Last week Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York warned that "if we don’t AND , as in the case of Rep. Nadler, it can happen.
Executive war power structurally ensures groupthink and escalatory interventions
Fleischman 10 – Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, "A Functional Distribution of War Powers", New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. 26 Pub. Pol’y 137, Lexis
While Nzelibe and Yoo’s model is clearly plausible, it misses certain critical institutional constructs AND that justifies abandoning the traditional and effective means of coming to a decision. The first argument offered by Nzelibe and Yoo reasons that presidents tend to be held AND lead to short-term political gain and an unwillingness to concede defeat. Furthermore, ex post congressional constraints on presidential actions are insufficient. The fact is AND viewed as endangering troops n109 or giving America a weaker image abroad. n110 The second way in which Nzelibe and Yoo justify expansive executive powers is by arguing AND , correcting the disparities should negate the odds of Type I errors occurring. The third functional argument presented by Nzelibe and Yoo concerns the relative value of signaling AND should decrease the likelihood of Type I errors with respect to all regimes. The totality of the analysis suggests that deliberation decreases the likelihood of Type I errors AND around a particular opinion, executive staffers are likely to possess policy preferences. Type II errors (not entering "good" wars) would only be more AND it is the institutional design that would better accommodate functionalists’ concerns and desires.
~{11~} The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse AND to an examination of the judiciary’s contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.
Terrorist spoofing
Blumrosen 11 – Alfred W. Blumrosen, Professor Emeritus at the Rutgers School of Law and Steven M. Blumrosen, J.D., Quinnipiac University School of Law, "Restoring the Congressional Duty to Declare War", Rutgers Law Review, Winter, 63 Rutgers L. Rev. 407, Lexis
Conclusion We have placed a heavy burden on June 1-4, 1787 to correct AND enormous debt on the United States with no visible gain to the country. We cannot prove that these two disasters would not have happened if Congress had taken AND unlimited power, in the immediate impact of the 9/11 carnage. The Congress must decide whether to take military action against an enemy even if we AND its response to a President’s claims of serious attacks on the United States. Professor Phillip Bobbit has focused on the difficulties of assigning "blame" for a AND This would suit only those who believe that western civilization is an abomination.
Groupthink causes Korean war
Gregg 13 – Donald P. Gregg, Chair of the Pacific Century Institute, Former National Security Advisor for Bush I, Former Ambassador to South Korea, 4/12/13 (Korea Times, "President Obama’s Edsel problem" Lexis)
How did that come about? Apparently in those days Detroit’s engineers were vulnerable to AND did we fight them when what they wanted was a peace treaty?’
So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could AND tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.
Requiring prior Congressional authorization for war deters adventurism
Dickerson 9 – Annette Warren Dickerson, Director of Education 26 Outreach for the Center for Constitutional Rights, "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution", Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
Reform the War Powers Resolution The War Powers Resolution has failed. Every president since the enactment of the Act AND seek relief, or that the claim presents non-justifiable political questions. The War Powers Resolution, as written, was flawed in several key respects. AND in is before hostilities are commenced, not 60 or 90 days afterward. Secondly, the War Powers Resolution correctly recognized that even congressional silence, inaction or AND responded by effectually saying: if Congress did nothing, why should we? Reforming the War Powers Resolution is a project that will require leadership from the President and the political will of Congress, working together in the service and preservation of the Constitution. In light of the abuses that have taken place under the Bush administration, it is the responsibility of a new administration to insist on transparency in the drafting of new legislation. There is a long history of attempts to revise the War Powers Resolution. As new legislation is drafted, though, it will be important to focus on the central constitutional issues. Much time has been spent in debating how to address contingencies. It will be impossible to write into law any comprehensive formula for every conceivable situation, though; much more important will be establishing the fundamental principles of reform: The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization. The only exception should be the executive’s power in an emergency to use short-term force to repel sudden attacks on US territories, troops or citizens. It is true that many potential conflict situations will be murky, complicated or divisive, and that quick congressional action may not always be forthcoming. Yet, history shows the folly of launching wars that are not supported by the American people. The United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise. Today, as in 1787, the reality is that the interests of the people AND disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law.
Contention 2 —- Warfighting
Power projection structurally fails because operations are guided by incoherent strategies disconnected from national political will
Understanding the Gap Since World War II, a wide gap has developed between Congress and the executive AND history does not clearly reveal the structural and political dimensions of this phenomenon. The Constitution grants most foreign policy prerogative to Congress in Article I. Article II AND . Consequently, considerable power has flowed from Congress to the president.50 Execution of US foreign policy is fraught with political uncertainty and vulnerability. Compared to AND to oversee the nation’s foreign policy has exposed America to unacceptable strategic risk. War, Strategy, and the Constitution One of Clausewitz’ greatest contributions to the study of war is his emphasis on the AND political dimension despite the recent emergence of nonstate actors and transnational groups.56 In other words, success at the tactical level of war first requires careful preparations AND political objectives, and commitment of resources sufficient to achieve strategic objectives.58 Since 1945, the United States has built the world’s most capable war-fighting machine. So why, then, have most of the nation’s large military interventions since World War II ended in defeat or, at best, stalemate? Political leaders should attend more to what Clausewitz calls the political dimensions of war—national unity and the political value of the objective—as inseparable from national and military strategy. War theorists have long emphasized the importance of national unity and the political value of AND mobilized for war, we must first examine our own political aim."60 National unity underwrites the commitment the nation needs to successfully prosecute war, provided the AND , and the will and support of Congress to support the war.62 A Risk to Strategy As the practice of declaring war has become passé, American strategy has likewise become AND 63 This connection, Clausewitz observed, is necessary for success in war. For example, US strategy following World War II ironically came to resemble the German AND which has little tolerance for long, risky, or uncertain conflicts.65 More recently, as the executive branch exercises greater authority in directing military interventions, AND American people’s collective will in their efforts to subvert our national strategy.67 Vietnam Strategy The tragic military and political experience of Vietnam was spawned by an aggressive president promoting AND , failing to determine strategic objectives and the means to obtain them.70 President Johnson made numerous decisions concerning the strategy and operations of the war, resulting in a strategy of incremental gradualism. Despite some tactical successes, Vietnam strategy never developed sufficient coherence nor the sustained support of the American people. Through executive design, Congress and the people never fully vetted the value of the political objective in the context of large-scale military intervention before President Johnson committed forces to combat.71 As a result, President Johnson lacked the top cover of a war declaration. AND the American people; they could not have cared less about Vietnam.73 Afghanistan and Iraq Strategies The strategies for the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have both failed to properly incorporate national strategic ends, ways, and means in a consistent manner across the whole of government. In the absence of a national consensus on strategic ends, Congressman James Marshall (D-GA) not surprisingly identified: The mismatches among the needs of post-conflict stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the size and the types of military forces available, and the pitiful scarcity of capability in the civilian branches of our government to effect nation-building efforts, as well as, our utter incompetence as a government in strategic communications.74 US Afghanistan strategy has continually morphed from 2001 to the present. The sweeping language AND support for the effort when the strategy did not unfold as planned.78 Eventually, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and their strategies became focal points in AND exposing the strategies to additional, unnecessary risk at a crucial time.79 Another Cry for Reform In 2009, The National War Powers Commission, a bipartisan group commissioned under the AND declaration for "large" force deployments and "significant armed conflict."81 The Commission recommended replacing the 1973 WPR with the War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 AND deploying forces into significant armed conflict without the full blessing of Congress.83 Conclusion Reminiscent of the 1973 WPR, the National War Powers Commission’s effort to redress war AND resulted in the expenditure of national blood and treasure for strategically hollow ends. The Constitution is, in itself, a strategic national security document. The founders’ AND wage fewer of them—and be far better positioned to win them.
Libya removed all remaining checks on unilateral executive war-making —- ruins accountability and signal of unified resolve
The president followed no clear historical standard when he unilaterally decided to use force in Libya. Once this action continued beyond his original definition of "days, not weeks," into months and months, he did not seek the approval of Congress to continue military activities. And, while administration members may have discussed this matter with some members of Congress, the administration never formally conferred with the legislative branch as a coequal partner in our constitutional system. Obviously, these points are not raised out of any lasting love for the late AND also the region-wide dispersion of thousands of weapons from Qaddafi’s armories. The inaction (some of it deliberate) of key congressional leaders during this period AND . We know he can do it because he already has done it. Few leaders in the legislative branch even asked for a formal debate over this exercise of unilateral presidential power, and in the Senate any legislation pertaining to the issue was prevented from reaching the floor. One can only wonder at what point these leaders or their successors might believe it is their constitutional duty to counter unchecked executive power exercised on behalf of overseas military action. AT BOTTOM, what we have witnessed in these instances, as with many others AND , to assert the authority that forms the basis of our governmental structure. When it comes to the long-term commitments that our country makes in the AND the authority that was so wisely given to it so many years ago. And as for the presidency, a final thought is worth pondering. From a AND America is united and not acting merely at the discretion of one individual.
That crushes unit cohesion, morale, and allied support —- Congressional approval’s key
Frye 2 – Alton Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow Emeritus and Director of the Program on Congress and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism", Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 4-17, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/applying-war-powers-resolution-war-terrorism/p4514
4. CONSENSUS IS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL COHESION The case for active, continuing congressional engagement on the many issues of high policy presented by an open-ended campaign against terrorism does not rest on an instinct for institutional self-aggrandizement. It is grounded in the critical need to forge and maintain America’s social cohesion as a nation caught up in war. War, especially prolonged war, always poses the risk of depleting that cohesion, so vital to domestic harmony and international effectiveness. Members of Congress should also realize how essential their involvement is to the morale and AND parallel, policy-centered procedures outlined here would serve that same need. Congress’s stand on how our nation uses the mighty arsenal at its disposal also bears AND when he acts "pursuant to an explicit or implied authorization of Congress." Marshaling international coalitions to wage the war on terrorism will depend importantly on giving our allies confidence that American power is guided and restrained by a disciplined relationship between Congress and President. Absent attentive, persistent congressional involvement, public diplomacy in the war on terrorism could lose much of the credibility that arises from the perception of America as a model of representative government. There is thus an enduring necessity to balance executive potency in military endeavors with the legislative review that provides democratic legitimacy. The challenge is not to enchain the presidency but to harness both branches to common purpose. On that insight the War Powers Resolution was founded, and in that insight may be found the germ of other innovations to guarantee that Congress will play its proper constitutional role in the war on terrorism.
Effective power projection stops hotspot escalation to nuclear war
Kagan 7 – Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, "The Case for Larger Ground Forces", Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan_OHanlon_07.pdf
We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but AND position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing AND forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. AND moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few AND personnelintensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while AND Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.
Executive war power ruins soft power and global alliances
Schiffer 9 – Adam Schiffer, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, and Carrie Liu Currier, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, "War Powers, International Alliances, the President, and Congress", http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/public/repository/US_Gov_Balance_of_Power_SF.pdf
The president’s advantages over Congress in the foreign policy realm have consequences far beyond the AND the second Bush administration has raised alarm in many countries around the world. In the past, the bipolar nature of the international system and the lack of AND presidential authority led to very disparate degrees of support from the international community. These two examples of U.S. military action in the Middle East offer AND was acknowledged as within the acceptable parameters as determined by the global community. In contrast, the 2003 war in Iraq did not gain the support of the AND other actors to give legitimacy to the U.S.-led war. The battle between the unilateralists and multilateralists with regard to U.S. foreign AND and how they are used to establish the legitimacy of American foreign policy.
Grounding use of force in constitutionally-based SOP creates a perception of benign hegemony and encourages international cooperation based on rule of law
Ikenberry 1 – G. John, Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, "Getting Hegemony Right - Analysis of the United States as a "Hyperpower" Nation", The National Interest, Spring, Lexis
A critical ingredient in stabilizing international relations in a world of radical power disparities is AND policy that protect the United States from the consequences of its own greatness. When other major states consider whether to work with the United States or resist it AND States will be more effective than balancing against U.S. power. America in large part stumbled into this open, institutionalized order in the 1940s, AND has been a vast system of America-centered economic and security partnerships. Even though the United States looks like a wayward power to many around the world today, it nonetheless has an unusual ability to co-opt and reassure. Three elements matter most in making U.S. power more stable, engaged and restrained. First, America’s mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it AND policies that do not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat. Think of the United States as a giant corporation that seeks foreign investors. It AND , to return to the corporate metaphor, to invest in ongoing partnerships. This open and decentralized political process works in a second way to reduce foreign worries AND partnerships that serve the long-term strategic interests of the United States. A third and final element of the American order that reduces worry about power asymmetries AND both more far-reaching and durable but also more predictable and malleable. In effect, the United States spun a web of institutions that connected other states AND a world where U.S. power was more restrained and reliable. Secretary of State Dean Rusk spelled out the terms of the bargain in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1965: We are every day, in one sense, accepting limitations upon our complete freedom of .... We have more than 4,300 treaties and international agreements, two-thirds of which have been entered into in the past 25 years.... Each one of which at least limits our freedom of action. We exercise our sovereignty going into these agreements. But Rusk argued that these agreements also create a more stable environment within which the United States can pursue its interests. "Law is a process by which we increase our range of freedom" and "we are constantly enlarging our freedom by being able to predict what others are going to do." ~6~ The United States gets a more predictable environment and more willing partners. There have been many moments when Asian and European allies have complained about the heavy-handedness of U.S. foreign policy, but the open and institutionalized character of the American order has minimized the possibilities of hegemonic excess over the long term. The untoward implications of sharp power asymmetries are reduced, cooperation and reciprocity are regularized, and the overall hegemonic order is rendered more legitimate and stable. The bargain—on both sides—remains intact. Renewing the Institutional Bargain AMERICA’s soaring power in the 1990s has put this open and rule-based postwar AND just anybody but by the United States, is undeniable." ~7~ The implication of my argument is that the more America’s brute power capabilities emerge from AND Representative in the Bush administration, describes the operation of this postwar order: The more powerful participants in this system—especially the United States—did not forswear all their advantages, but neither did they exercise their strength without substantial restraint. Because the United States believed the Trilateral system was in its interest, it sacrificed some degree of national autonomy to promote it. ~8~ What can America do to prevent the unraveling of this order? Three suggestions are AND influence how these states treat America when—not if—they recover. Second, the United States needs to renew the postwar institutional bargain by making it AND , Washington risks an ultimate shift toward some other form of global order. President George W. Bush seemed to acknowledge the dangers of an overweening foreign policy AND missile defense, and a variety of proposed multilateral political and environmental accords. Preserving the existing system through the redoubling of rule-based relationships will also require AND an enlightened order that serve long-term U.S. interests. Finally, the United States needs to find more ways to pursue its economic and AND environmental policy—is also a place where coordinated policymaking can be expanded. America’s unipolar moment need not end in antagonistic disarray. But the United States needs AND do so now, when America’s relative power may be at its peak.
Existential threats are likely —- democratic alliances founded on mutual restraint build capacity to prevent and mitigate their impact
Gr-Thsand Strategy as Liberal Order Building American dominance of the global system will eventually yield to the rise of other powerful states. The unipolar moment will pass. In facing this circumstance, American grand strategy should be informed by answers to this question: What sort of international order would we like to see in place in 2020 or 2030 when America is less powerful? Grand strategy is a set of coordinated and sustained policies designed to address the long AND States will need to return to the great tasks of liberal order building. It is useful to distinguish between two types of grand strategy: positional and milieu AND the future, this milieu-based approach to grand strategy is necessary. The United States does not face the sort of singular geopolitical threat that it did AND as the foundations of American national security, would be put at risk. What unites these threats and challenges is that they are all manifestations of rising security AND this unusually diverse, diffuse, and unpredictable array of threats and challenges. This is why a milieu-based grand strategy is attractive. The objective is AND its networks of social relations, that are available for solving collective problems. If American grand strategy is to be organized around liberal order building, what are AND , etc.—these safeguards are the stuff of a protective global infrastructure. Second, the United States should recommit to and rebuild its security alliances. The AND legally binding one, and in exchange it gets cooperation and political support. Third, the United States should reform and create encompassing global institutions that foster and AND grows rapidly when their governments can stand behind a UN-sanctioned action. Fourth, the United States should accommodate and institution-ally engage China. China AND has no choice but to join it and seek to prosper within it. The United States should also be seeking to construct a regional security order in East AND institutional arrangements in East Asia that will tie China to the wider region. Fifth, the United States should reclaim a liberal internationalist public philosophy. When American AND American elites as they make trade-offs between sovereignty and institutional cooperation. Under this philosophy, the restraint and the commitment of American power went hand in hand. Global rules and institutions advanced America’s national interest rather than threatened it. The alternative public philosophies that have circulated in recent years—philosophies that champion American unilateralism and disentanglement from global rules and institutions—did not meet with great success. So an opening exists for America’s postwar vision of internationalism to be updated and rearticulated today. The United States should embrace the tenets of this liberal public philosophy: Lead with AND and let the global system itself do the deep work of liberal modernization. As it navigates this brave new world, the United States will find itself needing AND liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.
Contention 3 —- SOP
Unchecked war power sets a precedent that causes the executive to broadly ignore Congressional controls
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the " AND begin thinking about the Commander in Chief’s proper place in the constitutional structure. We conclude that it would be wrong to assume, as some have suggested, AND a workable alternative, such forgetting will be far less likely to occur. brilliant and eccentric captain in the Army Corps of Engineers, was assigned to survey the water supply for the cities of Washington and Georgetown and eventually to oversee the War Department’s construction of an aqueduct along the Potomac River. Meigs’s subsequent ~*985~ report recommended that an aqueduct be built just above Great Falls, north of Washington. Congress approved that recommendation, and the Department of War began work on the aqueduct, led by Meigs himself. For several years, things ran very smoothly. In the Buchanan Administration, however, Meigs’s relationship with Secretary of War John Floyd turned sour: Floyd dismissed Meigs and made sure the Administration’s proposed budget included no funds for work on the aqueduct. Meigs subject to legislatively imposed restrictions. As we have seen, Presidents have long operated on just that assumption, and they have adjusted their actions accordingly - and in ways that cannot be said to have clearly imperiled the nation. Thus the history undermines assertions about the inherent or inevitable unmanageability or dangers of recognizing legislative control over the conduct of war. In other words, this history offers us valuable information about how things have worked in the past, and thereby helps to inform us about what consequences might follow from a constitutional judgment in the here and now. Moreover, this historical account performs at least one function beyond supplying information relevant to AND for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.
U.S. war powers are modeled internationally —- the precedent of unilateral executive authority ruins global human rights norms and encourages preemptive conflict in multiple hotspots
Sloane 8 – Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 (Robert, Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis)
There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of AND to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.
Conflict’s likely in Taiwan, Georgia, and India/Pakistan —- U.S. signal’s key
Another implication on sovereignty, due to the NSS, was, yet again, AND self-gain (Korb 26 Wadhams, 2006, p.2). Other academics have accused the Bush Doctrine of "legitimating a doctrine of anticipatory war AND Assembly in September 2003, articulated his deep restlessness with a policy that: "represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty eight years… if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force" (Annan, 2003). "The Bush administration has stubbornly resisted these warnings about the dangers of the preemptive policy set out in the NSS" (Wheeler, 2003, p.199). Kaufman agrees with the international stance that the NSS has set a dangerous precedent ( AND emption and preventive wars against Taiwan for the promotion of its Chinese values.
Preemption ruins U.S. leverage to deescalate regional crises —- goes nuclear
Steinberg 2 – James B. Steinberg, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Michael E. O’Hanlon and Susan E. Rice, "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption", Brookings Policy Brief Series, December, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2002/12/terrorism-ohanlon
The Dangers of Legitimating Preemption A final concern relates to the impact of the precedent set by the United States AND risk, and exacerbate regional crises already on the brink of open conflict. Of course, no country will embark suddenly on a war of aggression simply because AND the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay and diplomacy. Potential examples abound, ranging from Ethiopia and Eritrea, to China and Taiwan, AND . Kashmir’s status remains contentious, meaning that the risk of conflict remains. Should the crisis resume, a U.S. policy of preemption may provide hawks in India the added ammunition they need to justify a strike against Pakistan in the eyes of their fellow Indian decision-makers. Recently, India Finance Minister (and former Foreign Minister) Jaswant Singh welcomed the administration’s new emphasis on the legitimacy of preemption. Russia’s recent threats against the sovereign state of Georgia, which it accuses of harboring or at least failing to pursue Islamic extremists tied to the Chechen war, also illustrate the dangers of legitimating an easy and early recourse to preemption.
Requiring formal declaration of war restores Congressional war powers and balances SOP by checking the Executive
Weinberger 9 – Seth Weinberger, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound, M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University, "Balancing War Powers in an Age of Terror", The Good Society, 18(2), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v018/18.2.weinberger.html
The key to developing a constitutionally, legally, and practically sound balanced theory of AND ), and the participation in the NATO operation against Kosovo (1999).14 It is this disparity that is a major source of the current imbalance of war AND policy outcomes in limbo to be challenged in U.S. courts. Restoring meaning to the power to declare war offers a way to restore congressional war AND , even if the nation is engaged in armed conflict with an enemy. This distinction between the powers of the legislative branch and those of the executive branch AND laws from the power to enforce them. As John Locke tells us: It may be too great a temptation to human frailty apt to grasp at power AND rest of the community, contrary to the ends of society and government. Madison, Hamilton, and Locke sum up the fears expressed by many over the exercises of power by President Bush in the war on terror. As one prominent critic put it, President Bush is trying to "eliminate nearly all the checks and balances that have been traditionally understood to limit the power of the president."18 The power to declare war, when properly understood, provides Congress with a powerful AND over appropriations ensures that Congress can always end a conflict it deems unwise. Rather, a declaration of war is about acknowledging the severity of a threat to AND and the president did not need expanded domestic powers to prosecute the wars. By contrast, while the war on terror does have components that look like traditional AND branch of American government. The power to declare war provides that check. Understanding the declare war clause along these lines clearly separates potential armed conflicts into distinct AND used and what powers can be called upon to support the military effort. In a perfect war: One whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every place, and under every circumstance. In such a war all the members act under a general authority, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.20 In a perfect war, the entire energy of the nation is directed towards the effort, while an imperfect war is fought in a more ~End Page 6~ limited manner. Justice Chase’s concurrence in Bas explains the limitations that result from a war being imperfect: Congress has not declared war in general terms, but Congress has authorized hostilities on AND only to citizens appointed by commissions or exposed to immediate outrage and violence. A war of the formally declared, or perfect, type involves a level and AND for food and materiel, or even intern large numbers of American citizens. When the country is not in a state of perfect war by virtue of a AND power to take over the mills and force them to produce steel.21 Despite Truman’s claim of inherent authority and military necessity, the seizure of the mills was struck down as it was, according to Justice Black’s opinion, "lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President. … In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."22 Furthermore: The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as AND a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.23 When the president wants to take, pursuant to his powers as commander-in AND terrorist organizations, or change the rules governing the procedures for military commissions. In wartime, however, it may be neither expedient nor strategically sound for the AND Congress time and time again to enact laws to advance the war effort. The declarations of war for World Wars I and II both contain specific, particular AND than when using force in a less comprehensive manner during a limited conflict. "All the resources of the government" and "all of the resources of AND congressional legislation, there are still certain constitutional guarantees that cannot be ignored. In the narrow interpretation advanced by the Bush administration, the trigger for the president’s AND in the balance of powers between the president and Congress in wartime."27 This argument is unsatisfying on two grounds. First, it cannot be said that AND 1989 Panama War, or of Yugoslavs during the Kosovo conflict. …"29 The second reason that this argument does not work is in the language of the AND war powers and places the president at the height of his war powers. But the language of the AUMFs does not support such an argument. Where the AND times of crisis, Congress still can and must play an important role. As President Ford admonished, a theory of war powers must be capable of functioning AND -so to undo that separation, even in the face of war.
Congress must be the first mover
Hansen 9 – Hansen and Friedman, professors of law at the New England School of Law, 2009 (Victor and Lawrence, The Case for Congress: Separation of Powers and the War on Terror, p.130)
The problem, of course, is that much of this congressional involvement has come AND more difficult for Congress to stand up to an assertive and aggressive president.
Only formal checks signal restraint
Damrosch 97 – Lori Fisler Damrosch, Professor of Law at the Columbia University School of Law, "Use of Force and Constitutionalism", Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 449, Lexis
Structural-institutional explanations, on the other hand, point to features of liberal AND war in the form of institutional constraint if not of inherent disposition." n31 ~CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE~ n31. Russett, supra note 23, at 39 (citing War and Reason AND perception of Spain in 1898), the restraint may fail to take effect.
Plan –
The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force.
Plan’s the perfect balance that checks the Executive but preserves defensive capabilities
Lobel 8 – Jules Lobel, Professor at University of Pittsburgh Law School, "War Powers for the 21st Century: The Constitutional Perspective", Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, 4-10, http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lob041008.htm
III Revising the War Powers Resolution I believe that it is necessary and possible to reform the War Powers Resolution, and that H.R. Res. 53 is an excellent step in that direction. The first, crucial revision contained in the new statute is the language in Section 3 prohibiting the President from initiating warfare without clear authorization from Congress, unless he or she is acting to repel armed attacks on United States territories, troops or citizens. Various administrations and commentators have argued that the situations in which the President requires AND respond to attacks on U.S. territories, troops or citizens. One could, of course, hypothesize a myriad of situations where the nation AND any rationality, be turned into a justification for "launching sudden attacks." Today, as in 1787, the reality is that American national security can AND rumors, reports, intuitions, or even informed intelligence warnings of attacks. Moreover, Congress has demonstrated that where United States national security is seriously threatened AND Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, or the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. It is true that many situations will be murky, complicated or divisive and therefore that quick congressional action will not be forthcoming. But in those cases, the United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise. While there might be rare future emergencies not covered under the repel armed attack AND President Lincoln argued should be done when faced with such grave emergency crises. From this constitutional perspective, section 3 of the Constitutional War Powers Amendments of AND be subject to misinterpretation. As then congressman Abraham Lincoln argued in 1848, Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repell an invasion . . . and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect.22
Obama will comply
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also AND even purported to regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed. Even since claims of preclusive power emerged in full, the practice within the executive AND almost no actual defiance of statutory limitations predicated on such a constitutional theory. This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential executive branch stance is not, we AND , the Constitution compels the Commander in Chief to comply with legislative restrictions. In this way, the founding legal charter itself exhorts the President to justify controversial AND the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.
Plan overcomes barriers to enforcement
Lobel 9 – Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution". Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org files CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization AND disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law. To ensure that this principle is enforced, new legislation should prohibit the use of AND a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.
Even if initial non-compliance occurs, Court enforcement solves
Garcia 12 – Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, "War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution", Congressional Research Service Report, 2-17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30352.pdf
The courts have made clear, however, that while formidable, none of the AND unlikely that the courts will venture into this politically and constitutionally charged thicket.
Last week Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York warned that "if we don’t AND , as in the case of Rep. Nadler, it can happen.
Executive war power structurally ensures groupthink and escalatory interventions
Fleischman 10 – Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, "A Functional Distribution of War Powers", New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. 26 Pub. Pol’y 137, Lexis
While Nzelibe and Yoo’s model is clearly plausible, it misses certain critical institutional constructs AND it is the institutional design that would better accommodate functionalists’ concerns and desires.
~{11~} The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse AND to an examination of the judiciary’s contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.
Terrorist spoofing
Blumrosen 11 – Alfred W. Blumrosen, Professor Emeritus at the Rutgers School of Law and Steven M. Blumrosen, J.D., Quinnipiac University School of Law, "Restoring the Congressional Duty to Declare War", Rutgers Law Review, Winter, 63 Rutgers L. Rev. 407, Lexis
Conclusion We have placed a heavy burden on June 1-4, 1787 to correct AND enormous debt on the United States with no visible gain to the country. We cannot prove that these two disasters would not have happened if Congress had taken AND unlimited power, in the immediate impact of the 9/11 carnage. The Congress must decide whether to take military action against an enemy even if we AND its response to a President’s claims of serious attacks on the United States. Professor Phillip Bobbit has focused on the difficulties of assigning "blame" for a AND This would suit only those who believe that western civilization is an abomination.
Groupthink causes Korean war
Gregg 13 – Donald P. Gregg, Chair of the Pacific Century Institute, Former National Security Advisor for Bush I, Former Ambassador to South Korea, 4/12/13 (Korea Times, "President Obama’s Edsel problem" Lexis)
How did that come about? Apparently in those days Detroit’s engineers were vulnerable to AND did we fight them when what they wanted was a peace treaty?’
So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could AND tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.
Requiring prior Congressional authorization for war deters adventurism
Dickerson 9 – Annette Warren Dickerson, Director of Education 26 Outreach for the Center for Constitutional Rights, "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution", Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
Reform the War Powers Resolution The War Powers Resolution has failed. Every president since the enactment of the Act AND seek relief, or that the claim presents non-justifiable political questions. The War Powers Resolution, as written, was flawed in several key respects. AND in is before hostilities are commenced, not 60 or 90 days afterward. Secondly, the War Powers Resolution correctly recognized that even congressional silence, inaction or AND responded by effectually saying: if Congress did nothing, why should we? Reforming the War Powers Resolution is a project that will require leadership from the President and the political will of Congress, working together in the service and preservation of the Constitution. In light of the abuses that have taken place under the Bush administration, it is the responsibility of a new administration to insist on transparency in the drafting of new legislation. There is a long history of attempts to revise the War Powers Resolution. As new legislation is drafted, though, it will be important to focus on the central constitutional issues. Much time has been spent in debating how to address contingencies. It will be impossible to write into law any comprehensive formula for every conceivable situation, though; much more important will be establishing the fundamental principles of reform: The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization. The only exception should be the executive’s power in an emergency to use short-term force to repel sudden attacks on US territories, troops or citizens. It is true that many potential conflict situations will be murky, complicated or divisive, and that quick congressional action may not always be forthcoming. Yet, history shows the folly of launching wars that are not supported by the American people. The United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise. Today, as in 1787, the reality is that the interests of the people AND disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law.
Contention 2 —- Warfighting
Power projection structurally fails because operations are guided by incoherent strategies disconnected from national political will
Understanding the Gap Since World War II, a wide gap has developed between Congress and the executive AND history does not clearly reveal the structural and political dimensions of this phenomenon. The Constitution grants most foreign policy prerogative to Congress in Article I. Article II AND . Consequently, considerable power has flowed from Congress to the president.50 Execution of US foreign policy is fraught with political uncertainty and vulnerability. Compared to AND to oversee the nation’s foreign policy has exposed America to unacceptable strategic risk. War, Strategy, and the Constitution One of Clausewitz’ greatest contributions to the study of war is his emphasis on the AND political dimension despite the recent emergence of nonstate actors and transnational groups.56 In other words, success at the tactical level of war first requires careful preparations AND political objectives, and commitment of resources sufficient to achieve strategic objectives.58 Since 1945, the United States has built the world’s most capable war-fighting machine. So why, then, have most of the nation’s large military interventions since World War II ended in defeat or, at best, stalemate? Political leaders should attend more to what Clausewitz calls the political dimensions of war—national unity and the political value of the objective—as inseparable from national and military strategy. War theorists have long emphasized the importance of national unity and the political value of AND mobilized for war, we must first examine our own political aim."60 National unity underwrites the commitment the nation needs to successfully prosecute war, provided the AND , and the will and support of Congress to support the war.62 A Risk to Strategy As the practice of declaring war has become passé, American strategy has likewise become AND 63 This connection, Clausewitz observed, is necessary for success in war. For example, US strategy following World War II ironically came to resemble the German AND which has little tolerance for long, risky, or uncertain conflicts.65 More recently, as the executive branch exercises greater authority in directing military interventions, AND American people’s collective will in their efforts to subvert our national strategy.67 Vietnam Strategy The tragic military and political experience of Vietnam was spawned by an aggressive president promoting AND , failing to determine strategic objectives and the means to obtain them.70 President Johnson made numerous decisions concerning the strategy and operations of the war, resulting in a strategy of incremental gradualism. Despite some tactical successes, Vietnam strategy never developed sufficient coherence nor the sustained support of the American people. Through executive design, Congress and the people never fully vetted the value of the political objective in the context of large-scale military intervention before President Johnson committed forces to combat.71 As a result, President Johnson lacked the top cover of a war declaration. AND the American people; they could not have cared less about Vietnam.73 Afghanistan and Iraq Strategies The strategies for the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have both failed to properly incorporate national strategic ends, ways, and means in a consistent manner across the whole of government. In the absence of a national consensus on strategic ends, Congressman James Marshall (D-GA) not surprisingly identified: The mismatches among the needs of post-conflict stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the size and the types of military forces available, and the pitiful scarcity of capability in the civilian branches of our government to effect nation-building efforts, as well as, our utter incompetence as a government in strategic communications.74 US Afghanistan strategy has continually morphed from 2001 to the present. The sweeping language AND support for the effort when the strategy did not unfold as planned.78 Eventually, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and their strategies became focal points in AND exposing the strategies to additional, unnecessary risk at a crucial time.79 Another Cry for Reform In 2009, The National War Powers Commission, a bipartisan group commissioned under the AND declaration for "large" force deployments and "significant armed conflict."81 The Commission recommended replacing the 1973 WPR with the War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 AND deploying forces into significant armed conflict without the full blessing of Congress.83 Conclusion Reminiscent of the 1973 WPR, the National War Powers Commission’s effort to redress war AND resulted in the expenditure of national blood and treasure for strategically hollow ends. The Constitution is, in itself, a strategic national security document. The founders’ AND wage fewer of them—and be far better positioned to win them.
Libya removed all remaining checks on unilateral executive war-making —- ruins accountability and signal of unified resolve
The president followed no clear historical standard when he unilaterally decided to use force in Libya. Once this action continued beyond his original definition of "days, not weeks," into months and months, he did not seek the approval of Congress to continue military activities. And, while administration members may have discussed this matter with some members of Congress, the administration never formally conferred with the legislative branch as a coequal partner in our constitutional system. Obviously, these points are not raised out of any lasting love for the late AND also the region-wide dispersion of thousands of weapons from Qaddafi’s armories. The inaction (some of it deliberate) of key congressional leaders during this period AND . We know he can do it because he already has done it. Few leaders in the legislative branch even asked for a formal debate over this exercise of unilateral presidential power, and in the Senate any legislation pertaining to the issue was prevented from reaching the floor. One can only wonder at what point these leaders or their successors might believe it is their constitutional duty to counter unchecked executive power exercised on behalf of overseas military action. AT BOTTOM, what we have witnessed in these instances, as with many others AND , to assert the authority that forms the basis of our governmental structure. When it comes to the long-term commitments that our country makes in the AND the authority that was so wisely given to it so many years ago. And as for the presidency, a final thought is worth pondering. From a AND America is united and not acting merely at the discretion of one individual.
That crushes unit cohesion, morale, and allied support —- Congressional approval’s key
Frye 2 – Alton Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow Emeritus and Director of the Program on Congress and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism", Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 4-17, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/applying-war-powers-resolution-war-terrorism/p4514
4. CONSENSUS IS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL COHESION The case for active, continuing congressional engagement on the many issues of high policy presented by an open-ended campaign against terrorism does not rest on an instinct for institutional self-aggrandizement. It is grounded in the critical need to forge and maintain America’s social cohesion as a nation caught up in war. War, especially prolonged war, always poses the risk of depleting that cohesion, so vital to domestic harmony and international effectiveness. Members of Congress should also realize how essential their involvement is to the morale and AND parallel, policy-centered procedures outlined here would serve that same need. Congress’s stand on how our nation uses the mighty arsenal at its disposal also bears AND when he acts "pursuant to an explicit or implied authorization of Congress." Marshaling international coalitions to wage the war on terrorism will depend importantly on giving our allies confidence that American power is guided and restrained by a disciplined relationship between Congress and President. Absent attentive, persistent congressional involvement, public diplomacy in the war on terrorism could lose much of the credibility that arises from the perception of America as a model of representative government. There is thus an enduring necessity to balance executive potency in military endeavors with the legislative review that provides democratic legitimacy. The challenge is not to enchain the presidency but to harness both branches to common purpose. On that insight the War Powers Resolution was founded, and in that insight may be found the germ of other innovations to guarantee that Congress will play its proper constitutional role in the war on terrorism.
Effective power projection stops hotspot escalation to nuclear war
Kagan 7 – Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, "The Case for Larger Ground Forces", Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan_OHanlon_07.pdf
We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but AND position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing AND forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. AND moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few AND personnelintensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while AND Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.
Executive war power ruins soft power and global alliances
Schiffer 9 – Adam Schiffer, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, and Carrie Liu Currier, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, "War Powers, International Alliances, the President, and Congress", http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/public/repository/US_Gov_Balance_of_Power_SF.pdf
The president’s advantages over Congress in the foreign policy realm have consequences far beyond the AND the second Bush administration has raised alarm in many countries around the world. In the past, the bipolar nature of the international system and the lack of AND presidential authority led to very disparate degrees of support from the international community. These two examples of U.S. military action in the Middle East offer AND was acknowledged as within the acceptable parameters as determined by the global community. In contrast, the 2003 war in Iraq did not gain the support of the AND other actors to give legitimacy to the U.S.-led war. The battle between the unilateralists and multilateralists with regard to U.S. foreign AND and how they are used to establish the legitimacy of American foreign policy.
Grounding use of force in constitutionally-based SOP creates a perception of benign hegemony and encourages international cooperation based on rule of law
Ikenberry 1 – G. John, Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, "Getting Hegemony Right - Analysis of the United States as a "Hyperpower" Nation", The National Interest, Spring, Lexis
A critical ingredient in stabilizing international relations in a world of radical power disparities is AND do so now, when America’s relative power may be at its peak.
Existential threats are likely —- democratic alliances founded on mutual restraint build capacity to prevent and mitigate their impact
Gr-Thsand Strategy as Liberal Order Building American dominance of the global system will eventually yield to the rise of other powerful states. The unipolar moment will pass. In facing this circumstance, American grand strategy should be informed by answers to this question: What sort of international order would we like to see in place in 2020 or 2030 AND AND liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.
Contention 3 —- SOP
Unchecked war power sets a precedent that causes the executive to broadly ignore Congressional controls
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the " AND for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.
U.S. war powers are modeled internationally —- the precedent of unilateral executive authority ruins global human rights norms and encourages preemptive conflict in multiple hotspots
Sloane 8 – Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 (Robert, Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis)
There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of AND to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.
Conflict’s likely in Taiwan, Georgia, and India/Pakistan —- U.S. signal’s key
Another implication on sovereignty, due to the NSS, was, yet again, AND self-gain (Korb 26 Wadhams, 2006, p.2). Other academics have accused the Bush Doctrine of "legitimating a doctrine of anticipatory war AND Assembly in September 2003, articulated his deep restlessness with a policy that: "represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty eight years… if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force" (Annan, 2003). "The Bush administration has stubbornly resisted these warnings about the dangers of the preemptive policy set out in the NSS" (Wheeler, 2003, p.199). Kaufman agrees with the international stance that the NSS has set a dangerous precedent ( AND emption and preventive wars against Taiwan for the promotion of its Chinese values.
Preemption ruins U.S. leverage to deescalate regional crises —- goes nuclear
Steinberg 2 – James B. Steinberg, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Michael E. O’Hanlon and Susan E. Rice, "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption", Brookings Policy Brief Series, December, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2002/12/terrorism-ohanlon
The Dangers of Legitimating Preemption A final concern relates to the impact of the precedent set by the United States AND risk, and exacerbate regional crises already on the brink of open conflict. Of course, no country will embark suddenly on a war of aggression simply because AND the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay and diplomacy. Potential examples abound, ranging from Ethiopia and Eritrea, to China and Taiwan, AND . Kashmir’s status remains contentious, meaning that the risk of conflict remains. Should the crisis resume, a U.S. policy of preemption may provide hawks in India the added ammunition they need to justify a strike against Pakistan in the eyes of their fellow Indian decision-makers. Recently, India Finance Minister (and former Foreign Minister) Jaswant Singh welcomed the administration’s new emphasis on the legitimacy of preemption. Russia’s recent threats against the sovereign state of Georgia, which it accuses of harboring or at least failing to pursue Islamic extremists tied to the Chechen war, also illustrate the dangers of legitimating an easy and early recourse to preemption.
Requiring formal declaration of war restores Congressional war powers and balances SOP by checking the Executive
Weinberger 9 – Seth Weinberger, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound, M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University, "Balancing War Powers in an Age of Terror", The Good Society, 18(2), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v018/18.2.weinberger.html
The key to developing a constitutionally, legally, and practically sound balanced theory of AND -so to undo that separation, even in the face of war.
Congress must be the first mover
Hansen 9 – Hansen and Friedman, professors of law at the New England School of Law, 2009 (Victor and Lawrence, The Case for Congress: Separation of Powers and the War on Terror, p.130)
The problem, of course, is that much of this congressional involvement has come AND more difficult for Congress to stand up to an assertive and aggressive president.
Only formal checks signal restraint
Damrosch 97 – Lori Fisler Damrosch, Professor of Law at the Columbia University School of Law, "Use of Force and Constitutionalism", Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 449, Lexis
Structural-institutional explanations, on the other hand, point to features of liberal AND war in the form of institutional constraint if not of inherent disposition." n31 ~CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE~ n31. Russett, supra note 23, at 39 (citing War and Reason AND perception of Spain in 1898), the restraint may fail to take effect.
Plan –
The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force.
Plan’s the perfect balance that checks the Executive but preserves defensive capabilities
Lobel 8 – Jules Lobel, Professor at University of Pittsburgh Law School, "War Powers for the 21st Century: The Constitutional Perspective", Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, 4-10, http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lob041008.htm
III Revising the War Powers Resolution I believe that it is necessary and possible to reform the War Powers Resolution, and that H.R. Res. 53 is an excellent step in that direction. The first, crucial revision contained in the new statute is the language in Section 3 prohibiting the President from initiating warfare without clear authorization from Congress, unless he or she is acting to repel armed attacks on United States territories, troops or citizens. Various administrations and commentators have argued that the situations in which the President requires AND respond to attacks on U.S. territories, troops or citizens. One could, of course, hypothesize a myriad of situations where the nation AND any rationality, be turned into a justification for "launching sudden attacks." Today, as in 1787, the reality is that American national security can AND rumors, reports, intuitions, or even informed intelligence warnings of attacks. Moreover, Congress has demonstrated that where United States national security is seriously threatened AND Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, or the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. It is true that many situations will be murky, complicated or divisive and therefore that quick congressional action will not be forthcoming. But in those cases, the United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise. While there might be rare future emergencies not covered under the repel armed attack AND President Lincoln argued should be done when faced with such grave emergency crises. From this constitutional perspective, section 3 of the Constitutional War Powers Amendments of AND be subject to misinterpretation. As then congressman Abraham Lincoln argued in 1848, Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repell an invasion . . . and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect.22
Obama will comply
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also AND even purported to regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed. Even since claims of preclusive power emerged in full, the practice within the executive AND almost no actual defiance of statutory limitations predicated on such a constitutional theory. This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential executive branch stance is not, we AND , the Constitution compels the Commander in Chief to comply with legislative restrictions. In this way, the founding legal charter itself exhorts the President to justify controversial AND the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.
Plan overcomes barriers to enforcement
Lobel 9 – Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution". Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org files CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization AND disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law. To ensure that this principle is enforced, new legislation should prohibit the use of AND a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.
Even if initial non-compliance occurs, Court enforcement solves
Garcia 12 – Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, "War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution", Congressional Research Service Report, 2-17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30352.pdf
The courts have made clear, however, that while formidable, none of the AND unlikely that the courts will venture into this politically and constitutionally charged thicket.
10/5/13
1AC
Tournament: Kentucky | Round: 5 | Opponent: Cal State Fullerton GR | Judge: Tim Barouch
1AC – Executive Precedents
Contention One is: Executive Precedents
Unchecked war power sets a precedent now.
Barron ’8 David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the " AND a workable alternative, such forgetting will be far less likely to occur.
The precedent spills-beyond war power. Means executives are unchecked on many issues.
Barron ’8 David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis Moreover, this historical account performs at least one function beyond supplying information relevant to AND for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.
It gets modeled worldwide. Debates about the precedent check preventive wars and other abuses of executive authority.
Sloane ’8 (Robert Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis) There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of AND to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.
Legislative restraints means fewer Executives starting fewer conflicts worldwide. For executive authority, teaching the heuristic of work within institutions is a pre-req.
Grynaviski ’13 Eric Grynaviski, Professor of Political Science at The George Washington University, "The Bloodstained Spear: Public Reason and Declarations of War", International Theory, 5(2), Cambridge Journals
Conclusion The burden of the argument, thus far, has been to show that AND well as more recent issues such as the targeted killing of political leaders.
Pragmatism’s key in this context. "Root cause" and "cure-alls" won’t check violence.
Bacevich ’13 Andrew, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, The New American Militarism, p. 205-210
There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, "always a well- AND point, citizens should replace them by electing people able to do so.
Legislative checks solve both advantages. Without them, executive-induced casualties will persist.
Zelizer ’11 Julian E. Zelizer, Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton University, "War Powers Belong to Congress and the President", CNN Opinion, 6-27, http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/27/zelizer.war.powers/index.html But the failure of Congress to fully participate in the initial decision to use military AND declare war forces voters to think about the decision sooner rather than later.
Preventive war standard causes large death tolls globally.
Williams ’12 Ryan – Assistant Professor, Western State University College of Law – "DANGEROUS PRECEDENT: AMERICA’S ILLEGAL WAR IN AFGHANISTAN" – University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2012 – https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/145-williams33upajintll5632011pdf
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FIGHTING THIS ILLEGAL WAR America should be concerned about setting a AND . The negative consequences of establishing such a precedent should not be underestimated.
Drones Advantage
Contention Two – Drones
Lack of a legislative role cedes war-fighting to the executive. This drives secretive policy – including the squo’s non-transparent drone policy.
Twelve and a half years after Congress didn’t declare war on an organization of hundreds AND Middle East and what’s left of American democracy and liberties are further destabilized.
Drones can’t be wished-away – they’ll exist in other nations. Even if Congress did little, public light matters. A more-transparent precedent dissuades global use and halts a distinct mechanism for violence versus dissent.
Boyle ’13 Dr. Michael Boyle has an interdisciplinary background. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia. He was previously a Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St. Andrews. He holds a Ph.D. from The University of Cambridge, 2005; an M.P.P. from the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2001; a M.Phil, from the University of Cambridge, 1999 – "The costs and consequences of drone warfare" – International Affairs; 89: 1 (2013) 1–29 – http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
An important, but overlooked, strategic consequence of the Obama administra - tion’s embrace AND to shrug off the loss of life that drones inflict on others today.
Drones cause deaths. This ev also proves international experiences are a "starting-point boomerang" shaping oppressive domestic practices.
Graham ’10 STEPHEN GRAHAM is Professor of Cities and Society at Newcastle University and previously taught at Durham and MIT, among other universities. Cities Under Siege: the New Military Urbanism – p. xiii-xvii
Such fantasies of high -tech omnipotence are much more than science fiction. As AND security operations, is the second key feature of the new military urbanism.
Plan text
The United States Federal Government should not authorize Presidential initiation of offensive military force without prior Congressional authorization.
Underview – 1AC
Macro-Institutional starting points are often critiqued. But micro-starting points of SELF or societal, instead of State, transformation are less effective in this narrow context.
Stuhr ’8 (John J, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy at Emory University "A Terrible Love of Hope", The Journal of Speculative Philosophy New Series, Volume 22, Number 4, Project Muse)
And then what, now what? What should a meliorist do? Terrible lovers AND peace must be, in the broadest sense of the term, educational.
If we lose pre-fiat, then we do nothing. But non-concrete activism is WORSE THAN NOTHING. No Framework QUESTION can veer this round from the NEXUS QUESTION OF CONCRETE ALTS. Without those, we’re awful activists.
Bryant ’12 (EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE – the author said "she" and it was replaced with the word "to" – Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied ’disclosedness’ with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, "Critique of the Academic Left", http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)
I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because AND . Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.
Even if "fiat’s not real", and Affs don’t control levers of power today, we advance a heuristic. Without this heuristic of fiat, we’ll re-enforce dangerous nihilism.
Hoff ’6 (et al, Dr. Dianne Hoff, professor in the College of Education and Human Development and president of Faculty Senate, University of Maine, Journal of Educational Administration, 44:3 – available via Emerald Management 120 database).
There is no question that helping educational leadership students become self-analytical and reflect AND . This is an arena from which a new social order can emerge.
Our heuristic’s about CONCRETE and Pragmatic ALTS. It’s important regardless of drones or executive power. Helps us learn to check violence.
Small ’6 (Jonathan, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition, "Moving Forward," The Journal for Civic Commitment, Spring, http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.jsp) What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip AND engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context.
And, if the debate winds-up a "tie", presumption should shift in favor of change – best avoids nihilism.
Serial Policy Failure wrong and Policy Nihilism Bad.
Tallis ’97 Raymond Tallis, Professor of Geriatric Medicine at the University of Manchester – Enemies of Hope: A Critique of Contemporary Pessimism, Published by Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 0312173261, p. 407-409
If we deny or rubbish the progress that mankind has already made, and at AND poverty of spirit and meanness of mind will not have the last word.
Particularity Thesis. Sweeping claims don’t undercut the Aff. We can advance contingent and particular knowledge without "Big T" Truths.
We’re not pro-State, but we’re "anti-anti State". Some things can ONLY be solved "through the system". Lifting existing POTUS authority is such an issue:
Barbrook ’97 (Dr. Richard, School of Westminster, Nettime, "More Provocations", 6-5, ¶ http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html) I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left AND can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.
Suffering not inevitable – results from context. If some is inevitable – degree matters.
Eagen ’4 (Jennifer Eagen – "Philisophical interests" September 9 http://home.earthlink.net/~~jeagan/id3.html) Suffering is the theme of two of my published papers, which both examine the AND e.g., gender). I’m looking forward to exploring this further.
Walton 7 – C. Dale Walton, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49
Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does AND a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.
(10) The Bush doctrine. The fate of the Bush doctrine of preemption, unilateralism, and reliance on military solutions to international problems will be a major signpost for those forecasting the future of US–China relations. A less imperial and more benign US hegemony will promote US–China partnership. But either an imperial America or a failed US hegemony are likely to promote US–China rivalry.
( ) Perm – do plan and all non-competitive parts of their worldview
( ) Alt fails and policy framework’s better even if fiat’s not real.
Bryant ’12 (Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied ’disclosedness’ with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, "Critique of the Academic Left", http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)
Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s AND . Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.
( ) Prefer policy framework. Regress – endless items become nexus questions and link to Bryant. Other options unfairly whisk away the 1AC .
( ) Biopower K too sweeping and wrong. Throws positive power out with the bathwater.
Dickinson ’4 (UC Berkeley – History, Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48) In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices AND of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.
( ) prefer particularity as a standard for epistemic accuracy.
( ) Impact as policy disad is silly – perm solves, uniqueness woes, and other defense disproves try-or-die. Prefer Aff’s try or die claims – specific scenarios and more workable alt.
A critical analysis of the Vietnam War shows why Congress’s constitutional mandate to declare war AND very heart of our democratic system — the civilian control of the military."
No impact to the DA
Terr DA:
Plan leaves flexibility to respond to terrorism
Fleischman 10 – Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, "A Functional Distribution of War Powers", New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. 26 Pub. Pol’y 137, Lexis
C. Responding to Terrorism - War Powers in the Twenty-First Century The current global climate leads many to believe that the new dominant force of aggression AND First or President-First system is more effective in preventing these errors. ~*159~ In their argument, Nzelibe and Yoo wrongfully assume that all uses of military force are subject to the same guidelines. Calling an attack on a terrorist cell a war is fallacious because "war has traditionally been understood as involving nation-states," n143 while al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are not nation states. n144 Under international law, "insurgent" is the lowest status for a type of warfare combatants and requires the group: (1) to represent an identifiable group of people or to have a relatively stable ... base of support within a broader population; (2) to have the semblance of a government; (3) to have an organized military force and to be able to field its military units in hostilities; and (4) to control significant portion of territory as its own. n145 Al Qaeda fails to meet this definition, as it does not possess anything that resembles a government and does not control significant territory of its own. n146 While including terrorism in the international law definition of war may sound appealing, there are reasons to be cautious. Even if the United States and al Qaeda cannot officially be at war, the AND mechanism for engaging in armed combat with a terrorist organization that lacks statehood. Traditionally, the United States responded to acts of terrorism through use of the legal AND formal criminal proceedings may be limited by geographic constraints and jurisdictional requirements. n152 The history of the United States shows us that there are a litany of different AND and the Congress-First view with regard to traditional war powers activities. D. Summary of Analysis This analysis demonstrates that the Congress-First approach is superior to the President- AND more thoroughly to prevent Type I and Type II errors in warfare decisions.
Only link is quick preemptive strikes —- those backfire
Diehl 6 – Paul F. Diehl* and Tom Ginsburg, * Henning Larson Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, "Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to Professors Nzelibe and Yoo", Michigan Journal of International Law, Summer, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1239, Lexis
Additionally, Nzelibe and Yoo suggest that the advantages of executive primacy lie in its AND ), but any other benefit from unilateral executive action is not readily apparent.
No mass panic and congressional involvement solves
Pearlstein 9 – Deborah N. Pearlstein, Visiting Scholar and Lecturer in Public and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public 26 International Affairs, Princeton University, "Form and Function in the National Security Constitution", Connecticut Law Review, July, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1549, Lexis
In any case, disaster experience provides important reason to pause before embracing the raw AND control and normalcy may well be helpful in mitigating the risk of panic.
Congressional oversight’s key to solve terrorism
Dean 2 – John W. Dean, JD from Georgetown University Law Center, Former Counsel to the President of the United States, Former Chief Minority Counsel to the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives, "Tom Ridge’s Non-Testimonial Appearance Before Congress: Another Nixon-style Move By The Bush Administration", FindLaw, 4-12, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20020412.html
Congressional Oversight Is Imperative For Homeland Security Fortunately, there have so far been no subsequent terrorist acts in the United States comparable to what occurred on September 11th. Does this mean the Office of Homeland Security is working? It’s unclear. If terrorist attacks have been foiled, it has been a well-kept secret. More likely, we’ve just been lucky. All we really know about homeland security is that Tom Ridge, after several months on the job, has announced a color-coded warning system that few Americans understand, and even fewer believe will make a tinker’s damn of difference to their safety. We also know that there is a wide consensus of opinion in Washington, outside the Bush Administration, that the Office of Homeland Security is all hat, and no cattle - as they say in Texas. And finally, we know that Ridge has refused to testify about his work. I’m sure I don’t have to tell anyone, but Americans are being treated like fools. Fortunately, they are much more sophisticated today, and better informed, than they were during World War II, when FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was able to bluff the public into believing the vigilance of the FBI was protecting them from Nazi and Japanese saboteurs. The historical records show Hoover was not effective at all, only occasionally fortunate. Congressional oversight and the collective wisdom of Congress are essential in our dealing with terrorism AND incompetent appointees (after all, they chose them in the first place)? In contrast, Congress wants to do all these things, thereby keeping a President on his toes. Its oversight is crucial - for the Presidential and Executive Branch limitations I’ve suggested are only a few of the myriad problems that might hamper the efficacy of the Executive in its efforts to deal with terrorism, and that Congress can help to correct.
Terrorists won’t attack the US—few deaths, no terrorists, no motivation, effective prevention
While the horrific bombing at the Boston Marathon has brought concerns about terrorism back to AND 1970s, but only 168 in the 10 years after 9/11. Our instincts tell us that terrorism ought to be quite common. In our open AND fill in the blank~ and cause massive damage." And it’s true. Then why doesn’t it happen more often? The main reason is that there just aren’t that many would-be terrorists in AND dramatic fashion possible — the use of violence to cause death and destruction. But the process of moving from a law-abiding citizen to violent killer in AND they are motivated to commit violence just to make a point is tiny. In fact, many Americans couldn’t care less about politics. Those who do generally accept the normal rule that disagreements are decided through elections or legislation. Sure, there is vitriol in American politics. But free speech and debate serves as a release valve for pent-up ideological animosities. Terrorists are the rare birds who become psychologically attached to a political cause and reject normal politics as a means for addressing their grievances. While no domestic controversies have resulted in serious enough grievances to sustain significant amounts of AND to an enemy willing, even eager, to die for a cause. Despite the controversies surrounding some elements of the response to 9/11, by AND would have thought impossible in the nervous days and months after September 2001. The key elements of this counterterrorism strategy have been the application of military force by the United States and its partners in strategic areas around the world, a globally coordinated intelligence collection effort, a large scale shift of federal law enforcement resources to preventing terrorism, a much more rigorous vetting of visa applicants from high-risk countries, and greater border security and immigration controls. The use of force abroad has reduced the supply of active terrorists by killing many senior al Qaeda members and dampening the allure of al Qaeda to potential recruits. The adventure of training in the Hindu Kush and fighting against foreign infidels once had a romantic allure to many — hiding from American drones in the hinterlands of Pakistan does not. We have also benefitted from a strategically inept enemy. Al Qaeda’s intolerance and brutality AND how quickly the Pakistani Taliban disavowed any connection to the attacks in Boston. Tightened immigration controls have undoubtedly made it more difficult for foreign terrorists to get to AND two Muslim Americans have been arrested on terrorism charges so far in 2013. Terrorism also continues to be rare in the United States because the substantial resources committed AND come to the attention of the police and ultimately find themselves behind bars. And yet, the fact that terrorism is rare is little solace to the victims AND society and our government should respond to the attack on the Boston Marathon.
Indeed, the real lesson of Riedel’s article is that much of the so- AND these activities has prevented al Qaeda and its copycats from making a comeback.
CP
Perm do both
The CP is the squo, their Yoo evidence indicates current power of the purse is a sufficient check on the President
Statutory checks key – that’s Damrosch from the 1AC
Links to politics
Double bind: either
They reduce interventionism and link to terror DA or
They don’t and the Dickerson impact is a disad to the CP
Extend Frye, absent Congressional declaration warfighting is not effective, Kagan is a disad to the aff, nuclear wars globally
Doesn’t solve any of SOP, institutional checks are key, ensures escalation globally
Obama Good – 2AC
All the incentives line up against a deal
Chris Cillizza, 9/18/13, 5 reasons why a government shutdown is (likely) coming, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/09/18/5-reasons-why-a-government-shutdown-is-likely-coming/?wprss=rss_politics26clsrd
Speaker John Boehner had a choice going into today’s meeting: Go forward AND could be very detrimental to his chances of being Speaker again in 2015.
Not intrinsic —- do the plan and pass Debt Ceiling.
Passing this legislation might not be easy. But the time is right. Liberals AND with subsequent regrets about either the war itself or how it was fought. But in the wake of the Iraq War such a law might also appeal to AND emboldened, and we begin to lose—first psychologically and then literally.
Ideology outweighs and no spillover
Edwards 3 – George C. Edwards, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A26M University and Former Director of the Center for Presidential Studies, "Riding High in the Polls: George W. Bush and Public Opinion", www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF-http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF
Passing legislation was even more difficult on the divisive domestic issues that remained on Congress’s AND tenets of their ideology solely in deference to a widely supported chief executive.
Fiat solves the link —- it’s instant —- no political effect
Obama will horse-trade restrictions for his agenda
McGinnis 93 – John O. McGinnis, Assistant Professor at the Cardozo School of Law and Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, "Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers", Law and Contemporary Problems, 56(4), p. 322-324
C. Bargaining in Foreign Policy Areas Where the Accommodation Reflects Congress’s Predominant Interest Shortly after coming to office, President Bush faced congressional opposition in continuing to aid AND the White House defended the accord’s legality and carried out its terms.145 The incident displays the separation of powers as a system of bargains but provides a AND have great difficulty preventing them because the deals can be struck tacitly.149 Bush’s confrontation with Congress also reflects that interests at stake in the distribution of foreign AND matters of foreign aid that he enjoys in the use of military force. Finally, this incident reveals a fundamental tension in how different agencies and departments within AND necessary in order to overcome the internal opposition of institutions such as OLC.
With his decision to seek congressional approval for an attack, Obama created a political AND , accusing the president of misleading the world and engaging in conspiratorial warmongering.
Key to the agenda
Dickerson 13 (John, Slate, Go for the Throat21, 1/18, www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/01/barack_obama_s_second_inaugural_address_the_president_should_declare_war.single.html)
On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. AND the party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.
PC isn’t key and winners win
Hirsh 2-7 – Michael, Senior Editor at Newsweek Magazine and Chief Correspondent for the National Journal, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital", National Journal, 2013, Lexis
On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do AND change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect."
Plan restricts the President’s authority over initiation of hostilities
Keynes 10 – Edward Keynes, Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power, p. 163-164
Although the zones of exclusive legislative and executive authority cannot be defined precisely, the AND President to initiate hostilities or to transform defensive military actions into offensive wars. Whether Congress declares war or authorizes limited military hostilities, the legislature has ample constitutional AND or propriety of limiting the President’s power to initiate war and military hostilities. In addition to exercising its auxiliary war powers, some commentators suggest that Congress could AND Congress could manipulate to reduce the executive to a mere ministerial agency.2
"Restriction" means limitation
Mattice 7 (Harry S., Jr., United States District Judge, "Wright v. Magellan Behavioral Health, Inc.", 7-3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48718, Lexis)
In the instant case, the Court is required to interpret the word "restriction" as used by the parties in the Agreement. The parties apparently agree that the legal definition of restriction—"a limitation or qualification," Black’s Law Dictionary 1341 (8th ed. 1999)—is a good place to start. Thus, the Court must determine whether the board’s supervision requirement falls within this definition.
Best balance—-forces the Aff to directly affect war power and establishes a clear topic direction—-solves Neg ground but lets the Aff access the most common and deep topic literatue—-authorization of war is a core issue for war powers with tons of ground for both sides—-if this isn’t topical, nothing defensible is—-err Aff: massive theory bias and the K give them structural advantages—-reasonability is best: competing interpretations causes a race to the bottom
CASE:
Intervention Adv:
Accidents an miscalc Hemasath 00 – Paul A. Hemesath, J.D./M.S.F.S. from the Georgetown University Law Center, "Who’s Got the Button? Nuclear War Powers Uncertainty in the Post-Cold War Era", Georgetown Law Journal, August, 88 Geo. L.J. 2473, Lexis
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF AMBIGUITY: CONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY AND ILLEGITIMACY The uncertainty of a divided nuclear war powers regime may be more than an academic AND serious notice of the constitutional limits applied to the use of nuclear weapons.
Extinction
Hayes and Green 10 (Peter, Professor of International Relations – Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and Director – Nautilus Institute, and Michael Hamel, Victoria University, "The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia", Nautilus Institute Special Report, 1-5, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments AND threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.
?
War Fighting
Tanks heg
Record 00 – Jeffrey Record, Professor of International Security Studies at the Air War College, MA and Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, "Failed States and Casualty Phobia: Implications for Force Structure and Technology Choices", Occasional Paper No. 18, September, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA425499
The strategic consequences of elite casualty phobia as well as its implications for the military AND change was driven mainly by fear of the anticipated risks and costs involved.
Causes hostile China rise
Eichenberg 5 – Eichenberg, Associate Professor of Political Science al Tufts University, 2005 (Richard C, International Security. "Victory has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force. 1981-2005." Summer, Project Muse)
The second reason to reevaluate the sensitivity of the public to casualties is that decisionmakers AND mounted in Iraq, one wonders if views in Beijing have changed.32
Global nuclear war
Walton 7 – C. Dale Walton, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49
Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does AND a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.
SOP:
Indo Pak: High risk of escalation Richard Weitz, director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute , July 12, 2010, "South Asia’s Nuclear War Risk," The Diplomat, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/07/12/south-asiaE28099s-nuclear-war-risk/4/ Yet even setting aside the question of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands, nuclear AND is particularly prone to a destabilizing arms race. And perhaps nuclear war.
House Republicans have shut down the federal government with the bizarre demand that President Obama AND , the president said Washington won’t be able to keep paying its bills.
Shutdown causes chaos for debt ceiling and thumps the econ impact
A shutdown would have serious implications for the American economy, which is still struggling AND vote over whether to approve more borrowing to fund the government’s existing obligations.
PC low and fails for fiscal fights
Greg Sargent 9-12, September 12th, 2013, "The Morning Plum: Senate conservatives stick the knife in House GOP leaders," Washington Post, factiva
All of this underscores a basic fact about this fall’s fiscal fights: Far and AND . The time for injecting reality into the debate has long since passed.
On the eve of another fiscal showdown with congressional Republicans, President Obama is outright AND this month will likely not help bolster positive relations heading into the fall.
Passing this legislation might not be easy. But the time is right. Liberals AND with subsequent regrets about either the war itself or how it was fought. But in the wake of the Iraq War such a law might also appeal to AND emboldened, and we begin to lose—first psychologically and then literally.
Ideology outweighs and no spillover
Edwards 3 – George C. Edwards, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A26M University and Former Director of the Center for Presidential Studies, "Riding High in the Polls: George W. Bush and Public Opinion", www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF-http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF
Passing legislation was even more difficult on the divisive domestic issues that remained on Congress’s AND tenets of their ideology solely in deference to a widely supported chief executive.
With his decision to seek congressional approval for an attack, Obama created a political AND , accusing the president of misleading the world and engaging in conspiratorial warmongering.
Key to the agenda
Dickerson 13 (John, Slate, Go for the Throat21, 1/18, www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/01/barack_obama_s_second_inaugural_address_the_president_should_declare_war.single.html)
On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. AND the party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.
President Barack Obama, who pledged to push his second-term domestic agenda through executive actions when Congress wouldn’t cooperate, has moved in the opposite direction on international affairs in recent months as he created new checks on executive authority. By asking Congress to authorize military action against Syria, proposing some constraints on National Security Agency surveillance programs and placing limits on drone strikes, the president voluntarily has ceded some authority in foreign policy and national security, legal experts say. The president’s moves on national-security issues reflect a mix of political pragmatism as well as personal principles, and exactly how much power Mr. Obama actually has given up is the subject of debate. He has walked a fine line on Syria, for example, saying he wasn’t required to seek sign-off from lawmakers for a military strike but asking for their approval anyway. A senior administration official said that while the new drone-strike policy does rein in executive authority, the NSA and Syria proposals weren’t a reduction of power but an effort to increase transparency and build public confidence. Still, the president, who was criticized for seizing too much power through recess appointments and other steps that some said circumvented Congress, now is being criticized by veterans of past Republican administrations for weakening the presidency. John Yoo, a Justice Department official in the George W. Bush administration, said Mr. Obama had unnecessarily limited his own authority. He noted that it is rare to see a president restrict his powers.
PC isn’t key and winners win
Hirsh 2-7 – Michael, Senior Editor at Newsweek Magazine and Chief Correspondent for the National Journal, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital", National Journal, 2013, Lexis
On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do AND change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect."
Also, this time, it’s unclear whether federal workers considered to be in nonessential AND any agreement that remunerates federal employees for the time they did not work."
First, the Obama administration has continued controversial Bush-era interpretations of international law AND it did so through CIA covert action rather than through more open channels. I have no doubt that law and lawyers and concern for creating unfavorable precedents are AND the lawyers, deserves credit, or blame, for our Syria policy.)
CP gets ignored and doesn’t bind
Posner, 12 (Eric A. – Kirkland 26 Ellis Professor at the University of Chicago Law School, Winter, "Reflections On The Law Of September 11: A Ten-Year Retrospective: Deference To The Executive In The United States After September 11: Congress, The Courts, And The Office Of Legal Counsel", Harvard Journal of Law 26 Public Policy, 35 Harv. J.L. 26 Pub. Pol’y 213, Lexis)
B. The OLC as a Constraint on the Executive A number of scholars have argued that the OLC can serve as an important constraint AND and other institutions with political power, then the President would ignore it.
? On the K:
Radical rejection fails —- the plan’s the most pragmatic check on militarism
Bacevich 13 – Andrew, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, The New American Militarism, p. 205-210
There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, "always a well- AND point, citizens should replace them by electing people able to do so.
Role of the ballots to simulate USFG action—-key to fairness and ground, otherwise they wish away 9 minutes of offense
No impact to threat construction—-case turns the K
Kaufman 9 – Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, ’9 (Stuart J, "Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case," Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434)
Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war AND and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.
10/5/13
2AC
Tournament: Kentucky | Round: 5 | Opponent: Cal State Fullerton GR | Judge: Tim Barouch They oversimplify Eurocentrism
Kupperman ’5 (et al, Jeff Kupperman is an Associate Professor of Education at the University of Michigan-Flint and a core member of the University of Michigan’s Interactive Communications 26 Simulations group. Gary Weisserman is head of school at the 180-student Oakland Early College. He is also affiliated with the University of Michigan and West Bloomfield High School – Curriculum games: An online character-playing project as "ironist curriculum" – April 4, 2005 – available at: http://blog.jkupp.com/files/curriculum_games.pdf) This paper is a mixture of narrative and theory. The narratives were collected from AND new vocabularies, can have in creating a more just distribution of power.
( ) Curriculum’s best when it starts with fiated, state-based political action
Gitlin ’5 Todd Gitlin formerly served as professor of sociology and director of the mass communications program at the University of California, Berkeley, and then a professor of culture, journalism and sociology at New York University. He is now a professor of journalism and sociology and chair of the Ph.D. program in Communications at Columbia University. He was a long-time political activist( from the Left). From the Book: The Intellectuals and the Flag – 2005 – available via CIAO Books – date accessed 7/17/10 – http://www.ciaonet.org.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/book/git01/git01_04.pdf Weak thinking on the American left is especially glaring after September 11, 2001, AND useless. It amounts to secession from the world where most people live.
( ) Other forms of "politics" do exist – but here’s a pedagogy disad to those "anti-political" starting points. We’ll Also indicts critical theorists and their quest for "me-search".
Chandler ’7 (David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – "The Attraction of Post-Territorial Politics: Ethics and Activism in the International Sphere" – Inaugural Lecture – May – available at: http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/short_articles/Inaugural20lecture.pdf) However, politics is no less important to many of us today. Politics still AND about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world.
( ) Particularity Good. Sweeping K doesn’t prove specific rejoinder – makes decisions and scholarship worse.
Smith ’6 Dr. Benedict Smith – Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy and a member of staff at the University of Durham – Acta Analytica – Volume 21, Number 2 – available via Springer Link Database
In a related way, Dancy seeks to undermine certain ’coercive’ (Dancy 1993: AND serve to rationally constrain any candidate beliefs or actions in a given circumstance.
( ) Suffering not inevitable – results from context. If some is inevitable – degree matters.
Eagen ’4 (Jennifer Eagen – "Philisophical interests" September 9 http://home.earthlink.net/~~jeagan/id3.html) Suffering is the theme of two of my published papers, which both examine the AND e.g., gender). I’m looking forward to exploring this further.
( ) Nietzsche is wrong – can’t explain global dynamics
Colatrella ’11 Steven Colatrella, is a former Fulbright scholar. He has taught at several universities in Rome, Italy and at Bard College. He is currently at University of Maryland University College, Europe – Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, vol.9. no.1 — http://www.jceps.com/PDFs/09-1-05.pdf Missing in Agamben?s work – and by extension given his influences, in AND we can maximize our effect and even turn the situation to our advantage.
( ) Colonialism best evaluated by judge choice and contingency – their thesis is based on particulars masquerading as universals.
Varisco ’7 (Dr. Daniel Martin Varisco is a Professor of Anthropology and Director of Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies at Hofstra University– From the book: Reading orientalism – 2007 – page 54) Rather than parse out the principles by which an overarching ideology engineered historical interaction, AND the writer’s theme, without denning the field of evidence in advance."122
Imperialism doesn’t make war inevitable – that oversimplifies
Coontz’1 Phyllis D. Coontz, PhD Graduate School of Public and International Affairs University of Pittsburgh, et al, JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING, 2001, 18(4), 235-246 – J-Stor In the 1950s, psychiatrist and theorist Viktor Frankl (1963) described an existential AND and fu- ture to strengthen one’s present life (Reed, 1991b).
( ) They totalize the State – kills change and ignores it can work for good
Williams and Krause ’97 (Michael C., Assistant Political Science Pf- U of Southern Maine; Keith, Political Science Pf- Graduate Institute of International Studies, CRITICAL SECURITIES, p.xvi) Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a concern with the centrality of AND of influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary world politics.
Nietzsche 26 Ressentiment wrong – don’t generalize human experience based-on depressed dudes from the 1800’s. Foot ’1 (Philippa, Professor of philosophy at UCLA and Fellow of Somerville College- Oxford, "Nietzche: the Revaluation of Values," in NIETZCHE, Eds: John Richardson and Brian Leiter, p.220)
Now on some points in his psychological observation Nietzsche undoubtedly was right; he was AND and could see inhumanity on its present scale and its present blatant forms.
10/6/13
2AC 1AR UK Rd 3
Tournament: Kentucky | Round: 3 | Opponent: Chicago BP | Judge: Gus Eyzaguirre
CP
Plan is a disad to itself, Koreans dying bad
Would cause Extinction
Hayes and Green 10 (Peter, Professor of International Relations – Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and Director – Nautilus Institute, and Michael Hamel, Victoria University, "The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia", Nautilus Institute Special Report, 1-5, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments AND threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.
Their no capability ev is from 03, that’s bad
CP makes all aff impacts worse, that’s Ikenberry, Frye, Adler.
Conflicting signals inevitable—-formal checks irrelevant – their author
I recently posted my new paper on The Constitutional Power to Threaten War (forthcoming AND most important ways in which the United States government wields its military might. Here are three issues discussed in the paper that relate to Syria and the President’s AND the norm against using chemical weapons with U.S. military power. First, a point about constraints on the President: Whatever one thinks about the AND to the Syrian government, U.S. allies, and others. Some of that political constraint has probably come from Congress all along, and even AND and allies, alike – observing and reacting to those politics, too.
DA:
Vocal opposition’s inevitable and triggers the link —- binding checks are irrelevant
A. Democratic Constraints on the Power to the Threaten Force At first blush, including the power to threaten war or force in our understanding AND expend lots of political capital. As Jon Pevehouse and William Howell explain: When members of Congress vocally oppose a use of force, they undermine the president’s AND abandon, those military operations that do not involve vital strategic interests.145
First, as a descriptive matter, in the absence of formal legal checks on AND , and instead have focused on legally controlling the actual use of force.
No resolve or unified signal—-Syria decked everything
In the last two weeks we have witnessed potentially historic diplomacy in the Middle East. One hopes that this yields a safer Middle East and lessens the likelihood of the United States or Israel engaging in dangerous military operations. As the President pursues diplomacy with Syria and Iran, the U.S. Congress must reaffirm the tough policy positions that have gotten us to this point. It is more important than ever that the Congress affirm and strengthen its commitment to AND system as a lack of American resolve in opposition to Iranian nuclear development. A nuclear Iran would pose a far greater threat to our country than Syria likely AND radical Islam would achieve unprecedented and potentially irreversible power in the Middle East. A core, longstanding plank of the President’s policy to deter Iran from obtaining nuclear AND people and their leaders having shown themselves very wary of new military engagements. In the wake of the deal for the removal of chemical weapons from Syria, AND deter – by means of a credible military threat – Iranian nuclear development. And Congress must not delay in sending this message. Syria’s apparent use of chemical weapons—and the subsequent, lengthy debate about how to respond—underscore the need for Congress to speak well before Iran achieves a nuclear-weapons capability. Otherwise, Congressional action would be too late, and our deterrence policy will already have fallen short, with dire consequences. Notwithstanding all that has happened in Syria, Iran is currently accelerating the expansion of its uranium-enrichment capacity and the development of a reactor that can yield plutonium for bombs. Russia, newly emboldened and ever cynical, is reportedly on the verge of significant new arms sales to Iran. And while Iran’s new President Hassan Rouhani has signaled his desire to improve relations with the U.S., he has not matched his rhetoric with actions.
No impact to "flexibility"—-their ev uses it in a different context, like "flexibility to AVOID force"—-proves the plan’s a turn by decreasing threats
Congress would easily authorize force —- makes negotiations effective
Congress would authorize President Barack Obama to use military force to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program, under legislation Sen. Lindsey Graham plans to offer later this year. "My goal is to avoid war, and the best way to avoid war is to let the Iranians know they’re going to face one and lose," Graham said. The Seneca Republican, in an interview Tuesday at the Capitol, said he wants Congress to reinforce Obama’s position of not ruling out the use of military power to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb. "What I want to do this fall is try to get my colleagues to AND be the last card to play before we have to actually use force." Vice President Joe Biden said in March that Obama is "not bluffing" when it comes to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear capability. "We are not looking for war," Biden said in a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. "We are looking to and ready to negotiate peacefully, but all options, including military force, are on the table." Graham, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he agrees with the White House that preventing Iranians from developing nuclear weapons makes more sense than trying to contain them once the weapons are a reality. Introducing a war resolution in September or October, Graham said, would give more time for economic sanctions to work and would give the new Iranian president, Hasan Rawhani, a chance to act first. But Graham said he’s growing more skeptical Iran will stand down without a stronger threat of military action from the U.S. "If the Iranians thought for a moment that the U.S. would seriously consider taking out their nuclear program, it would reinforce the sanctions," Graham told European Union legislators visiting Washington. "Without a belief the American military would act, I think the Iranians are going to move forward." Anthony Cordesman, a security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said Graham’s legislation, assuming it receives broad bipartisan support, would also send a key message to U.S. friends in the region. "Many allies also wonder after Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria whether the U.S. is really willing to act," Cordesman said. In May, the Senate voted 99-0 for a resolution by Graham saying the U.S. supports Israel’s right to defend itself against Iran’s nuclear program, and that the U.S. would provide Israel with diplomatic, military and economic support if it came to that. Cordesman said the vote suggests authorizing use of force - without mandating it - also could get broad support in Congress. "It would get rid of reservations that do exist in Iran that basically you have a divided Congress and the president doesn’t have the public support he needs to act," Cordesman said.
Perm solves best - Multiplicity of theories is necessary to solve for human suffering and escape the current system. Only adopting Baudrillard’s alternative fails. Kellner, Kneller Philosophy of Education Chair Social Sciences and Comparative Education @UCLA, 1989 (Douglas, Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond, p.141-2)
Foucault’s merit in comparison with Baudrillard is the care with which he studies the institutions AND to other positions to provide more adequate theories of power in contemporary society.
Yet it would be a mistake to draw too sharp a distinction between the modern AND that aspires to a higher ground above the special interests of particular groups.
In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postmodern politics emerged AND as multiple sources of progressive change which can bring about "radical democracy."
? Even if their K’s true – the real world so buys-into simulated assumptions that our claims are accurate.
Here’s proof that the ballot as a tool for transgresson or resistance loses to presumption.
Ritter ’13 MICHAEL J. RITTER , J.D. – Mr. Ritter received his law degree (J.D.) from the University of Texas School of Law. He is a former debater and currently coordinates the NATIONAL JOURNAL OF SPEECH 26 DEBATE – NJSD – VOLUME II: ISSUE One – SEPTEMBER 2013 – http://site.theforensicsfiles.com/NJSD.2-1.Final.pdf
Many students who participate in comp etitive interscholastic debate in high school and college 20 AND the exclusion of out - of - round, non - competitive discussions.
Here’s ev specific to Baudrillaird that says his nihilism is so extreme that it’s action-denying and should presumptively be deemed wrong .. We’re sure "it’s not their Baudrilliard" – but that begs the question of what is being negated.
Gilman-Opalsky ’10 Richard Gilman-Opalsky. Ph.D .. is Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Springfield – Theory in Action v. 3 no. 2 (April 2010) p. 9-37 Simulacra are, by definition, indistinguishable from real events. Nevertheless, the actual AND thinking a faked death was real than that a real death was faked.
Baudrilliard’s nihilism denies progressivism and cements the worst violence
Gilman-Opalsky ’10 Richard Gilman-Opalsky. Ph.D .. is Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Springfield – Theory in Action v. 3 no. 2 (April 2010) p. 9-37
We must also ask, from a political point of view, what it means AND , and where one hopes that the best heads will enter the fray."
( ) Baudrillard’s scholarship flawed on solvency questions– their pessimism of the squo and optimism toward the Aff are off.
Gilman-Opalsky ’10 Richard Gilman-Opalsky. Ph.D .. is Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Springfield – Theory in Action v. 3 no. 2 (April 2010) p. 9-37 In short. while Baudrillard’s work is indispensable for the evolution of a critical theory AND is rightly and frequently seen as an iconic post• modernist.’"
Baudrillard’s philosophy justifies terrorism. Butterfield 2 ~Bradley, Assistant Professor of English at University of Wisconsin at La Crosse, "The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9/11, and the War of Good and Evil" Postmodern Culture, volume 13, September, 2002, Project MUSE~ In Simulacra and Simulations (1981), Baudrillard wrote that systemic nihilism and the mass AND justified the World Trade Center attack. (Kelly et al. 4)
( ) Baudrillard’s scholarship wrong – no basis for defensive "simulation" args or offensive "trying to know bad" arg
Gilman-Opalsky ’10 Richard Gilman-Opalsky. Ph.D .. is Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Springfield – Theory in Action v. 3 no. 2 (April 2010) p. 9-37
Unfortunately, Baudrillard ’s work from the 1980s to 2007 is full of (perhaps AND most valuable within this post-World War II French intellectual trajectory. 13
( ) Baudrillard wrong – reality exists
Matthias ’7 (Michael – frequent contributor to Daily Kos – self-described liberal in Philly…also a fan of South Park – and who isn’t ?... Daily Kos – March 7th – http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/03/07/309298/-Baudrillard-is-not-really-dead) Baudrillard is not really dead......he is just simulated that way. The Guardian AND , such as Foucault or Bourdieu, who were also difficult and French.
( ) The hyper-reality K reifies – the remedy is contingent logic.
Case is a prereq to alt solvency —- the linguistic turn we advocate through discussion AND superseded, whereby it becomes an inadequate moment in a wider critical process.
Just because something is a social construction doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist at all - our evidence gives multiple examples Mackinnon No Date Given ~Catharine, "Points against postmodernism" Chicago-Kent Law Review, http://www.adelinotorres.com/filosofia/Against20Postmodernism.pdf~~ It is my view that it is the relation of theory to reality that feminism changed, and it is in part a reversion to a prefeminist relation of theory to reality that postmodernism is reimposing. This is not about truth. Truth is a generality, an abstraction of a certain shape and quality. Social realities are something else again. Postmodernism has decided that because truth died with God, there are no social facts. The fact that reality is a social construction does not mean that it is not there; it means that it is there, in society, where we live. According to postmodernism, there are no facts; everything is a reading, so there can be no lies. Apparently it cannot be known whether the Holocaust is a hoax, whether women love to be raped, whether Black people are genetically intellectually inferior to white people, whether homosexuals are child molesters. To postmodernists, these factish things are indeterminate, contingent, in play, all a matter of interpretation. Similarly, whether or not acts of incest happened or are traumatic to children become fogged over in "epistemological quandaries" as beyond thinking, beyond narrative, beyond intelligibility, as "this event that is no event"—as if survivors have not often reported, in intelligible narratives, that such events did happen and did harm them.41 That violation often damages speech and memory does not mean that, if one has speech and memory, one was not violated. Recall when Bill Clinton, asked about his sexual relationship with a young woman intern, said that it all depended on what "is" means. The country jeered his epistemic dodge as a transparent and slimy subterfuge to evade accountability: get real. The postmodernists were strangely silent. But you can’t commit perjury if there are no facts. Where are these people when you need them?
( ) Baudrillard epistemically flawed and can’t challenge oppression
Leitch ’96 By Professor Vincent B Leitch – Chair in English George Lynn Cross Research Professor University of Oklahoma Postmodernism—: Local Effects, Global Flows – p.19-20
To enter into orbit is to split off from the real into hyperreality; to AND , however, worrying systems of exploitation, which seems a crucial limitation.
( ) Baudrillard’s epistemic K is wrong.
Stevenson ’2 Dr. Nick Stevenson, The University of Nottingham, Senior Lecturer in Sociology – ¶ Understanding Media Cultures: Social Theory and Mass Communication – p. 180
From a different angle, the fast-flowing world of media images has been AND money and power. Unfortunately Baudrillard’s nihilistic social theory renders such issues irrelevant.
Joint Operations – 2AC
Plan’s key to effective joint operations
Moss 8 (Kenneth B., Professor and Chair of the Department of National Security Studies at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Formerly affiliated with the Siemens Corporation, the Woodrow Wilson Center, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Undeclared War and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 220-221)
While the Constitution’s authors would rightly view the current U.S. situation with AND inattention, even disregard, of its own constitution in war and peace.
However, this growing geostrategic reliance on maritime power emerges at a problematic time. AND ought to be achievable by U.S. forces alone if necessary.
Solves great power war
Conway 7 (James T., General – U.S. Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral – U.S. Navy, Thad W. Allen, Admiral – U.S. Coast Guard, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," October, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf)
No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers AND and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.
First, as a descriptive matter, in the absence of formal legal checks on AND , and instead have focused on legally controlling the actual use of force.
The men and women who eventually become president may not come into this world with AND has nearly every president who came before him and as will the next.
—- food conflicts go global —- extinction
Calvin 98 (William, Theoretical Neurophysiologist – U Washington, Atlantic Monthly, January, Vol 281, No. 1, p. 47-64)
The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields would AND longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.
10/5/13
Hostilities 1AC
Tournament: GSU | Round: 1 | Opponent: West Georgia AM | Judge: Justin Green
1AC – Executive Precedents
Contention One is: Executive Precedents
Unchecked war power sets a precedent now.
Barron ’8 David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the " AND a workable alternative, such forgetting will be far less likely to occur.
The precedent spills-beyond war power. Means executives are unchecked on many issues.
Barron ’8 David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis Moreover, this historical account performs at least one function beyond supplying information relevant to AND for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.
It gets modeled worldwide. Debates about the precedent check preventive wars and other abuses of executive authority.
Sloane ’8 (Robert Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis) There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of AND to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.
Legislative restraints means fewer Executives starting fewer conflicts worldwide. For executive authority, teaching the heuristic of work within institutions is a pre-req.
Grynaviski ’13 Eric Grynaviski, Professor of Political Science at The George Washington University, "The Bloodstained Spear: Public Reason and Declarations of War", International Theory, 5(2), Cambridge Journals
Conclusion The burden of the argument, thus far, has been to show that AND well as more recent issues such as the targeted killing of political leaders.
Pragmatism’s key in this context. "Root cause" and "cure-alls" won’t check violence.
Bacevich ’13 Andrew, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, The New American Militarism, p. 205-210
There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, "always a well- AND point, citizens should replace them by electing people able to do so.
Legislative checks solve both advantages. Without them, executive-induced casualties will persist.
Zelizer ’11 Julian E. Zelizer, Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton University, "War Powers Belong to Congress and the President", CNN Opinion, 6-27, http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/27/zelizer.war.powers/index.html But the failure of Congress to fully participate in the initial decision to use military AND declare war forces voters to think about the decision sooner rather than later.
Preventive war standard causes large death tolls globally.
Williams ’12 Ryan – Assistant Professor, Western State University College of Law – "DANGEROUS PRECEDENT: AMERICA’S ILLEGAL WAR IN AFGHANISTAN" – University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2012 – https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/145-williams33upajintll5632011pdf
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FIGHTING THIS ILLEGAL WAR America should be concerned about setting a AND . The negative consequences of establishing such a precedent should not be underestimated.
Drones Advantage
Contention Two – Drones
Lack of a legislative role cedes war-fighting to the executive. This drives secretive policy – including the squo’s non-transparent drone policy.
Twelve and a half years after Congress didn’t declare war on an organization of hundreds AND Middle East and what’s left of American democracy and liberties are further destabilized.
Drones can’t be wished-away – they’ll exist in other nations. Even if Congress did little, public light matters. A more-transparent precedent dissuades global use and halts a distinct mechanism for violence versus dissent.
Boyle ’13 Dr. Michael Boyle has an interdisciplinary background. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia. He was previously a Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St. Andrews. He holds a Ph.D. from The University of Cambridge, 2005; an M.P.P. from the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2001; a M.Phil, from the University of Cambridge, 1999 – "The costs and consequences of drone warfare" – International Affairs; 89: 1 (2013) 1–29 – http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf
An important, but overlooked, strategic consequence of the Obama administra - tion’s embrace AND to shrug off the loss of life that drones inflict on others today.
Drones cause deaths. This ev also proves international experiences are a "starting-point boomerang" shaping oppressive domestic practices.
Graham ’10 STEPHEN GRAHAM is Professor of Cities and Society at Newcastle University and previously taught at Durham and MIT, among other universities. Cities Under Siege: the New Military Urbanism – p. xiii-xvii
Such fantasies of high -tech omnipotence are much more than science fiction. As AND security operations, is the second key feature of the new military urbanism.
Plan text
The United States Federal Government should not authorize Presidential initiation of offensive military force without prior Congressional authorization.
Underview – 1AC
Macro-Institutional starting points are often critiqued. But micro-starting points of SELF or societal, instead of State, transformation are less effective in this narrow context.
Stuhr ’8 (John J, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy at Emory University "A Terrible Love of Hope", The Journal of Speculative Philosophy New Series, Volume 22, Number 4, Project Muse)
And then what, now what? What should a meliorist do? Terrible lovers AND peace must be, in the broadest sense of the term, educational.
Particularity Thesis. Sweeping claims don’t undercut the Aff. We can advance contingent and particular knowledge without "Big T" Truths.
If we lose pre-fiat, then we do nothing. But non-concrete activism is WORSE THAN NOTHING. No Framework QUESTION can veer this round from the NEXUS QUESTION OF CONCRETE ALTS. Without those, we’re awful activists.
Bryant ’12 (EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE – the author said "she" and it was replaced with the word "to" – Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied ’disclosedness’ with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, "Critique of the Academic Left", http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)
I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because AND . Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.
Even if "fiat’s not real", and Affs don’t control levers of power today, we advance a heuristic. Without this heuristic of fiat, we’ll re-enforce dangerous nihilism.
Hoff ’6 (et al, Dr. Dianne Hoff, professor in the College of Education and Human Development and president of Faculty Senate, University of Maine, Journal of Educational Administration, 44:3 – available via Emerald Management 120 database).
There is no question that helping educational leadership students become self-analytical and reflect AND . This is an arena from which a new social order can emerge.
Our heuristic’s about CONCRETE and Pragmatic ALTS. It’s important regardless of drones or executive power. Helps us learn to check violence.
Small ’6 (Jonathan, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition, "Moving Forward," The Journal for Civic Commitment, Spring, http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.jsp) What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip AND engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context.
And, if the debate winds-up a "tie", presumption should shift in favor of change – best avoids nihilism.
Serial Policy Failure wrong and Policy Nihilism Bad.
Tallis ’97 Raymond Tallis, Professor of Geriatric Medicine at the University of Manchester – Enemies of Hope: A Critique of Contemporary Pessimism, Published by Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 0312173261, p. 407-409
If we deny or rubbish the progress that mankind has already made, and at AND poverty of spirit and meanness of mind will not have the last word.
We’re not pro-State, but we’re "anti-anti State". Some things can ONLY be solved "through the system". Lifting existing POTUS authority is such an issue:
Barbrook ’97 (Dr. Richard, School of Westminster, Nettime, "More Provocations", 6-5, ¶ http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html) I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left AND can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.
9/22/13
Hostilities 1AC UK Rd 3
Tournament: Kentucky | Round: 3 | Opponent: Chicago BP | Judge: Gus Eyzaguirre
Contention 1 —- Intervention
Congress has abdicated war powers, leaving no check on unitary executive war-making
Last week Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York warned that "if we don’t AND , as in the case of Rep. Nadler, it can happen.
Executive war power structurally ensures groupthink and escalatory interventions
Fleischman 10 – Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, "A Functional Distribution of War Powers", New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. 26 Pub. Pol’y 137, Lexis
While Nzelibe and Yoo’s model is clearly plausible, it misses certain critical institutional constructs AND that justifies abandoning the traditional and effective means of coming to a decision. The first argument offered by Nzelibe and Yoo reasons that presidents tend to be held AND lead to short-term political gain and an unwillingness to concede defeat. Furthermore, ex post congressional constraints on presidential actions are insufficient. The fact is AND viewed as endangering troops n109 or giving America a weaker image abroad. n110 The second way in which Nzelibe and Yoo justify expansive executive powers is by arguing AND , correcting the disparities should negate the odds of Type I errors occurring. The third functional argument presented by Nzelibe and Yoo concerns the relative value of signaling AND should decrease the likelihood of Type I errors with respect to all regimes. The totality of the analysis suggests that deliberation decreases the likelihood of Type I errors AND around a particular opinion, executive staffers are likely to possess policy preferences.
Type II errors (not entering "good" wars) would only be more likely under the Congress-First approach if Congress were more likely than the Executive to be opposed to good wars. However, since research shows that Congress is likely to approve most wars independent of circumstances n125 that is highly unlikely to be the case. But there is no reason to believe that Congress has any aversion to good wars. n126 Ultimately, a Congress-First system would decrease Type I errors and have little impact on Type II errors when dealing with traditional warfare, and it is the institutional design that would better accommodate functionalists’ concerns and desires.
~{11~} The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse AND to an examination of the judiciary’s contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.
An Increasing Tempo of Operations All of this came just before the United States emerged as the world’s single global power — a global empire — that by definition would be waging war at an increased tempo, from Kuwait, to Haiti, to Kosovo, to Afghanistan, to Iraq, and so on in an ever-increasing number of operations. And now in Libya, we have reached the point that even resolutions are no longer needed. It is said that there is no precedent for fighting al Qaeda, for example, because it is not a nation but a subnational group. Therefore, Bush could not reasonably have been expected to ask for a declaration of war. But there is precedent: Thomas Jefferson asked for and received a declaration of war against the Barbary pirates. This authorized Jefferson to wage war against a subnational group of pirates as if they were a nation. Had Bush requested a declaration of war on al Qaeda on Sept. 12, AND they were or to move to block them wherever the president saw fit. Leaving aside the military wisdom of Afghanistan or Iraq, the legal and moral foundations AND . Bush did not. He worked in twilight between war and peace. One of the dilemmas that could have been avoided was the massive confusion of whether AND to prevent the other side from acting, not to punish the actors. The Importance of the Declaration A declaration of war, I am arguing, is an essential aspect of war AND both frees and restrains the president, as it was meant to do. I began by talking about the American empire. I won’t make the argument on that here, but simply assert it. What is most important is that the republic not be overwhelmed in the course of pursuing imperial goals. The declaration of war is precisely the point at which imperial interests can overwhelm republican prerogatives. There are enormous complexities here. Nuclear war has not been abolished. The United AND the republic. If this can be done, what can’t be done? My readers will know that I am far from squeamish about war. I have AND of citizens to waging war requires meticulous attention to the law and proprieties. As our international power and interests surge, it would seem reasonable that our commitment AND -or-death matter, a tonic for our adolescent body politic.
Requiring prior Congressional authorization for war deters adventurism
Bacevich 13 – Andrew, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, The New American Militarism, p. 205-210
There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, "always a well- AND point, citizens should replace them by electing people able to do so.
The process makes conflict less likely, regardless of Congress’ response
Grynaviski 13 – Eric Grynaviski, Professor of Political Science at The George Washington University, "The Bloodstained Spear: Public Reason and Declarations of War", International Theory, 5(2), Cambridge Journals
Conclusion The burden of the argument, thus far, has been to show that no AND are fully responsible for the harms that wars inevitably do to the innocent. One broader implication of the argument for declarations of war is to relate institutional solutions AND case is probably an important condition for any of these schemes to work. The international system likely will not include robust, impartial international institutions that can make AND or inflict humanitarian causalities in wars declared for humanitarian reasons (Finnemore 2009). A broader implication relates to public reason and just war thinking. Showing that poorly AND to rostra (the platform in the forum where speakers could be heard). Cicero’s distinction between force and argument is central to his thinking about the conditions under AND
he is falling and no longer has control over his actions.22 Modern discussions of ethics in war usually discount diplomatic solutions. In doing so, AND diplomacy does not loom large as a central component of just war reasoning.
Contention 2 —- Warfighting
Power projection structurally fails because operations are guided by incoherent strategies disconnected from national political will
Understanding the Gap Since World War II, a wide gap has developed between Congress and the executive AND resulted in the expenditure of national blood and treasure for strategically hollow ends. The Constitution is, in itself, a strategic national security document. The founders’ AND wage fewer of them—and be far better positioned to win them.
That crushes unit cohesion, morale, and allied support —- Congressional approval’s key
Frye 2 – Alton Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow Emeritus and Director of the Program on Congress and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism", Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 4-17, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/applying-war-powers-resolution-war-terrorism/p4514
4. CONSENSUS IS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL COHESION AND was founded, and in that insight may be found the germ of other innovations to guarantee that Congress will play its proper constitutional role in the war on terrorism.
Effective power projection stops hotspot escalation to nuclear war
Kagan 7 – Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, "The Case for Larger Ground Forces", Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan_OHanlon_07.pdf
We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but AND position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing AND forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. AND moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few AND personnelintensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while AND Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.
This is statistically proven
Drezner 5 – Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Senior Editor at the National Interest, M.A. in Economics and Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University, "Gregg Easterbrook, War, and the Dangers of Extrapolation", 5-25, http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html
Via Oxblog’s Patrick Belton, I see that Gregg Easterbrook has a cover story in AND , the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.
Executive war power ruins soft power and global alliances
Schiffer 9 – Adam Schiffer, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, and Carrie Liu Currier, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, "War Powers, International Alliances, the President, and Congress", http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/public/repository/US_Gov_Balance_of_Power_SF.pdf
The president’s advantages over Congress in the foreign policy realm have consequences far beyond the AND the second Bush administration has raised alarm in many countries around the world. In the past, the bipolar nature of the international system and the lack of AND presidential authority led to very disparate degrees of support from the international community. These two examples of U.S. military action in the Middle East offer AND was acknowledged as within the acceptable parameters as determined by the global community. In contrast, the 2003 war in Iraq did not gain the support of the AND other actors to give legitimacy to the U.S.-led war. The battle between the unilateralists and multilateralists with regard to U.S. foreign AND and how they are used to establish the legitimacy of American foreign policy.
Restraining use of force builds democratic cooperation that prevents and mitigates food shortages
Many Americans see terrorism as the principal threat to security, but for much of AND For them, it is the next meal that is the overriding concern."
Contention 3 —- SOP
Unchecked war power sets a precedent that causes the executive to broadly ignore Congressional controls
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the " AND Moreover, this historical account performs at least one function beyond supplying information relevant to AND for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.
U.S. war powers are modeled internationally —- precedent of executive authority encourages preemptive conflict in Korea
Sloane 8 – Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 (Robert, Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis)
There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of AND to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.
Despite everything, this crisis will almost certainly not peak with North Korea deciding to AND this. We do not know whether Mr Kim’s is hot or cold.
Korea escalates —- model of preemption bypasses their defense
Pulcifer 3 – Ash Pulcifer, U.S. Based Analyst of International Conflicts and Human Rights Activist at the Information Clearing House, "The Dangers Caused By A Policy Of Preemption", 3-1, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1722.htm
Furthermore, North Korea jabbed the sword even deeper into the heart of White House rhetoric when they claimed that Pyongyang reserved the right to preemptively attack hostile nations21 Pyongyang’s clever strategy turned Washington’s preemption policy on its head and left the Bush administration without an adequate response. Since then, the administration has offered some economic incentives to the North, in AND , tough words such as Rumsfeld’s are usually used to cover up falsities. This is where the danger lies in the Bush administration’s policy of arm bending diplomacy AND concessions from the United States, or they will increase their nuclear forces. In the case that North Korea creates or increases their nuclear arsenal, it will AND the United States to refrain from creating another crisis on the Korean peninsula. So, while to the outside observer it may look as if North Korea is AND , can often lead to unexpected conflicts that quickly spiral out of control.
This is based on internal documents, not Western IR
As witnessed by two nuclear tests and intermittent missile launches, the¶ so- AND the¶ current world order and to build a new world order.25
Requiring formal declaration of war restores Congressional war powers and balances SOP by checking the Executive
Weinberger 9 – Seth Weinberger, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound, M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University, "Balancing War Powers in an Age of Terror", The Good Society, 18(2), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v018/18.2.weinberger.html
The key to developing a constitutionally, legally, and practically sound balanced theory of AND ), and the participation in the NATO operation against Kosovo (1999).14 It is this disparity that is a major source of the current imbalance of war AND policy outcomes in limbo to be challenged in U.S. courts. Restoring meaning to the power to declare war offers a way to restore congressional war AND , even if the nation is engaged in armed conflict with an enemy. This distinction between the powers of the legislative branch and those of the executive branch AND laws from the power to enforce them. As John Locke tells us: It may be too great a temptation to human frailty apt to grasp at power AND rest of the community, contrary to the ends of society and government. Madison, Hamilton, and Locke sum up the fears expressed by many over the exercises of power by President Bush in the war on terror. As one prominent critic put it, President Bush is trying to "eliminate nearly all the checks and balances that have been traditionally understood to limit the power of the president."18 The power to declare war, when properly understood, provides Congress with a powerful AND over appropriations ensures that Congress can always end a conflict it deems unwise. Rather, a declaration of war is about acknowledging the severity of a threat to AND and the president did not need expanded domestic powers to prosecute the wars. By contrast, while the war on terror does have components that look like traditional AND branch of American government. The power to declare war provides that check. Understanding the declare war clause along these lines clearly separates potential armed conflicts into distinct AND used and what powers can be called upon to support the military effort. In a perfect war: One whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every place, and under every circumstance. In such a war all the members act under a general authority, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.20 In a perfect war, the entire energy of the nation is directed towards the effort, while an imperfect war is fought in a more ~End Page 6~ limited manner. Justice Chase’s concurrence in Bas explains the limitations that result from a war being imperfect: Congress has not declared war in general terms, but Congress has authorized hostilities on AND only to citizens appointed by commissions or exposed to immediate outrage and violence. A war of the formally declared, or perfect, type involves a level and AND for food and materiel, or even intern large numbers of American citizens. When the country is not in a state of perfect war by virtue of a AND power to take over the mills and force them to produce steel.21 Despite Truman’s claim of inherent authority and military necessity, the seizure of the mills was struck down as it was, according to Justice Black’s opinion, "lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President. … In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."22 Furthermore: The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as AND a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.23 When the president wants to take, pursuant to his powers as commander-in AND terrorist organizations, or change the rules governing the procedures for military commissions. In wartime, however, it may be neither expedient nor strategically sound for the AND Congress time and time again to enact laws to advance the war effort. The declarations of war for World Wars I and II both contain specific, particular AND than when using force in a less comprehensive manner during a limited conflict. "All the resources of the government" and "all of the resources of AND congressional legislation, there are still certain constitutional guarantees that cannot be ignored. In the narrow interpretation advanced by the Bush administration, the trigger for the president’s AND in the balance of powers between the president and Congress in wartime."27 This argument is unsatisfying on two grounds. First, it cannot be said that AND 1989 Panama War, or of Yugoslavs during the Kosovo conflict. …"29 The second reason that this argument does not work is in the language of the AND war powers and places the president at the height of his war powers. But the language of the AUMFs does not support such an argument. Where the AND times of crisis, Congress still can and must play an important role. As President Ford admonished, a theory of war powers must be capable of functioning AND -so to undo that separation, even in the face of war.
Plan –
The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force.
Plan’s the perfect balance that checks the Executive but preserves defensive capabilities
Lobel 8 – Jules Lobel, Professor at University of Pittsburgh Law School, "War Powers for the 21st Century: The Constitutional Perspective", Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, 4-10, http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lob041008.htm
III Revising the War Powers Resolution I believe that it is necessary and possible to reform the War Powers Resolution, and that H.R. Res. 53 is an excellent step in that direction. The first, crucial revision contained in the new statute is the language in Section 3 prohibiting the President from initiating warfare without clear authorization from Congress, unless he or she is acting to repel armed attacks on United States territories, troops or citizens. Various administrations and commentators have argued that the situations in which the President requires AND respond to attacks on U.S. territories, troops or citizens. One could, of course, hypothesize a myriad of situations where the nation AND any rationality, be turned into a justification for "launching sudden attacks." Today, as in 1787, the reality is that American national security can AND rumors, reports, intuitions, or even informed intelligence warnings of attacks. Moreover, Congress has demonstrated that where United States national security is seriously threatened AND Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, or the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. It is true that many situations will be murky, complicated or divisive and therefore that quick congressional action will not be forthcoming. But in those cases, the United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise. While there might be rare future emergencies not covered under the repel armed attack AND President Lincoln argued should be done when faced with such grave emergency crises. From this constitutional perspective, section 3 of the Constitutional War Powers Amendments of AND be subject to misinterpretation. As then congressman Abraham Lincoln argued in 1848, Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repell an invasion . . . and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect.22
Plan overcomes barriers to enforcement
Lobel 9 – Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution". Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org files CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization AND disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law. To ensure that this principle is enforced, new legislation should prohibit the use of AND a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.
Obama will comply
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also AND even purported to regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed. Even since claims of preclusive power emerged in full, the practice within the executive AND almost no actual defiance of statutory limitations predicated on such a constitutional theory. This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential executive branch stance is not, we AND , the Constitution compels the Commander in Chief to comply with legislative restrictions. In this way, the founding legal charter itself exhorts the President to justify controversial AND the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.
Even if initial non-compliance occurs, Court enforcement solves
Garcia 12 – Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, "War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution", Congressional Research Service Report, 2-17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30352.pdf
The courts have made clear, however, that while formidable, none of the AND unlikely that the courts will venture into this politically and constitutionally charged thicket.
10/5/13
Hostilities 1AC and 2AC
Tournament: GSU | Round: 4 | Opponent: Georgia KS | Judge: Michael Hall
1AC
Contention 1 —- Intervention
Congress has abdicated war powers, leaving no check on unitary executive war-making
Last week Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York warned that "if we don’t AND , as in the case of Rep. Nadler, it can happen.
Executive war power structurally ensures groupthink and escalatory interventions
Fleischman 10 – Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, "A Functional Distribution of War Powers", New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. 26 Pub. Pol’y 137, Lexis
While Nzelibe and Yoo’s model is clearly plausible, it misses certain critical institutional constructs AND that justifies abandoning the traditional and effective means of coming to a decision. The first argument offered by Nzelibe and Yoo reasons that presidents tend to be held AND lead to short-term political gain and an unwillingness to concede defeat. Furthermore, ex post congressional constraints on presidential actions are insufficient. The fact is AND viewed as endangering troops n109 or giving America a weaker image abroad. n110 The second way in which Nzelibe and Yoo justify expansive executive powers is by arguing AND , correcting the disparities should negate the odds of Type I errors occurring. The third functional argument presented by Nzelibe and Yoo concerns the relative value of signaling AND should decrease the likelihood of Type I errors with respect to all regimes. The totality of the analysis suggests that deliberation decreases the likelihood of Type I errors AND around a particular opinion, executive staffers are likely to possess policy preferences. Type II errors (not entering "good" wars) would only be more AND it is the institutional design that would better accommodate functionalists’ concerns and desires.
~{11~} The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse AND to an examination of the judiciary’s contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.
Terrorist spoofing
Blumrosen 11 – Alfred W. Blumrosen, Professor Emeritus at the Rutgers School of Law and Steven M. Blumrosen, J.D., Quinnipiac University School of Law, "Restoring the Congressional Duty to Declare War", Rutgers Law Review, Winter, 63 Rutgers L. Rev. 407, Lexis
Conclusion We have placed a heavy burden on June 1-4, 1787 to correct AND enormous debt on the United States with no visible gain to the country. We cannot prove that these two disasters would not have happened if Congress had taken AND unlimited power, in the immediate impact of the 9/11 carnage. The Congress must decide whether to take military action against an enemy even if we AND its response to a President’s claims of serious attacks on the United States. Professor Phillip Bobbit has focused on the difficulties of assigning "blame" for a AND This would suit only those who believe that western civilization is an abomination.
Groupthink causes Korean war
Gregg 13 – Donald P. Gregg, Chair of the Pacific Century Institute, Former National Security Advisor for Bush I, Former Ambassador to South Korea, 4/12/13 (Korea Times, "President Obama’s Edsel problem" Lexis)
How did that come about? Apparently in those days Detroit’s engineers were vulnerable to AND did we fight them when what they wanted was a peace treaty?’
So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could AND tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.
Requiring prior Congressional authorization for war deters adventurism
Dickerson 9 – Annette Warren Dickerson, Director of Education 26 Outreach for the Center for Constitutional Rights, "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution", Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
Reform the War Powers Resolution The War Powers Resolution has failed. Every president since the enactment of the Act AND seek relief, or that the claim presents non-justifiable political questions. The War Powers Resolution, as written, was flawed in several key respects. AND in is before hostilities are commenced, not 60 or 90 days afterward. Secondly, the War Powers Resolution correctly recognized that even congressional silence, inaction or AND responded by effectually saying: if Congress did nothing, why should we? Reforming the War Powers Resolution is a project that will require leadership from the President and the political will of Congress, working together in the service and preservation of the Constitution. In light of the abuses that have taken place under the Bush administration, it is the responsibility of a new administration to insist on transparency in the drafting of new legislation. There is a long history of attempts to revise the War Powers Resolution. As new legislation is drafted, though, it will be important to focus on the central constitutional issues. Much time has been spent in debating how to address contingencies. It will be impossible to write into law any comprehensive formula for every conceivable situation, though; much more important will be establishing the fundamental principles of reform: The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization. The only exception should be the executive’s power in an emergency to use short-term force to repel sudden attacks on US territories, troops or citizens. It is true that many potential conflict situations will be murky, complicated or divisive, and that quick congressional action may not always be forthcoming. Yet, history shows the folly of launching wars that are not supported by the American people. The United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise. Today, as in 1787, the reality is that the interests of the people AND disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law.
Contention 2 —- Warfighting
Power projection structurally fails because operations are guided by incoherent strategies disconnected from national political will
Understanding the Gap Since World War II, a wide gap has developed between Congress and the executive AND history does not clearly reveal the structural and political dimensions of this phenomenon. The Constitution grants most foreign policy prerogative to Congress in Article I. Article II AND . Consequently, considerable power has flowed from Congress to the president.50 Execution of US foreign policy is fraught with political uncertainty and vulnerability. Compared to AND to oversee the nation’s foreign policy has exposed America to unacceptable strategic risk. War, Strategy, and the Constitution One of Clausewitz’ greatest contributions to the study of war is his emphasis on the AND political dimension despite the recent emergence of nonstate actors and transnational groups.56 In other words, success at the tactical level of war first requires careful preparations AND political objectives, and commitment of resources sufficient to achieve strategic objectives.58 Since 1945, the United States has built the world’s most capable war-fighting machine. So why, then, have most of the nation’s large military interventions since World War II ended in defeat or, at best, stalemate? Political leaders should attend more to what Clausewitz calls the political dimensions of war—national unity and the political value of the objective—as inseparable from national and military strategy. War theorists have long emphasized the importance of national unity and the political value of AND mobilized for war, we must first examine our own political aim."60 National unity underwrites the commitment the nation needs to successfully prosecute war, provided the AND , and the will and support of Congress to support the war.62 A Risk to Strategy As the practice of declaring war has become passé, American strategy has likewise become AND 63 This connection, Clausewitz observed, is necessary for success in war. For example, US strategy following World War II ironically came to resemble the German AND which has little tolerance for long, risky, or uncertain conflicts.65 More recently, as the executive branch exercises greater authority in directing military interventions, AND American people’s collective will in their efforts to subvert our national strategy.67 Vietnam Strategy The tragic military and political experience of Vietnam was spawned by an aggressive president promoting AND , failing to determine strategic objectives and the means to obtain them.70 President Johnson made numerous decisions concerning the strategy and operations of the war, resulting in a strategy of incremental gradualism. Despite some tactical successes, Vietnam strategy never developed sufficient coherence nor the sustained support of the American people. Through executive design, Congress and the people never fully vetted the value of the political objective in the context of large-scale military intervention before President Johnson committed forces to combat.71 As a result, President Johnson lacked the top cover of a war declaration. AND the American people; they could not have cared less about Vietnam.73 Afghanistan and Iraq Strategies The strategies for the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have both failed to properly incorporate national strategic ends, ways, and means in a consistent manner across the whole of government. In the absence of a national consensus on strategic ends, Congressman James Marshall (D-GA) not surprisingly identified: The mismatches among the needs of post-conflict stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the size and the types of military forces available, and the pitiful scarcity of capability in the civilian branches of our government to effect nation-building efforts, as well as, our utter incompetence as a government in strategic communications.74 US Afghanistan strategy has continually morphed from 2001 to the present. The sweeping language AND support for the effort when the strategy did not unfold as planned.78 Eventually, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and their strategies became focal points in AND exposing the strategies to additional, unnecessary risk at a crucial time.79 Another Cry for Reform In 2009, The National War Powers Commission, a bipartisan group commissioned under the AND declaration for "large" force deployments and "significant armed conflict."81 The Commission recommended replacing the 1973 WPR with the War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 AND deploying forces into significant armed conflict without the full blessing of Congress.83 Conclusion Reminiscent of the 1973 WPR, the National War Powers Commission’s effort to redress war AND resulted in the expenditure of national blood and treasure for strategically hollow ends. The Constitution is, in itself, a strategic national security document. The founders’ AND wage fewer of them—and be far better positioned to win them.
Libya removed all remaining checks on unilateral executive war-making —- ruins accountability and signal of unified resolve
The president followed no clear historical standard when he unilaterally decided to use force in Libya. Once this action continued beyond his original definition of "days, not weeks," into months and months, he did not seek the approval of Congress to continue military activities. And, while administration members may have discussed this matter with some members of Congress, the administration never formally conferred with the legislative branch as a coequal partner in our constitutional system. Obviously, these points are not raised out of any lasting love for the late AND also the region-wide dispersion of thousands of weapons from Qaddafi’s armories. The inaction (some of it deliberate) of key congressional leaders during this period AND . We know he can do it because he already has done it. Few leaders in the legislative branch even asked for a formal debate over this exercise of unilateral presidential power, and in the Senate any legislation pertaining to the issue was prevented from reaching the floor. One can only wonder at what point these leaders or their successors might believe it is their constitutional duty to counter unchecked executive power exercised on behalf of overseas military action. AT BOTTOM, what we have witnessed in these instances, as with many others AND , to assert the authority that forms the basis of our governmental structure. When it comes to the long-term commitments that our country makes in the AND the authority that was so wisely given to it so many years ago. And as for the presidency, a final thought is worth pondering. From a AND America is united and not acting merely at the discretion of one individual.
That crushes unit cohesion, morale, and allied support —- Congressional approval’s key
Frye 2 – Alton Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow Emeritus and Director of the Program on Congress and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism", Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 4-17, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/applying-war-powers-resolution-war-terrorism/p4514
4. CONSENSUS IS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL COHESION The case for active, continuing congressional engagement on the many issues of high policy presented by an open-ended campaign against terrorism does not rest on an instinct for institutional self-aggrandizement. It is grounded in the critical need to forge and maintain America’s social cohesion as a nation caught up in war. War, especially prolonged war, always poses the risk of depleting that cohesion, so vital to domestic harmony and international effectiveness. Members of Congress should also realize how essential their involvement is to the morale and AND parallel, policy-centered procedures outlined here would serve that same need. Congress’s stand on how our nation uses the mighty arsenal at its disposal also bears AND when he acts "pursuant to an explicit or implied authorization of Congress." Marshaling international coalitions to wage the war on terrorism will depend importantly on giving our allies confidence that American power is guided and restrained by a disciplined relationship between Congress and President. Absent attentive, persistent congressional involvement, public diplomacy in the war on terrorism could lose much of the credibility that arises from the perception of America as a model of representative government. There is thus an enduring necessity to balance executive potency in military endeavors with the legislative review that provides democratic legitimacy. The challenge is not to enchain the presidency but to harness both branches to common purpose. On that insight the War Powers Resolution was founded, and in that insight may be found the germ of other innovations to guarantee that Congress will play its proper constitutional role in the war on terrorism.
Effective power projection stops hotspot escalation to nuclear war
Kagan 7 – Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, "The Case for Larger Ground Forces", Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan_OHanlon_07.pdf
We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but AND position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing AND forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. AND moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few AND personnelintensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while AND Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.
Executive war power ruins soft power and global alliances
Schiffer 9 – Adam Schiffer, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, and Carrie Liu Currier, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, "War Powers, International Alliances, the President, and Congress", http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/public/repository/US_Gov_Balance_of_Power_SF.pdf
The president’s advantages over Congress in the foreign policy realm have consequences far beyond the AND the second Bush administration has raised alarm in many countries around the world. In the past, the bipolar nature of the international system and the lack of AND presidential authority led to very disparate degrees of support from the international community. These two examples of U.S. military action in the Middle East offer AND was acknowledged as within the acceptable parameters as determined by the global community. In contrast, the 2003 war in Iraq did not gain the support of the AND other actors to give legitimacy to the U.S.-led war. The battle between the unilateralists and multilateralists with regard to U.S. foreign AND and how they are used to establish the legitimacy of American foreign policy.
Grounding use of force in constitutionally-based SOP creates a perception of benign hegemony and encourages international cooperation based on rule of law
Ikenberry 1 – G. John, Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, "Getting Hegemony Right - Analysis of the United States as a "Hyperpower" Nation", The National Interest, Spring, Lexis
A critical ingredient in stabilizing international relations in a world of radical power disparities is AND policy that protect the United States from the consequences of its own greatness. When other major states consider whether to work with the United States or resist it AND States will be more effective than balancing against U.S. power. America in large part stumbled into this open, institutionalized order in the 1940s, AND has been a vast system of America-centered economic and security partnerships. Even though the United States looks like a wayward power to many around the world today, it nonetheless has an unusual ability to co-opt and reassure. Three elements matter most in making U.S. power more stable, engaged and restrained. First, America’s mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it AND policies that do not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat. Think of the United States as a giant corporation that seeks foreign investors. It AND , to return to the corporate metaphor, to invest in ongoing partnerships. This open and decentralized political process works in a second way to reduce foreign worries AND partnerships that serve the long-term strategic interests of the United States. A third and final element of the American order that reduces worry about power asymmetries AND both more far-reaching and durable but also more predictable and malleable. In effect, the United States spun a web of institutions that connected other states AND a world where U.S. power was more restrained and reliable. Secretary of State Dean Rusk spelled out the terms of the bargain in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1965: We are every day, in one sense, accepting limitations upon our complete freedom of .... We have more than 4,300 treaties and international agreements, two-thirds of which have been entered into in the past 25 years.... Each one of which at least limits our freedom of action. We exercise our sovereignty going into these agreements. But Rusk argued that these agreements also create a more stable environment within which the United States can pursue its interests. "Law is a process by which we increase our range of freedom" and "we are constantly enlarging our freedom by being able to predict what others are going to do." ~6~ The United States gets a more predictable environment and more willing partners. There have been many moments when Asian and European allies have complained about the heavy-handedness of U.S. foreign policy, but the open and institutionalized character of the American order has minimized the possibilities of hegemonic excess over the long term. The untoward implications of sharp power asymmetries are reduced, cooperation and reciprocity are regularized, and the overall hegemonic order is rendered more legitimate and stable. The bargain—on both sides—remains intact. Renewing the Institutional Bargain AMERICA’s soaring power in the 1990s has put this open and rule-based postwar AND just anybody but by the United States, is undeniable." ~7~ The implication of my argument is that the more America’s brute power capabilities emerge from AND Representative in the Bush administration, describes the operation of this postwar order: The more powerful participants in this system—especially the United States—did not forswear all their advantages, but neither did they exercise their strength without substantial restraint. Because the United States believed the Trilateral system was in its interest, it sacrificed some degree of national autonomy to promote it. ~8~ What can America do to prevent the unraveling of this order? Three suggestions are AND influence how these states treat America when—not if—they recover. Second, the United States needs to renew the postwar institutional bargain by making it AND , Washington risks an ultimate shift toward some other form of global order. President George W. Bush seemed to acknowledge the dangers of an overweening foreign policy AND missile defense, and a variety of proposed multilateral political and environmental accords. Preserving the existing system through the redoubling of rule-based relationships will also require AND an enlightened order that serve long-term U.S. interests. Finally, the United States needs to find more ways to pursue its economic and AND environmental policy—is also a place where coordinated policymaking can be expanded. America’s unipolar moment need not end in antagonistic disarray. But the United States needs AND do so now, when America’s relative power may be at its peak.
Existential threats are likely —- democratic alliances founded on mutual restraint build capacity to prevent and mitigate their impact
Gr-Thsand Strategy as Liberal Order Building American dominance of the global system will eventually yield to the rise of other powerful states. The unipolar moment will pass. In facing this circumstance, American grand strategy should be informed by answers to this question: What sort of international order would we like to see in place in 2020 or 2030 when America is less powerful? Grand strategy is a set of coordinated and sustained policies designed to address the long AND States will need to return to the great tasks of liberal order building. It is useful to distinguish between two types of grand strategy: positional and milieu AND the future, this milieu-based approach to grand strategy is necessary. The United States does not face the sort of singular geopolitical threat that it did AND as the foundations of American national security, would be put at risk. What unites these threats and challenges is that they are all manifestations of rising security AND this unusually diverse, diffuse, and unpredictable array of threats and challenges. This is why a milieu-based grand strategy is attractive. The objective is AND its networks of social relations, that are available for solving collective problems. If American grand strategy is to be organized around liberal order building, what are AND , etc.—these safeguards are the stuff of a protective global infrastructure. Second, the United States should recommit to and rebuild its security alliances. The AND legally binding one, and in exchange it gets cooperation and political support. Third, the United States should reform and create encompassing global institutions that foster and AND grows rapidly when their governments can stand behind a UN-sanctioned action. Fourth, the United States should accommodate and institution-ally engage China. China AND has no choice but to join it and seek to prosper within it. The United States should also be seeking to construct a regional security order in East AND institutional arrangements in East Asia that will tie China to the wider region. Fifth, the United States should reclaim a liberal internationalist public philosophy. When American AND American elites as they make trade-offs between sovereignty and institutional cooperation. Under this philosophy, the restraint and the commitment of American power went hand in hand. Global rules and institutions advanced America’s national interest rather than threatened it. The alternative public philosophies that have circulated in recent years—philosophies that champion American unilateralism and disentanglement from global rules and institutions—did not meet with great success. So an opening exists for America’s postwar vision of internationalism to be updated and rearticulated today. The United States should embrace the tenets of this liberal public philosophy: Lead with AND and let the global system itself do the deep work of liberal modernization. As it navigates this brave new world, the United States will find itself needing AND liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.
Contention 3 —- SOP
Unchecked war power sets a precedent that causes the executive to broadly ignore Congressional controls
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the " AND begin thinking about the Commander in Chief’s proper place in the constitutional structure. We conclude that it would be wrong to assume, as some have suggested, AND a workable alternative, such forgetting will be far less likely to occur. brilliant and eccentric captain in the Army Corps of Engineers, was assigned to survey the water supply for the cities of Washington and Georgetown and eventually to oversee the War Department’s construction of an aqueduct along the Potomac River. Meigs’s subsequent ~*985~ report recommended that an aqueduct be built just above Great Falls, north of Washington. Congress approved that recommendation, and the Department of War began work on the aqueduct, led by Meigs himself. For several years, things ran very smoothly. In the Buchanan Administration, however, Meigs’s relationship with Secretary of War John Floyd turned sour: Floyd dismissed Meigs and made sure the Administration’s proposed budget included no funds for work on the aqueduct. Meigs subject to legislatively imposed restrictions. As we have seen, Presidents have long operated on just that assumption, and they have adjusted their actions accordingly - and in ways that cannot be said to have clearly imperiled the nation. Thus the history undermines assertions about the inherent or inevitable unmanageability or dangers of recognizing legislative control over the conduct of war. In other words, this history offers us valuable information about how things have worked in the past, and thereby helps to inform us about what consequences might follow from a constitutional judgment in the here and now. Moreover, this historical account performs at least one function beyond supplying information relevant to AND for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.
U.S. war powers are modeled internationally —- the precedent of unilateral executive authority ruins global human rights norms and encourages preemptive conflict in multiple hotspots
Sloane 8 – Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 (Robert, Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis)
There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of AND to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.
Conflict’s likely in Taiwan, Georgia, and India/Pakistan —- U.S. signal’s key
Another implication on sovereignty, due to the NSS, was, yet again, AND self-gain (Korb 26 Wadhams, 2006, p.2). Other academics have accused the Bush Doctrine of "legitimating a doctrine of anticipatory war AND Assembly in September 2003, articulated his deep restlessness with a policy that: "represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty eight years… if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force" (Annan, 2003). "The Bush administration has stubbornly resisted these warnings about the dangers of the preemptive policy set out in the NSS" (Wheeler, 2003, p.199). Kaufman agrees with the international stance that the NSS has set a dangerous precedent ( AND emption and preventive wars against Taiwan for the promotion of its Chinese values.
Preemption ruins U.S. leverage to deescalate regional crises —- goes nuclear
Steinberg 2 – James B. Steinberg, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Michael E. O’Hanlon and Susan E. Rice, "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption", Brookings Policy Brief Series, December, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2002/12/terrorism-ohanlon
The Dangers of Legitimating Preemption A final concern relates to the impact of the precedent set by the United States AND risk, and exacerbate regional crises already on the brink of open conflict. Of course, no country will embark suddenly on a war of aggression simply because AND the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay and diplomacy. Potential examples abound, ranging from Ethiopia and Eritrea, to China and Taiwan, AND . Kashmir’s status remains contentious, meaning that the risk of conflict remains. Should the crisis resume, a U.S. policy of preemption may provide hawks in India the added ammunition they need to justify a strike against Pakistan in the eyes of their fellow Indian decision-makers. Recently, India Finance Minister (and former Foreign Minister) Jaswant Singh welcomed the administration’s new emphasis on the legitimacy of preemption. Russia’s recent threats against the sovereign state of Georgia, which it accuses of harboring or at least failing to pursue Islamic extremists tied to the Chechen war, also illustrate the dangers of legitimating an easy and early recourse to preemption.
Requiring formal declaration of war restores Congressional war powers and balances SOP by checking the Executive
Weinberger 9 – Seth Weinberger, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound, M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University, "Balancing War Powers in an Age of Terror", The Good Society, 18(2), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v018/18.2.weinberger.html
The key to developing a constitutionally, legally, and practically sound balanced theory of AND ), and the participation in the NATO operation against Kosovo (1999).14 It is this disparity that is a major source of the current imbalance of war AND policy outcomes in limbo to be challenged in U.S. courts. Restoring meaning to the power to declare war offers a way to restore congressional war AND , even if the nation is engaged in armed conflict with an enemy. This distinction between the powers of the legislative branch and those of the executive branch AND laws from the power to enforce them. As John Locke tells us: It may be too great a temptation to human frailty apt to grasp at power AND rest of the community, contrary to the ends of society and government. Madison, Hamilton, and Locke sum up the fears expressed by many over the exercises of power by President Bush in the war on terror. As one prominent critic put it, President Bush is trying to "eliminate nearly all the checks and balances that have been traditionally understood to limit the power of the president."18 The power to declare war, when properly understood, provides Congress with a powerful AND over appropriations ensures that Congress can always end a conflict it deems unwise. Rather, a declaration of war is about acknowledging the severity of a threat to AND and the president did not need expanded domestic powers to prosecute the wars. By contrast, while the war on terror does have components that look like traditional AND branch of American government. The power to declare war provides that check. Understanding the declare war clause along these lines clearly separates potential armed conflicts into distinct AND used and what powers can be called upon to support the military effort. In a perfect war: One whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every place, and under every circumstance. In such a war all the members act under a general authority, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.20 In a perfect war, the entire energy of the nation is directed towards the effort, while an imperfect war is fought in a more ~End Page 6~ limited manner. Justice Chase’s concurrence in Bas explains the limitations that result from a war being imperfect: Congress has not declared war in general terms, but Congress has authorized hostilities on AND only to citizens appointed by commissions or exposed to immediate outrage and violence. A war of the formally declared, or perfect, type involves a level and AND for food and materiel, or even intern large numbers of American citizens. When the country is not in a state of perfect war by virtue of a AND power to take over the mills and force them to produce steel.21 Despite Truman’s claim of inherent authority and military necessity, the seizure of the mills was struck down as it was, according to Justice Black’s opinion, "lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President. … In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."22 Furthermore: The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as AND a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.23 When the president wants to take, pursuant to his powers as commander-in AND terrorist organizations, or change the rules governing the procedures for military commissions. In wartime, however, it may be neither expedient nor strategically sound for the AND Congress time and time again to enact laws to advance the war effort. The declarations of war for World Wars I and II both contain specific, particular AND than when using force in a less comprehensive manner during a limited conflict. "All the resources of the government" and "all of the resources of AND congressional legislation, there are still certain constitutional guarantees that cannot be ignored. In the narrow interpretation advanced by the Bush administration, the trigger for the president’s AND in the balance of powers between the president and Congress in wartime."27 This argument is unsatisfying on two grounds. First, it cannot be said that AND 1989 Panama War, or of Yugoslavs during the Kosovo conflict. …"29 The second reason that this argument does not work is in the language of the AND war powers and places the president at the height of his war powers. But the language of the AUMFs does not support such an argument. Where the AND times of crisis, Congress still can and must play an important role. As President Ford admonished, a theory of war powers must be capable of functioning AND -so to undo that separation, even in the face of war.
Congress must be the first mover
Hansen 9 – Hansen and Friedman, professors of law at the New England School of Law, 2009 (Victor and Lawrence, The Case for Congress: Separation of Powers and the War on Terror, p.130)
The problem, of course, is that much of this congressional involvement has come AND more difficult for Congress to stand up to an assertive and aggressive president.
Only formal checks signal restraint
Damrosch 97 – Lori Fisler Damrosch, Professor of Law at the Columbia University School of Law, "Use of Force and Constitutionalism", Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 449, Lexis
Structural-institutional explanations, on the other hand, point to features of liberal AND war in the form of institutional constraint if not of inherent disposition." n31 ~CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE~ n31. Russett, supra note 23, at 39 (citing War and Reason AND perception of Spain in 1898), the restraint may fail to take effect.
Plan –
The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force.
Plan’s the perfect balance that checks the Executive but preserves defensive capabilities
Lobel 8 – Jules Lobel, Professor at University of Pittsburgh Law School, "War Powers for the 21st Century: The Constitutional Perspective", Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, 4-10, http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lob041008.htm
III Revising the War Powers Resolution I believe that it is necessary and possible to reform the War Powers Resolution, and that H.R. Res. 53 is an excellent step in that direction. The first, crucial revision contained in the new statute is the language in Section 3 prohibiting the President from initiating warfare without clear authorization from Congress, unless he or she is acting to repel armed attacks on United States territories, troops or citizens. Various administrations and commentators have argued that the situations in which the President requires AND respond to attacks on U.S. territories, troops or citizens. One could, of course, hypothesize a myriad of situations where the nation AND any rationality, be turned into a justification for "launching sudden attacks." Today, as in 1787, the reality is that American national security can AND rumors, reports, intuitions, or even informed intelligence warnings of attacks. Moreover, Congress has demonstrated that where United States national security is seriously threatened AND Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, or the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. It is true that many situations will be murky, complicated or divisive and therefore that quick congressional action will not be forthcoming. But in those cases, the United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise. While there might be rare future emergencies not covered under the repel armed attack AND President Lincoln argued should be done when faced with such grave emergency crises. From this constitutional perspective, section 3 of the Constitutional War Powers Amendments of AND be subject to misinterpretation. As then congressman Abraham Lincoln argued in 1848, Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repell an invasion . . . and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect.22
Obama will comply
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also AND even purported to regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed. Even since claims of preclusive power emerged in full, the practice within the executive AND almost no actual defiance of statutory limitations predicated on such a constitutional theory. This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential executive branch stance is not, we AND , the Constitution compels the Commander in Chief to comply with legislative restrictions. In this way, the founding legal charter itself exhorts the President to justify controversial AND the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.
Plan overcomes barriers to enforcement
Lobel 9 – Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution". Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org files CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization AND disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law. To ensure that this principle is enforced, new legislation should prohibit the use of AND a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.
Even if initial non-compliance occurs, Court enforcement solves
Garcia 12 – Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, "War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution", Congressional Research Service Report, 2-17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30352.pdf
The courts have made clear, however, that while formidable, none of the AND unlikely that the courts will venture into this politically and constitutionally charged thicket.
Intervention Adv:
Accidents an miscalc Hemasath 00 – Paul A. Hemesath, J.D./M.S.F.S. from the Georgetown University Law Center, "Who’s Got the Button? Nuclear War Powers Uncertainty in the Post-Cold War Era", Georgetown Law Journal, August, 88 Geo. L.J. 2473, Lexis
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF AMBIGUITY: CONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY AND ILLEGITIMACY The uncertainty of a divided nuclear war powers regime may be more than an academic AND serious notice of the constitutional limits applied to the use of nuclear weapons.
Extinction
Hayes and Green 10 (Peter, Professor of International Relations – Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and Director – Nautilus Institute, and Michael Hamel, Victoria University, "The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia", Nautilus Institute Special Report, 1-5, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments AND threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.
?
War Fighting
Tanks heg
Record 00 – Jeffrey Record, Professor of International Security Studies at the Air War College, MA and Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, "Failed States and Casualty Phobia: Implications for Force Structure and Technology Choices", Occasional Paper No. 18, September, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA425499
The strategic consequences of elite casualty phobia as well as its implications for the military AND change was driven mainly by fear of the anticipated risks and costs involved.
Causes hostile China rise
Eichenberg 5 – Eichenberg, Associate Professor of Political Science al Tufts University, 2005 (Richard C, International Security. "Victory has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force. 1981-2005." Summer, Project Muse)
The second reason to reevaluate the sensitivity of the public to casualties is that decisionmakers AND mounted in Iraq, one wonders if views in Beijing have changed.32
Global nuclear war
Walton 7 – C. Dale Walton, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49
Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does AND a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.
SOP:
Indo Pak: High risk of escalation Richard Weitz, director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute , July 12, 2010, "South Asia’s Nuclear War Risk," The Diplomat, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/07/12/south-asiaE28099s-nuclear-war-risk/4/ Yet even setting aside the question of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands, nuclear AND is particularly prone to a destabilizing arms race. And perhaps nuclear war.
(10) The Bush doctrine. The fate of the Bush doctrine of preemption, unilateralism, and reliance on military solutions to international problems will be a major signpost for those forecasting the future of US–China relations. A less imperial and more benign US hegemony will promote US–China partnership. But either an imperial America or a failed US hegemony are likely to promote US–China rivalry.
?
Pltx:
Republicans no better – no shutdown
Glauber 13, Ron Johnson, other Republicans say government shutdown unlikely, Bill Glauber of the Journal Sentinel Aug. 13, 2013. Last week, Rep. Reid Ribble (R-Wis.) told a Fox AND gained some experience in walking down that path that hasn’t been as positive."
Passing this legislation might not be easy. But the time is right. Liberals AND with subsequent regrets about either the war itself or how it was fought. But in the wake of the Iraq War such a law might also appeal to AND emboldened, and we begin to lose—first psychologically and then literally.
Ideology outweighs and no spillover
Edwards 3 – George C. Edwards, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A26M University and Former Director of the Center for Presidential Studies, "Riding High in the Polls: George W. Bush and Public Opinion", www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF-http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Edwards.PDF
Passing legislation was even more difficult on the divisive domestic issues that remained on Congress’s AND tenets of their ideology solely in deference to a widely supported chief executive.
Fiat solves the link —- it’s instant —- no political effect
Obama will horse-trade restrictions for his agenda
McGinnis 93 – John O. McGinnis, Assistant Professor at the Cardozo School of Law and Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, "Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers", Law and Contemporary Problems, 56(4), p. 322-324
C. Bargaining in Foreign Policy Areas Where the Accommodation Reflects Congress’s Predominant Interest Shortly after coming to office, President Bush faced congressional opposition in continuing to aid AND the White House defended the accord’s legality and carried out its terms.145 The incident displays the separation of powers as a system of bargains but provides a AND have great difficulty preventing them because the deals can be struck tacitly.149 Bush’s confrontation with Congress also reflects that interests at stake in the distribution of foreign AND matters of foreign aid that he enjoys in the use of military force. Finally, this incident reveals a fundamental tension in how different agencies and departments within AND necessary in order to overcome the internal opposition of institutions such as OLC.
With his decision to seek congressional approval for an attack, Obama created a political AND , accusing the president of misleading the world and engaging in conspiratorial warmongering.
Key to the agenda
Dickerson 13 (John, Slate, Go for the Throat21, 1/18, www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/01/barack_obama_s_second_inaugural_address_the_president_should_declare_war.single.html)
On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. AND the party that will leave it, at least temporarily, in disarray.
Extend Barron 8 from the 1AC solvency, Obama will comply – he won’t fight and so won’t lose pol cap.
PC isn’t key and winners win
Hirsh 2-7 – Michael, Senior Editor at Newsweek Magazine and Chief Correspondent for the National Journal, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital", National Journal, 2013, Lexis
On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do AND change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect."
No, the U.S. Economy Has Not Been Fragile After All¶ AND a couple of days. These are not signs of a fragile economy.
CP:
Perm: do both
Counterplan makes no sense. The plan does not cause a NFU policy. Their impact card says it is bad for us not to be able to launch a nuke before being hit and the plan DOES NOT CHANGE THAT. The President can ask Congress to launch a nuke before being retaliated.
No net-benefit —- it’s functionally the same —- it’s controversial and indefinite so it ruins flexibility —- links are a question of sufficiency, not "any risk" —- presumption’s Aff
Doesn’t solve SOP —-
CP fails
Scheuerman 12 – William E. Scheuerman, Professor of Political Science and West European Studies at Indiana University, "Review Essay: Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy", Law and Social Inquiry, Summer, 37 Law 26 Soc. Inquiry 743, Lexis
Posner and Vermeule rely on two main claims. First, even if the president AND —of what the executive is doing (2010, 137-53). However, as Schmitt aptly grasped, even formally free elections potentially become charades when AND who know how to engage in executive signaling in just the right way? The familiar reason the executive needs elite and popular support, of course, is AND seems like a pale replacement for liberal legalism and the separation of powers.
====Plan’s way more credible==== Pildes 12 – Richard H. Pildes, Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law at the NYU School of Law and Co-Director of the NYU Center on Law and Security, "Book Review: Law and the President", Harvard Law Review, April, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, Lexis
That Posner and Vermeule miss the role of legal compliance as a powerful signal, AND that an ill-motivated president would reject" (p. 135). By complying with these constraints, presidents signal their good faith and accrue more trust AND American political culture, is probably the President’s willingness to comply with law.
PMC
Case turns the terminal impact, institutions k2 alliances because unilateral power alienates, that’s Ikeberry – squo still triggers the impact
The US is dunzo with deploying troops for CT —other nations fill in
This has not prevented the Obama administration from effectively declaring that the war is over AND . We settled the score. We are no longer the world’s bodyguard. Indeed, Mr Obama started making this clear very early on in his first term AND – which is to say, build its own social democratic welfare state.
No shift – Obama prefers drones
Greenfield 13(Danya, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, Foreign Policy, "Obama’s drone speech misses the mark," June 4, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/04/obama_s_drone_speech_misses_the_mark) Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the current administration will make such an investment. AND remain optimistic, but fight the same fight for some time to come.
Security K – 2AC
Perm —- do both
Plan solves insecurity spirals and conflict—-democratic checks restrain war-fighting and remove threat perceptions—-the alt can’t solve without including strong legislative checks on war—-visible, institutional reform’s key—-that’s Damrosch
Radical rejection fails —- the plan’s the most pragmatic check on militarism
Bacevich 13 – Andrew, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, The New American Militarism, p. 205-210
There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, "always a well- AND point, citizens should replace them by electing people able to do so.
Role of the ballots to simulate USFG action—-key to fairness and ground, otherwise they wish away 9 minutes of offense
No impact to threat construction—-case turns the K
Kaufman 9 – Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, ’9 (Stuart J, "Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case," Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434)
Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war AND and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.
