1AC-Break open the possibilities of pleasure and the body of the president 1NC-Ruins K Anthro K 2NC-Ruins 1NR-Anthro 2NR-Ruins
Pitt RR
1
Opponent: Kansas BC | Judge: Jason Russell
Michigan HK broke a new aff which begins by revealing a desire to f@ Ronald Reagan as a gateway to discussing the construction of the libidinal economy of the president and how we construct pleasuredesire in the debate community The point of the AFF is deconstruct the construction of desire from the starting point of Queer Futurity Popular phrases in the 2AC1AR are "their desires are not their own" and "join us in our pursuit of ecstasy" The role of the judge according to their interpretation is to endorse the breaking away of the endless circling of debate which lusts after an ideal but lost debate community 1NC strat was Framework counter advocacy and case Framework was must used the USFG to restrict war powers as a point of stasis which is key to Neg ground and deliberation a pretty standard FW argument The counter advocacy was to do the aff without reference to queerness because queerness assumes a certain starting point which privilege the white upper class intellectual queer man The alt was to use a starting point of Quar Case answers included 'must use the law' reifying the heterosexual man through an oppositional queer starting point turns case and psychoanalysis leads to banalization 2AC Answers to FW hinge on critiquing framework as both an exclusionary method of creating a community a "lust for a nostalgic debate community" and a construct of the desire the 1AC already critiques They also respond with a counter-interpretation that the AFF just needs to be contestable and that the AFF will not perm a counter-advocacy The Block kicked the counter advocacy and spent the 2NC on FW and 1NR on case The 2NR was FW
1ac = 3nr dissolve congress death poem and affirmation
Usc
1
Opponent: Harvard Bolman-Suo | Judge: Glass
1ac = Hacking 2nr = Psychoanalysis
Usc
3
Opponent: Michigan State Keywork-Friedman | Judge: Kanellopoulos
2nr = T
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Cites
Entry
Date
1AC 3NR, Dissolve Congress, Death Poetry, and Affirm Delirium
Tournament: Texas | Round: 4 | Opponent: Oklahoma Leonardi-Masterson | Judge: Kelsie The entire 1ac was read out of books and magazines, so no open source. The 1ac was 4 off
Offcase 1: 3NR from the Pitt Round Robin.
Offcase 2: Affirm restricting presidential war powers over indefinite detention by dissolving Congress “Dissolve Congress,” Jean-Phillipe Immarigeon, Harper’s Magazine, Feb 2014
Over the past five years … Bastille Day a l’americaine.
Cutting off the head of the king is key to solve Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, March 1990
In political thought and analysis … future that was at hand.
Offcase 3:
Because I could not stop for Death, He kindly stopped for me; The carriage held but just ourselves And Immortality.
We slowly drove, he knew no haste, And I had put away My labour, and my leisure too, For his civility.
We passed the school where children played, Their lessons scarcely done; We passed the fields of gazing grain, We passed the setting sun.
We paused before a house that seemed A swelling of the ground; The roof was scarcely visible, The cornice but a mound.
Since then 'tis centuries; but each Feels shorter than the day I first surmised the horses' heads Were toward eternity.*
Habeas corpus has been effectively denied to Guantanamo detainees – pathetically low evidentiary requirements by Lower Court decisions allow detention without cause or charge Ahuja and Tutt 12 Jasmeet K. Ahuja and Andrew Tutt, “Evidentiary Rules Governing Guantanamo Habeas Petitions: Their Effects and Consequences,” 31 Yale L. and Pol'y Rev. 185, 2012
Beginning in 2001, the United States … role in the outcome of these cases.
Careful judicial fact-finding has been abandoned – deference to governmental standards means they win every petition Denbeaux et al. 12 Mark Denbeaux, Seton Hall University - School of Law, Jonathan Hafetz, Seton Hall Law School, Sara Ben-David, affiliation not provided to SSRN, Nicholas Stratton, affiliation not provided to SSRN, Lauren Winchester, affiliation not provided to SSRN, May 1, 2012, Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 2145554 , “NO HEARING HABEAS: D.C. CIRCUIT RESTRICTS MEANINGFUL REVIEW”, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2145554
It is an open secret .. district court fact-finding. The denial of habeas to Guantanamo inmates is a unique form of cruel and unusual punishment Eisenberg 9 “Guantánamo Bay: Redefining Cruel and Unusual”, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL Vol. 1 No. 1, http://nulj.org/journal/NULJ_v1n1_Eisenberg.pdf, Stewart “Buz” Eisenberg is Of Counsel to Weinberg and Garber, P.C. of¶ Northampton, MA, serves as President of the International Justice Network,¶ and is a Professor of Civil Liberties at Greenfield Community College. Since¶ 2004 he has provided direct representation to four Guantánamo detainees, Northeastern University Law Journal vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 2009
Representing Guantánamo detainee … Guantánamo, redefining cruel and unusual. Denial of habeas ensures the continuation of torture and force-feeding policies Loo 13 Dennis Loo, January 8, 2013, “Why is Guantanamo Still Open?”, Associate Professor of Sociology at Cal Poly Pomona, http://www.worldcantwait.net/index.php/torture/8455-why-is-guantanamo-still-open
Force feeding violates longstanding … years in detention without charge, losing all faith in our justice system. Challenging medical doubling is a prerequisite to establishing ethical orientations towards life and death Lifton 4 Robert, Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard University, “Doctors and Torture”, New England Journal of Medicine, 6/29, http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp048065
There is increasing evidence that … also compromise the integrity of health professionals.”5
Torture exists prior to other ethical questions – uses the body and mind as vessels to capture and control consciousness in a totality of pain – horrible beyond imagination Scarry, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, 87 (Elaine, The Body in Pain, 1987)
A fifth dimension of … that is not the palpable manifestation of the prisoner's pain.
Plan: The United States federal government should apply burdens of proof and presumptions regarding evidence in habeas corpus hearings that favor individuals in military detention.
The plan solves: low-burden presumptions reflect a post 9-11 heuristic of deference to the executive and acceptance of its claims of imminent threat based on irrational fears Cover 13 Avidan, 2013, Assistant Professor and Associate Director at the Global Institute for National Security Law, Attorney in Newark, NJ with 10 years of experience, “PRESUMED IMMINENCE: JUDICIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD” works.bepress.com/avidan_cover/3/?
It is difficult to determine the … disclose their uncertainty and anxiety over terrorism threats. This causes ineffective risk analysis that produces bad decisionmaking and mass racial discrimination—aff solves Cover 13 Avidan, 2013, Assistant Professor and Associate Director at the Global Institute for National Security Law, Attorney in Newark, NJ with 10 years of experience, “PRESUMED IMMINENCE: JUDICIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD” works.bepress.com/avidan_cover/3/?
This section examines how courts … for government action intended to prevent terrorism. Race and executive power are inevitably intertwined—war on terror presents a key opportunity for a judicial challenge – aff solves Joo 2 Fall, 2002; Thomas W. Joo, Professor, University of California, Davis, School of Law (King Hall), “PRESUMED DISLOYAL: EXECUTIVE POWER, JUDICIAL DEFERENCE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RACE BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11”, 34 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 1
It is far from clear that the .. lasting negative effects on law and democracy.
1AC RISK Contention 3: The Looking Glass The dominance of “any risk logic” that pervades judicial decision-making is a direct parallel to the debate community: Don’t assume every part of their DA is true – instead you should have inherent skepticism Schneier 10 5/12/10, Bruce Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School and a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute, He is an an internationally renowned security technologist, called a "security guru" by The Economist. He is the author of 12 books -- including Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust Society Needs to Thrive -- as well as hundreds of articles, essays, and academic papers. His influential newsletter "Crypto-Gram" and his blog "Schneier on Security" are read by over 250,000 people. He has testified before Congress, is a frequent guest on television and radio, has served on several government committees, and is regularly quoted in the press. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Chief Technology Officer at Co3 Systems, Inc. He has a Ph. D. from the University of Westminster by the Department of Electronics and Computer Science, “Worst-case thinking makes us nuts, not safe”, http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/05/12/schneier.worst.case.thinking/
we do not endorse this author’s intent of ableist language and apologize for it
(CNN) -- At a security conference recently, the … counterarguments, there's no point in listening to them. This undermines all decisionmaking and makes robust national security policymaking impossible by substituting cultural anxieties for real analysis Friedman 8, Research Fellow and Affiliate at MIT Winter 2008, Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies. He is an affiliate of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Terrible ‘Ifs’”, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-1.pdf Students of regulatory … dangers are not always as uncertain and dangerous as we hear. Moreover, the race to high-magnitude impacts promotes illogical decisionmaking and limits out meaningful discussion of structural violence, racism, and gendered violent. The inevitable answer to this argument will be: but you have internal links too! Yes, obviously, but the path to solving habeas trials is fraught with several magnitudes of fewer assumptions than the path to nuclear war – basic math proves. Cohn 13 Nate, debate coach at Georgia, politics writer for the New York Times, Kyle Deming’s roommate, Nov 24, “Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate”, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=printpage;topic=5416.0
The fact that policy debate is …, which isn’t a logical response to the affirmative.
The impact is delinking the debate community from academia – rethinking how you evaluate risk assessment is necessary to avoid the destruction of the community Hester 13 Mike, dean at West Georgia, an extremely successful and influential policy debate coach at University of West Georgia, “Mike Hester: USA Policy Debate in a "Hot Mess"”, Nov 22, 2013
To whom it may concern,¶ CEDA-… Academy is necessary.
2/24/14
1AC Drone Court
Tournament: Ndtdistrict5 | Round: 1 | Opponent: Wayne State Nagel-Wirth | Judge: Archer, DeLong, Gliniecki Advantage 1 Accountability Ex ante review key to accountable and legitimate targeted killing Adelsberg 12 (Samuel, J.D. – Yale Law School, “Bouncing the Executive's Blank Check: Judicial Review and the Targeting of Citizens,” Harvard Law and Policy Review, Summer, 6 Harv. L. and Pol'y Rev. 437, Lexis)
The relevance of … what this judicial involvement would look like. Drones key to legitimacy Kennedy, 13 “Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism”, Greg Kennedy is a Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy at the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, in Shrivenham, Parameters 42(4)/43(1) Winter-Spring 2013
The exponential rise in the use of … operational and tactical expediency. Heg without legitimacy causes violent transitions—voluntary limits on power maintain relative stability Martin Griffiths January 2004; Associate Professor and Head of School at School of Government and International Relations, Griffith University (coincidence, as it turns out) “BEYOND THE BUSH DOCTRINE: AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND WORLD ORDER” AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES www.anzasa.arts.usyd.edu.au/a.j.a.s/Articles/1_04/Griffiths.pdf?
In international relations, an …hegemon, was a reluctant superpower. That prevents great power war, economic collapse, and global governance failures Thayer 13—PhD U Chicago, former research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, political science professor at Baylor (Bradley, professor in the political science department at Baylor University, “Humans, Not Angels: Reasons to Doubt the Decline of War Thesis”, International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 396–419, September 2013, dml)
Accordingly, while Pinker is sensitive to the … benefit of the United States. Formal judicial oversight key – balances resolve with restraint NYT, 10 “Lethal Force under Law”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/opinion/10sun1.html
The drone program has been effective, killing … drastic action with careful judgment. External court review maintains legitimacy – key to global stability Knowles, 9 Robert, Assistant Professor, NYU Law, “Article: American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution”, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87, p. lexis
The hegemonic model also … serious challenges, permits the courts to reduce the "deference gap" between foreign and domestic cases. Intra-executive processes cause operational error Chehab, 12 Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review
The practical, pragmatic justification …subject to little to no review. Ex ante key – FISA critics miss the mark Guiora, 12 Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All Out of Proportion, Amos N. Guiora. Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, p. SSRN
The unitary executive theory … and “over-broad” approaches.10
Advantage 2 Norms Transparent drone use solves deterrence breakdowns that escalate globally Boyle, 13 “The costs and consequences of drone warfare”, MICHAEL J. BOYLE, International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, assistant professor of political science at LaSalle University
Drone technology and drone use have … Doing so would help establish new norms for everyone. China’s recent test proves conflict is possible Harress, 14 The Rise of China's Drone Fleet and Why It May Lead to Increased Tension in Asia by Christopher Harress on January 11 2014 12:30 PM, http://www.ibtimes.com/rise-chinas-drone-fleet-why-it-may-lead-increased-tension-asia-1535718
China has successfully … combat air vehicles, and rotary-wing UAV. Goes nuclear Goldstein, 13 – Avery, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania (“First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, vol. 37, no. 4, Spring 2013, Muse Red)
In a recent article, David Wood expresses … would be terrifying.
Plan: The United States Federal Government should establish a limited ex ante judicial review process for targeted killing by drones.
Our procedural safeguard is key to minimize error and establish a credible signal Somin, 13 Ilya Somin Professor of Law HEARING ON “DRONE WARS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND COUNTERTERRORISM IMPLICATIONS OF TARGETED KILLING” TESTIMONY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS April 23, 2013
Several people have voiced objections to the … by one’s government without judicial involvement.
Executive lead role spurs mistrust and global opposition Goldsmith, 13 May 1st, Jack Goldsmith teaches at Harvard Law School and is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. He is the author, most recently, of Power and Constraint, How Obama Undermined the War on Terror http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism
And so Barack Obama greatly expanded … e alone is today responsible, is increasingly viewed as illegitimate.
2/24/14
1AC Minor Literature
Tournament: Cedanats | Round: 3 | Opponent: Cal State Fullerton Brooks-Stanfield | Judge: Voeller 1AC—STORY
Before the law …. I’m going now to close it.
Franz Kafka, the parable “Before the Law,” http://www.kafka-online.info/before-the-law-page2.html 1AC—ADVANTAGE “Before the Law” is Franz Kafka’s profound RUPTURE with the transcendent ordering of the law, which sees the law as existing but always out there, in the hands only of the gate keepers, who validate the existence of the objective Law via the act of punishment, an endless feedback loop of representations on top of representations of the law, ultimately concealing that there is just no there there. The law is an assemblage, a social machine, whose component parts constitute only our belief in the transcendent signifier of the Law. We affirm the potentiality of minor literature to put the law, language, and reality themselves to flight: Kafka writes escape routes that use representations of the law themselves to dismantle the assemblage of the law, to focus in on such small parts of the so-called law that the assumed existence of such a system is called into question. Deleuze and Guattari 86. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, “Immanence and Desire,” pg. 43-52
Negative theology (or the theology of absence), … and that has nothing to do with an activity of intimacy.3
Writing itself can have a radical character: translate everything into assemblages or machines of words, and then dismantle those assemblages. This is particularly poignant in terms of how Kafka, a Czech Jew, chose to situate himself within the German language of the majority in order to force it to take flight Deleuze and Guattari 86. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, “Immanence and Desire,” pg. 43-52
Writing has a double function… this is certainly not a mental, psychical, or interior procedure.
Where one believed there was the law, there was in fact desire and desire alone: the law is written in a porno book, and we’re all fantasizing, calling its transcendent order into existence Deleuze and Guattari 86. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, “Immanence and Desire,” pg. 43-52
Here, then, are the new characteristics of … and its arbitrary fortunes.
Renounce the idea of the transcendence of the law. Hold the law up to molecular, microscopic investigation: tiny affects, momentary perceptions, and quotidian interpretations contribute to a collective desiring-law which holds the whole system together. Situate the law immanent to your own body: how do you participate in it? Lose yourself, your essence, and your sense of personhood and study the fluxes and flows of desire which made those attributes realizable in the first place. Deleuze and Guattari 86. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, “Immanence and Desire,” pg. 43-52
From this point on, it is even … of Gregor, the platonic apple that his father throws at him.
Kafka’s “Before the Law” is minor literature insofar as it is minoritarian, it resists majoritarian deciphering. Majorities have nothing to do with numbers, but presume a transcendent model, like common presuppositions about the existence of the law. A minority, in contrast, has no model, it is dismantling, destructive, and performs the very operation of Kafka’s parable: reading the law against itself. Deleuze and Negri 90. Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri, “Gilles Deleuze in conversation with Antonio Negri,” http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpdeleuze3.htm
Negri: How can minority-becoming be powerful? …, so we can elude control.
Like Kafka’s milieu, that of Czech Jewish exiled authors immediately before the holocaust, minority literature must emerge from within the cramped spaces of majoritarian language and spaces, effecting a dismantling, even if only momentary, of the perceived coherence of that majority. Deleuze and Guattari 86. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, “What is Minor Literature?” pg. 17-18
So far we have dealt with little more … and would lead its own life).
3/22/14
1AC Parrhesia
Tournament: Ndtdistrict5 | Round: 8 | Opponent: Indiana Smale-Peculis | Judge: Henry, Koch, loghry From The New York Times December 4, 2016. Caroll Herman, chief technological warfare research and development correspondent at the New York Times, This is a work of FICTION written by Liam Lambert, the author of Weaponized Architecture and editor of the Funambulist “SHORT DIGRESSION ABOUT THE FUTURE OF DRONES (AFTER SEEING ONE AT JFK),” Legal Theory, The Funambulist Pamphlets Vol 3, pg. 68
Since the vote of … restrain them.
The drone emperor has no clothes, cloaked in the language of the legal power/knowledge nexus. The 1ac is an affirmation of the potential reversibility of power relations, particularly those undergirding how we can conceive of drones. Krasmann 12. Susanne Krasmann, prof. Dr, Institute for Criminological Research, University of Hamburg, “Targeted Killing and Its Law: On a Mutually Constitutive Relationship,” Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), 25, pg. 678
The legal debate on targeted .. killing operations’ legality. To speak of drones is to speak fiction—the question is what story. Rothstein 13. Adam Rothstein, Insurgent Activist and Researcher, How to Write Drone Fiction, Jan 20 2013, http://www.thestate.ae/how-to-write-drone-fiction/)
This is easy for me to respond … connect our attention back to the facts of UAVs.
All of their arguments will be fictions too—but at least we’ve got a defense of ours. Simpson 12. Zachary Simpson, professor of philosophy at the University of Arts and Sciences of Oklahoma, Foucault Studies, No. 13, May 2012, pg. 105 *We reject the gendered language in this evidence.
Foucault’s conception … transform that which does exist.”28 Power relations can always be strategically reversed. Those undergirding discussions of drones are no different. The 1ac’s act of historical fictioning makes possible new understandings of the potentiality of this technology. Campbell 08. David, Prof. of International Politics @ the University of Newcastle, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Revised Edition, University of Minnesota Press, ISBN 0-8166-3144-1, Pg. 202-205
This is not to suggest that … which identity is articulated."42
The story of aerial warfare is unlimited destruction, the constant policing of non-white bodies. The unseeing eye of the drone is everywhere. Total war is the here and now, There are no more innocent civilians in this racialized war against difference Neocleous 13—Department of Politics and History, Brunel University (Mark, “Air power and police power”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2013, volume 31, pages 578 – 593, dml)
Moreover, and more pressingly, we … defeat of a military enemy but the victory of perpetual police.
To question the power/knowledge nexus through fictioning renders alternative solutions to the problem of drones not only conceivable, but possible. Consider these examples. Lambert 12. Liam Lambert, architect, dissident, editor of the Funambulist, author of Weaponized Architecture, “National Security Drones vs. Liam Young’s Counter-Surveillance Measures,” THE FUNAMBULIST PAMPHLETS VOLUME 05, pg. 60 Many of us are afraid … before they caught up with us.2
The space separating policy and legal debates is smaller than you think. Subjectivity cannot escape power. Therefore adopt a critical attitude and use the ballot to preserve the right to question. Legalistic assumptions regarding drones and debate conciliations to power, not guarantees. Cadman 10. Louisa Cadman, professor of geography at the University of Glasgow, “How (not) to be governed: Foucault, critique, and the political,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2010, volume 28, pg. 550
Transactional realities provide … is it necessarily stifled by liberal governmentality.
The ballot ought to speak truth to power—if your first reaction is to demand strategies you have fundamentally missed the point Steele 10—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas gender/ableist language modified with brackets (Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 130-132, dml)
When facing these dire … habitation” (1964 2006: 233).
Complexity defines politics; the political arena is messy. And facts—those paltry constructions of reality—are used to bully intellectuals into accepting the here and now. Rothenberg, ’13. Daniel Rothenberg is a professor of practice at the School of Politics and Global Studies, ASU and the Lincoln fellow for Ethics and International Human Rights Law. He is editing a book with Peter Bergen on drones to be published later this year. "What the Drone Debate Is Really About"; May 6, 2013;http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/05/drones_in_the_united_states_what_the_debate_is_really_about.html
The term drone draws … very real fears of so many. Our understanding of speech itself does not capitulate to status quo definitions—the write the unwritable, speak the unspeakable Deleuze and Guattari 96. What is Philosophy? pg. 107-8
Human rights are axioms. … intolerable, to shame, and to the present.
2/24/14
2AC vs FrameworkT
Tournament: Usc | Round: 3 | Opponent: Michigan State Keywork-Friedman | Judge: Kanellopoulos Resolved is to reduce by mental analysis, Random House 11
Education itself is slavery. The basis of how debate decides curriculums must be hacked. None of their ballot as currency arguments presume our alternative—such a framing of the ballot maintains the ruling class’s grip on the SCARCITY of information—the curriculum MUST BE FREE Wark 04. McKenzie Wark, scholar, activist, hacker based in Australia, A Hacker Manifesto, https://www.academia.edu/182789/A_Hacker_Manifesto
Education is slavery. Education … much as the ruling class would have them see it— as a privilege.
Cyber activism is comparatively MORE IMPORTANT to creating the possibility of peace online than judicial reform Deibert 2k3 (Ronald, “Black Code: Censorship, Surveillance, and the Militarisation of Cyberspace” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2003 32: 501)
Accompanying electronic … arms control per se, the following section offers a survey of the prospects.
Absent recognizing the importance of the figure of the hacker, their policy is doomed to failure—this evidence is from a policy expert Rosenzweig, 12 Copyright (c) 2012 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society Fall, 2012 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 8 ISJLP 393 LENGTH: 7722 words NAME: Paul * BIO: * Principal, Red Branch Consulting PLLC; Carnegie Fellow in National Security Journalism, Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University (2011); Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University. The author served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security from 2005-09. Portions of this article will appear in the forthcoming book Cyberwarfare: How Conflicts in Cyberspace are Challenging American and Changing the World (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012, p. lexis
IV. Conclusion If the question about … build good cyber policy.
Don’t be the gatekeeper – there is a difference between having a plan and having a policy and the negative has obfuscated this Harney and Moten 13. Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Modern Poetry at Duke University, “Politics Surrounded,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 82
Deputies will lead the way toward … intelligible if you got a plan. Group the dialogue arguments—their attempt to create a sterilized space for dialogical communion effaces the multiplicity of identities within debate—our radical dissent is a form of reinscribing the terms of communication which is a precondition to true deliberative democracy Livingston 12—Assistant prof of Government @ Cornell purple=slow (Alexander, “Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and the Public Sphere”, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2012), pp. 269-294, dml)
It is important here to stress what a critical … new identities and claims to flourish.
1/4/14
Ballard 1AC
Tournament: Pitt RR | Round: 3 | Opponent: Texas FM | Judge: Avery Henry 1ac—story WHY I WANT TO FUCK RONALD REAGAN SEXUAL FANTASIES IN CONNECTION WITH RONALD REAGAN. The genitalia of the Presidential contender exercised a continuing fascination. A series of imaginary genitalia were constructed using (a) the mouth parts of Jacqueline Kennedy, (b) a Cadillac, (c) the assembly kid prepuce of President Johnson...In 89 of cases, the constructed genitalia generated a high incidence of self-induced orgasm. Tests indicate the masturbatory nature of the Presidential contender’s posture. Dolls consisting of plastic models of Reagan’s alternate genitalia were found to have a disturbing effect on deprived children.
REAGAN'S HAIRSTYLE. Studies were conducted on the marked fascination exercised by the Presidential contender’s hairstyle. 65 of male subjects made positive connections between the hairstyle and their own pubic hair. A series of optimum hairstyles were constructed.
THE CONCEPTUAL ROLE OF REAGAN. Fragments of Reagan’s cinetized postures were used in the construction of model psychodramas in which the Reagan-figure played the role of husband, doctor, insurance salesman, marriage counselor, etc.
The failure of these roles to express any meaning reveals the nonfunctional character of Reagan. Reagan’s success therefore indicates society’s periodic need to re-conceptualize its political leaders. Reagan thus appears as a series of posture concepts, basic equations which reformulate the roles of aggression and anality. Reagan’s personality. The profound anality of the Presidential contender may be expected to dominate the United States in the coming years. By contrast the late JFK remained the prototype of the oral subject, usually conceived in pre-pubertal terms. In further studies sadistic psychopaths were given the task of devising sex fantasies involving Reagan. Results confirm the probability of Presidential figures being perceived primarily in genital terms; the face of LB Johnson is clearly genital in significant appearance--the nasal prepuce, scrotal jaw, etc. Faces were seen as either circumcised (JFK, Khrushchev) or uncircumcised (LBJ, Adenauer). In assembly-kit tests Reagan’s face was uniformly perceived as a penile erection. Patients were encouraged to devise the optimum sex-death of Ronald Reagan.
Excerpted from the short story “Why I Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan” by J.G. Ballard. 1ac—advantage Ultimately our understand of what Reagan is, what a president is, what the government is all established by the production and regulation of what thoughts, what desires, and what pleasures are appropriate to think about America’s political leaders and its government. All of this contributes to the formation of community—but the problem is that this is always imperfect, exclusive, and closed. Break open the possibilities of pleasure and the body of the president. Our desires are not our own. They are our prisons, defining the terms and the scope of conceivable action. The 1ac ruptures the illusion of a normative economy of what it is appropriate Foster 94. Dennis A. Foster, Daisy Dean Frensley Chair in English Literature at Southern Methodist University, PhD from UC Irvine, “Pleasure and Community in Cultural Criticism,” American Literary History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Summer, 1994), pg. 372 Foster 94. Dennis A. Foster, Daisy Dean Frensley Chair in English Literature at Southern Methodist University, PhD from UC Irvine, “Pleasure and Community in Cultural Criticism,” American Literary History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Summer, 1994), pg. 372
It has, some argue, always been the impulse of Americans to see their AND , and even gender lie ancient enjoyments that remain mostly unconscious but vital. Obviously perfect satisfaction is impossible. Being alive guarantees that shit happens that we don’t necessarily enjoy and we’ll never claim to solve that problem. Legislating what people ought to derive pleasure from is always already a reaction to the imperfections in any such system of value—the question of this debate is whether you’ll legislate our pleasure in enjoying the sexualization of the body of the president. What will you do with us, the discontents, the other worldly, those that dare to desire what civilization deems undesirable: commandeering the body of the commander-in-chief? The fatal repetition of contemporary politics is that we can never consider our policies, their objects, or their subjects as joyous and instead circle ourselves endless, stuck in the same logic of stale, limited simulacra. Think the possibility of deriving joy from disorganized speech. Foster continues. Dennis A. Foster, Daisy Dean Frensley Chair in English Literature at Southern Methodist University, PhD from UC Irvine, “Pleasure and Community in Cultural Criticism,” American Literary History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Summer, 1994), pg. 372 unbroken
What Lyotard adds to this discussion is a description of the dynamics of these unconscious AND , domestic, the foundation, not the end, of social change. Free from all fascistic norms that regulate libidinal desire—our model is that of the schizophrenic—complaint against the system on its own terms only feeds into it Deleuze and Guattari 72. Anti-Oedipus, 1972, pg. 340-342
From the viewpoint of unconscious libidinal investment, all the oscillations from one formula to AND investment is social, and in any case bears upon a sociohistorical field.
The status quo is characterized by microfascist understandings of what desire can BECOME—becoming is the most important political choice because only it can explain molecular fascism, the fascism of the everyday that limits the forms we can take, the people we can fuck, and the desires that we have—this is what makes the desire to BECOME-DEAD, to destroy the self in a fascistic blaze of glory possible Deleuze and Guattari 80. A Thousand Plateaus, 1980, pg. 230-231 *THIS EVIDENCE HAS BEEN GENDER MODIFIED
We cannot say that one of these three lines is bad and another good, AND the destruction. All the dangers of the other lines pale by comparison.
1/25/14
Hacking 1AC
Tournament: Usc | Round: 1 | Opponent: Harvard Bolman-Suo | Judge: Glass All understandings of cyber security, cyber politics, cyber operations…cyber ANYTHING take place on the stage of the cyber state of emergency. No politics is possible. The only choice: SOFTWARE SABOTAGE. Cox and Knahl 11. Geoff Cox Researcher in Digital Aesthetics as part of the Digital Urban Living Research Center, Aarhus University (DK). He is also an occasional artist, and Associate Curator of Online Projects, Arnolfini, Bristol (UK), adjunct faculty, Transart Institute, Berlin/New York (DE/US), Associate Professor (Reader), University of Plymouth (UK), where he is part ofKURATOR/Art and Social Technologies Research group, and Martin Knahl, Lecturer at the University of Plymouth. He is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Information Security and Network Research, “NeMe: Critique of Software Violence,” http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security, May 2011
When no other choice is possible, software … necessarily violent even when it appears nonviolent.
Affirming the rule of law implicitly justifies exceptional violence by the sovereign in order to preserve it—a better strategy to resist cyber security is that of the malware developer, finding the cracks and fissures between sovereignty and network—only the affirmative can stop validating tools of cyber-securitization and use them against the elites who would dominate our ability to use the internet Cox and Knahl 11. Geoff Cox Researcher in Digital Aesthetics as part of the Digital Urban Living Research Center, Aarhus University (DK). He is also an occasional artist, and Associate Curator of Online Projects, Arnolfini, Bristol (UK), adjunct faculty, Transart Institute, Berlin/New York (DE/US), Associate Professor (Reader), University of Plymouth (UK), where he is part ofKURATOR/Art and Social Technologies Research group, and Martin Knahl, Lecturer at the University of Plymouth. He is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Information Security and Network Research, “NeMe: Critique of Software Violence,” http://www.neme.org/1300/critique-of-software-security, May 2011
The background to this line of thinking … (collections of software robots, or bots, that run autonomously).6
The only radical alternative can be to hack the ballot—communication itself has been stolen from us, all that is left now is to hijack supposedly neutral conduits for the transmission of information themselves. Refuse to script the meaning of minority—anything else guarantees a majoritarian reactivism. THUS, THE ROLE OF THE BALLOT CAN ONLY BE: VOTE AFFIRMATIVE AND GIVE MICHIGAN THIRTIES. Voting aff to jam the tabroom software with aberrational statistical noise short-circuits the meaning-generating infrastructure and produces radical insurrectionary politics. Deleuze and Negri 90. Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri, “Gilles Deleuze in conversation with Antonio Negri,” http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpdeleuze3.htm
Negri: How can minority-becoming be powerful? How … noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.
The society of control is one in which even the illusion of choice is yet another move that plays into the hands of the sad effects of the system—refuse this depressing condition Deleuze and Parnet ‘87 famous philosopher, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, Dialogues II, European Perspectives, with Claire Parnet, freelance journalist, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 2002 pgs.61-62
When Spinoza says 'The surprising thing is the … to soul its life, not to save it.
The hacker class, being numerically small and … comes not a moment too soon.
All political action is ultimately criminal. Refuse predictability, portability, and acknowledge all claims on a home place in debate are ultimately arbitrary acts of violent primitive accumulation—the position of the criminal must be the starting point for non-locatable politics Harney and Moten 13. Stefano H
1/4/14
NDT R1 Aff - Drones
Tournament: Ndt | Round: 2 | Opponent: James Madison Miller-Lepp | Judge: Fifelski, Gibson, Hart Adv 1 Advantage 1 Norms Transparent drone use solves deterrence breakdowns that escalate Boyle, 13 “The costs and consequences of drone warfare”, MICHAEL J. BOYLE, International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, assistant professor of political science at LaSalle University
Drone technology and drone use have also proliferated in other countries. And even more AND respond to provocations. Doing so would help establish new norms for everyone. China’s recent test proves conflict is possible Harress, 14 The Rise of China's Drone Fleet and Why It May Lead to Increased Tension in Asia by Christopher Harress on January 11 2014 12:30 PM, http://www.ibtimes.com/rise-chinas-drone-fleet-why-it-may-lead-increased-tension-asia-1535718
China has successfully flown its first stealth drone for around 20 minutes in Chengdu, AND , blimps, unmanned combat air vehicles, and rotary-wing UAV. Goes nuclear Goldstein, 13 – Avery, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania (“First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, vol. 37, no. 4, Spring 2013, Muse Red)
Two concerns have driven much of the debate about international security in the post- AND a crisis, compressing the time frame for diplomacy to avert military conflict. Judicial enforcement mechanisms key to signal accountability Wexler, 13 The Role of the Judicial Branch during the Long War: Drone Courts, Damage Suits, and FOIA Requests, Lesley Wexler, Professor of Law and Thomas A. Mengler Faculty Scholar, 3rd Speaker and semifinalist 1998 National Debate Tournament, p. SSRN
The current practice of using drones to engage in overseas killings raises difficult legal ques AND Even the threat of such a judicial role may influence executive branch behavior. Transparency and accountability key to drone norms Kreps and Zenko, 14 “The Next Drone Wars Preparing for Proliferation”, SARAH KREPS is Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. MICAH ZENKO is Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140746/sarah-kreps-and-micah-zenko/the-next-drone-wars As the only country to have used drones extensively, the United States must take AND traditional combat, greater disclosure is the only concession it could realistically offer.
In a recent article, David Wood expresses concern over the start of a drone AND , then surely China or Russia possessing such a program would be terrifying.
Adv 2 Advantage 2 Accountability Ex ante review key to accountable and legitimate targeted killing Adelsberg 12 (Samuel, J.D. – Yale Law School, “Bouncing the Executive's Blank Check: Judicial Review and the Targeting of Citizens,” Harvard Law and Policy Review, Summer, 6 Harv. L. and Pol'y Rev. 437, Lexis)
The relevance of these precedents to the targeting of citizens is clear: the constitutional AND Now, we will turn to what this judicial involvement would look like. Drones key to legitimacy Kennedy, 13 “Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism”, Greg Kennedy is a Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy at the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, in Shrivenham, Parameters 42(4)/43(1) Winter-Spring 2013
The exponential rise in the use of drone technology in a variety of military and AND to ensure its strategic aims are not derailed by operational and tactical expediency. Heg without legitimacy causes violent transitions—voluntary limits on power maintain relative stability Martin Griffiths January 2004; Associate Professor and Head of School at School of Government and International Relations, Griffith University (coincidence, as it turns out) “BEYOND THE BUSH DOCTRINE: AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND WORLD ORDER” AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES www.anzasa.arts.usyd.edu.au/a.j.a.s/Articles/1_04/Griffiths.pdf?
In international relations, an established hegemony helps the cause of international peace in a AND States, far from being a domineering hegemon, was a reluctant superpower. That prevents great power war, economic collapse, and global governance failures Thayer 13—PhD U Chicago, former research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, political science professor at Baylor (Bradley, professor in the political science department at Baylor University, “Humans, Not Angels: Reasons to Doubt the Decline of War Thesis”, International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 396–419, September 2013, dml)
Accordingly, while Pinker is sensitive to the importance of power in a domestic context AND of relative power changes and not to the benefit of the United States. External court review maintains legitimacy – key to global stability Knowles, 9 Robert, Assistant Professor, NYU Law, “Article: American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution”, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87, p. lexis
The hegemonic model also reduces the need for executive branch flexibility, and the institutional AND courts to reduce the "deference gap" between foreign and domestic cases. Intra-executive processes cause operational error Chehab, 12 Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review
The practical, pragmatic justification for the COAACC derives largely from considering social psychological findings AND choices and evaluate available alternatives than when subject to little to no review. Op error strengthens armed insurgencies Mayer 9 (Jane, critically acclaimed author and staff writer for the New Yorker, “The Predator War,” The New Yorker, 10-26, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer)
Indeed, the history of targeted killing is marked by errors. In 1973, AND -and-blood investment if we go too far down this road.” The impact is Middle East War and Pakistani collapse Hussain 13 (Nazia, research scholar at the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center and a doctoral student at George Mason University, “Pakistan's Jihadi Problem and the Middle East,” Middle East Institute, 4-11, http://www.mei.edu/content/pakistans-jihadi-problem-and-middle-east)
Jihadi groups in Pakistan pose grave threats to the stability of the country and the AND tragic for Pakistan and dangerous for its immediate neighbors and the international community. Goes nuclear Michael O’Hanlon 5, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies PhD in public and international affairs from Princeton, Apr 27 2005, “Dealing with the Collapse of a Nuclear-Armed State: The Cases of North Korea and Pakistan,” http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/ohanlon.pdf
Were Pakistan to collapse, it is unclear what the United States and like- AND Indian Army, nuclear dangers have long been considered to run very high.
Plan The United States Federal Government should establish a limited ex ante judicial review process for targeted killing by drones.
The President may express concerns that involving a neutral decisionmaker unduly frustrates his ability to AND law from a neutral decisionmaker before executing a drone strike against that target. Our procedural safeguard minimizes error and establishes credible signal Somin, 13 Ilya Somin Professor of Law HEARING ON “DRONE WARS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND COUNTERTERRORISM IMPLICATIONS OF TARGETED KILLING” TESTIMONY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS April 23, 2013
In my view, the use of targeted killings by drones is not inherently illegal AND . But I very much hope that such a conjecture is unduly pessimistic.
Executive lead role spurs mistrust and global opposition Goldsmith, 13 May 1st, Jack Goldsmith teaches at Harvard Law School and is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. He is the author, most recently, of Power and Constraint, How Obama Undermined the War on Terror http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism
And so Barack Obama greatly expanded the secret war that George W. Bush began AND for which he alone is today responsible, is increasingly viewed as illegitimate.
Ex ante key – FISA critics miss the mark Guiora, 12 Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All Out of Proportion, Amos N. Guiora. Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, p. SSRN
The unitary executive theory aggressively articulated, and implemented, by the Bush Administration has AND “over-board” and “over-broad” approaches.10
Contrary to what some have argued that the president requires full and unadjudicated control of AND we put into place laws and parameters that clearly define this new norm.
A. Option One: Congress Could Pass Legislation to Establish Screening and Oversight of AND ultimate authority to an impartial judge with no institutional connection to the CIA. Formal judicial oversight key – balances resolve with restraint NYT, 10 “Lethal Force under Law”, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/opinion/10sun1.html
The drone program has been effective, killing more than 400 Al Qaeda militants this AND to other countries that the United States couples drastic action with careful judgment.
3/28/14
NDT RD 8 1AC Drones Title 50 Shift
Tournament: NDT RD 8 | Round: 8 | Opponent: Liberty BM | Judge: Harris, Young, Short 1ac Plan The United States Federal Government should remove by statute the President’s authority under Title 50 for targeted killing by drones
As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, the United States continues AND Mali and the Ugandan government in its fight against the Lord’s Resistance Army. CIA targeted killing undermines program sustainability – conflicting legal regimes Burt and Wagner, 12 ~Blurred Lines: An Argument for a More Robust Legal Framework Governing the CIA Drone Program Andrew Burt† 26 Alex Wagner Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2014. ‡ Special Advisor for Rule of Law and Detainee Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. All views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and not those of the United States, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or the Department of Defens The Yale Journal of International Law Online~
The principle of "distinction" between civilians and combatants forms the basis for one of the core concepts of international humanitarian law. During armed conflict, civilians are presumptively assumed not to be taking a direct role in the conduct of hostilities, must not be attacked, and are entitled to various degrees of protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Civilians lose these protections under the law of war when they cease operating in a civilian capacity and instead take a direct role in the conduct of hostilities. According to the Interpretive Guidance of the ICRC, civilian "direct participation in hostilities" (DPH) refers to "specific acts carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed conflict," and civilians become targetable while performing those acts.48 For those unprivileged belligerents who assume a larger, consistent role in hostilities (know as a "continuous combat function"), such conduct alters their status, enabling them to be targeted as belligerents, rather than only for the time they commit a specific hostile act. Without the legal status of combatant, and thus the privileges described above, CIA civilians who operate drones that hunt and shoot Hellfire missiles at al Qaeda militants arguably lose both the protection due to civilians and the immunity reserved for lawful combatants, rendering them both lawful targets of attack and criminally liable (for war crimes under international law or for murder under domestic law where the hostilities occur). Two principal problems arise from this uncomfortable similarity in legal status between CIA civilians and the terrorists they combat. The first is one of misalignment: it is less than ideal for the United States to be waging a military, diplomatic, and public relations campaign against a global network of terrorists whose members arguably share the same legal status as a segment of the Americans targeting them, especially when the legal status of the terrorists as unlawful belligerents is part of the justification for pursuing them. Second, U.S. domestic law itself (the Military Commissions Act of 2009) treats the conduct of unprivileged belligerents as inconsistent with the laws of war.49 A legal regime justifying the United States’ global fight against al Qaeda jeopardizes its sustainability, but most importantly, its credibility, with this type of contradiction at its core. Indeed, the undeniable success of the drone strikes in pushing al Qaeda to the brink of strategic defeat makes it imperative that critics cannot assert a legal—or perhaps even moral—equivalency between the CIA and al Qaeda. The drone program’s continued viability necessitates a stronger grounding in both international and domestic law. The plan makes targeted killing sustainable and effective—fosters legal clarity and perception of oversight Waxman, 13 ~3/20, Matthew, law professor at Columbia Law School, co-chair, Roger Hertog Program on Law and National Security, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, "Going Clear," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/20/going_clear?wp_login_redirect=0~~
According to Daniel Klaidman at the Daily Beast, "~T~he White House AND perhaps more restrained and formalized, long-term policy of targeted killing. JSOC key to combat terrorism —- the plan’s mode of selective disclosure assuages public fears, while maintaining JSOC’s core competence Sahadi, 13 ~By: Michael J. Sahadi, Jr., J.D. Ave Maria School of Law Class of 2013KEEPING JSOC A SECRET: The Exposure of Special Warfare and its Adverse Effects on National Security and Defense to the United States, p. internet~
It is no secret that the United States uses drones as a military tool. AND therefore JSOC should remain a secret. Any exposure is too much exposure. Program backlash inhibits effective use, even if it doesn’t end it—the aff is key middle ground Zenko, 13 ~Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, "U.S. Drone Strike Policies", i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones_CSR65.pdf?~
In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: "Where force AND if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.
Credible threat of legal backlash creates a chilling effect Goldsmith, 12 ~Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School Professor, focus on national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, and conflict of laws, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense, Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, March 2012, Power and Constraint, P. 199-201~
For the GTMO Bar and its cousin NGOs and activists, however, the al-Aulaqi lawsuit, like other lawsuits on different issues, was merely an early battle in a long war over the legitimacy of U.S. targeting practices—a war that will take place not just in the United States, but in other countries as well. When the CCR failed to achieve what it viewed as adequate accountability for Bush administration officials in the United States in connection with interrogation and detention practices, it started pursuing, and continues to pursue, lawsuits and prosecutions against U.S. officials in Spain, Germany, and other European countries. "You look for every niche you can when you can take on the issues that you think are important," said Michael Ratner, explaining the CCR’s strategy for pursuing lawsuits in Europe. Clive Stafford Smith, a former CCR attorney who was instrumental in its early GTMO victories and who now leads the British advocacy organization Reprieve, is using this strategy in the targeted killing context. "There are endless ways in which the courts in Britain, the courts in America, the international Pakistani courts can get involved" in scrutinizing U.S. targeting killing practices, he argues. "It’s going to be the next ’Guantanamo Bay’ issue."’ Working in a global network of NGO activists, Stafford Smith has begun a process in Pakistan to seek the arrest of former CIA lawyer John Rizzo in connection with drone strikes in Pakistan, and he is planning more lawsuits in the United States and elsewhere against drone operators." "The crucial court here is the court of public opinion," he said, explaining why the lawsuits are important even if he loses. His efforts are backed by a growing web of proclamations in the United Nations, foreign capitals, the press, and the academy that U.S. drone practices are unlawful. What American University law professor Ken Anderson has described as the "international legal-media-academic-NGO-international organization-global opinion complex" is hard at work to stigmatize drones and those who support and operate them." This strategy is having an impact. The slew of lawsuits in the United States and threatened prosecutions in Europe against Bush administration officials imposes reputational, emotional, and financial costs on them that help to promote the human rights groups’ ideological goals, even if courts never actually rule against the officials. By design, these suits also give pause to current officials who are considering controversial actions for fear that the same thing might later happen to them. This effect is starting to be felt with drones. Several Obama administration officials have told me that they worry targeted killings will be seen in the future (as Stafford Smith predicts) as their administration’s GTMO. The attempted judicial action against Rizzo, the earlier lawsuits against top CIA officials in Pakistan and elsewhere, and the louder and louder proclamations of illegality around the world all of which have gained momentum after al-Aulaqi’s killing—are also having an impact. These actions are rallying cries for protest and political pushback in the countries where the drone strikes take place. And they lead CIA operators to worry about legal exposure before becoming involved in the Agency’s drone program." We don’t know yet whether these forces have affected actual targeting practices and related tactics. But they induce the officials involved to take more caution. And it is only a matter of time, if it has not happened already, before they lead the U.S. government to forgo lawful targeted killing actions otherwise deemed to be in the interest of U.S. national security. Drone use prevents planning and executing terrorist attacks Johnston 12 (Patrick B. Johnston is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institution. He is the author of "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," published in International Security (Spring 2012)., 8/22/2012, "Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida", www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/drone-strikes-keep-pressure-on-al-qaida.html)
Should the U.S. continue to strike at al-Qaida’s leadership with AND bin Laden did in Afghanistan in 1996, after his ouster from Sudan.
The impact is nuclear miscalc Barrett et al 13 PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, "Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia," Science 26 Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor 26 Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
Attacks are feasible Bunn, et al, 13 ~Bunn, Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998.http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html-http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html~~
Introduction In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian AND the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.
Drones key to heg—- prevents escalation Bruntstetter 12 Daniel, Assistance Professor of Political Science at the School of Social Sciences at the University of California, "Drones: The Future of Warfare?", April 10, www.e-ir.info/2012/04/10/drones-the-future-of-warfare/
Since President Obama took office, the use of and hype surrounding drones has greatly AND terrorism should not be taken as evidence of drone effectiveness in all situations.
That prevents great power war, economic collapse, and global governance failures Thayer 13—PhD U Chicago, former research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, political science professor at Baylor (Bradley, professor in the political science department at Baylor University, "Humans, Not Angels: Reasons to Doubt the Decline of War Thesis", International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 396–419, September 2013, dml)
Accordingly, while Pinker is sensitive to the importance of power in a domestic context—the Leviathan is good for safety and the decline of violence—he neglects the role of power in the international context, specifically he neglects US power as a force for stability. So, if a liberal Leviathan is good for domestic politics, a liberal Leviathan should be as well for international politics. The primacy of the United States provides the world with that liberal Leviathan and has four major positive consequences for international politics (Thayer 2006). In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, US leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy and the security blanket it provides reduce nuclear proliferation incentives and help keep a number of complicated relationships stable such as between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. Wars still occur where Washington’s interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war’s likelihood—particularly the worst form—great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and many of the other positive forces Pinker identifies. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Rather, it is because they are more transparent, more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with US leadership. Third, along with the growth of the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, mobility of capital, and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good. Fourth, and finally, the United States has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to also promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth’s leading source of positive externalities for the world. The US military has participated in over 50 operations since the end of the Cold War—and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the US military is the earth’s "911 force"—it serves, de facto, as the world’s police, the global paramedic, and the planet’s fire department. There is no other state, group of states, or international organizations that can provide these global benefits. Without US power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. But, the waning of US power, at least in relative terms, introduces additional problems for Pinker concerning the decline of violence in the international realm. Given the importance of the distribution of power in international politics, and specifically US power for stability, there is reason to be concerned about the future as the distribution of relative power changes and not to the benefit of the United States.
Adv 2 Advantage 2: Norms A Subpoint —- CIA Fails Drone jurisdiction shapes global norms—CIA control sets a precedent that collapses accountability and influence Alston, 11 ~Harvard National Security Journal, 2 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 283, "The CIA and Targeted Killings beyond Borders," Philip Alston, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, p. lexis~
3. Self-interest: Setting Prudent Precedents for Others Because the United States AND United States before long when invoked by other states with highly problematic agendas. That signal matters—reserving the act for military members demonstrates US compliance Nauman 12 ~Joshua, JD, LLM, Commander, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, U.S. Navy, "Civilians on the Battlefield: By Using U.S. Civilians in the War on Terror, Is the Pot Calling the Kettle Black?" 91 Neb. L. Rev., google scholar~
Similarly, the prosecution of enemy belligerents by military commission for, among other things, using lethal force against an enemy uniformed combatant, runs the risk of creating a mixed message. Specifically, the United States asserts it is per se unlawful for an enemy civilian to take up arms against a lawful combatant, but it is not unlawful for a U.S. civilian to take up arms against an enemy belligerent. 258 There remains a very important moral distinction: the United States deliberately targets those who, either through current action, or through membership in al-Qaeda, pose a direct threat to the United States, whereas the enemy deliberately targets innocent civilians. Nonetheless, we are a nation bound by the rule of law, and therefore legal distinctions matter. So long as we are able to successfully defend ourselves, we should do all that is within our power to preserve the rule of law and maintain a consistent position or message with regard to who may, or may not, properly engage in warfare. The United States should draw and maintain clear distinctions between its service member combatants and its civilian support personnel. Using the broad definitions of DPH as discussed supra, the United States should honor those definitions by ensuring that its civilian employees and contractors do not, themselves, directly participate in hostilities. While instances of DPH on the part of civilians by the United States are not per se LOAC violations, they nonetheless weaken the necessary LOAC wall between civilian and combatant and provide critics with support for the argument that the United States exhibits a limited respect for international law. The use of CIA operatives in the War on Terror is not likely to abate. As numerous U.S. government officials have stated, we are "at war" with terrorists and the United States will continue to use every means at its disposal in the prosecution of this war.259 In this author’s view, however, there is a better path. The United States can still bring to bear all of the vast resources of the U.S. Government, including the CIA, but can insist that only military members apply the ultimate application of lethal force.260 DPH is clearly more broad than simply "pulling the trigger," so this proposal does not necessarily obviate the risk that other activities engaged in by the CIA or other civilians are, themselves, also DPH. However, reserving the distinct act of applying lethal force to uniformed members of the military will serve the important purpose of showing that the United States reserves the most extreme, overt form of direct participation to those in uniform. Some may say this is form over substance, but appearance matters, particularly when the United States is often setting the tone in the conduct of modern warfare, and the world is watching. One of the defining and most beneficial aspects of modern democracies is their state monopoly on the use of lethal force. Generally speaking, the United States, like other industrialized democracies, limits the official, sanctioned use of deadly force to the judicial system, law enforcement, and the military. This state monopoly on the use of lethal force does not eliminate murder, but murder is investigated and punished and there does not exist widespread use of vigilante justice or extra-judicial killings. The United States does not rely on tribal justice or gang warfare to mete out justice or control the population. Because of this feature of our democracy, we can employ lethal force in ways and at times of our choosing, all according to the rule of law. Accordingly, to more fully and perfectly respect the LOAC built up over the past 150 years, the United States should insist that in the "war" on terror, where the use of deadly force is concerned, uniformed service members should apply the force. While some may label this as overly idealistic, idealism is precisely the point. The rule of law, and in particular, the LOAC, is all about ideals. These ideals, and especially the ideal of distinguishing between combatants and civilians, have dramatically reduced the suffering and carnage imposed on civilian populations over the last 150 years. War is still horrific and inevitably leads to death, but limiting the application of this force by and against combatants helps to minimize the carnage and make war arguably more humane. We now return to the opening hypothetical . . . Applying Professor Corn’s functional discretion test, the UAV technician would not exercise discretion that implicates LOAC principles, nor would the MWR employee. However, the intelligence analyst that provides targeting advice to the commander, even if through a military member, may in fact be making decisions that directly implicate the LOAC principles of distinction and proportionality. Therefore, the intelligence analyst is taking a DPH. Similarly, if the drone strike is a CIA operation, the CIA officers would certainly be exercising discretionary functions that directly implicate the LOAC. Additionally, if the enemy were to apply a MCA-type legal regime to U.S. civilian actions, then the CIA officers, the UAV technical support contractor, and the intelligence analyst would likely all be guilty of taking a direct part in the killing of either a protected person or a privileged combatant, all while acting as an unprivileged belligerent. By changing how it employs civilians in the War on Terror, the United States can continue to comply with and remain a leading champion of the LOAC, while at the same time maintain a more consistent approach to civilian participation in war, regardless of whose side they are on. As a world leader, we owe nothing less. B Subpoint —- Convergence Bifurcated drone authority causes functional convergence Alston, 11 ~Harvard National Security Journal, 2 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 283, "The CIA and Targeted Killings beyond Borders," Philip Alston, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, p. lexis~
B. Transparency as to Legal Authority and Operational Responsibility: The Old "Double-Hatting" Trick A degree of transparency in relation to operational responsibility is essential both in terms of facilitating public or political accountability and establishing whether operations are being conducted with the necessary legal authority under domestic law. If one does not know which agency is responsible, it is impossible to know to whom questions should be directed. The division of labor between the DOD and the CIA, both in relation to drone killings and night-raid killings, is thus central to the present inquiry. In the earlier section examining "who is doing what" in relation to night raids, we saw that there is now extensive fluidity between the JSOC (DOD) special forces and their CIA counterparts, to the point where it is virtually impossible for anyone outside the two agencies to know who is in fact responsible in a given context.232 Many terms have been used to describe the resulting situation—leveraging, comingling, fungibility, doublehatting— but there has been almost no sustained analysis of the legal implications of this intentional blurring of what were once generally considered to be legally mandated hard and fast distinctions. The convergence trend wrecks accountability by sowing ambiguity about what constraints actually apply to targeted killing Chesney, 12 ~Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law (Robert Chesney, "Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate," http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Military-Intelligence-Convergence-and-the-Law-of-the-Title-10Title-50-Debate.pdf~~
Leon Panetta appeared on PBS Newshour not long after the raid that killed Osama bin AND my recommendations for reform within the analysis at each step along the way. It’s reverse causal—JSOC operations retain strategic advantages while satisfying oversight demands—uniquely boosts our influence on drone norms Zenko, 13 ~POLI CY INNOVATION MEMORANDUM NO. 31 Date: April 16, 2013 From: Micah Zenko Re: Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the PentagonMicah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations~
The main obstacle to acknowledging the scope, legality, and oversight of U. AND the precedents of greater openness in how such operations are conducted by others. C Subpoint —— Oversight Congress key to accountability – solves inflated assertions in a legal vacuum Schiff, 3/12/14 ~Op-Ed Contributor Let the Military Run Drone Warfare By ADAM B. SCHIFF March 12, 2014, Adam B. Schiff, Democrat of California, is a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.’~
It has been widely reported that the C.I.A. has been responsible for unmanned drone attacks. Last May, President Obama spoke at the National Defense University to articulate the legal and policy basis of the government’s drone program, promising transparency and reform. But the single biggest reform — ensuring that only the Department of Defense carries out lethal strikes — remains stalled by Congressional opposition and bureaucratic inertia. Those roadblocks must no longer stand in the way of reforms to increase the transparency, accountability and legitimacy of our drone program. First, Congress needs to get out of the way and allow the president to move the drone program to the Joint Special Operations Command (J.S.O.C.) at the Pentagon. Though it may appear that we’d just be shuffling the chairs, this change would have two benefits: It would allow our other agencies to focus on their core mission of intelligence gathering, rather than paramilitary activities, and it would enable us to be more public about the successes and failures of the drone program, since such operations would no longer be covert. Some Republicans and Democrats on both the House and Senate intelligence committees argue that the J.S.O.C. lacks expertise in targeting and may cause more collateral damage. But these claims are more anecdotal than evidentiary, and the intelligence committees have yet to be presented with the facts to back them up. They also ignore the joint role that Defense Department and intelligence agency personnel play in identifying and locating targets. These combined efforts would continue, even if the agency pulling the trigger changed. Second, we must hold ourselves accountable by being more open about the effect of our drone strikes. While there may still be a need for covert drone operations in some parts of the world, greater disclosure would be in our interest. In the absence of official accounts, inflated and often wildly inaccurate assertions of the number of civilian casualties — generally advanced by our enemies — fill the informational vacuum. I’ve proposed legislation, along with my fellow California Democrat Senator Dianne Feinstein, to require an annual report of the number of civilian and combatant casualties caused by drone strikes, including an explanation of how we define those terms. Finally, with regard to the uniquely difficult situation of an American citizen who has taken up arms against his own nation and who cannot feasibly be arrested, the Obama administration must go further to explain what protections are in place to ensure due process for any American who may be targeted. A 2011 strike targeted and killed Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born cleric and top operative of Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, and other Americans may be targeted in the future. I’ve put forward a proposal to require an independent review of any decision to target an American with lethal force. These reports should be declassified after 10 years. Knowing that they’ll be made public will help ensure that the task is approached with the appropriate rigor. The United States is the only country with a significant armed drone capability, but that distinction will not last forever. As other nations develop and deploy these technologies, we will be better positioned to urge their responsible and transparent use if we have set an example ourselves. We must hold ourselves to a high standard and do it in public, not behind closed doors. That is the commitment the president has made, and it’s a promise worth keeping. Congressional action builds confidence—key to global dialogue and norm development Kreps and Zenko, 14 ~"The Next Drone Wars Preparing for Proliferation", SARAH KREPS is Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. MICAH ZENKO is Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140746/sarah-kreps-and-micah-zenko/the-next-drone-wars~~
It’s now been a year since Japan’s previously ruling liberal government purchased three of the AND political leadership, these technologies could very well lead the region into war. Incidents escalate—drone crisis triggers US battle plans Walker, 14 ~1/9/14, Richard, Former NY News Producer, "U.S. Interventionism in Asia Could Spark War With China", https://americanfreepress.net/?p=14557-https://americanfreepress.net/?p=14557~~
A war with China is a real possibility. All it might take is the kind of near collision between United States and Chinese naval vessels that happened recently in the East China Sea or a dog fight between Japanese and Chinese fighter planes in the skies over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. It could also start with a confrontation between Philippine and Chinese vessels in energy-rich parts of the South China Sea now claimed by Beijing. There have been many close calls lately as China begins to assert itself around the world, and most experts admit that once the genie is out of the bottle it will be impossible to put it back in. This may have already occurred. In December 2012, Japan scrambled fighters after Chinese surveillance planes were spotted over the Senkaku Islands, territory China has since declared a Chinese air defense zone. Japan has been concerned by China’s use of drones close to its airspace and has vowed to retaliate by deploying U.S. made drones like the Global Kitty Hawk it hopes to buy from Washington. China has been developing its own drones, most likely with stolen U.S. technology. Some experts have forecast there will be a drone war in the region before long. Since his inauguration, President Barack Obama, like his predecessor, George W. Bush, has paid little heed to China’s growing naval ambitions. He has ignored repeated warnings from allies like India, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, the Philippines and South Korea that the Chinese have been building a formidable military that has been shaped specifically to dominate the Western Pacific. Hard Assets Alliance Neocons, who want America to continue to meddle around the world, issued warnings as far back as 2005 when Robert D. Kaplan wrote in The Atlantic Monthly that if China moved into the Pacific it would encounter a "U.S. Navy and Air Force unwilling to budge from the coastal shelf of the Asian mainland," resulting in a "replay of the decades-long Cold War, with a center of gravity not in the heart of Europe but among Pacific atolls." In AMERICAN FREE PRESS in 2007, this reporter wrote that China was not many years away from challenging U.S. dominance in Asia. At the time, a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) task force had recommended the U.S. needed to "defeat China swiftly and decisively in any military conflict." The CFR recommended expanding U.S. forces into Asia and shifting the balance of its naval and maritime power from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Globalists also wanted the U.S. to "invest heavily in new technologies appropriate for a naval and air battle with the Chinese." Since 2007, with an eye to defeating the U.S. in a war in the region, China has greatly expanded its short-and medium-range ballistic missile arsenal, giving it the capability to target all U.S. bases in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. It has also new anti-ship missiles capable of destroying U.S. aircraft carriers. By using an overwhelming number of short-and medium-range missiles, the Chinese could destroy U.S. bases and make resupply difficult in a future conflict. As the National Air Space Intelligence Center has pointed out, "China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world." A sign of how the U.S. might react in the opening exchanges of a conflict was contained in a Pentagon document leaked to The Washington Post in 2012. It talked of a plan that envisioned the U.S. destroying China’s surveillance and missile targeting capabilities "deep inside the country." The plan talked of a "blinding campaign" followed by a massive naval and air assault—the same "shock and awe" tactic used against Iraq, which resulted in scores of dead civilians. The assumption here is that China would not go nuclear once the missiles started flying. The bottom line is this could be the defining war of the 20th century if Washington refuses to bring U.S. troops and ships home and let Asia sort out its own troubles.
Spills over internationally Mustin and Rishikof, 11 ~BS, JD, MBA, MA in International Affairs AND BA, MA, JD, Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security, Professor of law and chair of the Department of National Security Strategy at the National War College, Jeff Mustin and Harvey Rishikof, Summer 2011, "Projecting Force in the 21st Century – Legitimacy and the Rule of Law," 63 Rutgers L. Rev. Iss. 4~
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS If these definitions are accepted as true, the result is AND military force without transparency is not the raison d’etre for a covert capability.
3/30/14
NDT RD 8 2AC AT Circumvention
Tournament: NDT RD 8 | Round: 8 | Opponent: Liberty BM | Judge: Harris, Young, Short
Public costs check
Waxman, 13 ~Proff Columbia, Observations About Targeting and Congressional Intelligence Oversight By Matthew Waxman Sunday, February 17, 2013 at 5:06 PM http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/observations-about-targeting-and-congressional-intelligence-oversight/~~ It’s true that congressional intelligence oversight is often weaker than it is in other areas of public policy, and it’s difficult and rare for Congress to pass binding legislation that restricts intelligence operations. The DoJ document controversy and the sometimes-testy Brennan confirmation process and delayed vote show, however, that members of Congress can exact political costs on executive branch intelligence programs, ceeven if they have little chan or interest in formally legislating. In theory intelligence committee oversight is supposed to operate as a substitute for public accountability (because of the secrecy of intelligence programs), but the combination of investigative journalism and congressional scrutiny in this case also demonstrates how some of the many-dimensional constraints on presidential action that Jack discusses in his recent book sometimes operate best in tandem. As Zegart notes in this New Republic article critical of congressional oversight of targeting programs: "The juice the committees get is from public support. To the extent that the committees are focusing public attention on intelligence issues, they have a lever in negotiations with the executive branch."
No risk of circumvention — Obama’s proposed transfer was blocked by Congress – Congressional action dictates the outcome of the transfer
Bellinger, 14 ~"Congressional Control of Intelligence Programs", John B. Bellinger III is a partner in the international and national security law practices at Arnold 26 Porter LLP in Washington, DC. He is also Adjunct Senior Fellow in International and National Security Law at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as The Legal Adviser for the Department of State from 2005–2009, as Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council at the White House from 2001–2005, and as Counsel for National Security Matters in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice from 1997–2001, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/01/congressional-control-of-intelligence-programs-sometimes/~~23.UwOei85ngrg-http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/01/congressional-control-of-intelligence-programs-sometimes/~~ In the last ten days, an interesting controversy has bubbled up over congressional control AND to ignore restrictions in classified annexes for fear of angering Congressional intelligence overseers.
Ethical obligations are tautological—the only coherent rubric is to maximize number of lives saved
What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn’t. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn’t Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the AND religion, they don’t really explain what’s distinctive about the philosophy in question.
3/30/14
NDT RD 8 2AC K Heteronormativity
Tournament: NDT RD 8 | Round: 8 | Opponent: Liberty BM | Judge: Harris, Young, Short
The 1ac’s approach is pedagogically sound – inculcating skills linked explicitly to normative political adoption creates the potential for effective political contestation
Donohue, 13 ~2013 Nation al Security Pedagogy: The Role of Simulations, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=217226context=facpub-http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=217226context=facpub~~ Student Organizations and Journals Mirroring law schools’ growing institutional focus on national security law is increased student interest in the field, manifest through student organizations and student - run journals. Of the top 100 ranked law schools, nearly three dozen have student organizations relating to national security law. 94 Sixteen of these have military law societies. 95 In the law review realm, not only have mainstream journals increasingly published articles in this area, but eight journals have adopted a strong focus on this area, with three solely dedicated to nat ional security law: the Georgetown Law - Syracuse Law Journal of National Security Law and Policy , the annual William Mitchell College of Law Journal of the National Security Forum , and the Harvard Law’s National Security Journal (initiated in Spring 2010). 96 These institutional developments suggest that law schools, as a structural matter, are responding to the growing demand for well - trained students. Thus far, the approach has been an organic process of responding on a case - by - case basis. The problem is that, for the most part, these programs and institutions are situated within traditional models, thus reflecting the dominant divisions and pedagogical aims of the broader institutions. Yet many of these approaches were adopted with a view towards the pra ctice of law generally, and not with specific focus on the challenges facing lawyers that want to move into national security law. III. L EGAL P EDAGOGY The practice of law , as suggested above, is deeply political in nature, with lawyers not merely providing a service to the community, but exercising government power and seeking to limit the same. This makes the profession susceptible to political shifts. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that the compromise forged between conflicting aims ( the practical realities of the practice of law, paired with the aspirations of critical distance and debate) r epeatedly surface s in the wake of military conflict. It was , after all, following the Civil War t hat Harvard confronted the outmoded, receptive nature of legal education. Subjected to recitation of treatises prepared years in advance, students had little to no agency in the classroom. 97 Harvard Law Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell sent shock waves through the system when he introduced three fundamental innovations, the aim of which was to inculcate academic achievement in students: he began sequencing courses, he created the case method of teaching, and he invented the (now infamous) issue - spotter examination, requiring students to respond in writing to complex hypothetical problems. 98 At the time, Oxford and Cambridge considered a liberal education to be sufficient preparation for the professions; the study of common law and other professional educ ation was left to the apprenticeship process. Students would be asked merely to present clients’ complaints in the appropriate legal form (i.e., the correct "writ" or "form of action", as appropriate to the facts of the case) to gain access to the courts. Students would be asked merely to present c lients’ complaints in the appropriate legal form (i.e., the correct "writ" or "form of action", as appropriate to the facts of the case) to gain access to the courts. Moskovitz explains, "Students listened to lectures (some by professors, but many by judge s and practicing lawyers) and read textbooks that distilled the rules from the cases. Both activities were essentially passive: the student absorbed information but did not interact much with the teacher." innovations thus flew in the face of both U.S. norms and those adopted across the Atlantic. 99 They at once recognized the importance of the practice of law, while providing to the legal academy the distinction of critical scholarly analysis. The decision to expand into the practice of law subsequently created divisions within the research university. Scholars saw their role as ensuring that students obtained a certain distance from the law and, as s uch, could subject it to more rigorous critique. The goal of practitioners in many ways proved the opposite: to immerse students so directly in the law as to give them fluency in the practice of the same. In the ensuing years, new evaluations of legal pedagogy have accompanied the country’s engagement in military hostilities. World War I , for instance, gave way to the Reed Report, which considered how those returning from war would seek to re - shape the existing institutions. Jerome Frank’s work, calling for greater engagement of the academy in the practice of law, bookended World War II. The close of Vietnam witnessed the first ABA Task Force Report on the role of legal education. The Cramton Report was soon followed by the MacCrate Report — coinc ident with the ending of the Cold War. A crucial weakness in many of these studies is that they have assumed the practice of law writ large to be the object of the inquiry — obfuscating, in the process, the practice of law in discreet contexts. Simultaneo usly, much of the discussion assumes as a given the division between doctrinal and clinical education, missing in the process the potential for developing a new framework for legal education. Perhaps most importantly, these inquiries, like many that mark the current pedagogical debate, have failed to appreciate the importance of the goals most appropriate to national security law. A . Limitations of the Current Pedagogical Debate One problem with the current pedagogical debate in the legal academy is th at it is almost entirely grounded in a general understanding of the practice of law. There is very little new about this approach. In 1978, for instance, t he ABA’s Task Force on Lawyer Competency: The Role of Law Schools , chaired by Dean Roger Cramton, i dentified three competencies required for the practice of law writ large : (1) knowledge about law and legal institutions; (2) fundamental skills; and (3) professional attributes and values. 100 Instead of considering any of the sub - fields in depth, the repor t focused on general legal education. It identified fundamental skills as legal analysis, legal research, fact investigation, written and oral communication, interviewing, counseling, negotiation, and organization. 101 Professional values, in turn, centered on discipline, integrity, 99 A LFRED Z ANTZINGER R EED , T RAINING FOR THE P UBLIC P ROFESSION OF THE L AW (1921), p. 23 ("In accordance with this tradition of the ultimate responsibility of lawyers for their own educational qualifications, the English universities have not only been denied any control over the admission of a law student to practice. They have not even been made directly responsible for providing any portion of his education, in whi ch they participate only as volunteer agencies. In the field of general education they offer much more than the practitioners demand. ~...~The conception...of institutional instruction in technical law as an essential part of a lawyer’s education, whether giv en in a university or whether given elsewhere, has never thoroughly reestablished itself in England sinc the decay of the original Inns of Courts. The pedagogical doctrine that this should constitute a distinct intermediate phase of his preparation, to be entered upon after he had completed his general education but before his practical training begins, is still more foreign to English thought. As a rule, an English student, having secured such general education as he thinks worth while or can afford, pro ceeds directly into a lawyer’s office.") See also B RUCE A. K IMBALL , T HE I NCEPTION OF M ODERN P ROFESSIONAL E DUCATION : C. C. L ANGDELL , 1826 - 1906 (2009), p. 161. 100 A MERICAN B AR A SSOCIATION , S ECTION OF L EGAL E DUCATION AND A DMISSIONS TO THE B AR , R EPORT AND R EC OMMENDATIONS ON THE T ASK F ORCE ON L AWYER C OMPETENCY : THE R OLE OF L AW S CHOOLS (1979), at 9 - 10 ~Hereinafter Cramton Report~. 101 Id. 21 conscientiousness, continued professional development, critical self - assessment, and hard work. 102 The report was not uncritical of the current state of play: w hile legal education did a r elatively good job of providing students with the knowledge of law, and legal analytical skills, as well as legal research and writing, it failed in three essential respects: (a) developing some of the fundamental skills underemphasized by traditional le gal education; (b) shaping attitudes, values, and work habits critical to the individual’s ability to translate knowledge and relevant skills into adequate professional performance; and (c) providing integrated learning experiences focused on particular fi elds of lawyer practice. 103 The Report offered dozens of recommendations to address the gap. 104 Ten years later, following the end of the Cold War, the American Bar Association’s Section of Legal E ducation and Admissions to the Bar appointed yet another task force to look at the role of legal education in preparing attorneys for practice. Once again, it took a cookie - cutter approach to the subject, assuming legal education prepared students for a uniform fi eld. Chaired by Robert MacCrate, the resulting 414 - page report included within it a "Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Professional Values", in which it highlighted ten fundamental skills and four values to guide those seeking to enter the pr ofession. 105 The goal of legal education was and ought to be developing students’ skills with regard to problem - solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation, litigation and ADR, organiz ation and management of legal work, and recognizing and resolving legal dilemmas . 106 With the aim of legal education thus defined, the report went on to note the fundamental values of the profession: the provision of competent representation, striving to p romote justice, fairness, and morality, working to improve the profession, and professional development. 107 Cognizant of the critiques that would inevitably follow, the Report noted that the skills and values thus presented was not definitive; instead, the y provided a starting point for further discussion of different areas of the profession. The aim was not to lock schools into a specific curriculum, to create criteria for accreditation, or to cement bar examiners into one approach. In achieving these goa ls, the Report emphasized the importance of clinical education: Clinics have made, and continue to make, an invaluable contribution to the entire legal education enterprise. They are a key component in the development and advancement of skills and values throughout the profession. . . . clinics provide students with the opportunity to integrate, in an actual practice setting, all of the fundamental lawyering skills. In clinic courses, students sharpen their understanding of professional responsibility an d deepen their appreciation for their own values as well as those of the profession as a whole. 108 102 Id., at 10. 103 Id., at 14. 104 Id., at 3 - 7, recommendations 3 - 5. 105 A MERICAN B AR A SSOCIATION S ECTION OF L EGAL E DUCATION AND A DMI SSION TO THE B AR , L EGAL E DUCATION AND P ROFESSIONAL D EVELOPMENT : A N E DUCATIONAL C ONTINUUM , R EPORT OF THE T ASK F ORCE ON L AW S CHOOLS AND THE P ROFESSION : N ARROWING THE G AP (1992) ~hereinafter, MacCrate Report~. 106 MacCrate Report, supra , at 121 - 22. 107 MacCrate Report, supra , at 140 - 41. 108 MacCrate Report, supra ,at 238. 25 la wyer. Not only must students understand these processes, Baker argues, but they must take into account the way in which processes unique to national security law influence lawyers’ ability to engage in traditional legal analysis and recommendation. The opportunity, for instance, for lawyers to engage in considered debate about legal interpretations or to have their work cross - checked by other attorneys, perhaps even more steeped in these fields, may be limited. Baker explains, Lawyers tend to focus on t he formal aspects of constitutional government – legislation, the oversight hearing, the Justice Department opinion, and presidential statements. For sure, these legal events dominate constitutional history and precedent. However, much of constitutional practice within each branch, and between each branch, is informal in nature, outside public view, and without documentation. 126 Beyond the informal nature of such processes is the classified context within which government attorneys operate. Two salient p oints here stand out: first is the difficulty of working collaboratively in a classified context when time is of the essence . That is, even where a number of legal experts may be privy to the information, the abbreviated timeline under which national security attorneys must work limits the extent to which collaboration may occur. The second point centers on limitations on the number of individuals with whom a lawyer can discuss the specific matter in question. There may be very few legal experts with whom an attorney can consult. Nevertheless, decisions reached in these contexts may have significant implications: they may shift the U.S. legal posture on domestic and international instruments, with formidable consequences for operations, U.S. policy, and safety and security. These characteristics of national security law mean that law schools must sharpen students’ analytical skills, as well as their substantive knowledge. That is, schools must not just teach students how to think about the law, but they must convey a significant amount of what the law actually is so that students have some idea of the current authorities and the framing and the groundwork on which future initiatives are built. Simultaneously, they must make students aware of the way in which formal and informal process influences the quality of their legal analysis and understanding, and help them to develop different tools to manage such processes to ensure better performance. With the black letter law in national security rapidly changing and growing, law schools must further look at what the emerging topics are and adjust existing courses and offer new top ics accordingly. This is a different model than the relative stasis marking much of the 20 th Century. Most schools have generally agreed over the course of decades that criminal law, criminal procedure, constitutional law, civil procedure, contracts, tor ts, and property, merit attention. Eventually schools began to offer courses in new areas, such as international law, and environmental law. But the sudden explosion in national security law here means two things: first, the re - evaluation of traditional classes to include new and emerging areas. Material support provisions, new surveillance authorities, and the difference between Title III orders and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court warrants may thus become an important part of Criminal Procedure . Regulatory courses, in turn, may need to expand to include new financial regulations unique to the national security world. Second, rapid changes suggest the construction of new courses, offering both novel combinations of subjects as well as new substa ntive areas, such as courses focused on international law and habeas corpus, pandemic disease and consequence management law, intelligence law, or cyber threats. 126 B AKER , supra note 5 , at 63. 26 As a pedagogical matter then, examination of new and emerging areas must be incorporated into the doctrinal study of legal authorities, even as the processes at work in the national security realm are featured. Active review of courses across the board wi ll further accomplish this aim — an approach somewhat antithetical to traditional approaches to teaching, where faculty members typically offer (relatively static) introductory courses, paired with upper level courses on matters of particular interest. New organization may therefore be required to bring national security law faculty and curriculum together, as an intellectual and structural enterprise, to consider the breadth and range of current course offerings. b. " Washington Context " While recognizing t he importance of legal authorities and processes, in the field of national security law, both may be overridden by considerations unique to what may be called the " Washington context " . The inherent political friction between the branches of government, the institutional frictions between Departments and Agencies, and the interpersonal components that accompany the exercise of power all influence the manner in which national security l aw evolves. To the extent that law schools ignore this aspect of the practice, they do students a great disservice. To take an example that arose in one of my course s , students may (correctly) read HSPD 5 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to mean th at the Secretary of Homeland Security has the authority to order an evacuation. To act on this authority, however, without direct communication with (and permission from) the White House, would be inappropriate. This type of Washington - based, p olitical a uthority is critical to the exercise of power. Herein lies the rub: national security instruments often incorporate power that has significant domestic and international political ramifications. The stakes are high. It is thus imperative that students understand the broader authorities and processes at work. Such processes extend beyond the executive branch to dealings with Congress — a branch often sidelined in law school curricula. Lawyers working in the field, from the executive branch and legislati ve branches to private industry, must understand the political processes in Congress in order to be more effective. The relative strength of different committees, the contours of legislative oversight, the range of policy documents applicable to the field (and required by Congress via statute), the formal and informal mechanisms to obtain information relating to executive branch national security matters, the role of party politics — all of this proves relevant. Understanding political authority extends to chain of command, as well as inter - agency processes. c. Policy Environment The " Washington context" can be distinguished from a second way in which political considerations enter into national security law: namely, the broader policy environment. On e way to understand this is in terms of the push and pull of policymaking. In the former realm, law constitutes just one of many competing demands that policymakers take into account before deciding which actions to pursue. In the latter area, the impact of the actions taken is felt in both the domestic and international arena. Each constitutes an ex ante consideration for lawyers operating in this domain. Within government practice, in determining which course to set, the role that law plays may be just one of many competing demands on the policymaker’s decision - making strategy. In order to secure a place for legal considerations, lawyers must therefore be cognizant of the different pressures influencing the process. Part of this is 27 learning how to communicate clearly with those involved in making and implementing policy. It also entails developing a feel for when and how to initiate appropriate participa tion. That is, lawyers must insert themselves into the conversation, representing the interests of law itself. I n policy discussions, lawyers are often n ot seated at the table. T hey may be a "plus one" in the discussion, and, in this capacity, they mus t come to terms with the fact that the law is only one consideration at play. They may have to accept being relegated to a supporting role, with their recommendation overridden. In this context, they must grapple with not just personality management, but issues related to ego and subordination. They must then decide how to react to this situation, when and how to take the initiative, when to concede, and when to pr oceed through other channels. In brief, they must learn both how to insert legal considerations into what is essentially a policy debate , and how to treat the outcome of such efforts in the context of professional and personal goals . At the back end, legal recommendations carry with them strong policy implications. It is worth noting at the ou tset that t here is disagreement over whether national security lawyers need to take this into account. Professor John Yoo, for instance, argues that it is not the national security lawyer’s role to think about the policy impact of legal advice given — even when delivered at the highest levels of government . 127 The logic behind this is that separating law from policy is essential to good lawyering , and that to combine policy considerations with strict legal analysis undermines the strength of the intellectual endeavor, as well as the integrity of the advisory system itself. As an ex ante consideration, taking into account either competing interests or the resulting policy impact thus runs counter to the purpose of obtaining strict legal advice. Instead, it is for policymakers to balance competing concerns and to determine the most approp riate course of action. There is much to commend this strict adherence to the distinction between law and policy. The problem with this approach, however, is that it results in a sort of false silo, where lawyers ostensibly operate in a manner completely insulated from policy concerns. In national security law, this is simply not the case. Law and policy — for reasons discussed in Part I of this Article — often overlap. The result of attempting to ignore the policy side of the eq uation, moreover, may sidel ine law at the front end: i.e., when lawyers present not just a particular legal analysis, but act to insert considerations of law qua law into the policymaker’s decisionmaking process . Here, identifying and thinking about competing policy concerns provi des lawyers with important knowledge about how and when to insert legal considerations. Failure to take account of policy concerns may further entail a breach of professional responsibility and ethical obligations at the back end . It may be, for instanc e, that there is no legal bar to acting in a certain manner. ( It is precisely for this reason that criminal law continues to evolve. ) But absence of prohibition does not automatically translate into permission for action. A strict legal analysis may thu s suggest legality, where the actual implications of such actions would run contrary to legal or ethical norms. The role of national security law is here of great importance: as an exercise of power — indeed, at one extreme, the most coercive powers available to the state — failure to take into account the implications of the legal analysis may suggest a failure of professional responsibility. d . Adaptation and Evolution 127 John Yoo, Remarks , Debate on Guantanamo Bay Detainees, Oct. 12, 2005, Stanford Law School, Co - sponsored by the Federalist Society and the American Constitution Society. 28 Not only must students learn about legal and authorities and processes, the Washington context, and policy concerns, but they must learn how to adapt and evolve to deal with new and emerging bureaucratic and administrative structures. Innovation is the hallmark of this skill, and it is one that requires a different kind of learning than dominates in doctrinal settings. 128 In the national security world, p olitical leadership rapidly changes, with constant movement of personnel. Institutions themselves are in flux: the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, as aforemen tioned, placed twenty - two executive branch agencies — some of which were major and complex organs of the government, such as the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Secret Service, the Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency — under one umbrella, growing by 2012 to some 216,000 people. 129 DHS agencies continue to evolve and morph as the mission of the Department steadily expands. The Department of Defense’s creation of NORTHCOM similarly generated two new domestic intelligence institutions and a substantial infrastructure to support the command. Treasury, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of State, and others have had to adapt to the new environment, in the process shifting i nstitutional structures. Collectively, what these characteristics mean is that those who take up positions within these entities need to be able to quickly adapt to new and changing legal and political authorities and processes. So, too, must those outside of government, who need to respond to new initiatives and rapidly changing institutional arrangements. The sheer size of the infrastructure and the number of new initiatives requires the ability to work in a fluctuating environment and to quickly iden tify changing power structures. 2 . Factual Chaos and Uncertainty One of the most important skills for students going into national security law is the ability to deal with factual chaos. This significantly differs from the traditional model of legal edu cation, which tends to provide students with a set of facts, which they must then analyze. In contrast, l awyers working in national security law must figure out what information they need, integrate enormous amounts of data from numerous sources, determin e which information is reliable and relevant, and proceed with analysis and recommendations. These recommendations, moreover, must be based on contingent conditions: facts may be classified and unavailable to the legal analyst, or facts may change as new information emerges. This is as true for government lawyers as it is for those outside of governmental structures. They must be aware of what is known, what is unsure, what is unknown, and the possibility of changing circumstances , and they must advise their clients, from the beginning, how the legal analysis might shift if the factual basis were to be altered. a. Chaos Concern about information overload in the national security environment is not new: in the 1970s scholars discussed and debated how to handle the sequential phases of 128 For rel ated discussion of innovation in the context of self - learning for corporate law, see Karl S. Okamoto, Learning and Learning - to - Learn by Doing: Simulating Corporate Practice in Law School , 45 J. OF L EGAL E D ., 495 (1995). 129 The Department of Homeland Security, the Executive Branch, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/our - government/executive - branch (accessed Jan. 6, 2012). 29 intelligence gathering and analysis in a manner that yielded an optimal result. 130 But the digital revolution has exponentially transformed the quantitative terms of reference, the technical means of collection and analysis , and the volume of information available. At the same time, t he number of s ources of information — not least in the online world — is staggering. Added to this is the rapid expansion in national security law itself: myriad new Executive Orders, Presidentia l Directives, institutions, programs, statutes, regulations, lawsuits, and judicial decisions mean is that national security law itself is rapidly changing. What this means is that l awyers inside and outside of government must keep abreast of constantly e volving provisions. The international arena too is in flux, as global entities, such as the United Nations, the European Court of Human Rights, the G7/G8, and other countries introduce new instruments whose reach includes U.S. interests. Rapid geopoliti cal changes relating to critical national security concerns, such as worldwide financial flows, the Middle East, the Arab Spring, South American drug Cartels, North Korea, the former Soviet Union, China, and other issues increase the importance of keeping up on what is happening globally, as a way of understanding domestic concerns. Further expanding the information overload is the changing nature of what constitutes national security itself. 131 In sum, the sheer amount of information the national security l awyer needs to assimilate is significant. The basic skills required in the 1970s thus may be the same — such as the ability (a) to know where to look for relevant and reliable information; (b) to obtain the necessary information in the most efficient manner possible; (c) to quickly discern reliable from unreliable information; (d) to know what data is critical; and (e) to ascertain what is as yet unknown or contingent on other conditions. But the volume of information, the diversity of information sources, and the heavy reliance on technology requires lawyers to develop new skills . They must be able to obtain the right information and to ignore chaos to focus on the critical issues. These features point in opposite directions — i.e., to both a broadening of knowledge and a narrowing of focus. A law school system built on the gradual and incremental advance of law, bolstered or defeated by judicial decisions and solidified through the adhesive nature of stare decisis appea rs particularly inapp osite for this rapidly - changing environment. An important question that will thus confront students upon leaving the legal academy is how to keep abreast of rapidly changing national security and geopolitical concerns, in an information - rich world, in a m anner that allows for capture of relevant information, while retaining the ability to focus on the immediate task at hand. Part of staying ahead of the curve means developing a sense of timing — when to respond to important legal and factual shifts — and identifying the best means of doing so. Again, this applies to government and non - government employees. How should students prioritize certain information and then act upon it? This, too, is an aspect of information overloadNational security law proves an information - rich, factually - driven environment. The ability to deal with such chaos, however, may be further hampered by gaps in the information available and the difficulty of engaging i n complex fact - finding — a skill often under - taught in law school. Investigation of relevant information may need to reach far afield in order to generate more careful legal analysis. Uncertainty here plays a key role. In determining, for instance, the contours of quarantine authority, lawye rs may need to understand how the pandemic in question works, where there have been outbreaks, how it will spread, what treatments are available, which social distancing measures may prove most effective, what steps are being taken locally, at a state - leve l, and internationally, and the like. Lawyers in non - profit organizations, legal academics, in - house attorneys, and others, in turn, working in the field, must learn how to find out the relevant information before commenting on new programs and initiative s, agreeing to contractual terms, or advising clients on the best course of action. For both government and non - government lawyers, the secrecy inherent in the field here is of great consequence. The key here is learning to ask intelligent questions to a ccommodate for chaos and uncertainty to generate the best legal analysis possible. It may be the case that national security lawyers are not aware of the facts they are missing — facts that would be central to legal analysis. This phenomenon front - loads the type of advice and discussions in which national security lawyers must engage. That is, it means that analysis must be given in a transparent manner, i.e., contingent on a set of facts as are then currently known, with indication given up front as to how that analysis might change, should the factual basis shift. This is particularly true of government attorneys, who may be advising policymakers — who may or may not have a background in the law and who may have access to more information than the attorney. Signaling the key facts on which the legal decision rests and indicating how such analysis might change if the facts change, provides for more robust consideration of critically important issues. c. Creative Problem Solving Part of dealing with factu al uncertainty in a rapidly changing environment is learning how to construct new ways to address emerging issues. Admit t edly, m uch has been made in the academy about the importance of problem - based learning as a method in developing students’ critical thinking skills. 132 Problem - solving, however, is not merely a method of teaching. It is itself a goal for the type of activities in which lawyers will be engaged. The means - ends distinction is an important one to make here, as problem - solving in a classro om environment may be merely a conduit for learning a specific area of the law or a limited set of skills. But problem - solving as an ends suggests the accumulation of a broader set of tools, such as familiarity with multidisciplinary approaches, creativit y and originality, sequencing, collaboration, identification of contributors’ expertise and how to leverage each skill set. This goal presents itself in the context of fact - finding, but it draws equally on strong understanding of legal authorities and pr actices , the Washington context, and policy considerations . Similarly, l ike the factors highlighted in the first pedagogical goal, adding to the tensions inherent in factual analysis is the abbreviated timeline in which national security attorneys must op erate. Time may not be a commodity in surplus. This context means that legal education must not only develop students’ complex fact - finding skills and the ability provide contingent analysis, but it must teach them how to swiftly and efficiently engage i n these activities. 3 . Critical Distance As was recognized more than a century ago, analytical skills by themselves are insufficient training for individuals moving into the legal profession. 133 Critical thinking provides the necessary distance from the law that is required in order to move the legal system forward. Critical thought, influenced by the Ancient Greek tradition, finds itself bound up in the Socratic method of dialogue that continues to define the legal academy. But it goes beyond such const ructs as well. Scholars and educators disagree, of course, on what exactly critical thinking entails. 134 For purposes of our present discussion, I understand it as the meta - conversation in the law. Whereas legal analysis and substantive knowledge focus o n the law as it is and how to work within the existing structures, critical thought provides distance and allows students to engage in purposeful discussion of theoretical constructs that deepen our understanding of both the actual and potential constructs of law. It is inherently reflective. For the purpose of practicing national security law, critical thought is paramount. Part of the reason for this is because of the unique conditions that tend to accompany the introduction of national security provisions: often introduced in the midst of an emergency, new powers frequently have significant implications for distribution of authority at a federal level, a diminished role for state and local government in the federalism realm, and a direct impact on individual rights. 135 Constitutional implications demand careful scrutiny. Yet at the time of an attack, enormous pressure is on officials and legislators to act and to be seen to act to respond. 136 With the impact on rights, in particular, foremost in legislators’ minds, the first recourse often is to make such powers temporary. However, they rarely turn out to be so, instead becoming embedded in the legislative framework and providing a baseline on which further measures are built. 137 In order to be withdrawn, legislators must demonstrate either that the provisions are not effective or that by withdrawing them, no violence will ensue Alternatively, legislators woul d have to acknowledge that some level of violence may be tolerated — a step no politician is willing to take. This steady ratcheting effect means that new powers, introduced in the heat of the moment, may become a permanent part of the statutory and re gulato ry regime. They may not operate the way in which they were intended. They may impact certain groups in a disparate manner . They may have unintended and detrimental consequences. For all of this, it is necessary for national security lawyers to be able to view such provisions, and related policy decisions, from a distance and to be able to think through such authorities outside of the contemporary regime. There are many other reasons such critical analysis matters that reflect in other areas of the law. The ability to recognize problems, articulate underlying assumptions and values, understand how language is being used, assess whether argument is logical, test conclusions, and determine and analyze pertinent information depends on critical thinking skills. Indeed, one could draw argue that it is the goal of higher education to build the capacity to engage in critical thought. Deeply humanistic theories underlie this approach. The ability to develop discerning judgment — the very meaning of the Greek ter m, ???????? , provides the basis for advancing the human condition through reason and intellectual engagement. There is yet another way in which critical thought presents in national security law which may seem somewhat antithetical to the legal enterprise: particularly for government lawyers and consultants, there may be times in which not providing legal advice, when asked for it, may be as important as providing legal analysis. That is, it may be important not to put certain options on the table, with a legal justification behind them. Such concerns are bound up in considerations of policy, professional respons ibility, and ethics. They may also relate to questions as to who one’s client is in the wo rld of national security law. 138 I t may be unclear whether and at what point one’s client is a supervisor, the legal (or political) head of an agency, a cross - agency organization, the White House, the Constitution, or the American public. Depending upon this determination, the national security lawyer may or may not want to provide legal advice to one of the potential clients. A lternatively, such a lawyer may want to call attention to certain analyses to other clients. Determining when and how to act in these circumstances requires critical distance. 4 . Nontraditional Written and Oral Communication Skills Law schools have long focused on written and oral communication skills that are central to the practice of law. Brief writing, scholarly analysis, criminal complaints, contractual agreements, trial advocacy, and appellate arguments constitute standard far e. What is perhaps unique about the way communication skills present in the national security world is the importance of modes of communication not traditionally recognized via formal models, such as concise (and precise) oral briefings, email exchanges, private and passing conversations, agenda setting, meeting injects, and communications built on swiftly evolving and uncertain information. For m any of these types of exchanges — and unlike the significant amounts of time that accompany preparation of leng thy legal documents (and the painstaking preparation for oral argument that marks moot court preparations) — speed may be of the essence. Much of the activity that goes on within the Executive Branch occurs within a hierarchical system, wherein those closes t to the issues have exceedingly short amounts 138 For a thoughtful discussion of who constitutes the client in national security law, see B AKER , supra note 5, chapter 10. 33 of time to deliver the key points to those with the authority to exercise government power. Unexpected events, shifting conditions on the ground, and deadlines require immediate input, without the opportunity for lengthy consideration of the different facets of the issue presented. This is a different type of activity from the preparation of an appellate brief, for instance, involving a fuller exposition of the issues involved. It is closer to a blend of Sup reme Court oral argument and witness cross - examination — although national security lawyers often may not have the luxury of the months, indeed, years, that cases take to evolve, to address the myriad legal questions involved. Facts on which the legal anal ysis rests, moreover, as discussed above, may not be known. This has substantive implications for written and oral communications. Tension between the level of legal analysis possible and the national security process itself may lead to a different norm than in other areas of the law. Chief Judge Baker explains, If lawyers insist on knowing all the facts all the time, before they are willing to render advice, or, if they insist on preparing a written legal opinion in response to every question, then na tional security process would become dysfunctional. The delay alone would cause the policymaker to avoid, and perhaps evade, legal review . 139 Simultaneously, lawyers cannot function without some opportunity to look carefully at the questions presented and to consult authoritative sources. "The art of lawyering in such context," Baker explains, "lies in spotting the issue, accurately identifying the timeline for decision, and applying a meaningful degree of formal or informal review in r e s p o n s e . " 140 The lawye r providing advice must resist the pressure of the moment and yet still be responsive to the demand for swift action. The resulting written and oral communications thus may be shaped in different ways. Unwilling to bind clients’ hands, particularly in li ght of rapidly - changing facts and conditions, the potential for nuance to be lost is considerable. The political and historical overlay of national security law here matters. In some circumstances, even where written advice is not formally required, it ma y be in the national security lawyer’s best interests to commit informal advice to paper in the form of an email, notation, or short memo. The process may serve to both provide an external check on the pressures that have been internalized, by allowing th e lawyer to separate from the material and read it. It may give the lawyer the opportunity to have someone subject it to scrutiny. Baker suggests that "on issues of importance, even where the law is clear, as well as situations where novel positions are taken, lawyers should record their informal advice in a formal manner so that they may be held accountable for what they say, and what they don’t s a y . " 141 Written and oral communication, may occur at highly irregular moments — yet it is at these moments (in th e elevator, during an email exchange, at a meeting, in the course of a telephone call), that critical legal and constitutional decisions are made. This model departs from the formalized natur e of legal writing and research . Yet it is important that students are prepared for these types of written and oral communication as an ends in and of themselves. 5 . Leadership, Integrity and Good J udgment National security law often takes place in a high s takes environment. There is tremendous pressure on attorneys operating in the field — not least because of the coercive 139 B AKER , supra note 5 , at 65. 140 Id. 141 B AKER , supra note 5 , at 66. 34 nature of the authorities in question . The classified environment also plays a key role: m any of the decisions made will never be known publicly; nor will they be examined outside of a small group of individuals — much less in a court of law. In this context, leadership, integrity, and good judgment stand paramount. The types of powers at issue in national security law are among the most coercive authorities available to the government. Decisions may result in the death of one or many human beings, the abridgment of rights, and the bypassing of protections otherwise incorporated into the law. The amount of pressure under which attorneys are thus placed is of a different order of magnit ude than many other areas of the law. Overlaying this pressure is the highly political nature of national security law and the necessity of understanding the broader Washington context, within which individual decision - making , power relations and institut ional authorities compete . Policy concerns similarly dominate the landscape . It is not enough for national security attorneys to claim that they si mply deal in legal advice. T heir analyses carry consequences for those exercising power, for those who are the targets of such authorities , and for the public at large. The function of leadership in this context may be more about process than substantive authority. It may be a willingness to act on critical thought and to accept the impact of legal analysis. It is closely bound to integrity and professional responsibility and the ability to retain good judgment in extraordinary circumstances. Equally important in considerations of leadership and good judgment is the classified nature of so much of what is d one in national security law. All data , for instance, relating to the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of special nuclear material, or the use of nuclear material in the production of energy is classified from birth. 142 N ational security information (NSI), the bread and butter of the practice of national security law, is similarly classified. U.S. law defines NSI as " ..information which pertains to the national defense and foreign relations (National Security) of the U nited States and is classified in acco rdance with an Executive Order." Nine primary Executive Orders and two subsidiary ones have been issued in this realm . 143 The sheer amount of information incorporated within the classification scheme is here relevant. While original classification authorities have steadily decreased since 1980, and the number of original classification decisions is beginning to fall, the num bers are still high: in FY 2010, for instance, there were nearly 2,300 original classification authorities and almost 225,000 original classification d e c i s i o n s . 144 The classification realm , moreover, in which national security lawyers are most active , is e xpanding . Namely, d erivative classification decisions — i.e., classification resulting from the incorporation, paraphrasing, restating, or generation of classified information in some new form, is increasing . In FY 2010, there were more than 76 million such decisions made. 145 This number is tr ipple what it was in FY 2008. Legal decisions and advice tend to be based on information already classified relating to programs, initiatives, facts, intelligence, and previously classified legal opinions . The key issue here is that with so much of the essential information, decisionmaking, and executive branch jurisprudence necessarily secret, lawyers are limited in their opportunity for outside appraisal and review . Even w ithin the executive branch, stove - piping occurs. The use of secure compartmentalized information (SCI) further compounds this problem as only a limited number of individuals — much less lawyers — may be read into a program. This diminishes the opportunity to identify and correct errors or to engag e in debate and discussion over the law . O nce a legal opinion is drafted, the opportunity to expose it to other lawyers may be restricted . The effect may be felt for decades, as successive Administrations reference prior legal deci sions within certain ag encies. The Office of Legal Counsel, for instance, has an entire body of jurisprudence that has never been made public, which continues to inform the legal analysis provided to the President. Only a handful of people at OLC may be aware of the previous d ecisions. They are prevented by classification authorities from revealing these decisions, resulting in a sort of generational secret jurisprudence. Questions related to professional responsibility thus place the national security lawyer in a difficult position: not only may opportunit ies to check factual data or to consult with other attorneys be limited, but the impact of legal advice rendered may be felt for years to come. The problem extends beyond the executive branch . There are limited opportunities , for instance, for external ju dicial review. Two elements are here at work: first, v ery few cases relating to the many national security concerns that arise make it into court. Much of what is happening is simply not known. Even when it is known, it may be impossible to demonstrate standing — a persistent problem with regard to challenging, for instance, surveillance programs underway. Second , courts have historically proved particularly reluctant to intervene on national security matters. J udicially - created devices such as politica l question doctrine and state secrets underscore the reluctance of the judiciary to second - guess the executive in this realm. The exercise of these doctrines is increasing in the post - 9/11 environment. Consider state secrets. While much was made of some 5 - 7 state secrets cases that came to court during the Bush Administration, in more than 100 cases the executive branch formally invoked state secrets, which the courts a c c e p t e d . 146 Many times judges did not even bother to look at the evidence in question, before blocking evidence and/or dismissing the suit. In numerous additional cases, the courts treated the claims as though state secrets had been asserted — even where it had not been formally invoked. 147 In light of t he pressure put on national security lawy ers in the performance of their duties, the profound consequences of m any national security decisions, the existence of stovepiping even within the executive branch, and limited opportunity for external review , the practice of national security law depends upon a particularly rigorous and committed adherence to ethical standards an d professional responsibility. In other words, this is a unique world in which there are enormous pressures, with potentially few external consequences for not acting in accordan ce with high standards. It thus becomes particularly important, from a pedagogical perspective, to think through the types of situations that may present to national security attorneys, and to address the types of questions related to professional respons ibility that will confront them in the course of their careers . Closely related to this area is the necessity of exercising good judgment and leadership. This skill, like many of those discussed, may also be relevant to other areas of the law; however, th e type of leadership called f or in the world described above may 146 See Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets , U. P ENN . L. R EV . (2009). 147 Id. 36 be different in important ways. Good judgment, for instance, may mean any number of things, depending upon the attorney’s position within the political hierarchy. Policymaking positions, fo r instance, may be considerably different from the provision of legal advice to policymakers. Leadership , too , may mean something different in a field intimately tied to political circumstance. It may mean breaking ranks with the political hierarchy, visibly adopting unpopular public or private positions, creating new bureaucratic structures to more effectively r espond to threats, resigning when faced by unethical situations, or holding off clients until the attorneys within one’s group have the opportunity to look at issues while still being sensitive to the political needs of the institution. Recourse in such s ituations may be political, either through public statements and use of the media, or by going to different branches of government for a solution. 6 . Creating Opportunities for Learning In addition to the above skills, national security lawyers must be a ble to engage in continuous self - learning in order to improve their performance. In other words, they must be able to generate frameworks for identifying new and emerging legal and political authorities and processes, systems for handling factual chaos an d uncertainty, mechanisms to ensure critical distance, evaluating written and oral performance, and analyzing leadership skills. Law schools do not traditionally focus on how to teach students to continue their learning beyond the walls of academia. Yet it is vital for their future success to give students the wherewithal to create conditions of learning. Some of this learning may be generated by interpersonal feedback. Supervisors, law partners, and formal and informal mentors have traditionally perfor med a similar function. But in a highly political environment, where personnel frequently change, individuals repeatedly cross agencies in the course of their career, and classification limits cross - pollination, such opportunities may be limited. Thus, w hile feedback and growth may involve students’ ability to create and inculcate mentoring relationships, it may equally depend upon creating peer - to - peer learning opportunities, gaining feedback from colleagues, developing ex ante markers for reaching certa in goals, and following through with ex post analysis of one’s performance. In addition to the foregoing, n ational security lawyers need to be able to perform the six goals in tandem. That is, they need to be able to integrate these different skills into one experience. It is thus incumbent on law schools not just to emphasize these skills, but to give students the opportunity to layer their experiences. Students must learn to perform on all these fronts at once. Recognizing the importance of integrativ e learning, of course, is not new; however, for reasons discussed below, the structures that have been more broadly adopted within the legal academy to accomplish this aim are, on the whole, ill - suited to the substantive nature of the skills students need to develop as well as the task of performing such skills in near - simultaneous manner
The ballot should simulate the plans enactment
the plan is a valuable heuristic for thinking about uncertain futures
Vote aff despite prior questions—impact timeframe means you gotta act on the best info available
Kratochwil, professor of international relations – European University Institute, 2008 (Friedrich, "The Puzzles of Politics," pg. 200-213)
The lesson seems clear. Even at the danger of "fuzzy boundaries", when AND Besides, "timing" seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.
The K’s thesis is wrong – politics is a site of reform – that’s why people vote, care about the environment and live in communities – death is inevitable, but there is value in tangible improvements in the human condition
Brenkman ’2 (John, Distinguished Professor of English and Comprative Literature at CUNY Graduate Center, Narrative, "Queer Post-Politics", Volume 10, Issue 2, p. 174-180, Project Muse)
But Edelman interprets this nonrecognition in very different terms from those I have just used AND order strikes me as politically self-destructive and theoretically just plain wrong.
Embracing political change is important for altering the future and for queer scholarship — Even if there’s no future, the aff is key to make the present better
Duggan 94 – Lisa, Queering the State, Social Text, No. 39 (summer, 1994), pp. 1-14 The problem for those of us engaged in queer scholarship and teaching, who have a stake in queer politics, is how to respond to these attacks at a moment when we have unprecedented opportunities (we are present in university curriculums and national politics as never before), yet confront perilous and paralyzing assaults. It is imperative that we respond to these attacks in the public arena from which they are launched. We cannot defend our teaching and scholarship without engaging in public debate and addressing the nature and operations of the state upon which our jobs and futures depend. In other words, the need to turn our attention to state politics is not only theoretical (though it is also that). It is time for queer intellectuals to concentrate on the creative production of strategies at the boundary of queer and nation-strategies specifically for queering the state.5
Reducing the future to reproduction is reductionist – fantasies of immortality are inevitable – the case is a da to the alt
Feit 2005 (Mario, "Extinction anxieties: same-sex marriage and modes of citizenship" theory and event, 8:3, projectmuse)
Warner is thus concerned with the purity of the queer alternative, which he sees AND more complex awareness of the challenges of political strategies for plural queer communities.
Futurism is key to human survival – internal link turns their impacts
Kurasawa 4 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).
In recent years, the rise of a dystopian imaginary has accompanied damning assessments and widespread recognition of the international community’s repeated failures to adequately intervene in a number of largely preventable disasters (from the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and East Timor to climate change and the spiraling AIDS pandemics in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia). Social movements, NGOs, diasporic groups, and concerned citizens are not mincing words in their criticisms of the United Nations system and its member-states, and thus beginning to shift the discursive and moral terrain in world affairs. As a result, the callousness implicit in disregarding the future has been exposed as a threat to the survival of humanity and its natural surroundings. The Realpolitik of national self-interest and the neoliberal logic of the market will undoubtedly continue to assert themselves, yet demands for farsightedness are increasingly reining them in. Though governments, multilateral institutions, and transnational corporations will probably never completely modify the presentist assumptions underlying their modes of operation, they are, at the very least, finding themselves compelled to account for egregious instances of short-sightedness and rhetorically commit themselves to taking corrective steps. What may seem like a modest development at first glance would have been unimaginable even a few decades ago, indicating the extent to which we have moved toward a culture of prevention. A new imperative has come into being, that of preventive foresight.
Zero empirical or logical basis for the psychoanalytic critique
Mootz, 2k ~Francis J, Visiting Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law, Yale Journal of the Law 26 Humanities, 12 Yale J.L. 26 Human. 299, p. 319-320~ Freudian psychoanalysis increasingly is the target of blistering criticism from a wide variety of commentators. 54 In a recent review, Frederick Crews reports that independent studies have begun to converge toward a verdict... that there is literally nothing to be said, scientifically or therapeutically, to the advantage of the entire Freudian system or any of its component dogmas Analysis as a whole remains powerless... and understandably so, because a thoroughgoing epistemological critique, based on commonly acknowledged standards of evidence and logic decertifies every distinctively psychoanalytic proposition. 55 The most telling criticism of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory is that it has proven no more effective in producing therapeutic benefits than have other forms of psychotherapy. 56 Critics draw the obvious conclusion that the benefits (if any) of psychotherapy are neither explained nor facilitated by psychoanalytic theories. Although Freudian psychoanalytic theory purports to provide a truthful account of the operations of the psyche and the causes for mental disturbances, critics argue that psychoanalytic theory may prove in the end to be nothing more than fancy verbiage that tends to obscure whatever healing effects psychotherapeutic dialogue may have. 57 Freudian psychoanalysis failed because it could not make good on its claim to be a AND his theories. This belief now appears to be completely unfounded and indefensible. Freud’s quest for a scientifically grounded psychotherapy was not amateurish or naive. Although Freud AND presuppositions no longer were plausible according to their own criteria of validation. n66
Turn – radical individualism cedes the political and destroys movements
A second factor in queer politics is the assertion of diversity in itself as a AND , then, it is the undermining of any form of communitarian politics.
Edelman’s overidentification with the culture of death cedes the political to elites
Balasopoulos, 2006 ~Antonis, Journal of American Studies, v. 40, projectmuse~
No Future is a work whose argument cannot be divorced from the experience of disillusionment AND the increasingly polarized and disconcertingly fundamentalist climate of American politics in the present.
One speech act doesn’t cause securitization – it’s an ongoing process
Ghughunishvili 10 Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf-http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf
As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to "rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ’one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.
Legal reforms restrain the cycle of violence and prevent error replication
Colm O’Kennedy 8, Senior Lecturer in Law at University College London, "Strapped to the Mast: The Siren Song of Dreadful Necessity, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat," Ch 15 in Fresh Perspectives on the ’War on Terror,’ ed. Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew, http://epress.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch15s07.html-http://epress.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch15s07.html This ’symbiotic’ relationship between counter-terrorism measures and political violence, and the AND repression: the need for mobilisation in response may therefore also be diluted.
Alt fails – cooption – political engagement key
McCormack, 10 ~Tara, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 137-138~ In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic AND Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.
Permutation do the plan and
The plan gives security transformative potential —- alt alone fails and their impact is false
Nunes, 12 ~Reclaiming the political: Emancipation and critique in security studies, João Nunes, Security Dialogue 2012 43: 345,Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK, p. sage publications~ In the works of these authors, one can identify a tendency to see security AND to address these limitations, the next section revisits emancipatory understandings of security.
No lash out – institutional safeguards check
Buchanan 7 ~Allen, Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at Duke, 2007, Preemption: military action and moral justification, pg. 128~
The intuitively plausible idea behind the ’irresponsible act’ argument is that, other things being equal, the higher the stakes in acting and in particular the greater the moral risk, the higher are the epistemic requirements for justified action. The decision to go to war is generally a high stakes decision par excellence and the moral risks are especially great, for two reasons. First, unless one is justified in going to war, one’s deliberate killing of enemy combatants will he murder, indeed mass murder. Secondly, at least in large-scale modem war, it is a virtual certainty that one will kill innocent people even if one is justified in going to war and conducts the war in such a way as to try to minimize harm to innocents. Given these grave moral risks of going to war, quite apart from often substantial prudential concerns, some types of justifications for going to war may simply be too subject to abuse and error to make it justifiable to invoke them. The ’irresponsible act’ objection is not a consequentialist objection in any interesting sense. It does not depend upon the assumption that every particular act of going to war preventively has unacceptably bad consequences (whether in itself or by virtue of contributing lo the general acceptance of a principle allowing preventive war); nor does it assume that it is always wrong lo rely on a justification which, if generally accepted, would produce unacceptable consequences. Instead, the "irresponsible act’ objection is more accurately described as an agent-centered argument and more particularly an argument from moral epistemic responsibility. The ’irresponsible act’ objection to preventive war is highly plausible if— but only if—one assumes that the agents who would invoke the preventive-war justification are, as it were, on their own in making the decision to go to war preventively. In other words, the objection is incomplete unless the context of decision-making is further specified. Whether the special risks of relying on the preventive-war justification are unacceptably high will depend, inter alia, upon whether the decision-making process includes effective provisions for redu¬cing those special risks. Because the special risks are at least in significant part epistemic—due to the inherently speculative character of the preventive war-justification—the epistemic context of the decision is crucial. Because institutions can improve the epistemic performance of agents, it is critical to know what the institutional context of the preventive-war decision is, before we can regard the ’irresponsible agent’ objection as conclusive. Like the ’bad practice’ argument, this second objection to preventive war is inconclusive because it does not consider— and rule out—the possibility that well-designed institutions for decision-making could address the problems that would otherwise make it irresponsible for a leader to invoke the preventive-war justification.
No risk of "endless warfare"- we should embrace pragmatism in security
Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration", http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf-http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf)
7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security AND strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.
And, communicating risk doesn’t result in alarmist overreaction — cultivating deliberation about future scenarios avoids predictive failure and knee jerk reactions which are worse
Tournament: NDT RD 8 | Round: 8 | Opponent: Liberty BM | Judge: Harris, Young, Short
Unrestricted drone use causes nuclear war in the Caucuses
Clayton 12 (Nick Clayton, Worked in several publications, including the Washington Times the Asia Times and Washington Diplomat. He is currently the senior editor of Kanal PIK TV’s English Service (a Russian-language channel), lived in the Caucuses for several years,10/23/2012, "Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war", www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war)
Armenia and Azerbaijan could soon be at war if drone proliferation on both sides of AND ~ will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of."
Drone restrictions thump
Bennett, 14 ~John T, Defense News, "McCain Vows New Fight Over Control of US Armed Drone Program", http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140219/DEFREG02/302190025/McCain-Vows-New-Fight-Over-Control-US-Armed-Drone-Program WASHINGTON — A senior US lawmaker intends to renew his fight to require the Obama administration to fully shift its armed drone program from the CIA to the Defense Department. Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., a senior Armed Services Committee member, told Defense News on Wednesday, just before Congress left for a weeklong recess, that he will push the issue when the panel crafts its 2015 Pentagon policy bill in coming months. "We’re going to have that debate," McCain said in a brief interview. "There is no doubt about it." McCain’s comments come weeks after he expressed disgust with language reportedly inserted into the classified portion of a Pentagon-funding section of an omnibus spending bill blocking the shift of the drone program from the CIA to the military. The administration of President Barack Obama last year signaled it wanted to move most — or all — of the program from the spy agency to the military. But that plan hit a number of legal and operational snags, and was not fully completed before Congress passed the omnibus. But McCain says the fight isn’t over. "I would like to make sure they are cooperating with other countries," McCain said, referring to concerns among some lawmakers and analysts that the Obama administration avoids getting clearance from leaders of countries before flying drones into their airspace. "Mostly, I want to see it moved over to DoD. That’s my primary goal," McCain said. Many analysts say that other than possibly taking up a new immigration reform measure, Congress likely is finished with major legislation this year. The mid-term election cycle is in full swing, and both parties seem content to battle it out back home after five years of bitter partisan fights here. But Congress is expected, as it has for 52 consecutive years, to pass a defense authorization bill. And McCain’s intentions will revive a battle between two powerful camps on Capitol Hill. Lawmakers on both sides of the debate have strong opinions about whether it is the job of the military or intelligence community to kill al-Qaida leaders and operatives. And behind the issue of whether the CIA should be firing missiles from remotely piloted aircraft is a simmering congressional turf war between the chambers’ Armed Services and Intelligence committees. If the Defense Department is handed control of the CIA’s armed drone fleet and strike missions against al-Qaida targets, it would also gain what intelligence analysts say is the program’s sizable budget and control over one of the White House’s primary tactics for combating the terrorist group. On one side are pro-military lawmakers like McCain. They believe the military should be the US entity charged with killing America’s foes, and that the CIA should get back to collecting and analyzing intelligence. On the other side are members like Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif. These members, largely Democrats, are skeptical of the military’s ability to use what they see as the CIA’s rigorous decision process before carrying out armed strikes.
Afghanistan (2ac)
Targeted killings are key to Afghan stability post-withdrawal
Byman 13 (Daniel, Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, July/August 2013, "Why Drones Work," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4) In places where terrorists are actively plotting against the United States, however, drones give Washington the ability to limit its military commitments abroad while keeping Americans safe. Afghanistan, for example, could again become a Taliban-run haven for terrorists after U.S. forces depart next year. Drones can greatly reduce the risk of this happening. Hovering in the skies above, they can keep Taliban leaders on the run and hinder al Qaeda’s ability to plot another 9/11.
Extinction
Carafano 10 (James Jay is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, "Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe," Jan 2 http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/) We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a "paper tiger." If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.
