Tournament: West Point | Round: 2 | Opponent: Binghamton RS | Judge: Patrick Waldinger

Prolif

Status quo disarmament is too slow and ineffective – nuclear talks are breaking down

Ogilvie-White and Santoro 11 (Tanya Ogilvie-White, and David Santoro, "Disarmament and Non-proliferation: Towards More Realistic Bargains," Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 53, Issue 3, 2011, pages 101-118) DOI:10.1080/00396338.2011.586194
Although the disarmament steps the current administration has taken have so far been relatively small
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the need to make progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. 

Plan restores the grand bargain—solves nuke tech transfer controls

Korb and Rothman 12 (Lawrence J. Korb,  senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, and Alexander H. Rothman,  special assistant with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress, "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(2) 34–42, 2012) DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
A US decision to declare a no-first-use policy would have benefits
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original policy and thereby improve stability between the South Asian nuclear weapons states.

And it prevents NPT collapse—rallies non-nuclear states

Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, "The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
Finally, because NFU would be an important departure from the past six decades of
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. commitment to Article 6 as an excuse not to vigorously support nonproliferation. 

Prolif causes nuke war—MAD doesn’t apply and not all actors are rational

Kroenig 12 (Matthew Kroenig, Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2012, "The history of proliferation optimism: does it have a future?" http://npolicy.org/article_file/The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism.pdf)
Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear
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that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. 

Timeframe for widespread prolif is 5 years—multiple hotspots

Albright et al. 13 (David Albright, founder of the non-governmental Institute for Science and International Security-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute_for_Science_and_International_Security (ISIS), its current president, and author of several books on proliferation of atomic weapons-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_weapons. Albright holds a Master of Science-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Master_of_Science in physics-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physics from Indiana University-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_University and a M.Sc. inmathematics-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematics from Wright State University-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wright_State_University. He has taught physics at George Mason University-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Mason_University in Virginia-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia.  Andrea Stricker, Senior Policy Analyst at Institute for Science and International Security, MA in Security Policy Studies from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and a BA in Political Science and French, certificate in Middle Eastern Studies, from the University of Arizona, Houston Wood, Professor of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at the University of Virginia. He earned his B.A. and M.S. degrees in mathematics from Mississippi State University, and his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the University of Virginia, He was Visiting Scientist at Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique, Saclay, France in 1996 and at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN in 2004. From July – December 2007, he was Visiting Research Scholar at Princeton University in the Woodrow Wilson School and the Program on Science and Global Security, Institute for Science and International Security, 7/29/13, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2013/Full20Report_DTRA-PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf-http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2013/Full Report_DTRA-PASCC_29July2013-FINAL.pdf)
As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, several additional
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. One key part of this effort will remain smuggling of nuclear commodities. 

Specifically in Asia—NPT solves via disarmament cred

Clarke 12 (Michael Clarke, Director General of the Royal United Services Institute,  Visiting Professor of Defence Studies at Kings College London, "Nuclear non-proliferation trends in the Asia-Pacific: the dilemmas of regime stasis, strategic flux and market expansion," Australian Journal of International Affairs Volume 66, Issue 5, 2012) DOI:10.1080/10357718.2011.570241
Despite the recent surge in both governmental and academic advocacy of nuclear disarmament, including
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in a region whose strategic environment could change significantly in the immediate future. 

That escalates—Asian political interconnectivity

Cirincione, 2000 – Director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Spring 2000, Joseph, Foreign Policy, "The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain", JStor)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already
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, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945. 

China

Squo US nuke doctrine causes Chinese nuke modernization and doctrine shift from NFU—wants to balance the US

Blumenthal and Mazza 11 (Dan Blumenthal,  M.A., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Mazza, M.A., international relations (strategic studies and international economics), Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, program manager for AEI’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy, "China’s Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The PLA’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine and Force Posture," 4/6/11) http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Strategic_Forces.pdf
When it comes to its development and deployment of nuclear weapons-China first tested
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United States, its public airing was ill-received by the Chinese.

Specifically, US first use policy worsens inevitable modernization

Perkovich and Lefever 2k (George Perkovich and Ernest W. Lefever, "Loose Nukes: Arms Control Is No Place for Folly," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2000), pp. 162-167)
The thousands of American nuclear weapons under a first-use doctrine will also eventually
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a "private" visit to his American alma mater, Cornell University. 

Scenario one is miscalc

Chinese doctrine shift causes it—launch-on-warning mechanisms

Saunders and Yuan 2000, Phillip C Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monteray Institute of International Studies, July 2000, "China’s Strategic Force Modernization: Issues and Implications," http://www.emergingfromconflict.org/readings/saunders.pdf
A doctrinal shift from minimum to limited deterrence could also trigger a major increase in
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only a few DF-31 and DF-41 systems were available. 

Multiple hotspots for US-Sino crisis means high probability for crisis escalation

Goldstein 13 (Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, "First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations" International Security Spring 2013, Vol. 37, No. 4, Pages 49-89)
U.S.-China Crises: More Likely Than War; More Than Just
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and her suggestion that multilateral forums could be useful in this regard.20 

US first-use exacerbates crises by creating first-strike advantages—makes launch inevitable

Gerson 10 (Michael S. Gerson,  research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, "The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7–47) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018
On the other hand, if states do believe that the United States might use
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choose to use nuclear weapons at an early point in the conºict.104 

Scenario 2 is India

Chinese doctrine shift causes Sino-Indian arms race— New Delhi threatened by Chinese shift to NFU posture

Cunningham and Medcalf 11 (Fiona Cunningham, Research Associate at the International Security Program of the Lowy Institute, and Rory Medcalf, Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute, "The Dangers of Denial: Nuclear Weapons in China-India Relation," October 2011)
China’s reluctance to thus acknowledge India as a nuclear peer rankles the Indian strategic community
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improve and if dissatisfaction with the doctrine increases in the Chinese strategic community. 

Spills over regionally into Indopak and Sino-India wars - both go nuclear

Blumenthal and Mazza 11 (Dan Blumenthal,  M.A., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Mazza, M.A., international relations (strategic studies and international economics), Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, program manager for AEI’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy, "China’s Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The PLA’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine and Force Posture," 4/6/11) http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Strategic_Forces.pdf
The Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is, however, much more complicated. India
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enter a period of flux, with potentially destabilizing consequences for the region.

Independently, Indopak war likely and draws in China and US—alliances and regional interests prove

Korb and Rothman 12 (Lawrence J. Korb,  senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, and Alexander H. Rothman,  special assistant with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress, "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(2) 34–42, 2012) DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
In the twenty-first century, the Indian subcontinent has surpassed Europe as the
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no guarantees that it would choose to restrain itself after another such incident. 

Plan incentivizes modeling and solves in South Asia—reassures China and prevents Indopak escalation

Korb and Rothman 12 (Lawrence J. Korb, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, and Alexander H. Rothman,  special assistant with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress, "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(2) 34–42, 2012) DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
No-first-use and the global nonproliferation regime Given the volatile situation in
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least denounce the use of nuclear weapons against all but an existential threat. 

Plan modeled in India, solves the scenario—historical trends prove

Sagan 9 (Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Co-Director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, "The Case for No First Use", Survival vol. 51 no. 3 June–July 2009 pp. 163–182)
US officials have long claimed that US nuclear declaratory policy and posture have no influence
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have at least some positive influence in pushing India in the opposite direction. 

Plan solves independent of modeling—prevents US-China draw-in

Korb and Rothman 12 (Lawrence J. Korb,  senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration, and Alexander H. Rothman,  special assistant with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress, "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68(2) 34–42, 2012) DOI: 10.1177/0096340212438385
In the event of a conflict on the Indian subcontinent, a no-first
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Russia, if it agreed to a no-first-use policy.) 

Plan

The United States Congress should restrict the authority of the President of the United States to introduce nuclear weapons first into hostilities without congressional approval.

Solvency

Plan’s key:

Congress key to clarify the distribution of nuke powers—they’re in a zone of twilight—this is key to enforcement

Schultz 4 PREEMPTING PREEMPTION: NUCLEAR FIRST-USE AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS JEFFREY L. SCHULTZ Mr. Schultz is an associate at Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis. Schultz is engaged in the practice of business litigation, with significant experience in trade secret, non-compete, unfair competition and intellectual property matters Kennedy School Review;2004, Vol. 5, p27 

Under uninterrupted constitutional practice since the use of the first nuclear weapons by the United
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nuclear preemptive strike, it had better say so by means of legislation.

Key to set a military restraint that necessitates doctrine shifts—solves credibility

Gallagher 11 Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication Joseph V. Gallagher III served as an F/A-18C Pilot, Air Officer, and F/A-18C/D Flight Instructor in the US Marine Corps operating forces. He worked Security Assistance initiatives for the US European Command and most recently as a Joint Planner in the USEUCOM J3 and J5. Gallagher is currently assigned to the Joint Staff, PakistanAfghanistan Coordination Cell. http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2011summer/gallagher.pdf-http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2011summer/gallagher.pdf

As the practice of declaring war has become passé, American strategy has likewise become
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American people’s collective will in their efforts to subvert our national strategy.67

Credibility and enforcement are key—makes the declaratory nature of the policy perceived as a full commitment

Miller 2 (Steven, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, London UK 15-17 November, The utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of No-First Use. Pugwash Meeting no. 279)

If NFU is to be more than a declaratory policy, then it must be
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if others are to be convinced that NFU is more than declaratory policy.¶