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Page: Jones-Bhattacharjee Aff
Tournament | Round | Opponent | Judge | Cites | Round Report | Open Source | Video | Edit/Delete |
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2013babyjo | 5 | UT Dallas Gonzales-Loehr | Osborn |
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2013babyjo | 8 | California, Berkeley Wimsatt-Sergent-Leventhal | Samuels |
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2013babyjo | 4 | Oklahoma Maddy-Massey | Fifelski |
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UMKC | 1 | KU CD | Eric Robinson |
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tournament | 5 | California, Berkeley Martin-Epner | Herndon |
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Entry | Date |
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1 ACTournament: UMKC | Round: 1 | Opponent: KU CD | Judge: Eric Robinson
Analysts point to several factors that indicate U.S. targeted killings are likely to expand in the near term. Drone strikes and special operations raids put fewer Americans in harm's way and provide a low-cost alternative to expensive and cumbersome conventional forces, especially given likely cuts in the defense budget and a waning public appetite for long wars. 2. *Lack of transparency is biggest reason war powers are expanding now – Increase in Congressional oversight key Despite this, Leiter and others seem convinced that Congress should pass a new law authorizing force. Strangely, these calls for Congress to delegate new power to the executive branch seem animated less by an articulated security strategy or identified target than by a sense that thiswill actually help constrain the use of presidential power. As the argument goes, the president—any president—will want the option at some point of using force against some terrorist group. If Congress legislates, it can establish limits on the scope of the president’s authority by setting the rules for him to exercise it. The search for meaningful constraints on power is indeed the central challenge of our constitutional system. But Congress has an abysmal track record of successfully reining in presidential uses of force overseas. And there is little cause for hope it will succeed here. Consider the recent history. Congressdecided in the days after 9/11 to authorize the use of force against a limited set of targets responsible for the attacks of 9/11, and two presidents have now used that authority to its fullest. But such broad congressional authority has not stopped President Obama, just like his predecessors, from asserting that he retains inherent authority to use force in self-defense under Article II of theConstitution, above and beyond what Congress authorizes. Congress can authorize whatever new wars it wishes; the president can still use force against imminent threats without it. This is hardly to say the president’s decision to use force operates under no constraint at all. Using force is expensive, it is alienating, it is provocative, and it may create greater threats to the American people than it prevents. Presidents have to convince the American public that war is worthfighting. This has even been true when they respond to acts of terror in self-defense. When President Reagan ordered strikes against Libya following the bombing of the civilian airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, he made a speech from the Oval Office. Ditto for President Clinton when he bombed Sudan in response to al-Qaida’s attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Missiondetails were rightly few, but both presidents explained who we had targeted and why. And the public, if they were displeased, could hold accountable the president or his party.Today, it is this lack of transparency—not Congress’ relative apathy—that has boosted executive power and threatened the legitimacy of current drone operations. If Congress wants to do somethingabout this, it should start by beefing up its own oversight efforts. Current federal laws require the president to notify the intelligence committees of all covert actions carried out by CIA (after the fact if need be). Congress should also require the same degree of notification of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees for operations carried out by the military’s Joint Special Operations Command, an active participant in U.S. targeting operations. The much maligned War PowersResolution has been modestly effective in requiring the White House to report the introduction of military forces into hostilities. Inthe age of drones, Congress should explore strengthening that reporting requirement further.If a terrorist group poses a threat to the United States that is truly imminent, the president of course retains his power to respond with force in self-defense. If and when a new terrorist group emerges that poses the kind of profound threat to the American people al-Qaida posed in the years leading up to 9/11, the president should seek authorization from Congress to use force against thatgroup. New authority to use force is unlikely to diminish the president’s power. Neither does it ensure the public will be told who the United States attacks or why. Absent either, the case for new use-of-force legislation is impossibly thin. Drone Prolif
US Targeted Killing and Drone Strike Practices May Establish Dangerous Precedents and Undermine the Rule of Law and US Democracy Fourth, current US targeted killings and drone strike practices undermine respect for the rule of law and international legal protections and may set dangerous precedents. This report casts doubt on the legality of strikes on individuals or groups not linked to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and who do not pose imminent threats to the US. The US government’s failure to ensure basic transparency and accountability in its targeted killing policies, to provide necessary details about its targeted killing program, or adequately to set out the legal factors involved in decisions to strike hinders necessary democratic debate about a key aspect of US foreign and national security policy. US practices may also facilitate recourse to lethal force around the globe by establishing dangerous precedents for other governments. As drone manufacturers and officials successfully reduce export control barriers, and as more countries develop lethal drone technologies, these risks increase. 3. US led drone prolif presents the greatest threat to civilization- o/w traditional nuclear war because of lack of protocol The drone wars seem pointless yet unstoppable. Their appeal to western leaders lies partly in their sheer novelty, partly in the hope they may make defeat less awful. They are like the USS New Jersey's shelling of Lebanon's Chouf mountains in 1984, a blood-thirsty display to cover withdrawal. The drone is not an aid to victory, but it eases the defeat its use has made more likely. The Taliban in Waziristan are no threat to London or to Washington. Al-Qaida can do no more to undermine the state than set off the occasional bomb, best prevented by domestic intelligence. Today's "wars of choice" reflect a more sinister aspect of democracy. Elected leaders seem to crave them, defying all warnings of the difficulty of ending them. Mesmerised by Margaret Thatcher's gain from the Falklands, they all want a good war. In this the drone is fool's gold. Driven by high-pressure arms salesmanship, Obama (and David Cameron) are briefed that they are the no-hands war of the future, safe, easy, clean, "precision targeted". No one on our side need get hurt. Someone else can do the dirty work on the ground. The tenuous legality of this form of combat requires the aggressor to have "declared war" on another state. But al-Qaida is no state. As a result these attacks on foreign soil are not just wars of choice, they are wars of self-invention. How soon will it be before the US finds itself "at war" with Iran and Syria, and sends over the drones? When it does, and the killing starts, it can hardly complain when the victims retaliate with suicide bombers. Nor will it just be suicide bombers. Drones are cheap and will easily proliferate. Eleven states deploy them already. The US is selling them to Japan to help against China. China is building 11 bases for its Anjian drones along its coast. The Pentagon is now training more drone operators than pilots. What happens when every nation with an air force does likewise, and every combustible border is buzzing with them? I did not fear nuclear proliferation because I believe such bombs are mere prestige acquisitions, so horrible not even lunatics would use them. Drones are different. When they were called guided missiles, they were in some degree governed by international law and protocol, as was the practice of global assassination. Obama rejects all that. He and the US are teaching the world that a pilotless aircraft is a self-justifying, self-exonerating, legal and effective weapon of war. However counter-productive a drone may be strategically, it cuts a glamorous dash on the home front. It is hard to imagine a greater danger to world peace. To date no public data or test results on simulated installations are available for the use of armed drones or other UAVW such as aerostats or balloons, kites and gliders, miniaturized rockets, and others, against the ultimate soft target: nuclear reactors, their control and core cooling systems, and other nuclear-related targets. Chernobyl and Fukushima however provide all the data needed on potential economic loss and loss of human life from worst-possible nuclear damage. Both catastrophes have resulted, or in Fukushima’s case will result in economic losses in the range of $350 – $500 billion. The death toll from the Chernobyl catastrophe remains “controversial”, but may be as high as 35 000 across Europe, to date, in the nearly 27 years since the event. The US can in no way pretend to be surprised, although it should be alarmed at the swift pace of worldwide development, followed by deployment of UAVWs, due to the nature of the technology. Firstly, as clearly admitted but hidden inside the tortured prose of US Administration officials, drones are literally “fire and forget”, “no harm to us” weapons. They are politically expedient because they avoid using human troops on the ground or “in theatre”, and prevent any loss of these troops with its inevitable blowback on domestic public opinion in favour of, at least accepting the stated war aims. The political cost of using drones is low. They can be made operational very fast. At least as important however, UAVWs are cheap relative to conventional military hardware and operations, and they drastically lower the “strike threshold” for causing maximum possible damage to the enemy. Lowering this threshold will very surely and certainly create an important, possibly disastrous problem for world peace and national security in the years to come. Not only will this be driven by the shift made by the US in the 1990-2000 period, from using unarmed surveillance drones, to armed UAVWs, but by very rapid “Moore’s Law” increase of the numbers and capabilities of UAVWs worldwide. Put another way, the US opened the Pandora’s Box of the Poor WoMans Nuke and will have to live with the consequences. The problem is that everybody else will also be forced to do so. Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event. The reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea and most parts of Western Asia will be affected. Many thousands will die, potentially millions under a worse case scenario, including far outside East Asia. Moreover, at least five reactors are at risk. Already, a 20-mile wide radius was evacuated. What happened in Japan can occur anywhere. Yet Obama's proposed budget includes $36 billion for new reactors, a shocking disregard for global safety. Calling Fukushima an "apocalyptic event," Wasserman said "(t)hese nuclear plants have to be shut," let alone budget billions for new ones. It's unthinkable, he said. If a similar disaster struck California, nuclear fallout would affect all America, Canada, Mexico, Central America, and parts of South America. Nuclear Power: A Technology from Hell Nuclear expert Helen Caldicott agrees, telling this writer by phone that a potential regional catastrophe is unfolding. Over 30 years ago, she warned of its inevitability. Her 2006 book titled, "Nuclear Power is Not the Answer" explained that contrary to government and industry propaganda, even during normal operations, nuclear power generation causes significant discharges of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as hundreds of thousands of curies of deadly radioactive gases and other radioactive elements into the environment every year. Moreover, nuclear plants are atom bomb factories. A 1000 megawatt reactor produces 500 pounds of plutonium annually. Only 10 are needed for a bomb able to devastate a large city, besides causing permanent radiation contamination. Nuclear Power not Cleaner and Greener Just the opposite, in fact. Although a nuclear power plant releases no carbon dioxide (CO2), the primary greenhouse gas, a vast infrastructure is required. Called the nuclear fuel cycle, it uses large amounts of fossil fuels. Each cycle stage exacerbates the problem, starting with the enormous cost of mining and milling uranium, needing fossil fuel to do it. How then to dispose of mill tailings, produced in the extraction process. It requires great amounts of greenhouse emitting fuels to remediate. The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched Yevgeny Primakov 1 3 2 RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 7 • No. 3 • JULY – SEPTEMBER• 2009 by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility. Middle East war causes extinction—escalation of WMDs Wars in the Middle East are of a new type. Formerly, the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union had prevented them, under the balance of the nuclear terror, from launching war against each other. In the Middle East, the possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction leads to military clashes and wars. Instead of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, the United States and Israel are using military force to prevent others from acquiring them, while they insist on maintaining their own weapons to pose deadly threats to other nations. But the production, proliferation and threat or uses of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear chemical and biological) are among the major global problems which could lead, if left unchecked, to the extinction of life on earth. Different from the limited character of former wars, the current wars in the Middle East manipulate global problems and escalate their dangers instead of solving them Hegemony At the Progressive, we have talked about the constitutionality of drone strokes. We have discussed whether or not the President even has the authority to continue the UAV (unPersoned aerial vehicle) strikes. The other question is whether the US is making a foreign policy mistake by continuing the controversial program. The loss of political capital in the US is bad enough, but the loss of soft power abroad creates the risk of undoing the drones’ missions. Drones are exceedingly unpopular abroad, seen as another case of American overreaching. Even when these attacks succeed in getting their target, they offer the risk of collateral damage and loss of innocent life. According to Pakistan, 700 civilians were killed by drone strikes from 2007 to 2009. Better technology and increased precision can decrease the probability of killing more civilians, but there will always be a risk. In a Gallup poll released yesterday, Pakistani approval of the US leadership sunk to a staggering 4. The rest of the Middle East has similarly experienced a lack of trust in the Obama administration. This is particularly troubling because US foreign policy cannot only be built on the use of hard power. Not all issues can be solved by drone strikes and the use of force. When these issues arise, the US may find they have sacrificed their influence away. It is absurd to suggest tailoring foreign policy to fit only foreign interests, but it seems equally short-sighted to completely ignore legitimate concerns. Obama is sacrificing the moral upper-hand, a valuable position to hold. In a discussion about human rights, he will not be as effective. Obama is giving up a tremendous amount of soft power and persuasive influence for the use of drone strikes. In my opinion he is making a mistake. Obama is gambling that his increased hard power will make up for it. These alliances are key to cooperative engagement Perhaps with an eye toward America losing its preeminent military position, Hagel argued that “engagement” is the key to address many international problems. In the national security world, engagement generally encompasses negotiations or multinational efforts. It has never been a popular tactic among most Republicans and some pro-military Democrats. However, Hagel insisted that “engagement is not surrender, it’s not appeasement,” clearly taking on some of his GOP colleagues, who have slung around appeasement — associated with the foolish actions of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as he tried to avert war with Germany — to describe some of President Barack Obama’s efforts to prevent international tensions from flaring into conflict. Engagement is “an opportunity to better understand” others, Hagel said, and to bring “mutual self respect” among contesting parties. As the U.S. faces a litany of problems and potential crises in the future, he said, “we will need to turn our receivers on and our transmitters off.” The emerging issues, Hagel said, “are beyond the control of any great power” and the U.S. “cannot solve them alone.” Instead, they must be addressed through alliances, through “joint thinking,” he said. 2) Drone strikes as is hurt U.S. credibility – lack of congressional oversight means we get blamed for all bombings The problem with maintaining that drone strikes are covert is that both the American and international publics often misunderstand how drones are used. And in affected states, citizens often blame the United States for collateral damage that could have been caused by the host states’ own weapon systems. According to a recent report from Yemen: It’s extremely difficult to figure out who is responsible for any given strike. . . . It could be a Personed plane from the Yemeni Air Force or the U.S. military. Or it could be an unPersoned drone flown by the U.S. military or the CIA. . . . But no matter who launches a particular strike, Yemenis are likely to blame it on the Americans. What’s more, we found that many more civilians are being killed than officials acknowledge.37 Congressional oversight of drone strikes varies depending on whether the CIA or the U.S. military is the lead executive authority. The CIA, according to the chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Dianne Feinstein, meets its “fully and currently informed” legal obligations through “monthly in-depth oversight meetings to review strike records and question every aspect of the program.” 38 Individual JSOC strikes are not reported to the relevant armed services committees, but are covered under the broad special access program biannual reporting to Congress. According to senior staff members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, many of their peers have little understanding of how drone strikes are conducted within the countries for which they are responsible for exercising oversight. Even serving White House officials and members of Congress repeatedly make inaccurate statements about U.S. targeted killings and appear to be unaware of how policies have changed over the past decade.39 At the same time, the judiciary committees have been repeatedly denied access to the June 2010 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that presented the legal basis for the drone strike that killed U.S. citizen and alleged leader of AQAP Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011.40 Finally, despite nearly ten years of nonbattlefield targeted killings, no congressional committee has conducted a hearing on any aspect of them. Credibility is key to hard power Unlike something a nation possesses and can easily measure, like wealth or military might, standing is an attribute assigned to the United States by actors beyond its borders—such as foreign leaders and peoples, international organizations, and transnational groups—and assessed by citizens within them. U.S. standing has both an absolute and a relative quality. It is absolute in the sense that it can be high or low and can vary over time. It is relative in that U.S. standing could be better or worse than that of other countries or actors, such as China or the European Union.Standing has two major facets: credibility and esteem. Credibility refers to the U.S. government’s ability to do what it says it is going to do—to “stand up” for what it believes, and to “stand against” threats to its interests and ideals. Esteem refers to America’s stature, or what America is perceived to “stand for” in the hearts and minds of foreign publics and policymakers. Credibility and esteem can be mutually reinforcing, but they can also be difficult to pursue in tandem—a trade-off implied by Machiavelli’s famous dictum: “it is much safer to be feared than loved.” Standing is densely interwoven with U.S. “hard power”—the nation’s material military and economic capabilities. U.S. capabilities help the nation realize its interests, and a modern military and robust economy breed appeal and respect. Power and standing, however, are not the same thing. U.S. standing may vary even if U.S. hard power does not, as we have seen since 2000: standing has declined (see Figure 3), but relative American power has been steady (see Figure 5 below).. Likewise with “soft power”: a country’s standing can rise and fall even as the attractiveness of its system remains relatively constant. And unlike pro- or anti-Americanism, standing is not about whether others are for or against the United States, but instead whether they view the United States as a credible actor with traits that should be admired or emulated. Why should policymakers—or political scientists—care about standing at all?First, recent history suggests that standing can play a fundamental role in the shaping of strategy. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush initiated a new national strategy for the United States that favored the credibility dimension of standing—emphasizing a policy package of assertive unilateralism, preventive use of force, and aggressive democratization. The administration achieved some initial successes, swiftly toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan, securing dismantlement of Libya’s nuclear program, and encouraging an apparent halt or slow-down in Iran’s nuclear program. Yet, over time, despite the lack of further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, American standing declined. The Bush administration’s single-minded approach lost significant support at home and abroad, as the United States grew mired in Iraq, was accused of violations of international law, and drew international criticism and resentment—even as Osama bin Laden remained at large. This decline in standing only made it harder for the United States to be effective in foreign affairs—prompting the Bush administration to take what some saw as a reverse course after 2005 and return to the typical pattern of American internationalism since World War II. More distant history speaks to the significance of standing as well. In the long competition with the Soviet Union, the United States was anxious that its reputation to protect its allies, especially those in Europe, be seen as credible by both Soviet leaders and Europeans. U.S. participation in the Korean and Viet Nam wars was spurred by the fear that a perception of diminished U.S. credibility would lead others to join a rising Communist tide. As Lyndon Johnson explained to Martin Luther King, Jr. in early 1965, “If I pulled out of Vietnam ... I think the Germans would be scared to death that our commitment to them was no good, and God knows what we’d have in other places in the world....”Standing is the everyday currency of America’s existence in the world. Political standing is akin to long-term political capital (or “goodwill” in accounting). It has intrinsic value, including in the self-understanding of Americans, even when it has no readily observable behavioral implications. Soft power is key to sustain hegemony – solves a laundry list of impacts A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power--the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.(FN1)¶ Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests.¶ But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy.¶ There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this.¶ So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not.¶ A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor.¶ In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.¶ And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.¶ Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.(FN2) This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.¶ A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence.¶ Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.¶ U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.¶ You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington.¶ Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States.¶ China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.¶ The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.¶ THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics.¶ Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)."¶ Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars.¶ Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.(FN3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. Thi Terrorism
The central justification for US drone strikes is that they are necessary to make the US safer by disrupting militant activity. Proponents argue that they are an effective, accurate, and precise tool to that end. However, serious questions have been raised about the accuracy and efficacy of strikes, and the publicly available evidence that they have made the US safer overall is ambiguous at best. Considerable costs also have been documented. The under-accounted-for harm to civilians–injuries, killings, and broad impacts on daily life, education, and mental health–was analyzed in detail above, and must be factored as a severe cost of the US program.687In addition, it is clear that US strikes in Pakistan foster anti-American sentiment and undermine US credibility not only in Pakistan but throughout the region. There is strong evidence to suggest that US drone strikes have facilitated recruitment to violent non-state armed groups, and motivate attacks against both US military and civilian targets. Further, current US targeted killing and drone strike practices may set dangerous global legal precedents, erode the rule of law, and facilitate recourse to lethal force. 3. Transparency solves terrorism by releasing justifications and real civilian casualties to Pakistani people The New America Foundation has compiled a database on drone strikes from news accounts. It estimates that since 2004, between 1,963 and 3,293 people have been killed in Pakistan, of whom 430 to 635 were civilians. Peter Bergen, who oversees the project, says that with improvements in intelligence and munitions, the percentage of civilian deaths has dropped from about 40 percent in the Bush years, to “low single digits” now. Bergen says the administration’s refusal to discuss the program has “allowed conspiracy theories to flourish” and made it harder to refute claims of massive civilian deaths. “If you had a less covert program,” he says, you could openly tell the Pakistani people: “We killed Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud, who had the blood of hundreds or even thousands of Pakistanis on his hands.” Zenko calls the silence “the worst strategic communications strategy in the world.” If the administration wants to maintain some freedom of action—and calm international anxiety—it needs to come up with a clear and proportionate set of rules for drone use. Among Zenko’s recommendations: The president should follow his declared policy and limit targeted killings to the leadership of al-Qaeda and related forces or individuals directly involved in past or current terrorist plots. The administration should explain its procedures for preventing harm to civilians and investigating errant strikes and commit to providing restitution for families of civilian victims. And the U.S. should begin talking to other countries about the principles and limits of drone warfare. The Brookings Institution’s Singer says 76 other countries and an ever-wider group of nonstate actors have or are seeking drones, which makes the need to come up with international norms even more urgent. The U.S. has used drone strikes against militants in Pakistan and Yemen whom it deems “terrorists.” But, Singer asks, what if it’s Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad “asking Iran to use drones against Syrian rebels? Would we have a leg to stand on?” Before last fall’s election, Obama aides scrambled to come up with a set of formal rules for the use of drones, just in case Mitt Romney won. Among the ideas now being discussed are a secret court to review kill orders for U.S. citizens (an official says that may be too hard to organize) and shifting more of the program from the CIA to the military, which could raise accountability and transparency. “The president trusts himself … to do this the right way, but he doesn’t know about the next government,” the U.S. official says with no apparent irony. “He also knows that in 5, 10 years, the Russians and Chinese will be using drones. The only way we can influence their use is by being as public and transparent as possible.” Better late than never.
7. Terrorism causes miscalculation that draws in Russia and China and culminates in extinction- also causes rising alert levels A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. Plan Text Solvency In light of these concerns, this report recommends that the US conduct a fundamental re-evaluation of current targeted killing practices, taking into account all available evidence, the concerns of various stakeholders, and the short and long-term costs and benefits. A significant rethinking of current US targeted killing and drone strike policies is long overdue. US policy-makers, and the American public, cannot continue to ignore evidence of the civilian harm and counter-productive impacts of US targeted killings and drone strikes in Pakistan. The US should fulfill its international obligations with respect to accountability and transparency, and ensure proper democratic debate about key policies. The US should: | 9/14/13 |
1ACTournament: 2013babyjo | Round: 5 | Opponent: UT Dallas Gonzales-Loehr | Judge: Osborn Inherency
Despite this, Leiter and others seem convinced Drone Prolif
US Targeted Killing and Drone Strike Practices May Fourth, current US targeted killings and drone 3. US led drone prolif presents the greatest threat to civilization- o/w traditional nuclear war because of lack of protocol The drone wars seem pointless yet unstoppable. To date no public data or test results Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $ The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms Middle East war causes extinction—escalation of WMDs Wars in the Middle East are of a Hegemony Drones Hurt Hegemony- Multiple Internal Links 2) These alliances are key to cooperative engagement Perhaps with an eye toward America losing its 3) Drone strikes as is hurt U.S. credibility – lack of transparency means we get blamed for all bombings The problem with maintaining that drone strikes are 4) Credibility is key to hard power Unlike something a nation possesses and can easily Soft power is key to exercise hard power In the global information age, the attractiveness A grand strategy based on American primacy means Transparent drone procedures solve perception of legitimacy To maintain international legitimacy and retain the moral Terrorism
The central justification for US drone strikes is 2. Transparency solves terrorism by releasing justifications and real civilian casualties to Pakistani people The New America Foundation has compiled a database Where that general compliance is no longer certain 4. Terrorism causes miscalculation that draws in Russia and China and culminates in extinction- also causes rising alert levels A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the Plan Text Solvency In light of these concerns, this report *Increasing congressional visibility is the only way to stop drone proliferation that prevents instability. The proliferation of drone technology has moved well US will set the precedent for the next 50 Nations to get drones The trouble isn't just the drones themselves. To maintain international legitimacy and retain the moral Transparency standards are key – executive restraint does not allow the US to restore credibility | 9/16/13 |
1ACTournament: 2013babyjo | Round: 8 | Opponent: California, Berkeley Wimsatt-Sergent-Leventhal | Judge: Samuels Inherency
Despite this, Leiter and others seem convinced Drone Prolif
US Targeted Killing and Drone Strike Practices May Fourth, current US targeted killings and drone 3. US led drone prolif presents the greatest threat to civilization- o/w traditional nuclear war because of lack of protocol The drone wars seem pointless yet unstoppable. To date no public data or test results Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $ The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms Middle East war causes extinction—escalation of WMDs Wars in the Middle East are of a Hegemony Drones Hurt Hegemony- Multiple Internal Links 2) These alliances are key to cooperative engagement Perhaps with an eye toward America losing its 3) Drone strikes as is hurt U.S. credibility – lack of transparency means we get blamed for all bombings The problem with maintaining that drone strikes are 4) Credibility is key to hard power Unlike something a nation possesses and can easily Soft power is key to exercise hard power In the global information age, the attractiveness A grand strategy based on American primacy means Transparent drone procedures solve perception of legitimacy To maintain international legitimacy and retain the moral Terrorism
The central justification for US drone strikes is 2. Transparency solves terrorism by releasing justifications and real civilian casualties to Pakistani people The New America Foundation has compiled a database Where that general compliance is no longer certain 4. Terrorism causes miscalculation that draws in Russia and China and culminates in extinction- also causes rising alert levels A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the Plan Text Solvency In light of these concerns, this report *Increasing congressional visibility is the only way to stop drone proliferation that prevents instability. The proliferation of drone technology has moved well US will set the precedent for the next 50 Nations to get drones The trouble isn't just the drones themselves. To maintain international legitimacy and retain the moral Transparency standards are key – executive restraint does not allow the US to restore credibility | 9/16/13 |
1ACTournament: 2013babyjo | Round: 4 | Opponent: Oklahoma Maddy-Massey | Judge: Fifelski Despite this, Leiter and others seem convinced At the Progressive, we have talked about These alliances are key to cooperative engagement Perhaps with an eye toward America losing its 2) Drone strikes as is hurt U.S. credibility – lack of congressional oversight means we get blamed for all bombings The problem with maintaining that drone strikes are Credibility is key to hard power Unlike something a nation possesses and can easily In the global information age, the attractiveness Today the international situation is also one of Even if hegemony is bad—transition to another system causes a multipolar vacuum leading to multiple scenarios for extinction-- there is no alternative to US leadership So what is left? Waning empires. Heg sustainable—military superiority Seen in this light, the United States Transition will be violent – regional balancing escalates to global conflicts American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without We can accurately identify patterns (economics, IR, etc.) even if we can’t explain the entire system Policy decisions can be in?uenced by several types Violence is decreasing due to US hegemony US engagement as a superpower creates the preconditions for peace- statistical data proves wars have been in decline since American became the superpower Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Longitudinal empirical analysis supports our impacts A totalizing rejection of hegemony is fails – the alternative is reactionary, ineffective, and ignores the very real contributions western political thought has made to combat oppression Hegemony in international terms without some kind of Plan Text Solvency Transparent drone procedures key to perception of legitimacy To maintain international legitimacy and retain the moral Releasing the DOJ memoranda solves transparency with other nations, targeting criteria, and civilian data In light of these concerns, this report Transparency standards are key – executive restraint does not allow the US to restore credibility | 9/16/13 |
Aff for all UNLV PrelimsTournament: tournament | Round: 5 | Opponent: California, Berkeley Martin-Epner | Judge: Herndon PLAN: The United States Congress should establish statutory requirements for drone strikes in the area of targeted killing based on relevant executive documents outlining the legal basis and justifications for drone strikes. CONTENTION 1: DRONE PROLIFERATION US Targeted Killing and Drone Strike Practices May This has two impacts The proliferation of drone technology has moved well B. Armenia-Azerbaijan War Armenia and Azerbaijan could soon be at war Washington’s burgeoning military-political-economic involvement CONTENTION: HEGEMONY The significant global opposition to drone strikes also Two ways the plan solves Plan solves – clarified drone procedures solve perception of legitimacy To maintain international legitimacy and retain the moral Lack of transparency and Congressional support now kills soft power As a result, much of what the Soft power is key to solve multiple extinction scenarios B. Democratic hypocrisy That kills hegemony Unlike something a nation possesses and can easily Decline in hegemony causes escalation of multiple global flashpoints for violence—there is no sustainable alternative to American leadership Today the international situation is also one of CONTENTION 3: SOLVENCY And, there is existing Congressional oversight now, but legally codifying it is key | 10/21/13 |
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