Tournament: CEDA | Round: 1 | Opponent: Everyone | Judge: Any of them
_ and  advocate insurrection against statism.  Use the ballot to endorse our refusal to equate statism with political agency.
Ob 1: Agency
Requiring us to simulate the USFG assumes the State is the normative site for political engagement and domesticates challenges to its power.
Newman—Professor at the University of London, 11 (Saul, Ph.D in Political Science and Reader at Goldsmiths – University of London, “Postanarchism and space: Revolutionary fantasies and autonomous zones.” Published in Planning Theory online 7 July 2011. Accessed online 3/12/13 via http://plt.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/06/03/1473095211413753)
As an alternative to the collaborative/communicative model, Hillier has proposed a model based around the recognition that contestation and antagonism are central to the political, and which seeks to create a forum whereby these antagonisms can be brought to the surface and mobilized in a democratic form: Since we cannot eliminate antagonism, we need to domesticate it to a condition of agonism in which passion is mobilized constructively (rather than destructively) towards the promotion of democratic decisions that are partly consensual, but which also respectfully accept unresolvable disagreements (Hillier, 2003: 42). This agonistic model is derived from Connolly, and from Chantal Mouffe, who has sought to revitalize democratic theory through a combination of pluralism and the Schmittian friend–enemy opposition (see 2000, 2005). The advantage of this model over the collaborative one is that it seeks to make visible what Mouffe calls ‘the ineradicable dimension of antagonism which exists in human societies’, and which is central to the category of the political (2005: 119). At the same time, however, I find this model, particularly in the form presented by Mouffe, itself insufficient for thinking about a genuinely radical politics today. In this model, democratic agonism always takes place within the unacknowledged framework of the state, and it is unable to conceive of politics outside this framework. We can see this in a number of aspects of Mouffe’s thought – for instance, in her hostility to notions of transnational activism and cosmopolitan politics. While she is perfectly correct in her criticism of certain neoliberal, as well as social democratic, visions of cosmopolitan globalization, her approach seems to reaffirm the concept of state sovereignty, and regards the nation state as the only legitimate site of democratic politics, thus ruling out any conception of transnational political spaces.17 Furthermore, we find in Mouffe’s theory of democracy a strong defence of parliamentary institutions because of the way that they stage antagonistic relationships, transforming them into ‘safe’ forms of agonism (see 2005: 23). This seems a somewhat limited model for a radically democratic politics to follow. By situating democratic agonistic struggles primarily within the state and its parliamentary institutions, Mouffe leaves the actual political space of the state unchallenged. ¶ Instead of this, I would like to propose an alternative theoretical model based on the politics of autonomy, which contests the idea of the state being the exclusive site of the political; on the contrary, I see the state as a machine of depoliticization and governmentality, what Rancière would call ‘the police’ (see 1999). Moreover, it contends that genuinely political relationships always stage a confrontation with the state and can only be realized in opposition to it. The existence of autonomous movements, organiza­tions and political spaces forces us to re-situate the political dimension away from the centricity of the state and towards alternative practices and forms of decision-making. If I could formulate it in this way: the autonomy of the political – the category central to Mouffe (and Schmitt) – only makes sense if it is thought of in terms of a politics of autonomy. The re-situation of the political dimension away from the hegemony of the state is what I see as central to postanarchism (see Newman, 2010a).
Moreover, if we are to think about democratic politics as autonomous and as not bound by the state, we can take heed of Abensour’s argument that genuine democracy articulates itself in opposition to the state; indeed, he posits a notion of ‘insurgent democ­racy’ as a democracy against the state – ‘democracy is anti-statist or else it is not’ (2011: xxxiii). Indeed, Abensour distinguishes ‘insurgent democracy’ from what he calls ‘con­flictual democracy’, or what I understand as ‘agonistic democracy’:
Insurgent democracy is not a variant of conflictual democracy, but its exact opposite. Whereas conflictual democracy practices conflict within the State, a democratic State which in its very name presents itself as an avoidance of the original conflict, inclining as a result conflictuality towards permanent compromise, insurgent democracy situates conflict in another space, outside the State, against it, and far from practicing the avoidance of the major conflict – democracy against the State – it does not shrink from rupture, if need be (Abensour, 2011: xl italics are mine).

The State subordinates the individual and civil society to its ends, making war and genocide possible. By recovering our agency, we can deprive the state of its ability to make corpses  
Beres, Professor of International Law at Purdue, '94 (Louis René, Ph. D from Princeton and Professor of International Law, Department of Political Science, Purdue University. “SELF-DETERMINATION, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SURVIVAL ON PLANET EARTH” Arizona Journal of International and comparitive law. Spring 1994. Accessed online 2/24/13 via http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.library.ewu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=srandcsi=146210 djc)
The problem of the omnivorous State, which subordinates all individual sensibilities to the idea of unlimited internal and external jurisdiction, was foreseen brilliantly in the 1930s by Jose Ortega y Gasset. In The Revolt of the Masses, Ortega correctly identifies the State as "the greatest danger," mustering its immense and unassailable resources "to crush beneath it any creative minority which disturbs it -- disturbs it in any order of things: in politics, in ideas, in industry." n29 Set in motion by individuals whom it has already rendered anonymous, the State positions its machinery above society so that humankind comes to live for the State, for the governmental apparatus: And as, after all, it is only a machine whose existence and maintenance depend on vital supports around it, the State, after sucking out the very marrow of society, will be left bloodless, a skeleton, dead with that rusty death of machinery, more gruesome than the death of a living organism. n30 A similar image is offered by Simone Weil: "The development of the State exhausts a country. The State eats away its moral substance, lives on it, fattens on it, until the day comes when no more nourishment can be drawn from it, and famine reduces it to a condition of lethargy." n31 Ortega's and Weil's characterizations of the State were prefigured by Nietzsche. "State," he exclaims in the First Part of Zarathustra, "is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly, it tells lies too and this lie crawls out of its mouth! 'I, the State, am the people.' That is a lie! It was creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served life."n32 The task, therefore, is to migrate from the Kingdom of the State to the Kingdom of the Self. But in this movement one must also want to live in the second Kingdom. This is the most difficult part of the needed migration because the Kingdom of the State has immense attractions. The risks of living within this Kingdom become apparent to most only when the possibilities of migration no longer exist. *13  Kierkegaard understood the dilemma, and articulated it in the following way: Devoid of imagination, as the Philistine always is, he lives in a certain trivial province of experience as to how things go, what is possible, what usually occurs. . . . For philistinism thinks it is in control of possibility . . . it carries possibility around like a prisoner in the cage of the probable, and shows it off. n33The "trivial province of experience" must be recognized. Only then can it be indicted and condemned to speedy execution. Today this province is maintained by an endless succession of electronic and print images which distort meaning and suppress Self. Taking the lies of such images as truth, we ignore the only real truth -- the one contained and imprisoned within us. And because we live in falsehood, we are, as Simone Weil notes, "under the illusion that happiness is what is unconditionally important." n34 Furthermore, we misunderstand happiness, believing that it can be purchased, along with self-worth, by money.The connections are fractured and incoherent. Both Socrates and Plato understood that the pursuit of happiness is never the pursuit of pleasure. In fact, they are diametrically opposed. With the pursuit of pleasure, people inevitably transform freedom into obedience. Although unhindered by the normal expressions of political tyranny, they understand that becoming a self must always be treason. The State requires its members to be serviceable instruments, suppressing every glimmer of creativity and imagination in the interest of a plastic mediocrity. Even political liberty within particular States does nothing to encourage opposition to war or to genocide in other States. Since "patriotic self-sacrifice" is demanded even of "free" peoples, the expectations of inter-State competition may include war and the mass killing of other peoples. In the final analysis, war and genocide are made possible by the surrender of Self to the State. Given that the claims of international law n35 are rendered  *14  impotent by Realpolitik, this commitment to so-called power politics is itself an expression of control by the herd. Without such control, individuals could discover authentic bases of personal value inside themselves, depriving the State of its capacity to make corpses of others. The herd controls not through the vulgar fingers of politics but by the more subtle hands of Society. Living without any perceptible rewards for innerdirection, most people have discovered the meaning of all their activity in what they seek to exchange for pleasure. Hence, meaning is absorbed into the universal exchange medium, money, and anything that enlarges this medium is treated as good. According to this model, finality of life is not, as Miguel de Unamuno wrote, "to make oneself a soul," n36 but rather to justify one's "success" to the herd. Instead of seeking to structure what Simone Weil, who was strongly influenced by Unamuno, calls "an architecture within the soul," we build life upon the foundations of death. Thus does humankind nurture great misfortune. The Talmud tells us: "The dust from which the first man was made was gathered in all the corners of the world." n37 Seizing this wisdom, people everywhere must begin to move toward generous new visions of planetary identity. Shorn of the dreadful misunderstanding that people can exist only amid the death struggles of competing herds, the residents of Earth could escape from the dark side of national self-determination n38 and recover an overriding cosmopolitanism that brings self-affirmation and safety.

Challenging the dominance of statist practices in our own community is key to revolutionary societal transformation       

Graeber, ‘4 (David, professor of anthropology at the London School of Economics, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, pp. 43-45)

In fact, the world is under no obligation to live up to our expectations, and insofar as “reality” refers to anything, it refers to precisely that which can never be entirely encompassed by our imaginative constructions. Totalities, in particular, are always creatures of the imagination. Nations, societies, ideologies, closed systems... none of these really exist. Reality is always infinitely messier than that—even if the belief that they exist is an undeniable social force. For one thing, the habit of thought which defines the world, or society, as a totalizing system (in which every element takes on its significance only in relation to the others) tends to lead almost inevitably to a view of revolutions as cataclysmic ruptures. Since, after all, how else could one totalizing system be replaced by a completely different one than by a cataclysmic rupture? Human history thus becomes a series of revolutions: the Neolithic revolution, the Industrial revolution, the Information revolution, etc., and the political dream becomes to somehow take control of the process; to get to the point where we can cause a rupture of this sort, a momentous breakthrough that will not just happen but result directly from some kind of collective will. “The revolution,” properly speaking. ¶ If so it’s not surprising that the moment radical thinkers felt they had to give up this dream, their first reaction was to redouble their efforts to identify revolutions happening anyway, to the point where in the eyes of someone like Paul Virilio, rupture is our permanent state of being, or for someone like Jean Baudrillard, the world now changes completely every couple years, whenever he gets a new idea.¶ This is not an appeal for a flat-out rejection of such imaginary totalities—even assuming this were possible, which it probably isn’t, since they are probably a necessary tool of human thought. It is an appeal to always bear in mind that they are just that: tools of thought. For instance, it is indeed a very good thing to be able to ask “after the revolution, how will we organize mass transportation?,” “who will fund scientific research?,” or even, “after the revolution, do you think there will still be fashion magazines?” The phrase is a useful mental hinge; even if we also recognize that in reality, unless we are willing to massacre thousands of people (and probably even then), the revolution will almost certainly not be quite such a clean break as such a phrase implies ¶.What will it be, then? I have already made some suggestions. A revolution on a world scale will take a very long time. But it is also possible to recognize that it is already starting to happen. The easiest way to get our minds around it is to stop thinking about revolution as a thing—“the” revolution, the great cataclysmic break—and instead ask “what is revolutionary action?” We could then suggest: revolutionary action is any collective action which rejects, and therefore confronts, some form of power or domination and in doing so, reconstitutes social relations—even within the collectivity—in that light. Revolutionary action does not necessarily have to aim to topple governments. ¶ Attempts to create autonomous communities in the face of power (using Castoriadis’ definition here: ones that constitute themselves, collectively make their own rules or principles of operation, and continually reexamine them), would, for instance, be almost by definition revolutionary acts. And history shows us that the continual accumulation of such acts can change (almost) everything.
Ob 2: Ontology
The idea that humans devolve into egoists absent control is justified by neither anthropological nor historical study.  It is a product of bourgeois culture, masquerading as a universal.

Sahlins, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, 8 (Marshall, The Western Illusion of Human Nature, Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press,  An Earlier version of this pamphlet was delivered as the Tanner Lecture at the University of Michigan, on 4 November 2005.  Marshall David Sahlins is an American anthropologist who is professor emeritus at the University of Chicago)

Time and again for more than two millennia, the people we call “Western” have been haunted by the specter of their own inner being: an apparition of human nature so avaricious and contentious that, unless it is somehow governed, it will reduce society to anarchy.  The political science of the unruly animal has come for the most part in two contrasting and alternating forms: either hierarchy or equality, monarchial authority or republican equilibrium: either a system of domination that (ideally) restrains people’s natural self-interest by an external power; or a self-organizing system of free and equal powers whose opposition (ideally) reconciles their particular interest in the common interest.  Beyond politics, this is a totalized metaphysics of order, for the same generic structure of an elemental anarchy resolved by hierarchy or equality is found in the organization of the universe as well as the city, and again in therapeutic concepts of the human body.  I claim it is a specifically Western metaphysics, for it supposes an opposition between nature and culture that is distinctive of our own folklore—and contrastive to the many people who consider that beasts are basically human rather than humans basically beasts  These peoples could know no primordial “animal” nature,” let alone one that must be overcome.  And they have a point, inasmuch as the modern human species, Homo sapiens, emerged relatively recently under the aegis of a much older human culture.  By our own paleontological evidence, we too are animal creatures of culture endowed with the biology of our symbology.  The idea that we are involuntary servants of our animal dispositions is an illusion—also originating in the culture.  ¶ I am going against the grain of the genetic determinism now so popular in America for its seeming ability to explain all manner of cultural forms by an innate disposition of competitive self-interest.  In combination with an analogous Economic Science of autonomous individuals devoted singularly to their own satisfactions by the “rational choice” of everything, not to mention the common native wisdom of the same ilk, such fashionable disciplines as Evolutionary Psychology and Sociobiology are making an all-purpose social science of the “selfish gene.”  But as Oscar Wilde said of professors, their ignorance is the result of long study.  Oblivious to history and cultural diversity, these enthusiasts of evolutionary egoism fail to recognize the classic bourgeois subject in their portrait of so-called human nature.  Or else they celebrate their ethnocentrism by taking certain of our customary practices as proof of their universal theories of human behavior.  In this kind of ethnoscience, l’espece, c’est moi—I am the species. ¶ It goes against the current grain too—I mean here the exigent postmodern cravings for indeterminacy—to make extravagant claims for the uniqueness of the Western ideas of man’s innate wickedness.  I should qualify.  Similar notions might well be imagined in state formations elsewhere, insofar as they develop similar interests in controlling their underlying populations.  Even Confucian philosophy, for all its suppositions that men are inherently good (Mencius) or inherently capable of the good (Confucious), can come up with alternative views of natural wickedness (Hsun Tzu).  Still, I would argue that neither the Chinese nor any other cultural tradition can match the sustained Western contempt for humanity: this long-term scandal of human avarice, together with the antithesis of culture and nature that informs it. ¶ On the other hand, we have not always been so convinced of our depravity.  Other concepts of the human being are embedded, for example, in our kinship relations, and they have found certain expressions in our philosophies.  Yet we have long been at least half-beast, and that half as a fact of nature has seemed more intractable than any artifice of culture.  While I offer no sustained narrative of this lugubrious sense of what we are—no claim of doing an intellectual history, or even an “archeology”—I put in evidence of its duration the fact that intellectual ancestors from Thucydides through St. Augustine, Machiavelli and the authors of the Federalist Papers, right up to our sociobiological contemporaries, have all been accorded the scholarly label of “Hobbesian.”  Some of these were monarchists, others partisans of democratic republics, yet all shared the same sinister view of human nature.  
Analysis of ‘human nature’ must begin with mutual aid, not acquisitive self-interest.  This is the true bases for collective order, crowded out by statist control. 

Sahlins, 8 (Marshall, The Western Illusion of Human Nature, Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press,  An Earlier version of this pamphlet was delivered as the Tanner Lecture at the University of Michigan, on 4 November 2005.  Marshall David Sahlins is an American anthropologist who is professor emeritus at the University of Chicago)

Perhaps the antithesis of nature (physis) and culture (nomos) became an issue with the origin of the state and its encroachments on the “natural” bonds of kinship—although the question would remain, why in Greece and not in many other societies that experienced the same development?  In any case, it seems fair to say that the dramatic conflicts between kinship and the city that since Homer were a revisited topos of the poets involved just such reflections on the nature-culture divide.  In Sophocles’ Antigone, tragedy inheres in the incompatibilities between the principles of the kindred and the prescriptions of the polis, as personified in Antigone’s defiance of Creon, tyrant ruler of Thebes.  By forbidding her to bury her brother because he was an enemy of the city, having died in an attack upon it, Creon put the laws of the state before Antigone’s obligation to her kinsman.  Creon is intransigent, but only until he becomes a victim of the same opposition, when his civic policy makes a mortal victim of his own son.  For present purposes, the moral may be something more than another good nature/bad culture variant of the ancient dualism.  The argument from familial obligation involves conceptions of the human condition undreamed of in our received philosophies of human nature, for what means “self-interest” when both selves and interests are transpersonal relationships rather than predicates of individuals?
Beyond the current controversies over human nature and its supposed cultural complements, the Western tradition has long harbored an alternative conception of order and being, of the kind anthropologists have often studied: kinship community.  True that in the West this is the unmarked human condition, despite that (or perhaps because) family and kindred relations are sources of our deepest sentiments and attachments.  Ignoring these, our philosophies of human nature generally come from the larger society, organized on radically different principles.  What we are pleased to consider human nature mostly consists of the inclinations of (bourgeois) adult males, largely to the exclusion of women, children and old folks and to the comparative neglect of the one universal principle of human sociality, kinship.  One would think that human nature begins at home; but then it would have to be understood differently than self-interest, since charity was always already there.
The lurking contradiction may help account for some remarkable recommendations of kinship community and subjectivity on the part of the ancients.  Plato and Augustine both formulated a broad system of Hawaiian-type kinship as the mode of society most appropriate for mankind: Augustine asserting that this conception of humanity as family was the original divinely-sanctioned social order; Plato, that it was the ideal society among the enlightened classes of his utopian Republic.  In Hawaiian systems everyone is related to everyone in the community through the primary ties of mother, father, brother, sister, son and daughter.  It was not for nothing, opined Augustine, but rather for universal love that God made us descendants of a single ancestor, thus all mankind but one kindred.  The Bishop of Hippo also forestalled E.B. Taylor’s famous explanation of the incest taboo—“marry out or die out”—by some fifteen hundred years, arguing that the prohibition of unions within the family would multiply the number of its kindred relations and accordingly broaden its support.  (One would have a sister, a wife, and in-laws rather than a sister who is a wife and one’s natal family only)  Speaking thus of the community of common ancestry, the encompassment of distant  kin in primary relationships (classificatory kinship), the incest taboo and marrying out (exogamy), these ancient anthropologies could already perceive kinship as a collective order.
Still it was Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics who penned what still seems the best determination of what kinship is.  Reading Aristotle on the friendship of kinsmen, one could be reading Marilyn Strathern (on the New Guinea Highlands) or Janet Carsten (on the Indonesian islanders) analyzing kinship as relationship to other intrinsic to a person’s subjective being and objective identity.  Just so for Aristotle, kinsmen are the same entity in different subjects; children are their parents’ other selves; and brothers, cousins and other relatives are people who belong to one another, if in varying degrees:
Parents then love children as being themselves (for those sprong from them are as it were other selves of theirs, resulting from the separation), children love parents as being what they have grown from, and brothers each othe by virtue of their having grown from the same sources: for the self-sameness of their relation to those produces the same with each other (hence people say, ‘same blood,’ ‘same root,’ and things like that).  They are, then, the same entity in a way, even though in different subjects….The belonging to each other of cousins and other relatives derives from these, since it exists by virtue of their being from the same origins, but some of these belong more closely while others are more distant, depending on whether the ancestral common sources are near or far off. (Nich. Eth. 1162a).
If I may be allowed to abstract the general principle, kinship is a mutual relationship of being.  Kinsmen are members of one another.  Their mutuality may be a sameness of being, as among brothers or descendants of a common ancestor; or it may entail belonging to one another in a reciprocal and complementary relationship, as between husband and wife.  In any case, the relationship to the other, and in that sense the other himself or herself, is intrinsic to one’s own existence.
Aristotle spoke primarily of the kinship of sameness, the one entity in different subjects, as engendered by birth and descent and objectified by shared bodily substance; thus people of the “same blood” or the same stock.  Yet in giving salience only to the kinship of the same kind or common descent, Aristotle’s concept of relatedness was incomplete.  It was an early reflection of the long-standing Western distinction between the naturalness of kinship by birth or by “blood” in contrast to man-made relationships by marriage or by law: the self-same opposition of physis and nomos that David Schneider discerned in a celebrated study of modern American kinship.  Still this privilege given to consanguinity is not a necessary bias of kinship everywhere, or even of the definition of the in-group of “same people.” Ethnographers tell of people who establish a solidary kinship of sameness on various principles, including common residence, common history, common land rights, gift exchange, food-providing and shared memories, among other ways of thus constituting mutuality of being.  It would hardly need saying, except for sociobiological delusions on this score, that the determination of kin relationships is not necessarily genealogical and need not entail any sense of the corporeal identity of those known as relatives: no necessity of shared substance at all.  What is, however, universally valid in Aristotle’s description of kinship as the one entity in different subjects is the ethics of this sameness: the love such kinsmen are enjoined to have for one another.  In respect of their common identity they are equals, although they may be differentiated in other ways, and the generic economic relation among them should be mutual aid.  “Kinship” and “kindness” E.B. Tylor once observed, have a common root, a derivation that expresses in the happiest way one of the main principles of social life.  
Yet for all its ethics of love and mutual aid, a kinship group of the “same people” or “own people” cannot reproduce itself, inasmuch as the incest taboo deprives it of necessary generative capacities and enjoins its dependence on the external others who supply the want.  The marital exchanges that transfer members of one group into the households of others effect a circulation of life powers, thus constituting vital kinship relations of difference, alliances with others that create children as complementary beings.  (These transfers usually involve the reproductive contributions of men in matrilineal orders, of women in patrilineal, or of either in other kinship schemes.)  The affinal relationship is thus a real-life, experiential form of the great mystical predicament of the human condition: that people truly depend on the sui generis powers of vitality and mortality of which they are neither the authors or the masters, powers rather that exist outside their own self-organized communities.  If people did control their own existence, they would die.  Nor do they control the elements, the seasons, or other such conditions on which their welfare depends.  Hence the frequent and widely-distributed ethnographic reports that link affinal relatives to cosmic beings that govern the human fate, for the former are likewise life-giving or life-taking through the transactions of marriage.  Even important gods may be affines, and important affines gods.  Hence also, as Edmund Leach famously observed, “relations of alliance are viewed as metaphysical bonds.  Here, in kinship, as in relations to the cosmos in general, alterity is a condition of the possibility of being.
Ethnographic reports speak of the “the transpersonal self” (Native Americans), of the self as “a locus of shared social relations or shared biographies” (Caroline Islands), of persons as “the plural and composite site of the relationships that produced them” (New Guinea Highlands).  Referring broadly to the African concept of “the individual,” Roger Bastide writes: “He does not exist except to the extent he is ‘outside’ and ‘different’ from himself.”  Clearly the self in these societies is not synonymous with the bounded, unitary and autonomous individual as we know him—him in particular, as in our social theory if not our kinship practice.  Rather, the individual person is the locus of multiple other selves with whom he or she is joined in mutual relations of being; even as, for the same reason, any person’s self is more or less widely distributed among others.  McKim Marriott’s notice of this phenomena in India first brought it to anthropological attention:
Persons—single actors—are not thought in South Asia to be “individual,” that is, indivisible bounded units, as they are in much of Western social and psychological theory as well as in common sense.  Instead it appears that persons are generally thought of by South Asians to be “dividual” or divisible.  To exist, divided persons absorb heterogenous material influences.  They must also give out from themselves particulars of their own coded substances—essences, residues or other active influence—they may then reproduce in others something of the nature of the persons in whom they have originated.
In sum and in general, in kin relationships, others become predicates of one’s own existence and vice versa.  I do not mean the interchange of standpoints that is a feature of all direct social relationships according to the phenomenologists.  I do not mean the integration of certain relationships, hence the participation of certain others in one’s own being.  And if “I am another,” then the other is also my own purpose.
As members of one another, kinsmen lead each other’s lives and die each other’s deaths.  One works and acts in terms of relationships, with others in mind, thus on behalf of one’s child, cross-cousin, husband, clansmen, mothers’ brother, or other kinsperson.  In this regard, Marilyn Strathern observes of New Guinea peoples, neither agency nor intentionality is a simple expression of individuality, inasmuch as the being of the other is an internal condition of one’s own activity.  Not only work but consumption itself is “no simple matter of self-replacement,” Strathern notes, “but the recognition and monitoring of relationships.”  Unlike the classic bourgeois individualism, the body is not the private possession of the individual.  “A body is the responsibility of the micro-community that feeds and cares for it,” Anne Becker reports of Figian people; “consequently, crafting its form is the province of the community rather than the self.”  The body’s shape is a matter of village comment and concern, since it encodes the community’s ability to care for its members and the individual’s capacity to serve others.   In such kinship communities, the body is a social body, the subject of the empathy, concern, and responsibility of others, as it is also and reciprocally devoted to their well-being.
It follows that neither is experience an exclusively individual function.  In the manner and to the extent that people are members of one another, so may experiences be shared among them.  Not at the level of sensation, of course, but at the level of meaning: of what it is that happens, which is the human cum communicable quality of experience.  “Experience was diffused among persons,” Maurice Leinhardt told of New Caledonians, “it was not considered specific to the individual.”  People suffered illnesses as a result of moral or religious transgressions of their relatives—a common ethnographic finding.  Many are the societies where kinsmen must be compensated for the injuries one receives, even more for one’s death, although something less for having one’s hair cut.  In many also, the affinal kin of the injured or deceased have a special right of compensation, because they are the source of the life concerned.  Thus this notice of the Northeast Coast Tlingit:
Perceived as being closely connected to each other, all clan members are affected whenever one of them was insulted or hurt physically, not to mention his death.  If a clan member injured himself, he not only had to give a feast and offer gifts to the “opposite side” that is, affines of the opposite moiety, but was expected to sponsor a small feast for his own clan for the embarrassment brought upon them by his disfigurement.
Numerous again are the societies where people die symbolically with their relatives not only by self-inflicted wounds, but as removed from society by mourning practices that negate their normal social personhood: seclusion, torn apparel, interdiction on bathing and the life.  Not to claim these practices are universal, but often enough people do not die alone.  Death too is a shared fact.
Natural self-interest?  For the greater part of humanity, self-interest as we know it is unnatural in the normative sense: it is considered madness, witchcraft or some such grounds for ostracism, execution or at least therapy.  Rather than expressing a pre-social human nature, such avarice is generally taken for a loss of humanity. It puts in abeyance the mutual relationships of being that define a human existence.  Yet if the self, the body, experience, pleasure, pain, agency and intentionality, even death itself, are transpersonal relationships in so many societies, and in all likelihood through so many eons of human history, it follows that the native Western concept of man’s self-regarding animal nature is an illusion of world-anthropological proportions.
The idea that societies inevitably develop statist forms is empirically false and ethnocentric. Societies without states have effective consensus-based institutions

Graeber, Professor of Anthropology at the London School of Economics, ‘4 (David, professor of anthropology at the London School of Economics, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, pp. 21-23)

In the end, though, Marcel Mauss has probably had more influence on anarchists than all the other ones combined. This is because he was interested in alternative moralities, which opened the way to thinking that societies without states and markets were the way they were because they actively wished to live that way. Which in our terms means, because they were anarchists. Insofar as fragments of an anarchist anthropology do, already, exist, they largely derive from him.¶ Before Mauss, the universal assumption had been that economies without money or markets had operated by means of “barter”; they were trying to engage in market behavior (acquire useful goods and services at the least cost to themselves, get rich if possible...), they just hadn’t yet developed very sophisticated ways of going about it. Mauss demonstrated that in fact, such economies were really “gift economies.” They were not based on calculation, but on a refusal to calculate; they were rooted in an ethical system which consciously rejected most of what we would consider the basic principles of economics. It was not that they had not yet learned to seek profit through the most efficient means. They would have found the very premise that the point of an economic transaction—at least, one with someone who was not your enemy—was to seek the greatest profit deeply offensive. .¶ It is significant that the one (of the few) overtly anarchist anthropologists of recent memory, another Frenchman, Pierre Clastres, became famous for making a similar argument on the political level. He insisted political anthropologists had still not completely gotten over the old evolutionist perspectives that saw the state primarily as a more sophisticated form of organization than what had come before; stateless peoples, such as the Amazonian societies Clastres studied, were tacitly assumed not to have attained the level of say, the Aztecs or the Inca. But what if, he proposed, Amazonians were not entirely unaware of what the elementary forms of state power might be like—what it would mean to allow some men to give everyone else orders which could not be questioned, since they were backed up by the threat of force—and were for that very reason determined to ensure such things never came about? What if they considered the fundamental premises of our political science morally objectionable? ¶ The parallels between the two arguments are actually quite striking. In gift economies there are, often, venues for enterprising individuals: But everything is arranged in such a way they could never be used as a platform for creating permanent inequalities of wealth, since self-aggrandizing types all end up competing to see who can give the most away. In Amazonian (or North American) societies, the institution of the chief played the same role on a political level: the position was so demanding, and so little rewarding, so hedged about by safeguards, that there was no way for power-hungry individuals to do much with it. Amazonians might not have literally whacked off the ruler’s head every few years, but it’s not an entirely inappropriate metaphor. ¶  By these lights these were all, in a very real sense, anarchist societies. They were founded on an explicit rejection of the logic of the state and of the market.
Ob 3: Ethics
All ethical appeals regarding persons suppose they have reason and are free – it follows that they should not be coerced 

Wolff, Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University, 98 (Robert Paul, Professor in Philosophy at Harvard and then Columbia University, In Defense of Anarchism, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998, p.  gendered language modified)
The fundamental assumption of moral philosophy is that persons are responsible for their actions. From this assumption it follows necessarily, as Kant pointed out, that persons are metaphysically free, which is to say that in some sense they are capable of choosing how they shall act. Being able to choose how he acts makes a man person responsible, but merely choosing is not in itself enough to constitute taking responsibility for one's actions. Taking responsibility involves attempting to determine what one ought to do, and that, as philosophers since Aristotle have recognized, lays upon one the additional burdens of gaining knowledge, reflecting on motives, predicting outcomes, criticizing principles, and so forth. ¶ The obligation to take responsibility for one's actions does not derive from man's freedom of will alone, for more is required in taking responsibility than freedom of choice. Only because man has persons have the capacity to reason about his their choices can he they be said to stand under a continuing obligation to take responsibility for them. It is quite appropriate that moral philosophers should group together children and madmen as beings not fully responsible for their actions, for as madmen are thought to lack freedom of choice, so children do not yet possess the power of reason in a developed form. It is even just that we should assign a greater degree of responsibility to children, for madmen, by virtue of their lack of free will, are completely without responsibility, while children, insofar as they possess reason in a partially developed form, can be held responsible (i.e., can be required to take responsibility) to a corresponding degree. ¶ Every man who possesses both free will and reason has an obligation to take responsibility for his actions, even though he may not be actively engaged in a continuing process of reflection, investigation, and deliberation about how he ought to act. A man will sometimes announce his willingness to take responsibility for the consequences of his actions, even though he has not deliberated about them, or does not intend to do so in the future. Such a declaration is, of course, an advance over the refusal to take responsibility; it at least acknowledges the existence of the obligation. But it does not relieve the man of the duty to engage in the reflective process which he has thus far shunned. It goes without saying that a man may take responsibility for his actions and yet act wrongly. When we describe someone as a responsible individual, we do not imply that he always does what is right, but only that he does not neglect the duty of attempting to ascertain what is right. ¶ The responsible person is not capricious or anarchic, for they do acknowledge themselves bound by moral constraints. But they insists that they alone are the judge of those constraints. He may listen to the advice of others, but he makes it his own by determining for himself whether it is good advice. He may learn from others about his moral obligations, but only in the sense that a mathematician learns from other mathematicians -- namely by hearing from them arguments whose validity he recognizes even though he did not think of them himself. He does not learn in the sense that one learns from an explorer, by accepting as true his accounts of things one cannot see for oneself. ¶ Since the responsible person arrives at moral decisions which they expresses to themselves in the form of imperatives, we may say that they give laws to themselves, or is self-legislating. In short, they are autonomous. As Kant argued, moral autonomy is a combination of freedom and responsibility; it is a submission to laws which one has made for oneself. The autonomous man, insofar as he is autonomous, is not subject to the will of another. He may do what another tells him, but not because he has been told to do it. He is therefore, in the political sense of the word, free. ¶
We must always reject the right of the state to coerce subjects against their will.  Philosophical anarchism alone upholds autonomy as an end in itself

Wolff 98 (Robert Paul, Professor in Philosophy at Harvard and then Columbia University, In Defense of Anarchism, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998, p.  ) 

The defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary obligation of persons is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. It would seem, then, that there can be no resolution of the conflict between the autonomy of the individual and the putative authority of the state. Insofar as a man person fulfills their obligation to make themselves the author of their decisions, they  will resist the state's claim to have authority over them. That is to say, he will deny that he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws. In that sense, it would seem that anarchism is the only political doctrine consistent with the virtue of autonomy. ¶ Now, of course, an anarchist may grant the necessity of complying with the law under certain circumstances or for the time being. He may even doubt that there is any real prospect of eliminating the state as a human institution. But he they will never view the commands of the state as legitimate, as having a binding moral force. In a sense, we might characterize the anarchist as a man without a country, for despite the ties which bind him to the land of his childhood, he stands in precisely the same moral relationship to "his" government as he does to the government of any other country in which he might happen to be staying for a time. When I take a vacation in Great Britain, I obey its laws, both because of prudential self-interest and because of the obvious moral considerations concerning the value of order, the general good consequences of preserving a system of property, and so forth. On my return to the United States, I have a sense of reentering my country, and if I think about the matter at all, I imagine myself to stand in a different and more intimate relation to American laws. They have been promulgated by my government, and I therefore have a special obligation to obey them. But the anarchist tells me that my feeling is purely sentimental and has no objective moral basis. All authority is equally illegitimate, although of course not therefore equally worthy or unworthy of support, and my obedience to American laws, if I am to be morally autonomous, must proceed from the same considerations which determine me abroad. ¶ The dilemma which we have posed can be succinctly expressed in terms of the concept of a de jure state. If all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of autonomy possible, then there would appear to be no state whose subjects have a moral obligation to obey its commands. Hence, the concept of a de jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous, and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened person.
Autonomy should be preferred over coercive hierarchy in all social relations.  This challenges the precondition of every form of domination – including capitalism, patriarchy, racism, and speceism

Olson, Professor of Politics at Northern Arizona University, 9 (Joel, Assoc. Professor of Politics at Northern Arizona University, “The Problem with Infoshops and Insurrection,” Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An Introductory Anthology of Anarchy in the Academy, ed. Amster et. al., Routledge, pp. 36-37)
The intellectual framework of most contemporary American anarchism rests on a critique of hierarchy.  Murray Bookchin, perhaps the most important theorist of the concept, defines hierarchy as “a complex system of command and obedience in which elites enjoy varying degrees of control over their subordinates” (Bookchin 1982: 4).  Capitalism, organized religion, and the state are important forms of hierarchy, but the concept includes other relations of domination such as of: 

the young by the old, of women by men, of one ethnic group by another, of “masses” by bureaucrats…, of countryside by town, and in a more subtle psychological sense, of body by mind, of spirit by a shallow instrumental rationality, and of nature by society and technology. (4)

Hierarchy pervades our social relations and reaches into our psyche, thereby “percolating into virtually every realm of experience” (63).  The critique of hierarchy, Bookchin argues, is more expansive and radical than the Marxist critique of capitalism or the classical anarchist critique of the state because it “poses the need to alter every thread of the social fabric, including the way we experience reality, before we can truly live in harmony with each other and with the natural world” (Bookchin 1986: 22-23).
This analysis of hierarchy has broadened contemporary anarchism into a critique of all forms of oppression, including capitalism, the state, and organized religion but also patriarchy, heterosexism, anthropocentrism, racism and more.  This critique, anarchists argue, is superior to class reductionism or the argument that class exploitation is the primary form of oppression that all other oppressions can be “reduced” to.  (Other versions of this argument substitute class with gender or nationality.)  The political task according to contemporary anarchism is to attack all forms of oppression, not just a “main” one, because without an attack on hierarchy itself, other forms of oppression will not necessarily wither away after capitalism (or patriarchy, or colonialism) is destroyed.  
Ob 4: Society
A. Domestic Life
State welfare was modelled after the mutual aid societies it crowded out –spontaneous networks of care would replace statist welfare.  The National Health Service proves.

Ward, Centennial Professor of Housing and Social Policy at the London School of Economics, 2004 (Colin, Honorary Doctor of Philosophy Anglia Ruskin University, former Centennial Professor of Housing and Social Policy at the London School of Economics, Anarchism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. _)

Social spontaneity is highly valued by anarchists but is not on the agenda of the politicians involved in dismantling the British post-war welfare state, and recommending the virtues of profit-making private enterprise. Anarchists are frequently told that their antipathy to the state is historically outmoded, since a main function of the modern state is the provision of social welfare. They respond by stressing that social welfare in Britain did not originate from government, nor from the post-war National Insurance laws, nor with the initiation of the National Health Service in 1948. It evolved from the vast network of friendly societies and mutual aid organizations that had sprung up through working-class self-help in the 19th century.¶ The founding father of the NHS was the then member of parliament for Tredegar in South Wales, Aneurin Bevan, the Labour Government’s Minister of Health. His constituency was the home of the Tredegar Medical Society, founded in 1870 and surviving until 1995. It provided medical care for the local employed workers, who were mostly miners and steelworkers, but also (unlike the pre-1948 National Health Insurance) for the needs of dependants, children, the old, and the non-employed: everyone living in the district. ¶ It was sustained through the years by voluntary contributions of three old pennies in the pound from the wage-packets of miners and steelworkers . . . At one time the society employed five doctors, a dentist, a chiropodist and a physiotherapist to care for the health of about 25,000 people. ¶ A retired miner told Peter Hennessy that when Bevan initiated the National Health Service, ‘We thought he was turning the whole country into one big Tredegar.’ In practice, the Health Service has been in a state of continuous reorganization ever since its foundation, but has never been submitted to a local and federalized approach to medical care. A second reflection on the story of Tredegar is that when every employed worker in that town paid a voluntary levy to extend the local medical service to every resident, the earnings of even highly skilled industrial workers were below the liability to income tax. But ever since full employment and the system of PAYE (automatic deduction of tax as a duty of employers) was introduced during the Second World War, the central government’s Treasury has creamed off the cash that once supported local initiatives. If the pattern of local self-taxation on the Tredegar model had become the general pattern for health provision, this permanent daily need would not have become the plaything of central government financial policy. ¶ Anarchists cite this little, local example of an alternative approach to the provision of health care to indicate that a different style of social organization could have evolved. In British experience, another variety was to be found in the 1930s and 1950s in what became known as the Peckham Experiment in south London, which was essentially a family health club where medical care was a feature of a social club providing sporting and swimming facilities. ¶ These and much more recent attempts to change the relationships in meeting universal social needs exemplify the urgency of the search for alternatives to the dreary polarity of public bureaucracy on the one hand and private profit on the other. I have myself heard the former chief architect to the Ministry of Health admit that the advice he gave for years on hospital design was misguided, and have heard similar confessions from management consultants, expensively hired to solve the NHS’s organizational problems. ¶ A century ago, Kropotkin noted the endless variety of ‘friendly societies, the unities of oddfellows, the village and town clubs organised for meeting the doctor’s bills’ built up by working-class self-help; as part of his evidence for Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, and in a later book, Modern Science and Anarchism, he declared that ‘the economic and political liberation of man will have to create new forms for its expression in life, instead of those established by the State’. For he saw it as self-evident that ‘this new form will have to be more popular, more decentralised, and nearer to the folk-mote self-government than representative government can ever be’. He reiterated that we will be compelled to find new forms of organization for the social functions that the state fulfils through the bureaucracy, and that ‘as long as this is not done, nothing will be done’. ¶ It is often suggested that as a result of modern personal mobility and instant communications, we all live in a series of global villages and that consequently the concept of local control of local services is obsolete. But there is confusion here between the concepts of communities of propinquity and communities of interest. We may share concerns with people on the other side of the world, and not even know our neighbours. But the picture is transformed at different stages in our personal or family history when we have shared interests with other users of the local primary school or health centre, and the local shop or post office. Here there is, as every parent will confirm, an intense concern with very local issues. ¶ Alternative patterns of social control of local facilities could have emerged, but for the fact that centralized government imposed national uniformity, while popular disillusionment with the bureaucratic welfare state coincided with the rise of the all-party gospel of managerial capitalism. Anarchists claim that after the inevitable disappointment, an alternative concept of socialism will be rediscovered. They argue that the identification of social welfare with bureaucratic managerialism is one of the factors that has delayed the exploration of other approaches for half a century.  The private sector, as it is called, is happy to take over the health needs of those citizens who can pay its bills. Other citizens would either have to suffer the minimal services that remain for them, or to re-create the institutions that they built up in the 19th century. ¶ The anarchists see their methods as more relevant than ever, waiting to be reinvented, precisely because modern society has learned the limitations of both socialist and capitalist alternatives.
Assuming the everyday benevolence of the state welfare opens up the pathway to nuclear extinction

Kateb, Professor Emeritus of Politics at Princeton, 86 George, "Nuclear Weapons and Individual Rights"  Dissent Magazine, V. Guevara

One task of a renewed and revised individualism is to challenge everyday state-activism.¶ Remote as the connection may seem, the encouragement of state-a
ctivism, or the failure to¶ resist it, contributes to nuclear statism, and¶ thus to the disposition to accept and inflict¶ massive ruin and, with that, the unwanted and¶ denied possibility of extinction. In the nuclear¶ situation, one must be attentive to even remote¶ 170 connections that may exist between human¶ activity and human extinction.¶ There are no certainties of analysis on these¶ possible connections. And so far the worst¶ speculative connection is not exemplified in¶ American society. I only mean to refer to the¶ hypothesis offered independently first by Hannah Arendt and then by Michel Foucault;¶ namely, that where the state is regarded both¶ by itself and by the population not as a mere¶ protector of life against domestic or foreign¶ violence but as the source of contented and¶ adjusted and regularized life (through its welfarist policies and other interventions), it is¶ subtly empowered to take the next step and¶ become the source of mass death. What it gives it can take away, like God. But though still¶ short of this extreme, American society is full¶ of serious tendencies of state-activism that indirectly cooperate with the possibility of extinction.¶ BY CONTINUOUSLY EXPANDING THE SCOPE of¶ governmental activity, these tendencies work¶ against one of the principal constituent elements of individualism, the idea that each¶ person should be subject to the smallest possible amount of government regulation that goes¶ beyond insuring the obligation that binds individuals as well as the government: the acknowledgment of and respect for rights. Indeed, the¶ protection of rights and the restriction of governmental activity are jointly at the service of a¶ free life.¶ One's life is not supposed to be arranged or¶ designed by government nor have meaning or¶ coherence given to it by government; nor is one¶ supposed to be helped too much, or saved from¶ oneself, or looked at closely or continuously.¶ One is supposed to be free, autonomous, self reliant. Individual rights are not always¶ abridged when government acts to substitute¶ itself for the individual and tries to lead our¶ lives for us. Government may abide by the¶ constitutional limitations on itself, and nevertheless fill up too many vacant places in a¶ person's life, thus leaving too little raw material¶ out of which a person develops on his or her¶ own. This ideal of free being is under relentless¶ attack; but the attack could not score its successes unless we cooperated. In cooperating we¶ forget the ideal, or let preliminary aspects of it,¶ like the pursuit of interests and self-regarding¶ claims, exhaustively define the whole ideal.¶ The very notion of rights becomes bloated¶ because of obsession with interests and claims¶ and turns false to itself.¶ Resistance must be offered from within the¶ ideal, not from collectivism or communitarianism, which are both on the side of making a¶ people systematically docile and ready for mobilization. Even if nuclear weapons did not¶ exist, and there were no possibility of extinction, the fight against state-activism would¶ have to be carried on. But the link between¶ state-activism and extinction suggests itself, and a cultivated individualism must be enlisted¶ against such activism and in behalf of avoiding¶ massive ruin and the possibility of extinction.
b. International
Voluntary participation would not end the military: an anarchist society would be able to defend itself 

Wolff, 98 (Robert Paul, Professor in Philosophy at Harvard and then Columbia University, In Defense of Anarchism, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998, p.  )

With regard to matters of national defense and foreign adventure, it seems to me that there is much to be said for the adoption of a system of voluntary compliance with governmental directives. If we assume a society of anarchists -- a society, that is to say, which has achieved a level of moral and intellectual development at which superstitious beliefs in legitimacy of authority have evaporated -- then the citizenry would be perfectly capable of choosing freely whether to defend the nation and carry its purpose beyond the national borders. The army itself could be run on the basis of voluntary commitments and submission to orders. To be sure, the day might arrive when there were not enough volunteers to protect the freedom and security of the society. But if that were the case, then it would clearly be illegitimate to command the citizens to fight. Why should a nation continue to exist if its populace does not wish to defend it? One thinks here of the contrast between the Yugoslav partisans or Israeli soldiers, on the one hand, and the American forces in Vietnam on the other. ¶ The idea of voluntary compliance with governmental directives is hardly new, but it inevitably provokes the shocked reaction that social chaos would result from any such procedure. My own opinion is that superstition rather than reason lies behind this reaction. I personally would feel quite safe in an America whose soldiers were free to choose when and for what they would fight.
The state does not provide protection, it is itself a protection racket – it creates the threat it ‘protects’ us from

Tilly, Professor of Social Science at Columbia , 85 (Charles, Joseph L. Buttenwieser Professor of Social Science at Columbia University, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, in Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 171)

Apologists for particular governments and for government in general commonly argue, precisely, that they offer protection from local and external violence. They claim that the prices they charge barely cover the costs of protection. They call people who complain about the price of protection "anarchists," "subversives." or both at once. But consider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. Governments’ provision of protection, by this standard, often qualifies as racketeering. To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. Since governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers. There is, of course, a difference; Racketeers, by the conventional definition, operate without the sanctity of governments.

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 1 | Opponent: Everybody | Judge: All of them
Observation 1: Inherency
The Supreme Court will not construe the False Statement Act to apply to the president – an explicit Congressional statute naming the president is necessary
Fein 9 (TESTIMONY OF BRUCE FEIN, LEGAL CONSULTANT, WASHINGTON, DC, EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC., p. 69-70)

Plan
Congress will pass the Executive Accountability Act of 2009, as per Fischer’s recommendations before the House. 

Observation 2: Solvency
The EAA motivates the disclosure of attending circumstances of war to Congress in closed sessions
Fein 9 (TESTIMONY OF BRUCE FEIN, LEGAL CONSULTANT, WASHINGTON, DC, EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC., p. 42)

Evidence will go to judiciary committees – empirically, requirement of transparency to commitees is a significant check on presidential excess
Fischer 9 (LOUIS, SPECIALIST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LAW LIBRARY OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC, EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC., p. 24-25)

Gives Congressional committees a powerful tool they can exercise in daily oversight –
Fischer 9 (LOUIS, SPECIALIST IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LAW LIBRARY OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC, EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC., p. 33)

Observation 3: Imperialism
Scenario 1: Eternal War
The plan is necessary to halt endless imperial wars on every square inch of the planet  
Fein 9 (TESTIMONY OF BRUCE FEIN, LEGAL CONSULTANT, WASHINGTON, DC, EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC., p. 45-50)

Empirically, lies are at the heart of American imperial expansion – only EAA is a remedy for perpetual global war
Fein 9 (TESTIMONY OF BRUCE FEIN, LEGAL CONSULTANT, WASHINGTON, DC, EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC., p. 51-57)

Scenario 2: Syria
Russian proposal will fail – several reasons
Crowley 9/10/13 (Michael Crowley is a senior correspondent for TIME. He previously covered domestic politics and foreign policy for The New Republic, and was also a reporter at the Boston Globe. He has also written for such publications as New York magazine, GQ, Slate, and the New York Times magazine, “Russia’s Plan for Syria Could Rescue Obama, if Only it Wasn’t Likely to Fail,” Time, Sept. 10, 2013,
http://swampland.time.com/2013/09/10/russias-plan-for-syria-could-rescue-obama-if-only-it-wasnt-likely-to-fail/#ixzz2eY0LfsOJ

Failure of diplomacy strengthens Obama’s hand in pushing Congress to war, even though evidence is weak
Crowley 9/9/13 (Former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Spokesman for the U.S. Department of State and now a Fellow at the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication (IPDGC) and Professor of Practice at The George Washington University's School of Media and Public Affairs. http://takefiveblog.org/2013/09/09/the-russian-proposal-and-the-public-diplomacy-battle-over-syria/)

Review of evidence would ‘derail’ the rush to attack
Watson 9/1/13 (Paul Joseph,  Paul Joseph Watson is the editor and writer for Infowars.com and Prison Planet.com. He is the author of Order Out Of Chaos. Watson is also a host for Infowars Nightly News,
 “Jabhat al-Nusra Rebels Admit Responsibility for Chemical Weapons Attack,” Global Research, September 01, 2013, http://www.globalresearch.ca/jabhat-al-nusra-rebels-admit-responsibility-for-chemical-weapons-attack/5347485)

Plan sends a strong signal to the exec that all ev must be presented
Today in the Military, 9 (“Rep. Punish Those Who Lie Us Into War,” Military.com, 2-9-09 http://web.archive.org/web/20090212082121/http://www.military.com/news/article/rep-punish-those-who-lie-us-into-war.html?)

A bipartisan group – led by the original sponsor of the EAA – is calling for all evidence to be viewed by Congress 

WITN 8/28/13 (“Congressman Jones: Fighting Against Unconstitutional Military Action In Syria”http:www.witn.com/news/stateregional/headlines/Congressman-Jones--Fighting-Against-Unconstitutional--221565221.html, Updated: Wed 11:19 PM, Aug 28, 2013)

Striking Syria would lead to World War 3
Chossudovsky 8/31/13 (Michel, “Dangerous Crossroads. A War on Syria, Prelude to a World War III Scenario?” Global Research, August 31, 2013, http://www.globalresearch.ca/dangerous-crossroads-a-war-on-syria-prelude-to-a-world-war-iii-scenario/5347370, Chossudovsky is an award-winning author, Professor of Economics (emeritus) at the University of Ottawa, Founder and Director of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), Montreal and Editor of the globalresearch.ca website. He is the author of The Globalization of Poverty and The New World Order (2003) and America’s “War on Terrorism” (2005). His most recent book is entitled Towards a World War III Scenario: The Dangers of Nuclear War (2011). He is also a contributor to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. His writings have been published in more than twenty languages)

Scenario 3: Pakistan
The US keeps bases in Afghanistan to seize Pakistan’s mobile nuclear weapons if instability occurs.  We are on the edge of an incursion that would cause a prolonged occupation and nuclear war.  
Douglas 13 (Jack D., Jack D. Douglas is a retired professor of sociology from the University of California at San Diego. He has published widely on all major aspects of human beings, most notably The Myth of the Welfare State, “The Great U.S. Crisis in Pakistan,” March 12, 2013,
http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/03/jack-d-douglas/the-great-u-s-crisis-in-pakistan/) 

Bill is urgent – necessary to check future rush to war in Pakistan
Fein 9 (TESTIMONY OF BRUCE FEIN, LEGAL CONSULTANT, WASHINGTON, DC, EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC., p. 43)

Observation 4: Tyranny
The rush to war ends civil liberties and unleashes tyranny, undermining the cornerstone of self-governance
Fein 9 (TESTIMONY OF BRUCE FEIN, LEGAL CONSULTANT, WASHINGTON, DC, EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC., p. 45-50)

The impact is value to life – tyranny must be resisted at every turn
Petro, Wake Forest Professor in Toledo Law Review, 1974
(Sylvester, Spring, page 480)

More Solvency, if time allows
EAA suspends the statute of limitations and allows charges by a simple resolution, ensures ease of prosecution and time for the truth to out
Jones 9 (TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE WALTER B. JONES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC., p. 17-18)

Even if never used, the threat pressures the executive to verify facts and publicly defend his justification for going to war
Jones 9 (TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE WALTER B. JONES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2009 MONDAY, JULY 27, 2009, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC., p. 20)