Tournament: Indiana | Round: 2 | Opponent: Michigan CP | Judge: Craig Hennigan

Intervention 1AC

Congress has abdicated war powers, leaving no check on unitary executive war-making

Pinhiero 11 – John C. Pinhiero, Associate Professor of History at Aquinas College, ““Hostilities” and War Powers: Let’s Choose the Constitution”, History News Service, 6-29, http://historynewsservice.org/2011/06/hostilities-and-war-powers-lets-choose-the-constitution/
Last week Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York warned that "if we don't
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, as in the case of Rep. Nadler, it can happen.

Executive war power structurally ensures groupthink and escalatory interventions

Fleischman 10 – Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, “A Functional Distribution of War Powers”, New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. and Pub. Pol'y 137, Lexis
While Nzelibe and Yoo's model is clearly plausible, it misses certain critical institutional constructs
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that justifies abandoning the traditional and effective means of coming to a decision.
The first argument offered by Nzelibe and Yoo reasons that presidents tend to be held
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lead to short-term political gain and an unwillingness to concede defeat.
Furthermore, ex post congressional constraints on presidential actions are insufficient. The fact is
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viewed as endangering troops n109 or giving America a weaker image abroad. n110
The second way in which Nzelibe and Yoo justify expansive executive powers is by arguing
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, correcting the disparities should negate the odds of Type I errors occurring.
The third functional argument presented by Nzelibe and Yoo concerns the relative value of signaling
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should decrease the likelihood of Type I errors with respect to all regimes.
The totality of the analysis suggests that deliberation decreases the likelihood of Type I errors
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around a particular opinion, executive staffers are likely to possess policy preferences.
Type II errors (not entering "good" wars) would only be more
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it is the institutional design that would better accommodate functionalists' concerns and desires.

Those go nuclear ---

Accidents and miscalc

Adler 8 – David Gray, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, “The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs: A Critique”, 6-1, http://www.freerangethought.com/index.php?option=com_contentandtask=blogsectionandid=6andItemid=41
{11} The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse
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to an examination of the judiciary's contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.

High tempo interventions draw in outside powers

Friedman 11 – George Friedman, President of Stratfor Global Forecasting, “What Happened to the American Declaration of War?”, Stratfor, 3-29, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110328-what-happened-american-declaration-war
An Increasing Tempo of Operations
All of this came just before the United States emerged as the world's single global power -- a global empire -- that by definition would be waging war at an increased tempo, from Kuwait, to Haiti, to Kosovo, to Afghanistan, to Iraq, and so on in an ever-increasing number of operations. And now in Libya, we have reached the point that even resolutions are no longer needed.
It is said that there is no precedent for fighting al Qaeda, for example, because it is not a nation but a subnational group. Therefore, Bush could not reasonably have been expected to ask for a declaration of war. But there is precedent: Thomas Jefferson asked for and received a declaration of war against the Barbary pirates. This authorized Jefferson to wage war against a subnational group of pirates as if they were a nation.
Had Bush requested a declaration of war on al Qaeda on Sept. 12,
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they were or to move to block them wherever the president saw fit.
Leaving aside the military wisdom of Afghanistan or Iraq, the legal and moral foundations
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. Bush did not. He worked in twilight between war and peace.
One of the dilemmas that could have been avoided was the massive confusion of whether
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to prevent the other side from acting, not to punish the actors.
The Importance of the Declaration
A declaration of war, I am arguing, is an essential aspect of war
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both frees and restrains the president, as it was meant to do.
I began by talking about the American empire. I won't make the argument on that here, but simply assert it. What is most important is that the republic not be overwhelmed in the course of pursuing imperial goals. The declaration of war is precisely the point at which imperial interests can overwhelm republican prerogatives.
There are enormous complexities here. Nuclear war has not been abolished. The United
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the republic. If this can be done, what can't be done?
My readers will know that I am far from squeamish about war. I have
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of citizens to waging war requires meticulous attention to the law and proprieties.
As our international power and interests surge, it would seem reasonable that our commitment
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-or-death matter, a tonic for our adolescent body politic.

Requiring prior Congressional authorization for war deters adventurism

Dickerson 9 – Annette Warren Dickerson, Director of Education and Outreach for the Center for Constitutional Rights, “Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution”, Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
Reform the War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution has failed. Every president since the enactment of the Act
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seek relief, or that the claim presents non-justifiable political questions.
The War Powers Resolution, as written, was flawed in several key respects.
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in is before hostilities are commenced, not 60 or 90 days afterward.
Secondly, the War Powers Resolution correctly recognized that even congressional silence, inaction or
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responded by effectually saying: if Congress did nothing, why should we?
Reforming the War Powers Resolution is a project that will require leadership from the President and the political will of Congress, working together in the service and preservation of the Constitution. In light of the abuses that have taken place under the Bush administration, it is the responsibility of a new administration to insist on transparency in the drafting of new legislation.
There is a long history of attempts to revise the War Powers Resolution. As new legislation is drafted, though, it will be important to focus on the central constitutional issues. Much time has been spent in debating how to address contingencies. It will be impossible to write into law any comprehensive formula for every conceivable situation, though; much more important will be establishing the fundamental principles of reform:
The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization. The only exception should be the executive’s power in an emergency to use short-term force to repel sudden attacks on US territories, troops or citizens.
It is true that many potential conflict situations will be murky, complicated or divisive, and that quick congressional action may not always be forthcoming. Yet, history shows the folly of launching wars that are not supported by the American people. The United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise.
Today, as in 1787, the reality is that the interests of the people
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disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law.

China 1AC

Restoring war power stops Congressional meddling in diplomacy---it’s growing over the East China Sea

Carpenter 13 – Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and Contributing Editor to The National Interest, “Congress' Worst-of-Both-Worlds Approach to Foreign Policy”, National Interest, 11-13, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/congress-worst-both-worlds-approach-foreign-policy-9394
The role of Congress in the conduct of foreign policy has become nearly the opposite
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key reason why the Constitution established a presidency with significant, independent powers.
At the same time, the founders wanted Congress to play a major role in the most crucial aspects of foreign affairs. Thus, all treaties had to receive approval by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Even more graphic evidence of original intent was the provision regarding the war power. When it came to making the momentous decision about whether to take the republic to war, the Constitution gave Congress, not the president, that authority.
What we have today is a perverse mirror image of that system. Presidents have usurped—and Congress has abdicated—the war power, yet Congress has become more involved in everyday diplomacy.
The last time that Congress declared war, or was even asked to do so
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1990s, presidents acted without even the fig leaf of perfunctory congressional approval.
With the recent Syrian crisis, President Barack Obama tried both approaches. Initially,
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circuited what might have been a refreshing reassertion of the congressional war power.
Even as Congress became (at least until the Syria dispute) little more than a cipher regarding decisions about war and peace, it became increasingly active on measures that should properly be left to the executive branch. Three recent examples highlight that growing tendency to meddle in the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs.
One was a Senate resolution passed in the summer of 2013 regarding the highly sensitive territorial disputes in the South China and East China seas between China and neighboring states. Several of the “resolved” clauses in the resolution exhibited unsubtle criticism of and hostility toward China.
Not surprisingly, the Chinese government reacted angrily to the passage (by an overwhelming
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mine field, and the Senate’s action increased the likelihood of a detonation.
A second example of congressional meddling involves the sensitive matter of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The Obama administration, even more than its predecessors, has sought to pursue a “Goldilocks” strategy regarding the issue—selling just enough modern weapons to satisfy the Taiwanese government without enraging Beijing. That balancing act is inherently delicate and difficult, but recent congressional actions make it more so.
Pressure (especially from the Republican-controlled House of Representatives) is mounting on
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the sale of Apache attack helicopters in 2014 and Patriot missiles in 2015.
Beijing’s reaction to sales of the Apaches or Patriots would be anything but mild. Chinese officials regard those systems with only a little less hostility than they do the sale of advanced F-16’s. The Taiwan arms sale issue is sensitive enough without this kind of congressional meddling.
The third, and potentially the most unhelpful and dangerous case of congressional interference involves
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Washington, which would help dampen an especially dangerous flashpoint in international affairs.
One would hope that Congress would let the executive branch conduct this delicate diplomacy with
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such ultra hawks as Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham have long embraced.
This is the worst sort of attempted congressional micromanagement of foreign affairs. The Iranian negotiations are at an especially sensitive point, and such interference could sabotage a potential breakthrough to foster peace in the most volatile region of the world. The executive branch needs to have wide latitude to pursue its diplomacy.
Instead of such unhelpful, if not malicious, interference, Menendez and other members of Congress should concentrate on restoring the badly eroded congressional war power. The decision between war and peace is an exceptionally important responsibility that the Constitution vests in the legislative branch. It is alarming to see that legitimate power wither while members of Congress instead meddle in situations where the Constitution wisely gave the executive branch primary responsibility.

Congressional interference in day-to-day foreign policy torpedoes US/China cooperation---risks military escalation over the Senkakus

Carpenter 13 – Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and Contributing Editor to The National Interest, “Dangerous Congressional Meddling in the South China Sea”, China US Focus, 8-12, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/dangerous-congressional-meddling-in-the-south-china-sea/
There is a strong argument for a vigorous congressional role in the conduct of U
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of foreign policy that were meant to be handled by the executive branch.
Two recent incidents highlight that trend.  One was a Senate resolution regarding the highly
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. foreign policy, especially to relations with a key power: China.
On the surface, the Senate resolution seemed innocuous enough.  It expressed the “strong support of the United States for the peaceful resolution of territorial, sovereignty, and jurisdictional disputes in the Asia-Pacific maritime domains.”  The resolution also proclaimed that the United States “does not take a position on competing territorial claims over land features and maritime boundaries.”  But despite such soothing language, the measure was a rather undiplomatic rebuke to China and its policies.
It stressed a U.S. national interest in the disputes, including respect
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listed as posing a threat to those interests were attributed to Chinese actions.
That aspect was especially unfair.  The infamous naval “water cannons” battle between
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senators had nothing to say about such provocations from parties other than China.
Indeed, the resolution enumerated several steps taken by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
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and emphasized that Beijing in no way challenges Japan’s sovereignty over the island.
Lest anyone in China miss the underlying message, the resolution went on to emphasize Washington’s support for Japan’s continuing administration of the Senkaku Islands (which China claims under the name Diaoyu Islands) and stressed that the bilateral U.S.-Japan defense treaty covered those islands, despite their disputed status.  So much for the professed U.S. “neutrality” regarding territorial controversies!
Several of the “resolved” clauses exhibited more than an undertone of criticism and
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,” to advance those goals could hardly be viewed in Beijing as friendly.
Not surprisingly, the Chinese government reacted angrily to the passage (by an overwhelming
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its error “to avoid further complicating the issue and the regional situation.”
Ever since Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s speech to ASEAN in July 2010, Chinese
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field, and the Senate’s action has increased the likelihood of a detonation.

Interjection in the conflict chain-gangs the U.S. into conflict---nuclear war

Eland 12-10 – Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty, The Independent Institute, “Stay Out of Petty Island Disputes in East Asia”, Huffington Post, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ivan-eland/stay-out-of-petty-island-_b_4414811.html
One of the most dangerous international disputes that the United States could get dragged into
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Falklands war, the United States might be right in the atomic crosshairs.
Of the two antagonists in the Falklands War, only Britain had nuclear weapons,
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S. leaders would make this ridiculously bad tradeoff if all else failed.
Of course these East Asian nations are not quarreling because the islands or stone outcroppings are intrinsically valuable, but because primarily they, depending on the particular dispute involved, are in waters that have natural riches -- fisheries or oil or gas resources.
In one dispute, the Senkaku or Diaoyu dispute -- depending on whether the Japanese
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, China believes that the United States has chosen sides in the quarrel.

Escalation’s likely

Gertz 13 – Bill Gertz, Media Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University and National Security Columnist for the Washington Times, “Inside the Ring: Danger of China Conflict Grows”, Washington Times, 11-13, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/13/inside-the-ring-danger-of-china-conflict-grows/?page=all
As China steps up sovereignty claims over disputed waters in Asia, U.S. military forces face the growing risk of conflict with the Chinese military, according to a draft congressional report.
“Through its diplomatic actions and the rebalance to Asia, the United States has signaled its intent to strengthen its relationship with partners and allies in East Asia,” the forthcoming report of the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission states.
“However, China’s military modernization, coupled with the potential decline in U.S. power caused by sequestration, is altering the balance of power in the region and reducing the deterrent effect of the rebalance policy. The risk is therefore increasing that China’s coercive approach to its sovereignty claims will lead to greater conflict in the region.”
China is using its military forces to coerce Japan into giving up claims to the Senkaku Islands, and is also pressuring the Philippines to renounce its claims to the Spratlys in the South China Sea. Both regions are believed to harbor valuable undersea oil and gas reserves.
The report said the sovereignty disputes in the East and South China seas are not new. But it warned that “China’s growing diplomatic, economic, and military clout is changing the regional security architecture.”
“It is increasingly clear that China does not intend to resolve those disputes through multilateral negotiations or the application of international laws and adjudicative processes, but it will use its growing power in support of coercive tactics that pressure its neighbors to concede China’s claims,” said the report’s chapter on Asian maritime disputes.
The late draft is dated Oct. 21 and the final report is set for release Nov. 20. A copy of the draft was obtained by Inside the Ring. A commission spokesman said the final report could change slightly from the draft.
“The commissioners are very concerned about the way that the Defense Department budget and force structure is shaping up,” said a source close to the commission.
“We were pretty strong on the need to maintain a credible naval and air presence in the Asia-Pacific and to live up to the Pentagon’s shift to a 60 percent force concentration in Asia. Obviously 60 percent of 200 ships is less than 60 percent of 300, and it looks like the People’s Liberation Army is moving toward a 300-ship navy.”
The report said China is fueling maritime disputes domestically through “ardent popular nationalism” and by asserting its claims are “central” to national security.
Key triggers to a future conflict are the Chinese system’s weak crisis-management structure and apparent divisions between the powerful Communist Party-controlled People’s Liberation Army and government Foreign Ministry.
In January, the Chinese navy came close to triggering a naval shootout after a Chinese frigate locked its weapons radar on a Japanese ship. U.S. officials said it was the closest to a shooting incident since China began aggressive maritime actions several years ago.
The report concludes that “Beijing’s tendency to demonstrate resolve in its maritime disputes; its large and complicated political, foreign affairs, and military bureaucracy; and its inconsistent adherence to internationally accepted norms of air and maritime operations may contribute to operational miscalculations in the East and South China seas.
“Unyielding positions on sovereignty and nationalist sentiment surrounding these maritime disputes increase the risk of escalation from a miscalculation at sea to a political crisis,” it said.
US/China relations solve multiple scenarios for extinction
Wenzhong 4 – Wenzhong, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2-7-4 (Zhou, “Vigorously Pushing Forward the Constructive and Cooperative Relationship Between China and the United States,” http://china-japan21.org/eng/zxxx/t64286.htm)
China's development needs a peaceful international environment, particularly in its periphery. We will
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countries, we will see even greater accomplishments in China-US relations. 

Plan stops escalation over the East and South China Seas

Kelly 13 – Robert E. Kelly, Professor of International Relations at Pusan National University, Interview with James Pach, 10/10, “The Diplomat Interviews”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/author-spotlight/2013/10/10/the-diplomat-interviews-robert-e-kelly-2/)
Your most recent feature for us argued that the assertiveness of the British Parliament and U.S. Congress over military strikes on Syria was a positive for democracy. In Asia, given flashpoints like North Korea (not to mention Senkaku/Diaoyu and the South China Sea) do you think there could be a risk of misjudgment if the U.S. president is seen as weak or the U.S. as having “war fatigue?”
My concern in that essay is to reinstall legislative checks-and-balances on
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is simply too large to exclude the Congress and public from the debate.

North Korea 1AC

U.S. relies on threats of force against North Korea---makes prolif inevitable

Hallinan 13 (Conn, Foreign Policy In Focus columnist. Hallinan is also a columnist for the Berkeley Daily Planet, and an occasional free lance medical policy writer. He is a recipient of a Project Censored "Real News Award." He formally ran the journalism program at the University of California at Santa Cruz, where he was also a college provost, Counterpunch, “Obama’s Flawed Korea Policies,” April 28, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/04/26/obamas-flawed-korea-policies/)
Ignoring North Korea, however, did not sit well with Japan and South Korea
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and the North Koreans were essentially saying, “We told you so.”

Taking back threats spurs reform

Scobell 5 (Andrew, Associate Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College, “NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGIC INTENTIONS,” July, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub611.pdf)
Selig Harrison: Regime Is Moderating. Selig Harrison is a long time observer and
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e., plans to invade South Korea in any serious way.”17

Korean prolif causes war and EMP use---extinction

Pry 13 (Peter Vincent, executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, and served on the Congressional EMP Commission and the House Armed Services Committee and at the CIA, Washington Times, PRY: The danger of dismissing North Korea’s nuclear threat, April 15, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/15/the-danger-of-dismissing-north-koreas-nuclear-thre/?page=all)
Prudence and common sense appear to be absent in the Obama administration and Secretary of
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three successful nuclear tests is still not a real threat to the American heartland

North Korean EMP threat is high and causes global wars

Pry 12 (Peter, executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, and served on the Congressional EMP Commission and the House Armed Services Committee and at the CIA, “PRY: North Korea EMP attack could destroy U.S. — now,” December 19, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/19/north-korea-emp-attack-could-destroy-us-now/?page=all)
North Korea has labored for years and starved its people so it could develop an
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dictators, will they want to take America with them down into darkness?

Formal restraint recruits Chinese support---makes reunification peaceful

Beinart 13 (Peter, former editor of The New Republic, he has written for Time, The New York Times, The New York Review of Books among other periodicals, and is the author of three books, The Daily Beast, “Hey, Obama: Keep Out of North Korea,” April 8, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/08/obama-can-help-stop-north-korea-by-promising-never-to-station-troops.html)
Ever since the Cold War’s end, the government of the United States has done
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of its disgraceful nuclear bluster. Which would be nice right about now.

North Korean collapse’s inevitable---peaceful reunification prevents instability

Bandow 12-17 (Doug, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, “North Korea’s Dangerous Shakeup,” 2013, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/north-koreas-dangerous-shakeup?utm_source=bufferandutm_campaign=Bufferandutm_content=bufferf19bdandutm_medium=twitter)
Nevertheless, the DPRK could be heading for further instability. The episode is unprecedented
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or unsettled—isn’t likely to bring peace or stability to the region.

Unstable collapse draws in great powers and goes nuclear

Bennett, 13 (bruce w., senior defense analyst at the rand corporation and ph.d. in policy analysis from the pardee rand graduate school, “preparing for the possibility of a north korean collapse”, rand corporation, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND_RR331.pdf)
The most immediate consequences of a North Korean government collapse will occur in North Korea
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these circumstances could doom Korea to division for at least many more decades.

Extinction

Hayes and Green 10 (Peter, Professor of International Relations – Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and Director – Nautilus Institute, and Michael Hamel, Victoria University, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, Nautilus Institute Special Report, 1-5, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments
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threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

Plan tempers coercive diplomacy---formal legislative checks stop threats and build international confidence

Waxman 13 – Matthew Waxman, Law Professor at Columbia Law School, “The Constitutional Power To Threaten War”, Yale Law Journal, 10-1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316777
C. Legal Reform and Strategies of Threatened Force
Among legal scholars of war powers, the ultimate prescriptive question is whether the President
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own unilateral authority, such as deterring imminent attacks on the United States.
Whereas legal scholars are consumed with the internal effects of war powers law, such
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above helps generate some initial hypotheses and avenues for further research and analysis.
One might ask at this point why, though, having exposed as a hole
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augments the usual reform debate with appreciation for the importance of credible threats.
A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that stronger legislative checks on war
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deterrent diplomacy, even to head off explosive confrontations.”183 He continued:
In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, the authority of the President to set clear and silent limits in advance is perhaps the most important of all the powers in our constitutional armory to prevent confrontations that could carry nuclear implications. …
It is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the circumstance of modern life—the power to make a credible threat to use force in order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate.184
In his veto statement on the War Powers Resolution, President Nixon echoed these concerns
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preserved in legal doctrine, enhances the credibility of presidential threats to escalate.
A second argument, this one advanced by some congressionalists, is that stronger legislative checks on presidential uses of force would improve deterrent and coercive strategies by making them more selective and credible. The most credible U.S. threats, this argument holds, are those that carry formal approval by Congress, which reflects strong public support and willingness to bear the costs of war.186

Solvency

Plan –
The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force unless to repel attacks on the United States.

Plan’s the perfect balance that checks the Executive but preserves defensive capabilities

Lobel 8 – Jules Lobel, Professor at University of Pittsburgh Law School, “War Powers for the 21st Century: The Constitutional Perspective”, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, 4-10, http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lob041008.htm
III Revising the War Powers Resolution¶ I believe that it is necessary and possible
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if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect.22

Obama will comply

Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -- A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also
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the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

Plan overcomes barriers to enforcement

Lobel 9 – Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. "Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution". Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org files CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization
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a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.

Tournament: Georgia State | Round: 3 | Opponent: Dartmouth-CK | Judge: Struth
1AC

Contention 1 -~-- Intervention
Congress has abdicated war powers, leaving no check on unitary executive war-making
Pinhiero 11 – John C. Pinhiero, Associate Professor of History at Aquinas College, ““Hostilities” and War Powers: Let’s Choose the Constitution”, History News Service, 6-29, http://historynewsservice.org/2011/06/hostilities-and-war-powers-lets-choose-the-constitution/
Last week Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York warned that and#34;if we donand#39;t
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, as in the case of Rep. Nadler, it can happen.

Executive war power structurally ensures groupthink and escalatory interventions
Fleischman 10 – Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, “A Functional Distribution of War Powers”, New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. and Pub. Poland#39;y 137, Lexis
While Nzelibe and Yooand#39;s model is clearly plausible, it misses certain critical institutional constructs
AND
it is the institutional design that would better accommodate functionalistsand#39; concerns and desires.

Those go nuclear -~--
Accidents and miscalc
Adler 8 – David Gray, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, “The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs: A Critique”, 6-1, http://www.freerangethought.com/index.php?option=com_contentandtask=blogsectionandid=6andItemid=41
and#123;11} The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse
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to an examination of the judiciaryand#39;s contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.

Terrorist spoofing causes escalation
Blumrosen 11 – Alfred W. Blumrosen, Professor Emeritus at the Rutgers School of Law and Steven M. Blumrosen, J.D., Quinnipiac University School of Law, “Restoring the Congressional Duty to Declare War”, Rutgers Law Review, Winter, 63 Rutgers L. Rev. 407, Lexis
Conclusion¶ We have placed a heavy burden on June 1-4, 1787
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This would suit only those who believe that western civilization is an abomination.

High tempo interventions draw in outside powers
Friedman 11 – George Friedman, President of Stratfor Global Forecasting, “What Happened to the American Declaration of War?”, Stratfor, 3-29, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110328-what-happened-american-declaration-war
An Increasing Tempo of Operations
All of this came just before the United States emerged as the worldand#39;s single global
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-or-death matter, a tonic for our adolescent body politic.

Requiring prior Congressional authorization for war deters adventurism
Dickerson 9 – Annette Warren Dickerson, Director of Education and Outreach for the Center for Constitutional Rights, “Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution”, Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
Reform the War Powers Resolution¶ The War Powers Resolution has failed. Every president
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disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law.

Contention 2 -~-- Warfighting

Power projection structurally fails because operations are guided by incoherent strategies disconnected from national political will
Gallagher 11 – Lieutenant Colonel Joseph V. Gallagher III, United States Marine Corps, “Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication”, Parameters, Summer, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2011summer/gallagher.pdf
Understanding the Gap¶ Since World War II, a wide gap has developed between
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wage fewer of them—and be far better positioned to win them.

Libya removed all remaining checks on unilateral executive war-making -~-- ruins accountability and signal of unified resolve
Webb 13 – Jim Webb, Former U.S. Senator from Virginia and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan Administration, “Congressional Abdication”, The National Interest, 3-1, http://nationalinterest.org/article/congressional-abdication-8138?page=show
The president followed no clear historical standard when he unilaterally decided to use force in
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America is united and not acting merely at the discretion of one individual.

That crushes unit cohesion, morale, and allied support -~-- Congressional approval’s key
Frye 2 – Alton Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow Emeritus and Director of the Program on Congress and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism”, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 4-17, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/applying-war-powers-resolution-war-terrorism/p4514
4. CONSENSUS IS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL COHESION¶ The case for active, continuing
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that Congress will play its proper constitutional role in the war on terrorism.

Plan boosts credible negotiating power by locking in public and Congressional support prior to conflict
Gelb 5 – Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of International and Public Affairs, “Declare War”, The Atlantic, 11-1, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/declare-war/304301/?single_page=true
*Gender Modified
In the wake of the Vietnam War, Congress tried to fix this problem by
AND
support, they he would gain enormous credibility for his threats.

Effective power projection stops hotspot escalation to nuclear war
Kagan 7 – Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan_OHanlon_07.pdf
We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but
AND
Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

Executive war power ruins soft power and global alliances
Schiffer 9 – Adam Schiffer, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, and Carrie Liu Currier, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, “War Powers, International Alliances, the President, and Congress”, http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/public/repository/US_Gov_Balance_of_Power_SF.pdf
The president’s advantages over Congress in the foreign policy realm have consequences far beyond the
AND
and how they are used to establish the legitimacy of American foreign policy.

Grounding use of force in constitutionally-based SOP creates a perception of benign hegemony and encourages international cooperation based on rule of law
Ikenberry 1 – G. John, Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Getting Hegemony Right - Analysis of the United States as a and#34;Hyperpowerand#34; Nation”, The National Interest, Spring, Lexis
A critical ingredient in stabilizing international relations in a world of radical power disparities is
AND
do so now, when Americaand#39;s relative power may be at its peak.

Existential threats are likely -~-- democratic alliances founded on mutual restraint build capacity to prevent and mitigate their impact
Ikenberry 11 – G. John Ikenberry, Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “A World of Our Making”, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Issue #21, Summer, http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all
Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building¶ American dominance of the global system will eventually
AND
liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.

Contention 3 -~-- SOP

Unchecked war power sets a precedent that causes the executive to broadly ignore Congressional controls
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -- A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the and#34;
AND
for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.

U.S. war powers are modeled internationally -~-- the precedent of unilateral executive authority encourages preemptive conflict in multiple hotspots
Sloane 8 – Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 (Robert, Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis)
There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of
AND
to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.

Conflict’s likely in Taiwan, Georgia, and India/Pakistan -~-- U.S. signal’s key
Rehman 12 – Fehzan Rehman, International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Analyzing America’s National Security Strategy”, e-International Relations, 9-13, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/13/analyzing-americas-national-security-strategy/
Another implication on sovereignty, due to the NSS, was, yet again,
AND
emption and preventive wars against Taiwan for the promotion of its Chinese values.

These go nuclear without US leverage
Steinberg 2 – James B. Steinberg, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Michael E. Oand#39;Hanlon and Susan E. Rice, “The New National Security Strategy and Preemption”, Brookings Policy Brief Series, December, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2002/12/terrorism-ohanlon
The Dangers of Legitimating Preemption¶ A final concern relates to the impact of the
AND
also illustrate the dangers of legitimating an easy and early recourse to preemption.

Requiring formal declaration of war restores Congressional war powers and balances SOP by checking the Executive
Weinberger 9 – Seth Weinberger, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound, M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University, “Balancing War Powers in an Age of Terror”, The Good Society, 18(2), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v018/18.2.weinberger.html
The key to developing a constitutionally, legally, and practically sound balanced theory of
AND
-so to undo that separation, even in the face of war.

Plan –
The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force.

Plan’s the perfect balance that checks the Executive but preserves defensive capabilities
Lobel 8 – Jules Lobel, Professor at University of Pittsburgh Law School, “War Powers for the 21st Century: The Constitutional Perspective”, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, 4-10, http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lob041008.htm
III Revising the War Powers Resolution¶ I believe that it is necessary and possible
AND
if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect.22

Obama will comply
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -- A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also
AND
the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.

Plan overcomes barriers to enforcement
Lobel 9 – Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. and#34;Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolutionand#34;. Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org files CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf
The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization
AND
a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.

2AC

A2: Topicality

We meet – “Warfare” is “hostilities”
Goldsmith 11
(Jack, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003–2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002–2003, “Problems with the Obama Administration’s War Powers Resolution Theory,” 6-16-11, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/problems-with-the-obama-administrationE28099s-war-powers-resolution-theory-2/)

Warfare from a Distance¶ The Administration argues that once it starts firing missiles from
AND
the fighting (though of course “hostilities” can refer to reciprocated fighting

A2: CP

Ruins solvency
Lobel 95 – Jules Lobel, Professor at University of Pittsburgh Law School, “and#34;Little Warsand#34; and the Constitution”, University of Miami Law Review, October, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 61, Lexis

IV. Procedural v. Substantive Reform Approaches
Professor Ely and I start from the same basic proposition that all acts of combat
AND
secret prior to its initiation is clearly essential to its military effectiveness ....and#34; n56
Those two broad exceptions render the entire advance authorization provision hortatory. As Ely recognizes
AND
the time limit to twenty days and provide judicial enforceability of that limitation.
I agree that Professor Elyand#39;s approach would make a major difference, presuming a different substantive climate permitting the enactment and enforcement of his proposed statute. The President would have to request congressional authorization whenever she launched a and#34;little war,and#34; or strike, or intervention, and twenty days is a relatively short period within which to operate. I would be quite happy to see Professor Elyand#39;s statute enacted.
But Iand#39;m not convinced it is the best approach. After the President launches an
AND
months of protracted struggle when the popular support for the war was low.
For Professor Ely, there is no alternative to the procedural approach based on time
AND
. Elyand#39;s concession turns out to be driven by hypotheticals, not reality.
Today, as in 1787, the reality is that American national security can be
AND
the planes were airborne?), most situations will be clear.  *78
CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE
n62. I do not accept an exception for repelling an imminent attack on civilians
AND
militarily respond. Actual attacks require military action, imminent threats do not.
FOOTNOTE ENDS
There are, of course, hypothetical situations that do not meet the test I
AND
hoped the police officer got the information in time using any method necessary.
Many of the founders had a theory of and#34;emergencyand#34; that dealt with these
AND
  kindle emergenciesand#34; n66 has proved true in the war powers area.
A return to the original design of allowing the Executive emergency power only to repel actual attacks would in all likelihood eliminate the purported emergencies that have driven U.S. policy for decades. And if a real emergency did arise, Jeffersonand#39;s and Lincolnand#39;s policy of acting extra-constitutionally to save the nation and later seeking congressional ratification for their actions is an appropriate response.

A2: Executive WP
History disproves the DA
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -- A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis

At the same time, the history we have reviewed casts doubt on the functionalist
AND
what consequences might follow from a constitutional judgment in the here and now.

DA
Plan’s key to resolve and negotiating power -~-- their card’s a straw person
Waxman 13 – Matthew Waxman, Law Professor at Columbia Law School, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War”, Yale Law Journal, 8-25, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2316777

Other scholars have recently pointed to the special role of legislative bodies in signaling with regard to threatened force. This is especially interesting from the perspective of constitutional powers debates, because it posits a distinct role for Congress – and, again, one that does not necessarily rely on Congress’s ability to pass binding legislation that formally confines the President.
Kenneth Schultz, for instance, argues that the open nature of competition within democratic
AND
– make it difficult to conceal or misrepresent preferences about war and peace.
Faced with such institutional constraints, Presidents will incline to be more selective about making
AND
political conditions domestically favor the use of force should it be necessary.169
In some cases, Congress may communicate greater willingness than the president to use force, for instance through non-binding resolutions.170 Such powerful signals of resolve should in theory make adversaries more likely to back down.
The credibility-enhancing effects of legislative constraints on threats are subject to dispute.
AND
as to how foreign leaders interpret political maneuvers within Congress regarding threatened force.
Nevertheless, at the very least, strands of recent political science scholarship cast significant doubt on the intuition that democratic checks are inherently disadvantageous to strategies of threatened force. Quite the contrary, they suggest that legislative checks – or, indeed, even the signaling functions that Congress is institutionally situated to play with respect to foreign audiences interpreting U.S. government moves – can be harnessed in some circumstances to support such strategies.

?
Legislative control makes threats credible and effective
Waxman 13 – Matthew Waxman, Law Professor at Columbia Law School, “Constitutional Power to Threaten War: Three Points on Syria”, Lawfare Blog, 9-3, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/constitutional-power-to-threaten-war-three-points-on-syria/

On the one hand, one might intuitively expect that robust democratic checks would generally
AND
credible and effective in resolving international crises without actual resort to armed conflict.

A2: Debt Ceiling

Won’t pass- momentum, conclusive, no GOP support
MSNBC, 9-13-2013 http://maddowblog.msnbc.com/_news/2013/09/13/20477384-congress-on-crazy-pills?lite

What do Boehner and GOP leaders intend to do? In a way, thatand#39;s
AND
likelihood of a shutdown at this point is about 65 and climbing.

PC low and fails for fiscal fights
Greg Sargent 9-12, September 12th, 2013, and#34;The Morning Plum: Senate conservatives stick the knife in House GOP leaders,and#34; Washington Post, factiva
All of this underscores a basic fact about this falland#39;s fiscal fights: Far and
AND
. The time for injecting reality into the debate has long since passed.

Obama not pushing- won’t even picnic
ABC News, 9-15-2013 http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/09/obama-calls-gop-debt-ceiling-demands-an-assault-on-us-constitutional-structure/
On the eve of another fiscal showdown with congressional Republicans, President Obama is outright
AND
this month will likely not help bolster positive relations heading into the fall.

Budget, farm bill, Syria, energy and immigration thump
WP, 9-16-2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/09/16/the-congressional-fight-over-obamacare-part-341/
Will the House pass a short-term budget this week? Maybe. Will
AND
to gauge whether there is any hope for the issue in coming weeks.

Intervention

Future interventions in low-level conflicts are inevitable without an end to Congressional deference
Hendrickson 10 – Dr. Ryan C. Hendrickson, Professor of Political Science at Eastern Illinois University, “War Powers in the Obama Administration”, http://thekeep.eiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001andcontext=polisci_fac

With the arrival of a new American president in 2009, the power and constitutional
AND
even more questions over how and when to engage American military forces abroad.
At the same time, the new commander in chief inherits a presidency from George
AND
the commander in chief and Congress over the use of force abroad.2
This article seeks to explain the war powers political context of the Obama presidency.
AND
a brief assessment of the legacy of the George W. Bush administration.
The paper then follows with an examination of President Barack Obama’s and Vice President Joseph
AND
in Afghanistan and the Department of Defense’s use of force against Somali pirates.
Although it is early in the Obama administration, these first military actions indicate that
AND
in chief is an institutional pattern in the conduct of the executive branch.
Moreover, Congress generally continues to defer to the commander in chief, and partisan
AND
for American military policy is the White House and not the American Congress.

Warfighting

Credible warfighting key to deter Russia
Dowd, 11, Senior Fellow of the Fraser Institute
(The Big Chill: Energy Needs Fueling Tensions in the Arctic,” https://www.fraserinstitute.org/research-news/news/display.aspx?id=2147483979)
One reason a military presence will be necessary is the possibility of accidents caused by
AND
When the message is unclear, Russia will take what it can get. 

Nuclear war
Wallace and Staples 10 – Michael Wallace is Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia; Steven Staples is President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa, March 2010, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons A Task Long Overdue”, http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf
The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition.
AND
geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 

SOP

Congress must be the first mover
Hansen 9 – Hansen and Friedman, professors of law at the New England School of Law, 2009 (Victor and Lawrence, The Case for Congress: Separation of Powers and the War on Terror, p.130)
The problem, of course, is that much of this congressional involvement has come
AND
more difficult for Congress to stand up to an assertive and aggressive president.

Solvency

A2: K

K

Should avoid preventable death – contemplating it gives meaning to our life – letting people die is just wrong
Kelsang 99 - internationally renowned teacher of Buddhism
Geshe, http://dealingwithfear.org/fear-of-death.htm
Preparing for Death Generally, our fear of death is an unhealthy and unrealistic fear
AND
the kindest and wisest things we can do both for ourself and others.

Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative
Rejection over negligent details shatters coalition building and the possibility of actual change – only combining both viewpoints solves
Krishna 93 (Sankaran, Dep. Poly Sci @ U. Hawaii, 1993, Alternatives, v. 18
While this point is, perhaps, debatable, Der Derian’s further assertion, that
AND
genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

Tournament: Georgia State | Round: 1 | Opponent: Wake-MinQuinn | Judge: Najor
1AC Rd 1 GSU
Contention 1 -~-- Intervention
Congress has abdicated war powers, leaving no check on unitary executive war-making
Pinhiero 11 – John C. Pinhiero, Associate Professor of History at Aquinas College, ““Hostilities” and War Powers: Let’s Choose the Constitution”, History News Service, 6-29, http://historynewsservice.org/2011/06/hostilities-and-war-powers-lets-choose-the-constitution/
Last week Rep. Jerrold Nadler of New York warned that and#34;if we donand#39;t
AND
, as in the case of Rep. Nadler, it can happen.
Executive war power structurally ensures groupthink and escalatory interventions
Fleischman 10 – Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, “A Functional Distribution of War Powers”, New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. and Pub. Poland#39;y 137, Lexis

While Nzelibe and Yooand#39;s model is clearly plausible, it misses certain critical institutional constructs
AND
it is the institutional design that would better accommodate functionalistsand#39; concerns and desires.
Those go nuclear -~--
Accidents and miscalc
Adler 8 – David Gray, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, “The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs: A Critique”, 6-1, http://www.freerangethought.com/index.php?option=com_contentandtask=blogsectionandid=6andItemid=41¶ and#123;11} The structure of shared … contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.
High tempo interventions draw in outside powers
Friedman 11 – George Friedman, President of Stratfor Global Forecasting, “What Happened to the American Declaration of War?”, Stratfor, 3-29, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110328-what-happened-american-declaration-war

An Increasing Tempo of Operations¶ All of this came just before the United States
AND
-or-death matter, a tonic for our adolescent body politic.
Requiring prior Congressional authorization for war deters adventurism
Dickerson 9 – Annette Warren Dickerson, Director of Education and Outreach for the Center for Constitutional Rights, “Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution”, Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf

Reform the War Powers Resolution¶ The War Powers Resolution has failed. Every president
AND
disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law.
Contention 2 -~-- Warfighting

Power projection structurally fails because operations are guided by incoherent strategies disconnected from national political will
Gallagher 11 – Lieutenant Colonel Joseph V. Gallagher III, United States Marine Corps, “Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication”, Parameters, Summer, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2011summer/gallagher.pdf
¶ Understanding the Gap¶ Since World War II, a wide gap has developed
AND
wage fewer of them—and be far better positioned to win them.

Libya removed all remaining checks on unilateral executive war-making -~-- ruins accountability and signal of unified resolve
Webb 13 – Jim Webb, Former U.S. Senator from Virginia and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan Administration, “Congressional Abdication”, The National Interest, 3-1, http://nationalinterest.org/article/congressional-abdication-8138?page=show
The president followed no clear historical standard when he unilaterally decided to use force in
AND
America is united and not acting merely at the discretion of one individual.

That crushes unit cohesion, morale, and allied support -~-- Congressional approval’s key
Frye 2 – Alton Frye, Presidential Senior Fellow Emeritus and Director of the Program on Congress and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on Terrorism”, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 4-17, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/applying-war-powers-resolution-war-terrorism/p4514
4. CONSENSUS IS ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL COHESION¶ The case for active, continuing
AND
that Congress will play its proper constitutional role in the war on terrorism.

Plan boosts credible negotiating power by locking in public and Congressional support prior to conflict
Gelb 5 – Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of International and Public Affairs, “Declare War”, The Atlantic, 11-1, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/declare-war/304301/?single_page=true
*Gender Modified
In the wake of the Vietnam War, Congress tried to fix this problem by
AND
support, they he would gain enormous credibility for his threats.

Effective power projection stops hotspot escalation to nuclear war
Kagan 7 – Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, Stanley Foundation Report, April, http://stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/Kagan_OHanlon_07.pdf
We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but
AND
Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

Executive war power ruins soft power and global alliances
Schiffer 9 – Adam Schiffer, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, and Carrie Liu Currier, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Christian University, “War Powers, International Alliances, the President, and Congress”, http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/public/repository/US_Gov_Balance_of_Power_SF.pdf
¶ The president’s advantages over Congress in the foreign policy realm have consequences far beyond
AND
and how they are used to establish the legitimacy of American foreign policy.

Grounding use of force in constitutionally-based SOP creates a perception of benign hegemony and encourages international cooperation based on rule of law
Ikenberry 1 – G. John, Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Getting Hegemony Right - Analysis of the United States as a and#34;Hyperpowerand#34; Nation”, The National Interest, Spring, Lexis
A critical ingredient in stabilizing international relations in a world of radical power disparities is
AND
do so now, when Americaand#39;s relative power may be at its peak.

Existential threats are likely -~-- democratic alliances founded on mutual restraint build capacity to prevent and mitigate their impact
Ikenberry 11 – G. John Ikenberry, Peter F. Krogh Professor of Global Justice at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “A World of Our Making”, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Issue #21, Summer, http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all
¶ Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building¶ American dominance of the global system will
AND
liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.

Contention 3 -~-- SOP

Unchecked war power sets a precedent that causes the executive to broadly ignore Congressional controls
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -- A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the and#34;
AND
for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.

U.S. war powers are modeled internationally -~-- the precedent of unilateral executive authority encourages preemptive conflict in multiple hotspots
Sloane 8 – Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 (Robert, Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis)
There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of
AND
to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.

Conflict’s likely in Taiwan, Georgia, and India/Pakistan -~-- U.S. signal’s key
Rehman 12 – Fehzan Rehman, International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Analyzing America’s National Security Strategy”, e-International Relations, 9-13, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/13/analyzing-americas-national-security-strategy/
Another implication on sovereignty, due to the NSS, was, yet again,
AND
emption and preventive wars against Taiwan for the promotion of its Chinese values.

These go nuclear without US leverage
Steinberg 2 – James B. Steinberg, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Michael E. Oand#39;Hanlon and Susan E. Rice, “The New National Security Strategy and Preemption”, Brookings Policy Brief Series, December, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2002/12/terrorism-ohanlon

The Dangers of Legitimating Preemption¶ A final concern relates to the impact of the
AND
also illustrate the dangers of legitimating an easy and early recourse to preemption.
Requiring formal declaration of war restores Congressional war powers and balances SOP by checking the Executive
Weinberger 9 – Seth Weinberger, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound, M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University, “Balancing War Powers in an Age of Terror”, The Good Society, 18(2), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/good_society/v018/18.2.weinberger.html

The key to developing a constitutionally, legally, and practically sound balanced theory of
AND
-so to undo that separation, even in the face of war.
Plan –
The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating warfare unless to repel attacks on the United States.
Plan’s the perfect balance that checks the Executive but preserves defensive capabilities
Lobel 8 – Jules Lobel, Professor at University of Pittsburgh Law School, “War Powers for the 21st Century: The Constitutional Perspective”, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, 4-10, http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lob041008.htm
¶ III Revising the War Powers Resolution¶             I believe that it is necessary and
AND
if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect.22
Obama will comply
Barron 8 – David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -- A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis

In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also
AND
the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.
Plan overcomes barriers to enforcement
Lobel 9 – Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. and#34;Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolutionand#34;. Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org files CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf

The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization
AND
a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.
Even if initial non-compliance occurs, Court enforcement solves
Garcia 12 – Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, “War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution”, Congressional Research Service Report, 2-17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30352.pdf

The courts have made clear, however, that while formidable, none of the
AND
unlikely that the courts will venture into this politically and constitutionally charged thicket.¶ 

2AC  Rd 1 GSU
K

On the 1st K
Psychoanalysis K wrong – over-explains and is a tautology

Robinson ‘5
(Andrew, Early Career Fellow in the School of Politics – University of Nottingham, “The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique”, Theory and Event, 8(1))
•  Lacanian analysis consists mainly of an exercise in projection.  As a result,
AND
he is committed to euphoric investments generated through the repetition of the same. 

K’s of Psychoanalysis wrong and link to anti-politics

Gordon ‘1
(Paul, psychotherapist living and working in London, author of Face to Face: Therapy as ethics, RACE and CLASS, v42, n4, p. 30/1)
The postmodernistsand#39; problem is that they cannot live with dis-appointment.  All the
AND
to change the world, not just to interpret it need to look elsewhere

Next to Hillman K

Focusing on literal wars is critical to learn useful lessons from them. War itself is not the worst evil; mishandling the practical execution of wars is.
HANSON, 7 Victor Davis, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, “Why Study War?” Summer, d/a: 7/26/10, http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_3_military_history.html

The academic neglect of war is even more acute today. Military history as a
AND
equally civilized and peaceful rivals, and so solved without resorting to violence.

Radical rejection fails -~-- the plan’s the most pragmatic check on militarism
Bacevich 13 – Andrew, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, The New American Militarism, p. 205-210

There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, “always a well-
AND
point, citizens should replace them by electing people able to do so.
No impact to threat construction-~--case turns the K
Kaufman 9 – Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, ‘9 (Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434) 

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war
AND
and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

PrezPowers DA
No risk of collapse
Howell 13
(William, Sydney Stein professor of American politics at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy as well as in the department of political science, “The not-so-imperial presidency of Barack Obama,” 8-8-13, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/opinion-william-howell-barack-obama-95352.html)

The men and women who eventually become president may not come into this world with
AND
has nearly every president who came before him and as will the next.

Debt Ceiling
Budget, farm bill, Syria, energy and immigration thump
WP, 9-16-2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/09/16/the-congressional-fight-over-obamacare-part-341/

Will the House pass a short-term budget this week? Maybe. Will
AND
to gauge whether there is any hope for the issue in coming weeks.
Huge bipartisan support for the plan
Gelb 5 – Leslie H. Gelb, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of International and Public Affairs, “Declare War”, The Atlantic, 11-1, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/declare-war/304301/?single_page=true

Passing this legislation might not be easy. But the time is right. Liberals
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emboldened, and we begin to lose—first psychologically and then literally.
Executive Restraint CP
No durable enforcement
HLR 12 – Harvard Law Review 12, and#34;Developments in the Law: Presidential Authority,and#34; Vol. 125:2057, www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol125_devo.pdf

Political checks thus can work to restrain the President by prompting executive self-binding
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practices. 147 Only time, and perhaps public opinion, will tell.
Doesn’t solve SOP -~--
Statutory check’s key to signal restraint -~-- states look to formal structures -~-- that’s Damrosch. CP fails.
Scheuerman 12 – William E. Scheuerman, Professor of Political Science and West European Studies at Indiana University, “Review Essay:  Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy”, Law and Social Inquiry, Summer, 37 Law and Soc. Inquiry 743, Lexis

Posner and Vermeule rely on two main claims. First, even if the president
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seems like a pale replacement for liberal legalism and the separation of powers.

Drone Shift DA
No unique shift – drones are already the tactic of choice
Greenfield 13(Danya, deputy director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, Foreign Policy, “Obama’s drone speech misses the mark,” June 4, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/04/obama_s_drone_speech_misses_the_mark)
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the current administration will make such an investment.
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remain optimistic, but fight the same fight for some time to come.

1AR
K
Turns the K, Politics critical to resolving conflicts and a sustained critique of power and coercion
Bohman 99 (John, Professor, St. Louis University, Monist, April, 1999, Vol. 82, No. 2, p. 235-52)
The interaction between the state and the public sphere raises questions about the status of
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democratic contestation of power and domination, and intersubjective structures of mutual recognition. 

Threats good
The 1AC is necessary discourse – combating complacency is crucial to halting certain and inevitable extinction
Epstein and Zhao 9 – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse
We shall not speculate here as to the “how and when” of human
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and newsworthy than the roller-coaster booms and busts of stock markets.
Executive Restraint CP
No durable enforcement
HLR 12 – Harvard Law Review 12, and#34;Developments in the Law: Presidential Authority,and#34; Vol. 125:2057, www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol125_devo.pdf

Political checks thus can work to restrain the President by prompting executive self-binding
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practices. 147 Only time, and perhaps public opinion, will tell.
Compromise key to solve and their link isn’t about the aff – we aren’t imperialist in any way
Spencer 6 (Robert, NYT Bestselling author on Islam, http://media.web.britannica.com/ebsco/pdf/23/23648989.pdf, date accessed: 7/8/2010) AJK
We postcolonial critics should have the courage to heed Saidand#39;s proposition that the problem with
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evildoers and declaim from their pulpits the merits of Americaand#39;s divinely sanctioned power.
Threats are real and our disaster discourse mobilizes people to deal with them
Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University in Toronto, Canada, 2004, Constellations Vol 11, No 4, 2004, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight    http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa20Articles/Constellations20Article.pdf)
In addition, farsightedness has become a priority in wCorld affairs due to the appearance
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-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

Tournament: Georgia State | Round: 5 | Opponent: Georgia State SL | Judge: Gordon, Ross
1AC

Contention One is: Executive Precedents
Unchecked war power sets a precedent now. 

Barron ‘8
David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -- A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the "
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a workable alternative, such forgetting will be far less likely to occur.

The precedent spills-beyond war power. Means executives are unchecked on many issues. 

Barron ‘8
David J. Barron, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, “The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -- A Constitutional History”, Harvard Law Review, February, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941, Lexis
Moreover, this historical account performs at least one function beyond supplying information relevant to
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for a change that risks such a fundamental revision of our national identity.

It gets modeled worldwide. Debates about the precedent check preventive wars and other abuses of executive authority. 

Sloane ‘8
(Robert Sloane, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, 2008 Boston University Law Review, April, 88 B.U.L. Rev. 341, Lexis)
There is a great deal more constitutional history that arguably bears on the scope of
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to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century.

Legislative restraints means fewer Executives starting fewer conflicts worldwide. For executive authority, teaching the heuristic of work within institutions is a pre-req.

Grynaviski ‘13
Eric Grynaviski, Professor of Political Science at The George Washington University, “The Bloodstained Spear: Public Reason and Declarations of War”, International Theory, 5(2), Cambridge Journals

Conclusion The burden of the argument, thus far, has been to show that
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well as more recent issues such as the targeted killing of political leaders.

Pragmatism’s key in this context. “Root cause” and “cure-alls” won’t check violence.

Bacevich ‘13
Andrew, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, The New American Militarism, p. 205-210

There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, “always a well-
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point, citizens should replace them by electing people able to do so. 

Legislative checks solve both advantages. Without them, executive-induced casualties will persist.

Zelizer ‘11
Julian E. Zelizer, Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton University, “War Powers Belong to Congress and the President”, CNN Opinion, 6-27, http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/27/zelizer.war.powers/index.html
But the failure of Congress to fully participate in the initial decision to use military
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declare war forces voters to think about the decision sooner rather than later.

Preventive war is already killing many people. Its precedent stands to cause ever-escalating violence.

Lichterman ‘2
(et al; Andrew Lichterman is program director of Western States Legal Foundation. John Burroughs is executive director of Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy. “War Is Not the Path to Peace: The United States, Iraq, and the Need for Stronger International Legal Standards to Prevent War” – October 24th – http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/iraqlaw2.htm)
The dangers of this new war extend far beyond the borders of Iraq and far
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a result of disease and privation caused by the destruction of essential services.
Unilateral war making efforts fail because they ignore public support
Weingast 98 – Matthew S. Weingast, Adjunct Professor at the Joint Military Intelligence College, Associate on the National Security Team at Booz-Allen and Hamilton, M.S. in Strategic Intelligence from The Defense Intelligence College, Former Strategic Intelligence Officer for The Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The Strategic Necessity Perspective: A New Approach to Solving Old Constitutional War Powers Questions”, USAFA Journal of Legal Studies, 8 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 109, Lexis

Allowing the President to enter wars without Congressional authorization violates the bedrock principle of the
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avoid the need for popular support before entering actions which are clearly wars.

Contention Two – Drones
Lack of a legislative role cedes war-fighting to the executive. This drives secretive policy – including the squo’s non-transparent drone policy. 

Bacevich 13
Andrew, professor of history and international relations (Boston University), Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History (Princeton), “Andrew Bacevich, The Eternal War?” The Nation Institute, 5/28, http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175704/

Twelve and a half years after Congress didn’t declare war on an organization of hundreds
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Middle East and what’s left of American democracy and liberties are further destabilized.

Drones can’t be wished-away – they’ll exist in other nations. Even if Congress did little, public light matters. A more-transparent precedent dissuades global use and halts a distinct mechanism for violence versus dissent.

Boyle ‘13
Dr. Michael Boyle has an interdisciplinary background. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia. He was previously a Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St. Andrews. He holds a Ph.D. from The University of Cambridge, 2005; an M.P.P. from the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2001; a M.Phil, from the University of Cambridge, 1999 – “The costs and consequences of drone warfare” – International Affairs; 89: 1 (2013) 1–29 – http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf

An important, but overlooked, strategic consequence of the Obama administra - tion’s embrace
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to shrug off the loss of life that drones inflict on others today.

Drones cause deaths. This ev also proves international experiences are a “starting-point boomerang” shaping oppressive domestic practices. 

Graham ‘10
STEPHEN GRAHAM is Professor of Cities and Society at Newcastle University and previously taught at Durham and MIT, among other universities. Cities Under Siege: the New Military Urbanism – p. xiii-xvii

Such fantasies of high -tech omnipotence are much more than science fiction. As
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security operations, is the second key feature of the new military urbanism.
Plan: The President of the United States should not be authorized to initiate offensive military force without prior Congressional authorization. 

Macro-Institutional starting points are often critiqued. But micro-starting points of SELF or societal, instead of State, transformation are less effective in this narrow context.  

Stuhr ‘8
(John J, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy at Emory University “A Terrible Love of Hope”,  The Journal of Speculative Philosophy New Series, Volume 22, Number 4, Project Muse)

And then what, now what? What should a meliorist do? Terrible lovers
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peace must be, in the broadest sense of the term, educational. 

Particularity Thesis. Sweeping claims don’t undercut the Aff. We can advance contingent  and particular knowledge without “Big T” Truths.

PRICE ‘98
(RICHARD PRICE is a former prof in the Department of Anthropology at Yale University. Later, he moved to Johns Hopkins University to found the Department of Anthropology, where he served three terms as chair. A decade of freelance teaching (University of Minnesota, Stanford University, Princeton University, University of Florida, Universidade Federal da Bahia), ensued. This article is co-authored with CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT – Monash University – European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 1998 via SAGE Publications – http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/PriceReusSmithCriticalInternatlTheoryConstructivism.pdf)
One of the central departures of critical international theory from positivism is the view that
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violates the interpretive ethos of critical international theory than does critical theory itself.

If we lose pre-fiat, then we do nothing. But non-concrete activism is WORSE THAN NOTHING. No Framework QUESTION can veer this round from the NEXUS QUESTION OF CONCRETE ALTS. Without those, we’re awful activists. 

Bryant ‘12
(EDITED FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE – the author said “she” and it was replaced with the word “to” – Levi Bryant is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze,  “Critique of the Academic Left”, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because
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. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

Even if “fiat’s not real”, and Affs don’t control levers of power today, we advance a heuristic. Without this heuristic of fiat, we’ll re-enforce dangerous nihilism. 

Hoff ‘6
(et al, Dr. Dianne Hoff, professor in the College of Education and Human Development and president of Faculty Senate, University of Maine, Journal of Educational Administration, 44:3 – available via Emerald Management 120 database).

There is no question that helping educational leadership students become self-analytical and reflect
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. This is an arena from which a new social order can emerge.

2AC

2AC v. GSU K
 (  ) Perm do both – working on both fronts.

Extend our 1AC Stuhr ev. K’s of Aff’s macro-political starting point don’t apply in the War Powers context. Stuhr’s next paragraph prove that WE DON’T EXCLUDE their framework – but perm’s the best option. 

Stuhr ‘8
(John J, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy at Emory University “A Terrible Love of Hope”,  The Journal of Speculative Philosophy New Series, Volume 22, Number 4, Project Muse)

These and related experiences, rooted in a love of war, are not merely
AND
imperative. A century later, that day has not come. Yet.

(  ) In-Round focus turn
calls for the ballot discourages community change on issues of oppression.

Ritter ‘13
MICHAEL J. RITTER , J.D. – Mr. Ritter received his law degree (J.D.) from the University of Texas School of Law. He is a former debater and currently coordinates the NATIONAL JOURNAL OF SPEECH and DEBATE – NJSD – VOLUME II: ISSUE One – SEPTEMBER 2013 – http://site.theforensicsfiles.com/NJSD.2-1.Final.pdf

The preceding discussion demonstrates why arguments about social change— even social change within the
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round of anything beyond the ultimate question of who did the better debating.

B - “the Ballot as currency” functions to discourage out-of-round community solutions. 

Ritter ‘13
MICHAEL J. RITTER , J.D. – Mr. Ritter received his law degree (J.D.) from the University of Texas School of Law. He is a former debater and currently coordinates the NATIONAL JOURNAL OF SPEECH and DEBATE – NJSD – VOLUME II: ISSUE One – SEPTEMBER 2013 – http://site.theforensicsfiles.com/NJSD.2-1.Final.pdf

The fiction of social change through debate abuses the win—loss structure of debate
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resolution of social issues within and outside the debate community by prompting backlash.

(  ) Neg ballot doesn’t solve their framework’s broader goals.

Ritter ‘13
MICHAEL J. RITTER , J.D. – Mr. Ritter received his law degree (J.D.) from the University of Texas School of Law. He is a former debater and currently coordinates the NATIONAL JOURNAL OF SPEECH and DEBATE – NJSD – VOLUME II: ISSUE One – SEPTEMBER 2013 – http://site.theforensicsfiles.com/NJSD.2-1.Final.pdf

Many students who participate in comp etitive interscholastic debate in high school and college 20
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the exclusion of out - of - round, non - competitive discussions. 

(  ) Our starting point is better – macro-structures that we tackle necessarily shape micro-factors like the Debate community.

Ebert ‘5
Teresa L. Ebert is a professor of cultural theory at the University at Albany, State University of New YorkScience and Society, Vol. 69, No. 1, January 2005, 33–55, available at: http://people.missouristate.edu/WilliamBurling/Adobe20files/Rematerializing20Feminism.pdf
The emergence of micropolitics marks the impact of the globalization of capitalist production and the
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ethnographical studies of the behavior of the subject in its multiple consuming relations.

(  ) Their arg is a link of omission – that we have not discussed veterans perspective does not mean are violent towards it. Since everyone enjoys some intersection, their role for the ballot invariably excludes some subject position.

Bankey ‘13
BRENDON BANKEY – A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of   WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES   in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements   for the Degree of   MASTER OF ARTS   Communication   August 2013 – Bankey holds an BA from Trinity and now holds an MA from Wake Forest. This thesis was approved by: Michael J. Hyde, Ph.D., Advisor; Mary M. Dalton, Ph.D., Chair; R. Jarrod Atchison, Ph.D.   THE “FACT OF BLACKNESS” DOES NOT EXIST: AN EVOCATIVE CRITICISM OF RESISTANCE RHETORIC IN ACADEMIC POLICY DEBATE AND ITS   (MIS)USE OF FRANTZ FANON’S BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS – From Chapter Five – http://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/39020/Bankey_wfu_0248M_10473.pdf

Furthermore, perhaps it is time that we   give more credit to   the notion that
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willingness to occupy a space filled with total strangers and give a   speech.

(  ) Darcell explains his pre-round arg. (All types of oppression, can’t just subjectively put one over another. Causes a continuous cycle of voices not being heard)

(  ) Micro-political focus is flawed. 

Davis ‘7
Lennard J. Davis is Professor in the English Department in the School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois at Chicago, “Review of: Shelley Tremain, ed. Foucault and the Government of Disability. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005.” – ESC: English Studies in Canada, Volume 33, Issue 1-2, March/June¶ 2007, pp. 298-304 – available via Project Muse

The collection is as good as it gets in using Foucault in disability studies.¶
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a solution. The method is, in a sense, the madness.

A2: CP

CP is unconstitutional, can’t just consult half of Congress
D-Rule
Levinson 00 (Daryl, Professor of law – University of Virginia, UC Law Review, Spring, Lexis)

Extending a majority rule analysis of optimal deterrence to constitutional torts requires some explanation,
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better off, by whatever measure, if constitutional rights were never violated.

Conditionality is bad

( ) Strategy Skew - they can force us out of all our best offense

( ) Time skew - Forces us to answer a ton of short policy options just to have the neg kick them. It's worse than disads or T because it interacts with other arguments in the debate.

( ) Argumentative irresponsibility - they can run multiple contradictory arguments and just kick out of our best offense.

( ) Justifies aff conditionality. This should be reciprocal - kicking the counterplan justifies 2AC replanning.

( ) Justifies advocating the permutations. At the very least, we should get leeway on the link questions.

( ) Creates multiple worlds, destroying all chance we have to compete. This hurts education because we never focus in one a single policy option.

( ) Voter for ground, fairness, education and potential abuse.

1AR

Link

Structural

Experts are reflexive and should be preferred – they understand the K better
Snjezana 10 (Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
“Trusting Experts: Trust, Testimony, and Evidence”. Received: 2010-02-19. Original scientific article. University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Omladinska 14, 51000, Scholar)
Let us define expertism as being a position that is composed of three statements:
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experts entails blind trust as a precondition of the functioning of our reason.

Discourse
Focus on discourse trades off with direct action, meaning we must put policy before reps to have any solvency
Taft-Kaufman 95 (Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”, p pq)
The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported
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through political agendas institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them., 

Plan Text

Plann text argument doesn’t make any sense, we advocate a policy action that we will defend is good

Epistemology
Obsession with epistemological justification causes us to search for flaws and just ends up collapsing ALL meaningful evaluation
Nussbaum 92 (Martha, Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics – U. Chicago, Political Theory, “HUMAN FUNCTIONING AND SOCIAL JUSTICE In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism'”, 20:2, May, JSTOR)
Let me say very directly where I stand on the objections to essentialism. I
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get on with the business of reasoning in which we were already engaged.