, http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/144241
Where in this long history of new weapons and attempts to regulate them ethically and AND to autonomy mean, if anything, to the legal and ethical concerns? One answer to these questions is to wait and see: it is too early AND questions of law and ethics even at their current research and development stage. This is the time—before technologies and weapons development have become “hardened” AND defend a framework for evaluating them that advances simultaneously strategic and moral interests. A recent and widely circulated report from the British Ministry of Defense on the future AND unintended autonomous functions (perhaps in how it interoperates with other systems).21
2AC TPA Obama not spending capital on TPA Phil Levy, Foreign Policy, 1/29/14, Is Obama even trying on trade, shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/29/is_obama_even_trying_on_trade
The president faces an enormous challenge on trade. He has built much of his Asian foreign policy around the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and much of his European foreign policy around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In each case, he did so on the promise to our international partners -- explicit or implicit -- that he would sooner or later bring Congress around. It is now later. The TPP was nominally to conclude last year. Other AND Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-MT), off to Beijing. In the House, members of the president's party have voiced skepticism about what trade AND mistaken. Instead, here was the sum total of the president's pitch: "...when 98 percent of our exporters are small businesses, new trade partnerships with Europe and the Asia-Pacific will help them create even more jobs. We need to work together on tools like bipartisan trade promotion authority to protect our workers, protect our environment and open new markets to new goods stamped 'Made in the USA.'" Even had the president made this statement at the beginning of last summer, when AND does it mean when we run a trade deficit and imports exceed exports?). Not only did the president fail to make much of a sales pitch, but AND simply fall into its lap without much expenditure of effort or political capital. Success on the trade front was going to require experienced leadership in the Congress and a concerted public and private persuasion campaign from the President. Instead, the last month has brought the removal of an irreplaceable Capitol Hill proponent and noncommittal nods from the White House. This does not bode well.
Reid blocks and Obama not actually pushing James Polti, Financial Times, 1/30/14, Top Democrat puts Obama trade deals in doubt, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bf61f75a-88a1-11e3-bb5f-00144feab7de.html#axzz2sT74OPia
President Barack Obama’s push to strike trade deals with the European Union and 11 Pacific AND That will keep the momentum, also on this side of the pond.”
PC fails, and the plan isn’t necessary for GOP obstruction The Economist, 1/30/14, Clowns to the left, jokers to the right, www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/01/barack-obama
I find this argument unpersuasive. Ed Luce made the key point a year and AND lost, squandered political capital, and mired his party in the mud.
Today President Barack Obama finally joins the national debate he called for a long time AND he is willing to spend in the months ahead to defend his policies.
Plan doesn’t cost capital Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 59-60
Presidents and politicos alike have long recognized Congress's ability to reduce the political costs that AND .S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution."36 Obamacare outweighs AND solves the link – it determines PC and the survival of every agenda item Sean Sullivan 12-23, Washington Post, Joe Manchin’s Obamacare fears — and why they matter, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/12/23/joe-manchins-obamacare-fears-and-why-they-matter/
That of course, is a sort of worst-case-scenario view. But preparing for the worst possible scenario is what red and swing state Democrats like Manchin will be doing throughout the course of the next year. If problems with the health-care law continue, you will start to hear Democrats from states in which Obama is unpopular distance themselves even more from him. If the law’s image improves, you will hear less of that. And that will mean more political capital for Obama to address issues like the economy — or maybe even immigration. Then, Republicans eager to shepherd immigration reform may grow increasingly open to working with the president on a modest bill that meets his requirements. And there may be more common fiscal ground to be found for congressional Republicans and the White House — some of which was paved in the bipartisan budget plan that passed this year. But for now at least, the health-care law looks to remain the dominant issue. And how it proceeds headed into the new year will determine a lot, even on issues that have nothing to do with health care.
No trade agenda—not spending capital effectively James Politi, Finacial Times, 1/5/13, Obama challenge on selling trade deals to resurgent left, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ae053274-7604-11e3-b028-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2pf2zyet3
Mr Obama is likely to reprise the themes from that speech in his State of AND and one of his missions for 2014 will be to reconcile the two.
No brink and no now key argument Ikenson 9 (Daniel, associate director for the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” 3/12, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-037.html
A Little Perspective, Please Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism AND what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive,"
even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates AND far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.
1AR President believes he is constrained by statute Saikrishna Prakash 12, professor of law at the University of Virginia and Michael Ramsey, professor of law at San Diego, “The Goldilocks Executive” Feb, SSRN
We accept that the President’s lawyers search for legal arguments to justify presidential action, AND of law would trigger censure from Congress, courts, and the public. 1AR---QDR SOLVENCY DEFICIT Won’t change DoD’s preference for squo policy Erin K. Fitzgerald, and Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, 8/27/2009, THE 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: A+, F, OR DEAD ON ARRIVAL?, http://csis.org/files/publication/090809_qdrahc_revised.pdf
Still, this survey shows that the Department of Defense’s QDRs to date have been AND public policy that Department has so far violated with grim and consistent determination. The Pentagon has been conducting Quadrennial Defense Reviews since early in the Clinton administration. AND the 1993 BUR is included), the process is stagnant and barely useful.
Doesn’t cause follow on Erin K. Fitzgerald, and Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, 8/27/2009, THE 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: A+, F, OR DEAD ON ARRIVAL?, http://csis.org/files/publication/090809_qdrahc_revised.pdf
Like its two predecessors, the 2005 QDR was decoupled from a real world force AND to be made between major increases in the budget and current force plans.
The CP is literally pointless Rebecca Grant, Air Force Magazine, April 2011, On QDRs, www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2011/April 2011/0411qdr.aspx
The QDR’s purpose is noble. According to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the goal of the QDR is to delineate a military strategy consistent with the most recent national security strategy, define the defense programs to successfully execute the full range of missions assigned to the military by that strategy, and identify the budget plan necessary to successfully execute those missions at a low-to-moderate level of risk. Yet the QDR is not a beloved beast. "Every QDR disappoints," said Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments expert Jim Thomas in February 2010. "Appetites are way too great for what the QDR delivers," said Mark A. Gunzinger, who worked on three QDRs and is now also at CSBA. Longtime Center for Strategic and International Studies analyst Anthony H. Cordesman heaped the most AND or FYDP, and with no metrics to measure or determine its success."
1AR OVERVIEW Data disproves hegemony impacts Fettweis, 11 Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO
It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship AND , one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more AND analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U. AND back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or AND , which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other AND global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze AND worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession.
Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the AND almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions ( AND example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.
Wyden blocks fast track Cicki Needham, 2/6/14, Sen. Wyden says not so fast on trade, thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/trade/197610-sen-wyden-says-not-so-fast-on-trade
The next chairman of the Senate Finance Committee is making it plain to President Obama AND by preventing them from being amended and installing time limits on congressional consideration.
Wyden blocks fast track Cicki Needham, 2/6/14, Sen. Wyden says not so fast on trade, thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/trade/197610-sen-wyden-says-not-so-fast-on-trade
The next chairman of the Senate Finance Committee is making it plain to President Obama AND by preventing them from being amended and installing time limits on congressional consideration. Fast track won’t happen Alexander Bolton, 1/29/14, Reid shunts TPA onto slow track, thehill.com/homenews/senate/196853-reid-rejects-obamas-plea-for-trade-power
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) on Wednesday suggested he will AND the communities where we have not been. That’s a handicap of ours.” NSA sapped his capital—he’s not getting it back Adam Bistagne, Los Angeles Loyolan, 2/3/14, State of the Union address falls short, www.laloyolan.com/opinion/state-of-the-union-address-falls-short/article_37260576-8c4c-11e3-afb2-001a4bcf6878.html
In 2013, a slew of problems damaged the Obama Administration: the National Security Agency (NSA) leaks by Edward Snowden, health care rollout errors and a U-6 unemployment rate that’s still over 13 percent. Obama’s 2013 was so dreadful that Julie Pace of the Associated Press asked Obama whether 2013 had been the worst year of his presidency at a White House press conference. Obama’s State of the Union address was the first opportunity to change the tone for the coming year, to dig his feet into the ground and sway the national conversation. I think Obama’s address failed to meet these goals and instead highlighted the flaws of his time of office. The speech was Obama’s chance to say something significant about Edward Snowden, yet he missed his opportunity. Obama had a chance to reconcile abuses of privacy with a proposal to grant Snowden amnesty. Such a 180-turn on an issue fraught with serious domestic and international problems would have helped Obama reestablish his credibility. For American citizens, it would have provided us with some hope that our informational AND States trade deal negotiations have also been seriously derailed by the NSA fiasco. Only a bold, decisive move by Obama would have given him even a slight AND with political capital necessary to get Congress back working, if only somewhat.
Status quo administration policy delineates between geographic zones, but our legal justification for war everywhere remains in place Anthony Dworkin 13, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, "Drones And Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position", July, http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf
Two further points are worth noting. First, the administration has acknowledged that in AND the plans and capabilities of al-Qaeda and its associated forces".27 However, the details that have emerged about US targeting practices in the past few AND set an expansive precedent that is damaging to the international rule of law. Obama’s new policy on drones It is against this background that Obama’s recent counterterrorism speech and the policy directive he AND appeared to say that it might continue for 10 to 20 years.30 Second, the day before his speech, Obama set out regulations for drone strikes AND "near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed". In some respects, these standards remain unclear: the president did not specify how AND strikes will continue in the Pakistani tribal areas for the time being.33 However, the impact of the new policy will depend very much on how the AND that the level of attacks is hardly diminishing under the new guidelines.35 It is also notable that the new standards announced by Obama represent a policy decision AND to serve as a precedent for other states that wish to claim it.
The proliferation of drone technology has moved well beyond the control of the United States AND unmanned aerial vehicles. Not toys or models, but real flying machines. It’s a classic and common phase in the life cycle of a military innovation: AND the United States; it’s a precedent Washington does not want anyone following. America, the world’s leading democracy and a country built on a legal and moral framework unlike any other, has adopted a war-making process that too often bypasses its traditional, regimented, and rigorously overseen military in favor of a secret program never publicly discussed, based on legal advice never properly vetted. The Obama administration has used its executive power to refuse or outright ignore requests by congressional overseers, and it has resisted monitoring by federal courts. To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the AND -states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order. Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out AND learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention AND uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation. THE WRONG QUESTION The United States is the indisputable leader in drone technology and long-range strike AND billions of dollars that have gone into establishing and maintaining such a capability. That level of superiority leads some national security officials to downplay concerns about other nations’ AND the unparalleled intelligence-collection and data-analysis underpinning the aircraft’s mission. "There is what I think is just an unconstrained focus on a tool as AND who are interpreting the information that’s coming off the sensors on the aircraft." The analysts are part of the global architecture that makes precision strikes, and targeted AND ) outweigh the reward (judged by the value of the threat eliminated). "Is that a shovel or a rifle? Is that a Taliban member or AND . We can orbit long enough to be pretty sure about our target." Other countries, groups, and even individuals can and do fly drones. But no state or group has nearly the sophisticated network of intelligence and data analysis that gives the United States its strategic advantage. Although it would be foolish to dismiss the notion that potential U.S. adversaries aspire to attain that type of war-from-afar, pinpoint-strike capability, they have neither the income nor the perceived need to do so. That’s true, at least today. It’s also irrelevant. Others who employ drones are likely to carry a different agenda, one more concerned with employing a relatively inexpensive and ruthlessly efficient tool to dispatch an enemy close at hand. "It would be very difficult for them to create the global-strike architecture AND long-duration surveillance and potentially strike inside and right on its border." And that’s a NATO ally seeking the capability to conduct missions that would run afoul AND uses the aircraft to strike Lashkar-e-Taiba militants near Kashmir? "We don’t like other states using lethal force outside their borders. It’s destabilizing. It can lead to a sort of wider escalation of violence between two states," said Micah Zenko, a security policy and drone expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. "So the proliferation of drones is not just about the protection of the United States. It’s primarily about the likelihood that other states will increasingly use lethal force outside of their borders." LOWERING THE BAR Governments have covertly killed for ages, whether they maintained an official hit list or AND American security experts point to Russia as well, although Moscow disputes this. In the 1960s, the U.S. government was involved to differing levels AND late as 2001, Washington’s stated policy was to oppose Israel’s targeted killings.) When America adopted targeted killing again—first under the Bush administration after the September 11 attacks and then expanded by President Obama—the tools of the trade had changed. No longer was the CIA sending poison, pistols, and toxic cigars to assets overseas to kill enemy leaders. Now it could target people throughout al-Qaida’s hierarchy with accuracy, deliver lethal ordnance literally around the world, and watch the mission’s completion in real time. The United States is smartly using technology to improve combat efficacy, and to make AND , defense hawks and spendthrifts alike would criticize it if it did not. "If you believe that these folks are legitimate terrorists who are committing acts of AND Do we have the debate if an aircraft pilot drops a particular bomb?" But defense analysts argue—and military officials concede—there is a qualitative difference AND States would not have pursued an equivalent number of manned strikes in Pakistan. And what’s true for the United States will be true as well for other countries that own and arm remote piloted aircraft. "The drones—the responsiveness, the persistence, and without putting your personnel at risk—is what makes it a different technology," Zenko said. "When other states have this technology, if they follow U.S. practice, it will lower the threshold for their uses of lethal force outside their borders. So they will be more likely to conduct targeted killings than they have in the past." The Obama administration appears to be aware of and concerned about setting precedents through its targeted-strike program. When the development of a disposition matrix to catalog both targets and resources marshaled against the United States was first reported in 2012, officials spoke about it in part as an effort to create a standardized process that would live beyond the current administration, underscoring the long duration of the counterterrorism challenge. Indeed, the president’s legal and security advisers have put considerable effort into establishing rules AND lead somebody to be subject for an engagement by the United States government." BEHIND CLOSED DOORS The argument against public debate is easy enough to understand: Operational secrecy is necessary AND public debate, which is going to be a hard one to win." But by keeping legal and policy positions secret, only partially sharing information even with congressional oversight committees, and declining to open a public discussion about drone use, the president and his team are asking the world to just trust that America is getting this right. While some will, many people, especially outside the United States, will see that approach as hypocritical, coming from a government that calls for transparency and the rule of law elsewhere. "I know these people, and I know how much they really, really AND would be giving you a different rendering, and much more uncertain rendering." That’s only part of the problem with the White House’s trust-us approach. AND ) an imminent threat of violent attack 5) against the United States. But that’s not who is being targeted. Setting aside the administration’s redefining of "imminence" beyond all recognition, the majority AND States (another precedent that might be eagerly seized upon in the future). U.S. defense and intelligence officials reject any suggestion that the targets are AND new Secretary of State John Kerry criticized during his confirmation hearing this year. Human-rights groups might be loudest in their criticism of both the program and AND by principles and rules of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights." PEER PRESSURE Obama promised in his 2013 State of the Union to increase the drone program’s transparency AND of the legal memos the Justice Department drafted in support of targeted killing. But, beyond that, it’s not certain Obama will do anything more to shine light on this program. Except in situations where leaks help it tell a politically expedient story of its skill at killing bad guys, the administration has done little to make a case to the public and the world at large for its use of armed drones. Already, what’s become apparent is that the White House is not interested in changing AND largely off the table now, according to intelligence officials and committee members. Under discussion within the administration and on Capitol Hill is a potential program takeover by AND provide no guarantee of greater transparency for the public, or even Congress. And if the administration is not willing to share with lawmakers who are security-cleared to know, it certainly is not prepared to engage in a sensitive discussion, even among allies, that might begin to set the rules on use for a technology that could upend stability in already fragile and strategically significant places around the globe. Time is running out to do so. "The history of technology development like this is, you never maintain your lead very long. Somebody always gets it," said David Berteau, director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "They’re going to become cheaper. They’re going to become easier. They’re going to become interoperable," he said. "The destabilizing effects are very, very serious." Berteau is not alone. Zenko, of the Council on Foreign Relations, has AND angles on this question are why you see them in conflict right now." That’s in part a symptom of the "technological optimism" that often plagues the U.S. security community when it establishes a lead over its competitors, noted Georgetown University’s Kai-Henrik Barth. After the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States was sure it would be decades before the Soviets developed a nuclear-weapon capability. It took four years. With drones, the question is how long before the dozens of states with the AND nations have gone down the pathway of first only surveillance and then arming." The opportunity to write rules that might at least guide, if not restrain, AND —to be closer to certain that their target is the right one. But even without raising standards, tightening up drone-specific restrictions in the standing AND , or 15 years—might find helpful in arguing against another’s actions. A not-insignificant faction of U.S. defense and intelligence experts, AND some weapons, including land mines, blinding lasers, and nuclear bombs. Arguably more significant than spotty legal regimes, however, is the behavior of the AND policy that it did most recently on "enhanced interrogation" of terrorists. The case against open, transparent rule-making is that it might only hamstring AND operations manual for other nations but a legal and moral one as well.
Geographic restrictions are key Rosa Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation, 4/23/13, The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf
Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn now to the legal framework applicable AND requirements as the use of other lawful means and methods of warfare.28 But if drones used in traditional armed conflicts or traditional self-defense situations present no "new" legal issues, some of the activities and policies enabled and facilitated by drone technologies pose significant challenges to existing legal frameworks. As I have discussed above, the availability of perceived low cost of drone technologies AND traditional or "hot" battlefields that their use challenges existing legal frameworks. Law is almost always out of date: we make legal rules based on existing AND is on the verge of doing significant damage to the rule of law. A. The Rule of Law At root, the idea of "rule of law" is fairly simple, AND processes and rules that reflect basic notions of justice, humanity and fairness. Precisely what constitutes a fair process is debatable, but most would agree that at AND Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a party. In ordinary circumstances, this bundle of universally acknowledged rights (together with international law AND States government called this an act of murder—an unlawful political assassination. B. Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict Of course, sometimes the "ordinary" legal rules do not apply. In AND the principles of necessity, humanity, proportionality,29 and distinction.30 It is worth briefly explaining these principles. The principle of necessity requires parties to AND in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Finally, the principle of discrimination or distinction requires that parties to a conflict direct their actions only against combatants and military objectives, and take appropriate steps to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.31 This is a radical oversimplification of a very complex body of law.32 But AND by military necessity34 — but there are far fewer constraints on state behavior. Technically, the law of war is referred to using the Latin term "lex specialis" – special law. It is applicable in—and only in — special circumstances (in this case, armed conflict), and in those special circumstances, it supersedes "ordinary law," or "lex generalis," the "general law" that prevails in peacetime. We have one set of laws for "normal" situations, and another, more flexible set of laws for "extraordinary" situations, such as armed conflicts. None of this poses any inherent problem for the rule of law. Having one body of rules that tightly restricts the use of force and another body of rules that is far more permissive does not fundamentally undermine the rule of law, as long as we have a reasonable degree of consensus on what circumstances trigger the "special" law, and as long as the "special law" doesn’t end up undermining the general law. To put it a little differently, war, with its very different rules, AND , and between places where there’s war and places where there’s no war. Let me return now to the question of drones and targeted killings. When all AND Libyan military targets is no more controversial than the use of manned aircraft. That is because our core rule of law concerns have mostly been satisfied: we AND in the event of error or abuse (the various governments involved).35 Once you take targeted killings outside hot battlefields, it’s a different story. The AND any time — with regard to any person the administration deems a combatant. The trouble is, no one outside a very small group within the US executive AND of the time, the US will not even officially acknowledge targeted killings. This leaves all the key rule-of-law questions related to the ongoing AND determinations, and what is the precise chain of command for such decisions? I think the rule of law problem here is obvious: when "armed conflict AND are they, as some human rights groups have argued, unlawful murder? C. Targeted Killing and the International Law of Self-Defense When faced with criticisms of the law of war framework as a justification for targeted AND that the defensive force used is otherwise consistent with law of war principles. Like law of war-based arguments, this general principle is superficially uncontroversial: if someone overseas is about to launch a nuclear weapon at New York City, no one can doubt that the United States has a perfect right (and the president has a constitutional duty) to use force if needed to prevent that attack, regardless of the attacker’s nationality. But once again, the devil is in the details. To start with, what constitutes an "imminent" threat? Traditionally, both international law and domestic criminal law understand that term narrowly: 37 to be "imminent," a threat cannot be distant or speculative.38 But much like the Bush Administration before it, the Obama Administration has put forward an interpretation of the word "imminent" that bears little relation to traditional legal concepts. According to a leaked 2011 Justice Department white paper39—the most detailed legal justification that has yet become public— the requirement of imminence "does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future." This seems, in itself, like a substantial departure from accepted international law definitions of imminence. But the White Paper goes even further, stating that "certain members of al AND identity or status (a familiar part of the law of armed conflict). That concept of imminence has been called Orwellian, and although that is an overused epithet, in this context it seems fairly appropriate. According to the Obama Administration, "imminent" no longer means "immediate," and in fact the very absence of clear evidence indicating specific present or future attack plans becomes, paradoxically, the basis for assuming that attack may perpetually be "imminent." The 2011 Justice Department White Paper notes that the use of force in self-defense must comply with general law of war principles of necessity, proportionality, humanity, and distinction. The White Paper offers no guidance on the specific criteria for determining when an individual is a combatant (or a civilian participating directly in hostilities), however. It also offers no guidance on how to determine if a use of force is necessary or proportionate. From a traditional international law perspective, this necessity and proportionality inquiry relates both to AND American citizen abroad — or against non-citizens, for that matter? As I have noted, it is impossible for outsiders to fully evaluate US drone strikes, since so much vital information remains classified. In most cases, we know little about the identities; activities or future plans of those targeted. Nevertheless, given the increased frequency of US targeted killings in recent years, it seems reasonable to wonder whether the Administration conducts a rigorous necessity or proportionality analysis in all cases. So far, the leaked 2011 Justice Department White Paper represents the most detailed legal AND citizens are less exacting than those the Administration views as applicable to citizens. Defenders of administration targeted killing policy acknowledge that the criteria for determining how to answer these many questions have not been made public, but insist that this should not be cause for concern. The Administration has reportedly developed a detailed "playbook" outlining the targeting criteria and procedures,40, and insiders insist that executive branch officials go through an elaborate process in which they carefully consider every possible issue before determining that a drone strike is lawful.41 No doubt they do, but this is somewhat cold comfort. Formal processes tend to further normalize once-exceptional activities — and "trust us" is a rather shaky foundation for the rule of law. Indeed, the whole point of the rule of law is that individual lives and freedom should not depend solely on the good faith and benevolence of government officials. As with law of war arguments, stating that US targeted killings are clearly legal under traditional self-defense principles requires some significant cognitive dissonance. Law exists to restrain untrammeled power. It is no doubt possible to make a plausible legal argument justifying each and every U.S. drone strike — but this merely suggests that we are working with a legal framework that has begun to outlive its usefulness. The real question isn’t whether U.S. drone strikes are "legal." The real question is this: Do we really want to live in a world in which the U.S. government’s justification for killing is so malleable? 5. Setting Troubling International Precedents Here is an additional reason to worry about the U.S. overreliance on AND human rights records, such as Russia and China—are taking notice. Right now, the United States has a decided technological advantage when it comes to AND for how to foment instability and –literally — get away with murder. Take the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been a core concept of the AND or in self-defense "in the event of an armed attack." The 2011 Justice Department White Paper asserts that targeted killings carried out by the United AND unable" to suppress that threat, the logic is in fact circular. It goes like this: The United States — using its own malleable definition of AND posed by Person X and the use of force again presents no problem. This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty, AND them to justify the killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities?
While there are some justifiable points for the targeted killing program that individuals behind the AND that certain components and the resulting implications of the program are categorically unfair.
Those conflicts go nuclear Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, "The costs and consequences of drone warfare," International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many of the traditional concepts AND powers, thus magnifying the risks of a spiral of conflict between them.
Turkey follows US precedent to strike the PKK – collapses negotiations and Erdogan’s presidency Stein 13 (Aaron, Ph.D candidate at King’s College, London and the Nonproliferation Program Director at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies an independent think tank in Istanbul, "Turkey’s Negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and Armed Drones" February 26, 2013, Turkey Wonk Blog)
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently re-intiated peace talks with Abdullah Ocalan AND backlash from Turkish nationalists (An important AKP voting bloc by the way). The talks, despite having made some progress, broke down after President Abdullah Gul AND end of the talks and the re-militarization of the Kurdish issue. This time around, Erdogan has opted to publicize the talks, which has, AND Union reforms and deepening the country’s democratic system (Both AKP campaign themes). Erdogan, I am assuming, is betting that if he solves the PKK problem AND the recent attack, see this blog post by the excellent Frederike Geerdink). The AKP, however, receives a tremendous amount of political support from nationalists. AND penalty and the need to open chapters for Turkey’s stalled European Union bid. However, because the AKP has shown an incredible ability to set Turkey’s political agenda – using coordinated leaks, trial balloons, and speeches, which are framed by overarching themes like justice and development (The translation of the AKP’s name) – I believe that the AKP is capable of keeping its coalition together and ending the conflict with the PKK. (The PKK also has a lot to with this, but that is the subject for another blog post.) However, as I explain in my current piece on Foreign Policy, Ankara has AND candidate country, one would assume Turkey would try and figure this out). Moreover, if the drone is used in the southeast to attack PKK militants, AND , one need not look any further than the Uludere tragedy for confirmation). If Ankara presses ahead with its armed drone program (and it will), the AND the perspective of AKP political operatives, help them grow their voter base.
Key to Turkish model —- solves Middle East instability Kiri?ci 8/15/13 (Kemal Kiri?ci is the TÜS?AD senior fellow and director of the Center on the United States and Europe’s Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies, " The Rise and Fall of Turkey as a Model for the Arab World " August 15, 2013, Brookings Institution)
As the Arab Spring spread from Tunisia to the rest of the Middle East early AND so dramatically? Are there any prospects for Turkey to reclaim these credentials? For a long time, Turkish schoolchildren were taught how the 1923 establishment of the AND and some even feared that this could undermine Turkey’s national identity and secularism. The Arab Spring brought about a different context. This time it seemed that it AND EU and its prospects of membership also attracted considerable positive attention and appreciation. Turkey’s popularity was also strengthened by the "zero problems with neighbors" policy of AND the Arab street even if it did raise some eyebrows in diplomatic circles. However, this positive climate did not last very long and, as a result AND this dramatic transformation in Turkish foreign policy as "zero neighbors without problems." Secondly, the brutal police repression used against the anti-government protests in Istanbul AND for Tunisia’s transformation and taken a critical view of Erdo?an’s own democratic credentials. Is this then the end of the road for Turkey as a model for the AND East rather than an inspiration for pluralist democracy, consensus building and tolerance.
And, Turkish intervention goes nuclear Snyder 11 (Michael T. Snyder is a graduate of the McIntire School of AND see-a-war-between-syria-and-turkey)
In recent days, there have been persistent rumors that we could potentially be on AND us just hope that World War III does not erupt as a result.
And so does the Middle East James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ’9 (Spring) "Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East" IFRI, Proliferation Papers, ~2326, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) AND the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.
Drones cause SCS and ECS conflict – US precedent is key Bodeen 13 (Christopher, Beijing correspondent for The Associated Press, 5/3/2013, "China’s Drone Program Appears To Be Moving Into Overdrive", www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/03/china-drone-program_n_3207392.html)
Chinese aerospace firms have developed dozens of drones, known also as unmanned aerial vehicles AND rapidly and on the cusp of widespread use for surveillance and combat strikes. "My sense is that China is moving into large-scale deployments of UAVs," said Ian Easton, co-author of a recent report on Chinese drones for the Project 2049 Institute security think tank. China’s move into large-scale drone deployment displays its military’s growing sophistication and could challenge U.S. military dominance in the Asia-Pacific. It also could elevate the threat to neighbors with territorial disputes with Beijing, including Vietnam, Japan, India and the Philippines. China says its drones are capable of carrying bombs and missiles as well as conducting reconnaissance, potentially turning them into offensive weapons in a border conflict. China’s increased use of drones also adds to concerns about the lack of internationally recognized standards for drone attacks. The United States has widely employed drones as a means of eliminating terror suspects in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. "China is following the precedent set by the U.S. The thinking is that, `If the U.S. can do it, so can we. They’re a big country with security interests and so are we’," said Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the arms transfers program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, or SIPRI. "The justification for an attack would be that Beijing too has a responsibility for the safety of its citizens. There needs to be agreement on what the limits are," he said. Though China claims its military posture is entirely defensive, its navy and civilian maritime services have engaged in repeated standoffs with ships from other nations in the South China and East China seas. India, meanwhile, says Chinese troops have set up camp almost 20 kilometers (12 miles) into Indian-claimed territory. It isn’t yet known exactly what China’s latest drones are capable of, because, like most Chinese equipment, they remain untested in battle. The military and associated aerospace firms have offered little information, although in an interview last month with the official Xinhua News Agency, Yang Baikui, chief designer at plane maker COSIC, said Chinese drones were closing the gap but still needed to progress in half a dozen major areas, from airframe design to digital linkups. Executives at COSIC and drone makers ASN, Avic, and the 611 Institute declined to be interviewed by The Associated Press, citing their military links. The Defense Ministry’s latest report on the status of the military released in mid-April made no mention of drones, and spokesman Yang Yujun made only the barest acknowledgement of their existence in response to a question. "Drones are a new high-tech form of weaponry employed and used by many militaries around the world," Yang said. "China’s armed forces are developing weaponry and equipment for the purpose of upholding territorial integrity, national security and world peace. It will pose no threat to any country." Drones are already patrolling China’s borders, and a navy drone was deployed to the western province of Sichuan to provide aerial surveillance following last month’s deadly earthquake there. They may also soon be appearing over China’s maritime claims, including Japanese-controlled East China Sea islands that China considers its own. That could sharpen tensions in an area where Chinese and Japanese patrol boats already confront each other on a regular basis and Japan frequently scrambles fighters to tail Chinese manned aircraft.
SCS conflict causes extinction Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace 26 Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. AND —destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
Senkaku conflict causes extinction Baker 12 (Kevin R., Member of the Compensation Committee of Calfrac, Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee, served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Century Oilfield Services Inc. from August 2005 until November 10, 2009, when it was acquired by the Corporation. He also has served as the President of Baycor Capital Inc., 9/17/2012, "What Would Happen if China and Japan Went to War?", http://appreviews4u.com/2012/09/17/what-would-happen-if-china-and-japan-went-to-war/)
China is not an isolationist country but it is quite nationalistic. Their allies include, Russia, which is a big super power, Pakistan and Iran as well as North Korea. They have more allies than Japan, although most relations have been built on economic strategies, being a money-centric nation. Countries potentially hostile toward China in the event of a Japan vs. China war include Germany, Britain, Australia and South Korea. So even though Japan does not outwardly build relationships with allies, Japan would have allies rallying around them if China were to attack Japan. The island dispute would not play out as it did in the UK vs. Argentina island dispute, as both sides could cause massive damage to each other, whereas the UK was far superior in firepower compared to Argentina. Conclusion Even though China outweighs Japan in numbers, the likelihood that a war would develop into a nuclear war means that numbers don’t really mean anything anymore. The nuclear capabilities of Japan and China would mean that each country could destroy each other many times over. The island dispute would then escalate to possible mass extinction for the human race. The nuclear fall out would affect most of Asia and to a certain extent the AND maybe 20 years at best, if there are ample supplies of course.
Terror
CONTENTION THREE: TERRORISM
The plan is key to prevent an escalating public backlash against future drone use Zenko 13 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, "U.S. Drone Strike Policies", i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf?)
In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: "Where force AND if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.
Public backlash culminates in a legal crackdown that hemorrhages the targeted killing program Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School Professor, focus on national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, and conflict of laws, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense, Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, March 2012, Power and Constraint, P. 199-201
For the GTMO Bar and its cousin NGOs and activists, however, the al AND said Michael Ratner, explaining the CCR’s strategy for pursuing lawsuits in Europe. Clive Stafford Smith, a former CCR attorney who was instrumental in its early GTMO AND hard at work to stigmatize drones and those who support and operate them." This strategy is having an impact. The slew of lawsuits in the United States AND deemed to be in the interest of U.S. national security.
Support for the legality of global war against al-Qaeda is collapsing Robert Chesney, University of Texas School of Law Professor, 8/29/12, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138623
The drawdown in Afghanistan, combined with the expansion of the shadow war model, AND instead increasingly be rooted in other locations, such as Yemen and Somalia. It does not follow that LOAC accordingly will be irrelevant to future instances of detention AND provides a good example of an area ripe for such an analysis.190 But even in those cases, the very nature of the shadow war approach is AND a borderless armed conflict governed by LOAC wherever the parties may be found. The borderless-conflict position at first blush appears nicely entrenched in the status quo AND forward when new cases arise, as they are sure to do.192 Making matters worse, the U.S. government’s position on the relevance of AND provides a useful illustration, or perhaps more accurately, a cautionary tale.
* Though widely perceived at the time as a period of great legal controversy and uncertainty AND /11 decade will witness far more serious legal disputes as a result.
The plan is key to allied coop on counterterrorism David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the U.S. Department of Justice from March 2009 to March 2011, 6/15/2011, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/01_David-Kris.pdf
On the other side of the balance, certainly most of our friends in Europe AND the help of our allies, we need to work with them.77 More generally, we need to recognize the practical impact of our treatment of the AND cooperation from our allies and easier for the terrorists to find new recruits. This is not simply abstract philosophy. It is an important reality in our military’s AND hostilities, while we abandon those tools here in the United States.84
CNN should not have been surprised. Neither the Bush nor Obama administrations received blanket permission to transit Algerian airspace with surveillance planes or drones; instead, they received authorization only on a case-by-case basis and with advance notice. According to Washington Post journalist Craig Whitlock, the U.S. military relies AND .S. armed drones cannot be launched and recovered from naval platforms. According to Hollywood movies or television dramas, with its immense intelligence collection and military strike capabilities, the United States can locate, track, and kill anyone in the world. This misperception is continually reinvigorated by the White House’s, the CIA’s, and the AND doing a public opinion poll by virtue of giving me some good ideas." Similarly, as of November there were at least 10 movies about the Navy SEALs in production or in theaters, which included so much support from the Pentagon that one film even starred active-duty SEALs. The Obama administration’s lack of a military response in Algeria reflects how sovereign states routinely AND nations have complete discretion in regulating or prohibiting flights within their national airspace." Though not sexy and little reported, deploying CIA drones or special operations forces requires constant behind-the-scenes diplomacy: with very rare exceptions - like the Bin Laden raid - the U.S. military follows the rules of the world’s other 194 sovereign, independent states. These rules come in many forms. For example, basing rights agreements can limit AND assure that the United States did not violate its highly restrictive basing agreement. As Algeria is doing presently, the denial or approval of overflight rights is a AND the government has conducted an intermittent counterinsurgency against the Ogaden National Liberation Front.
Drones are effective and alternatives are worse—the plan prevents criticism Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, "Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington’s Weapon of Choice", www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)
Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, AND indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.
Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html)
I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and AND the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Drones solve safe havens – prevents an attack in the US Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida’s leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm’s way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida’s senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida’s central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan’s Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden’s letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military’s footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
Decapitation works—-studies Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He wrote this article while he was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Stanford University and at the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., Spring 2012, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47–79, "Does Decapitation Work?", www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076)
Conclusion Targeting militant leaders is now a centerpiece of U.S. strategy in AND from the battlefield to the shadows, this trend will likely remain true.
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, "Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence" SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
Causes US-Russia miscalc – extinction Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor 26 Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
Bioterror causes extinction Mhyrvold ’13 Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action," Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2 – 2013
As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the AND be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.
Ebola has capabilities of biological weaponization with catastrophic consequences, especially due to the fact AND can stream into the possible risk of bioterrorism during diagnostic research and procedures.
The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may well be the AND would be more than just a possibility, whatever promises had been made."
Plan
Plan: The United States Federal Government should restrict executive authority for targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
Solvency
CONTENTION FOUR: SOLVENCY
Plan’s mechanism is key to consensus-building on targeted killing norms Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
Legal scholars, policymakers, and state actors are embroiled in a heated debate about AND to govern intrastate conflicts) provides the answers that are so desperately needed. The zone approach proposed by this Article fills the international law gap, effectively mediating AND respond to grave threats to its security, wherever those threats are based. The United States has already adopted a number of policies that distinguish between zones of AND , and foreign policy gains make acceptance of this framework a worthy endeavor.
The plan is administration policy but just needs to be formalized Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
One might be skeptical that a nation like the United States would ever accept such constraints on the exercise of its authority. There are, however, several reasons why doing so would be in the United States’ best interest. First, as described in Section II.B, the general framework is largely consistent with current U.S. practice since 2006. The United States has, as a matter of policy, adopted important limits on its use of out-of-battlefield targeting and law-of-war detention suggesting an implicit recognition of the value and benefits of restraint. Second, while the proposed substantive and procedural safeguards are more stringent than those that AND detention without charge and targeted killing can yield legitimacy and security benefits. n218 Third, limiting the exercise of these authorities outside zones of active hostilities better accommodates AND development of an international consensus as to the rules that ought to apply. Fourth, such self-imposed restrictions are more consistent with the United States’ long-standing role as a champion of human rights and the rule of law a role that becomes difficult for the United States to play when viewed as supporting broad-based law-of-war authority that gives it wide latitude to employ force as a first resort and bypass otherwise applicable human rights and domestic law enforcement norms. Fifth, and critically, while the United States might be confident that it will AND American citizen, the United States would have few principled grounds for objecting.
What Should Congress Do? Does this analysis offer any practical policy prescriptions for Congress and the administration? The AND already seen by many as a legal non-starter under international law. Before addressing what Congress should do in this regard, we might ask from a AND Obama Administration. Perhaps it is better to let sleeping political dogs lie. These questions require difficult political calculations. However, the sources cited above suggest that AND when its sovereign prerogatives are challenged by the international soft-law community. The deeper issue here is not merely a strategic and political one about targeted killing AND a general approach of overt legislation that removes ambiguity is to be preferred. The single most important role for Congress to play in addressing targeted killings, therefore AND the task—as fundamental as it is—remains unfortunately poorly understood. Yet if it is really a matter of political consensus between Left and Right that AND as a very powerful, very important, and very legitimate sovereign state. Intellectually, continuing to squeeze all forms and instances of targeted killing by standoff platform AND itself a certain deformation of the IHL concept of hostilities and armed conflict.
2AC
Nato DA
2) Double bind – it’s already collapsed Leonard 12 (Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, the first pan-European think tank., 7/24/2012, "The End of the Affair", www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/24/the_end_of_the_affair)
But Obama’s stellar personal ratings in Europe hide the fact that the Western alliance has AND for both sides to wake up and realize just what is at stake.
Analysts say the Afghan war has been a blow to NATO’s psyche, with countries AND noting that the vast majority of conflicts around the world involved irregular forces.
Finally, generational change among the US political elite will have an impact on how AND —as if the US was no longer part of the alliance.61
Sanctions
1) Obama popularity collapse kills the agenda Jonathan Bernstein, 11/8/13, What matters, and what doesn’t, with Obama’s sliding approval numbers, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/11/08/what-matters-and-what-doesnt-with-obamas-sliding-approval-numbers/
Everyone is talking about Barack Obama’s falling numbers this week, with a new Pew AND more pressure there would probably be on states to join the Medicaid expansion.
2) Even if Obama had any political capital – it would be less than useless Reid Epstein, Politico, 11/10/13, White House seeks Republican immigration help, www.politico.com/story/2013/11/white-house-seeks-gop-immigration-help-99640.html
The government shutdown fight and Obama’s failure to establish relationships with Republicans haven’t helped either AND reform~ when he’s sort of scolding them about it all the time."
3) Democratic infighting blocks Jonathan Allen, Politico, 11/14/13, Trust frays between Obama, Democrats, www.politico.com/story/2013/11/trust-frayed-between-obama-dems-99897.html?hp=t1_3
President Barack Obama’s credibility may have taken a big hit with voters, but he’s AND to existing critics, but open to new attacks from his own party. "I don’t know how he f—-ed this up so badly," said one House Democrat who has been very supportive of Obama in the past.
4) Not an opportunity cost—a logical policymaker could pass the agenda item and the plan
5) Plan is Congressional legal affirmation of executive operational policy—that disproves the logic of the inter-branch fight link – That’s Daskal and Dworkin
6) Alignment means congress is down with the plan too Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 59-60
Presidents and politicos alike have long recognized Congress’s ability to reduce the political costs that AND .S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution."36
7) If Obama is focusing capital on Immigration it disproves Obama would initiate a fight over the plan
8) And its empirically proven he’ll avoid the fight William Howell and Jon Pevehouse, Associate Professors at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, 2007, When Congress Stops Wars, Foreign Affairs, EBSCO
After all, when presidents anticipate congressional resistance they will not be able to overcome AND Pace, so as to avoid a clash with Congress over his reappointment.
9) No deal – internal factions in Iran block and the economy is the only reason negotiations would succeed Applebaum 10/16/13 - Director of the Global Transitions Program at the Legatum Institute in London. She was a member of The Post’s editorial board from 2002 to 2006 and earlier worked as the foreign and deputy editor of the Spectator magazine in London, the political editor of the Evening Standard, a columnist at several British newspapers and the Warsaw correspondent for The Economist, Degrees from Yale and Oxford (Anne, 10/16/2013, "Iran’s spots haven’t changed, whatever it tells negotiators," http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/anne-applebaum-irans-stripes-havent-changed/2013/10/16/f3704948-3685-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_print.html)JCP
In Geneva this week, an Iranian delegation has been holding talks with six other AND . But the negotiators in Geneva should leave any optimism at the door.
Barriers mean Iran will never even try to develop nuclear weapons – much less succeed in a way that spurs their impacts Vaez 10/9/13 - senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group, having previously headed the Iran project of the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, D.C., focusing on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs(Ali, 10/9/13, "Iran’s nuclear program: Cause for concern, but not alarm," http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/9/iran-nuclear-programprimer.html)JCP
The last time President Hassan Rouhani was in charge of his country’s nuclear dossier, AND monitoring capabilities, and allow Iran to re-join the international community.
XO CP
Obama’s lawyers won’t defend the CP – that tubes effectiveness Kenneth Anderson 10, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Member of its Task Force on National Security and the Law, 3/18/10, Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War, digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=100226context=pub_disc_cong
26. Drone warfare, therefore, raises questions on its own – but an AND , of targeted killing by the CIA using drones, in the future. The Lack of Public Legal Justification from the Administration 27. The United States government is in a peculiar mismatch with respected to drone AND , but instead the lawfulness of particular parts, conducted by particular actors. 28. As much as CIA director Panetta needs to put those successes to the AND , as well they should – and yet the lawyers publicly say nothing. 29. It is no doubt unfair to say that the lawyers have not reached AND the legitimacy of these programs over the long term is distinctly at issue. 30. Congress could serve a useful function in pressing the administration to articulate publicly AND all the relevant legal analysis is hidden away in a confidential OLC opinion.
1AR
Case
Economic collapse doesn’t cause war Jervis, professor of political science – Columbia University, ’11 (Robert, Force in Our Times," Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved AND times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze AND worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org AND almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity — a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions ( AND example, hasn’t led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.
Ptx
Won’t escalate Luttwak, senior associate – CSIS, professor – Georgetown and Berkeley, 5/26/’7 (Edward, "The middle of nowhere," Prospect Magazine)
Strategically, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been almost irrelevant since the end of AND cutting US oil imports from the middle east by three quarters by 2025. Yes, it would be nice if Israelis and Palestinians could settle their differences, AND the transgressive west that relentlessly invades their minds, and sometimes their countries. Arab-Israeli catastrophism is wrong twice over, first because the conflict is contained within rather narrow boundaries, and second because the Levant is just not that important any more.
Trust gap kills his agenda Scott Wilson, WaPo, 11/13/13, Loss of public’s trust poses major problems ahead for Obama’s agenda, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/loss-of-publics-trust-poses-major-problems-ahead-for-obamas-agenda/2013/11/13/63f3d002-4c72-11e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4_story.html
Essential elements of Brand Obama in 2008 were trustworthiness and competence, virtues the candidate AND has so dramatically in rolling out the malfunctioning health-care Web site.
He’s a lame duck Peter Nicholas, WSJ, 11/10/13, Health-Law Rollout Weighs on Obama’s Ratings, Agenda, online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304868404579190222632451560
President Barack Obama, bogged down by problems with his signature health-care program AND bipartisan fashion because of GOP animosity toward him, some policy activists said.
Obama won’t recover Alex Roarty, National Journal, 11/12/13, Why Obama Won’t Bounce Back, www.nationaljournal.com/hotline-on-call/why-obama-won-t-bounce-back-20131112
History says President Obama’s sagging approval ratings — which this month have neared the lows of his entire presidency — aren’t going to improve before he leaves the White House in 2017. And that’s a troubling trajectory for Democrats feeling the pressure of reelection next year. Historically, presidents whose approval plummets in their second term don’t recover. Such was the case for Harry Truman back in 1950, according to Gallup surveys. After reaching a high of 46 percent in July of 1950, the 33rd president’s approval never rose above 35 percent during the last two-and-a-half years of his presidency. The precipitous drop coincided with America’s involvement in the Korean War. Another war helped bring about a more recent president’s downfall. George W. Bush never topped 50 percent after March 2005 and spent most his remaining tenure mired in the low to mid-30s, thanks in part to the unpopularity of the Iraq War. His approval further declined near the end of his presidency, when the financial crisis of 2008 left the economy in tatters. In fact, no president in the last 60 years has watched his approval ratings AND . But it also never fell to lows experienced by Truman or Bush. "In a second term, once a president’s numbers decline, they never come back up," Ed Goeas, a Republican pollster, told reporters last week during a breakfast hosted by the Christian Science Monitor. "There’s a good reason for that: they don’t have a reelection campaign going on. They don’t have the air cover on air. They’re not putting back together a campaign in contrast to the opposition." Goeas suggested Obama has reached a similar point-of-no-return in AND three-day rolling sample that showed it bottoming out at 39 percent. Obama and his supporters like to say he’ll never face reelection again, so his numbers don’t matter. But other Democrats — namely red-state Sens. Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, Mark Pryor of Arkansas of North, Kay Hagan of North Carolina and Mark Begich of Alaska — will face voters again, during next year’s midterms. And a slumping president has been nothing but bad news for his party colleagues.
Dem infighting now Charles Hurt, Washington Times, 11/12/13, HURT: It’s the Democrats, not the GOP, facing a looming civil war, www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/12/hurt-its-the-democrats-not-the-gop-facing-a-loomin/
Despite what the hysterical media will tell you, those distant blasts you heard last week rolling from New York City to Richmond were not cannon fire from the ongoing civil war within the Republican Party. They were the first shots fired in the civil war that is about to break wide open within the Democratic Party. The hyperventilating media have gone from simply jaundiced sideline observers to outright cheerleaders, breathlessly fanning the flames of discord within the GOP at every turn. Who knew The New York Times cares so much about Republican politicians from Texas and Utah? Of course, they don’t. Unless those conservative Texans and Utahans are in a knife fight with establishment Republicans in Washington. Last Tuesday’s Democratic routs in Virginia and in New York City, the media squealed with delight, was final proof that the Republican Party is finished. Not only in sophisticated places like New York City, but also important battleground states like Virginia. Now it is certainly true that Republicans have suffered some humiliating defeats of late. Chief among them has been their inability in three elections to win the argument against Obamacare. Now that Americans have met Obamacare, we realize just how pathetic Republicans had to have been to lose that fight. All of that pain caused in recent years by the tea party and the conservative purists throwing overboard so many of the whorish politicians in their own midst who came to Washington only to be corrupted will pay off down the road. The growing new voices in the Republican Party sound more and more reasonable and principled by the day, especially with the hot disaster that has become of centralized socialist medicine. Some of those battles are still yet to come, but at least the party is on the road to recovery. Not so the Democrats. Flush with victories of their opponents’ making in recent years, they have gotten a little fat and lazy, and now they’re overreaching. Terry McAuliffe was cruising to a double-digit win in Virginia — only to have Obamacare raise its ugly head and nearly snatch victory away at the last minute. In New York City, voters elected an unreconstructed old-school liberal from the days of Austin Powers. New Yorkers are not nearly the doctrinaire liberals that many people tend to believe. They like politicians who make their sprawling, unruly city work. Just as soon as the crime, trash piles and taxes start rising, they will be ready to throw Bill DiBlasio out. Democrats in the Senate realize the trouble they are in, which is why they marched down to the White House last week to blast President Obama over the political stink bomb of a health care law that he has dumped into their laps just in time for their 2014 re-election campaigns. Best of all, the Clintons realize this, too. Tuesday’s explosive interview where former President Clinton called on Mr. Obama to "honor" his "commitment" and allow people to keep their health insurance plans if they like them was not only another blast in the Democratic civil war, it was the opening salvo by the Clinton campaign to throw Mr. Obama under the bus.
The United States federal government should limit the war power authority of the president for self-defense targeted killings to outside an armed conflict.
1AC Drones
Advantage one is Drones
Conflation of legal regimes for targeted killing results in overly constrained operations—undermines counterterrorism
Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, J.D., 10/22/11, Self-defense Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947838
At the core of the self-defense targeting theory is the assumption that the AND ad bellum legal basis for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination.77 This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention lawtriggering equation.78 Adoption AND neutralize the impact of ad bellum legality in law applicability analysis.81 This effort rapidly became the norm of international law.82 Armed conflict analysis simply AND as irrelevant when deciding what rules apply to regulate operational and tactical execution. This aspect of ad bellum/in bello compartmentalization is not called into question by AND bellum principles indicates that these principles subsume in bello conflict regulation norms.91 There are two fundamental flaws with this conflation. First, by contradicting the traditional AND of these principles is distinct within each branch of the jus belli.94 Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum principles purportedly invoked AND these consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict regulation.98
That makes future terrorist attacks inevitable
Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, 6/2/13, Corn Comments on the Costs of Shifting to a Pure Self-Defense Model, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/corn-comments-on-the-prospect-of-a-shift-to-a-pure-self-defense-model/
The President’s speech – like prior statements of other administration officials – certainly suggests that AND force) threat that will provide an analogous decisive effect in the future. It strikes me (no pun intended) that arguments – or policy choices – AND , targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America." Relying exclusively on the inherent right of self-defense would, I suggest, AND not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11." A key advantage of the armed conflict framework is that it provides the legal maneuver AND context of an existing armed conflict than in isolated self-defense actions. It may, of course, be possible to adopt an interpretation of imminence expansive AND opposed to disable, terrorist threats, because of concerns of perceived overreach. It may be that a shift to this use of force framework is not only AND administration is unlikely to be too quick to abandon reliance on the AUMF.
Drones solve safe havens – prevents a terror attack
Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida’s leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm’s way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida’s senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida’s central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan’s Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden’s letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military’s footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
Drones are operationally effective and alternatives are worse—establishing a clear strike policy solves criticism.
Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, "Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington’s Weapon of Choice", www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)
Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, AND indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.
Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html)
I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and AND the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Extinction
Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, "Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence" SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
Causes US-Russia miscalc—extinction
Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor 26 Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
1AC Legal Regimes
Advantage two is legal regimes
US targeted killing derives authority from both armed conflict (jus in bello) and self-defense (jus ad bellum) legal regimes—that authority overlap conflates the legal regimes
For the past several years, the United States has relied on both armed conflict AND the implementation of the concepts of necessity and imminence, among many others. However, equally fundamental questions arise from the use of both justifications at the same AND raises significant concerns about both current implementation and future development of the law. One overarching concern is the conflation in general of jus ad bellum and jus in AND of their cause. The result: an invitation to unregulated warfare.11
Authority overlap destroys both the self-defense and armed conflict legal regimes
In contrast, human rights law’s requirement that force only be used as a last AND therefore every attempt must be made to capture before resorting to lethal force. In the abstract, the differences in the obligations regarding surrender and capture seem straightforward AND , and tried, those are the means which should be employed.105 The Israeli Supreme Court’s finding that targeting is only lawful if no less harmful means AND ,108 it demonstrates some of the challenges of conflating the two paradigms. First, if this added obligation of less harmful means was understood to form part AND who are lawful combatants, a result not contemplated in the LOAC.109 Second, soldiers faced with an obligation to always use less harmful means may well AND conflict, a central component of the protection of all persons in wartime. From the opposing perspective, if the armed conflict rules for capture and surrender were AND as a consequence of the broadening use of force outside of armed conflict.
This degrades the entire collective security structure resulting in widespread interstate war
The United States has been engaging in this practice of using drone-mounted missile AND S. justification and in accordance with the rationales developed to support it. Some of the implications of such an adjustment in the jus ad bellum regime are AND 2(4) prohibition on the use of force would be expanded. In addition, however, the targeted killing policy threatens to create other holes in AND without being subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the IHL regime. The structure of Harold Koh’s two-pronged justification similarly implies a severance of this AND against the threat or use of force under the jus ad bellum regime. This interpretation of the justifications cannot be pressed too far on the basis of the AND use of force against the states in which the groups may be operating. While the initial use of force in jus ad bellum terms is currently understood to AND system of laws designed to govern and constrain all aspects of its operation. There is a tendency in the U.S. approach to the so- AND creating the U.N. system after the Second World War.108 The premise of my argument is not that any return to past principles is inherently AND , and international armed conflict was thus far more frequent and widespread.109 The entire debate on targeted killing is so narrowly focused on the particular problems posed AND states under the pretext of self-proclaimed armed conflict with NSAs generally. We may think about each of these innovations as being related specifically to operations against AND a threat that is much less serious in the grand scheme of things.
Robust support for the impact—legal regime conflation results in uncontrollable conflict escalation
Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, December 2009, CONTROLLING THE RECOURSE TO WAR BY MODIFYING JUS IN BELLO, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law / Volume 12
A substantial literature exists on the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. However, the consequences for the former side of the equation – the resort to war – is generally under-examined. Instead, academic commentary has focused on the effects of compliance with humanitarian rules in armed conflict and, in particular, the equality of application principle. In this section, I attempt to help correct that imbalance. In the following analysis, I use the (admittedly provocative) short-hand labels of ’desirable’ and ’undesirable’ wars. The former consists of efforts that aim to promote the general welfare of foreign populations such as humanitarian interventions and, on some accounts, peacekeeping operations. The latter – undesirable wars – include conflicts that result from security spirals that serve neither state’s interest and also include predatory acts of aggression. 4.1.1 Decreased likelihood of ’desirable wars’ A central question in debates about humanitarian intervention is whether the international community should be AND short, all ’interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ are affected. Two developments render desirable interventions less likely. First, consider implications of the Kosovo AND one would most want to incentivize to initiate and participate in humanitarian interventions. The second development shares many of these same consequences. Consider the implications of the AND disproportionately affect the very states that take international human rights obligations most seriously. Notably, in these cases, the disincentives might weigh most heavily on third parties AND the international regime should prefer to be involved in these kinds of interventions. The developments regulating jus ad bellum through jus in bello also threaten to make ’ AND result from the pressures created by Type I erosions of the separation principle. First, increasing the tax on humanitarian interventions (the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach AND language (in resolutions and the like) espousing or emphasizing humanitarian objectives. Second, the elevation of self-regarding – security and strategic – frameworks over AND international disputes exert significant influence on whether conflicts will eventually culminate in war. Third, a large body of empirical research demonstrates that states will routinely engage in AND demands for increased bellicosity, unintended security spirals, and military violence.103 Importantly, these effects may result even if one is skeptical about the power of AND states entering into disastrous military campaigns that their leaders did not initially intend.
Self-defense regime collapse causes global war—US TK legal regime key—only Congress solves international norm development
Therefore, the more likely result is that the Executive Branch, grappling with the AND prove legally fragile, destabilizing to the international political order, or both.
Effect on Domestic Law and Policy Congress’s failure to reauthorize military force would lead to bad domestic law and even worse AND be to continue to rely on the September 18, 2001, AUMF. Second, basing U.S. counterterrorism efforts on the President’s constitutional authority as AND would lack stability—confounding cooperation with allies and hindering negotiations with adversaries. There are, of course, many situations where the president’s position as Commander in AND conflict than the public might otherwise ~be~ willing to support."140 In a world without a valid AUMF, the United States could base its continued AND problems."141 Only then can the President’s efforts be sustained and legitimate. 2. Effect on the International Law of Self-Defense A failure to reauthorize military force would lead to significant negative consequences on the international AND allowing the executive to rely on a self-defense authorization alone.144 This approach also would inevitably lead to dangerous "slippery slopes." Once the President AND international law of self defense would likely lead to precisely such a result. The slippery slope problem, however, is not just limited to the United States’s AND to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos."148 Encouraging the proliferation of an expansive law of international self-defense would not only AND and rooting~ counterterrorism efforts within a more durable, legal foundation."152 Widely accepted legal arguments also facilitate cooperation from U.S. allies, especially AND , but facilitating that rationale’s destabilizing adoption by nations around the world.158
Law of armed conflict controls deterrence—collapse causes global WMD conflict
Delahunty, associate prof – U St. Thomas Law, and Yoo, law prof – UC Berkeley, ’10 (Robert and John, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 803)
Finally, the extension of IHRL to armed conflict may have significant consequences for the AND norms of distinction and the humane treatment of combatants and civilians in wartime. IHRL norms, on the other hand, may suffer from much lower rates of AND would be to adapt the legal system already specifically designed for armed conflict.
LOAC key to regulate cyber development—prevents spillover of the Stuxtnet precedent
Jeremy Richmond, J.D., March 2012, NOTE: EVOLVING BATTLEFIELDS DOES STUXNET DEMONSTRATE A NEED FOR MODIFICATIONS TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT?, 35 Fordham Int’l L.J. 842
Stuxnet almost certainly foreshadows a fundamental change in modern warfare. It demonstrates that a well-orchestrated CNA can strike a target with greater precision, greater damage to the enemy, and less collateral loss of life and property than a kinetic weapon. Will the change in warfare, ~*894~ however, be so drastic that it also necessitates a change in the LOAC? The answer appears to be both "yes" and "no." The principles of distinction, discrimination, and proportionality, when applied to Stuxnet, AND that fundamental alterations to the LOAC are not necessary to regulate cyber weapons.
Solves extinction
Guterl 12, executive editor – Scientific American, 11/28/’12 (Fred, "Armageddon 2.0," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)
The world lived for half a century with the constant specter of nuclear war and its potentially devastating consequences. The end of the Cold War took the potency out of this Armageddon scenario, yet the existential dangers have only multiplied. Today the technologies that pose some of the biggest problems are not so much military AND form the basis of our global civilization and are essential to our survival. The mistake many of us make about the darker aspects of our high-tech civilization is in thinking that we have plenty of time to address them. We may, if we’re lucky. But it’s more likely that we have less time than we think. There may be a limited window of opportunity for preventing catastrophes such as pandemics, runaway climate change, and cyber attacks on national power grids. Emerging diseases. The influenza pandemic of 2009 is a case in point. Because AND , it was already well on its way to spreading far and wide. "H1N1 caught us all with our pants down," says flu expert Robert G AND the medicines you need. Society as we know it would fall apart." Climate change. Climate is another potentially urgent risk. It’s easy to think about AND state in which the Arctic is ice-free during the summer months. Perhaps the most alarming of Lenton’s tipping points is the Indian summer monsoon. Smoke AND very different effect on the Indian summer monsoon: It makes it stronger. These two opposite influences make the fate of the monsoon difficult to predict and subject AND happens then? More than a billion people depend on the monsoon’s rains. Other tipping points may be in play, says Lenton. The West African monsoon AND change more quickly than currently projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Computer hacking. The computer industry has already made it possible for computers to handle AND currently being field tested, could hit dealer showrooms in a few years. Autonomous computers can make our lives easier and safer, but they can also make AND survive and carry out its mission even if it found itself cut off. The uranium centrifuges that Stuxnet attacked are very similar in principle to the generators that AND cause them to shake, rattle, and roll — and eventually explode. If Stuxnet-like malware were to insinuate itself into a few hundred power generators AND . Worldwide production currently amounts to only a few hundred generators per year. The consequences of going without power for months, across a large swath of the AND down, according to an analysis by Scott Borg, a cybersecurity expert.
TK self-defense norms modeled globally —- causes global war Fisk 26 Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk —- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos— PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, "Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm" 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)
Conclusion Preventive self-defense entails waging a war or an attack by choice, in AND for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, and/or precision targeting. Thus, the results of our plausibility probe provide some evidence that the global norm AND or lesser power. Research in this vein would compliment our analyses herein. With the proliferation of technology in a globalized world, it seems only a matter AND it continues to provide other states with the justification to do the same.
China models US self-defense precedent —- they’ll strike in the South China Sea Fisk 26 Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk —- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, "Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm" 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)
China Though scholars debate the strategic culture of China, the dominant view has been one AND evidence that China is buying into the norm of preventive self-defense. Indeed, a year later (in 2006), China released a national defense report AND has territorial disputes should "mentally prepare for the sounds of cannons."73 Beyond the territorial disputes, also consider the recent terrorist attacks within China and their AND though not as clear-cut as in the India and Russia cases). In each of the cases under review, the military has shifted in its orientation AND sophisticated new RMA technology, after having observed US success in this area. Alongside our analysis of state rhetoric, these changes in strategies and high-tech AND role in combat operations in Afghanistan in 2009—by borrowing American drones. Taken together, though, in terms of their position on the idea of preventive AND drones are an obvious choice for states committed to preventive self-defense.
SCS conflict causes extinction Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace 26 Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. AND —destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
1AC Solvency
Congressional limits of self-defense authority within armed conflict is necessary to resolve legal ambiguity
Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, Winter 2012, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html
In the wake of the attacks by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, AND not wise for the long-term health of the rule of law. This article traces the history of targeted killing from a U.S. perspective AND Constitution demands nothing less, but thus far, Congress’s silence is deafening. History of Targeted Killing During the Cold War, the United States used covert operations AND is declared hostile; the enemy is now targetable. Anticipatory Self-defense This paradigm shift is novel for the United States. The President’s authority to order AND , but now they are hampering its desires to target and kill terrorists. Skeptics of targeted killing admit that "~t~he decision to target specific individuals AND even some foreign governments40 is where these targeted killings can be conducted.41 According to the U.S. critics, if armed conflict between the states AND negative: the strike constituted "a clear case of extrajudicial killing."42 The Obama administration, like its predecessor, disagrees. Its legal justification for targeted AND , must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it."44 A state can act under the guise of anticipatory self-defense. This truism AND stated legal authority is self-defense? There is no clear answer. The administration is blurring the contours of the right of the state to act in Yemen under self-defense and the law of war protections afforded its soldiers when so acting. Therefore, what protections do U.S. Airmen enjoy when operating the drone that killed an individual in Yemen, Somalia, or Libya? If they are indicted by a Spanish court for murder, what is the defense AND international legal norms intersect and potentially conflict with measures stemming from domestic law.
That clarity over legal authority is necessary to solve
As noted in the introduction to this article, maintaining the separation between and independence AND of international security, and to the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. III. BLURRING THE LINES The nature of the terrorist threat the United States and other states face does indeed AND individuals by blurring the lines between the key parameters of the two paradigms. A. Location of Attacks: International Law and the Scope of the Battlefield The distinct differences between the targeting regimes in armed conflict and in self-defense AND parameters of the zone of combat in the conflict with al Qaeda.70 Traditionally, the law of neutrality provided the guiding framework for the parameters of the AND the armed conflict directly to the territory of one or more belligerent parties. The neutrality framework as a geographic parameter is left wanting in today’s conflicts with terrorist AND armies and their enemies or as police forces and their criminal adversaries.78 Simply locating terrorist groups and operatives does not therefore identify the parameters of the battlefield—the fact that the United States and other states use a combination of military operations and law enforcement measures to combat terrorism blurs the lines one might look for in defining the battlefield. In many situations, "the fight against transnational jihadi groups . . . largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield."79 Second, a look at U.S. jurisprudence in the past and today AND our country must engage if our form of government is to survive.81 In each of those cases, the United States was a belligerent in an international AND both the difference in approach and the uncertainty involved in defining today’s conflicts. The current U.S. approach of using both the armed conflict paradigm and AND and/or self-defense to cover all areas without further delineation. Second, on a broader level of legal application and interpretation, the development of AND prove detrimental in the future when it seeks sharper delineations for other purposes.
Executive "clarification" is insufficient
Laurie Blank, Emory International Humanitarian Law Clinic Director, Professor, 10/10/13, "Raid Watching" and Trying to Discern Law from Policy, today.law.utah.edu/projects/raid-watching-and-trying-to-discern-law-from-policy/
Trying to identify and understand the legal framework the United States believes is applicable to AND where does the United States believe its authority derived from this conflict reaches? On Saturday, U.S. Special Forces came ashore in Somalia and engaged AND Shabaab is a party to that armed conflict or another independent armed conflict? The reality, however, is that this latest counterterrorism operation highlights once again the conflation of law and policy that exemplifies the entire discourse about the United States conflict with al Qaeda and other U.S. counterterrorism operations as well. And that using policy to discern law is a highly risky venture. The remarkable series of public speeches by top Obama Administration legal advisors and national security AND of the conflation of law and policy and the consequences of that conflation. Policy and strategic considerations are without a doubt an essential component of understanding contemporary military operations and the application of international law. However, it is equally important to distinguish between law and policy, and to recognize when one is driving analysis versus the other. The law regarding the use of force against an individual or group outside the borders AND force is necessary and proportionate to repel or deter the attack or threat. The United States has consistently blurred these two legal justifications for the use of force AND the perspective of careful legal analysis, however, it can prove problematic. In effect, it is U.S. policy to eliminate "bad guys AND raids, capture — each situation involves its own tactical plans and twists. But do any of these specific tactical choices tell us anything in particular about whether AND and used deadly force in the process of trying to effectuate that capture. Ultimately, however, the only certain information is that the United States viewed this AND particular military mission at hand, the operational imperatives and national command policy. The fact that the operation may have had capture as its goal, if feasible AND force, but that use of force may nonetheless be robust when necessary. "Raid-watching" — trying to predict the applicable legal framework from reports AND policy for legal analysis ultimately substitutes policy’s flexibility for the law’s normative foundations.
2AC
2AC T–Prohibit
"Restrictions" are on time, place, and purpose – this includes the plan Lobel, professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh, 2008 (Jules, "Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War," Ohio State Law Journal, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel_.pdf)
Throughout Amebrican history, Congress has placed restrictions on the President’s power as Commander in AND subject to the control and oversight of Congress in the conduct of warfare.
2AC PTX
No vote – incentives don’t outweigh Michael McAuliff, Huff Post, 1/14, "Harry Reid: Fast Track Free Trade Bill Goes Nowhere ," www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/14/harry-reid-fast-track_n_4598486.html
WASHINGTON — The fast track trade bill introduced in the Senate last week will go nowhere anytime soon, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) said Tuesday. Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.), chair of the Senate Finance Committee and President Barack Obama’s pick to be his next ambassador to China, offered the legislation last week, surprising many of his colleagues. Baucus’ bill, which would reauthorize 2002’s Trade Promotional Authority, would essentially give the White House the power to present Congress with trade agreements that lawmakers could not amend. The fast track bill would ease the way for the controversial Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation trade deal that opponents contend would undermine labor, environmental and other protections. But if those opponents were worried the fast-track measure might advance, Reid was emphatic in saying it would not — at least for now. Asked if he told Baucus that Reid would make time on the floor of the U.S. Senate to debate the measure, Reid said "No," four times. "There’s a lot of controversy on that, and I’m going to see how that plays out with my caucus and the Senate.," Reid told reporters on Capitol Hill. Indeed, many Democrats are so unhappy with the current draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, they are willing to kill it even though it is a key element of Obama’s ambitious pivot toward Asia.
Lack of democratic support kills the bill Eric Brander, Politico, 1/15, "Hill Democrats MIA on Obama’s trade agenda," www.politico.com/story/2014/01/obama-trade-agenda-hill-democrats-102177.html
President Barack Obama threw a trade party and almost no Democrats showed up. His administration is pushing for legislation to ease the passage of a pair of massive trade deals, but the White House can’t even find a Democratic co-sponsor in the House. Meanwhile, the bill’s main Democratic backer in the Senate, Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, is on his way out, and key senior Democrats on the committee, including its incoming chairman, say they either don’t support the bill or want to change it. Take what Democratic Reps. George Miller of California, Louise Slaughter of New York and Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut said of the measure, introduced last week: "Our constituents did not send us to Washington to ship their jobs overseas, and Congress will not be a rubber stamp for another flawed trade deal that will hang the middle class out to dry." Their comments echoed those of dozens of Democrats who greeted the bill with a raft of complaints, saying that advancing huge trade deals is out of step with their party’s more populist election-year message of economic inequality. The free-trade push joins a growing list of policies Obama has championed that are unpopular with Democrats, not the least of which have been agreeing to steep fiscal cuts, using drones abroad, failing to rein in eavesdropping on Americans by the National Security Agency and abandoning the public option in the landmark 2010 heath care overhaul, for which the president has bled support. The problem isn’t just Obama’s trade policy but also its execution, congressional sources said.
Plan doesn’t cost capital Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 59-60
Presidents and politicos alike have long recognized Congress’s ability to reduce the political costs that AND .S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution."36
If Obama is focusing capital on _¬¬¬¬_, it disproves Obama would initiate a fight over the plan
He’ll avoid the fight William Howell and Jon Pevehouse, Associate Professors at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, 2007, When Congress Stops Wars, Foreign Affairs, EBSCO
After all, when presidents anticipate congressional resistance they will not be able to overcome AND Pace, so as to avoid a clash with Congress over his reappointment.
That of course, is a sort of worst-case-scenario view. But preparing for the worst possible scenario is what red and swing state Democrats like Manchin will be doing throughout the course of the next year. If problems with the health-care law continue, you will start to hear Democrats from states in which Obama is unpopular distance themselves even more from him. If the law’s image improves, you will hear less of that. And that will mean more political capital for Obama to address issues like the economy — or maybe even immigration. Then, Republicans eager to shepherd immigration reform may grow increasingly open to working with the president on a modest bill that meets his requirements. And there may be more common fiscal ground to be found for congressional Republicans and the White House — some of which was paved in the bipartisan budget plan that passed this year. But for now at least, the health-care law looks to remain the dominant issue. And how it proceeds headed into the new year will determine a lot, even on issues that have nothing to do with health care.
Obama won’t exert capital Maureen Dowd, NYTimes, 4/20/13, No Bully in the Pulpit, www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/opinion/sunday/dowd-president-obama-is-no-bully-in-the-pulpit.html?partner=rssnyt26emc=rss26_r=126
Unfortunately, he still has not learned how to govern. How is it that the president won the argument on gun safety with the public and lost the vote in the Senate? It’s because he doesn’t know how to work the system. And it’s clear now that he doesn’t want to learn, or to even hire some clever people who can tell him how to do it or do it for him. It’s unbelievable that with 90 percent of Americans on his side, he could get only 54 votes in the Senate. It was a glaring example of his weakness in using leverage to get what he wants. No one on Capitol Hill is scared of him. Even House Republicans who had no intention of voting for the gun bill marveled privately that the president could not muster 60 votes in a Senate that his party controls. President Obama thinks he can use emotion to bring pressure on Congress. But that’s not how adults with power respond to things. He chooses not to get down in the weeds and pretend he values the stroking and other little things that matter to lawmakers. After the Newtown massacre, he and his aides hashed it out and decided he would look cold and unsympathetic if he didn’t push for some new regulations. To thunderous applause at the State of the Union, the president said, "The families of Newtown deserve a vote." Then, as usual, he took his foot off the gas, lost momentum and confided his pessimism to journalists. The White House had a defeatist mantra: This is tough. We need to do it. But we’re probably going to lose. When you go into a fight saying you’re probably going to lose, you’re probably going to lose. The president once more delegated to the vice president. Couldn’t he have come to the Hill himself to lobby with the families and Joe Biden? The White House should have created a war room full of charts with the names of pols they had to capture, like they had in "The American President." Soaring speeches have their place, but this was about blocking and tackling. Instead of the pit-bull legislative aides in Aaron Sorkin’s movie, Obama has Miguel Rodriguez, an arm-twister so genteel that The Washington Post’s Philip Rucker wrote recently that no one in Congress even knows who he is.
Trade doesn’t solve war or terror Martin et. al. 8 (Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)
Does globalization pacify international relations? The "liberal" view in political science argues AND , even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.
2AC CP
Object fiat is a voter – avoids the core question of pres powers by fiating away obama’s behavior in the squo – justifies the end war cp which means the neg wins every debate – it’s not in the lit which is key Hansen 12 (Victor, Professor of Law, New England Law, New England Law Review, Vol. 46, pp. 27-36, 2011, "Predator Drone Attacks", February 22, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009313-http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009313, PDF, ZBurdette)
Any checks on the President’s use of drone attacks must come domestically. In the domestic arena the two options are either the courts or Congress. As discussed above, the courts are institutionally unsuited and incapable of providing appropriate oversight. Congress is the branch with the constitutional authority, historical precedent, and institutional capacity to exercise meaningful and effective oversight of the President’s actions.
Links to politics – makes Obama a lightning rod Phillip Cooper 97, Prof of Public Administration @ Portland State, Nov 97, "Power tools for an effective and responsible presidency" Administration and Society, Vol. 29, p. Proquest Interestingly enough, the effort to avoid opposition from Congress or agencies can have the AND Quayle Commission working in concert with OIRA provides a dramatic case in point.
Executive clarification fails—not legally binding, no cred, raises expectations Sarah Knuckey, NYU Law School Project on Extrajudicial Executions Director, Special Advisor to the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, 10/1/13, Transparency on Targeted Killings: Promises Made, but Little Progress, justsecurity.org/2013/10/01/transparency-targeted-killings-promises-made-progress/
Some interpreted these efforts and the President’s speech to mark the beginning of improved transparency. But despite transparency promises and expectations, many of the same, core concerns regarding undue secrecy remain. The President’s speech, the Policy Guidance, and Holder’s letter – because of textual ambiguities within each, and combined with events since – have largely failed to address these longstanding concerns, and in some important respects aggravated them. Continuing Secrecy on Core Issues Key areas in which transparency has not yet been forthcoming include: Who can be killed, where, and on what basis. Demands for AND had "expanded the scope" of who could be targeted in Yemen).
The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law AND full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official ("TopOff") exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the AND focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge AND and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem AND student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the AND that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and AND giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal ~1 AND Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount AND execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise AND but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution AND , generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – AND simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) AND many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize AND to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the AND exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during AND , while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop AND uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account AND weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might AND through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts AND , giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to AND relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives ( AND , or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law AND releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, AND the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students AND opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who AND concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the AND both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, AND greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national AND to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, AND in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model AND undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.
The alt’s pacificism lets injustice go unstopped – we can acknowledge that all violence is tragic while still recognizing that it’s necessary in some instances Debra Bergoffen, Professor of Philosophy and a member of the Women’s Studies and Cultural Studies programs at George Mason University, Spring 2008, The Just War Tradition: Translating the Ethics of Human Dignity into Political Practices, Hypatia Volume 23, Number 2
The just war tradition is riddled with ambiguities. It speaks of a single human AND by pacifists for sacrificing the principles of peace to the demands of war. Twentiethand twenty-first-century war waging has bolstered "realist" and pacifist AND , however, create the conditions for peace envisioned by just war advocates. The twenty-first century, young as it is, has managed to establish AND war tradition to establish itself as a counterweight to the politics of violence. Given the destructive powers of modern weaponry and the absolutist ideologies of contemporary conflicts, AND and less amenable to the rule of reason required by just war restrictions. Before writing the just war obituary, however, we need to note the ways AND just war insistence that the political and moral worlds are tethered remains relevant. To see whether just war theory can meet the challenges of its origins and of our times we need to see how it fares against the criticisms of power-politics advocates, such as Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), and how it stands up to pacifist and nonviolent rejections of all forms of political violence. In his classic text, On War, Clausewitz argued that even when/if AND He anticipated Rwanda. Machetes were all the Hutu needed to perpetuate genocide. Clausewitz’s argument against the just war premise of rule-governed war has been joined AND of war making (Coates 1997, 6; Shaw 2003, 63). Arguments against the just war premise that war can be contained both in its objectives AND advocates developing nonviolent methods of resistance to violence (Ruddick 1990, 232). Power-politics advocates, nonviolence proponents, and perpetual-peace defenders agree that AND -cut justice or war logic of power-politics and pacifist advocates. Between the ambiguous agenda of the just war tradition and its realist and pacifist critics AND looks for ways to translate moral discourses into (imperfect) political strategies. My sympathy for the project of the just war tradition owes much to Simone de AND certain circumstances, an affirmation of one’s dignity. ~End Page 75~ Between her discussions of what must be done when confronted by the Nazi soldier in AND and human rights, I take up the ambiguities of this common ground.
Perm do the plan and all non mutually exclusive parts of the alt
Antagonism is inevitable in the international sphere only LOAC provides a high barrier to militarized solutions to those conflicts. The plan is key to give legal constraints meaning and prevent conflict escalation Luban ’13 (David, University Professor in Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center, "Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law," Leiden Journal of International Law, Volume 26, Issue 02, pp 315-349)
These arguments about military necessity are not meant as a ’refutation’ of the LOAC AND principles that could be accepted even by adherents of the other comprehensive view. To illustrate with an example: Article 57 of AP I requires militaries to take AND of these interpretations can be right, and lawyers should not advance them. This conciliatory approach is not self-evident. In purely scientific pursuits, epistemologists AND ? Is that not the most likely way in which truth will out? The obvious difference is that lawyers arguing about the interpretation of law are not pursuing AND when in fact the law is ’an elaborate discourse of evasion’.106 But suppose there were no LOAC or ICL. Do we really believe that more AND their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom.’107 The two cultures are stuck with each other aboard the same wounded ship. The AND is also the most plausible strategy for achieving whatever convergence is humanly possible.
Nobody accepts the alt Brooks ’12 (Rosa, Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and a Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, "Strange Bedfellows: The Convergence of Sovereignty-Limiting Doctrines in Counterterrorist and Human Rights Discourse," Law and Ethics Summer/Fall 2012)
None of these projects would be straightforward; each might be seen as facing barriers AND of emerging sovereigntylimiting doctrines, organized hypocrisy is the best we can do.
Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism The risk that terrorists will set off a nuclear AND seek to undercut the efforts of the select few with a nuclear intent?
Last Thursday, legislation to restore "fast track" trade promotion authority was introduced AND a flat tire – and the spare is buried in the president’s trunk. What was intended to be a bicameral, bipartisan package sponsored by the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees lacked the support of Rep. Sander Levin (D-MI), ranking member of Ways and Means. Levin – who considers protecting incumbent domestic firms from the inconvenience of foreign competition the abiding purpose of trade policy – finds the fast track legislation insufficiently deferential to the demands of the "Detroit" automakers.
A slew of issues overwhelm and Boehner won’t allow controversial votes before the midterms Tim Alberta, National Journal, 1/16, "House GOP at 2014 Crossroads: Go Big, or Keep Quiet?," www.nationaljournal.com/congress/house-gop-at-2014-crossroads-go-big-or-keep-quiet-20140116
According to sources with knowledge of the deliberations, Boehner and his leadership team prefer a quiet, noncontroversial legislative session in which Republicans steer clear of mistakes and run out the clock until the November elections. This play-it-safe strategy hinges on voters turning out in droves to voice their displeasure with President Obama’s health care law and his administration’s domestic-surveillance policies, among other things. But such an approach is unacceptable to the most conservative members of the House GOP. After two weeks of private deliberations, and fresh off a mini-retreat this week organized by the Republican Study Committee, conservatives are united in their resolve to make 2014 more about Republicans’ "bold, positive vision" and less about Obama’s failures. "I’m convinced Republicans have the best vision for America’s future," Rep. Kevin Brady of Texas said outside of Wednesday’s RSC meeting. "We’ve spent a lot of time opposing the president’s policies, but it’s time to share our vision if we want to win in November." That sentiment has echoed among conservative lawmakers all week, and it ramped up during AND reform plan, a welfare-reform package, and a privacy bill. "I don’t want to play prevent defense," Scalise said, according to members in attendance. "I want to play offense." Asked to explain the remark later in an interview, Scalise said, "Usually teams that play prevent defense lose the game." But Boehner’s team doesn’t share that view. GOP leadership has done everything possible in recent months to keep the electorate’s attention on the Democrats, especially highlighting the disastrous rollout of President Obama’s health care law and Republican oversight efforts on the IRS scandal and Benghazi attacks. Leadership officials are intent on keeping the American public "talking about Obamacare" all the way until November. Besides, already fewer than 90 work days remain in the legislative session. Even if leadership officials were to embrace an ambitious agenda, they see little time to implement it. "We have to do a budget, we have to do appropriations, we have to do debt ceiling. There are a lot of issues that are hanging out there that have to be done that dominate a lot of the calendar," said Rep. James Lankford, the Republican policy chairman and a member of leadership. That said, many of the conservatives’ policy objectives for 2014 are likely dead on arrival in Cambridge anyway.
—Trade defense
Trade will never collapse Ikenson 9 (Daniel, associate director for the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, "A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived," 3/12, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-037.html
A Little Perspective, Please Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism AND far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.
Unsurprisingly, this article embraces an interpretation of the Constitution that is at odds with AND military force in a manner which is binding on the Executive Branch.18 Furthermore, the Vesting Clause thesis and all-powerful views of the Commander in AND , at least in part, because the Obama Administration says it matters. The scope of the AUMF is also important for any future judicial opinion that might AND Framers did not intend to fashion the President into an American monarch.27 Jackson’s concurrence has become the most significant guidepost in debates over the constitutionality of executive AND its precise scope, authorization, and continuing vitality matter a great deal.
Congressional statutes are effective for simple constraints like the plan Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 12-13
Without a credible threat of congressional action, why would presidents incorporate congressional preferences, AND political costs the president stands to reap from his preferred military policy course. In a similar vein, highly visible congressional actions send important signals of domestic resolve AND military policymaking from the end of Reconstruction to the ongoing war in Iraq.
Status quo administration policy delineates between geographic zones, but our legal justification for war everywhere remains in place Anthony Dworkin 13, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, "Drones And Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position", July, http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf
Two further points are worth noting. First, the administration has acknowledged that in AND the plans and capabilities of al-Qaeda and its associated forces".27 However, the details that have emerged about US targeting practices in the past few AND set an expansive precedent that is damaging to the international rule of law. Obama’s new policy on drones It is against this background that Obama’s recent counterterrorism speech and the policy directive he AND appeared to say that it might continue for 10 to 20 years.30 Second, the day before his speech, Obama set out regulations for drone strikes AND "near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed". In some respects, these standards remain unclear: the president did not specify how AND strikes will continue in the Pakistani tribal areas for the time being.33 However, the impact of the new policy will depend very much on how the AND that the level of attacks is hardly diminishing under the new guidelines.35 It is also notable that the new standards announced by Obama represent a policy decision AND to serve as a precedent for other states that wish to claim it.
The proliferation of drone technology has moved well beyond the control of the United States AND unmanned aerial vehicles. Not toys or models, but real flying machines. It’s a classic and common phase in the life cycle of a military innovation: AND the United States; it’s a precedent Washington does not want anyone following. America, the world’s leading democracy and a country built on a legal and moral framework unlike any other, has adopted a war-making process that too often bypasses its traditional, regimented, and rigorously overseen military in favor of a secret program never publicly discussed, based on legal advice never properly vetted. The Obama administration has used its executive power to refuse or outright ignore requests by congressional overseers, and it has resisted monitoring by federal courts. To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the AND -states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order. Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out AND learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention AND uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation. THE WRONG QUESTION The United States is the indisputable leader in drone technology and long-range strike AND billions of dollars that have gone into establishing and maintaining such a capability. That level of superiority leads some national security officials to downplay concerns about other nations’ AND the unparalleled intelligence-collection and data-analysis underpinning the aircraft’s mission. "There is what I think is just an unconstrained focus on a tool as AND who are interpreting the information that’s coming off the sensors on the aircraft." The analysts are part of the global architecture that makes precision strikes, and targeted AND ) outweigh the reward (judged by the value of the threat eliminated). "Is that a shovel or a rifle? Is that a Taliban member or AND . We can orbit long enough to be pretty sure about our target." Other countries, groups, and even individuals can and do fly drones. But no state or group has nearly the sophisticated network of intelligence and data analysis that gives the United States its strategic advantage. Although it would be foolish to dismiss the notion that potential U.S. adversaries aspire to attain that type of war-from-afar, pinpoint-strike capability, they have neither the income nor the perceived need to do so. That’s true, at least today. It’s also irrelevant. Others who employ drones are likely to carry a different agenda, one more concerned with employing a relatively inexpensive and ruthlessly efficient tool to dispatch an enemy close at hand. "It would be very difficult for them to create the global-strike architecture AND long-duration surveillance and potentially strike inside and right on its border." And that’s a NATO ally seeking the capability to conduct missions that would run afoul AND uses the aircraft to strike Lashkar-e-Taiba militants near Kashmir? "We don’t like other states using lethal force outside their borders. It’s destabilizing. It can lead to a sort of wider escalation of violence between two states," said Micah Zenko, a security policy and drone expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. "So the proliferation of drones is not just about the protection of the United States. It’s primarily about the likelihood that other states will increasingly use lethal force outside of their borders." LOWERING THE BAR Governments have covertly killed for ages, whether they maintained an official hit list or AND American security experts point to Russia as well, although Moscow disputes this. In the 1960s, the U.S. government was involved to differing levels AND late as 2001, Washington’s stated policy was to oppose Israel’s targeted killings.) When America adopted targeted killing again—first under the Bush administration after the September 11 attacks and then expanded by President Obama—the tools of the trade had changed. No longer was the CIA sending poison, pistols, and toxic cigars to assets overseas to kill enemy leaders. Now it could target people throughout al-Qaida’s hierarchy with accuracy, deliver lethal ordnance literally around the world, and watch the mission’s completion in real time. The United States is smartly using technology to improve combat efficacy, and to make AND , defense hawks and spendthrifts alike would criticize it if it did not. "If you believe that these folks are legitimate terrorists who are committing acts of AND Do we have the debate if an aircraft pilot drops a particular bomb?" But defense analysts argue—and military officials concede—there is a qualitative difference AND States would not have pursued an equivalent number of manned strikes in Pakistan. And what’s true for the United States will be true as well for other countries that own and arm remote piloted aircraft. "The drones—the responsiveness, the persistence, and without putting your personnel at risk—is what makes it a different technology," Zenko said. "When other states have this technology, if they follow U.S. practice, it will lower the threshold for their uses of lethal force outside their borders. So they will be more likely to conduct targeted killings than they have in the past." The Obama administration appears to be aware of and concerned about setting precedents through its targeted-strike program. When the development of a disposition matrix to catalog both targets and resources marshaled against the United States was first reported in 2012, officials spoke about it in part as an effort to create a standardized process that would live beyond the current administration, underscoring the long duration of the counterterrorism challenge. Indeed, the president’s legal and security advisers have put considerable effort into establishing rules AND lead somebody to be subject for an engagement by the United States government." BEHIND CLOSED DOORS The argument against public debate is easy enough to understand: Operational secrecy is necessary AND public debate, which is going to be a hard one to win." But by keeping legal and policy positions secret, only partially sharing information even with congressional oversight committees, and declining to open a public discussion about drone use, the president and his team are asking the world to just trust that America is getting this right. While some will, many people, especially outside the United States, will see that approach as hypocritical, coming from a government that calls for transparency and the rule of law elsewhere. "I know these people, and I know how much they really, really AND would be giving you a different rendering, and much more uncertain rendering." That’s only part of the problem with the White House’s trust-us approach. AND ) an imminent threat of violent attack 5) against the United States. But that’s not who is being targeted. Setting aside the administration’s redefining of "imminence" beyond all recognition, the majority AND States (another precedent that might be eagerly seized upon in the future). U.S. defense and intelligence officials reject any suggestion that the targets are AND new Secretary of State John Kerry criticized during his confirmation hearing this year. Human-rights groups might be loudest in their criticism of both the program and AND by principles and rules of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights." PEER PRESSURE Obama promised in his 2013 State of the Union to increase the drone program’s transparency AND of the legal memos the Justice Department drafted in support of targeted killing. But, beyond that, it’s not certain Obama will do anything more to shine light on this program. Except in situations where leaks help it tell a politically expedient story of its skill at killing bad guys, the administration has done little to make a case to the public and the world at large for its use of armed drones. Already, what’s become apparent is that the White House is not interested in changing AND largely off the table now, according to intelligence officials and committee members. Under discussion within the administration and on Capitol Hill is a potential program takeover by AND provide no guarantee of greater transparency for the public, or even Congress. And if the administration is not willing to share with lawmakers who are security-cleared to know, it certainly is not prepared to engage in a sensitive discussion, even among allies, that might begin to set the rules on use for a technology that could upend stability in already fragile and strategically significant places around the globe. Time is running out to do so. "The history of technology development like this is, you never maintain your lead very long. Somebody always gets it," said David Berteau, director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "They’re going to become cheaper. They’re going to become easier. They’re going to become interoperable," he said. "The destabilizing effects are very, very serious." Berteau is not alone. Zenko, of the Council on Foreign Relations, has AND angles on this question are why you see them in conflict right now." That’s in part a symptom of the "technological optimism" that often plagues the U.S. security community when it establishes a lead over its competitors, noted Georgetown University’s Kai-Henrik Barth. After the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States was sure it would be decades before the Soviets developed a nuclear-weapon capability. It took four years. With drones, the question is how long before the dozens of states with the AND nations have gone down the pathway of first only surveillance and then arming." The opportunity to write rules that might at least guide, if not restrain, AND —to be closer to certain that their target is the right one. But even without raising standards, tightening up drone-specific restrictions in the standing AND , or 15 years—might find helpful in arguing against another’s actions. A not-insignificant faction of U.S. defense and intelligence experts, AND some weapons, including land mines, blinding lasers, and nuclear bombs. Arguably more significant than spotty legal regimes, however, is the behavior of the AND policy that it did most recently on "enhanced interrogation" of terrorists. The case against open, transparent rule-making is that it might only hamstring AND operations manual for other nations but a legal and moral one as well.
Geographic restrictions are key Rosa Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation, 4/23/13, The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf
Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn now to the legal framework applicable AND requirements as the use of other lawful means and methods of warfare.28 But if drones used in traditional armed conflicts or traditional self-defense situations present no "new" legal issues, some of the activities and policies enabled and facilitated by drone technologies pose significant challenges to existing legal frameworks. As I have discussed above, the availability of perceived low cost of drone technologies AND traditional or "hot" battlefields that their use challenges existing legal frameworks. Law is almost always out of date: we make legal rules based on existing AND is on the verge of doing significant damage to the rule of law. A. The Rule of Law At root, the idea of "rule of law" is fairly simple, AND processes and rules that reflect basic notions of justice, humanity and fairness. Precisely what constitutes a fair process is debatable, but most would agree that at AND Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a party. In ordinary circumstances, this bundle of universally acknowledged rights (together with international law AND States government called this an act of murder—an unlawful political assassination. B. Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict Of course, sometimes the "ordinary" legal rules do not apply. In AND the principles of necessity, humanity, proportionality,29 and distinction.30 It is worth briefly explaining these principles. The principle of necessity requires parties to AND in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Finally, the principle of discrimination or distinction requires that parties to a conflict direct their actions only against combatants and military objectives, and take appropriate steps to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.31 This is a radical oversimplification of a very complex body of law.32 But AND by military necessity34 — but there are far fewer constraints on state behavior. Technically, the law of war is referred to using the Latin term "lex specialis" – special law. It is applicable in—and only in — special circumstances (in this case, armed conflict), and in those special circumstances, it supersedes "ordinary law," or "lex generalis," the "general law" that prevails in peacetime. We have one set of laws for "normal" situations, and another, more flexible set of laws for "extraordinary" situations, such as armed conflicts. None of this poses any inherent problem for the rule of law. Having one body of rules that tightly restricts the use of force and another body of rules that is far more permissive does not fundamentally undermine the rule of law, as long as we have a reasonable degree of consensus on what circumstances trigger the "special" law, and as long as the "special law" doesn’t end up undermining the general law. To put it a little differently, war, with its very different rules, AND , and between places where there’s war and places where there’s no war. Let me return now to the question of drones and targeted killings. When all AND Libyan military targets is no more controversial than the use of manned aircraft. That is because our core rule of law concerns have mostly been satisfied: we AND in the event of error or abuse (the various governments involved).35 Once you take targeted killings outside hot battlefields, it’s a different story. The AND any time — with regard to any person the administration deems a combatant. The trouble is, no one outside a very small group within the US executive AND of the time, the US will not even officially acknowledge targeted killings. This leaves all the key rule-of-law questions related to the ongoing AND determinations, and what is the precise chain of command for such decisions? I think the rule of law problem here is obvious: when "armed conflict AND are they, as some human rights groups have argued, unlawful murder? C. Targeted Killing and the International Law of Self-Defense When faced with criticisms of the law of war framework as a justification for targeted AND that the defensive force used is otherwise consistent with law of war principles. Like law of war-based arguments, this general principle is superficially uncontroversial: if someone overseas is about to launch a nuclear weapon at New York City, no one can doubt that the United States has a perfect right (and the president has a constitutional duty) to use force if needed to prevent that attack, regardless of the attacker’s nationality. But once again, the devil is in the details. To start with, what constitutes an "imminent" threat? Traditionally, both international law and domestic criminal law understand that term narrowly: 37 to be "imminent," a threat cannot be distant or speculative.38 But much like the Bush Administration before it, the Obama Administration has put forward an interpretation of the word "imminent" that bears little relation to traditional legal concepts. According to a leaked 2011 Justice Department white paper39—the most detailed legal justification that has yet become public— the requirement of imminence "does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future." This seems, in itself, like a substantial departure from accepted international law definitions of imminence. But the White Paper goes even further, stating that "certain members of al AND identity or status (a familiar part of the law of armed conflict). That concept of imminence has been called Orwellian, and although that is an overused epithet, in this context it seems fairly appropriate. According to the Obama Administration, "imminent" no longer means "immediate," and in fact the very absence of clear evidence indicating specific present or future attack plans becomes, paradoxically, the basis for assuming that attack may perpetually be "imminent." The 2011 Justice Department White Paper notes that the use of force in self-defense must comply with general law of war principles of necessity, proportionality, humanity, and distinction. The White Paper offers no guidance on the specific criteria for determining when an individual is a combatant (or a civilian participating directly in hostilities), however. It also offers no guidance on how to determine if a use of force is necessary or proportionate. From a traditional international law perspective, this necessity and proportionality inquiry relates both to AND American citizen abroad — or against non-citizens, for that matter? As I have noted, it is impossible for outsiders to fully evaluate US drone strikes, since so much vital information remains classified. In most cases, we know little about the identities; activities or future plans of those targeted. Nevertheless, given the increased frequency of US targeted killings in recent years, it seems reasonable to wonder whether the Administration conducts a rigorous necessity or proportionality analysis in all cases. So far, the leaked 2011 Justice Department White Paper represents the most detailed legal AND citizens are less exacting than those the Administration views as applicable to citizens. Defenders of administration targeted killing policy acknowledge that the criteria for determining how to answer these many questions have not been made public, but insist that this should not be cause for concern. The Administration has reportedly developed a detailed "playbook" outlining the targeting criteria and procedures,40, and insiders insist that executive branch officials go through an elaborate process in which they carefully consider every possible issue before determining that a drone strike is lawful.41 No doubt they do, but this is somewhat cold comfort. Formal processes tend to further normalize once-exceptional activities — and "trust us" is a rather shaky foundation for the rule of law. Indeed, the whole point of the rule of law is that individual lives and freedom should not depend solely on the good faith and benevolence of government officials. As with law of war arguments, stating that US targeted killings are clearly legal under traditional self-defense principles requires some significant cognitive dissonance. Law exists to restrain untrammeled power. It is no doubt possible to make a plausible legal argument justifying each and every U.S. drone strike — but this merely suggests that we are working with a legal framework that has begun to outlive its usefulness. The real question isn’t whether U.S. drone strikes are "legal." The real question is this: Do we really want to live in a world in which the U.S. government’s justification for killing is so malleable? 5. Setting Troubling International Precedents Here is an additional reason to worry about the U.S. overreliance on AND human rights records, such as Russia and China—are taking notice. Right now, the United States has a decided technological advantage when it comes to AND for how to foment instability and –literally — get away with murder. Take the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been a core concept of the AND or in self-defense "in the event of an armed attack." The 2011 Justice Department White Paper asserts that targeted killings carried out by the United AND unable" to suppress that threat, the logic is in fact circular. It goes like this: The United States — using its own malleable definition of AND posed by Person X and the use of force again presents no problem. This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty, AND them to justify the killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities?
While there are some justifiable points for the targeted killing program that individuals behind the AND that certain components and the resulting implications of the program are categorically unfair.
Those conflicts go nuclear Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, "The costs and consequences of drone warfare," International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many of the traditional concepts AND powers, thus magnifying the risks of a spiral of conflict between them.
Drones cause SCS and ECS conflict – US precedent is key Bodeen 13 (Christopher, Beijing correspondent for The Associated Press, 5/3/2013, "China’s Drone Program Appears To Be Moving Into Overdrive", www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/03/china-drone-program_n_3207392.html)
Chinese aerospace firms have developed dozens of drones, known also as unmanned aerial vehicles AND rapidly and on the cusp of widespread use for surveillance and combat strikes. "My sense is that China is moving into large-scale deployments of UAVs," said Ian Easton, co-author of a recent report on Chinese drones for the Project 2049 Institute security think tank. China’s move into large-scale drone deployment displays its military’s growing sophistication and could challenge U.S. military dominance in the Asia-Pacific. It also could elevate the threat to neighbors with territorial disputes with Beijing, including Vietnam, Japan, India and the Philippines. China says its drones are capable of carrying bombs and missiles as well as conducting reconnaissance, potentially turning them into offensive weapons in a border conflict. China’s increased use of drones also adds to concerns about the lack of internationally recognized standards for drone attacks. The United States has widely employed drones as a means of eliminating terror suspects in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. "China is following the precedent set by the U.S. The thinking is that, `If the U.S. can do it, so can we. They’re a big country with security interests and so are we’," said Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the arms transfers program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, or SIPRI. "The justification for an attack would be that Beijing too has a responsibility for the safety of its citizens. There needs to be agreement on what the limits are," he said. Though China claims its military posture is entirely defensive, its navy and civilian maritime services have engaged in repeated standoffs with ships from other nations in the South China and East China seas. India, meanwhile, says Chinese troops have set up camp almost 20 kilometers (12 miles) into Indian-claimed territory. It isn’t yet known exactly what China’s latest drones are capable of, because, like most Chinese equipment, they remain untested in battle. The military and associated aerospace firms have offered little information, although in an interview last month with the official Xinhua News Agency, Yang Baikui, chief designer at plane maker COSIC, said Chinese drones were closing the gap but still needed to progress in half a dozen major areas, from airframe design to digital linkups. Executives at COSIC and drone makers ASN, Avic, and the 611 Institute declined to be interviewed by The Associated Press, citing their military links. The Defense Ministry’s latest report on the status of the military released in mid-April made no mention of drones, and spokesman Yang Yujun made only the barest acknowledgement of their existence in response to a question. "Drones are a new high-tech form of weaponry employed and used by many militaries around the world," Yang said. "China’s armed forces are developing weaponry and equipment for the purpose of upholding territorial integrity, national security and world peace. It will pose no threat to any country." Drones are already patrolling China’s borders, and a navy drone was deployed to the western province of Sichuan to provide aerial surveillance following last month’s deadly earthquake there. They may also soon be appearing over China’s maritime claims, including Japanese-controlled East China Sea islands that China considers its own. That could sharpen tensions in an area where Chinese and Japanese patrol boats already confront each other on a regular basis and Japan frequently scrambles fighters to tail Chinese manned aircraft.
SCS conflict causes extinction Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace 26 Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. AND —destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
Senkaku conflict causes extinction Baker 12 (Kevin R., Member of the Compensation Committee of Calfrac, Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee, served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Century Oilfield Services Inc. from August 2005 until November 10, 2009, when it was acquired by the Corporation. He also has served as the President of Baycor Capital Inc., 9/17/2012, "What Would Happen if China and Japan Went to War?", http://appreviews4u.com/2012/09/17/what-would-happen-if-china-and-japan-went-to-war/)
China is not an isolationist country but it is quite nationalistic. Their allies include, Russia, which is a big super power, Pakistan and Iran as well as North Korea. They have more allies than Japan, although most relations have been built on economic strategies, being a money-centric nation. Countries potentially hostile toward China in the event of a Japan vs. China war include Germany, Britain, Australia and South Korea. So even though Japan does not outwardly build relationships with allies, Japan would have allies rallying around them if China were to attack Japan. The island dispute would not play out as it did in the UK vs. Argentina island dispute, as both sides could cause massive damage to each other, whereas the UK was far superior in firepower compared to Argentina. Conclusion Even though China outweighs Japan in numbers, the likelihood that a war would develop into a nuclear war means that numbers don’t really mean anything anymore. The nuclear capabilities of Japan and China would mean that each country could destroy each other many times over. The island dispute would then escalate to possible mass extinction for the human race. The nuclear fall out would affect most of Asia and to a certain extent the AND maybe 20 years at best, if there are ample supplies of course.
India will strike militants in Pakistan – US precedent is key Siddique 13 (Qandeel, researcher and policy advisor based in Oslo. She specialises in international terrorism, political violence and South Asian affairs for the Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, 4/8/2013, "THE UNITED STATES’ DRONE PROGRAM IN PAKISTAN: An Analysis of the Efficacy and the Pakistani Government’s Complicity", strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner202013/2013-04-08_SISA4_DroneProgram_QandeelS.pdf)
While only a small share of countries presently possess armed drones, the demand for AND has declared its goal of acquiring "mass acquisition of armed UAVs.4
Causes escalation Keck 13 (Zachary Keck is Associate Editor of The Diplomat. He has previously served as a Deputy Editor for E-IR and as an Editorial Assistant for The Diplomat. Zach has published in various outlets such as Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The Atlantic, Foreign Affairs, and World Politics Review., 8/29/2013, "India Eyes Drone-Launched Smart Bombs", thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/08/29/india-eyes-drone-launched-smart-bombs/)
Yogesh Joshi, an expert on India’s strategic and missile capabilities at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, was slightly more optimistic. "It will take them a lot of time to get where U.S. and Israel are," Joshi told The Diplomat referring to DRDO. "However, DRDO is also benefiting a lot by collaboration with U.S. and particularly Israel. Given the fact ~that the~ U.S. is not as critical of India-Israel engagement as it used to be has benefited this relationship. So the progress may be much more speedy than we expect." Both experts also agreed that having such a capability would be useful to Delhi in a number of important areas. Karnad, who helped draft India’s nuclear doctrine in the late 1990s, said that there is a "whole bunch of tactical and strategic military uses," for drones armed with smart bombs, including "on the conventional military battlefield versus Pakistan and China, for deployment against terrorist training camps and staging areas/supply depots in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and to fight the Naxal insurgents active inside the country." Joshi had a similar assessment saying that the drones could be "used for fighting terrorism inside the country in remote areas of Jammu and Kashmir as well as anti-Naxal operations." He didn’t believe that the drones would be used to target anti-India militants inside Pakistan proper in the same way that the U.S. has used its drone fleet to carry out targeted strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters operating in Pakistan’s northwestern regions. "I think it will be foolish to use them against militants on foreign soil," Joshi said when asked by The Diplomat if the drones would be used inside Pakistan. He pointed out that Pakistan has repeatedly said it has the capability to shoot down U.S. drones, and Iran has in fact taken down a U.S. drone that was conducting surveillance operations in Iranian airspace. "For all obvious reasons, Pakistan certainly can’t shoot down U.S. drones. But in the case of India, it will not restrain itself at all. We would therefore be staring at… a loss of resources, international embarrassment as well as an escalation of conflict."
The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most AND lead to all-out war between the two that could quickly escalate.
Terror
CONTENTION THREE: TERRORISM
The plan is key to prevent an escalating public backlash against future drone use Zenko 13 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, "U.S. Drone Strike Policies", i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf?)
In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: "Where force AND if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.
Public backlash culminates in a legal crackdown that hemorrhages the targeted killing program Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School Professor, focus on national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, and conflict of laws, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense, Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, March 2012, Power and Constraint, P. 199-201
For the GTMO Bar and its cousin NGOs and activists, however, the al AND said Michael Ratner, explaining the CCR’s strategy for pursuing lawsuits in Europe. Clive Stafford Smith, a former CCR attorney who was instrumental in its early GTMO AND hard at work to stigmatize drones and those who support and operate them." This strategy is having an impact. The slew of lawsuits in the United States AND deemed to be in the interest of U.S. national security.
Support for the legality of global war against al-Qaeda is collapsing Robert Chesney, University of Texas School of Law Professor, 8/29/12, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138623
The drawdown in Afghanistan, combined with the expansion of the shadow war model, AND instead increasingly be rooted in other locations, such as Yemen and Somalia. It does not follow that LOAC accordingly will be irrelevant to future instances of detention AND provides a good example of an area ripe for such an analysis.190 But even in those cases, the very nature of the shadow war approach is AND a borderless armed conflict governed by LOAC wherever the parties may be found. The borderless-conflict position at first blush appears nicely entrenched in the status quo AND forward when new cases arise, as they are sure to do.192 Making matters worse, the U.S. government’s position on the relevance of AND provides a useful illustration, or perhaps more accurately, a cautionary tale.
* Though widely perceived at the time as a period of great legal controversy and uncertainty AND /11 decade will witness far more serious legal disputes as a result.
The plan is key to allied coop on counterterrorism David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the U.S. Department of Justice from March 2009 to March 2011, 6/15/2011, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/01_David-Kris.pdf
On the other side of the balance, certainly most of our friends in Europe AND the help of our allies, we need to work with them.77 More generally, we need to recognize the practical impact of our treatment of the AND cooperation from our allies and easier for the terrorists to find new recruits. This is not simply abstract philosophy. It is an important reality in our military’s AND hostilities, while we abandon those tools here in the United States.84
CNN should not have been surprised. Neither the Bush nor Obama administrations received blanket permission to transit Algerian airspace with surveillance planes or drones; instead, they received authorization only on a case-by-case basis and with advance notice. According to Washington Post journalist Craig Whitlock, the U.S. military relies AND .S. armed drones cannot be launched and recovered from naval platforms. According to Hollywood movies or television dramas, with its immense intelligence collection and military strike capabilities, the United States can locate, track, and kill anyone in the world. This misperception is continually reinvigorated by the White House’s, the CIA’s, and the AND doing a public opinion poll by virtue of giving me some good ideas." Similarly, as of November there were at least 10 movies about the Navy SEALs in production or in theaters, which included so much support from the Pentagon that one film even starred active-duty SEALs. The Obama administration’s lack of a military response in Algeria reflects how sovereign states routinely AND nations have complete discretion in regulating or prohibiting flights within their national airspace." Though not sexy and little reported, deploying CIA drones or special operations forces requires constant behind-the-scenes diplomacy: with very rare exceptions - like the Bin Laden raid - the U.S. military follows the rules of the world’s other 194 sovereign, independent states. These rules come in many forms. For example, basing rights agreements can limit AND assure that the United States did not violate its highly restrictive basing agreement. As Algeria is doing presently, the denial or approval of overflight rights is a AND the government has conducted an intermittent counterinsurgency against the Ogaden National Liberation Front.
Drones are effective and alternatives are worse—the plan prevents criticism Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, "Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington’s Weapon of Choice", www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)
Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, AND indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.
Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html)
I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and AND the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Drones solve safe havens – prevents an attack in the US Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida’s leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm’s way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida’s senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida’s central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan’s Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden’s letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military’s footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
Decapitation works—-studies Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He wrote this article while he was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Stanford University and at the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., Spring 2012, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47–79, "Does Decapitation Work?", www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076)
Conclusion Targeting militant leaders is now a centerpiece of U.S. strategy in AND from the battlefield to the shadows, this trend will likely remain true.
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, "Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence" SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
Causes US-Russia miscalc – extinction Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor 26 Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
Bioterror causes extinction Mhyrvold ’13 Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action," Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2 – 2013
As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the AND be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.
Ebola has capabilities of biological weaponization with catastrophic consequences, especially due to the fact AND can stream into the possible risk of bioterrorism during diagnostic research and procedures.
The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may well be the AND would be more than just a possibility, whatever promises had been made."
But until Islamabad cracks down more aggressively on groups attacking U.S. interests in the region and beyond, drones will remain an essential tool for fighting global terrorism. Numbering over three hundred and fifty since 2004, drone strikes in Pakistan have killed more than two dozen Al Qaeda operatives and hundreds of militants targeting U.S. and coalition forces. President Obama made clear in his May 23 speech at the National Defense University that AND that by preemptively striking at terrorists, many innocent lives had been saved. The most compelling evidence of the efficacy of the drone program came from Osama bin Laden himself, who shortly before his death contemplated moving Al Qaeda operatives from Pakistan into forested areas of Afghanistan in an attempt to escape the drones’ reach, according to Peter Bergen, renowned author of Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad. How to Reduce the Need for Drones The continuation of drone strikes signals U.S. frustration with Pakistan’s unwillingness to crack down consistently and comprehensively on groups that find sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal areas. There continue to be close ties between the Pakistan military and the Taliban-allied Haqqani Network, which attacks U.S. forces in Afghanistan and undermines the overall U.S. and NATO strategy there. The most recent U.S. drone attack inside Pakistani territory occurred last week against militants from the Haqqani Network located in North Waziristan, along the border with Afghanistan. In early June, drone missiles also targeted a group of fighters in Pakistan that were preparing to cross over into Afghanistan. On both occasions, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry condemned the attacks as counterproductive and said they raised serious questions about human rights. No doubt a better alternative to the drones would be Pakistani action against terrorist sanctuaries. But Pakistan has stonewalled repeated U.S. requests for operations against the Haqqani network. In addition to continuing drone strikes as necessary, the U.S. should further condition military aid to Pakistan based on its willingness to crack down on the Haqqani Network. In early June, the House of Representatives approved language in the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act that conditions reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) pending Pakistani actions against the Haqqani network. Hopefully, the language will be retained in the final bill. The United States provides CSF funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with stationing some one hundred thousand Pakistani troops along the border with Afghanistan. Pakistan has received over 2410 billion in CSF funding over the last decade. One must question the worth of having troops stationed in this region if they refuse to go after one of the most dangerous terrorist groups. Details of the relationship between the Pakistan military and the Haqqani Network are laid out AND helps to sustain the Haqqani group and enhance its effectiveness on the battlefield. Drones Help Pakistan It is no secret that the drone strikes often benefit the Pakistani state. On AND -up to the May elections, declaring a goal of killing democracy. Complicating the picture even further is the fact that Pakistan’s support for the Haqqani network indirectly benefits the Pakistani Taliban. The Haqqanis play a pivotal role in the region by simultaneously maintaining ties with Al Qaeda, Pakistani intelligence and anti-Pakistan groups like the TTP. With such a confused and self-defeating Pakistani strategy, Washington has no choice but to rely on the judicious use of drone strikes. Complicated Relationship The U.S. will need to keep a close eye on the tribal AND will remain of vital strategic interest for Washington for many years to come. Though the drone issue will continue to be a source of tension in the relationship, it is doubtful that it alone would derail ties. The extent to which the United States will continue to rely on drone strikes ultimately depends on Islamabad’s willingness to develop more decisive and comprehensive counterterrorism policies that include targeting groups like the Haqqani Network.
But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep AND Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner.
Plan
Plan: The United States Federal Government should restrict executive authority for targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
Solvency
CONTENTION FOUR: SOLVENCY
Plan’s mechanism is key to consensus-building on targeted killing norms Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
Legal scholars, policymakers, and state actors are embroiled in a heated debate about AND to govern intrastate conflicts) provides the answers that are so desperately needed. The zone approach proposed by this Article fills the international law gap, effectively mediating AND respond to grave threats to its security, wherever those threats are based. The United States has already adopted a number of policies that distinguish between zones of AND , and foreign policy gains make acceptance of this framework a worthy endeavor.
The plan is administration policy but just needs to be formalized Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
One might be skeptical that a nation like the United States would ever accept such constraints on the exercise of its authority. There are, however, several reasons why doing so would be in the United States’ best interest. First, as described in Section II.B, the general framework is largely consistent with current U.S. practice since 2006. The United States has, as a matter of policy, adopted important limits on its use of out-of-battlefield targeting and law-of-war detention suggesting an implicit recognition of the value and benefits of restraint. Second, while the proposed substantive and procedural safeguards are more stringent than those that AND detention without charge and targeted killing can yield legitimacy and security benefits. n218 Third, limiting the exercise of these authorities outside zones of active hostilities better accommodates AND development of an international consensus as to the rules that ought to apply. Fourth, such self-imposed restrictions are more consistent with the United States’ long-standing role as a champion of human rights and the rule of law a role that becomes difficult for the United States to play when viewed as supporting broad-based law-of-war authority that gives it wide latitude to employ force as a first resort and bypass otherwise applicable human rights and domestic law enforcement norms. Fifth, and critically, while the United States might be confident that it will AND American citizen, the United States would have few principled grounds for objecting.
What Should Congress Do? Does this analysis offer any practical policy prescriptions for Congress and the administration? The AND already seen by many as a legal non-starter under international law. Before addressing what Congress should do in this regard, we might ask from a AND Obama Administration. Perhaps it is better to let sleeping political dogs lie. These questions require difficult political calculations. However, the sources cited above suggest that AND when its sovereign prerogatives are challenged by the international soft-law community. The deeper issue here is not merely a strategic and political one about targeted killing AND a general approach of overt legislation that removes ambiguity is to be preferred. The single most important role for Congress to play in addressing targeted killings, therefore AND the task—as fundamental as it is—remains unfortunately poorly understood. Yet if it is really a matter of political consensus between Left and Right that AND as a very powerful, very important, and very legitimate sovereign state. Intellectually, continuing to squeeze all forms and instances of targeted killing by standoff platform AND itself a certain deformation of the IHL concept of hostilities and armed conflict.
2AC
2AC State Secret
1) Uniqueness disproves the link - if courts always defer on interpreting state secrets, they wouldn’t rule on those grounds or even take up a case that challenged Obama on following the restriction
2) The Court wouldn’t rule on the case - it’s a political question Delery et al ’12 STUART F. DELERY Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Division RUPA BHATTACHARYYA Director, Torts Branch MARY HAMPTON MASON Senior Trial Counsel D.C. Bar No. 427461 /s/ Paul E. Werner PAUL E. WERNER (MD Bar, under LCvR 83.2(e)) Trial Attorney United States Department of Justice, "DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS," http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/Dec2014-20122020Defendants~’20Motion20to20Dismiss.pdf-http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/Dec 14-2012 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.pdf
Plaintiffs’ Claims Raise Non-Justiciable Political Questions. At the core of their claims, Plaintiffs ask this Court to pass judgment on AND whether any factors the Supreme Court identified in Baker v. Carr apply.
3) Obama won’t backlash to plan - it’s already his internal policy - that’s Dworkin - means there’s no lawsuit to rule on the State Secret Doctrine
WASHINGTON — A federal appeals court held Friday that the Central Intelligence Agency must disclose AND memorandums related to the killing of both citizens and to targeted killings generally.
6) Broad interpretation of the doctrine is unsustainable - cases that limit its application key to strengthen it Frost 09 Amanda Frost, Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, AND, Justin Florence, Associate, O’Melveny 26 Myers, LLP; Nonresident Fellow, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, "Reforming the State Secrets Privilege", http://www.acslaw.org/files/Frost20FINAL.pdf-http://www.acslaw.org/files/Frost FINAL.pdf
As scholars, lawyers, and policymakers have recognized, the executive branch can place AND of the courts through excessive use of the state secrets privilege eventually backfire. When the executive branch deprives courts of the ability to perform their constitutional job of AND claims of privilege, it should better police its assertions of the privilege.
^^Naval power defense
2AC Spec Ops PIC
Perm do both
Perm do the CP – TK doesn’t include spec ops Bachmann 13 Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Reader in International Law (University of Lincoln); State Exam in Law (Ludwig-Maximilians Universität, Munich), Assessor Jur, LLM (Stellenbosch), LLD (Johannesburg); Sascha-Dominik is a Lieutenant Colonel in the German Army Reserves and had multiple deployments in peacekeeping missions in operational and advisory roles as part of NATO/KFOR from 2002 to 2006, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, "Targeted Killings: Contemporary Challenges, Risks and Opportunities", http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/05/31/jcsl.krt007.full
Operation ’Neptune Spear’ as well as the alleged Israeli Mossad Operation to kill the AND using remotely piloted aircraft, UAVs or drones respectively, as weapons platform.
Perm do the CP – the plan just says restrict the authority – we still restrict it via the CP they just specify further how that restriction occurs
PICs – reject the team Competitive equity – aff offense is impossible against plan mechanism – kills substantive clash Infinite regression leads to vague affs – nit-picky distinctions kill in-depth policy examination
No net benefit – TK only includes special ops that target specific individuals so isn’t restricted – their author Alston, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, 5/28/2010 (Philip, "Study on Targeted Killings," U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fourteenth Session, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf) A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator. In recent years, a few States have adopted policies, either openly or implicitly, of using targeted killings, including in the territories of other States.
Spec ops TK isn’t first resort now - capture and civilian tests are prior Anderson 11/1/13 Kenneth Anderson is professor of law at Washington College of Law, American University; a visiting fellow of the Hoover Institution and member of its Task Force on National Security and Law; and a non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, Lawfare, November 1, 2013, "The More You Attempt Capture Operations, the Less Feasible They Become", http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/the-more-you-attempt-capture-operations-the-less-feasible-they-become/
Feasibility of capture, as I explain in my Lawfare post, is a policy AND about the decision whether to put a team on the ground or not. The Somalia raid three weeks ago failed to capture its target; it has been AND a tool. Here is a bit from part III of the post:
The most glaring and critical operational deficit is the fact that, according to doctrine AND have been unable to fulfill their role of planning and conducting special operations. The second operational shortfall is the lack of unity of command. Special operations forces AND and host-nation governments even more complex and fraught with potential misunderstandings. The third operational shortfall is the lack of a mechanism to ensure that sustained special AND the desired results, such as those achieved in Colombia and the Philippines. In addition to these internal operational shortfalls, special operations forces and conventional military forces AND continuing reluctance to make the changes necessary to institutionalize and improve such innovations.
Spec ops ineffective - their ev exaggerates Exum 12 Andrew Exum is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and teaches a course in low-intensity conflict at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, World Politics Review, May 30, 2012, "Abu Muqawama: Special Operations Forces’ Expanding Global Role", http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12005/abu-muqawama-special-operations-forces-expanding-global-role
Third, U.S. special operations forces are not always as good as AND activities, as much as kinetic capabilities, are critical to successful counterinsurgency. Some U.S. special operations commanders are eager to convince policymakers that U.S. Army Special Forces, which receive some linguistic and cultural training, have such a sophisticated understanding of local dynamics in the various counterterrorism theaters where the U.S. is now engaged that they will be able to more easily intervene to weaken al-Qaida or associated movements. They may even believe this, and indeed most probably do. But Alexander Pope’s warning that a little learning can be a dangerous thing is worth AND his team and U.S. policy in a world of trouble. Before I myself enrolled in a graduate program in Middle Eastern Studies, I had AND asking hard questions about how to best utilize these forces in the future.
2AC CP 2
Perm Do the CP – it’s still a restriction on presidential use of force outside of a substantial number of zones of active hostilities
Perm do both
Solvency deficit – "active hostilities" is a term of art in international law – key to clarity and signal – that’s 1AC dworkin and Daskall
Here’s more ev – they send an ambiguous signal and spur backlash by forcing us to declare war on entire countries instead of regions of hostililites within them Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
This task is both necessary and inherently difficult. It is an attempt to develop AND that debate and discussion will help develop and refine the details over time. A. The Zone of Active Hostilities Commentary, political discourse, court rulings, and academic literature are rife with references AND of law as well as the normative and practical reasons for this distinction.
Treaty and Case Law While not explicitly articulated, the notion of a distinct zone of active hostilities where AND is actual or planned troop movement, even if no active fighting. n121 In a variety of contexts, U.S. courts also have opined on AND forces, and casualty counts to identify a theater of active conflict. n124 Conversely, U.S. courts have often assumed that areas in which there AND Bosnia, Pakistan, and Thailand as outside an active battle zone. n128 In defining what constitutes a conflict in the first place, international courts have similarly AND of material destruction." n130 Security Council attention is also deemed relevant. n131 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has similarly defined noninternational armed conflicts as "protracted armed confrontations" that involve a "minimum level of intensity." 2. Identifying the Zone Consistent with treaty and case law, overt and sustained fighting are key factors in AND recognition of the existence of a hot conflict zone, are also relevant. Linking the zone of active hostilities primarily to the duration and intensity of the fighting and to states’ own proclamations suffers, however, from an inherent circularity. A state can itself create a zone of active hostilities by ratcheting up violence or issuing a declaration of intent, thereby making previously unlawful actions lawful. n134 It is impossible to fully address this concern. The problem can, however, AND sufficiently intense and pervasive enough to create a new zone of active hostilities. 3. Geographic Scope of the Zone A secondary question relates to the geographic scope of the zone of active hostilities. AND control over any territory and is driven more by ideology than territorial ambition. This Article suggests a more nuanced, albeit still imperfect, approach: If the AND on both the conditions on the ground and preexisting state and administrative boundaries. It remains somewhat arbitrary, of course, to link the zone of hostilities to AND identifying the zone of active hostilities, at least over the short term.
1) Squo disproves – actual administration practice is geographically restricted now, so terrorists should’ve already priced in the advantage to relocating
2) No impact uq – the program’s going to collapse now, which makes everywhere a safe haven
3) Allied cooperation solves – extradition, police coop, and intel sharing are all key
4) No escalation – if an attack occurs in another place, then that becomes a zone of hostilies, which solves the impact
5) First resort/second resort distinction solves safe havens and turns legal uncertainty Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
It remains somewhat arbitrary, of course, to link the zone of hostilities to AND identifying the zone of active hostilities, at least over the short term. Over the long term, it would be preferable for the belligerent state to declare AND ~ reflect the actual fighting than would preexisting state or administrative boundaries. n138 Some likely will object that such an official designation would recreate the same safe havens AND that the target meets the enhanced criteria described in Section III.B.
6) Least necessary means is sufficient to solve Ryan Goodman 13, New York University School of Law Professor, 2/26/13, What the Critics of the "Lesser Evil" Rule (Still) Get Wrong: A Rejoinder to Corn, Blank, Jenks, and Jensen, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/goodman-responds-to-corn-blank-jenks-and-jensen-on-capture-instead-of-kill/
Finally, I must address CBJJ’s contention that my position would be impractical if applied AND is impractical because they misconstrue what it is (see Part I above).
7) Prefer specifics - our legal constraint is just not operationally constraining Robert Chesney, 10/4/13, Would Abandoning the War Model of Counterterrorism Make a Difference from a Legal Perspective?, www.newrepublic.com/article/114995/would-abandoning-war-model-counterterrorism-make-difference
What’s more, the convergence of current targeting policies and the pre-9/ AND be true postwar, at least insofar as the legal architecture is concerned.
8) First resort solves – it is the middle ground between a complete ban or failing to codify sovereignty Laurie Blank 10, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 1 DEFINING THE BATTLEFIELD IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT AND COUNTERTERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING THE PARAMETERS OF THE ZONE OF COMBAT, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677965? The ramifications of including areas within the zone of combat, such as the accompanying AND and extend the conflict by enabling them to regroup and continue their attacks. Alternatively, others argue that the lack of geographic limitations on the zone of combat AND , as more and more locations fall within the arena of military operations.
2AC Immigration
1) No immigration. No capital. Healthcare overwhelms. Ezra Klein, WaPo, 11/14/13, Wonkbook: A low for the Obama administration, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/11/14/wonkbook-a-new-low-for-the-obama-administration/
President Obama’s second term began with two clear projects. The first was to successfully AND "They suck unbelievably much, considering where we were six weeks ago."
2) Democratic infighting blocks Jonathan Allen, Politico, 11/14/13, Trust frays between Obama, Democrats, www.politico.com/story/2013/11/trust-frayed-between-obama-dems-99897.html?hp=t1_3
President Barack Obama’s credibility may have taken a big hit with voters, but he’s AND to existing critics, but open to new attacks from his own party. "I don’t know how he f—-ed this up so badly," said one House Democrat who has been very supportive of Obama in the past.
3) Not an opportunity cost—a logical policymaker could pass the agenda item and the plan
4) Plan is Congressional legal affirmation of executive operational policy—that disproves the logic of the inter-branch fight link – That’s Daskal and Dworkin
5) Alignment means congress is down with the plan too Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 59-60
Presidents and politicos alike have long recognized Congress’s ability to reduce the political costs that AND .S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution."36
6) If Obama is focusing capital on Immigration it disproves Obama would initiate a fight over the plan
7) And its empirically proven he’ll avoid the fight William Howell and Jon Pevehouse, Associate Professors at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, 2007, When Congress Stops Wars, Foreign Affairs, EBSCO
After all, when presidents anticipate congressional resistance they will not be able to overcome AND Pace, so as to avoid a clash with Congress over his reappointment.
8) Obama popularity collapse kills the agenda Jonathan Bernstein, 11/8/13, What matters, and what doesn’t, with Obama’s sliding approval numbers, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/11/08/what-matters-and-what-doesnt-with-obamas-sliding-approval-numbers/
Everyone is talking about Barack Obama’s falling numbers this week, with a new Pew AND more pressure there would probably be on states to join the Medicaid expansion.
9) Even if Obama had any political capital – it would be less than useless Reid Epstein, Politico, 11/10/13, White House seeks Republican immigration help, www.politico.com/story/2013/11/white-house-seeks-gop-immigration-help-99640.html
The government shutdown fight and Obama’s failure to establish relationships with Republicans haven’t helped either AND reform~ when he’s sort of scolding them about it all the time."
Relations are useless Ostapenko 9 (E. Ostapenko, Trend Daily News, 2009. "Normalization in U.S.-Russian relations not to change political situation in world: analyst at French studies institute," p. Lexis)
Normalization of relations between the United States and Russia will not assume a global significance AND a descent relationship with Russia and not totally antagonistic one," said Moisi.
In another blow to President Obama’s "reset policy" with Russia, Moscow and AND poison Moscow’s relationship with Washington, its European allies and Sunni Arab states.
1AR
The plan doesn’t alter US AQAP strategy Peter Margulies, Opinio Juris, 1/14/13, Boundaries of the Battlefield Symposium Insight, opiniojuris.org/2013/01/14/boundaries-of-the-battlefield-symposium-insight/
Marko Milanovic of the University of Nottingham, who has written insightfully on norm conflicts AND Professor Gill referred to naked self-defense as a "carnivorous hamster." The weapon of metaphor is a double-edged sword, and Ken’s critics may AND not trigger the risk of "war everywhere" that US critics fear.
11/17/13
Round 8 Navy
Tournament: Navy | Round: 8 | Opponent: Dartmouth College Kreus-Singh | Judge: Woodruff
1AC
Inherency
CONTENTION ONE: INHERENCY
Status quo administration policy delineates between geographic zones, but our legal justification for war everywhere remains in place Anthony Dworkin 13, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, "Drones And Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position", July, http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf
Two further points are worth noting. First, the administration has acknowledged that in AND the plans and capabilities of al-Qaeda and its associated forces".27 However, the details that have emerged about US targeting practices in the past few AND set an expansive precedent that is damaging to the international rule of law. Obama’s new policy on drones It is against this background that Obama’s recent counterterrorism speech and the policy directive he AND appeared to say that it might continue for 10 to 20 years.30 Second, the day before his speech, Obama set out regulations for drone strikes AND "near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed". In some respects, these standards remain unclear: the president did not specify how AND strikes will continue in the Pakistani tribal areas for the time being.33 However, the impact of the new policy will depend very much on how the AND that the level of attacks is hardly diminishing under the new guidelines.35 It is also notable that the new standards announced by Obama represent a policy decision AND to serve as a precedent for other states that wish to claim it.
The proliferation of drone technology has moved well beyond the control of the United States AND unmanned aerial vehicles. Not toys or models, but real flying machines. It’s a classic and common phase in the life cycle of a military innovation: AND the United States; it’s a precedent Washington does not want anyone following. America, the world’s leading democracy and a country built on a legal and moral framework unlike any other, has adopted a war-making process that too often bypasses its traditional, regimented, and rigorously overseen military in favor of a secret program never publicly discussed, based on legal advice never properly vetted. The Obama administration has used its executive power to refuse or outright ignore requests by congressional overseers, and it has resisted monitoring by federal courts. To implement this covert program, the administration has adopted a tool that lowers the AND -states involved but also destabilize entire regions and potentially upset geopolitical order. Hyperbole? Consider this: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out AND learned it by watching you. In Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. This is the unintended consequence of American drone warfare. For all of the attention AND uses of one of the most awesome military robotics capabilities of this generation. THE WRONG QUESTION The United States is the indisputable leader in drone technology and long-range strike AND billions of dollars that have gone into establishing and maintaining such a capability. That level of superiority leads some national security officials to downplay concerns about other nations’ AND the unparalleled intelligence-collection and data-analysis underpinning the aircraft’s mission. "There is what I think is just an unconstrained focus on a tool as AND who are interpreting the information that’s coming off the sensors on the aircraft." The analysts are part of the global architecture that makes precision strikes, and targeted AND ) outweigh the reward (judged by the value of the threat eliminated). "Is that a shovel or a rifle? Is that a Taliban member or AND . We can orbit long enough to be pretty sure about our target." Other countries, groups, and even individuals can and do fly drones. But no state or group has nearly the sophisticated network of intelligence and data analysis that gives the United States its strategic advantage. Although it would be foolish to dismiss the notion that potential U.S. adversaries aspire to attain that type of war-from-afar, pinpoint-strike capability, they have neither the income nor the perceived need to do so. That’s true, at least today. It’s also irrelevant. Others who employ drones are likely to carry a different agenda, one more concerned with employing a relatively inexpensive and ruthlessly efficient tool to dispatch an enemy close at hand. "It would be very difficult for them to create the global-strike architecture AND long-duration surveillance and potentially strike inside and right on its border." And that’s a NATO ally seeking the capability to conduct missions that would run afoul AND uses the aircraft to strike Lashkar-e-Taiba militants near Kashmir? "We don’t like other states using lethal force outside their borders. It’s destabilizing. It can lead to a sort of wider escalation of violence between two states," said Micah Zenko, a security policy and drone expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. "So the proliferation of drones is not just about the protection of the United States. It’s primarily about the likelihood that other states will increasingly use lethal force outside of their borders." LOWERING THE BAR Governments have covertly killed for ages, whether they maintained an official hit list or AND American security experts point to Russia as well, although Moscow disputes this. In the 1960s, the U.S. government was involved to differing levels AND late as 2001, Washington’s stated policy was to oppose Israel’s targeted killings.) When America adopted targeted killing again—first under the Bush administration after the September 11 attacks and then expanded by President Obama—the tools of the trade had changed. No longer was the CIA sending poison, pistols, and toxic cigars to assets overseas to kill enemy leaders. Now it could target people throughout al-Qaida’s hierarchy with accuracy, deliver lethal ordnance literally around the world, and watch the mission’s completion in real time. The United States is smartly using technology to improve combat efficacy, and to make AND , defense hawks and spendthrifts alike would criticize it if it did not. "If you believe that these folks are legitimate terrorists who are committing acts of AND Do we have the debate if an aircraft pilot drops a particular bomb?" But defense analysts argue—and military officials concede—there is a qualitative difference AND States would not have pursued an equivalent number of manned strikes in Pakistan. And what’s true for the United States will be true as well for other countries that own and arm remote piloted aircraft. "The drones—the responsiveness, the persistence, and without putting your personnel at risk—is what makes it a different technology," Zenko said. "When other states have this technology, if they follow U.S. practice, it will lower the threshold for their uses of lethal force outside their borders. So they will be more likely to conduct targeted killings than they have in the past." The Obama administration appears to be aware of and concerned about setting precedents through its targeted-strike program. When the development of a disposition matrix to catalog both targets and resources marshaled against the United States was first reported in 2012, officials spoke about it in part as an effort to create a standardized process that would live beyond the current administration, underscoring the long duration of the counterterrorism challenge. Indeed, the president’s legal and security advisers have put considerable effort into establishing rules AND lead somebody to be subject for an engagement by the United States government." BEHIND CLOSED DOORS The argument against public debate is easy enough to understand: Operational secrecy is necessary AND public debate, which is going to be a hard one to win." But by keeping legal and policy positions secret, only partially sharing information even with congressional oversight committees, and declining to open a public discussion about drone use, the president and his team are asking the world to just trust that America is getting this right. While some will, many people, especially outside the United States, will see that approach as hypocritical, coming from a government that calls for transparency and the rule of law elsewhere. "I know these people, and I know how much they really, really AND would be giving you a different rendering, and much more uncertain rendering." That’s only part of the problem with the White House’s trust-us approach. AND ) an imminent threat of violent attack 5) against the United States. But that’s not who is being targeted. Setting aside the administration’s redefining of "imminence" beyond all recognition, the majority AND States (another precedent that might be eagerly seized upon in the future). U.S. defense and intelligence officials reject any suggestion that the targets are AND new Secretary of State John Kerry criticized during his confirmation hearing this year. Human-rights groups might be loudest in their criticism of both the program and AND by principles and rules of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights." PEER PRESSURE Obama promised in his 2013 State of the Union to increase the drone program’s transparency AND of the legal memos the Justice Department drafted in support of targeted killing. But, beyond that, it’s not certain Obama will do anything more to shine light on this program. Except in situations where leaks help it tell a politically expedient story of its skill at killing bad guys, the administration has done little to make a case to the public and the world at large for its use of armed drones. Already, what’s become apparent is that the White House is not interested in changing AND largely off the table now, according to intelligence officials and committee members. Under discussion within the administration and on Capitol Hill is a potential program takeover by AND provide no guarantee of greater transparency for the public, or even Congress. And if the administration is not willing to share with lawmakers who are security-cleared to know, it certainly is not prepared to engage in a sensitive discussion, even among allies, that might begin to set the rules on use for a technology that could upend stability in already fragile and strategically significant places around the globe. Time is running out to do so. "The history of technology development like this is, you never maintain your lead very long. Somebody always gets it," said David Berteau, director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "They’re going to become cheaper. They’re going to become easier. They’re going to become interoperable," he said. "The destabilizing effects are very, very serious." Berteau is not alone. Zenko, of the Council on Foreign Relations, has AND angles on this question are why you see them in conflict right now." That’s in part a symptom of the "technological optimism" that often plagues the U.S. security community when it establishes a lead over its competitors, noted Georgetown University’s Kai-Henrik Barth. After the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States was sure it would be decades before the Soviets developed a nuclear-weapon capability. It took four years. With drones, the question is how long before the dozens of states with the AND nations have gone down the pathway of first only surveillance and then arming." The opportunity to write rules that might at least guide, if not restrain, AND —to be closer to certain that their target is the right one. But even without raising standards, tightening up drone-specific restrictions in the standing AND , or 15 years—might find helpful in arguing against another’s actions. A not-insignificant faction of U.S. defense and intelligence experts, AND some weapons, including land mines, blinding lasers, and nuclear bombs. Arguably more significant than spotty legal regimes, however, is the behavior of the AND policy that it did most recently on "enhanced interrogation" of terrorists. The case against open, transparent rule-making is that it might only hamstring AND operations manual for other nations but a legal and moral one as well.
Geographic restrictions are key Rosa Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation, 4/23/13, The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf
Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn now to the legal framework applicable AND requirements as the use of other lawful means and methods of warfare.28 But if drones used in traditional armed conflicts or traditional self-defense situations present no "new" legal issues, some of the activities and policies enabled and facilitated by drone technologies pose significant challenges to existing legal frameworks. As I have discussed above, the availability of perceived low cost of drone technologies AND traditional or "hot" battlefields that their use challenges existing legal frameworks. Law is almost always out of date: we make legal rules based on existing AND is on the verge of doing significant damage to the rule of law. A. The Rule of Law At root, the idea of "rule of law" is fairly simple, AND processes and rules that reflect basic notions of justice, humanity and fairness. Precisely what constitutes a fair process is debatable, but most would agree that at AND Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a party. In ordinary circumstances, this bundle of universally acknowledged rights (together with international law AND States government called this an act of murder—an unlawful political assassination. B. Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict Of course, sometimes the "ordinary" legal rules do not apply. In AND the principles of necessity, humanity, proportionality,29 and distinction.30 It is worth briefly explaining these principles. The principle of necessity requires parties to AND in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Finally, the principle of discrimination or distinction requires that parties to a conflict direct their actions only against combatants and military objectives, and take appropriate steps to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.31 This is a radical oversimplification of a very complex body of law.32 But AND by military necessity34 — but there are far fewer constraints on state behavior. Technically, the law of war is referred to using the Latin term "lex specialis" – special law. It is applicable in—and only in — special circumstances (in this case, armed conflict), and in those special circumstances, it supersedes "ordinary law," or "lex generalis," the "general law" that prevails in peacetime. We have one set of laws for "normal" situations, and another, more flexible set of laws for "extraordinary" situations, such as armed conflicts. None of this poses any inherent problem for the rule of law. Having one body of rules that tightly restricts the use of force and another body of rules that is far more permissive does not fundamentally undermine the rule of law, as long as we have a reasonable degree of consensus on what circumstances trigger the "special" law, and as long as the "special law" doesn’t end up undermining the general law. To put it a little differently, war, with its very different rules, AND , and between places where there’s war and places where there’s no war. Let me return now to the question of drones and targeted killings. When all AND Libyan military targets is no more controversial than the use of manned aircraft. That is because our core rule of law concerns have mostly been satisfied: we AND in the event of error or abuse (the various governments involved).35 Once you take targeted killings outside hot battlefields, it’s a different story. The AND any time — with regard to any person the administration deems a combatant. The trouble is, no one outside a very small group within the US executive AND of the time, the US will not even officially acknowledge targeted killings. This leaves all the key rule-of-law questions related to the ongoing AND determinations, and what is the precise chain of command for such decisions? I think the rule of law problem here is obvious: when "armed conflict AND are they, as some human rights groups have argued, unlawful murder? C. Targeted Killing and the International Law of Self-Defense When faced with criticisms of the law of war framework as a justification for targeted AND that the defensive force used is otherwise consistent with law of war principles. Like law of war-based arguments, this general principle is superficially uncontroversial: if someone overseas is about to launch a nuclear weapon at New York City, no one can doubt that the United States has a perfect right (and the president has a constitutional duty) to use force if needed to prevent that attack, regardless of the attacker’s nationality. But once again, the devil is in the details. To start with, what constitutes an "imminent" threat? Traditionally, both international law and domestic criminal law understand that term narrowly: 37 to be "imminent," a threat cannot be distant or speculative.38 But much like the Bush Administration before it, the Obama Administration has put forward an interpretation of the word "imminent" that bears little relation to traditional legal concepts. According to a leaked 2011 Justice Department white paper39—the most detailed legal justification that has yet become public— the requirement of imminence "does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future." This seems, in itself, like a substantial departure from accepted international law definitions of imminence. But the White Paper goes even further, stating that "certain members of al AND identity or status (a familiar part of the law of armed conflict). That concept of imminence has been called Orwellian, and although that is an overused epithet, in this context it seems fairly appropriate. According to the Obama Administration, "imminent" no longer means "immediate," and in fact the very absence of clear evidence indicating specific present or future attack plans becomes, paradoxically, the basis for assuming that attack may perpetually be "imminent." The 2011 Justice Department White Paper notes that the use of force in self-defense must comply with general law of war principles of necessity, proportionality, humanity, and distinction. The White Paper offers no guidance on the specific criteria for determining when an individual is a combatant (or a civilian participating directly in hostilities), however. It also offers no guidance on how to determine if a use of force is necessary or proportionate. From a traditional international law perspective, this necessity and proportionality inquiry relates both to AND American citizen abroad — or against non-citizens, for that matter? As I have noted, it is impossible for outsiders to fully evaluate US drone strikes, since so much vital information remains classified. In most cases, we know little about the identities; activities or future plans of those targeted. Nevertheless, given the increased frequency of US targeted killings in recent years, it seems reasonable to wonder whether the Administration conducts a rigorous necessity or proportionality analysis in all cases. So far, the leaked 2011 Justice Department White Paper represents the most detailed legal AND citizens are less exacting than those the Administration views as applicable to citizens. Defenders of administration targeted killing policy acknowledge that the criteria for determining how to answer these many questions have not been made public, but insist that this should not be cause for concern. The Administration has reportedly developed a detailed "playbook" outlining the targeting criteria and procedures,40, and insiders insist that executive branch officials go through an elaborate process in which they carefully consider every possible issue before determining that a drone strike is lawful.41 No doubt they do, but this is somewhat cold comfort. Formal processes tend to further normalize once-exceptional activities — and "trust us" is a rather shaky foundation for the rule of law. Indeed, the whole point of the rule of law is that individual lives and freedom should not depend solely on the good faith and benevolence of government officials. As with law of war arguments, stating that US targeted killings are clearly legal under traditional self-defense principles requires some significant cognitive dissonance. Law exists to restrain untrammeled power. It is no doubt possible to make a plausible legal argument justifying each and every U.S. drone strike — but this merely suggests that we are working with a legal framework that has begun to outlive its usefulness. The real question isn’t whether U.S. drone strikes are "legal." The real question is this: Do we really want to live in a world in which the U.S. government’s justification for killing is so malleable? 5. Setting Troubling International Precedents Here is an additional reason to worry about the U.S. overreliance on AND human rights records, such as Russia and China—are taking notice. Right now, the United States has a decided technological advantage when it comes to AND for how to foment instability and –literally — get away with murder. Take the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been a core concept of the AND or in self-defense "in the event of an armed attack." The 2011 Justice Department White Paper asserts that targeted killings carried out by the United AND unable" to suppress that threat, the logic is in fact circular. It goes like this: The United States — using its own malleable definition of AND posed by Person X and the use of force again presents no problem. This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty, AND them to justify the killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities?
While there are some justifiable points for the targeted killing program that individuals behind the AND that certain components and the resulting implications of the program are categorically unfair.
Those conflicts go nuclear Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, "The costs and consequences of drone warfare," International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many of the traditional concepts AND powers, thus magnifying the risks of a spiral of conflict between them.
Drones cause SCS and ECS conflict – US precedent is key Bodeen 13 (Christopher, Beijing correspondent for The Associated Press, 5/3/2013, "China’s Drone Program Appears To Be Moving Into Overdrive", www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/03/china-drone-program_n_3207392.html)
Chinese aerospace firms have developed dozens of drones, known also as unmanned aerial vehicles AND rapidly and on the cusp of widespread use for surveillance and combat strikes. "My sense is that China is moving into large-scale deployments of UAVs," said Ian Easton, co-author of a recent report on Chinese drones for the Project 2049 Institute security think tank. China’s move into large-scale drone deployment displays its military’s growing sophistication and could challenge U.S. military dominance in the Asia-Pacific. It also could elevate the threat to neighbors with territorial disputes with Beijing, including Vietnam, Japan, India and the Philippines. China says its drones are capable of carrying bombs and missiles as well as conducting reconnaissance, potentially turning them into offensive weapons in a border conflict. China’s increased use of drones also adds to concerns about the lack of internationally recognized standards for drone attacks. The United States has widely employed drones as a means of eliminating terror suspects in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. "China is following the precedent set by the U.S. The thinking is that, `If the U.S. can do it, so can we. They’re a big country with security interests and so are we’," said Siemon Wezeman, a senior fellow at the arms transfers program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, or SIPRI. "The justification for an attack would be that Beijing too has a responsibility for the safety of its citizens. There needs to be agreement on what the limits are," he said. Though China claims its military posture is entirely defensive, its navy and civilian maritime services have engaged in repeated standoffs with ships from other nations in the South China and East China seas. India, meanwhile, says Chinese troops have set up camp almost 20 kilometers (12 miles) into Indian-claimed territory. It isn’t yet known exactly what China’s latest drones are capable of, because, like most Chinese equipment, they remain untested in battle. The military and associated aerospace firms have offered little information, although in an interview last month with the official Xinhua News Agency, Yang Baikui, chief designer at plane maker COSIC, said Chinese drones were closing the gap but still needed to progress in half a dozen major areas, from airframe design to digital linkups. Executives at COSIC and drone makers ASN, Avic, and the 611 Institute declined to be interviewed by The Associated Press, citing their military links. The Defense Ministry’s latest report on the status of the military released in mid-April made no mention of drones, and spokesman Yang Yujun made only the barest acknowledgement of their existence in response to a question. "Drones are a new high-tech form of weaponry employed and used by many militaries around the world," Yang said. "China’s armed forces are developing weaponry and equipment for the purpose of upholding territorial integrity, national security and world peace. It will pose no threat to any country." Drones are already patrolling China’s borders, and a navy drone was deployed to the western province of Sichuan to provide aerial surveillance following last month’s deadly earthquake there. They may also soon be appearing over China’s maritime claims, including Japanese-controlled East China Sea islands that China considers its own. That could sharpen tensions in an area where Chinese and Japanese patrol boats already confront each other on a regular basis and Japan frequently scrambles fighters to tail Chinese manned aircraft.
SCS conflict causes extinction Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace 26 Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. AND —destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
Senkaku conflict causes extinction Baker 12 (Kevin R., Member of the Compensation Committee of Calfrac, Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee, served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Century Oilfield Services Inc. from August 2005 until November 10, 2009, when it was acquired by the Corporation. He also has served as the President of Baycor Capital Inc., 9/17/2012, "What Would Happen if China and Japan Went to War?", http://appreviews4u.com/2012/09/17/what-would-happen-if-china-and-japan-went-to-war/)
China is not an isolationist country but it is quite nationalistic. Their allies include, Russia, which is a big super power, Pakistan and Iran as well as North Korea. They have more allies than Japan, although most relations have been built on economic strategies, being a money-centric nation. Countries potentially hostile toward China in the event of a Japan vs. China war include Germany, Britain, Australia and South Korea. So even though Japan does not outwardly build relationships with allies, Japan would have allies rallying around them if China were to attack Japan. The island dispute would not play out as it did in the UK vs. Argentina island dispute, as both sides could cause massive damage to each other, whereas the UK was far superior in firepower compared to Argentina. Conclusion Even though China outweighs Japan in numbers, the likelihood that a war would develop into a nuclear war means that numbers don’t really mean anything anymore. The nuclear capabilities of Japan and China would mean that each country could destroy each other many times over. The island dispute would then escalate to possible mass extinction for the human race. The nuclear fall out would affect most of Asia and to a certain extent the AND maybe 20 years at best, if there are ample supplies of course.
India will strike militants in Pakistan – US precedent is key Siddique 13 (Qandeel, researcher and policy advisor based in Oslo. She specialises in international terrorism, political violence and South Asian affairs for the Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, 4/8/2013, "THE UNITED STATES’ DRONE PROGRAM IN PAKISTAN: An Analysis of the Efficacy and the Pakistani Government’s Complicity", strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner202013/2013-04-08_SISA4_DroneProgram_QandeelS.pdf)
While only a small share of countries presently possess armed drones, the demand for AND has declared its goal of acquiring "mass acquisition of armed UAVs.4
Causes escalation Keck 13 (Zachary Keck is Associate Editor of The Diplomat. He has previously served as a Deputy Editor for E-IR and as an Editorial Assistant for The Diplomat. Zach has published in various outlets such as Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The Atlantic, Foreign Affairs, and World Politics Review., 8/29/2013, "India Eyes Drone-Launched Smart Bombs", thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/08/29/india-eyes-drone-launched-smart-bombs/)
Yogesh Joshi, an expert on India’s strategic and missile capabilities at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, was slightly more optimistic. "It will take them a lot of time to get where U.S. and Israel are," Joshi told The Diplomat referring to DRDO. "However, DRDO is also benefiting a lot by collaboration with U.S. and particularly Israel. Given the fact ~that the~ U.S. is not as critical of India-Israel engagement as it used to be has benefited this relationship. So the progress may be much more speedy than we expect." Both experts also agreed that having such a capability would be useful to Delhi in a number of important areas. Karnad, who helped draft India’s nuclear doctrine in the late 1990s, said that there is a "whole bunch of tactical and strategic military uses," for drones armed with smart bombs, including "on the conventional military battlefield versus Pakistan and China, for deployment against terrorist training camps and staging areas/supply depots in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and to fight the Naxal insurgents active inside the country." Joshi had a similar assessment saying that the drones could be "used for fighting terrorism inside the country in remote areas of Jammu and Kashmir as well as anti-Naxal operations." He didn’t believe that the drones would be used to target anti-India militants inside Pakistan proper in the same way that the U.S. has used its drone fleet to carry out targeted strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters operating in Pakistan’s northwestern regions. "I think it will be foolish to use them against militants on foreign soil," Joshi said when asked by The Diplomat if the drones would be used inside Pakistan. He pointed out that Pakistan has repeatedly said it has the capability to shoot down U.S. drones, and Iran has in fact taken down a U.S. drone that was conducting surveillance operations in Iranian airspace. "For all obvious reasons, Pakistan certainly can’t shoot down U.S. drones. But in the case of India, it will not restrain itself at all. We would therefore be staring at… a loss of resources, international embarrassment as well as an escalation of conflict."
The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most AND lead to all-out war between the two that could quickly escalate.
Terror
CONTENTION THREE: TERRORISM
The plan is key to prevent an escalating public backlash against future drone use Zenko 13 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, "U.S. Drone Strike Policies", i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf?)
In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: "Where force AND if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.
Public backlash culminates in a legal crackdown that hemorrhages the targeted killing program Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School Professor, focus on national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, and conflict of laws, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense, Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, March 2012, Power and Constraint, P. 199-201
For the GTMO Bar and its cousin NGOs and activists, however, the al AND said Michael Ratner, explaining the CCR’s strategy for pursuing lawsuits in Europe. Clive Stafford Smith, a former CCR attorney who was instrumental in its early GTMO AND hard at work to stigmatize drones and those who support and operate them." This strategy is having an impact. The slew of lawsuits in the United States AND deemed to be in the interest of U.S. national security.
Support for the legality of global war against al-Qaeda is collapsing Robert Chesney, University of Texas School of Law Professor, 8/29/12, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138623
The drawdown in Afghanistan, combined with the expansion of the shadow war model, AND instead increasingly be rooted in other locations, such as Yemen and Somalia. It does not follow that LOAC accordingly will be irrelevant to future instances of detention AND provides a good example of an area ripe for such an analysis.190 But even in those cases, the very nature of the shadow war approach is AND a borderless armed conflict governed by LOAC wherever the parties may be found. The borderless-conflict position at first blush appears nicely entrenched in the status quo AND forward when new cases arise, as they are sure to do.192 Making matters worse, the U.S. government’s position on the relevance of AND provides a useful illustration, or perhaps more accurately, a cautionary tale.
* Though widely perceived at the time as a period of great legal controversy and uncertainty AND /11 decade will witness far more serious legal disputes as a result.
The plan is key to allied coop on counterterrorism David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the U.S. Department of Justice from March 2009 to March 2011, 6/15/2011, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/01_David-Kris.pdf
On the other side of the balance, certainly most of our friends in Europe AND the help of our allies, we need to work with them.77 More generally, we need to recognize the practical impact of our treatment of the AND cooperation from our allies and easier for the terrorists to find new recruits. This is not simply abstract philosophy. It is an important reality in our military’s AND hostilities, while we abandon those tools here in the United States.84
CNN should not have been surprised. Neither the Bush nor Obama administrations received blanket permission to transit Algerian airspace with surveillance planes or drones; instead, they received authorization only on a case-by-case basis and with advance notice. According to Washington Post journalist Craig Whitlock, the U.S. military relies AND .S. armed drones cannot be launched and recovered from naval platforms. According to Hollywood movies or television dramas, with its immense intelligence collection and military strike capabilities, the United States can locate, track, and kill anyone in the world. This misperception is continually reinvigorated by the White House’s, the CIA’s, and the AND doing a public opinion poll by virtue of giving me some good ideas." Similarly, as of November there were at least 10 movies about the Navy SEALs in production or in theaters, which included so much support from the Pentagon that one film even starred active-duty SEALs. The Obama administration’s lack of a military response in Algeria reflects how sovereign states routinely AND nations have complete discretion in regulating or prohibiting flights within their national airspace." Though not sexy and little reported, deploying CIA drones or special operations forces requires constant behind-the-scenes diplomacy: with very rare exceptions - like the Bin Laden raid - the U.S. military follows the rules of the world’s other 194 sovereign, independent states. These rules come in many forms. For example, basing rights agreements can limit AND assure that the United States did not violate its highly restrictive basing agreement. As Algeria is doing presently, the denial or approval of overflight rights is a AND the government has conducted an intermittent counterinsurgency against the Ogaden National Liberation Front.
Drones are effective and alternatives are worse—the plan prevents criticism Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, "Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington’s Weapon of Choice", www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)
Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, AND indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.
Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html)
I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and AND the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Drones solve safe havens – prevents an attack in the US Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida’s leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm’s way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida’s senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida’s central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan’s Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden’s letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military’s footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
Decapitation works—-studies Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. He wrote this article while he was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Stanford University and at the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., Spring 2012, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 47–79, "Does Decapitation Work?", www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00076)
Conclusion Targeting militant leaders is now a centerpiece of U.S. strategy in AND from the battlefield to the shadows, this trend will likely remain true.
Nuclear terrorism causes extinction Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, "Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence" SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
Causes US-Russia miscalc – extinction Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor 26 Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
Bioterror causes extinction Mhyrvold ’13 Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action," Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2 – 2013
As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the AND be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.
Ebola has capabilities of biological weaponization with catastrophic consequences, especially due to the fact AND can stream into the possible risk of bioterrorism during diagnostic research and procedures.
The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may well be the AND would be more than just a possibility, whatever promises had been made."
But until Islamabad cracks down more aggressively on groups attacking U.S. interests in the region and beyond, drones will remain an essential tool for fighting global terrorism. Numbering over three hundred and fifty since 2004, drone strikes in Pakistan have killed more than two dozen Al Qaeda operatives and hundreds of militants targeting U.S. and coalition forces. President Obama made clear in his May 23 speech at the National Defense University that AND that by preemptively striking at terrorists, many innocent lives had been saved. The most compelling evidence of the efficacy of the drone program came from Osama bin Laden himself, who shortly before his death contemplated moving Al Qaeda operatives from Pakistan into forested areas of Afghanistan in an attempt to escape the drones’ reach, according to Peter Bergen, renowned author of Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad. How to Reduce the Need for Drones The continuation of drone strikes signals U.S. frustration with Pakistan’s unwillingness to crack down consistently and comprehensively on groups that find sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal areas. There continue to be close ties between the Pakistan military and the Taliban-allied Haqqani Network, which attacks U.S. forces in Afghanistan and undermines the overall U.S. and NATO strategy there. The most recent U.S. drone attack inside Pakistani territory occurred last week against militants from the Haqqani Network located in North Waziristan, along the border with Afghanistan. In early June, drone missiles also targeted a group of fighters in Pakistan that were preparing to cross over into Afghanistan. On both occasions, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry condemned the attacks as counterproductive and said they raised serious questions about human rights. No doubt a better alternative to the drones would be Pakistani action against terrorist sanctuaries. But Pakistan has stonewalled repeated U.S. requests for operations against the Haqqani network. In addition to continuing drone strikes as necessary, the U.S. should further condition military aid to Pakistan based on its willingness to crack down on the Haqqani Network. In early June, the House of Representatives approved language in the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act that conditions reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) pending Pakistani actions against the Haqqani network. Hopefully, the language will be retained in the final bill. The United States provides CSF funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with stationing some one hundred thousand Pakistani troops along the border with Afghanistan. Pakistan has received over 2410 billion in CSF funding over the last decade. One must question the worth of having troops stationed in this region if they refuse to go after one of the most dangerous terrorist groups. Details of the relationship between the Pakistan military and the Haqqani Network are laid out AND helps to sustain the Haqqani group and enhance its effectiveness on the battlefield. Drones Help Pakistan It is no secret that the drone strikes often benefit the Pakistani state. On AND -up to the May elections, declaring a goal of killing democracy. Complicating the picture even further is the fact that Pakistan’s support for the Haqqani network indirectly benefits the Pakistani Taliban. The Haqqanis play a pivotal role in the region by simultaneously maintaining ties with Al Qaeda, Pakistani intelligence and anti-Pakistan groups like the TTP. With such a confused and self-defeating Pakistani strategy, Washington has no choice but to rely on the judicious use of drone strikes. Complicated Relationship The U.S. will need to keep a close eye on the tribal AND will remain of vital strategic interest for Washington for many years to come. Though the drone issue will continue to be a source of tension in the relationship, it is doubtful that it alone would derail ties. The extent to which the United States will continue to rely on drone strikes ultimately depends on Islamabad’s willingness to develop more decisive and comprehensive counterterrorism policies that include targeting groups like the Haqqani Network.
But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep AND Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner.
Plan
Plan: The United States Federal Government should restrict executive authority for targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
Solvency
CONTENTION FOUR: SOLVENCY
Plan’s mechanism is key to consensus-building on targeted killing norms Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
Legal scholars, policymakers, and state actors are embroiled in a heated debate about AND to govern intrastate conflicts) provides the answers that are so desperately needed. The zone approach proposed by this Article fills the international law gap, effectively mediating AND respond to grave threats to its security, wherever those threats are based. The United States has already adopted a number of policies that distinguish between zones of AND , and foreign policy gains make acceptance of this framework a worthy endeavor.
The plan is administration policy but just needs to be formalized Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165
One might be skeptical that a nation like the United States would ever accept such constraints on the exercise of its authority. There are, however, several reasons why doing so would be in the United States’ best interest. First, as described in Section II.B, the general framework is largely consistent with current U.S. practice since 2006. The United States has, as a matter of policy, adopted important limits on its use of out-of-battlefield targeting and law-of-war detention suggesting an implicit recognition of the value and benefits of restraint. Second, while the proposed substantive and procedural safeguards are more stringent than those that AND detention without charge and targeted killing can yield legitimacy and security benefits. n218 Third, limiting the exercise of these authorities outside zones of active hostilities better accommodates AND development of an international consensus as to the rules that ought to apply. Fourth, such self-imposed restrictions are more consistent with the United States’ long-standing role as a champion of human rights and the rule of law a role that becomes difficult for the United States to play when viewed as supporting broad-based law-of-war authority that gives it wide latitude to employ force as a first resort and bypass otherwise applicable human rights and domestic law enforcement norms. Fifth, and critically, while the United States might be confident that it will AND American citizen, the United States would have few principled grounds for objecting.
What Should Congress Do? Does this analysis offer any practical policy prescriptions for Congress and the administration? The AND already seen by many as a legal non-starter under international law. Before addressing what Congress should do in this regard, we might ask from a AND Obama Administration. Perhaps it is better to let sleeping political dogs lie. These questions require difficult political calculations. However, the sources cited above suggest that AND when its sovereign prerogatives are challenged by the international soft-law community. The deeper issue here is not merely a strategic and political one about targeted killing AND a general approach of overt legislation that removes ambiguity is to be preferred. The single most important role for Congress to play in addressing targeted killings, therefore AND the task—as fundamental as it is—remains unfortunately poorly understood. Yet if it is really a matter of political consensus between Left and Right that AND as a very powerful, very important, and very legitimate sovereign state. Intellectually, continuing to squeeze all forms and instances of targeted killing by standoff platform AND itself a certain deformation of the IHL concept of hostilities and armed conflict.
THIS is how wars usually start: with a steadily escalating stand-off over something intrinsically worthless. So don’t be too surprised if the US and Japan go to war with China next year over the uninhabited rocks that Japan calls the Senkakus and China calls the Diaoyu islands. And don’t assume the war would be contained and short. Of course we should all hope that common sense prevails. It seems almost laughably unthinkable that the world’s three richest countries - two of them AND wealth and power of Athens, and the fear this caused in Sparta. The analogy with Asia today is uncomfortably close and not at all reassuring. No one in 431BC really wanted a war, but when Athens threatened one of Sparta’s allies over a disputed colony, the Spartans felt they had to intervene. They feared that to step back in the face of Athens’ growing power would fatally compromise Sparta’s position in the Greek world, and concede supremacy to Athens. The Senkakus issue is likewise a symptom of tensions whose cause lies elsewhere, in China’s growing challenge to America’s long-standing leadership in Asia, and America’s response. In the past few years China has become both markedly stronger and notably more assertive. America has countered with the strategic pivot to Asia. Now, China is pushing back against President Barack Obama’s pivot by targeting Japan in the Senkakus. The Japanese themselves genuinely fear that China will become even more overbearing as its strength grows, and they depend on America to protect them. But they also worry whether they can rely on Washington as China becomes more formidable. China’s ratcheting pressure over the Senkakus strikes at both these anxieties. The push and shove over the islands has been escalating for months. Just before Japan’s recent election, China flew surveillance aircraft over the islands for the first time, and since the election both sides have reiterated their tough talk. Where will it end? The risk is that, without a clear circuit-breaker, the escalation will continue until at some point shots are exchanged, and a spiral to war begins that no one can stop. Neither side could win such a war, and it would be devastating not just for them but for the rest of us. No one wants this, but the crisis will not stop by itself. One side or other, or both, will have to take positive steps to break the cycle of action and reaction. This will be difficult, because any concession by either side would so easily be seen as a backdown, with huge domestic political costs and international implications. It would therefore need real political strength and skill, which is in short supply all round - especially in Tokyo and Beijing, which both have new and untested leaders. And each side apparently hopes that they will not have to face this test, because they expect the other side will back down first. Beijing apparently believes that if it keeps pushing, Washington will persuade Tokyo to make concessions over the disputed islands in order to avoid being dragged into a war with China, which would be a big win for them. Tokyo on the other hand fervently hopes that, faced with firm US support for Japan, China will have no choice but to back down. And in Washington, too, most people seem to think China will back off. They argue that China needs America more than America needs China, and that Beijing will back down rather than risk a break with the US which would devastate China’s economy. Unfortunately, the Chinese seem to see things differently. They believe America will not risk a break with China because America’s economy would suffer so much. These mutual misconceptions carry the seeds of a terrible miscalculation, as each side underestimates AND the kind of issues that great powers have often gone to war over.
Terror
Wrong Hoffman 13 (Bruce, director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, 17 July 2013, "Al Qaeda’s Uncertain Future," Studies in Conflict 26 Terrorism, Volume 36, Issue 8, Taylor 26 Francis)
The fundamental argument presented in this article, however, advocates a more cautious, AND , having, despite all odds, survived for nearly a quarter century. In this respect, the "Arab Spring," and especially the ongoing unrest and AND needed to ensure its continued existence for at least the next five years. Throughout its history, the oxygen that Al Qaeda depends on has ineluctably been its AND complementing its existing outposts in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia. It must also be noted that the Al Qaeda Core has stubbornly survived despite predictions AND , before more expansively declaring that "we’re close to dismantling them."12
K
1) The ballot should simulate the effects of the 1AC —they should only defend the squo or a competitive advocacy based off plan action—key to fairness and relevant decision making
The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law AND full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official ("TopOff") exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the AND focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge AND and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem AND student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the AND that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and AND giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal ~1 AND Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount AND execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise AND but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution AND , generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – AND simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) AND many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize AND to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the AND exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during AND , while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop AND uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account AND weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might AND through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts AND , giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to AND relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives ( AND , or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law AND releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, AND the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students AND opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who AND concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the AND both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, AND greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national AND to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, AND in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model AND undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.
3) Perm – do both
4) Perm – do the plan in the mindset of the alternative
5) The critique refuses to accept the falsifiable test our evidence goes through – disproves their methodology, destroys academic debate
6) Method focus undermines scholarly action Jackson 11, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, ’11 (Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)
Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of "falsification" and AND Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can AND goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.
One speech act doesn’t cause securitization – it’s an ongoing process Ghughunishvili 10 Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf
As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance AND the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.
The alt doesn’t spillover Mearsheimer 1, Poli. Sci. Prof. @ U. Chicago, (John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics)
Great powers cannot commit themselves to the pursuit of a peaceful world order for two AND Treaty of Versailles, not sur¬prisingly, did little to promote European stability. Furthermore, consider American thinking on how to achieve stability in Europe in the early AND it led directly to the Berlin crises of 1958-59 and 1961." Second, great powers cannot put aside power considerations and work to promote international peace AND with the broader interests of the international community, invariably die at birth.
The alt fails and destroys minority rights – sectarian violence causes re-securitization Roe, Assistant Professor, International Relations and European Studies – Central European University, ’4 (Paul, "Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization," Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3, September)
Aradau’s (valuable) contentions aside, what I want to emphasize here is the AND mechanisms through which the justification for emergency politics on both sides is reduced. Diagnosis of problems in our methodology fails in the absence of a positive alternative. Only PRAGMATIC POLICY options can break this deadlock Varisco 7 Reading orientalism: said and the unsaid (Google eBook) Dr. Daniel Martin Varisco is chair of anthropology and director of Middle Eastern and Central Asia studies at Hofstra University. He is fluent in Arabic and has lived in the Middle East (Yemen, Egypt, Qatar) for over 5 years since 1978. He has done fieldwork in Yemen, Egypt, Qatar, U.A.E. and Guatemala.
In sum, the essential argument of Orientalism is that a pervasive and endemic AND sound scholarship of the real Orient that Said so passionately tried to defend.
Legal norms don’t cause wars and the alt can’t effect liberalism David Luban 10, law prof at Georgetown, Beyond Traditional Concepts of Lawfare: Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 457
Among these associations is the positive, constructive side of politics, the very foundation AND administration. Yet issues like these are the stuff of peaceable human politics. Schmitt, I have said, uses the word "political" polemically—in AND succeeds in showing that lawfare is illegitimate, it de-legitimizes itself. What about the merits of Schmitt’s critique of humanitarianism? His argument is straightforward: either humanitarianism is toothless and ~*471~ apolitical, in which case ruthless political actors will destroy the humanitarians; or else humanitarianism is a fighting faith, in which case it has succumbed to the political but made matters worse, because wars on behalf of humanity are the most inhuman wars of all. Liberal humanitarianism is either too weak or too savage. The argument has obvious merit. When Schmitt wrote in 1932 that wars against " AND sinister and crazy" n58 —nor is he indifferent to human suffering. But international humanitarian law and criminal law are not the same thing as wars to AND would be a political decision. It would simply be a bad one.
What we call terrorists may not matter very much, but a restriction on what AND get to the truth, let’s hope that we can also find peace.
1AR
AT: Structural Violence
Their conception of violence is reductive and can’t be solved Boulding 77 Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung Author(s): Kenneth E. BouldingReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86Published Kenneth Ewart Boulding (January 18, 1910 – March 18, 1993) was an economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary philosopher.~1~~2~ He was cofounder of General Systems Theory and founder of numerous ongoing intellectual projects in economics and social science. He graduated from Oxford University, and was granted United States citizenship in 1948. During the years 1949 to 1967, he was a faculty member of the University of Michigan. In 1967, he joined the faculty of the University of Colorado at Boulder, where he remained until his retirement.
Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of ’structural violence’ ’and ’positive AND it may have d’one a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.
at: china link
View the debate through a lens of specificity – rigid rejection of "China threat" gets warped into a new orthodoxy and fuels extremism. Recognizing plural interpretations and linkages is more productive.
Callahan 5 (William A., Professor of Politics – University of Manchester, "How to Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power", Review of International Studies, 31)
Although ’China threat theory’ is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who AND more interesting to examine the debates that produced the threat/opportunity dynamic.
1/19/14
Texas Round 4
Tournament: Texas | Round: 4 | Opponent: Boston College Carelli-Kontopoulos | Judge: Susko 1AC PLAN The United States federal government should limit the war power authority of the president for self-defense targeted killings to outside an armed conflict. 1AC DRONES Advantage one is Drones Conflation of legal regimes for targeted killing results in overly constrained operations—undermines counterterrorism Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, J.D., 10/22/11, Self-defense Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947838
At the core of the self-defense targeting theory is the assumption that the AND ad bellum legal basis for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination.77 This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention lawtriggering equation.78 Adoption AND neutralize the impact of ad bellum legality in law applicability analysis.81 This effort rapidly became the norm of international law.82 Armed conflict analysis simply AND as irrelevant when deciding what rules apply to regulate operational and tactical execution. This aspect of ad bellum/in bello compartmentalization is not called into question by AND bellum principles indicates that these principles subsume in bello conflict regulation norms.91 There are two fundamental flaws with this conflation. First, by contradicting the traditional AND of these principles is distinct within each branch of the jus belli.94 Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum principles purportedly invoked AND these consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict regulation.98
That makes future terrorist attacks inevitable Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, 6/2/13, Corn Comments on the Costs of Shifting to a Pure Self-Defense Model, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/corn-comments-on-the-prospect-of-a-shift-to-a-pure-self-defense-model/
The President’s speech – like prior statements of other administration officials – certainly suggests that AND force) threat that will provide an analogous decisive effect in the future. It strikes me (no pun intended) that arguments – or policy choices – AND , targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America.” Relying exclusively on the inherent right of self-defense would, I suggest, AND not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.” A key advantage of the armed conflict framework is that it provides the legal maneuver AND context of an existing armed conflict than in isolated self-defense actions. It may, of course, be possible to adopt an interpretation of imminence expansive AND opposed to disable, terrorist threats, because of concerns of perceived overreach. It may be that a shift to this use of force framework is not only AND administration is unlikely to be too quick to abandon reliance on the AUMF.
Drones solve safe havens – prevents a terror attack Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida's leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm's way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida's senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida's central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan's Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden's letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military's footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
Drones are operationally effective and alternatives are worse—establishing a clear strike policy solves criticism. Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, “Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington's Weapon of Choice”, www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)
Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, AND indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.
Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, “Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment”, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html)
I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and AND the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Extinction Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
Causes US-Russia miscalc—extinction Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor and Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
1AC LEGAL REGIMES Advantage two is legal regimes US targeted killing derives authority from both armed conflict (jus in bello) and self-defense (jus ad bellum) legal regimes—that authority overlap conflates the legal regimes Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
For the past several years, the United States has relied on both armed conflict AND the implementation of the concepts of necessity and imminence, among many others. However, equally fundamental questions arise from the use of both justifications at the same AND raises significant concerns about both current implementation and future development of the law. One overarching concern is the conflation in general of jus ad bellum and jus in AND of their cause. The result: an invitation to unregulated warfare.11
Authority overlap destroys both the self-defense and armed conflict legal regimes Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
In contrast, human rights law’s requirement that force only be used as a last AND therefore every attempt must be made to capture before resorting to lethal force. In the abstract, the differences in the obligations regarding surrender and capture seem straightforward AND , and tried, those are the means which should be employed.105 The Israeli Supreme Court’s finding that targeting is only lawful if no less harmful means AND ,108 it demonstrates some of the challenges of conflating the two paradigms. First, if this added obligation of less harmful means was understood to form part AND who are lawful combatants, a result not contemplated in the LOAC.109 Second, soldiers faced with an obligation to always use less harmful means may well AND conflict, a central component of the protection of all persons in wartime. From the opposing perspective, if the armed conflict rules for capture and surrender were AND as a consequence of the broadening use of force outside of armed conflict.
This degrades the entire collective security structure resulting in widespread interstate war Craig Martin, Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law, 2011, GOING MEDIEVAL: TARGETED KILLING, SELF?DEFENSE AND THE JUS AD BELLUM REGIME, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1956141
The United States has been engaging in this practice of using drone-mounted missile AND S. justification and in accordance with the rationales developed to support it. Some of the implications of such an adjustment in the jus ad bellum regime are AND 2(4) prohibition on the use of force would be expanded. In addition, however, the targeted killing policy threatens to create other holes in AND without being subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the IHL regime. The structure of Harold Koh’s two-pronged justification similarly implies a severance of this AND against the threat or use of force under the jus ad bellum regime. This interpretation of the justifications cannot be pressed too far on the basis of the AND use of force against the states in which the groups may be operating. While the initial use of force in jus ad bellum terms is currently understood to AND system of laws designed to govern and constrain all aspects of its operation. There is a tendency in the U.S. approach to the so- AND creating the U.N. system after the Second World War.108 The premise of my argument is not that any return to past principles is inherently AND , and international armed conflict was thus far more frequent and widespread.109 The entire debate on targeted killing is so narrowly focused on the particular problems posed AND states under the pretext of self-proclaimed armed conflict with NSAs generally. We may think about each of these innovations as being related specifically to operations against AND a threat that is much less serious in the grand scheme of things.
Robust support for the impact—legal regime conflation results in uncontrollable conflict escalation Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, December 2009, CONTROLLING THE RECOURSE TO WAR BY MODIFYING JUS IN BELLO, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law / Volume 12
A substantial literature exists on the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. However, the consequences for the former side of the equation – the resort to war – is generally under-examined. Instead, academic commentary has focused on the effects of compliance with humanitarian rules in armed conflict and, in particular, the equality of application principle. In this section, I attempt to help correct that imbalance. In the following analysis, I use the (admittedly provocative) short-hand labels of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ wars. The former consists of efforts that aim to promote the general welfare of foreign populations such as humanitarian interventions and, on some accounts, peacekeeping operations. The latter – undesirable wars – include conflicts that result from security spirals that serve neither state’s interest and also include predatory acts of aggression. 4.1.1 Decreased likelihood of ‘desirable wars’ A central question in debates about humanitarian intervention is whether the international community should be AND short, all ‘interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ are affected. Two developments render desirable interventions less likely. First, consider implications of the Kosovo AND one would most want to incentivize to initiate and participate in humanitarian interventions. The second development shares many of these same consequences. Consider the implications of the AND disproportionately affect the very states that take international human rights obligations most seriously. Notably, in these cases, the disincentives might weigh most heavily on third parties AND the international regime should prefer to be involved in these kinds of interventions. The developments regulating jus ad bellum through jus in bello also threaten to make ‘ AND result from the pressures created by Type I erosions of the separation principle. First, increasing the tax on humanitarian interventions (the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach AND language (in resolutions and the like) espousing or emphasizing humanitarian objectives. Second, the elevation of self-regarding – security and strategic – frameworks over AND international disputes exert significant influence on whether conflicts will eventually culminate in war. Third, a large body of empirical research demonstrates that states will routinely engage in AND demands for increased bellicosity, unintended security spirals, and military violence.103 Importantly, these effects may result even if one is skeptical about the power of AND states entering into disastrous military campaigns that their leaders did not initially intend.
Therefore, the more likely result is that the Executive Branch, grappling with the AND prove legally fragile, destabilizing to the international political order, or both.
Effect on Domestic Law and Policy Congress’s failure to reauthorize military force would lead to bad domestic law and even worse AND be to continue to rely on the September 18, 2001, AUMF. Second, basing U.S. counterterrorism efforts on the President’s constitutional authority as AND would lack stability—confounding cooperation with allies and hindering negotiations with adversaries. There are, of course, many situations where the president’s position as Commander in AND conflict than the public might otherwise be willing to support.”140 In a world without a valid AUMF, the United States could base its continued AND problems.”141 Only then can the President’s efforts be sustained and legitimate. 2. Effect on the International Law of Self-Defense A failure to reauthorize military force would lead to significant negative consequences on the international AND allowing the executive to rely on a self-defense authorization alone.144 This approach also would inevitably lead to dangerous “slippery slopes.” Once the President AND international law of self defense would likely lead to precisely such a result. The slippery slope problem, however, is not just limited to the United States’s AND to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos.”148 Encouraging the proliferation of an expansive law of international self-defense would not only AND and rooting counterterrorism efforts within a more durable, legal foundation.”152 Widely accepted legal arguments also facilitate cooperation from U.S. allies, especially AND , but facilitating that rationale’s destabilizing adoption by nations around the world.158
Reverse causal and targeted killing is key - absent the plan global war is inevitable Fisk and Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk --- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos-- PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, “Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm” 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)
Conclusion Preventive self-defense entails waging a war or an attack by choice, in AND for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, and/or precision targeting. Thus, the results of our plausibility probe provide some evidence that the global norm AND or lesser power. Research in this vein would compliment our analyses herein. With the proliferation of technology in a globalized world, it seems only a matter AND it continues to provide other states with the justification to do the same.
Law of armed conflict controls deterrence—collapse causes global WMD conflict Delahunty, associate prof – U St. Thomas Law, and Yoo, law prof – UC Berkeley, ‘10 (Robert and John, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 803)
Finally, the extension of IHRL to armed conflict may have significant consequences for the AND norms of distinction and the humane treatment of combatants and civilians in wartime. IHRL norms, on the other hand, may suffer from much lower rates of AND would be to adapt the legal system already specifically designed for armed conflict.
A strong, adaptive LOAC regime is key to regulate inevitable autonomous weapons – the impact is global war Mark Gubrud 14, prof at UNC-Chapel Hill, was a research fellow at Princeton specializing in arms control, Stopping killer robots, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January/February 2014 vol. 70 no.1 32-42
Since the first lethal drone strike in 2001, the US use of remotely operated AND is now the most dynamic and destabilizing component of the global arms race. Drones and robots are enabled by embedded autonomous subsystems that keep engines in tune and antennas pointed at satellites, and some can navigate, walk, and maneuver in complex environments autonomously. But with few exceptions, the targeting and firing decisions of armed robotic systems remain tightly under the control of human operators. This may soon change. Autonomous weapons are robotic systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets AND attack on an adversary’s strategic forces. Autonomous weapons may fight each other. Just as the emergence of low-cost, high-performance information technology has been the most important driver of technological advance over the past half-century—including the revolution in military affairs already seen in the 1980s and displayed to the world during the 1991 Gulf War—so the emergence of artificial intelligence and autonomous robotics will likely be the most important development in both civilian and military technology to unfold over the next few decades. Proponents of autonomous weapons argue that technology will gradually take over combat decision making: AND fast, and the factors involved are too complex for real human comprehension.” Almost nobody favors a future in which humans have lost control over war machines. AND would cheat on agreements. This is the ideology of any arms race. Is autonomous warfare inevitable? Challenging the assumption of the inevitability of autonomous weapons and building on the work of AND The issue has been placed firmly on the global public and diplomatic agenda. Despite this impressive record of progress on an issue that was until recently virtually unknown AND , unrealized horror, one that some might hope will simply go away. Unless there is a strong push from civil society and from governments that have decided AND assumption that autonomous weapons will be programmed by humans is ultimately in doubt. Diplomats and public spokesmen may speak in one voice; warriors, engineers, and AND global arms race toward robotic arsenals that are increasingly out of human control. Humanitarian law vs. killer robots The public discussion launched by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has mostly centered on AND Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, 2012). The principle of distinction, as enshrined in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions AND expected from the attack. This is known as the principle of proportionality. “Losing Humanity” argues that technical limitations mean robots could not reliably distinguish civilians AND from now are unknown and highly controversial within both expert and lay communities. While it may not satisfy the reified principle of distinction, proponents of autonomous weapons AND to persuade many people that their use in weapons is a net benefit. Judgment of proportionality seems at first an even greater challenge, and some argue that AND this would be to degrade human judgment almost to the level of machines. On the other hand, IBM’s Watson computer (Ferruci et al., 2010) AND decisions that most people would judge as reasonable, most of the time. “Losing Humanity” also argues that robots, necessarily lacking emotion,2 would be unable to empathize and thus unable to accurately interpret human behavior or be affected by compassion. An important case of the latter is when soldiers refuse orders to put down rebellions. Robots would be ideal tools of repression and dictatorship. If robot soldiers become available on the world market, it is likely that repressive AND hands of dictators, both by restricting their availability and stigmatizing their use. Accountability is another much-discussed issue. Clearly, a robot cannot be held AND since a robot cannot be punished, it cannot be a legal combatant. These are some of the issues most likely to be discussed within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. However, US Defense Department policy (2012) preemptively addresses many of these issues by directing that “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” Under the US policy, commanders and operators are responsible for using autonomous weapons in AND -approves the immediate development, acquisition, and use of such weapons. Although the policy does not define “appropriate levels,” it applies this rubric even AND it to individual states to determine what levels of human judgment are appropriate. Demanding human control and responsibility As diplomatic discussions about killer robot regulation get under way, a good deal of time is apt to be lost in confusion about terms, definitions, and scope. “Losing Humanity” seeks to ban “fully autonomous weapons,” and Heyns’s report used the term “lethal autonomous robotics.” The US policy directive speaks of “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems,” and the distinction between these is ambiguous (Gubrud, 2013). The Geneva mandate is to discuss “lethal autonomous weapon systems.” Substantive questions include whether non-lethal weapons and those that target only matériel are within the scope of discussion. Legacy weapons such as simple mines may be regarded as autonomous, or distinguished as merely automatic, on grounds that their behavior is fully predictable by designers.3 Human-supervised autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, as defined by the United States, raise issues that, like fractal shapes, appear more complex the more closely they are examined. Instead of arguing about how to define what weapons should be banned, it may AND and a human has determined that it is an appropriate and legal target. A second principle is that a human commander must be responsible and accountable for the decision, and if the commander acts through another person who operates a weapon system, that person must be responsible and accountable for maintaining control of the system. “Responsible” refers here to a moral and legal obligation, and “accountable” refers to a formal system for accounting of actions. Both elements are essential to the approach. Responsibility implies that commanders and operators may not blame inadequacies of technological systems for any AND to prevent unintended engagements, the operator must refuse to operate the system. Accountability can be demonstrated by states that comply with this principle. They need only maintain records showing that each engagement was properly authorized and executed. If a violation is alleged, selected records can be unsealed in a closed inquiry conducted by an international body (Gubrud and Altmann, 2013).4 This framing, which focuses on human control and responsibility for the decision to use violent force, is both conceptually simple and morally compelling. What remains then is to set standards for adequate information to be presented to commanders, and to require positive action by operators of a weapon system. Those standards should also address any circumstances under which other parties—designers and manufacturers, for instance—might be held responsible for an unintended engagement. There is at least one exceptional circumstance in which human control may be applied less AND be delayed as long as possible to allow time for an override decision. The strategic need for robot arms control Principles of humanity may be the strongest foundation for an effective ban of autonomous weapons, but they are not necessarily the most compelling reason why a ban must be sought. The perceived military advantages of autonomy are so great that major powers are likely to strongly resist prohibition, but by the same token, autonomous weapons pose a severe threat to global peace and security. Although humans have (for now) superior capabilities for perception in complex environments and AND expensive, and their replacement by robots is expected to yield cost savings. While today’s relatively sparse use of drones, in undefended airspace, to target irregular AND the use of sea-based drones to attack targets inland as well. In a cold war, small robots could be used for covert infiltration, surveillance AND nuclear-capable and potentially unmanned, which would almost certainly mean autonomous. There can be no real game-changers in the nuclear stalemate. Yet the AND race would be global in scope, as the drone race already is. Since robots are regarded as expendable, they may be risked in provocative adventures. Recently, China has warned that if Japan makes good on threats to shoot down Chinese drones that approach disputed islands, it could be regarded as an act of war. Similarly, forward-basing of missile interceptors (Lewis and Postol, 2010) or other strategic weapons on unmanned platforms would risk misinterpretation as a signal of imminent attack, and could invite preemption. Engineering the stability of a robot confrontation would be a wickedly hard problem even for AND speed, the potential for events to spiral out of control is obvious. The way out Given the military significance of autonomous weapons, substantial pressure from civil society will be needed before the major powers will seriously consider accepting hard limits, let alone prohibition. The goal is as radical as, and no less necessary than, the control and abolition of nuclear weapons. The principle of humanity is an old concept in the law of war. It AND grounds and out of concern for the dangers of a new arms race. In the diplomatic discussions now under way, opponents of autonomous weapons should emphasize a AND has legal force in anticipation of an explicit law (Meron, 2000). Autonomous weapons are a threat to global peace and therefore a matter of concern under AND present major-power governments with an irresistible demand: Stop killer robots. 1AC SOLVENCY Congressional limits of self-defense authority within armed conflict is necessary to resolve legal ambiguity Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, Winter 2012, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html
In the wake of the attacks by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, AND not wise for the long-term health of the rule of law. This article traces the history of targeted killing from a U.S. perspective AND Constitution demands nothing less, but thus far, Congress’s silence is deafening. History of Targeted Killing During the Cold War, the United States used covert operations AND is declared hostile; the enemy is now targetable. Anticipatory Self-defense This paradigm shift is novel for the United States. The President’s authority to order AND , but now they are hampering its desires to target and kill terrorists. Skeptics of targeted killing admit that “the decision to target specific individuals AND even some foreign governments40 is where these targeted killings can be conducted.41 According to the U.S. critics, if armed conflict between the states AND negative: the strike constituted “a clear case of extrajudicial killing.”42 The Obama administration, like its predecessor, disagrees. Its legal justification for targeted AND , must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.”44 A state can act under the guise of anticipatory self-defense. This truism AND stated legal authority is self-defense? There is no clear answer. The administration is blurring the contours of the right of the state to act in Yemen under self-defense and the law of war protections afforded its soldiers when so acting. Therefore, what protections do U.S. Airmen enjoy when operating the drone that killed an individual in Yemen, Somalia, or Libya? If they are indicted by a Spanish court for murder, what is the defense AND international legal norms intersect and potentially conflict with measures stemming from domestic law.
Clear delineation of legal authority is key to solve Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
As noted in the introduction to this article, maintaining the separation between and independence AND of international security, and to the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. III. BLURRING THE LINES The nature of the terrorist threat the United States and other states face does indeed AND individuals by blurring the lines between the key parameters of the two paradigms. A. Location of Attacks: International Law and the Scope of the Battlefield The distinct differences between the targeting regimes in armed conflict and in self-defense AND parameters of the zone of combat in the conflict with al Qaeda.70 Traditionally, the law of neutrality provided the guiding framework for the parameters of the AND the armed conflict directly to the territory of one or more belligerent parties. The neutrality framework as a geographic parameter is left wanting in today’s conflicts with terrorist AND armies and their enemies or as police forces and their criminal adversaries.78 Simply locating terrorist groups and operatives does not therefore identify the parameters of the battlefield—the fact that the United States and other states use a combination of military operations and law enforcement measures to combat terrorism blurs the lines one might look for in defining the battlefield. In many situations, “the fight against transnational jihadi groups . . . largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield.”79 Second, a look at U.S. jurisprudence in the past and today AND our country must engage if our form of government is to survive.81 In each of those cases, the United States was a belligerent in an international AND both the difference in approach and the uncertainty involved in defining today’s conflicts. The current U.S. approach of using both the armed conflict paradigm and AND and/or self-defense to cover all areas without further delineation. Second, on a broader level of legal application and interpretation, the development of AND prove detrimental in the future when it seeks sharper delineations for other purposes.
Keeping action within the executive is the problem with the squo Laurie Blank, Emory International Humanitarian Law Clinic Director, Professor, 10/10/13, “Raid Watching” and Trying to Discern Law from Policy, today.law.utah.edu/projects/raid-watching-and-trying-to-discern-law-from-policy/
Trying to identify and understand the legal framework the United States believes is applicable to AND where does the United States believe its authority derived from this conflict reaches? On Saturday, U.S. Special Forces came ashore in Somalia and engaged AND Shabaab is a party to that armed conflict or another independent armed conflict? The reality, however, is that this latest counterterrorism operation highlights once again the conflation of law and policy that exemplifies the entire discourse about the United States conflict with al Qaeda and other U.S. counterterrorism operations as well. And that using policy to discern law is a highly risky venture. The remarkable series of public speeches by top Obama Administration legal advisors and national security AND of the conflation of law and policy and the consequences of that conflation. Policy and strategic considerations are without a doubt an essential component of understanding contemporary military operations and the application of international law. However, it is equally important to distinguish between law and policy, and to recognize when one is driving analysis versus the other. The law regarding the use of force against an individual or group outside the borders AND force is necessary and proportionate to repel or deter the attack or threat. The United States has consistently blurred these two legal justifications for the use of force AND the perspective of careful legal analysis, however, it can prove problematic. In effect, it is U.S. policy to eliminate “bad guys AND raids, capture — each situation involves its own tactical plans and twists. But do any of these specific tactical choices tell us anything in particular about whether AND and used deadly force in the process of trying to effectuate that capture. Ultimately, however, the only certain information is that the United States viewed this AND particular military mission at hand, the operational imperatives and national command policy. The fact that the operation may have had capture as its goal, if feasible AND force, but that use of force may nonetheless be robust when necessary. “Raid-watching” — trying to predict the applicable legal framework from reports AND policy for legal analysis ultimately substitutes policy’s flexibility for the law’s normative foundations.
2AC A2: NO MODELING US TK policy is key Braden R. Allenby 14, Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and of Law at Arizona State University, Are new technologies undermining the laws of war?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January/February 2014 vol. 70 no.1 21-31
As historical example strongly suggests, new technologies are likely to destabilize internal military cultures AND , autonomous combat aircraft raise questions of compliance with the laws of war. Changing contexts The laws of war and international humanitarian law are challenged today not just by technology, but by a perfect storm of cultural and geopolitical change. Many of the working assumptions that have been stable over much of the past centuries, and which have formed an unquestioned but critical underpinning for existing laws and norms, are stable no more. A look at four emerging military technologies helps illustrate this disruption. Why, for example, are military unmanned aerial vehicles so contentious?1 They AND , making it relatively easy to differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. Unmanned aerial vehicles raise other issues, as well: An unmanned US aircraft may AND for the Facebook posting that your sweetheart used to break up with you. And what about directed energy weapons, such as the US Army’s Active Denial System AND the laws of war break down under the challenges of this new complexity. Lethal autonomous robots are machines programmed and deployed with the ability to identify, track AND , autonomous weapons become, simply, the substitution of capital for labor. While highly contentious, autonomous weapons do not necessarily pose the foundational challenge to the AND in its compliance with international law, or simply much better than humans? If there is a game-changer among these four examples, it’s probably the AND allied nations may pass through many other nations that facilitate the information transfer. This global mixing of civilian and military activity poses interesting challenges to a body of AND criminal law? If the latter, just how effective will that be? More seriously, the essence of cyber warfare is non-attribution: It is AND tank comes from an identifiable party; a computer worm, not necessarily. Unsatisfying answers Experts are beginning to focus on the legal questions raised by emerging, disruptive military AND too limited to be effective against global jihadism, except in special cases.
Lethal robots have been making progress in the real world as well. One of AND patch of green foliage surrounded by the most militarized turf on the planet. Clearly, 21st century military affairs are already being driven by the quest to blend AND directions at the same time -- at least in the United States military. All this means that the moratorium Christof Heyns called for is likely to be dead AND will make occasional mistakes -- just as humans always have and always will. As to Heyns's worry that war will become too attractive if it can be waged AND and sustain an edge in military robots might have the ultimate peacekeeping capability. Think of Gort and his fellow alien robots from the original Day the Earth Stood Still movie. As Klaatu, his humanoid partner, makes clear to the people of Earth, his alliance of planets had placed their security in the hands of robots programmed to annihilate any among them who would break the peace. A good use of lethal robots for a greater humane purpose.
The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law AND full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the AND focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge AND and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem AND student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the AND that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and AND giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal 1 AND Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount AND execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise AND but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution AND , generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – AND simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) AND many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize AND to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the AND exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during AND , while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop AND uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account AND weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might AND through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts AND , giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to AND relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives ( AND , or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law AND releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, AND the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students AND opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who AND concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the AND both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, AND greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national AND to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, AND in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model AND undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.
6) Method focus undermines scholarly action Jackson 11, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, ‘11 (Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)
Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and AND Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can AND goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.
What is of crucial importance is that the regression to primitivism among lifestyle anarchists denies AND free itself from parochialism, mysticism, and superstition and change the world.
And, strategic anthropomorphism – all creatures identify with similar beings – it’s inevitable, but we can make decisions for the benefit of other beings Werner Scholtz 5, Associate Professor in Law – North-West University, “animal culling: a sustainable approach or anthropocentric atrocity?: issues of biodiversity and custodial sovereignty”, MqJICEL (2005) Vol 2
The CBD recognizes that the value of the biosphere is integrated with the importance of AND in non-human elements because of the linkage between man and environment.
Solves their thought experiment Tarik Kochi and Noam Ordan 8, Queen’s University and Bar Ilan University, An Argument for the Global Suicide of Humanity, Borderlands VOLUME 7 NUMBER 3
While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global AND no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.
The permutation’s weak anthropocentrism solves the K—their absolutism is internally contradictory. Lee ‘8 Department of Philosophy – Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, ‘8 (Wendy Lynne, “Environmental Pragmatism Revisited: Human-Centeredness, Language, and the Future of Aesthetic Experience,” Environmental Philosophy 5:1)
In 1984 pragmatist Bryan Norton published a landmark essay in environmental theory entitled "Environmental AND composed of felt and considered preferences within which the environment is accorded value.
Extinction isn’t inevitable --
A. Human adaptation solves, specifically democracy Peiser 2007 social anthropologist at Liverpool John Moores University, UK Benny, “Existential risk and democratic peace,” Nov 15 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7081804.stm
Nevertheless, there are many good and compelling reasons why human extinction is not predetermined AND protective shield that can safeguard life on the Earth from disastrous NEO impacts.
2AC The push is over. Only negotiation collapse would revive sanctions. Mark Landler, NYTimes, 2/5/14, Iran is rare setback for Israel lobby; Failure to win sanctions calls dominant position of Aipac into question, Lexis
The last time the nation’s most potent pro-Israel lobbying group lost a major showdown with the White House was when President Ronald Reagan agreed to sell Awacs surveillance planes to Saudi Arabia over the group’s bitter objections. Since then, the group, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, has run up an impressive record of legislative victories in its quest to rally American support for Israel, using a robust network of grass-roots supporters and a rich donor base to push a raft of bills through Congress. Typically, they pass by unanimous votes. But now Aipac, as the group is known, once again finds itself in a very public standoff with the White House. Its top priority, a Senate bill to impose new sanctions on Iran, has stalled after stiff resistance from President Obama, and in what amounts to a tacit retreat, Aipac has stopped pressuring Senate Democrats to vote for the bill. Officials at the group insist it never called for an immediate vote and say the legislation may yet pass if Mr. Obama’s effort to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran fails or if Iran reneges on its interim deal with the West. But for the moment, Mr. Obama has successfully made the case that passing new sanctions against Tehran now could scuttle the nuclear talks and put America on the road to another war. In doing so, the president has raised questions about the effectiveness of Aipac’s tactics and even its role as the unchallenged voice of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington. Jewish leaders say that pro-Israel groups disagreed on how aggressively to push the legislation, even if all the groups favor additional sanctions. “Some of us see the object as being to target Iran,” said Abraham H. Foxman, the national director of the Anti-Defamation League. “We’re not out there to target the president; we’re out there to target Iran.” With neither side spoiling for a fight or ready to back down, Mr. Foxman said, the sanctions campaign is stalled. Lawmakers confirm that the political climate on Capitol Hill has changed since the bill’s sponsors and Aipac made their push in December. Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, a staunch supporter of Israel, is one of 16 Democrats who signed on to the bill, along with 43 of the Senate’s 45 Republicans, bringing it to within a few votes of a veto-proof majority. Now Mr. Blumenthal says the Senate should hold off on a vote to give Mr. Obama breathing room for diplomacy. “There’s been an unquestionable, undeniable shift in the perception of national security,” Mr. Blumenthal said. “I’m sensitive to the feelings, the resistance, the aversion of the general public to any kind of American military engagement.” On Monday, 70 House Democrats sent Mr. Obama a letter backing his diplomatic efforts and opposing new sanctions. Former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton added her voice to those urging no legislation.
Today President Barack Obama finally joins the national debate he called for a long time AND he is willing to spend in the months ahead to defend his policies.
Plan doesn’t cost capital Douglas Kriner, Assistant Profess of Political Science at Boston University, 2010, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, p. 59-60
Presidents and politicos alike have long recognized Congress's ability to reduce the political costs that AND .S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution."36
If Obama is focusing capital on _¬¬¬¬_, it disproves Obama would initiate a fight over the plan
Obama is irrelevant—interim agreement success stopped sanction supporters Patricia Zengerle, 1/13/14, Iran deal progress dampens push for new U.S. sanctions bill, www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-iran-nuclear-congress-idUSBREA0D02T20140114?feedType=RSSandfeedName=topNewsandutm_source=dlvr.itandutm_medium=twitteranddlvrit=992637
President Barack Obama is more likely to win his battle with the U.S AND , an expert on Iran at the Wilson Center think tank in Washington.
Negotiations fail – hardliners block even without sanctions Hibbs, senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment nuclear policy program, 12/30/2013 (Mark, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/30/year-of-too-great-expectations-for-iran/gxbv) If all goes according to plan, sometime during 2014 Iran will sign a comprehensive final agreement to end a nuclear crisis that, over the course of a decade, has threatened to escalate into a war in the Middle East. But in light of the unresolved issues that must be addressed, it would be unwise to bet that events will unfold as planned. Unrealistic expectations about the Iran deal need to be revised downward. In Geneva on November 24, Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus Germany agreed to a Joint Plan of Action. For good reason, the world welcomed this initial agreement because it squarely put Iran and the powers on a road to end the crisis through diplomacy. The deal calls for Tehran and the powers to negotiate the “final step” AND period of time. In exchange, sanctions against Iran will be lifted. An effective final deal could emerge. But Iran and the West will continue to AND fundamental differences and become partners, as some observers either hope or fear. THE CLOCK IS TICKING U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry knew what he was talking about AND to be done could delay agreement on the final step for many months. The main problem is not that Iran will refuse to implement what it agreed to AND capability to produce plutonium, which can be used for making nuclear weapons. Tehran has every incentive to comply with these measures. Were it to cheat, Iran’s adversaries, convinced that Iran cannot be trusted, would be vindicated and would gain leverage to add sanctions or use force. Iran knows this. Instead, the potential showstoppers looming before the parties concern matters that the negotiation of AND by the IAEA that point to nuclear weapons research and development by Iran. The Joint Plan of Action is deliberately vague about how to handle these issues, AND steps two and three in the original scheme left to be worked out. If the parties do not work out the two major challenges they face, the negotiation may fail. If differences result in a stalemate, Iran’s hardliners could gain the upper hand, continue pursuing unfettered nuclear development, and eventually terminate the initial accord. Alternatively, U.S. lawmakers could respond to a lack of progress by adding to Iran’s sanctions burden, which would likewise doom the negotiation. There is much at stake.
Sanctions don’t block a deal Horing 1-21 Shoula Romano Horing (Law Prof @ Baker U, author and columnist on Israeli foreign policy); “Obama's Surrender to Iran”; January 21, 2014; http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/01/obamas_surrender_to_iran.html In lobbying against the legislation, the White House in recent days warned that any further sanctions would "anger" and "break-faith" with Iran, and blow up the talks and undermine the so called moderate Iranian leaders and lead us to war. But in reality the so called moderate Iranian leader whose victory in the summer elections AND stated that "The Geneva Agreement means the wall of sanctions has broken." Moreover, Rouhani's foreign minister, Mohamad Javid Zarif, another supposed "moderate," who negotiated with Kerry in Geneva, laid a wreath last Monday, at the grave of the Hezbollah terrorist who planned the terrorist attack on the U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut in 1983 which killed 241 American troops. For the last two months, between the initial November agreement and the second deal AND where the Iranians are suspected of experimenting with ways to weaponize their stockpile. It seems the Iranians do not fear Obama. Recent Iranian actions and words underscore AND signing deals, worth billions, with Iran selling its oil for goods. The only way now to pressure Iran, the regional bully, to agree in the upcoming final negotiations to dismantle their nuclear program is if the Iranians fear that the Congress is determined to override Obama's veto and shut down their economy again with much worse crippling sanctions. The only chance for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear threat is to support and pass the Menendez-Kirk sanctions bill.
The current deal causes nuclear war, the Mendez-Kirk sanctions bill resolves that Doran 1-15 MICHAEL DORAN and MAX BOOT (Michael Doran is a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Max Boot is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations); “Obama’s Losing Bet on Iran”; JAN. 15, 2014; http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/opinion/obamas-losing-bet-on-iran.html WASHINGTON — A great deal of diplomatic attention over the next few months will be focused on whether the temporary nuclear deal with Iran can be transformed into a full-blown accord. President Obama has staked the success of his foreign policy on this bold gamble. But discussion about the nuclear deal has diverted attention from an even riskier bet that Obama has placed: the idea that Iran can become a cooperative partner in regional security. Although they won’t say so publicly, Mr. Obama and Secretary of State John AND when the “Concert of Europe” worked together to stabilize that Continent. As a first step, Mr. Kerry has made no secret of his desire to involve Iran in Syrian peace talks, scheduled to convene next week in Geneva. And much more than previous administrations, this one has refrained from countering Iranian machinations in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. There are two main reasons for this attempted shift. One is simply the desire of the president to extricate the United States from the Middle East. The other reason, arguably more important, is fear of Al Qaeda: The White House undoubtedly sees Iran and its Shiite allies as potential partners in the fight against Sunni jihadism. The Obama strategy is breathtakingly ambitious. It is also destined to fail. First, it ignores the obvious fact that, unlike China at the time of AND threat to justify an alliance with the “capitalist imperialists” in Washington. The second major problem is that Iran has always harbored dreams of regional hegemony. There is no sign that the election of the “moderate” cleric Hassan Rouhani as president has changed anything. On the contrary, Iran is stepping up its support for militants in the region. There have been reports recently that Iran is smuggling sophisticated long-range missiles to Hezbollah via Syria and that it sent a ship, intercepted by the Bahraini authorities, loaded with armaments intended for Shiite opponents of the Sunni government in Bahrain. Iran under President Rouhani has done nothing to lessen its support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria either. It has, in fact, gone “all in,” sending large numbers of its own operatives and its Hezbollah allies, along with copious munitions, to help the regime stay in power. Iran’s power play is engendering a violent pushback from Sunnis increasingly radicalized in the process. This is the third and final problem that will doom Obama’s outreach to Tehran. In Iraq, the Shiite prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, who is surrounded by aides with ties to the Iranians, has been arresting prominent Sunnis in Anbar Province, thereby driving many of the tribal fighters who once fought Al Qaeda in Iraq back into an alliance with the terrorist group. Al Qaeda-linked fighters have now taken control of Falluja, a town that American forces secured in 2004 after a costly campaign. Jihadist influence now extends from western Iraq into neighboring Syria, where Sunnis are reacting just as violently to the Iranian-orchestrated offensive to keep Assad’s Alawite regime in power. With the United States providing little or no support to moderate opposition elements, extremist groups such as the Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (an offshoot of Al Qaeda in Iraq) are increasingly prominent among the rebel forces. The spillover from Syria is also affecting Lebanon, where Hezbollah has long been the AND , Rafik Hariri, was also killed by a car bomb in 2005. This shows what happens when the United States stands aloof and refuses to do more to counter Iranian power: America’s allies in the region take matters into their own hands. The result is the polarization of the entire region into pro- and anti-Iran blocs that feed a mushrooming cross-border civil war. The situation will only get worse if Iran is allowed to maintain its nuclear program with international blessing. Saudi Arabia has made clear that it is prepared to build its own bomb, while Israel has threatened to launch a unilateral strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Mr. Obama’s hopes of using an opening to Iran to stabilize the Middle East will almost certainly backfire. Before long, America is likely to be forced back into its traditional, post-1979 role as the leader of a coalition to counter Iranian designs. The place to begin is in Syria, which is now ground zero in the struggle between the two regional blocs. Expansive self-defense regime enables Israel strike on Iran --- escalates and causes World War 3 Slager 12 (Katherine, J.D. Candidate 2013, University of North Carolina School of Law, “Legality, Legitimacy and Anticipatory Self-Defense: Considering an Israeli Preemptive Strike on Iran's Nuclear Program” Fall, 2012, 38 N.C.J. Int'l L. and Com. Reg. 267)
I. Introduction World War III is an event the world universally wishes to avoid. n3 Threats AND will preemptively strike Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear attack capability. n7 *269 While a strike might forestall a nuclear Iran, at least AND and the international community, which must respond to this use of force. This comment assesses the legality of a potential Israeli preemptive strike against Iran's nuclear program AND to attack Israel with nuclear weapons and the intention to do so. n307 *309
Capability: Iran's Nuclear Development Towards the end of 2011 and into the early part of 2012, world tensions AND has consistently asserted that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes. n313 The most recent round of mounting tensions was marked by a November 2011 IAEA report AND Iran could develop nuclear weapons in sixty-two days or less. n320 Following the release of the November IAEA report, the United States and Europe began AND responding "frantically, and with increasing unpredictability" to the sanctions. n326 In February 2012, the IAEA released another report. n327 This *311 AND to have serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." n331 The summer of 2012 saw an increase in concerns over the volatility of the Israel AND on Iran's nuclear program would be legal or legitimate under modern international law. C. Analysis Under a restrictive interpretation of the U.N. Charter, Israel would not AND whether an Israeli preemptive strike would be acceptable under modern international law. n360
Customary International Law The Caroline doctrine, which underlies the customary international law analysis of anticipatory self- AND nuclear attack would meet the "necessity" requirement of the Caroline doctrine. Proportionality requires that action should not exceed what is minimally necessary to respond to a threat. n365 It would be in Israel's diplomatic interests to respond with only the minimum required to avert the threat of nuclear attack. A preemptive strike that neutralizes Iran's nuclear program and does not exceed the immediate threat to Israel to pursue "broader offensive or strategic goals" would satisfy the requirement of proportionality. n366 With the assumption that an Israeli preemptive strike would meet both the necessity and proportionality AND and the 1981 Israeli attack on Osirak, which was uniformly condemned. n368 As discussed in Part III.B, several threats were present in the * AND that seem to meet the "imminence" requirement of customary international law. Israel, taken in the light most favorable to an argument for legitimacy, may AND appear to be any further corroborations of an intention to attack Israel. n371 Developing nuclear weapons, because of their first-strike capabilities, may be tantamount AND only moderately resembles the threat posed by Egypt preceding the Six Day War. The present situation between Israel and Iran more closely resembles Israel's attack on the Osirak AND an even stronger argument for an "imminent attack" by Iran today. The presence of these factors, without more, does not rise to the " AND weapons - should they come into Iran's possession - against the Israeli state. While Israel may have a stronger argument for imminence today than it did in 1981, the present situation bears much stronger resemblance to the 1981 Osirak incident, where imminence was clearly not found, than to the 1967 Six Day War. As the Iranian threat against Israel does not rise to the imminence required by the Caroline doctrine, an Israeli preemptive strike against Iran would not be legal under customary international law. *319 2. Sadoff's Framework The analytical framework proposed by David Sadoff offers an analysis of anticipatory self-defense AND be sufficiently imminent to justify an act of anticipatory self-defense. n378 First, assessing the nature and scale of an Iranian nuclear attack is fairly straightforward. Israel fears facing the threat of "first strike" nuclear attack, which would leave little or no time for Israel to respond defensively once launched. n379 Israel would likely receive little to no warning of a nuclear launch. Such an attack could decimate the entirety of the Israeli state. The nature and scale of the threat is likely the gravest threat imaginable. The "likelihood" of the attack, however, is much more ambiguous. AND any intention to attack and does not presently have the capacity to attack. The third factor in gauging the threat, timing, is interspersed with the likelihood factor. Sadoff suggests similar questions for the assessment of these two components. n387 This seems appropriate. If an attack is not very likely to occur, then it is moot to consider whether the timing of an attack is sufficiently immediate to justify a pre-emptive strike. 3. Considerations Under the analyses of both the customary international law and Sadoff's frameworks, an Israeli AND Sadoff framework, using preemptive force to deter an attack would be justified. Also significant to the Caroline doctrine's approach is that there are more options available to AND -defense where there is no actual imminence of a threatened attack. n394 *322 Second, the rules that govern use of force must be AND that should bind, these laws lose their normative and prescriptive value. n395 Expansive overhaul of the modern international legal order is not the solution. Customary international AND law to develop at a pace with which international consensus can keep up. Incorporating legitimacy into modern international law is a priority. Legitimacy ensures the general acceptance AND and non-state actors, including the nongovernmental organizations and the press. Furthermore, the international community needs predictability and transparency in modern international law to assure AND of force, which will result in predictability and transparency in future evaluations. Under both traditional and alternative analyses, Israel would not be presently justified to preemptively AND thus foiling the trigger that would lead the world into World War III. 1AR AT: ROOT CAUSE
Violence is proximately caused – root cause logic is poor scholarship Sharpe, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, ‘10 (Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233)
We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework AND the empirical and analytic distinctness of the different object fields in complex societies. In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master AND produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology. We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It AND today pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy, neither reading it nor taking it seriously.
It is hard to say which is more surprising, that anyone still argues that AND and Tetlock emphasize, predictive methods can best be evaluated through comparative tournaments. Reliable prediction is so much a part of our daily lives that we don’t even AND we are likely to make progress in eliminating some errors in the future. Experts are an easy, although eminently justified, target for critiquing predictive accuracy. AND and biased by personal beliefs, the experts’ predictions will be widely scattered. Good prediction—and this is my belief—comes from dependence on logic and AND moving target because technology, ideas, and subject adaptation will be ongoing. Given what we know today and given the problems inherent in dealing with human interaction AND were rising swiftly in 2010 in Egypt while the expected costs were not. This is but one example that highlights what Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, who was AND to anticipate the consequences of alternative choices in many aspects of human interaction. How can game theory be harnessed to achieve reliable prediction? Acting like a fox AND and evaluated through replicable tests of evidence, we progress toward better prediction.
AT: FEAR OF DEATH
3. Nuclear fear is vital to prevent nuclear conflict Child, 86 (James W., professor of philosophy, Bowling Green State University, “Nuclear War: The Moral Dimension,” Transaction Publishers, pg. 176, Tashma) Likewise, we must develop strong, unfrightened, affirmative attitudes toward the risk of AND of nuclear war if we are ever to make that risk go away.
4. Fear of death solves extinction Beres 96 - Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University Louis Rene, Feb., Scholar Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival AND it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety."
3. Life is more than just energy – Lanza's theories are nonsense Myers 9 (Paul Zachary, associate professor of biology, University of Minnesota Morris, “The dead are dead,” 12/10/09, http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2009/12/10/the-dead-are-dead/, Tashma) We are not just “energy”. We are a pattern of energy and matter AND the importance of these higher-order relationships when talking about our fate.
HUMANS = VALUABLE
6. Link turn – sustaining life is necessary for people to learn to generate happiness through suffering Gulla 10 Ashok, Masters and Pre Doctoral studies in Physics, During the past fifteen years, the author has developed an interest in spirituality. His spiritual practice has been useful to know about personal values, morals, attitudes and behavior; and how these impact all of us, "How Pain and Suffering Generate Happiness," 4/12/10, http://voices.yahoo.com/how-pain-suffering-generate-happiness-5821188.html?cat=34 Every one of us fears from pain and suffering and wish to avoid it at AND take pain and suffering as a step forward to eternal peace and happiness.
Death is bad – no shit Kagan 12 – Professor of Philosophy @ Yale Shelly, professor of philosophy at Yale University, "Is Death Bad for You?" 5/13/12, http://chronicle.com/article/article-content/131818/ In thinking about this question, it is important to be clear about what AND known universe, and almost none of those people get to be born.
Only humans have the capabilities to prevent asteroid collisions and preserve life on earth Matheny 7 (Jason G., Special Advisor – Center for Biosecurity, “Ought We Worry About Human Extinction?”, 12-6, http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm) Animal life has existed on Earth for around 500 million years. Barring a dramatic AND relocating to another solar system (Kargel, 1994; Lewis, 1996).
2/8/14
Texas Round 5
Tournament: Texas | Round: 5 | Opponent: Oklahoma Campbell-Lee | Judge: Turner 1AC PLAN First, a good idea: The United States federal government should limit the war power authority of the president for self-defense targeted killings to outside an armed conflict.
CLARITY US targeted killing derives authority from both armed conflict (jus in bello) and self-defense (jus ad bellum) legal regimes—that authority overlap conflates the legal regimes Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
For the past several years, the United States has relied on both armed conflict AND the implementation of the concepts of necessity and imminence, among many others. However, equally fundamental questions arise from the use of both justifications at the same AND raises significant concerns about both current implementation and future development of the law. One overarching concern is the conflation in general of jus ad bellum and jus in AND of their cause. The result: an invitation to unregulated warfare.11
Authority overlap destroys both the self-defense and armed conflict legal regimes Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
In contrast, human rights law’s requirement that force only be used as a last AND therefore every attempt must be made to capture before resorting to lethal force. In the abstract, the differences in the obligations regarding surrender and capture seem straightforward AND , and tried, those are the means which should be employed.105 The Israeli Supreme Court’s finding that targeting is only lawful if no less harmful means AND ,108 it demonstrates some of the challenges of conflating the two paradigms. First, if this added obligation of less harmful means was understood to form part AND who are lawful combatants, a result not contemplated in the LOAC.109 Second, soldiers faced with an obligation to always use less harmful means may well AND conflict, a central component of the protection of all persons in wartime. From the opposing perspective, if the armed conflict rules for capture and surrender were AND as a consequence of the broadening use of force outside of armed conflict.
This degrades the entire collective security structure resulting in widespread interstate war Craig Martin, Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law, 2011, GOING MEDIEVAL: TARGETED KILLING, SELF?DEFENSE AND THE JUS AD BELLUM REGIME, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1956141
The United States has been engaging in this practice of using drone-mounted missile AND S. justification and in accordance with the rationales developed to support it. Some of the implications of such an adjustment in the jus ad bellum regime are AND 2(4) prohibition on the use of force would be expanded. In addition, however, the targeted killing policy threatens to create other holes in AND without being subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the IHL regime. The structure of Harold Koh’s two-pronged justification similarly implies a severance of this AND against the threat or use of force under the jus ad bellum regime. This interpretation of the justifications cannot be pressed too far on the basis of the AND use of force against the states in which the groups may be operating. While the initial use of force in jus ad bellum terms is currently understood to AND system of laws designed to govern and constrain all aspects of its operation. There is a tendency in the U.S. approach to the so- AND creating the U.N. system after the Second World War.108 The premise of my argument is not that any return to past principles is inherently AND , and international armed conflict was thus far more frequent and widespread.109 The entire debate on targeted killing is so narrowly focused on the particular problems posed AND states under the pretext of self-proclaimed armed conflict with NSAs generally. We may think about each of these innovations as being related specifically to operations against AND a threat that is much less serious in the grand scheme of things.
Robust support for the impact—legal regime conflation results in uncontrollable conflict escalation Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, December 2009, CONTROLLING THE RECOURSE TO WAR BY MODIFYING JUS IN BELLO, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law / Volume 12
A substantial literature exists on the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. However, the consequences for the former side of the equation – the resort to war – is generally under-examined. Instead, academic commentary has focused on the effects of compliance with humanitarian rules in armed conflict and, in particular, the equality of application principle. In this section, I attempt to help correct that imbalance. In the following analysis, I use the (admittedly provocative) short-hand labels of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ wars. The former consists of efforts that aim to promote the general welfare of foreign populations such as humanitarian interventions and, on some accounts, peacekeeping operations. The latter – undesirable wars – include conflicts that result from security spirals that serve neither state’s interest and also include predatory acts of aggression. 4.1.1 Decreased likelihood of ‘desirable wars’ A central question in debates about humanitarian intervention is whether the international community should be AND short, all ‘interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ are affected. Two developments render desirable interventions less likely. First, consider implications of the Kosovo AND one would most want to incentivize to initiate and participate in humanitarian interventions. The second development shares many of these same consequences. Consider the implications of the AND disproportionately affect the very states that take international human rights obligations most seriously. Notably, in these cases, the disincentives might weigh most heavily on third parties AND the international regime should prefer to be involved in these kinds of interventions. The developments regulating jus ad bellum through jus in bello also threaten to make ‘ AND result from the pressures created by Type I erosions of the separation principle. First, increasing the tax on humanitarian interventions (the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach AND language (in resolutions and the like) espousing or emphasizing humanitarian objectives. Second, the elevation of self-regarding – security and strategic – frameworks over AND international disputes exert significant influence on whether conflicts will eventually culminate in war. Third, a large body of empirical research demonstrates that states will routinely engage in AND demands for increased bellicosity, unintended security spirals, and military violence.103 Importantly, these effects may result even if one is skeptical about the power of AND states entering into disastrous military campaigns that their leaders did not initially intend.
A strong, adaptive LOAC regime is key to regulate inevitable autonomous weapons – the impact is global war and tyranny Mark Gubrud 14, prof at UNC-Chapel Hill, was a research fellow at Princeton specializing in arms control, Stopping killer robots, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January/February 2014 vol. 70 no.1 32-42
Since the first lethal drone strike in 2001, the US use of remotely operated AND is now the most dynamic and destabilizing component of the global arms race. Drones and robots are enabled by embedded autonomous subsystems that keep engines in tune and antennas pointed at satellites, and some can navigate, walk, and maneuver in complex environments autonomously. But with few exceptions, the targeting and firing decisions of armed robotic systems remain tightly under the control of human operators. This may soon change. Autonomous weapons are robotic systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets AND attack on an adversary’s strategic forces. Autonomous weapons may fight each other. Just as the emergence of low-cost, high-performance information technology has been the most important driver of technological advance over the past half-century—including the revolution in military affairs already seen in the 1980s and displayed to the world during the 1991 Gulf War—so the emergence of artificial intelligence and autonomous robotics will likely be the most important development in both civilian and military technology to unfold over the next few decades. Proponents of autonomous weapons argue that technology will gradually take over combat decision making: AND fast, and the factors involved are too complex for real human comprehension.” Almost nobody favors a future in which humans have lost control over war machines. AND would cheat on agreements. This is the ideology of any arms race. Is autonomous warfare inevitable? Challenging the assumption of the inevitability of autonomous weapons and building on the work of AND The issue has been placed firmly on the global public and diplomatic agenda. Despite this impressive record of progress on an issue that was until recently virtually unknown AND , unrealized horror, one that some might hope will simply go away. Unless there is a strong push from civil society and from governments that have decided AND assumption that autonomous weapons will be programmed by humans is ultimately in doubt. Diplomats and public spokesmen may speak in one voice; warriors, engineers, and AND global arms race toward robotic arsenals that are increasingly out of human control. Humanitarian law vs. killer robots The public discussion launched by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has mostly centered on AND Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, 2012). The principle of distinction, as enshrined in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions AND expected from the attack. This is known as the principle of proportionality. “Losing Humanity” argues that technical limitations mean robots could not reliably distinguish civilians AND from now are unknown and highly controversial within both expert and lay communities. While it may not satisfy the reified principle of distinction, proponents of autonomous weapons AND to persuade many people that their use in weapons is a net benefit. Judgment of proportionality seems at first an even greater challenge, and some argue that AND this would be to degrade human judgment almost to the level of machines. On the other hand, IBM’s Watson computer (Ferruci et al., 2010) AND decisions that most people would judge as reasonable, most of the time. “Losing Humanity” also argues that robots, necessarily lacking emotion,2 would be unable to empathize and thus unable to accurately interpret human behavior or be affected by compassion. An important case of the latter is when soldiers refuse orders to put down rebellions. Robots would be ideal tools of repression and dictatorship. If robot soldiers become available on the world market, it is likely that repressive AND hands of dictators, both by restricting their availability and stigmatizing their use. Accountability is another much-discussed issue. Clearly, a robot cannot be held AND since a robot cannot be punished, it cannot be a legal combatant. These are some of the issues most likely to be discussed within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. However, US Defense Department policy (2012) preemptively addresses many of these issues by directing that “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” Under the US policy, commanders and operators are responsible for using autonomous weapons in AND -approves the immediate development, acquisition, and use of such weapons. Although the policy does not define “appropriate levels,” it applies this rubric even AND it to individual states to determine what levels of human judgment are appropriate. Demanding human control and responsibility As diplomatic discussions about killer robot regulation get under way, a good deal of time is apt to be lost in confusion about terms, definitions, and scope. “Losing Humanity” seeks to ban “fully autonomous weapons,” and Heyns’s report used the term “lethal autonomous robotics.” The US policy directive speaks of “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems,” and the distinction between these is ambiguous (Gubrud, 2013). The Geneva mandate is to discuss “lethal autonomous weapon systems.” Substantive questions include whether non-lethal weapons and those that target only matériel are within the scope of discussion. Legacy weapons such as simple mines may be regarded as autonomous, or distinguished as merely automatic, on grounds that their behavior is fully predictable by designers.3 Human-supervised autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, as defined by the United States, raise issues that, like fractal shapes, appear more complex the more closely they are examined. Instead of arguing about how to define what weapons should be banned, it may AND and a human has determined that it is an appropriate and legal target. A second principle is that a human commander must be responsible and accountable for the decision, and if the commander acts through another person who operates a weapon system, that person must be responsible and accountable for maintaining control of the system. “Responsible” refers here to a moral and legal obligation, and “accountable” refers to a formal system for accounting of actions. Both elements are essential to the approach. Responsibility implies that commanders and operators may not blame inadequacies of technological systems for any AND to prevent unintended engagements, the operator must refuse to operate the system. Accountability can be demonstrated by states that comply with this principle. They need only maintain records showing that each engagement was properly authorized and executed. If a violation is alleged, selected records can be unsealed in a closed inquiry conducted by an international body (Gubrud and Altmann, 2013).4 This framing, which focuses on human control and responsibility for the decision to use violent force, is both conceptually simple and morally compelling. What remains then is to set standards for adequate information to be presented to commanders, and to require positive action by operators of a weapon system. Those standards should also address any circumstances under which other parties—designers and manufacturers, for instance—might be held responsible for an unintended engagement. There is at least one exceptional circumstance in which human control may be applied less AND be delayed as long as possible to allow time for an override decision. The strategic need for robot arms control Principles of humanity may be the strongest foundation for an effective ban of autonomous weapons, but they are not necessarily the most compelling reason why a ban must be sought. The perceived military advantages of autonomy are so great that major powers are likely to strongly resist prohibition, but by the same token, autonomous weapons pose a severe threat to global peace and security. Although humans have (for now) superior capabilities for perception in complex environments and AND expensive, and their replacement by robots is expected to yield cost savings. While today’s relatively sparse use of drones, in undefended airspace, to target irregular AND the use of sea-based drones to attack targets inland as well. In a cold war, small robots could be used for covert infiltration, surveillance AND nuclear-capable and potentially unmanned, which would almost certainly mean autonomous. There can be no real game-changers in the nuclear stalemate. Yet the AND race would be global in scope, as the drone race already is. Since robots are regarded as expendable, they may be risked in provocative adventures. Recently, China has warned that if Japan makes good on threats to shoot down Chinese drones that approach disputed islands, it could be regarded as an act of war. Similarly, forward-basing of missile interceptors (Lewis and Postol, 2010) or other strategic weapons on unmanned platforms would risk misinterpretation as a signal of imminent attack, and could invite preemption. Engineering the stability of a robot confrontation would be a wickedly hard problem even for AND speed, the potential for events to spiral out of control is obvious. The way out Given the military significance of autonomous weapons, substantial pressure from civil society will be needed before the major powers will seriously consider accepting hard limits, let alone prohibition. The goal is as radical as, and no less necessary than, the control and abolition of nuclear weapons. The principle of humanity is an old concept in the law of war. It AND grounds and out of concern for the dangers of a new arms race. In the diplomatic discussions now under way, opponents of autonomous weapons should emphasize a AND has legal force in anticipation of an explicit law (Meron, 2000). Autonomous weapons are a threat to global peace and therefore a matter of concern under AND present major-power governments with an irresistible demand: Stop killer robots.
Even if, in some distant future, advances in artificial intelligence give robots an AND encounter, and exercise the wisdom and judgment to adjust their behavior accordingly? To me, perhaps the most irreplaceable quality human soldiers possess is the capacity to AND an army that would never refuse an order, no matter how immoral.
Autonomous combat regulation provides a tool for moral growth Kenneth Anderson, professor of international law at Washington College of Law, American University, and visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Matthew Waxman, a professor of law at Columbia Law School and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/9/13, Law and Ethics for Autonomous weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can, http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/144241
The first is a broad claim that machine programming will never reach the point of AND the battlefield—compassion, empathy, and sympathy for other human beings. These assessments are mostly empirical. Although many who embrace them might also finally rest AND could not tell which was which on the basis of their behaviors.32 It is of course quite possible that fully autonomous weapons will never achieve the ability AND . No basis exists for such sweeping conclusions about the future of technology. We should not rule out in advance possibilities of positive technological outcomes—including the AND overcome human failings rather than addressing the weaknesses of human moral psychology directly. But the protection of civilians in war and reduction of the harms of war are AND channel technological development toward those protective ends of the law of armed conflict.
Simulating and debating the hypothetical implications of new technologies is a powerful tool for moral growth MacKinister 10 - Associate Professor of Education Education Department Environmental Studies Hobart and William Smith Colleges (http://www.springerlink.com/content/x661773353m04162/fulltext.html The Inclusion of Environmental Education in Science Teacher Education Jim MaKinster ) The role-play simulation helped students to see that politics is much more than AND for the nature of science and the real-world applications of science.
The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law AND full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the AND focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge AND and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem AND student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the AND that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and AND giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal 1 AND Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount AND execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise AND but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution AND , generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – AND simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) AND many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize AND to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the AND exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during AND , while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop AND uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account AND weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might AND through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts AND , giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to AND relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives ( AND , or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law AND releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, AND the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students AND opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who AND concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the AND both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, AND greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national AND to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, AND in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model AND undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.
Pragmatic potential is a controlling factor for evaluating simulations Shelby 7 – Tommie Shelby, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard, 2007, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity
But African American philosophy does not typically make public policy recommendations. Although engaged with AND ground between political liberalism and black nationalism, which many scholars have overlooked.
Analysis of policy is particularly empowering, even if we’re not the USFG Shulock 99 Nancy, PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY --- professor of Public Policy and Administration and director of the Institute for Higher Education Leadership and Policy (IHELP) at Sacramento State University, The Paradox of Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce So Much of It?, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, No. 2, 226–244 (1999)
In my view, none of these radical changes is necessary. As interesting as AND , can reshape the policy landscape. Policy analysis can supply the ideas.
The law is malleable—debating it is the only way to affect change Todd Hedrick, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University, Sept 2012, Democratic Constitutionalism as Mediation: The Decline and Recovery of an Idea in Critical Social Theory, Constellations Volume 19, Issue 3, pages 382–400
Habermas’ alleged abandonment of immanent critique, however, is belied by the role that AND , without the triumphalist pretension of ever being able to fully do so.
Falsifiability is key – Method focus undermines scholarly action Jackson 11, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, ‘11 (Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)
Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and AND Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can AND goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.
While this ballot has meandered off on a tangent I’ll take this opportunity to comment AND debate that is foreign to what I think happens in a debate round.
Temporarily identifying with the state is a beneficial form of education Brubaker 4 Rogers Brubaker, Department of Sociology, UCLA, 2004, In the Name of the Nation: Reflectionson Nationalism and Patriotism, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf
This, then, is the basic work done by the category ‘nation’ in AND between Shi’ites and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, North and South.2 In contexts like this, the category ‘nation’ can also be used in another AND nation exclude other ethnoreligious, ethnolinguistic, or ethnoracial groups in other settings. In the United States and other relatively settled, longstanding nation-states, ‘ AND in the social sciences and humanities, ‘nation’ is a suspect category. Few American scholars wave flags, and many of us are suspicious of those who AND , the ethnic group, the class, the party, the faith. In addition to the sense that nationalism is dangerous, and closely connected to some AND out of sync with the basic principles that structure social life today.4 The post-nationalist stance combines an empirical claim, a methodological critique, and AND multinational political space. Certainly nationhood remains the universal formula for legitimating statehood. Can one speak of an ‘unprecedented porosity’ of borders, as one recent AND rather than looser (Mann, 1997, pp. 491–2). The methodological critique is that the social sciences have long suffered from ‘methodological nationalism’ AND social scientists have long been doing on border-spanning flows and networks. But what follows from this critique? If it serves to encourage the study of AND or worse, a fundamental level of organization and fundamental locus of power. The normative critique of the nation-state comes from two directions. From above, the cosmopolitan argument is that humanity as a whole, not the nation- state, should define the primary horizon of our moral imagination and political engagement (Nussbaum, 1996). From below, muticulturalism and identity politics celebrate group identities and privilege them over wider, more encompassing affiliations. One can distinguish stronger and weaker versions of the cosmopolitan argument. The strong cosmopolitan AND moral imagination, our political energy, even perhaps our economic resources.9 The second strand of the normative critique of the nation-state—the multiculturalist AND identities and loyalties at the expense of state-wide identities and loyalties. In the face of this twofold cosmopolitan and multiculturalist critique, I would like to AND done with both languages. I therefore want to consider them together here. I want to suggest that patriotism and nationalism can be valuable in four respects. They can help develop more robust forms of citizenship, provide support for redistributive social policies, foster the integration of immigrants, and even serve as a check on the development of an aggressively unilateralist foreign policy. First, nationalism and patriotism can motivate and sustain civic engagement. It is sometimes AND some level my problems, for which I have a special responsibility.12 Patriotic identification with one’s country—the feeling that this is my country, and AND commitments can furnish the energies and passions that motivate and sustain civic engagement.
--CODE SWITCHING There are no fixed codes, to speak is to code switch, and insistence on a single preferable code is essentialist Mellom 6 - Assistant Research Scientist for CLASE; Center for Latino Achievement and Success in Education CODE-SWITCHING AT A BILINGUAL SCHOOL IN COSTA RICA: IDENTITY, INTERTEXTUALITY AND NEW ORTRAITS OF COMPETENCE, PAULA JEAN MELLOM http://athenaeum.libs.uga.edu/bitstream/handle/10724/9023/mellom_paula_j_200605_phd.pdf?sequence=1
On the other hand, some sociolinguists have tended to view code-switching as AND asserts that we must remember that all “standard languages” are hybrids.
Voting against us to endorse black intellectualism is an act of inadvertent colonization, where you as judges and we as debaters assume the mantle of anti-racist codes only to destroy their potential Shannon Sullivan, Penn State, 2004, White World-Traveling, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4
Lugones does not provide English translations of the Spanish portions of her essay co- AND /Anglo women to learn some- thing about Latino/a worlds. While a white/Anglo person’s learning Spanish can begin to balance the relationship of AND languages can be eroded once white people begin to understand and speak them. This point was brought home to me when a Latina friend and philosopher explained that AND that their presence inevitably (though not necessarily deliberately) pro- duces. Although he ultimately wants to risk inviting white people into Black semioticspace,Yancy clearly AND the code and an important form of resistance to white domination is eliminated.
Embrace a plurality of English-es rather than an insistence on the innate superiority of one linguistic strategy – the perm is the best option David E. Kirkland 10, English prof at NYU, “English(es) in Urban Contexts: Politics, Pluralism, and Possibilities”, English Education, V42, N3
By definition, language once uttered begins to break apart. Its many pieces assemble AND contexts, which are themselves complicated by linguistic legacies of survival and oppression.
We are not enforcing the discourse of the powerful, but recognizing that it needs to be changed Hunt ’90 (Alan, Professor of Law and Sociology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, “Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemon Strategies,” Journal of Law and Society Vol. 17 No. 3, 1990)
Another significant objection that can be levelled against rights strategies is¶ that they require AND needs to be stressed is that all struggles¶ commence on old ground. Ideology needs to be understood, as I have argued, not as the competition AND generate and mobilize re-combinations¶ of these well-tried elements. In order to underline the point, it is essential to insist that no discursive AND rather upon the way in which it is articulated with other discursive elements.
2AC PERM The perm’s effective---no cooption as “their cause” can become “our cause” Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity_Politics_and_the_Need_for_a_Tomorrow_) We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put forward AND ” since they are produced by very real actions, practices and projects.
Oppositional views of the law and it’s use for war are inevitable – ONLY the permutation resolves academic conflict Luban ’13 (David, University Professor in Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center, “Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law,” Leiden Journal of International Law, Volume 26, Issue 02, pp 315-349)
These arguments about military necessity are not meant as a ‘refutation’ of the LOAC AND principles that could be accepted even by adherents of the other comprehensive view. To illustrate with an example: Article 57 of AP I requires militaries to take AND of these interpretations can be right, and lawyers should not advance them. This conciliatory approach is not self-evident. In purely scientific pursuits, epistemologists AND ? Is that not the most likely way in which truth will out? The obvious difference is that lawyers arguing about the interpretation of law are not pursuing AND when in fact the law is ‘an elaborate discourse of evasion’.106 But suppose there were no LOAC or ICL. Do we really believe that more AND their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom.’107 The two cultures are stuck with each other aboard the same wounded ship. The AND is also the most plausible strategy for achieving whatever convergence is humanly possible.
Scenario education Paul Dragos Aligica 7, Senior Fellow at the Mercatus Center, an Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, and an Associate Professor at the National School of Political Science and Public Administration in Bucharest, Uncertainty, Human Action, and Scenarios; An Austrian Theory Based Decision Support Tool for Business Strategy and Public Policy, http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/Uncertainty.pdf
Scenarios are both a matter of cognition and imagination. "Scenarios attempt to describe AND be tested or at least discussed or evaluated (Kahn 1967: 262). Scenarios emphasize different aspects of "future history" and may do that in many AND of events (Kahn 1973: 120; 1967: 264-65). However, precisely because their unique usefulness, Kahn and his followers have been very AND , and translating it into a framework for judgment" (Wack 1985). At Hudson, Kahn transformed scenarios into a tool for business strategy and introduced them AND most effective and robust decision support methods in business strategy and public policy. The success was even more dramatic when the limits and failures of the "unified AND futures, i.e. precisely the scenario method's message and substance. However despite its success in the practical world of business, the scenario method felt AND after their triumph over the "unified planning machinery" prediction based approach.
1AR Means we turn their impact Clark, professor of law – Catholic University, ‘95 (Leroy D., 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23)
I must now address the thesis that there has been no evolutionary progress for blacks AND , to the powerlessness and abuse of periods preceding these leaps forward. n52
2/9/14
Texas Round 8
Tournament: Texas | Round: 8 | Opponent: Dartmouth College Chen-Cramer | Judge: Garrett 1AC PLAN The United States federal government should limit the war power authority of the president for self-defense targeted killings to outside an armed conflict. 1AC DRONES Advantage one is Drones Conflation of legal regimes for targeted killing results in constrained operations—undermines counterterror efforts Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, J.D., 10/22/11, Self-defense Targeting: Blurring the Line between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947838
At the core of the self-defense targeting theory is the assumption that the AND ad bellum legal basis for hostilities would be irrelevant to this determination.77 This compartmentalization lies at the core of the Geneva Convention lawtriggering equation.78 Adoption AND neutralize the impact of ad bellum legality in law applicability analysis.81 This effort rapidly became the norm of international law.82 Armed conflict analysis simply AND as irrelevant when deciding what rules apply to regulate operational and tactical execution. This aspect of ad bellum/in bello compartmentalization is not called into question by AND bellum principles indicates that these principles subsume in bello conflict regulation norms.91 There are two fundamental flaws with this conflation. First, by contradicting the traditional AND of these principles is distinct within each branch of the jus belli.94 Furthermore, because the scope of authority derived from jus ad bellum principles purportedly invoked AND these consequences and offers a more rational approach to counterterrorism conflict regulation.98
That makes future terrorist attacks inevitable Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of Law, 6/2/13, Corn Comments on the Costs of Shifting to a Pure Self-Defense Model, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/corn-comments-on-the-prospect-of-a-shift-to-a-pure-self-defense-model/
The President’s speech – like prior statements of other administration officials – certainly suggests that AND force) threat that will provide an analogous decisive effect in the future. It strikes me (no pun intended) that arguments – or policy choices – AND , targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America.” Relying exclusively on the inherent right of self-defense would, I suggest, AND not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.” A key advantage of the armed conflict framework is that it provides the legal maneuver AND context of an existing armed conflict than in isolated self-defense actions. It may, of course, be possible to adopt an interpretation of imminence expansive AND opposed to disable, terrorist threats, because of concerns of perceived overreach. It may be that a shift to this use of force framework is not only AND administration is unlikely to be too quick to abandon reliance on the AUMF.
Drones solve safe havens – prevents a terror attack Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida's leadership with drone attacks? A recent poll shows that while most Americans approve of drone strikes, in 17 out of 20 countries, more than half of those surveyed disapprove of them. My study of leadership decapitation in 90 counter-insurgencies since the 1970s shows that when militant leaders are captured or killed militant attacks decrease, terrorist campaigns end sooner, and their outcomes tend to favor the government or third-party country, not the militants. Those opposed to drone strikes often cite the June 2009 one that targeted Pakistani Taliban AND cited drone strikes as a key motivation for his May 2010 attempted attack. Compared to manned aircraft, drones have some advantages as counter-insurgency tools, such as lower costs, longer endurance and the lack of a pilot to place in harm's way and risk of capture. These characteristics can enable a more deliberative targeting process that serves to minimize unintentional casualties. But the weapons employed by drones are usually identical to those used via manned aircraft and can still kill civilians—creating enmity that breeds more terrorists. Yet many insurgents and terrorists have been taken off the battlefield by U.S. drones and special-operations forces. Besides Mehsud, the list includes Anwar al-Awlaki of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qaida deputy leader Abu Yahya al-Li-bi; and, of course, al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Given that list, it is possible that the drone program has prevented numerous attacks by their potential followers, like Shazad. What does the removal of al-Qaida leadership mean for U.S. national security? Though many in al-Qaida's senior leadership cadre remain, the historical record suggests that "decapitation" will likely weaken the organization and could cripple its ability to conduct major attacks on the U.S. homeland. Killing terrorist leaders is not necessarily a knockout blow, but can make it harder for terrorists to attack the U.S. Members of al-Qaida's central leadership, once safely amassed in northwestern Pakistan while America shifted its focus to Iraq, have been killed, captured, forced underground or scattered to various locations with little ability to communicate or move securely. Recently declassified correspondence seized in the bin Laden raid shows that the relentless pressure from the drone campaign on al-Qaida in Pakistan led bin Laden to advise al-Qaida operatives to leave Pakistan's Tribal Areas as no longer safe. Bin Laden's letters show that U.S. counterterrorism actions, which had forced him into self-imposed exile, had made running the organization not only more risky, but also more difficult. As al-Qaida members trickle out of Pakistan and seek sanctuary elsewhere, the U.S. military is ramping up its counterterrorism operations in Somalia and Yemen, while continuing its drone campaign in Pakistan. Despite its controversial nature, the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy has demonstrated a degree of effectiveness. The Obama administration is committed to reducing the size of the U.S. military's footprint overseas by relying on drones, special operations forces, and other intelligence capabilities. These methods have made it more difficult for al-Qaida remnants to reconstitute a new safe haven, as Osama bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
Drones are operationally effective and alternatives are worse—establishing a clear strike policy solves criticism. Byman 13 (Daniel Byman, Brookings Institute Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Research Director, and Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow, July/Aug 2013, “Why Drones Work: The Case for the Washington's Weapon of Choice”, www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman)
Despite President Barack Obama’s recent call to reduce the United States’ reliance on drones, AND indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.
Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now Bunn 13 (Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998., 10/2/2013, “Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism: Recommendations Based on the U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment”, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html)
I. Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and AND the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Extinction Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat AND assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
Causes US-Russia miscalc—extinction Barrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor and Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
1AC LEGAL REGIMES Advantage two is legal regimes US targeted killing derives authority from both armed conflict (jus in bello) and self-defense (jus ad bellum) legal regimes—that authority overlap conflates the legal regimes Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
For the past several years, the United States has relied on both armed conflict AND the implementation of the concepts of necessity and imminence, among many others. However, equally fundamental questions arise from the use of both justifications at the same AND raises significant concerns about both current implementation and future development of the law. One overarching concern is the conflation in general of jus ad bellum and jus in AND of their cause. The result: an invitation to unregulated warfare.11
Authority overlap destroys both the self-defense and armed conflict legal regimes Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
In contrast, human rights law’s requirement that force only be used as a last AND therefore every attempt must be made to capture before resorting to lethal force. In the abstract, the differences in the obligations regarding surrender and capture seem straightforward AND , and tried, those are the means which should be employed.105 The Israeli Supreme Court’s finding that targeting is only lawful if no less harmful means AND ,108 it demonstrates some of the challenges of conflating the two paradigms. First, if this added obligation of less harmful means was understood to form part AND who are lawful combatants, a result not contemplated in the LOAC.109 Second, soldiers faced with an obligation to always use less harmful means may well AND conflict, a central component of the protection of all persons in wartime. From the opposing perspective, if the armed conflict rules for capture and surrender were AND as a consequence of the broadening use of force outside of armed conflict.
This degrades the entire collective security structure resulting in widespread interstate war Craig Martin, Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law, 2011, GOING MEDIEVAL: TARGETED KILLING, SELF?DEFENSE AND THE JUS AD BELLUM REGIME, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1956141
The United States has been engaging in this practice of using drone-mounted missile AND S. justification and in accordance with the rationales developed to support it. Some of the implications of such an adjustment in the jus ad bellum regime are AND 2(4) prohibition on the use of force would be expanded. In addition, however, the targeted killing policy threatens to create other holes in AND without being subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the IHL regime. The structure of Harold Koh’s two-pronged justification similarly implies a severance of this AND against the threat or use of force under the jus ad bellum regime. This interpretation of the justifications cannot be pressed too far on the basis of the AND use of force against the states in which the groups may be operating. While the initial use of force in jus ad bellum terms is currently understood to AND system of laws designed to govern and constrain all aspects of its operation. There is a tendency in the U.S. approach to the so- AND creating the U.N. system after the Second World War.108 The premise of my argument is not that any return to past principles is inherently AND , and international armed conflict was thus far more frequent and widespread.109 The entire debate on targeted killing is so narrowly focused on the particular problems posed AND states under the pretext of self-proclaimed armed conflict with NSAs generally. We may think about each of these innovations as being related specifically to operations against AND a threat that is much less serious in the grand scheme of things.
Robust support for the impact—legal regime conflation results in uncontrollable conflict escalation Ryan Goodman, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, December 2009, CONTROLLING THE RECOURSE TO WAR BY MODIFYING JUS IN BELLO, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law / Volume 12
A substantial literature exists on the conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. However, the consequences for the former side of the equation – the resort to war – is generally under-examined. Instead, academic commentary has focused on the effects of compliance with humanitarian rules in armed conflict and, in particular, the equality of application principle. In this section, I attempt to help correct that imbalance. In the following analysis, I use the (admittedly provocative) short-hand labels of ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ wars. The former consists of efforts that aim to promote the general welfare of foreign populations such as humanitarian interventions and, on some accounts, peacekeeping operations. The latter – undesirable wars – include conflicts that result from security spirals that serve neither state’s interest and also include predatory acts of aggression. 4.1.1 Decreased likelihood of ‘desirable wars’ A central question in debates about humanitarian intervention is whether the international community should be AND short, all ‘interventions to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter’ are affected. Two developments render desirable interventions less likely. First, consider implications of the Kosovo AND one would most want to incentivize to initiate and participate in humanitarian interventions. The second development shares many of these same consequences. Consider the implications of the AND disproportionately affect the very states that take international human rights obligations most seriously. Notably, in these cases, the disincentives might weigh most heavily on third parties AND the international regime should prefer to be involved in these kinds of interventions. The developments regulating jus ad bellum through jus in bello also threaten to make ‘ AND result from the pressures created by Type I erosions of the separation principle. First, increasing the tax on humanitarian interventions (the Kosovo Commission/ICISS approach AND language (in resolutions and the like) espousing or emphasizing humanitarian objectives. Second, the elevation of self-regarding – security and strategic – frameworks over AND international disputes exert significant influence on whether conflicts will eventually culminate in war. Third, a large body of empirical research demonstrates that states will routinely engage in AND demands for increased bellicosity, unintended security spirals, and military violence.103 Importantly, these effects may result even if one is skeptical about the power of AND states entering into disastrous military campaigns that their leaders did not initially intend.
Therefore, the more likely result is that the Executive Branch, grappling with the AND prove legally fragile, destabilizing to the international political order, or both.
Effect on Domestic Law and Policy Congress’s failure to reauthorize military force would lead to bad domestic law and even worse AND be to continue to rely on the September 18, 2001, AUMF. Second, basing U.S. counterterrorism efforts on the President’s constitutional authority as AND would lack stability—confounding cooperation with allies and hindering negotiations with adversaries. There are, of course, many situations where the president’s position as Commander in AND conflict than the public might otherwise be willing to support.”140 In a world without a valid AUMF, the United States could base its continued AND problems.”141 Only then can the President’s efforts be sustained and legitimate. 2. Effect on the International Law of Self-Defense A failure to reauthorize military force would lead to significant negative consequences on the international AND allowing the executive to rely on a self-defense authorization alone.144 This approach also would inevitably lead to dangerous “slippery slopes.” Once the President AND international law of self defense would likely lead to precisely such a result. The slippery slope problem, however, is not just limited to the United States’s AND to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos.”148 Encouraging the proliferation of an expansive law of international self-defense would not only AND and rooting counterterrorism efforts within a more durable, legal foundation.”152 Widely accepted legal arguments also facilitate cooperation from U.S. allies, especially AND , but facilitating that rationale’s destabilizing adoption by nations around the world.158
Law of armed conflict controls deterrence—collapse causes global WMD conflict Delahunty, associate prof – U St. Thomas Law, and Yoo, law prof – UC Berkeley, ‘10 (Robert and John, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 803)
Finally, the extension of IHRL to armed conflict may have significant consequences for the AND norms of distinction and the humane treatment of combatants and civilians in wartime. IHRL norms, on the other hand, may suffer from much lower rates of AND would be to adapt the legal system already specifically designed for armed conflict.
Strong LOAC regime key to stable goldilocks on autonomous weapons systems - a total ban fails Anderson and Waxman 11/5/13 Mr. Anderson is a law professor at American University and a senior fellow of the Brookings Institution. Mr. Waxman is a professor at Columbia Law School and a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Both are members of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, Real Clear Defense, November 5, 2013, "Killer Robots and the Laws of War", http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/11/05/killer_robots_and_the_laws_of_war_106946.html
Computerized weapons capable of killing people sound like something from a dystopian film. So it's understandable why some, scared of the moral challenges such weapons present, would support a ban as the safest policy. In fact, a ban is unnecessary and dangerous. No country has publicly revealed plans to use fully autonomous weapons, including drone- AND -defense system similarly responds to threats faster than human reaction times permit. Contrary to what some critics of autonomous weapons claim, there won't be an abrupt AND from full command, to partial command, to oversight and so on. This evolution is inevitable as sensors, computer analytics and machine learning improve; as states demand greater protection for their military personnel; and as similar technologies in civilian life prove that they are capable of complex tasks, such as driving cars or performing surgery, with greater safety than human operators. But critics like the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots believe that governments must stop this AND , they believe that these systems may operate in unpredictable, ruthless ways. Yet a ban is unlikely to work, especially in constraining states or actors most inclined to abuse these weapons. Those actors will not respect such an agreement, and the technological elements of highly automated weapons will proliferate. Moreover, because the automation of weapons will happen gradually, it would be nearly impossible to design or enforce such a ban. Because the same system might be operable with or without effective human control or oversight, the line between legal weapons and illegal autonomous ones will not be clear-cut. If the goal is to reduce suffering and protect human lives, a ban could AND rules. Autonomous weapons systems have the potential to address these human shortcomings. No one can say with certainty how much automated capabilities might gradually reduce the harm of warfare, but it would be wrong not to pursue such gains, and it would be especially pernicious to ban research into such technologies. That said, autonomous weapons warrant careful regulation. Each step toward automation needs to AND for how these systems are to be used and in what combat environments. If the past decade of the U.S. drone program has taught us AND strategic imperative to demonstrate new weapons' adherence to high legal and ethical standards. This approach will not work if the U.S. goes it alone. America should gather a coalition of like-minded partners to adapt existing international legal standards and develop best practices for applying them to autonomous weapons. The British government, for example, has declared its opposition to a treaty ban on autonomous weapons but is urging responsible states to develop common standards for the weapons' use within the laws of war. Autonomous weapons are not inherently unlawful or unethical. If we adapt legal and ethical norms to address robotic weapons, they can be used responsibly and effectively on the battlefield.
Autonomous weapons make war obsolete in the long-term but stabilizing the transition is key - irresponsible usage causes short-term extinction Krishnan 09 Armin Krishnan is a Senior Research Assistant in the National Centre for Research Methods at the University of Southampton, UK, Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons, 2009, pg. 166-67
Conclusion: The Challenge Ahead This book has developed the hypothesis of the ‘killer robot': an autonomous weapon AND ‘unmanned combat' could represent a major discontinuity in the history of warfare. The current situation of an impending Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) triggered by AND use of force might once again become a frequent tool of foreign policy. Preventing this from happening will require a debate on the moral foundations of warfare, AND states around the world might not feel pressured to develop advanced robotic weapons. At the same time, there are certainly legitimate uses and roles for unmanned systems AND forget the moral responsibility one has, even toward their own the enemy. Harry Truman wrote a note after watching the first nuclear test in New Mexico in AND robots’ and it will be challenging to bypass the various roads to hell.
Reverse causal and targeted killing is key - absent the plan global war is inevitable Fisk and Ramos 13 (Kerstin Fisk --- PhD in Political Science focusing on interstate war @ Claremont Graduate University, Jennifer M. Ramos-- PhD in Polisci and Professor @ Loyola Marymount focusing on norms and foreign policy, including drone warfare and preventative use of force, “Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm” 15 APR 2013, International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1–23)
Conclusion Preventive self-defense entails waging a war or an attack by choice, in AND for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, and/or precision targeting. Thus, the results of our plausibility probe provide some evidence that the global norm AND or lesser power. Research in this vein would compliment our analyses herein. With the proliferation of technology in a globalized world, it seems only a matter AND it continues to provide other states with the justification to do the same.
US TK policy is key Braden R. Allenby 14, Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and of Law at Arizona State University, Are new technologies undermining the laws of war?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January/February 2014 vol. 70 no.1 21-31
As historical example strongly suggests, new technologies are likely to destabilize internal military cultures AND , autonomous combat aircraft raise questions of compliance with the laws of war. Changing contexts The laws of war and international humanitarian law are challenged today not just by technology, but by a perfect storm of cultural and geopolitical change. Many of the working assumptions that have been stable over much of the past centuries, and which have formed an unquestioned but critical underpinning for existing laws and norms, are stable no more. A look at four emerging military technologies helps illustrate this disruption. Why, for example, are military unmanned aerial vehicles so contentious?1 They AND , making it relatively easy to differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. Unmanned aerial vehicles raise other issues, as well: An unmanned US aircraft may AND for the Facebook posting that your sweetheart used to break up with you. And what about directed energy weapons, such as the US Army’s Active Denial System AND the laws of war break down under the challenges of this new complexity. Lethal autonomous robots are machines programmed and deployed with the ability to identify, track AND , autonomous weapons become, simply, the substitution of capital for labor. While highly contentious, autonomous weapons do not necessarily pose the foundational challenge to the AND in its compliance with international law, or simply much better than humans? If there is a game-changer among these four examples, it’s probably the AND allied nations may pass through many other nations that facilitate the information transfer. This global mixing of civilian and military activity poses interesting challenges to a body of AND criminal law? If the latter, just how effective will that be? More seriously, the essence of cyber warfare is non-attribution: It is AND tank comes from an identifiable party; a computer worm, not necessarily. Unsatisfying answers Experts are beginning to focus on the legal questions raised by emerging, disruptive military AND too limited to be effective against global jihadism, except in special cases. NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence has written the Tallinn Manual (2013) AND least as serious if a nation or nations begin to genetically engineer warriors. War becomes something new when, as in Afghanistan, it combines a witches’ brew AND technology, and they are governed by very different legal and ethical regimes. New military technologies have short-term and obvious institutional implications, but also longer AND it will affect not just military organization but the structure of society itself. Careful changes in the laws of war It is highly unlikely that the dramatic impacts of emerging military technologies and changing institutional AND might apply, and which need to be updated to fit current circumstances. Even so, truly discontinuous change in human systems is very rare. The laws AND arise as different legal and ethical regimes intersect in the same operational domain. What would seem to be appropriate, therefore, is neither the wholesale rejection of AND war and a desire to maintain them in the face of accelerating change. The challenges to the laws of war posed by technological evolution and associated social and AND that it has already wrought, but has yet to learn to manage.
1AC SOLVENCY Congressional limits of self-defense authority within armed conflict is necessary to resolve legal ambiguity Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, Winter 2012, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html
In the wake of the attacks by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, AND not wise for the long-term health of the rule of law. This article traces the history of targeted killing from a U.S. perspective AND Constitution demands nothing less, but thus far, Congress’s silence is deafening. History of Targeted Killing During the Cold War, the United States used covert operations AND is declared hostile; the enemy is now targetable. Anticipatory Self-defense This paradigm shift is novel for the United States. The President’s authority to order AND , but now they are hampering its desires to target and kill terrorists. Skeptics of targeted killing admit that “the decision to target specific individuals AND even some foreign governments40 is where these targeted killings can be conducted.41 According to the U.S. critics, if armed conflict between the states AND negative: the strike constituted “a clear case of extrajudicial killing.”42 The Obama administration, like its predecessor, disagrees. Its legal justification for targeted AND , must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.”44 A state can act under the guise of anticipatory self-defense. This truism AND stated legal authority is self-defense? There is no clear answer. The administration is blurring the contours of the right of the state to act in Yemen under self-defense and the law of war protections afforded its soldiers when so acting. Therefore, what protections do U.S. Airmen enjoy when operating the drone that killed an individual in Yemen, Somalia, or Libya? If they are indicted by a Spanish court for murder, what is the defense AND international legal norms intersect and potentially conflict with measures stemming from domestic law.
That clarity over legal authority is necessary to solve Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, 2012, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, http://www.wmitchell.edu/lawreview/Volume38/documents/11.BlankFINAL.pdf
As noted in the introduction to this article, maintaining the separation between and independence AND of international security, and to the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. III. BLURRING THE LINES The nature of the terrorist threat the United States and other states face does indeed AND individuals by blurring the lines between the key parameters of the two paradigms. A. Location of Attacks: International Law and the Scope of the Battlefield The distinct differences between the targeting regimes in armed conflict and in self-defense AND parameters of the zone of combat in the conflict with al Qaeda.70 Traditionally, the law of neutrality provided the guiding framework for the parameters of the AND the armed conflict directly to the territory of one or more belligerent parties. The neutrality framework as a geographic parameter is left wanting in today’s conflicts with terrorist AND armies and their enemies or as police forces and their criminal adversaries.78 Simply locating terrorist groups and operatives does not therefore identify the parameters of the battlefield—the fact that the United States and other states use a combination of military operations and law enforcement measures to combat terrorism blurs the lines one might look for in defining the battlefield. In many situations, “the fight against transnational jihadi groups . . . largely takes place away from any recognizable battlefield.”79 Second, a look at U.S. jurisprudence in the past and today AND our country must engage if our form of government is to survive.81 In each of those cases, the United States was a belligerent in an international AND both the difference in approach and the uncertainty involved in defining today’s conflicts. The current U.S. approach of using both the armed conflict paradigm and AND and/or self-defense to cover all areas without further delineation. Second, on a broader level of legal application and interpretation, the development of AND prove detrimental in the future when it seeks sharper delineations for other purposes.
Executive “clarification” is insufficient Laurie Blank, Emory International Humanitarian Law Clinic Director, Professor, 10/10/13, “Raid Watching” and Trying to Discern Law from Policy, today.law.utah.edu/projects/raid-watching-and-trying-to-discern-law-from-policy/
Trying to identify and understand the legal framework the United States believes is applicable to AND where does the United States believe its authority derived from this conflict reaches? On Saturday, U.S. Special Forces came ashore in Somalia and engaged AND Shabaab is a party to that armed conflict or another independent armed conflict? The reality, however, is that this latest counterterrorism operation highlights once again the conflation of law and policy that exemplifies the entire discourse about the United States conflict with al Qaeda and other U.S. counterterrorism operations as well. And that using policy to discern law is a highly risky venture. The remarkable series of public speeches by top Obama Administration legal advisors and national security AND of the conflation of law and policy and the consequences of that conflation. Policy and strategic considerations are without a doubt an essential component of understanding contemporary military operations and the application of international law. However, it is equally important to distinguish between law and policy, and to recognize when one is driving analysis versus the other. The law regarding the use of force against an individual or group outside the borders AND force is necessary and proportionate to repel or deter the attack or threat. The United States has consistently blurred these two legal justifications for the use of force AND the perspective of careful legal analysis, however, it can prove problematic. In effect, it is U.S. policy to eliminate “bad guys AND raids, capture — each situation involves its own tactical plans and twists. But do any of these specific tactical choices tell us anything in particular about whether AND and used deadly force in the process of trying to effectuate that capture. Ultimately, however, the only certain information is that the United States viewed this AND particular military mission at hand, the operational imperatives and national command policy. The fact that the operation may have had capture as its goal, if feasible AND force, but that use of force may nonetheless be robust when necessary. “Raid-watching” — trying to predict the applicable legal framework from reports of United States strikes and raids on targets abroad — highlights the challenges of the conflation of law and policy
and the concomitant risks of trying to sift the law out from the policy AND policy for legal analysis ultimately substitutes policy’s flexibility for the law’s normative foundations.
2AC Goodman doesn’t know what LOAC is Corn et al 13 -Geoff Corn, South Texas College of Law, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, J.D., Laurie Blank, Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory Law School, Christopher Jenks, SMU Director of the Criminal Justice Clinic and Assistant Professor of Law, and Eric Talbot Jensen, BYU Law Professor, LOAC Expert, 2/25/13, Corn, Blank, Jenks, and Jensen Respond to Goodman on Capture-Instead-of-Kill, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/corn-blank-jenks-and-jensen-respond-to-goodman-on-capture-instead-of-kill/
In a provocative essay on drone strikes in Slate, Professor Ryan Goodman claims that AND demonstrates the fallacy of asserting an LRM principle as a matter of law.
No it doesn’t – and don’t let them cross ap to the k Kellogg ’05 (Davida, Phd., Adjunct Professor of Military Science at the University of Maine from 1999 to 2003 and a 1992 Military History Fellow at the U.S. Military Academy, “International Law and Terrorism,” September/October 2005, http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/MilitaryReview/kellog.pdf)
Such incidents show how modern terror warfare has set Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz’s most AND over the most fundamental human rights the Geneva Conventions are intended to protect.
T The plan restricts armed conflict authority, which the AUMF is a subset of—we are a specific statute that applies to the AUMF—they are just a bad spec arg Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School, 9/1/2013, A Quick Primer on AUMFs, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/a-quick-primer-on-aumfs/
Via Ilya Somin at Volokh, I see that the administration has proffered its proposed AND some members of Congress surely will not support one that is that broad. An article that I wrote with Curt Bradley, which examined AUMFs throughout American history, provides a framework for understanding AUMFs. (And the Lawfare Wiki collects many historical AUMFs and declarations of war, here.) AUMFs can (as Bradley and I argued on pp. 2072 ff.) be broken down into five analytical components: (1) the authorized military resources; (2) the authorized methods of force; (3) the authorized targets; (4) the purpose of the use of force; and (5) the timing and procedural restrictions on the use of force Most AUMFs in U.S. History – for example, AUMFs for the AND the relatively broad AUMF that everyone knows, from September 18, 2001. Bradley and I summarized historical AUMFs as follows: This survey of authorizations to use force shows that Congress has authorized the President to AND exercised without specifying (at least implicitly) an enemy or a purpose. The primary differences between limited and broad authorizations are as follows: In limited authorizations AND broad purposes, and generally imposes few if any timing or procedural restrictions. AND—we have to meet because we specify “war power authority” The “war powers authority” of the President is his Commander-in-Chief authority Gallagher, Pakistan/Afghanistan coordination cell of the U.S. Joint Staff, Summer 2011 (Joseph, “Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication,” Parameters, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011summer/Gallagher.pdf) First, consider the constitutional issue of power imbalance. Central to the Constitution is the foundational principle of power distribution and provisions to check and balance exercises of that power. This clearly intended separation of powers across the three branches of government ensures that no single federal officeholder can wield an inordinate amount of power or influence. The founders carefully crafted constitutional war-making authority with the branch most representative of the people—Congress.4 The Federalist Papers No. 51, “The Structure of Government Must Furnish the AND —those who would ultimately sacrifice their blood and treasure in the effort.
War powers authority refers to the President’s authority to execute warfighting operations—that includes self-defense justifications Manget, law professor at Florida State and formerly in the Office of the General Counsel at the CIA, No Date (Fred, “Presidential War Powers,” http://media.nara.gov/dc-metro/rg-263/6922330/Box-10-114-7/263-a1-27-box-10-114-7.pdf)
The President has constitutional authority to order defensive military action in response to aggression without AND acts in defense of the nation, he acts under war powers authority. 3. Protection of Life and Property The President also has the power to order military intervention in foreign countries to protect AND Navy and Air Force aircraft bombed the modern Barbary Coast nation of Libya. 4. Collective Security The President may also authorize military operations without prior congressional approval pursuant to collective security agreements such as NA TO or OAS treaties. Unilaterial presidential action under these agreements may be justified as necessary for the protection of national security even though hostilities occur overseas and involve allies.36 5. National Defense Power The President's war powers authority is actually a national defense power that exists at all AND the national defense and the prosecution of national objectives through military means."39 Thus, the Executive Branch 's constitutional war powers authority does not spring into existence when Congress declares war, nor is it dependent on there being hostilities. It empowers the President to prepare for war as well as wage it, in the broadest sense. It operates at all times. 6. Role of the Military The fundamental function of the armed forces is to fight or to be ready to AND type of hostility are based on constitutional war powers authority of the President.
Prefer our interpretation Predictability – none of their evidence is a definition nor does it have an intent to define – means it is impossible to have a clear basis to construct affs from
Aff ground – they limit out core TK ground as well as the cyber and detention areas of the topic since they aren’t based on the AUMF. All the affs become contrived – it’s an extra hoop to fit advantages into. They overlimit – they allow only zone one cases – Congressional silence also creates authority in zone two – and the Constitution does in zone three – their author: Colby P. Horowitz 2013 “CREATING A MORE MEANINGFUL ¶ DETENTION STATUTE: LESSONS LEARNED ¶ FROM HEDGES V. OBAMA,” FORDHAM L.R. Vol. 81, http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/Vol_81/Horowitz_April.pdf
2. The Relational Theory of Presidential War Powers Justices Jackson and Frankfurter both wrote concurring opinions in Youngstown expressing the idea that presidential AND own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”126
Bidirectionality – defining the topic as restrictions on statutes as opposed to restrictions by statute allows the federal government to ignore Congress’s laws on Gitmo – defining the plan’s mechanism is better than defining the plan’s target
Prefer reasonability – competing interpretations causes a race to the bottom and over incentivizes going for T
WAR POWERS 3. History disproves their impact Bradley et al ‘12 Curtis A. Bradley, Sarah H. Cleveland, The Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh, Martin S. Lederman, Judith Resnik and Stephen I. Vladeck, “WAR, TERROR, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS, TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFERENCE*: ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS' SECTION ON FEDERAL COURTS PROGRAM AT THE 2012 AALS ANNUAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C.,” 61 Am. U.L. Rev. 1253 So where are we? Marty mentioned a word that had not been mentioned before AND memos. So the courts are playing a role in enforcing congressional restrictions.
4. No slippery slope – if things get out of hand the executive can reassert its power in critical areas Barron ‘8 David, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Martin Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB -- A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941 But that dramatic deviation did not come from nowhere. Rarely does our constitutional framework AND defiant actions, and impeachment is neither an easy nor an attractive remedy. 6. The internal link story is incoherent – increases or decreases in power are always counterbalanced until they reach a stable equilibrium KRAUSE 2 - Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He earned a B.A. degree in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh in April 1988. He also earned an M.A. degree in Economics (1990), M.A. degree in Political Science (1993), and a Ph.D. degree in Political Science (1994) from West Virginia University(George A., 2002, “Separated Powers and Institutional Growth in the Presidential and Congressional Branches: Distinguishing Between Short-Run versus -- Long-Run Dynamics,” Political Research Quarterly March 2002 vol. 55 no. 1 27-57, http://prq.sagepub.com/content/55/1/27.full.pdf+html)JCP
Rather than viewing one institution (presidential branch) dominating the other (congressional branch AND that Presidents and Congress cannot exploit one another with respect to branch building.
XO Object fiat is a voter – avoids the core question of pres powers by fiating away obama’s behavior in the squo – justifies the end war cp which means the neg wins every debate – it’s not in the lit which is key Hansen 12 (Victor, Professor of Law, New England Law, New England Law Review, Vol. 46, pp. 27-36, 2011, “Predator Drone Attacks”, February 22, 2012, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009313, PDF, ZBurdette)
Any checks on the President’s use of drone attacks must come domestically. In the domestic arena the two options are either the courts or Congress. As discussed above, the courts are institutionally unsuited and incapable of providing appropriate oversight. Congress is the branch with the constitutional authority, historical precedent, and institutional capacity to exercise meaningful and effective oversight of the President’s actions.
Executive clarification fails—not legally binding, no cred, raises expectations Sarah Knuckey, NYU Law School Project on Extrajudicial Executions Director, Special Advisor to the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, 10/1/13, Transparency on Targeted Killings: Promises Made, but Little Progress, justsecurity.org/2013/10/01/transparency-targeted-killings-promises-made-progress/
Some interpreted these efforts and the President’s speech to mark the beginning of improved transparency. But despite transparency promises and expectations, many of the same, core concerns regarding undue secrecy remain. The President’s speech, the Policy Guidance, and Holder’s letter – because of textual ambiguities within each, and combined with events since – have largely failed to address these longstanding concerns, and in some important respects aggravated them. Continuing Secrecy on Core Issues Key areas in which transparency has not yet been forthcoming include: Who can be killed, where, and on what basis. Demands for AND had “expanded the scope” of who could be targeted in Yemen).
The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law AND full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the AND focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge AND and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem AND student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the AND that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and AND giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal 1 AND Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount AND execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise AND but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution AND , generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – AND simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) AND many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize AND to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the AND exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during AND , while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop AND uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account AND weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might AND through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts AND , giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to AND relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives ( AND , or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law AND releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, AND the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students AND opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who AND concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the AND both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, AND greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national AND to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, AND in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model AND undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.
Ontology is a DESTRUCTIVE HISTORICAL FICTION – any GATEWAY claims are just TRICKS based on how we SHELVE BOOKS Shirky 5 Clay Shirky, teacher of NYU's graduate Interactive Telecommunications Program, 03/15/05 http://www.itconversations.com/shows/detail470.html I hold a joint appointment at NYU, as an Associate Arts Professor at the Interactive Telecommunications Program (ITP) and as a Distinguished Writer in Residence in the Journalism Department. I am also a Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society, and was the Edward R. Murrow Visiting Lecturer at Harvard's Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy in 2010.
There are many ways to organize data: labels, lists, categories, taxonomies AND interested in creativity, the LC ontology destroys value rather than creating it. As we have learned from the Web, when data is decoupled from physical presence AND advance, we are freed from needing to make it explicit at all. This talk begins by exploring the rise of ontological classification. In the period after the invention of the printing press but before the invention of the search engine, intellectual production was vested in books, objects that were numerous but opaque. When you have more than a few hundred books, categorization becomes a forced move, even if the categories are somewhat arbitrary, because without categories, you can no longer locate individual books.
LOAC does not legitimize violence—alternative is militarized violence Charles Kels, attorney for the Department of Homeland Security and a major in the Air Force Reserve, 12/6/12, THe Perilous Position of the Laws of War, harvardnsj.org/2012/12/the-perilous-position-of-the-laws-of-war/
The real nub of the current critique of U.S. policy, therefore AND words, an ad bellum argument cloaked in the language of in bello. LOAC is apolitical. Adherence to it does not legitimize an unlawful resort to force AND , LOAC is by far the best case scenario, not the worst. Transnational terrorist networks pose unique security problems, among them the need to apply preexisting AND a bulwark against indiscriminate carnage, steeped in history and tried in battle.
Perm do the plan and all non mutually exclusive parts of the alt
Oppositional views of the law and it’s use for war are inevitable – ONLY the permutation resolves academic conflict Luban ’13 (David, University Professor in Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center, “Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law,” Leiden Journal of International Law, Volume 26, Issue 02, pp 315-349)
These arguments about military necessity are not meant as a ‘refutation’ of the LOAC AND principles that could be accepted even by adherents of the other comprehensive view. To illustrate with an example: Article 57 of AP I requires militaries to take AND of these interpretations can be right, and lawyers should not advance them. This conciliatory approach is not self-evident. In purely scientific pursuits, epistemologists AND ? Is that not the most likely way in which truth will out? The obvious difference is that lawyers arguing about the interpretation of law are not pursuing AND when in fact the law is ‘an elaborate discourse of evasion’.106 But suppose there were no LOAC or ICL. Do we really believe that more AND their ship but are never able to start afresh from the bottom.’107 The two cultures are stuck with each other aboard the same wounded ship. The AND is also the most plausible strategy for achieving whatever convergence is humanly possible.
Unsurprisingly, this article embraces an interpretation of the Constitution that is at odds with AND military force in a manner which is binding on the Executive Branch.18 Furthermore, the Vesting Clause thesis and all-powerful views of the Commander in AND , at least in part, because the Obama Administration says it matters. The scope of the AUMF is also important for any future judicial opinion that might AND Framers did not intend to fashion the President into an American monarch.27 Jackson’s concurrence has become the most significant guidepost in debates over the constitutionality of executive AND its precise scope, authorization, and continuing vitality matter a great deal. President believes he is constrained by statute Saikrishna Prakash 12, professor of law at the University of Virginia and Michael Ramsey, professor of law at San Diego, “The Goldilocks Executive” Feb, SSRN
We accept that the President’s lawyers search for legal arguments to justify presidential action, AND of law would trigger censure from Congress, courts, and the public. 1AR---AT: STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures Ridley, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of The Economist, and award-winning science writer, 2010 (Matt, The Rational Optimist, pg. 13-15)
If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. AND was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500. Their explanation of the impact is overly reductive and can’t be solved Boulding 77 Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung Author(s): Kenneth E. BouldingReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1977), pp. 75-86Published Kenneth Ewart Boulding (January 18, 1910 – March 18, 1993) was an economist, educator, peace activist, poet, religious mystic, devoted Quaker, systems scientist, and interdisciplinary philosopher.12 He was cofounder of General Systems Theory and founder of numerous ongoing intellectual projects in economics and social science. He graduated from Oxford University, and was granted United States citizenship in 1948. During the years 1949 to 1967, he was a faculty member of the University of Michigan. In 1967, he joined the faculty of the University of Colorado at Boulder, where he remained until his retirement.
Finally, we come to the great Galtung metaphors of 'structural violence' 'and 'positive AND it may have d'one a disservice in preventing us from finding the answer.
No risk of endless warfare Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf)
7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security AND strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.
Shocks to the system are the ONLY propensity for conflict—liberal norms have eradicated warfare and structural violence—every field study proves JOHN HORGAN 9 is Director of the Center for Science at Stevens Institute of Technology, former senior writer at Scientific American, B.A. from Columbia and an M.S. from Columbia “The End of the Age of War,” Dec 7, http://www.newsweek.com/id/225616/page/1 GREEN The economic crisis was supposed to increase violence around the world. The truth is AND pageant -contestants—or something like it may finally come to pass. Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards – failure to express our fears causes them to occur Macy, general systems scholar; deep ecologist, ‘95 (Joanna, Ecopsychology)
There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is AND holocaust is often made to feel guilty of contributing to that very fate.
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