Tournament: USC | Round: 1 | Opponent: Wayne LM | Judge: Brendon Bankey

Contention 1 —- Intervention

Congress has reduced involvement in war powers, leaving insufficient checks on unitary executive war-making

Pinhiero 11 – John C. Pinhiero, Associate Professor of History at Aquinas College, ""Hostilities" and War Powers: Let’s Choose the Constitution", History News Service, 6-29, http://historynewsservice.org/2011/06/hostilities-and-war-powers-lets-choose-the-constitution/

Last week Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York warned that "if we don’t
AND
, as in the case of Rep. Nadler, it can happen.

Executive war power structurally encourages groupthink and escalatory interventions

Fleischman 10 – Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, "A Functional Distribution of War Powers", New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. 26 Pub. Pol’y 137, Lexis

While Nzelibe and Yoo’s model is clearly plausible, it misses certain critical institutional constructs
AND
that justifies abandoning the traditional and effective means of coming to a decision.
The first argument offered by Nzelibe and Yoo reasons that presidents tend to be held
AND
lead to short-term political gain and an unwillingness to concede defeat.
Furthermore, ex post congressional constraints on presidential actions are insufficient. The fact is
AND
viewed as endangering troops n109 or giving America a weaker image abroad. n110
The second way in which Nzelibe and Yoo justify expansive executive powers is by arguing
AND
, correcting the disparities should negate the odds of Type I errors occurring.
The third functional argument presented by Nzelibe and Yoo concerns the relative value of signaling
AND
should decrease the likelihood of Type I errors with respect to all regimes.
The totality of the analysis suggests that deliberation decreases the likelihood of Type I errors
AND
around a particular opinion, executive staffers are likely to possess policy preferences.
Type II errors (not entering "good" wars) would only be more
AND
it is the institutional design that would better accommodate functionalists’ concerns and desires.

High risk of nuclear escalation —-

Accidents and miscalc

Adler 8 – David Gray, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, "The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs: A Critique", 6-1, http://www.freerangethought.com/index.php?option=com_content26task=blogsection26id=626Itemid=41

~{11~} The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse
AND
to an examination of the judiciary’s contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.

High tempo interventions tend to draw in outside powers

Friedman 11 – George Friedman, President of Stratfor Global Forecasting, "What Happened to the American Declaration of War?", Stratfor, 3-29, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110328-what-happened-american-declaration-war

An Increasing Tempo of Operations
All of this came just before the United States emerged as the world’s single global power — a global empire — that by definition would be waging war at an increased tempo, from Kuwait, to Haiti, to Kosovo, to Afghanistan, to Iraq, and so on in an ever-increasing number of operations. And now in Libya, we have reached the point that even resolutions are no longer needed.
It is said that there is no precedent for fighting al Qaeda, for example, because it is not a nation but a subnational group. Therefore, Bush could not reasonably have been expected to ask for a declaration of war. But there is precedent: Thomas Jefferson asked for and received a declaration of war against the Barbary pirates. This authorized Jefferson to wage war against a subnational group of pirates as if they were a nation.
Had Bush requested a declaration of war on al Qaeda on Sept. 12,
AND
they were or to move to block them wherever the president saw fit.
Leaving aside the military wisdom of Afghanistan or Iraq, the legal and moral foundations
AND
. Bush did not. He worked in twilight between war and peace.
One of the dilemmas that could have been avoided was the massive confusion of whether
AND
to prevent the other side from acting, not to punish the actors.
The Importance of the Declaration
A declaration of war, I am arguing, is an essential aspect of war
AND
both frees and restrains the president, as it was meant to do.
I began by talking about the American empire. I won’t make the argument on that here, but simply assert it. What is most important is that the republic not be overwhelmed in the course of pursuing imperial goals. The declaration of war is precisely the point at which imperial interests can overwhelm republican prerogatives.
There are enormous complexities here. Nuclear war has not been abolished. The United
AND
the republic. If this can be done, what can’t be done?
My readers will know that I am far from squeamish about war. I have
AND
of citizens to waging war requires meticulous attention to the law and proprieties.
As our international power and interests surge, it would seem reasonable that our commitment
AND
-or-death matter, a tonic for our adolescent body politic.

Requiring prior Congressional authorization for war helps curtail adventurism

Bacevich 13 – Andrew, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, The New American Militarism, p. 205-210

There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, "always a well-
AND
point, citizens should replace them by electing people able to do so. 

The process makes conflict less likely, regardless of Congress’ response

Grynaviski 13 – Eric Grynaviski, Professor of Political Science at The George Washington University, "The Bloodstained Spear: Public Reason and Declarations of War", International Theory, 5(2), Cambridge Journals

Conclusion
The burden of the argument, thus far, has been to show that no
AND
are fully responsible for the harms that wars inevitably do to the innocent.
One broader implication of the argument for declarations of war is to relate institutional solutions
AND
case is probably an important condition for any of these schemes to work.
The international system likely will not include robust, impartial international institutions that can make
AND
or inflict humanitarian causalities in wars declared for humanitarian reasons (Finnemore 2009).
A broader implication relates to public reason and just war thinking. Showing that poorly
AND
to rostra (the platform in the forum where speakers could be heard).
Cicero’s distinction between force and argument is central to his thinking about the conditions under
AND

he is falling and no longer has control over his actions.22
Modern discussions of ethics in war usually discount diplomatic solutions. In doing so,
AND
diplomacy does not loom large as a central component of just war reasoning.

Contention 2 —- SOP

Unchecked war power sets a precedent that encourages the executive to broadly ignore Congressional controls

Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis

Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the "
AND
begin thinking about the Commander in Chief’s proper place in the constitutional structure.
We conclude that it would be wrong to assume, as some have suggested,
AND
a workable alternative, such forgetting will be far less likely to occur.
brilliant and eccentric captain in the Army Corps of Engineers, was assigned to survey the water supply for the cities of Washington and Georgetown and eventually to oversee the War Department’s construction of an aqueduct along the Potomac River. Meigs’s subsequent ~*985~ report recommended that an aqueduct be built just above Great Falls, north of Washington. Congress approved that recommendation, and the Department of War began work on the aqueduct, led by Meigs himself. For several years, things ran very smoothly. In the Buchanan Administration, however, Meigs’s relationship with Secretary of War John Floyd turned sour: Floyd dismissed Meigs and made sure the Administration’s proposed budget included no funds for work on the aqueduct. Meigs subject to legislatively imposed restrictions. As we have seen, Presidents have long operated on just that assumption, and they have adjusted their actions accordingly - and in ways that cannot be said to have clearly imperiled the nation. Thus the history undermines assertions about the inherent or inevitable unmanageability or dangers of recognizing legislative control over the conduct of war. In other words, this history offers us valuable information about how things have worked in the past, and thereby helps to inform us about what consequences might follow from a constitutional judgment in the here and now.
Moreover, this historical account performs at least one function beyond supplying information relevant to
AND
for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.

U.S. war powers set precedents modeled internationally —- precedent of executive authority encourages preemptive conflict in Korea

Sloane 8 – Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 (Robert, Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis)

There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of
AND
to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.

Risk’s high —- insufficient restraint

Blair 13 – David Blair, Chief Foreign Correspondent and Former Diplomatic Editor at The Daily Telegraph, National Post Wire Services, M.Phil in International Relations from Cambridge University, 2012 Foreign Reporter of the Year – The Press Awards, "A Small Incident Could Quickly Escalate into a Korean War That No Side Wants", National Post, 4-5, http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/04/05/a-small-incident-could-quickly-escalate-into-a-korean-war-that-no-side-wants/

Despite everything, this crisis will almost certainly not peak with North Korea deciding to
AND
this. We do not know whether Mr Kim’s is hot or cold.

Conditions support Korean escalation —- model of preemption often overwhelms restraint

Pulcifer 3 – Ash Pulcifer, U.S. Based Analyst of International Conflicts and Human Rights Activist at the Information Clearing House, "The Dangers Caused By A Policy Of Preemption", 3-1, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1722.htm

Furthermore, North Korea jabbed the sword even deeper into the heart of White House rhetoric when they claimed that Pyongyang reserved the right to preemptively attack hostile nations21 Pyongyang’s clever strategy turned Washington’s preemption policy on its head and left the Bush administration without an adequate response.
Since then, the administration has offered some economic incentives to the North, in
AND
, tough words such as Rumsfeld’s are usually used to cover up falsities.
This is where the danger lies in the Bush administration’s policy of arm bending diplomacy
AND
concessions from the United States, or they will increase their nuclear forces.
In the case that North Korea creates or increases their nuclear arsenal, it will
AND
the United States to refrain from creating another crisis on the Korean peninsula.
So, while to the outside observer it may look as if North Korea is
AND
, can often lead to unexpected conflicts that quickly spiral out of control.

This is based on internal documents, not Western IR 

Woo 11
Seongji Woo is currently an Associate Professor at the College of International Studies,¶ Kyung Hee University.¶ Pacific Focus, Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (August 2011), 188–205.¶ doi: 10.1111/j.1976-5118.2011.01062.x¶ © 2011 Center for International Studies, Inha University – available via EBSCO-HOST database. 

As witnessed by two nuclear tests and intermittent missile launches, the¶ so-
AND
the¶ current world order and to build a new world order.25

Requiring formal declaration of war restores Congressional war powers and helps balance SOP by checking the Executive

Weinberger 9 – Seth Weinberger, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound, M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University, "Balancing War Powers in an Age of Terror", The Good Society, 18(2), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v018/18.2.weinberger.html

The key to developing a constitutionally, legally, and practically sound balanced theory of
AND
), and the participation in the NATO operation against Kosovo (1999).14
It is this disparity that is a major source of the current imbalance of war
AND
policy outcomes in limbo to be challenged in U.S. courts.
Restoring meaning to the power to declare war offers a way to restore congressional war
AND
, even if the nation is engaged in armed conflict with an enemy.
This distinction between the powers of the legislative branch and those of the executive branch
AND
laws from the power to enforce them. As John Locke tells us:
It may be too great a temptation to human frailty apt to grasp at power
AND
rest of the community, contrary to the ends of society and government.
Madison, Hamilton, and Locke sum up the fears expressed by many over the exercises of power by President Bush in the war on terror. As one prominent critic put it, President Bush is trying to "eliminate nearly all the checks and balances that have been traditionally understood to limit the power of the president."18
The power to declare war, when properly understood, provides Congress with a powerful
AND
over appropriations ensures that Congress can always end a conflict it deems unwise.
Rather, a declaration of war is about acknowledging the severity of a threat to
AND
and the president did not need expanded domestic powers to prosecute the wars.
By contrast, while the war on terror does have components that look like traditional
AND
branch of American government. The power to declare war provides that check.
Understanding the declare war clause along these lines clearly separates potential armed conflicts into distinct
AND
used and what powers can be called upon to support the military effort.
In a perfect war:
One whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every place, and under every circumstance. In such a war all the members act under a general authority, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.20
In a perfect war, the entire energy of the nation is directed towards the effort, while an imperfect war is fought in a more ~End Page 6~ limited manner. Justice Chase’s concurrence in Bas explains the limitations that result from a war being imperfect:
Congress has not declared war in general terms, but Congress has authorized hostilities on
AND
only to citizens appointed by commissions or exposed to immediate outrage and violence.
A war of the formally declared, or perfect, type involves a level and
AND
for food and materiel, or even intern large numbers of American citizens.
When the country is not in a state of perfect war by virtue of a
AND
power to take over the mills and force them to produce steel.21
Despite Truman’s claim of inherent authority and military necessity, the seizure of the mills was struck down as it was, according to Justice Black’s opinion, "lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President. … In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."22 Furthermore:
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as
AND
a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.23
When the president wants to take, pursuant to his powers as commander-in
AND
terrorist organizations, or change the rules governing the procedures for military commissions.
In wartime, however, it may be neither expedient nor strategically sound for the
AND
Congress time and time again to enact laws to advance the war effort.
The declarations of war for World Wars I and II both contain specific, particular
AND
than when using force in a less comprehensive manner during a limited conflict.
"All the resources of the government" and "all of the resources of
AND
congressional legislation, there are still certain constitutional guarantees that cannot be ignored.
In the narrow interpretation advanced by the Bush administration, the trigger for the president’s
AND
in the balance of powers between the president and Congress in wartime."27
This argument is unsatisfying on two grounds. First, it cannot be said that
AND
1989 Panama War, or of Yugoslavs during the Kosovo conflict. …"29
The second reason that this argument does not work is in the language of the
AND
war powers and places the president at the height of his war powers.
But the language of the AUMFs does not support such an argument. Where the
AND
times of crisis, Congress still can and must play an important role.
As President Ford admonished, a theory of war powers must be capable of functioning
AND
-so to undo that separation, even in the face of war.

Plan –

The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force.

History strongly suggests Obama compliance

Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis

In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also
AND
even purported to regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed.
Even since claims of preclusive power emerged in full, the practice within the executive
AND
almost no actual defiance of statutory limitations predicated on such a constitutional theory.
This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential executive branch stance is not, we
AND
, the Constitution compels the Commander in Chief to comply with legislative restrictions.
In this way, the founding legal charter itself exhorts the President to justify controversial
AND
the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

Barriers to enforcement mitigated by plan’s mechanisms

Lobel 9 – Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution". Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org files CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization
AND
a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.

Underview – 1AC

Macro-Institutional starting points are often critiqued. But micro-starting points of SELF or societal, instead of State, transformation are less effective in this narrow context.

Stuhr ’8
(John J, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy at Emory University "A Terrible Love of Hope",  The Journal of Speculative Philosophy New Series, Volume 22, Number 4, Project Muse)

And then what, now what? What should a meliorist do? Terrible lovers
AND
peace must be, in the broadest sense of the term, educational. 

Particularity Thesis. Sweeping claims don’t undercut the Aff. We can advance contingent  and particular knowledge without "Big T" Truths.

PRICE ’98
(RICHARD PRICE is a former prof in the Department of Anthropology at Yale University. Later, he moved to Johns Hopkins University to found the Department of Anthropology, where he served three terms as chair. A decade of freelance teaching (University of Minnesota, Stanford University, Princeton University, University of Florida, Universidade Federal da Bahia), ensued. This article is co-authored with CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT – Monash University – European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 1998 via SAGE Publications – http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~~courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/PriceReusSmithCriticalInternatlTheoryConstructivism.pdf)
One of the central departures of critical international theory from positivism is the view that
AND
violates the interpretive ethos of critical international theory than does critical theory itself.

We’re not pro-State, but we’re "anti-anti State". Some things can ONLY be solved "through the system". Lifting existing POTUS authority is such an issue:

Barbrook ’97
(Dr. Richard, School of Westminster, Nettime, "More Provocations", 6-5, ¶ http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html)
I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left
AND
can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.

And, if the debate winds-up a "tie", presumption should shift in favor of change – best avoids nihilism.

Serial Policy Failure wrong and Policy Nihilism Bad.

Tallis ’97
Raymond Tallis, Professor of Geriatric Medicine at the University of Manchester – Enemies of Hope: A Critique of Contemporary Pessimism, Published by Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 0312173261, p. 407-409

If we deny or rubbish the progress that mankind has already made, and at
AND
poverty of spirit and meanness of mind will not have the last word. 

If we lose pre-fiat, then we do nothing. But non-concrete activism is WORSE THAN NOTHING. No Framework QUESTION can veer this round from the NEXUS QUESTION OF CONCRETE ALTS. Without those, we’re awful activists.

Bryant ’12 
(EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE – the author said "she" and it was replaced with the word "to" – Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied ’disclosedness’ with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze,  "Critique of the Academic Left", http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because
AND
. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

Even if "fiat’s not real", and Affs don’t control levers of power today, we advance a heuristic. Without this heuristic of fiat, we’ll re-enforce dangerous nihilism.

Hoff ’6
(et al, Dr. Dianne Hoff, professor in the College of Education and Human Development and president of Faculty Senate, University of Maine, Journal of Educational Administration, 44:3 – available via Emerald Management 120 database).

There is no question that helping educational leadership students become self-analytical and reflect
AND
. This is an arena from which a new social order can emerge.

Our heuristic’s about CONCRETE and Pragmatic ALTS.  It’s important regardless of precedent or executive power. Helps us learn to check violence.

Small ’6 
(Jonathan, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition,  "Moving Forward," The Journal for Civic Commitment,  Spring, http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.jsp)
What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip
AND
engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context.  

(  ) Policy Framework before Reps – coalitions, anti-politics, and zero impact

Churchill ’96
Ward Churchill, Professor of American Indian Studies at the University of Colorado, 1996 ("Semantic Masturbation on the Left: A Barrier to Unity and Action," From A Native Son: Selected Essays in Indigenism, 1985-1995, Published by South End Press, ISBN 0896085538, p. 460)
There can be little doubt that matters of linguistic appropriateness and precision are of serious
AND
nonsense, and on with the real work of effecting positive social change.

Tournament: USC | Round: 1 | Opponent: Wayne LM | Judge: Brendon Bankey

Contention 1 —- Intervention

Congress has reduced involvement in war powers, leaving insufficient checks on unitary executive war-making

Pinhiero 11 – John C. Pinhiero, Associate Professor of History at Aquinas College, ""Hostilities" and War Powers: Let’s Choose the Constitution", History News Service, 6-29, http://historynewsservice.org/2011/06/hostilities-and-war-powers-lets-choose-the-constitution/

Last week Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York warned that "if we don’t
AND
, as in the case of Rep. Nadler, it can happen.

Executive war power structurally encourages groupthink and escalatory interventions

Fleischman 10 – Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, "A Functional Distribution of War Powers", New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. 26 Pub. Pol’y 137, Lexis

While Nzelibe and Yoo’s model is clearly plausible, it misses certain critical institutional constructs
AND
that justifies abandoning the traditional and effective means of coming to a decision.
The first argument offered by Nzelibe and Yoo reasons that presidents tend to be held
AND
lead to short-term political gain and an unwillingness to concede defeat.
Furthermore, ex post congressional constraints on presidential actions are insufficient. The fact is
AND
viewed as endangering troops n109 or giving America a weaker image abroad. n110
The second way in which Nzelibe and Yoo justify expansive executive powers is by arguing
AND
, correcting the disparities should negate the odds of Type I errors occurring.
The third functional argument presented by Nzelibe and Yoo concerns the relative value of signaling
AND
should decrease the likelihood of Type I errors with respect to all regimes.
The totality of the analysis suggests that deliberation decreases the likelihood of Type I errors
AND
around a particular opinion, executive staffers are likely to possess policy preferences.
Type II errors (not entering "good" wars) would only be more
AND
it is the institutional design that would better accommodate functionalists’ concerns and desires.

High risk of nuclear escalation —-

Accidents and miscalc

Adler 8 – David Gray, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, "The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs: A Critique", 6-1, http://www.freerangethought.com/index.php?option=com_content26task=blogsection26id=626Itemid=41

~{11~} The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse
AND
to an examination of the judiciary’s contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.

High tempo interventions tend to draw in outside powers

Friedman 11 – George Friedman, President of Stratfor Global Forecasting, "What Happened to the American Declaration of War?", Stratfor, 3-29, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110328-what-happened-american-declaration-war

An Increasing Tempo of Operations
All of this came just before the United States emerged as the world’s single global power — a global empire — that by definition would be waging war at an increased tempo, from Kuwait, to Haiti, to Kosovo, to Afghanistan, to Iraq, and so on in an ever-increasing number of operations. And now in Libya, we have reached the point that even resolutions are no longer needed.
It is said that there is no precedent for fighting al Qaeda, for example, because it is not a nation but a subnational group. Therefore, Bush could not reasonably have been expected to ask for a declaration of war. But there is precedent: Thomas Jefferson asked for and received a declaration of war against the Barbary pirates. This authorized Jefferson to wage war against a subnational group of pirates as if they were a nation.
Had Bush requested a declaration of war on al Qaeda on Sept. 12,
AND
they were or to move to block them wherever the president saw fit.
Leaving aside the military wisdom of Afghanistan or Iraq, the legal and moral foundations
AND
. Bush did not. He worked in twilight between war and peace.
One of the dilemmas that could have been avoided was the massive confusion of whether
AND
to prevent the other side from acting, not to punish the actors.
The Importance of the Declaration
A declaration of war, I am arguing, is an essential aspect of war
AND
both frees and restrains the president, as it was meant to do.
I began by talking about the American empire. I won’t make the argument on that here, but simply assert it. What is most important is that the republic not be overwhelmed in the course of pursuing imperial goals. The declaration of war is precisely the point at which imperial interests can overwhelm republican prerogatives.
There are enormous complexities here. Nuclear war has not been abolished. The United
AND
the republic. If this can be done, what can’t be done?
My readers will know that I am far from squeamish about war. I have
AND
of citizens to waging war requires meticulous attention to the law and proprieties.
As our international power and interests surge, it would seem reasonable that our commitment
AND
-or-death matter, a tonic for our adolescent body politic.

Requiring prior Congressional authorization for war helps curtail adventurism

Bacevich 13 – Andrew, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, The New American Militarism, p. 205-210

There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, "always a well-
AND
point, citizens should replace them by electing people able to do so. 

The process makes conflict less likely, regardless of Congress’ response

Grynaviski 13 – Eric Grynaviski, Professor of Political Science at The George Washington University, "The Bloodstained Spear: Public Reason and Declarations of War", International Theory, 5(2), Cambridge Journals

Conclusion
The burden of the argument, thus far, has been to show that no
AND
are fully responsible for the harms that wars inevitably do to the innocent.
One broader implication of the argument for declarations of war is to relate institutional solutions
AND
case is probably an important condition for any of these schemes to work.
The international system likely will not include robust, impartial international institutions that can make
AND
or inflict humanitarian causalities in wars declared for humanitarian reasons (Finnemore 2009).
A broader implication relates to public reason and just war thinking. Showing that poorly
AND
to rostra (the platform in the forum where speakers could be heard).
Cicero’s distinction between force and argument is central to his thinking about the conditions under
AND

he is falling and no longer has control over his actions.22
Modern discussions of ethics in war usually discount diplomatic solutions. In doing so,
AND
diplomacy does not loom large as a central component of just war reasoning.

Contention 2 —- SOP

Unchecked war power sets a precedent that encourages the executive to broadly ignore Congressional controls

Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis

Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the "
AND
begin thinking about the Commander in Chief’s proper place in the constitutional structure.
We conclude that it would be wrong to assume, as some have suggested,
AND
a workable alternative, such forgetting will be far less likely to occur.
brilliant and eccentric captain in the Army Corps of Engineers, was assigned to survey the water supply for the cities of Washington and Georgetown and eventually to oversee the War Department’s construction of an aqueduct along the Potomac River. Meigs’s subsequent ~*985~ report recommended that an aqueduct be built just above Great Falls, north of Washington. Congress approved that recommendation, and the Department of War began work on the aqueduct, led by Meigs himself. For several years, things ran very smoothly. In the Buchanan Administration, however, Meigs’s relationship with Secretary of War John Floyd turned sour: Floyd dismissed Meigs and made sure the Administration’s proposed budget included no funds for work on the aqueduct. Meigs subject to legislatively imposed restrictions. As we have seen, Presidents have long operated on just that assumption, and they have adjusted their actions accordingly - and in ways that cannot be said to have clearly imperiled the nation. Thus the history undermines assertions about the inherent or inevitable unmanageability or dangers of recognizing legislative control over the conduct of war. In other words, this history offers us valuable information about how things have worked in the past, and thereby helps to inform us about what consequences might follow from a constitutional judgment in the here and now.
Moreover, this historical account performs at least one function beyond supplying information relevant to
AND
for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.

U.S. war powers set precedents modeled internationally —- precedent of executive authority encourages preemptive conflict in Korea

Sloane 8 – Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 (Robert, Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis)

There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of
AND
to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.

Risk’s high —- insufficient restraint

Blair 13 – David Blair, Chief Foreign Correspondent and Former Diplomatic Editor at The Daily Telegraph, National Post Wire Services, M.Phil in International Relations from Cambridge University, 2012 Foreign Reporter of the Year – The Press Awards, "A Small Incident Could Quickly Escalate into a Korean War That No Side Wants", National Post, 4-5, http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/04/05/a-small-incident-could-quickly-escalate-into-a-korean-war-that-no-side-wants/

Despite everything, this crisis will almost certainly not peak with North Korea deciding to
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this. We do not know whether Mr Kim’s is hot or cold.

Conditions support Korean escalation —- model of preemption often overwhelms restraint

Pulcifer 3 – Ash Pulcifer, U.S. Based Analyst of International Conflicts and Human Rights Activist at the Information Clearing House, "The Dangers Caused By A Policy Of Preemption", 3-1, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1722.htm

Furthermore, North Korea jabbed the sword even deeper into the heart of White House rhetoric when they claimed that Pyongyang reserved the right to preemptively attack hostile nations21 Pyongyang’s clever strategy turned Washington’s preemption policy on its head and left the Bush administration without an adequate response.
Since then, the administration has offered some economic incentives to the North, in
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, tough words such as Rumsfeld’s are usually used to cover up falsities.
This is where the danger lies in the Bush administration’s policy of arm bending diplomacy
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concessions from the United States, or they will increase their nuclear forces.
In the case that North Korea creates or increases their nuclear arsenal, it will
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the United States to refrain from creating another crisis on the Korean peninsula.
So, while to the outside observer it may look as if North Korea is
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, can often lead to unexpected conflicts that quickly spiral out of control.

This is based on internal documents, not Western IR 

Woo 11
Seongji Woo is currently an Associate Professor at the College of International Studies,¶ Kyung Hee University.¶ Pacific Focus, Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (August 2011), 188–205.¶ doi: 10.1111/j.1976-5118.2011.01062.x¶ © 2011 Center for International Studies, Inha University – available via EBSCO-HOST database. 

As witnessed by two nuclear tests and intermittent missile launches, the¶ so-
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the¶ current world order and to build a new world order.25

Requiring formal declaration of war restores Congressional war powers and helps balance SOP by checking the Executive

Weinberger 9 – Seth Weinberger, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound, M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University, "Balancing War Powers in an Age of Terror", The Good Society, 18(2), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v018/18.2.weinberger.html

The key to developing a constitutionally, legally, and practically sound balanced theory of
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), and the participation in the NATO operation against Kosovo (1999).14
It is this disparity that is a major source of the current imbalance of war
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policy outcomes in limbo to be challenged in U.S. courts.
Restoring meaning to the power to declare war offers a way to restore congressional war
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, even if the nation is engaged in armed conflict with an enemy.
This distinction between the powers of the legislative branch and those of the executive branch
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laws from the power to enforce them. As John Locke tells us:
It may be too great a temptation to human frailty apt to grasp at power
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rest of the community, contrary to the ends of society and government.
Madison, Hamilton, and Locke sum up the fears expressed by many over the exercises of power by President Bush in the war on terror. As one prominent critic put it, President Bush is trying to "eliminate nearly all the checks and balances that have been traditionally understood to limit the power of the president."18
The power to declare war, when properly understood, provides Congress with a powerful
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over appropriations ensures that Congress can always end a conflict it deems unwise.
Rather, a declaration of war is about acknowledging the severity of a threat to
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and the president did not need expanded domestic powers to prosecute the wars.
By contrast, while the war on terror does have components that look like traditional
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branch of American government. The power to declare war provides that check.
Understanding the declare war clause along these lines clearly separates potential armed conflicts into distinct
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used and what powers can be called upon to support the military effort.
In a perfect war:
One whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the members of the nation declaring war are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every place, and under every circumstance. In such a war all the members act under a general authority, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.20
In a perfect war, the entire energy of the nation is directed towards the effort, while an imperfect war is fought in a more ~End Page 6~ limited manner. Justice Chase’s concurrence in Bas explains the limitations that result from a war being imperfect:
Congress has not declared war in general terms, but Congress has authorized hostilities on
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only to citizens appointed by commissions or exposed to immediate outrage and violence.
A war of the formally declared, or perfect, type involves a level and
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for food and materiel, or even intern large numbers of American citizens.
When the country is not in a state of perfect war by virtue of a
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power to take over the mills and force them to produce steel.21
Despite Truman’s claim of inherent authority and military necessity, the seizure of the mills was struck down as it was, according to Justice Black’s opinion, "lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President. … In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."22 Furthermore:
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as
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a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.23
When the president wants to take, pursuant to his powers as commander-in
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terrorist organizations, or change the rules governing the procedures for military commissions.
In wartime, however, it may be neither expedient nor strategically sound for the
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Congress time and time again to enact laws to advance the war effort.
The declarations of war for World Wars I and II both contain specific, particular
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than when using force in a less comprehensive manner during a limited conflict.
"All the resources of the government" and "all of the resources of
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congressional legislation, there are still certain constitutional guarantees that cannot be ignored.
In the narrow interpretation advanced by the Bush administration, the trigger for the president’s
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in the balance of powers between the president and Congress in wartime."27
This argument is unsatisfying on two grounds. First, it cannot be said that
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1989 Panama War, or of Yugoslavs during the Kosovo conflict. …"29
The second reason that this argument does not work is in the language of the
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war powers and places the president at the height of his war powers.
But the language of the AUMFs does not support such an argument. Where the
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times of crisis, Congress still can and must play an important role.
As President Ford admonished, a theory of war powers must be capable of functioning
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-so to undo that separation, even in the face of war.

Plan –

The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force.

History strongly suggests Obama compliance

Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis

In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also
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even purported to regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed.
Even since claims of preclusive power emerged in full, the practice within the executive
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almost no actual defiance of statutory limitations predicated on such a constitutional theory.
This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential executive branch stance is not, we
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, the Constitution compels the Commander in Chief to comply with legislative restrictions.
In this way, the founding legal charter itself exhorts the President to justify controversial
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the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

Barriers to enforcement mitigated by plan’s mechanisms

Lobel 9 – Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution". Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org files CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization
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a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.

Underview – 1AC

Macro-Institutional starting points are often critiqued. But micro-starting points of SELF or societal, instead of State, transformation are less effective in this narrow context.

Stuhr ’8
(John J, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy at Emory University "A Terrible Love of Hope",  The Journal of Speculative Philosophy New Series, Volume 22, Number 4, Project Muse)

And then what, now what? What should a meliorist do? Terrible lovers
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peace must be, in the broadest sense of the term, educational. 

Particularity Thesis. Sweeping claims don’t undercut the Aff. We can advance contingent  and particular knowledge without "Big T" Truths.

PRICE ’98
(RICHARD PRICE is a former prof in the Department of Anthropology at Yale University. Later, he moved to Johns Hopkins University to found the Department of Anthropology, where he served three terms as chair. A decade of freelance teaching (University of Minnesota, Stanford University, Princeton University, University of Florida, Universidade Federal da Bahia), ensued. This article is co-authored with CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT – Monash University – European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 1998 via SAGE Publications – http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~~courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/PriceReusSmithCriticalInternatlTheoryConstructivism.pdf)
One of the central departures of critical international theory from positivism is the view that
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violates the interpretive ethos of critical international theory than does critical theory itself.

We’re not pro-State, but we’re "anti-anti State". Some things can ONLY be solved "through the system". Lifting existing POTUS authority is such an issue:

Barbrook ’97
(Dr. Richard, School of Westminster, Nettime, "More Provocations", 6-5, ¶ http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html)
I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left
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can be a fun artistic pose. However, human suffering is not.

And, if the debate winds-up a "tie", presumption should shift in favor of change – best avoids nihilism.

Serial Policy Failure wrong and Policy Nihilism Bad.

Tallis ’97
Raymond Tallis, Professor of Geriatric Medicine at the University of Manchester – Enemies of Hope: A Critique of Contemporary Pessimism, Published by Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 0312173261, p. 407-409

If we deny or rubbish the progress that mankind has already made, and at
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poverty of spirit and meanness of mind will not have the last word. 

If we lose pre-fiat, then we do nothing. But non-concrete activism is WORSE THAN NOTHING. No Framework QUESTION can veer this round from the NEXUS QUESTION OF CONCRETE ALTS. Without those, we’re awful activists.

Bryant ’12 
(EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE – the author said "she" and it was replaced with the word "to" – Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied ’disclosedness’ with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze,  "Critique of the Academic Left", http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because
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. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

Even if "fiat’s not real", and Affs don’t control levers of power today, we advance a heuristic. Without this heuristic of fiat, we’ll re-enforce dangerous nihilism.

Hoff ’6
(et al, Dr. Dianne Hoff, professor in the College of Education and Human Development and president of Faculty Senate, University of Maine, Journal of Educational Administration, 44:3 – available via Emerald Management 120 database).

There is no question that helping educational leadership students become self-analytical and reflect
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. This is an arena from which a new social order can emerge.

Our heuristic’s about CONCRETE and Pragmatic ALTS.  It’s important regardless of precedent or executive power. Helps us learn to check violence.

Small ’6 
(Jonathan, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition,  "Moving Forward," The Journal for Civic Commitment,  Spring, http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.jsp)
What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip
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engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context.  

(  ) Policy Framework before Reps – coalitions, anti-politics, and zero impact

Churchill ’96
Ward Churchill, Professor of American Indian Studies at the University of Colorado, 1996 ("Semantic Masturbation on the Left: A Barrier to Unity and Action," From A Native Son: Selected Essays in Indigenism, 1985-1995, Published by South End Press, ISBN 0896085538, p. 460)
There can be little doubt that matters of linguistic appropriateness and precision are of serious
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nonsense, and on with the real work of effecting positive social change.

Tournament: USC | Round: 4 | Opponent: Cal Berkeley EM | Judge: John Warden

Contention 1 Warfighting

Contention 1 is Warfighting

Power projection structurally fails because operations are guided by incoherent strategies disconnected from national political will

Smidt 9 – Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Smidt, Acting Staff Judge Advocate in the United States Army, "The Proposed 2009 War Powers Consultation Act", 3-19, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA500649
Shared Decisions Generate Greater Strategic Certainty Although the primary benefit from a joint Congressional and
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means that only half of the power available to the government is employed.

Libya removed all remaining checks on unilateral executive war-making —- ruins accountability and signal of unified resolve

Webb 13 – Jim Webb, Former U.S. Senator from Virginia and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan Administration, "Congressional Abdication", The National Interest, 3-1, http://nationalinterest.org/article/congressional-abdication-8138?page=show
The president followed no clear historical standard when he unilaterally decided to use force in
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America is united and not acting merely at the discretion of one individual.

That crushes unit cohesion, morale, and allied support —- Congressional approval’s key

Frye 2 – Alton Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow Emeritus and Director of the Program on Congress and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism", Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 4-17, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/applying-war-powers-resolution-war-terrorism/p4514
4. CONSENSUS IS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL COHESION The case for active, continuing congressional
AND
that Congress will play its proper constitutional role in the war on terrorism.

Effective power projection stops hotspot escalation to nuclear war

O’Hanlon 7 – Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, "The Case for Larger Ground Forces", Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan_OHanlon_07.pdf
We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but
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Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

Executive war power ruins cooperation and global alliances

Schiffer 9 – Adam Schiffer, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, and Carrie Liu Currier, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, "War Powers, International Alliances, the President, and Congress", http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/public/repository/US_Gov_Balance_of_Power_SF.pdf
The president’s advantages over Congress in the foreign policy realm have consequences far beyond the
AND
and how they are used to establish the legitimacy of American foreign policy.

Alliances underpin broad cooperation —- solves multiple global threats

Brooks 13 – Stephen G., Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, G. John ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul and William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, "Lean Forward", Foreign Affairs, January / February, 92(1)

CREATING COOPERATION
What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here
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where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability.
U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the
AND
can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others.
The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the
AND
. The operation did wonders for the United States’ image in the region.
The United States’ global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains
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a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen’s minds."
THE DEVIL WE KNOW
Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer
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international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits.

U.S. commitment to alliances is vital for establishing a lunar base

CSIS 6
(Center for Strategic and International Studies, "U.S. Leadership, International Cooperation, and Space Exploration," International Space Exploration Update, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060426_us_space_leadership.pdf-http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060426_us_space_leadership.pdf)
International and Multilateral Space Exploration¶ Multilateral Space¶ The environment for civil space is
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implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration is generating difficulties nationally and internationally.

Allied support creates political will – solves their alt causes

Handberg 10
(Roger, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida, "The future of American human space exploration and the "Critical Path"," 1-11-10, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1543/1-http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1543/1)
The United States at least temporarily moves from the position of dominant partner to that
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for incorporating different states into the program based on actual interest and capabilities.

Lunar base construction is feasible and fast

Atkinson 11
(Nancy, Senior Editor and writer for Universe Today, is the host of the NASA Lunar Science Institute podcast, is part of the production team for Astronomy Cast, and currently serves as an adviser for the 365 Days of Astronomy podcast, where she was project manager from 2009-2011, internally quoting Dr. Paul Spudis, senior staff scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute in Houston, "Paul Spudis’ plan for a sustainable and affordable lunar base," 10-21-11, http://phys.org/news/2011-10-paul-spudis-sustainable-lunar-base.html-http://phys.org/news/2011-10-paul-spudis-sustainable-lunar-base.html)
It’s long been a dream to have a human settlement on the Moon, but
AND
creates real capability. But the free variable is schedule, not money." 

Lunar bases solve extinction

Shapiro 7 – Robert, Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Scientist in the Chemistry Department of New York University, "Why the Moon? Human Survival21", The Space Review, 3-19, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/832/1
I am not writing here to add my voice to the chorus of Moon-
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if it is only days, rather than months or years, away.

Moon base solves the link and impact to asteroid strikes – extinction

Davis 9 – Senior Aerospace Scientist at Boeing (Dean E., Ad Astra, "Why Go to the Moon?" Ad Astra 21(1), Spring *Gender Modified
SAFE HAVEN Ultimately, the survival of ~hu~mankind, while difficult to
AND
we could deflect these objects before they get trapped in Earth’s gravity well. 

Contention 2 Congress

Contention 2 is Congressional Leadership

Plan boosts Congressional power:
First: muscle. Boldly rejecting unitary use of force restores credibility
Bacevich 7 – Andrew, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, "Rescinding the Bush Doctrine", Boston Globe, 3-1, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/03/01/rescinding_the_bush_doctrine/

RATHER THAN vainly sniping at President Bush over his management of the Iraq war, the Democratic-controlled Congress ought to focus on averting any recurrence of this misadventure. Decrying the so-called "surge" or curbing the president’s authority to conduct ongoing operations will contribute little to that end. Legislative action to foreswear preventive war might contribute quite a lot.
Long viewed as immoral, illicit, and imprudent, preventive war — attacking to
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to "impose preemptive, unilateral military force when and where it chooses."
Although the Constitution endows the legislative branch with the sole authority to declare war, the president did not consult Congress before announcing his new policy. He promulgated the Bush Doctrine by fiat. Then he acted on it.
In 2003, Saddam Hussein posed no immediate threat to the United States; arguing that he might one day do so, the administration depicted the invasion of Iraq as an act of anticipatory self-defense. To their everlasting shame, a majority of members in both the House and the Senate went along, passing a resolution that "authorized" the president to do what he was clearly intent on doing anyway. Implicitly, the Bush Doctrine received congressional endorsement.
Events since have affirmed the wisdom of seeing preventive war as immoral, illicit,
AND
would silence critics who condemned the war as morally unjustified and patently illegal.
None of these expectations has come to pass. In its trial run, the Bush Doctrine has been found wanting.
Today, Iraq teeters on the brink of disintegration. The war’s costs, already staggering, continue to mount. Violence triggered by the US invasion has killed thousands of Iraqi civilians. We cannot fully absolve ourselves of responsibility for those deaths.
Our folly has alienated friends and emboldened enemies. Rather than nipping in the bud an ostensibly emerging threat, the Iraq war has diverted attention from existing dangers (such as Al Qaeda) while encouraging potential adversaries (like Iran) to see us as weak.
The remedy to this catastrophic failure lies not in having another go — a preventive attack against Iran, for example — but in acknowledging that the Bush Doctrine is inherently pernicious. Our reckless flirtation with preventive war qualifies as not only wrong, but also stupid. Indeed, the Bush Doctrine poses a greater danger to the United States than do the perils it supposedly guards against.
We urgently need to abrogate that doctrine in favor of principles that reflect our true interests and our professed moral values. Here lies an opportunity for Congress to make a difference.
The fifth anniversary of President Bush’s West Point speech approaches. Prior to that date
AND
of force will require prior Congressional authorization, as required by the Constitution.
The legislation should state plainly our determination to defend ourselves and our allies. But it should indicate no less plainly that the United States no longer claims the prerogative of using "preemptive, unilateral military force when and where it chooses."
Declaring the Bush Doctrine defunct will not solve the problems posed by Iraq, but it will reduce the likelihood that we will see more Iraqs in our future. By taking such action, Congress will restore its relevance, its badly tarnished honor, and its standing in the eyes of the American people.
This spills over and builds institutional capacity for broader Congressional power —- active confrontation’s key
Schumer 7 – Charles E. Schumer, JD from Harvard Law School, AB in Politics from Harvard College, Senior United States Senator from New York, Youngest Representative in the History of New York State, "Under Attack: Congressional Power in the Twenty-First Century", Harvard Law 26 Policy Review, 1(1), http://web.archive.org/web/20120625034444/http://www.hlpronline.com/Vol1No1/schumer.pdf

Every basic civics text recites that our government is divided into three branches and that these three branches are co-equal partners. But as true as that once was, this system of exquisite checks and balances is at risk of being made anachronistic by recent legal and political developments. The traditional functions of Congress as lawmaker and a check on other branches have come under sustained and systematic assault from both the judicial and executive branches.
The assault from the Executive began as a gradual diminution of congressional power after a
AND
lawmaker and its role as a bulwark against overreaching by the other branches.
Although the trends in the two other branches of American government have developed separately,
AND
. The costs of an anemic Congress over the long term are considerable.
First, continued erosion of Congress’s lawmaking power undermines democracy. Preemption of the legislative function by the President increases the concentration of power and the risk of abuse. It also decreases the transparency that accompanies a legislative process marked by open debate and compromise. Preemption of the legislative function by the Judiciary similarly diminishes democracy.
Second, in the absence of a prompt reassertion of Congress’s power, its powerlessness
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, it may find that it lacks the institutional capacity to do so.
In sum, Congress does have a role equal to the other branches and must have this equal role. It is a role envisioned by the Framers, enshrined in the Constitution, and ennobled by the historical examples of our greatest legislators. A responsible and responsive Congress can solve many of the problems America confronts, improve respect for government by providing oversight and demanding accountability, and decrease partisan gridlock in Washington.1
Undoubtedly, Congress is at something of an institutional disadvantage against the Executive. It
AND
assertive branch of government. A Congress grown weak and compliant imperils democracy.
Second: experience and learning. Mandatory authorization increases Congressional engagement of foreign policy
Hunter 13 – Robert E. Hunter, Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Director of Middle East Affairs on the National Security Council Staff in the Carter Administration and Director of Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University, "Restoring Congress’ Role in Making War", Iran Review, 9-1, http://www.iranreview.org/content/documents/restoring-congress-role-in-making-war.htm

But seeking authorization for the use of force from Congress as opposed to conducting consultations
AND
few days’ duration, those provisions would almost certainly not come into play.
There were two basic reasons for abandoning the constitutional provision of a formal declaration of
AND
order to a conventional military attack on US and allied forces in Europe.
With the Cold War now on "the ash heap of history," this second
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he no doubt would have received it from Congress, very likely unanimously).
As times goes by, therefore, what President Obama said on August 29,
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a potentially significant step in reducing the excessive militarization of US foreign policy.
There would be one added benefit: members of Congress, most of whom know little about the outside world and have not for decades had to take seriously their constitutional responsibilities for declaring war, would be required to become better-informed participants in some of the most consequential decisions the nation has to take, which, not incidentally, also involve risks to the lives of America’s fighting men and women.

Congressional leadership’s key to foreign policy coherence—-solves multiple scenarios for extinction

Hamilton 2 – Lee H., President and Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council, Former Member of the United States House of Representatives for 34 Years, Co-Chair of the Iraq Study Group, Formerly Special Assistant to the Director at the Woodrow Wilson Center, A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress, p. 3-7

We face many dangers, however. The diversity of the security and economic threats
AND
such a foreign policy to advance our interests and values around the globe.
Foreign policy coherence accesses every major impact—-extinction
Doherty 13 – Patrick Doherty, Director of the Smart Strategy Initiative at the New America Foundation, "A New U.S. Grand Strategy", Foreign Policy, 1-9, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/09/a_new_us_grand_strategy?page=full

The strategic landscape of the 21st century has finally come into focus. The great global project is no longer to stop communism, counter terrorists, or promote a superficial notion of freedom. Rather, the world must accommodate 3 billion additional middle-class aspirants in two short decades — without provoking resource wars, insurgencies, and the devastation of our planet’s ecosystem. For this we need a strategy.
The status quo is untenable. In the United States, the country’s economic engine
AND
S. cities, the country is at the end of the road.
Abroad, Washington’s post-Cold War pattern of episodic adventurism and incremental crisis management
AND
Taiwan — grow increasingly enmeshed in the power dynamics of this new era.
Simply put, the current U.S. and international order is unsustainable, and myriad disruptions signal that it is now in a process of collapse. Until the United States implements a new grand strategy, the country will face even more rapid degradation of domestic and global conditions.
This is not an over-the-horizon danger. The interplay of four strategic antagonists is causing Americans daily harm.
Economic Inclusion
The ranks of the world’s nouveaux riches are swelling. The planet is on track to welcome 3 billion new members of the global middle class in the next 20 years. For those fortunate enough to climb out of poverty, advancement translates into a 300 percent increase in income and resource consumption.
That’s great for each individual, but as a whole, it will strain our
AND
to them, whether energy, water, food, or strategic minerals.
Ecosystem Depletion
Human activity has disrupted the equilibrium of the Earth’s planetary systems. We are emitting too much carbon, we are changing the chemistry of both freshwater and saltwater bodies, and we are overconsuming the natural capital we rely on to produce life-giving ecosystem services.
We are straining our planet to the breaking point, risking abrupt changes to the
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mass human migration, and regional war as these critical systems degrade further.
Contained Depression
The United States is not experiencing a mere business-cycle downturn — this is a "contained depression." The 2008 financial crisis triggered a broad deleveraging (debt crisis) across households and businesses. Incomes failed to service record levels of consumer and corporate debt, further reducing employment and in turn reducing revenues to state and federal governments.
While Federal Reserve policy, the TARP bailout, and the stimulus bill have contained
AND
, American households and businesses have only begun to address their deep indebtedness.
Bernanke and his colleagues cannot generate the circumstances necessary to end the depression — reviving
AND
amount of political attention being paid to long-term entitlements is misplaced.
Well before the country hits the entitlement wall, the economy is at great risk of deepening its austerity spiral as businesses shed employees to appear more profitable to shareholders. That will further reduce household incomes, decreasing demand and government revenue in turn. Meanwhile, extended American economic weakness will only exacerbate the global macroeconomic risk from the eurozone to China.
Resilience Deficit
The systems, supply chains, and infrastructure that connect our markets are fragile and
AND
result, prices for light bulbs, wind turbines, and batteries spiked.
It’s not just supply chains. Infrastructure arrears in the United States alone stand at
AND
contributing to disruptions from the Royal Bank of Scotland to the Greek treasury.
These four challenges — inclusion, depletion, depression, and resilience — are the
AND
it is, America has a tool for addressing this scale of challenge.
A Return to Grand Strategy
For the United States, a grand strategy is a generation’s plan to create the global conditions necessary for the country to pursue the great purposes set forth in the preamble of the U.S. Constitution. It looks at the world, it looks at America, and it defines the broad path the country must take to advance its most sacred objectives.
Throughout U.S. history, grand strategy has navigated between two unacceptable extremes: Empire America and Fortress America. Being an empire — governing other lands and peoples outside the U.S. Constitution — is an affront to America’s core principles of democracy and self-government. Isolationism, in turn, risks the certain rise of unacceptable threats to commerce, security, and basic American values.
To meet the global challenges of World War II and the Cold War, U.S. leaders innovated in the design of grand strategy. As practiced by Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower, grand strategy became the correlation of America’s economic engine, its foreign policy, and its governing institutions to meet the great global challenge of the era.
In both World War II and the Cold War, the secret to America’s success
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best them in a longer-term contest of economic and political systems.
And best them America did. To ensure the Soviets’ defeat, Truman and Eisenhower did not leave the economic contest to any invisible hand. Rather, they systematically oriented the U.S. economy to take advantage of the demand in the system: suburban housing, consumer goods, and reconstruction materials for Europe and Japan. By living the American Dream, Americans helped stop Soviet advances.
By the time candidates John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon debated in 1960, Eisenhower’s grand strategy had fused with America’s cultural DNA — it was fully adopted and internalized by both political parties, corporate leadership, government bureaucracy, and the American people. Since the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, however, the United States has failed to identify, adopt, or implement a revised grand strategy.
Instead, over the past 20 years, the United States’ default strategy has been to incrementally adjust national security and economic policies to defend and extend its Cold War economic engine. The result is the unsustainable U.S. and international order.
A New Grand Strategic Concept
In the face of the present danger and in the best tradition of the republic, America’s response must be to lead. The country must put its own house in order and, with willing partners, author a prosperous, secure, and sustainable future. The task is clear: The United States must lead the global transition to sustainability.
While some great powers and world capitals have been warning of these dangers for some time, it is clear that the effort ultimately requires an upgrade to the current international system. This will require the kind of principled, consistent leadership and hard-nosed geopolitics that only America, at its best, is able to deliver.
America must once again start at home. For a limited time, it will
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implement, and verify a durable transition framework among the world’s major economies.
Throughout the transition, America will have to build and strengthen capable partners to provide basic security assurances. Political boundaries will only change through a transparent process of self-determination; global commons will remain open and secure; and sovereignty will be limited only by the responsibility to protect.
This isn’t going to be easy. To achieve all this, Washington must redesign its institutions of governance, consistent with the U.S. Constitution, to ensure that government has the appropriate authorities and capabilities, and no more, to implement this strategy at home and abroad.

Congressional war power’s key to treaty power

Healy 00 – Gene Healy, Vice President at the Cato Institute and JD from University of Chicago Law School, "Arrogance of Power Reborn: The Imperial Presidency and Foreign Policy in the Clinton Years", Cato Policy Analysis No. 389, 12-13, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/arrogance-power-reborn-imperial-presidency-foreign-policy-clinton-years

As William Jefferson Clinton came to power in January 1993, there was some reason to hope that the imperial presidency would be scaled back. Clinton, after all, was the first post-Cold War president and a member of a political party that had in the wake of the Vietnam War striven to restrain presidential aggrandizement in foreign policy.
Such hopes proved illusory. Throughout his administration, President Clinton has adopted a view
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. Those actions demonstrate that President Clinton has routinely abused the treaty power.
In addition to the abuse of the treaty power, the president has repeatedly usurped the congressional war power. In Haiti, Iraq, Sudan, and Bosnia, the Clinton administration displayed its contempt for the constitutional process and asserted a unilateral power to wage war without congressional approval. The most flagrant example was the 78-day air war conducted against Serbia in 1999 despite Congress’s adamant refusal to approve the action.
As we approach the end of President Clinton’s second term, the imperial presidency is as unconstrained and as menacing as it has been at any time since the Vietnam War. Bold congressional action is needed to reclaim legislative authority over the war power and the treaty power. Only then will America have an executive branch that comports with republican principles of government and the original constitutional design.

Executive interpretation unravels the treaty system

Weiss 11 – Joshua Weiss, JD from George Washington University Law School, "Defining Executive Deference in Treaty Interpretation Cases", George Washington Law Review, 79(5), July, http://groups.law.gwu.edu/lr/ArticlePDF/79-5-Weiss.pdf

B. Total-Deference Proposals
Total deference, by contrast, would grant executive treaty interpretations dispositive weight. That
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, but also to set the foreign policy of the United States."72
The total-deference theory also has attendant flaws, however. Most notably, total deference creates unchecked executive power because of the Executive’s almost exclusive role in drafting treaty text. As a result, total deference could lead to manipulation and bad faith interpretation of U.S. treaty obligations. These risks are disconcerting in their own right, but they carry additional importance because persistent bad-faith treaty conduct would undermine the legitimacy of U.S. treaties and produce retaliatory interpretations abroad.73
The potential for self-dealing resulting from unfettered deference is particularly worrisome in the
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A suitable treaty interpretation framework must maintain a role for courts to play.

Extinction

Moss 10 – Lawrence C. Moss, JD from Stanford Law and Special Counsel for U.N. Reform at Human Rights Watch, "Renewing America’s Commitment To International Law", UNA-USA Occassional Paper, March, http://www.academia.edu/2593461/Renewing_Americas_Commitment_to_International_Law-http://www.academia.edu/2593461/Renewing_Americas_Commitment_to_International_Law

US adherence to the international treaty regime is essential to America’s ability to induce other
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international lawyers, but it is a vital part of securing American interests.

Plan-

The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force.

Contention 3 Solvency

Contention 3 is Solvency

Plan’s the perfect balance that checks the Executive but preserves defensive capabilities

Lobel 8 – Jules Lobel, Professor at University of Pittsburgh Law School, "War Powers for the 21st Century: The Constitutional Perspective", Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, 4-10, http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lob041008.htm

III Revising the War Powers Resolution
            I believe that it is necessary and possible to reform the War Powers Resolution, and that H.R. Res. 53 is an excellent step in that direction.  The first, crucial revision contained in the new statute is the language in Section 3 prohibiting the President from initiating warfare without clear authorization from Congress, unless he or she is acting to repel armed attacks on United States territories, troops or citizens.
            Various administrations and commentators have argued that the situations in which the President requires
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respond to attacks on U.S. territories, troops or citizens.
            One could, of course, hypothesize a myriad of situations where the nation
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any rationality, be turned into a justification for "launching sudden attacks."
            Today, as in 1787, the reality is that American national security can
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rumors, reports, intuitions, or even informed intelligence warnings of attacks.
            Moreover, Congress has demonstrated that where United States national security is seriously threatened
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Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, or the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
            It is true that many situations will be murky, complicated or divisive and therefore that quick congressional action will not be forthcoming.  But in those cases, the United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise.
            While there might be rare future emergencies not covered under the repel armed attack
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President Lincoln argued should be done when faced with such grave emergency crises.
            From this constitutional perspective, section 3 of the Constitutional War Powers Amendments of
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be subject to misinterpretation.  As then congressman Abraham Lincoln argued in 1848,
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repell an invasion . . . and you allow him to make war at pleasure.  Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect.22

Plan overcomes barriers to enforcement

Lobel 9 – Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution". Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org files CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization
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a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.

Obama will comply

Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, "The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History", Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis

In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also
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even purported to regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed.
Even since claims of preclusive power emerged in full, the practice within the executive
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almost no actual defiance of statutory limitations predicated on such a constitutional theory.
This repeated, though not unbroken, deferential executive branch stance is not, we
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, the Constitution compels the Commander in Chief to comply with legislative restrictions.
In this way, the founding legal charter itself exhorts the President to justify controversial
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the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

Even if initial non-compliance occurs, Court enforcement solves

Garcia 12 – Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, "War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution", Congressional Research Service Report, 2-17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30352.pdf
The courts have made clear, however, that while formidable, none of the
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unlikely that the courts will venture into this politically and constitutionally charged thicket.