Tournament: Ndt | Round: 3 | Opponent: Whitman College Menzies-Barsky | Judge: Lundberg, Spring, Woodward

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (1/16)

The killer robot haunts military strategy, blurring the line of what constitutes hostilities—killer robots are crucial to defining both hostilities and Armed Forces. Your decision must respond to the resolutional action driven by the killer robot

We draw inspiration from Manuel De Landa’s concept of a killer robot historian====
DeLanda 91 Manuel, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Zone Books, New York, NY. pp. 2-5 ~rcm~

If we disregard for a moment the fact that robotic intelligence will probably not follow
AND
resources and exploit the labor performed by circulating flows of matter and energy.

The robot historian is not an anthropomorphic prediction about the trajectory of artificial intelligence, but a perspective that generates new insight attuned to the way dronic technology affects military strategists, researchers, and generals.

De Landa Continues that
DeLanda 91 Manuel, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Zone Books, New York, NY. pp. 2-5 ~rcm~

If we disregard for a moment the fact that robotic intelligence will probably not
AND
would, for example, recognize that the logical structures of computer hardware were 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (2/16)

once incarnated in the human body in the form of empirical problem-solving recipes. These recipes, collectively known as "heuristics" (from the Green work for "discovery," related to the word "eureka"), include rules of thumb and shortcuts
discovered by trial and error, useful habits of mind developed through experience, and
AND
in the effort to understand the military functions they may one day replace. 

Killer Robots, in one form or another, have, perhaps, ALWAYS existed, but one their earlier incursions into a military may have occurred during the Napoleonic Wars and American Civil War where hot air balloons augmented reconnaissance capabilities. 

In the First World War CAMERAS were attached to weather balloons to SUREVY enemy territory over the trenches. The opposing military quickly learned to shoot down poorly camouflaged balloons and in response, UNTEATHERED decoy balloons were attached to kinetic explosives. Already killer robots were capable of responding to their environment with deadly force. 

After World War Two Killer Robots piqued the interest of robo-oligists at DARPA and the RAND Corporation by fueling excitement over the potential for robotic soldiers that never slept and would follow every command. Though such anthropomorphic dreams have yet to come true, autonomous killing machines remain a powerful force in the trajectory of military planning and research.

Rather than being inert objects, killer robots DEFY human control and in some
AND
and military researchers claimed drones would provide the cure to America’s Vietnam syndrome. 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (3/16)

The killer robot is a particular conjunction of kinetic weapons, targeting systems, aerial technology and algorithms, each imbued with its own historical and political trajectory. These dynamic systems can only be understood outside of totalizing human control through the lens of a machinic phylum

Barnet and Vaccari 9 Andres, tutor at the online program of the Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, and at the Faculty of Design and Creative Practice, University of Canberra. Belinda, Lecturer in Media at Swinburne University Melbourne. "Prolegomena to a Future Robot History: Stiegler, Epiphylogenesis and Technical Evolution," Transformations. Is. 17.

How does one tell the story of a machine? Can we say that technical
AND
a much larger impact in our lives than new stuff; ships, for 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (4/16)

example, have been more important for globalisation than computers and jumbo jets (Shock
AND
compartmentalisation of information within historical lineages. (interview with the author 2004)

CONTINUED

If we define a technical lineage based on function, the problem
AND
on human function would result in a greater mess than Eldredge’s retroactive cornets.

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (5/16)

Beginning in 2003 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld refocused US strategic and military policy to intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and named drones a top priority. The next ten years was characterized by a heavy restructuring of the CIAs Center for Technology and Management, Development and Engineering, Technical Readiness causing drastic changing in military budgeting and operational research.

Killer robots are then not tangential to the trajectory of U.S. military, but it’s past and seeming future. This frame inverts the typical understanding of killer robots as inert objects for human control. Rather they have AGENTIC CAPACTIES that actively move, attract, repel, and destroy other bodies—because they are political actors they necessarily have a history and because they have a history they are reconfirmed as political actors.
Holmqvist 13 Caroline, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics, UK Swedish National Defence College, Sweden. "Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare," Millennium. Vol. 41 No. 3. pp. 535-552 ~rcm~

In this article, I place a concern for ontology (ontologies of the body
AND
the human targets that personify that danger. The subject–object distinction is 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (6/16)

called into question by the drone’s capacity to ’see’ and ’interpret’, in
AND
a critical phenomenological sense will further analysis also of the human in war.

?

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (7/16)

Any analysis of the President’s War Powers must begin with the history and agency of warfighting technologies.

Grove 8 Jairus, Professor of International Relation at the University of Hawaii. "Chapter 1: A Schmittian Century?: From Nuclear Leviathan to Nuclear-Sovereign-Assemblage," Becoming War. http://becomingwar.blogspot.com/2008/03/chapter-1-schmittian-century-from.html ~rcm~

The going under of the nuclear sovereign and in some ways the sovereign more generally
AND
many levels the Nuclear-sovereign-assemblage can be engaged or reterritorialized. 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (8/16)

Killer robots like drones work to short-circuit the temporality of traditional conflict both compressing and extending it ad infinitum. Dronic warfare is then taken as permanent part of the environment, our contemporary ecology rather than temporary or contingent conflict—only a historiography solves

Hill 12 Mike, Associate Professor and Department Chair of English at the University at
AND
compression technology uses computational projection to decrease the amount of data needed to be 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (9/16)

compressed. It uses math to lighten data’s so-called weight. Fractal media
AND
(xiii). As the crypto-ontological analogue to post-Fordist shifts 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (10/16)

in economic production ("crypto-" because non-individuated), the multitude here marks
AND
. And during the Buffalo Wars of the 1840s, the US realized that 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (11/16)

eradicating the buffalo economy would help clear the plains of their human foes and end
AND
service to assume responsibility for meteorological knowledge in 1870. By 1881, the
National Weather Service (NWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Organization (NOAA
AND
of introducing drono-spheric SkyOps several moves above also displaces the human- 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (12/16)

centered notion of ENMOD by deliberate design à la Operation Popeye with a far more complicated (if not also suicidal) strategy of ENMOD by default: adaptation to, as much as mobilization of, the destructive power unleashed by coal-produced CO2 gases. Here the term climate change moves the problem of ecology from the limited context of anthropogenesis toward a more perversely expansive morphogenic realm of agitated particles, chance
compounds, and aleatory aggregates that are given human purpose only in the wake of
AND
are filled with new clouds that carry lethal capabilities" ( James 79).
?

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (13/16)

Be skeptical of that same temporal short-circuiting in war-gaming that becomes
AND
weapons test results, sometimes from thin air—not from real war. 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (14/16)

Thus, the introduction of killer robots should be included in the Hostilities Provision of the War Powers Resolution of 1973.

Louis Fisher provides our historical context
Fisher 12 Louis, Scholar in Residence, The Constitution Project, served for four decades at the Library of Congress. "Basic Principles of the War Power," Journal of National Security Law 26 Policy. Vol. 5:319 ~rcm~

In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in an attempt to define the
AND
be kept right; and if wrong, to be set right."97

?

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (15/16)

Our affirmation is a recursion into the history of Presidential War Power. Since law is always a calcification of technology our affirmation begins with law as inscribed by technology.
Pugliese 11 Joseph, Associate Professor at Macquarie University. "Prosthetics of law and the Anomic Violence of Drones," Grifith Law Review Vol 20 No 4, HeinOnline ~rcm~

If, as I argued above, a parenthetical logic of tele-techno mediations
AND
putting out of range of oneself through the prosthetics of drones is precisely what 

1AC—Killer Robot Historian (16/16)

enables the violent asymmetry that inscribes the conduct of drone warfare, with the drone
AND
operative in the use of these drone killing technologies and their ethical ramifications.

CONTINUED

The prosthetic grafting of drones to their land-based operators, however, opens
AND
, it should then charge and try suspects on criminal grounds.’"

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 1 | Opponent: UTSA CM | Judge: 

1AC

1AC (1/16)

Your decision must respond to the resolutional action driven by the killer robot

We draw inspiration from Manuel De Landa’s concept of a robot historian

DeLanda 91 Manuel, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Zone Books, New York, NY. pp. 2-5 ~rcm~

If we disregard for a moment the fact that robotic intelligence will probably not follow
AND
resources and exploit the labor performed by circulating flows of matter and energy.

The robot historian is not an anthropomorphic prediction about the trajectory of artificial intelligence, but a perspective that generates new insight attuned to the way dronic technology affects military stratigizers, military researchers, and generals.

De Landa Continues that
DeLanda 91 Manuel, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Zone Books, New York, NY. pp. 2-5 ~rcm~

If we disregard for a moment the fact that robotic intelligence will probably not follow
AND
in the effort to understand the military functions they may one day replace. 

1AC (2/16)

?

1AC (4/16)

The killer robot is a particular conjunction of kinetic weapons, targeting systems, arieal technology and algorithms. Each imbuned with its own hisotirical and political trajectory a non-anthropocentric historiography when discussing military technology.

Barnet and Vaccari 9 Andres, tutor at the online program of the Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, and at the Faculty of Design and Creative Practice, University of Canberra. Belinda, Lecturer in Media at Swinburne University Melbourne. "Prolegomena to a Future Robot History: Stiegler, Epiphylogenesis and Technical Evolution," Transformations. Is. 17.

How does one tell the story of a machine? Can we say that technical
AND
As historian David Edgerton has argued, ’old stuff’ has had, and 

CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED

1AC (5/16)

CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED

continues to have, a much larger impact in our lives than new stuff;
AND
compartmentalisation of information within historical lineages. (interview with the author 2004)

CONTINUED

If we define a technical lineage based on function, the problem
AND
on human function would result in a greater mess than Eldredge’s retroactive cornets.

?

1AC (6/16)

There is a long, dynamic trajectory of technology and institutions that the drone itself produces. Our analysis must be attuned to the way this technology mediates relations and conflict.
McCarthy 13 Daniel, University of Sussex. "Technology and ’the International’ or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Determinism," Millennium—Journal of International Studies. Vol. 41 no. 3 pp 470-490 ~rcm~

Despite the opprobrium heaped upon essentialist accounts of technological change, essentialist perspectives are more
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. It is important to note that contextualisation should be historical and spatial.

1AC (7/16)

CONTINUED

Yet this understanding sits in tension with their essentialist arguments centred upon interaction capacity.
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technological diffusion structures forms of social development within societies via relations between them.
Importantly, Herrera and Fritsch challenge the ahistorical conceptualisation of technological development employed by Buzan
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new products, technologies, and social and cultural trends and behaviors.45-http://mil.sagepub.com/content/41/3/470.full

New analysis is important understand the over-arching effects of unpersoned weaponized drones on its victims, international law, military and para-military institutions, drone operators, and the environment.

Hill 12 Mike, Associate Professor and Department Chair of English at the University at Albany, SUNY "Ecologies of War: Dispatch from the Aerial Empire," Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change Volume 1. Ed by Tom Cohen. Open Humanities Press An imprint of MPublishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor. ~rcm~
But technology, such as BCI and fractal data compression, comprises only one level
AND
if also troubled sort of political potential. This potential concerns the final voicing
of a grand collective silence—the "mass base"—which, precisely on
AND
, and argue, as I am, that war has "become the 

1AC (8/16)

CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED
primary organizing principle of society" (12). Because
AND
both weather and natural resources as unpredictably volatile extensions of aerial imperial war.
?

1AC (9/16)

Forms of analysis are never neutral—be skeptical of how war-gaming becomes
AND
weapons test results, sometimes from thin air—not from real war. 

1AC (10/16)

Rather than inert pieces of alloy unperson weaponized drones have political and agentic capacities both because of their politicized history but also their ability to move, attract, repel, and destroy bodies and information.

Holmqvist 13 Caroline, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics, UK Swedish National Defence College, Sweden. "Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare," Millennium. Vol. 41 No. 3. pp. 535-552 ~rcm~

In this article, I place a concern for ontology (ontologies of the body
AND
, but instruments surely also use persons (position them, endow them with 

CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED
?

1AC (11/16)

CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED

perspective, establish the trajectory of their action); they frame and form anyone who
AND
a critical phenomenological sense will further analysis also of the human in war.

?

1AC (12/16)

Rather than drones distancing people from violence they imbue it with a sense of proximity as flesh meshes with the steely drone body.

Holmqvist 13 Caroline, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics, UK Swedish National Defence College, Sweden. "Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare," Millennium. Vol. 41 No. 3. pp. 535-552 ~rcm~

No doubt, drone warfare is infinitely more real for the populations amongst whom attacks
AND
on the drone operator – they produce the same ’reality-effect’.
Virtual war, it seems, is less virtual than would appear at first glance
AND
bodies, is irredeemably generative. The following section will expand on how.
CONTINUED
Thinking a Complex Whole: How a Critical Engagement with Materiality Allows Us to Re-centre Ontological Concerns (and via Them Ethico-political Ones Too)
What we need to do then, it seems, is to integrate accounts of
AND
any ethics is an ontological assumption about what it means to be human.

1AC (13/16)

Plan: United States federal government should amend the War Powers Resolution of 1973 to include killer robots in its definition of Armed Forces.

?

1AC (14/16)

Drones should be considered Armed Forces

Goldsmith 11 Jack, the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, where he teaches and writes about national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and conflict of laws. Before coming to Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General. "Problems with the Obama Administration’s War Powers Resolution Theory," Lawfare. http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/problems-with-the-obama-administrationE28099s-war-powers-resolution-theory-2/-http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/problems-with-the-obama-administrationE28099s-war-powers-resolution-theory-2/ ~rcm~

I do not find the Administration’s arguments persuasive. Begin with the text of the WPR. Section 4(a) of the WPR requires the President to report to Congress "in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced: (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances …" Section 5(b) then requires the following: "Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless" Congress authorized the action. The administration’s position – this is clearer in the Savage story than in the formal announcement – is that the U.S. was (or might have been) engaged in "hostilities" under Section 4(a)(1) before April 7, but after that date it was not engaged in hostilities because it (I) stopped dropping bombs from fighter jets and started dropping them instead, occasionally, from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and (II) played only a "supporting role" to NATO. Thus, the Administration concludes, because hostilities ceased before 60 days, there is no need to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces under Section 5(b). I. Warfare from a Distance The Administration argues that once it starts firing missiles from drones it is no longer in "hostilities" because U.S. troops suffer no danger of return fire and no danger of casualties, and (in contrast to ground troops) drones can easily be removed from the fight if Congress so decides. (Note that this argument implies that the President can wage aggressive war with drones and all manner of offshore missiles without having to bother with the War Powers Resolution’s time limits. So the implications here, in a world of increasingly remote weapons, are large.) One difficulty in assessing the argument is that the WPR does not define "hostilities." But common sense suggests that firing missiles from drones that kill people over an extended period of time pursuant to a U.N.-authorized use of force constitutes "hostilities." So too do standard definitions of the term "hostilities," which refer to acts or states of warfare or violence or unfriendliness without reference to the vulnerability of the aggressor or the reciprocity of the fighting (though of course "hostilities" can refer to reciprocated fighting). Moreover, the House Report to the WPR says that "hostilities" was a substitute for "armed conflict" under the laws of war and was meant to have a broader meaning. Some might not think this legislative history is relevant to an interpretation of the statute. But a 1980 OLC opinion (no link) acknowledges without objection that "the word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat broader in scope." The Obama lawyers told Charlie Savage that the 1980 opinion "remained in force." This is a large problem for the Administration, because the U.S. component of the Libya operation, considered by itself, is clearly an armed conflict under the laws of war. That suggests, under the OLC opinion, that it also amounts to hostilities under the WPR. Nothing else in the 1980 opinion detracts from this conclusion. Attention has been focused on its statement that "the term ~"hostilities"~ included a situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces" (emphasis added). This passage does not say that exchanges of fire are necessary for hostilities, but rather that hostilities include exchanges of fire. The opinion went on to add that the term "hostilities" does not encompass "irregular or infrequent violence which may occur in a particular area," and should not necessarily be read to include "sporadic military or paramilitary attacks on our armed forces stationed abroad" because "~s~uch situations do not generally involve the full military engagements with which the Resolution is primarily concerned." U.S. involvement in the armed conflict in Libya is neither irregular nor infrequent nor sporadic. In short, I do not see how the Administration squares its interpretation of the WPR with the 1980 OLC opinion.

1AC (15/16)

A better understanding of non-human objects is crucial to change politics

Bryant 12 Levi, Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. "Worries About OOO and Politics," Larvalsubjects. ~rcm~

Responding to this situation so as to change it will thus involve responding to two
AND
big emancipatory differences can be introduced by attending to non-signifying entities.

1AC (16/16)

The killer robot historian imagines a world correlated outside of the human—this is necessary for any meaningful ontological rupture.

Shaviro 11 Steven Shaviro. Professor of English at Wayne State. October 4 2011. "Panpsychism And/Or Eliminativism". The Pinocchio Theory. http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=1012.

Correlationism is defined by Meillassoux as the doctrine according to which "we never grasp
AND
us, without thereby reducing it yet again to our own conceptual schemes.

Tournament: Shirley | Round: 6 | Opponent: Stanford Gulati-Rosenthal | Judge: Dunn
1AC (1/15)
The resolution is haunted by the drone that has come to dominate military strategy and blur the lines of what constitutes hostilities. Rather than limiting the scope or geographic area of hostilities, what would it mean to understand the drone’s place in Armed Forces—to take seriously the drone as a body affecting other bodies?
To think of the role of drone’s in defining Armed Forces and hostilities delineates fissures within military methods and planning which reduce Armed Forces to solely to human bodies. When Rumsfeld claimed that drones made casualties a thing of the past—he was obviously full of it, but many accepted this rational because drones weren’t supposed to bodies, right? Positioning drones as crucial to defining both hostilities and Armed Forces means that the continual policing and killings conducted by drones are no longer abstractions, but material practices.

Caroline Holmqvist describes the frame that should structure your decision
Caroline, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics, UK Swedish National Defence College, Sweden. “Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare,” Millennium. Vol. 41 No. 3. pp. 535-552 rcm

In this article, I place a concern for ontology (ontologies of the body
AND
material in contemporary United States (US) warfare in Afghanistan/Pakistan.

This frame inverts the typical understanding of drones as inert objects for human control.
AND
41 No. 3. pp. 535-552 rcm

This article by no means captures the total significance of robotic warfare for the critical
AND
The final part of the article suggests that we might think of ‘undoing
CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED?
1AC (2/15)

CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED
war’ by redirecting our attention towards the ontology of the human, and specifically Butler’s
AND
a critical phenomenological sense will further analysis also of the human in war.
?
1AC (3/15)
Individual technologies are structured through a MACHINIC PHYLUM. Drones are not single technological inventions, but are part of a larger body of KILLER ROBOTS.
DeLanda 91 Manuel, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Zone Books, New York, NY. pp. 2-5 rcm
If we disregard for a moment the fact that robotic intelligence will probably not follow
AND
resources and exploit the labor performed by circulating flows of matter and energy.
This PHYLUM is not an anthropomorphic prediction about the trajectory of artificial intelligence, but a PERSPECTIVE that generates new insight attuned to the way dronic technology affects military strategy and research.
De Landa Continues that DeLanda 91 Manuel, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Zone Books, New York, NY. pp. 2-5 rcm
If we disregard for a moment the fact that robotic intelligence will probably not follow
AND
in the effort to understand the military functions they may one day replace.
1AC (4/15)
Trevor Dupuy, retired Colonel, military historian, and analysts suggests that there have been only SIX historic moments where the human body and non-human technologies came to strategic convergence in military encounters: the phalanx-long spear assemblage in Macedonia, the gladius in Rome, Siege engines, the English longbow, light artillery used in the Napoleonic Wars, and the conjoined efforts of mechanized infantry and close air support in Blitzkrieg.   
PERHAPS we can add a seventh to this list—the emergence of drones
At the moment
Delanda, Manuel. War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. Swerve.1991. pg 64. Print.

It is very possible that predatory flying machines (such as BRAVE 3000) will
AND
a threshold and a new era will have begun for the machinic phylum.

Killer Robots, in one form or another, have ALWAYS existed, but perhaps
AND
Already killer robots were capable of responding to their environment with deadly force.   

After World War Two Killer Robots piqued the interest of robo-oligists at DARPA and the RAND Corporation by fueling excitement over the potential for robotic soldiers that never slept and would follow every command. Though such anthropomorphic dreams have yet to come true, the killer robot has haunted military planning ever since.

Rather than being inert objects, killer robots DEFY human control and in some
AND
and military researchers claimed drones would provide the cure to America’s Vietnam syndrome.
1AC (5/15)
The killer robot is a particular conjunction of kinetic weapons, targeting systems, aerial technology and algorithms, each imbued with its own historical and political trajectory. These dynamic systems can only be understood outside of totalizing human control through the lens of a machinic phylum
Barnet and Vaccari 9 Andres, tutor at the online program of the Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, and at the Faculty of Design and Creative Practice, University of Canberra. Belinda, Lecturer in Media at Swinburne University Melbourne. “Prolegomena to a Future Robot History: Stiegler, Epiphylogenesis and Technical Evolution,” Transformations. Is. 17.

How does one tell the story of a machine? Can we say that technical
AND
systems and satellites coexisting with rowboats and bicycles, mobile phones with Kalashnikovs,
1AC (6/15)

Petri dishes with rickshaws. As historian David Edgerton has argued, ‘old stuff’
AND
compartmentalisation of information within historical lineages. (interview with the author 2004)

CONTINUED

If we define a technical lineage based on function, the problem
AND
on human function would result in a greater mess than Eldredge’s retroactive cornets.
1AC (7/15)

In 2003 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld named drones a top priority, REFOCUSING US strategic and military policy to intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). The next TEN years were characterized by a restructuring of the CIAs Centers for Technology and Management, Development and Engineering, and Technical Readiness. Military budgeting and operational research also underwent drastic changes.
Unpersoned weaponized drones demand a new method of analysis to navigate their effects on  the environment, international law, military and para-military institutions, and drone operators and victims
Hill 12 Mike, Associate Professor and Department Chair of English at the University at Albany, SUNY “Ecologies of War: Dispatch from the Aerial Empire,” Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era of Climate Change Volume 1. Ed by Tom Cohen. Open Humanities Press An imprint of MPublishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor. rcm
But technology, such as BCI and fractal data compression, comprises only one level
AND
renewal. There is a certain kinship, traceable through a Deleuzian and Spinozist
1AC (8/15)

philosophical register, that connects the multitude to De Landa’s interest in the war machine
AND
both weather and natural resources as unpredictably volatile extensions of aerial imperial war.
?
1AC (9/15)

Forms of analysis are never neutral—be skeptical of how war-gaming obscures
AND
weapons test results, sometimes from thin air—not from real war.
1AC (10/15)
Rather than drones distancing people from violence they imbue it with a sense of proximity as flesh meshes with the steely drone body.
Holmqvist 13 Caroline, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics, UK Swedish National Defence College, Sweden. “Undoing War: War Ontologies and the Materiality of Drone Warfare,” Millennium. Vol. 41 No. 3. pp. 535-552 rcm

No doubt, drone warfare is infinitely more real for the populations amongst whom attacks
AND
bodies, is irredeemably generative. The following section will expand on how.
CONTINUED
Thinking a Complex Whole: How a Critical Engagement with Materiality Allows Us to Re
AND
any ethics is an ontological assumption about what it means to be human.
1AC (11/15)
Drones make instrumental understandings of the law and soverign human decision-making untenable—our analysis of the MACHINIC PHLYUM works to break down the humanist dichotomy in dronic law.
Pugliese 11 Joseph, Associate Professor at Macquarie University. “Prosthetics of law and the Anomic Violence of Drones,” Grifith Law Review Vol 20 No 4, HeinOnline rcm

If, as I argued above, a parenthetical logic of tele-techno mediations
AND
the human agent and the technological equipment - that is simultaneously predicated on technically
1AC (12/15)

augmenting the power and reach of the human agent through the figure of prostheticity.
AND
operative in the use of these drone killing technologies and their ethical ramifications.

CONTINUED

The prosthetic grafting of drones to their land-based operators, however, opens
AND
, it should then charge and try suspects on criminal grounds.'"
1AC (13/15)

Only an attunement to objects can cause radical political change—mapping out these structures is key!
Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant. Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. September 15 2012. “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table”. Larval Subjects. http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/.
The following post arises out of discussions I’ve been having with Alexander Galloway and Sara
AND
changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade
1AC (14/15)

CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED
others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still
AND
, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.

The university is always linked to military planning, technology, and research, criticism within the university is key
Shapiro 2007 Michael J, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii | “The New Violent Cartography” Security Dialogue 2007 38: 291| DOI: 10.1177/0967010607081511|amc
The modern university began, at least in part, as an ideological agency of
AND
Indian subcontinent culturally (Viswanathan, 1989). Certainly in the 20th century,
1AC (15/15)

CONTINUED NO TEXT DELETED
the Cold War stands out as a period in which a wide variety of disciplines
AND
reflectometry, dynamic simulation, human and facial animation, and realtime rendering’.