Tournament: D6 Districts | Round: 1 | Opponent: Louisville Lusco-Reddy | Judge: Sciullo
We begin with the story of Mohammad Sarwar. Mohammed Sedique explains in the 1996:
Sedique, ’96 Mohammed Sedique, demining survey team leader in Afghanistan. “Stories of Landmine Victims”, Huamn Rights Solidarity, http://www.hrsolidarity.net/mainfile.php/1996vol06no01/110/
In a letter to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, de-miner Mohammad Sedique tells the story of 10-year-old Mohammad Sarwar who lost his legs in a landmine explosion. Mr. Sedique is the survey team leader of team No. 10 of the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) in Afghanistan. Here is Mr. Sedique’s letter.

When I was busy surveying a mined area at Tapa Salam area of Kabul city in September 1995, I saw a disabled child walking with the help of sticks towards us. I stopped work and went to see him and to know the reason of his disability. When greeting, I noticed that he had lost both of his legs and walked with a prosthesis.

He introduced himself as Mohammad Sarwar, 10 years old. When asked about the reason of his disability, he replied after a pause and with a dull voice:

"We left our house," he said pointing towards a house near the minefield
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bring some water and I picked up the pails and left the house.

"When heading towards the well, I heard a thunder-like sound and
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longer be able to continue my education as I cannot walk to school."

Mohammad Sarwar also mentioned the story of one of his classmates who had fallen victim to a mine blast at the same area.

"I cannot enjoy my life and I cannot play with my friends any more. I miss all the happy times at the school and at the playgrounds with my friends. I have to live a terrible life. I wish you had come here to clear mines before I lost my legs."

Sarwar’s story is not an abnormality – landmines are responsible for 26,000 casualties a year and ongoing structural violence
TEPE 11 Lecturer in European Studies and German at King's College London Daniela Tepe, December 2011, The Myth about Global Civil Society: Domestic Politics to Ban Landmines page 77-79
Landmines are among the most deadly weapons in the contemporary  world. These weapons have
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destroy more than  eight mines out of ten (Hubert 1998: 314).
PLAN: The United States federal government should ratify the Mine Ban Treaty to prohibit the introduction of anti-personnel landmines into hostilities.
Ratifying the Ottawa convention protects victims of landmines and affirms the value of human security in international law
Holbrook 09 (Trevor Holbrook, MA, International Relations, Weber University, Thailand, “U.S. Policy Recommendation: Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines,” American University, Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Brief, No. 17, 2009)
This article examines the consequences of the U.S. refusal to sign the
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to U.S. goals to spread freedom and improve international security.

Political civil society engagement with landmines is key to success
BERNSTEIN 08 Director of the Nobel Women’s Initiative, former coordinator of the ICBL from 1998-2004 Elizabeth Bernstein, “Still Alive and Kicking,” from, Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security, edited by Jody Williams, Stephen D. Goose, and Mary Wareham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Page 46

Conclusion
…
accepting  their responsibility to act as global citizens working for a better World.
The Ottawa Treaty isn’t flawless – but it is a good place to start challenging the security apparatus. Linking calls for government action to human security needs reshapes institutions according to common interests of individuals and states. 

David ROBERTS Int’l Pol @ Ulster ‘8 Human Insecurity p. 180-183

But this critique is not undertaken with the intention of excluding realism from this debate
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who experience the consequences of the hegemony of the masculine approach to securitization.

We should link the ethical frame of human security to our anti-landmine advocacy.  Normative advocacy for human security is crucial for resolving global problems peacefully and avoiding the reduction of life to bare life.

Shahrbanou TADJBAKHSH Director Concentration on Human Security @ Master’s of Pulibc Affairs @ Sciences Po (Paris) ‘10 in Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding Ed. Oliver Richmond p. 120-123

The curiosity of Chandler's second otherwise noble criticism, that human security approaches objectify other
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framework to engage with the ethical concerns around the legitimisation of contemporary peacebuilding.
Human security key for confronting structural violence.  We provide the best framework for addressing government repression, genocide, discrimination, environmental degradation and poverty. 

Patrick HAYDEN IR @ St. Andrews ‘4 “Constraining War: Human Security and the Human Right to Peace” Human Rights Review October-December p.38-40

The more expansive formulation of human security represents a radically different approach to security from
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life. In short, human security is inseparable from conditions of peace.

Belief in the possibility of civil repair key to anti-colonialism, limiting arbitrary state violence, and empowerment.  Our impact turns and outweighs the k.

Jeffrey ALEXANDER Sociology @ Yale and Co-Director Center for Cultural Sociology ‘6 The Civil Sphere p.  549-553

IN THIS BOOK, I have presented a new theory of society by defining a
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cannot overcome binarism, we can fundamentally change its referents. There will alw

ays be two goalposts, but we shift them, even in the middle of
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society is a project. t inspires hope for a democratic life.

Tournament: Ndt | Round: 4 | Opponent: Michigan Hirn-Krakoff | Judge: Gliniecki, Norris, Zendeh
The United States federal government should statutorily restrict the President’s authority to introduce armed forces into outer space with the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.

Space War

Contention one is space war
US failure to commit to a legal regime for space ensures a weaponization race
AKULOV 10/30/13 ~Andrei Akulov, columnist @ Strategic Culture Foundation. "Russia, China Join Efforts to Prevent Arms Race in Space". Strategic Culture Foundation online global affairs journal. 10/30/13. http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/10/30/russia-china-join-efforts-to-prevent-arms-race-in-space.html~~
The international security agenda still has an important gap to fill. There are many
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international initiative they are coming up with to add to the UN agenda.
Speaking at the United Nations on October 17, 2013 Mikhail Ulyanov, director of
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Conference on PAROS (the prevention of an arms race in outer space).
Space and the problem of its weaponization
The history of space weaponization goes back to the late 1950s, when first antisatellite
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But the Outer Space Treaty mentions no restriction on conventional weapons in space.
SALT I, the first Soviet-American treaty on limiting strategic arms, included
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to smash incoming missiles which presupposes the capability to destroy satellites as well…
The UN resolutions and discussions show that there is a general agreement that placing weapons
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treaty to the UN on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.
However, due to the structure of the international legal regime and to the objection of a small number of states, like the USA, for instance, a treaty has not yet been negotiated to comprehensively prevent the deployment of space-based weapons.
On 12 February 2008, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, addressed the Conference
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long-term space security interests of the United States or its allies».
US space policy trends
In July 2010, the Obama administration released the document called the US National Space
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to those that belong to other countries is key to guaranteeing US dominance.
On December 11, 2012 the Orbital Test Vehicle Boeing X-37B - the
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satellite-tracker or a satellite-killer. It could be both. 

• * *
  The weaponization of space will undermine international security, disrupt existing arms control instruments and
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  proposing. Now the ball is on the other side of the field.
  War – first strike and miscalc
  Hitchens, 8 – president of the Center for Defense Information (Theresa, "Space Wars - Coming to the Sky Near You?", Scientific American, February, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=space-wars-coming-to-the-sky-near-you)

Perhaps of even greater concern is that several other nations, including one of China’s regional rivals, India, may feel compelled to seek ­offensive as well as defensive capabilities in space. The U.S. trade journal Defense News, for instance, quoted unidentified Indian defense officials as stating that their country had already begun developing its own kinetic-energy (nonexplosive, hit-to-kill) and laser-based antisatellite weapons.
If India goes down that path, its archrival Pakistan will probably follow suit. Like India, Pakistan has a well-developed ballistic missile program, including medium-range missiles that could launch an antisatellite system. Even Japan, the third major Asian power, might join such a space race. In June 2007 the National Diet of Japan began considering a bill backed by the current Fukuda government that would permit the development of satellites for "military and national security" purposes.
As for Russia, in the wake of the Chinese test President Vladimir Putin reiterated
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would be hard-pressed to forgo entering an arms race in space.
Given the proliferation of spacefaring entities, proponents of a robust space warfare strategy believe that arming the heavens is inevitable and that it would be best for the U.S. to get there first with firepower. Antisatellite and space-based weapons, they argue, will be necessary not only to defend U.S. military and commercial satellites but also to deny any future adversary the use of space capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces on the battlefield.  
Yet any arms race in space would almost inevitably destabilize the balance of power and
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reliably distinguishing an intentional act from an accidental one would be highly problematic.
Hit-to-Kill Interceptors
According to assessments by U.S.
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lasted half a century. The likely alternative would be unacceptable to all.

Escalates – deterrence doesn’t apply to space
Krepon and Clary, ’3 – Michael Krepon is President Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center. Christopher Clary is a research assistant at the Henry L. Stimson Center (The Henry L. Stimson Center. Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Page 53)
The inherent escalatory potential of satellite warfare between the United States and a major power
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weaponry, as well as missile defenses, is not deterrence but dominance. 

Extinction – nuclear, biological, and chemical
Gordon Mitchell, Associate Professor and Dir Debate – U Pittsburgh, Et al., ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defense, July 2001, http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html-https://mail.msu.edu/cgi-bin/webmail?timestamp=115577364626md5=nbdSk8IggXVhlJHMdBeJkw3D3D26redirect=http3A2F2Fwww.isisuk.demon.co.uk2F08112Fisis2Fuk2Fbmd2Fno6.html
A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of ’peace through strength’ deterrence
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space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.
Commercial space cooperation can become viable
Kennedy, 2/21/14 ~Jack Kennedy, MA space policy and law. "Space travel is moving toward private funding". TriCities. http://www.tricities.com/news/opinion_columns/article_750fff84-9aa9-11e3-bdbd-001a4bcf6878.html~~
American spaceflight triumphs are going to be led by fewer and fewer government astronauts in the decade ahead as the new 21st century private-sector astronaut corps emerges to manage private property.
The 1958 Russian Sputnik satellite changed America in the Cold War. The termination of the multibillion-dollar American Apollo moon program, as well as the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986, changed the role of America’s government astronauts forever.
The American government is paying the Russians more than 2470 million to ferry each NASA astronaut to the International Space Station aboard a Soyuz capsule. As the commercial space launch sector develops human-rated spacecraft to carry Americans to orbit, the picture of the new private-astronaut persona will emerge.
The next dramatic moments in human spaceflight might not be from a square-jawed, buzz-cut, hotshot male aviator superhero piloting a spacecraft to the surface of the moon. Instead, it may be the corporate researcher mom holding a doctoral degree in lunar geology and mining engineering.
The international group of women and men will most likely reside in expandable space habitats owned by American enterprise. These private-sector moonwalkers will be surveying the chemical makeup of the regolith (loose material on the moon’s surface), how it might benefit humanity in a new off-Earth economy, and how it might affect the Earth’s markets for rare metals.
Akin to the first commercial ships sailed to the New World or the first transcontinental railroad, a public-private partnership of American ingenuity and enterprise will build the infrastructure in low Earth orbit, in the orbit of the moon and on the lunar surface, opening opportunities for modern astropreneurs, making human spaceflight significantly more economical and sustainable.
The U.S. government and its NASA astronauts will most certainly have a role in the future, pushing boundaries of science and exploration. Nonetheless, with every passing day, it is becoming less and less likely that the spacecraft NASA astronauts ride in will be government issue.
Led by the Howard Hughes-like figure of our time, Elon Musk, the company SpaceX is building a variant of the Falcon booster rocket known as the Grasshopper to return to Earth for complete reuse. With the expandable, inflatable space stations owned and commercially operated by Robert Bigelow of Bigelow Aerospace at nearly 1/1000th the cost of the 24100 billion International Space Station, the expense of human spaceflight will radically change in this decade.
A mission launched aboard a reusable SpaceX Falcon 9 along with a lunar orbital injection spacecraft and a surface-landing vehicle providing access to a Bigelow habitat is likely to run the private sector around 241 billion using nearly off-the-shelf hardware by 2021.
The cost of going to the moon and back will continue to drop into the hundreds of millions of dollars as the reusable infrastructure becomes permanent.
But the possibility of weaponization is making it impossible
Michael Krepon, founding president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution, previously worked at at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 2003, http://www.stimson.org/pubs.cfm?ID=81
Basic questions also need to be asked regarding the interconnections of space weaponization and space
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of U.S. space warfare capabilities propose to assure commercial markets?
Extinction – try or die aff
Collins 26 Autino 10 – Professor of Life 26 Environmental Science @ Azabu University 26 Systems Engineer @ Andromeda Inc., Italy ~Patrick Collins (Expert in the economics of energy supply from space) 26 Adriano Autino, "What the growth of a space tourism industry could contribute to employment, economic growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace," Acta Astronautica 66 (2010) 1553–1562~

7.2. High return in safety from extra-terrestrial settlement Investment in
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travel in space are another enormous wasted resource. Pg. 1561-1562

Prolif

Contention two is prolif
Signing the PPWT solves MIRVing and causes Russia and China counter-prolif
Cristina Hansell and Nikita Perfilyev 09 *Director of the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program (NISNP)   Fulbright fellow at Monterey Institute of International Studies
(2009 "Strategic Relations between the United States, Russia, and China and the Possibility of Cooperation on Disarmament1" http://www.google.com/url?sa=t26source=web26cd=126ved=0CBoQFjAA26url=http3A2F2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch2Fserviceengine2FFiles2FISN2F988662Fichaptersection_singledocument2F3a91f3ca-e07c-41f9-8b2d-5e4610beba992Fen2FChapter2B9.pdf26ei=AekETurpFYHpOZHn2a0N26usg=AFQjCNE1ETWyfPfFglFNBqQMD8THhD7P4A26sig2=McBf0qQwmJhYZed8WQsbXg-http://www.google.com/url?sa=t26source=web26cd=126ved=0CBoQFjAA26url=http3A2F2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch2Fserviceengine2FFiles2FISN2F988662Fichaptersection_singledocument2F3a91f3ca-e07c-41f9-8b2d-5e4610beba992Fen2FChapter2B9.pdf26ei=AekETurpFYHpOZHn2a0N26usg=AFQjCNE1ETWyfPfFglFNBqQMD8THhD7P4A26sig2=McBf0qQwmJhYZed8WQsbXg)
Treaty on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space
Preventing the use of outer space for the deployment of weapons87 (or missile defenses
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Washington, Moscow, and Beijing from engaging in multilateral arms control discussions.
In recent years China and Russia have launched coordinated diplomatic efforts to mitigate what they
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states, international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty."89
In 2004 Russia and China submitted two "non-papers," on the "
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preserve costly space property, and strengthen general security and arms control."92
Although U.S. reluctance to address this issue, which both China and
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In the 2000s Russia even started to expand its GLONASS navigation satellite program.
While the Russian military is nowhere near as dependent on space assets as are U
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in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
For China, the issue of space weaponization is far more sensitive than for Russia
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, and nuclear nonproliferation regimes. As Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi put it:
"It should be stressed that efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space
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At best, such moves would never be conducive to nuclear disarmament."96
Indeed, to counter the deployment of space systems as part of a missile defense
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ASAT) weapons; and reconsidering China’s commitment to arms control agreements.103
For the moment, though, China is pursuing diplomacy, trying to preempt space
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United States to PAROS; a year later they submitted the draft PPWT.
This effort has not met with much success. On February 13, 2007,
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suggest U.S. support for the Sino-Russian treaty endeavor.
Continuing a tit-for-tat policy could have a disastrous effect on the
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be less likely to make concessions in other areas of common security interest.
MIRVing causes miscalculation
Gertz 08 (Bill, March 3, The Washington Times, U.S. to broach nuke concerns with China; Doubts peaceful intent of Beijing plan, LexisNexis)
Missile warhead upgrades for nuclear forces include new maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MaRV), multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding and anti-satellite weapons. The enhancements are intended to defeat missile defenses.
The strategic force buildup will "strengthen China’s deterrent and enhance its capabilities for strategic strike," the report said.
David S. Sedney, deputy assistant defense secretary for East Asia, said in announcing the strategic talks yesterday that they are needed to better understand China’s nuclear capabilities.
"I think the biggest thing for people to be concerned about, really, is the fact that we don’t have that kind of strategic understanding of these Chinese intentions, and that leads to uncertainty, that leads to a readiness to hedge against the possibility that China’s development will go in ways that the Chinese right now say it won’t," he said.
China’s leaders insist its military buildup is part of a peaceful rise.
Discussions with China on nuclear strategy and policy are "an area that really needs a lot more discussion," Mr. Sedney said, noting that the report refers to concerns about a lack of information on China’s nuclear forces. The talks might begin in the next two months.
The report to Congress, required under 1999 legislation, also stated China is speeding its military buildup and developing high-technology forces for waging wars beyond Taiwan.
Excessive secrecy by China about its motivation and key weapons systems are prompting fears over the threats posed by the buildup and that "denial and deception" about its military could lead to miscalculation and a military crisis, according to the report.
The near-term focus of the buildup is on a Taiwan conflict, but "long-term trends suggest China is building a force scoped for operations beyond Taiwan."
Russian and Chinese counter-prolif solves acquisition and use
Cristina Hansell and Nikita Perfilyev 09 *Director of the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program (NISNP)   Fulbright fellow at Monterey Institute of International Studies
(2009 "Strategic Relations between the United States, Russia, and China and the Possibility of Cooperation on Disarmament1" http://www.google.com/url?sa=t26source=web26cd=126ved=0CBoQFjAA26url=http3A2F2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch2Fserviceengine2FFiles2FISN2F988662Fichaptersection_singledocument2F3a91f3ca-e07c-41f9-8b2d-5e4610beba992Fen2FChapter2B9.pdf26ei=AekETurpFYHpOZHn2a0N26usg=AFQjCNE1ETWyfPfFglFNBqQMD8THhD7P4A26sig2=McBf0qQwmJhYZed8WQsbXg-http://www.google.com/url?sa=t26source=web26cd=126ved=0CBoQFjAA26url=http3A2F2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch2Fserviceengine2FFiles2FISN2F988662Fichaptersection_singledocument2F3a91f3ca-e07c-41f9-8b2d-5e4610beba992Fen2FChapter2B9.pdf26ei=AekETurpFYHpOZHn2a0N26usg=AFQjCNE1ETWyfPfFglFNBqQMD8THhD7P4A26sig2=McBf0qQwmJhYZed8WQsbXg)
Global strategic stability, as well as any possible future for arms control and nuclear
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the world is able to start down the path toward complete nuclear disarmament.
This essay explores possible pathways to nuclear zero that lead through Beijing and Moscow.
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control that does not include negotiations on these three military issues will fail.
In order to understand the possible future trajectories for nuclear weapons doctrine, this essay
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military aff airs and the 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.
While the formulation of U.S., Chinese, and Russian nuclear posture is
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destabilizing to the strategic balance and should be the subject of further research.
Embarking on a path to nuclear zero requires that Beijing and Moscow be confi dent
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reactions in Moscow and Beijing to changing U.S. strategic doctrine.
Extinction – new, rapid and destabilizing
Cimbala ’8  (Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, "Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia", 27, InformaWorld)
If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War
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could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.
Deterrence breakdown is inevitable – default to irreversibility
Krieger 09  ~David, Pres. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council, "Still Loving the Bomb After All These Years", 9-4, wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04_krieger_newsweek_response.php?krieger~
Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, "Why
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Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?
Independently plan solves China FMCT– that gets modeled – key to get stop indo-pak prolif and instability
Zhang 09 Hui Zhang is a Research Associate in the Project onManaging the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He received his Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Beijing University. His research focuses on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and China’s nuclear policy. "Chinese Perspectives on SpaceWeapons"
Negotiations on a universal FMCT, which would ban the production of fissile material (
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for several years has prevented the CD from continuing any arms control negotiations.
Aiming to break the deadlock at the CD and to promote the international arms control
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firmly holds that the prevention of space weaponization is an urgent issue.144
Extinction – miscalc
MacDonald 13 2013 Myra MacDonald LONDON | Thu Sep 12, 2013 11:42am EDT South Asian arms race raises risk of nuclear war: IISS think tank http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-southasia-nuclear-idUSBRE98B0R220130912
(Reuters) - An arms race in South Asia and Pakistan’s development of tactical "battlefield" nuclear weapons are increasing the risk of any conflict there becoming a nuclear war, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) said on Thursday.
Noting that Pakistan looks set to overtake Britain as the owner of the world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapons stockpile, it urged India and Pakistan to improve their communications to avoid any fatal misunderstandings during a crisis.
The think tank cited Pakistan’s development of short-range tactical nuclear weapons - which in theory could be used to stop any conventional Indian armored advance into Pakistani territory - as a particular cause of concern.
"The continuing expansion of Pakistan’s and India’s nuclear capabilities ... create ever greater concern about an intensifying nuclear arms race in South Asia," the IISS said in its annual strategic survey.
"Pakistan’s prospective introduction of tactical nuclear weapons increases the chance that a nuclear exchange will occur if a conflict breaks out, perhaps sparked by an act of terrorism," it added.
Both India and Pakistan have brushed off Western concerns about their nuclear arsenals in the past, saying their only purpose is deterrence.
India signed a nuclear deal with the United States in 2005 effectively recognizing it as a nuclear weapons state.
RADIATION RISK
Tactical nuclear arms - which can be used at close range on a battlefield - can increase the chance of an escalation, particularly if generals feel forced to use them to avoid them falling into the hands of advancing enemy troops.
India has said it will never start a nuclear conflict but has threatened a massive retaliation if Pakistan fires first.
Deployed against an invading army, tactical nuclear weapons would cause serious radiation damage to any country that used them - a major reason why NATO countries eventually abandoned them as a counter to any Soviet advance during the Cold War.
"In such a scenario, parts of Pakistan’s densely populated agricultural heartland could become a nuclear wasteland," the IISS said in an essay which gave unusual prominence to the South Asian arms race in the annual report.
Urging improved communications, the IISS noted that India and Pakistan had not engaged in significant nuclear risk-reduction talks since 2007.
And in contrast to relative strength of communications between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, no serving head of the Indian army had met his Pakistani counterpart since 1949.
India and Pakistan both publicly said they had tested nuclear weapons in 1998.
The two countries came close to war in 2001-2002 after an attack on the Indian parliament which India blamed on militants based in Pakistan.
Relations have been relatively stable since then - a ceasefire agreed in 2003 on the Line of Control in disputed Kashmir has mostly held, even after the 2008 attack on Mumbai by Pakistan-based militants which killed 166 people.
Tensions, however, have been rising again amid uncertainty in the region ahead of the withdrawal of most foreign troops from Afghanistan in 2014.
Linear impact – each FMCT reduces the risk of nuclear terrorism
Conference on Disarmament 06 5/15/2006 "BANNING THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL TO PREVENT CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR TERRORISM"
7. Yet, there exists another compelling counter-terrorism argument for a worldwide
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of organized crime, drugs  procurement, illicit arms- trafficking, etc.
8. If this turns out to be actually true, one could expect that,  in such an environment, nuclear  proliferation networks might produce the greatly feared "nexus" between global fissile material  stockpiles and terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. Indeed, in an ideal "organized crime  paradigm" everything may be potentially stolen or smuggled by threatening or buying human beings, and  hence the nuclear establishments of the NWSs may also be vulnerable to insider threats.
9. It is not likely that terrorist groups could reach HEU or Plutonium production
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diversion of fissile material should be  included in the text of a treaty. 

Extinction – nuclear winter
Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, "Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence" SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat
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assume that  preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option. 

Solvency

The PPWT is necessary and effective and sparks broader cooperation – default aff on irreversibility
Jaramillo, ’9 ~Cesar Jaramillo is a Program Officer at Project Ploughshares manages the Space Security Index, MA in global governance. "In Defence of the PPWT Treaty: Toward a Space Weapons Ban". The Ploughshares Monitor Winter 2009 Volume 30 Issue 4. http://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/in-defence-of-the-ppwt-treaty-toward-a-space-weapons-ban/-http://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/in-defence-of-the-ppwt-treaty-toward-a-space-weapons-ban/~~
The draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of
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, and universal space security treaty that unequivocally prohibits the weaponization of space.
Background
The existing legal regime that tackles the potential weaponization of outer space is outdated,
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emerging legal questions that inevitably arise as space becomes a more convoluted domain.
The PPWT—while not perfect and subject to revisions—represents what is undoubtedly
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space targets—activities which clearly need regulation, if not outright prohibition.
It is often said that the perils inherent to the indiscriminate weaponization of space are
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latter that is the primary focus of proponents of a space security treaty.
Not surprisingly, a resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
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, the rationale goes, there will be no arms race to prevent.
The PPWT draft treaty
What, then, makes the PPWT proposal worthy of serious consideration by the international
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repository for such a proposal and most member states have welcomed its introduction.
Specifically, as implied in the name of the treaty, the PPWT seeks to ban two different yet interrelated conducts:
the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects.
The first initiative sensibly eliminates the fundamental prerequisite for the actual utilization of space weapons: their placement in space. The PPWT treaty defines weapon in outer space in a thorough and comprehensive manner as:
Any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage, or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or to inflict damage on them. (Article 1C)
Clearly, if the Treaty enters into force, such a broad definition would contribute
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its mere placement in space would be considered a breach of the treaty.
Similarly, the second focal point of this treaty, against the threat or use of force against outer space objects, provides a comprehensive ban on any aggressive action against objects in space, defined as:
Any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, actions aimed at destroying them, damaging them, temporarily or permanently disrupting their normal functioning or deliberately changing their orbit parameters or the threat of such actions. (Article 1E)
A positive characteristic of this definition is that there is no indication that hostile actions must originate in space. That is, according to the treaty, outer space objects should be free from hostile interference regardless of where it originates. The implication is that Earth-based weapons systems capable of striking targets in space are included.
Challenges to the implementation of the PPWT
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to the adoption of the PPWT has been the staunch US
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US Office of Science 26 Technology Policy 2006), which specifically states that:
The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests.
It is highly unlikely that the PPWT draft treaty will ever see the light of
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about a change in position on space security to one that embraces multilateralism.
Several observers have also pointed to areas of the treaty in which shortcomings and inconsistencies
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space objects for hostile purposes" (CD 2009, p. 4).
Certainly, there is an inconsistency to be observed in this case. That is, if ASATs are not to be used, their development and testing would seem counterintuitive and contrary to the overall aims of the treaty.
Likewise, it is not entirely clear if, under the treaty, an attack
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sensitivity of information that could potentially be extracted from the satellite, etc.
To be sure, there are other points where the PPWT lacks precision, has potential loopholes, or is subject to interpretation. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the PPWT remains the most highly structured state-originating proposal that has been introduced in the CD with the aim of preventing the weaponization of space. With the necessary revisions and consultations, it could serve as a building block in a broader space security legal regime.
An urgent matter
Time is of the essence for a weapons ban. General Xu Qiliang, chief
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are a grim reminder of the risks associated with the weaponization of space.
If space weapons are indeed placed in orbit, with the utilization or threat of utilization by any state, the event will likely trigger an arms race, with potentially disastrous results. It is imperative to act now in moving toward a space weapons ban, before the first hostile weapon is launched.
If the international community fails to act decisively, there will probably be a ratchet effect, whereby the process of space weaponization will not go backwards once it is set in motion. The PPWT could stand in the way of that dangerous possibility and should be afforded the attention it deserves, so that space can be preserved as a peaceful global commons.

Space treaty key to credibility and sustainability – no circumvention and CP fails
Mutschler 10 Max M. Mutschler is a Researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin. He holds a doctoral degree from the Eberhard-Karls University Tübingen, where he worked as a lecturer and research associate at the Institute of Political Science. "Keeping Space Safe Towards a long-term strategy to arms control in space"
The major arguments in favor of a "rules of the road" approach which
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in space if there was a treaty banning the development of space weapons.
This is not to say that a "rules of the road" approach as
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space weapons is better suited to keeping space safe in the long term.