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Page: Bobbitt-Murray Neg
Tournament | Round | Opponent | Judge | Cites | Round Report | Open Source | Video | Edit/Delete |
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Adanationals | 2 | Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Bagwell |
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Adanationals | 2 | Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Bagwell |
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Adanationals | 4 | Samford Kimball-Sessions | Weiner |
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Adanationals | 6 | Wake Forest Min-Quinn | Brown |
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Bulldogdebates | 2 | Wake Forest Clifford-Villa | Gibson |
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Bulldogdebates | 3 | Samford Carley-Higgins | Holland |
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Bulldogdebates | 5 | West Georgia Zapata-Mauro | Montee |
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Bulldogdebates | 7 | Georgia Boyce-Feinberg | Lee, Brass, Galloway |
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Clarion | 2 | Pittsburgh Markus-C- | Weiner |
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Clarion | 3 | James Madison Lepp-Miller | Young |
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Clarion | 6 | George Mason Brown-Woodward | Mistretta |
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Clarion | Octas | JMU PP | judge |
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Clarion | Quarters | Wayne State LM |
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Fullerton | 2 | Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Davis |
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Fullerton | 4 | Michigan State Butler-Strong | Najor |
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Fullerton | 6 | Wayne State Justice-Slaw | Weil |
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GSU | 2 | Wake MQ | Wunderlich, Carly |
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GSU | 5 | Michigan AP | Antounicci |
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Gsu | 3 | Wake Forest Cronin-Harris | Layton |
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Gsu | 7 | Vanderbilt Williford-Stothers | Shook |
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JMU | 4 | James Madison Lepp-Miller | Ridley |
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JMU | Octas | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harper, OGorman, Warne |
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Kentucky | 2 | Michigan KK | Strauss |
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Kentucky | 4 | Texas Fitz-Makuch | Antonucci |
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Kentucky | 4 | Texas Fitz-Makuch | Antonucci |
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Kentucky | 4 | Texas Fitz-Makuch | Antonucci |
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Kentucky | 6 | Binghamton Sehgal-Smith | Bellon |
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Kentucky | 8 | Michigan Allen-Pappas | Atchison |
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NDT | 2 | Cal MS | Murrillo, Stevenson, Lundberg |
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NDT | 4 | Indiana PS | Schultz, Johnson, Vanluvanlee |
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NDT | 8 | Liberty BM | harris, young, short |
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Navy | 1 | Gonzaga Bauer-Johnson | Harper |
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Shirley | 2 | Towson Ruffin-Johnson | Murray |
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Shirley | 4 | Southern California Nhan-Placido | Deming |
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Shirley | 6 | Kansas City Kansas CC Ford-Glanzman | DeLong |
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Shirley | 7 | Houston Jennings-Jennings | Hennigan |
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Texas | 1 | Houston Asgari-Tari-Bockmon | Harris |
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Texas | 4 | Florida Frank-Prescott | Shanahan |
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Texas | 8 | Harvard Xu-Herman | Green |
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Texas | 5 | Georgia Caplan-Shanker | Davis |
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Usc | 2 | James Madison Panetti-Perez | Lundeen |
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Usc | 4 | Arizona State McDonald-Waxman | Glass |
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Usc | 5 | Kansas Campbell-Birzer | Cronin |
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Westpoint | 1 | Binghamton George-Friedman | Roberts |
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Westpoint | 3 | Binghamton Evans-Choudhury | Stone |
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Tournament | Round | Report |
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Adanationals | 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Bagwell T - Restrict 2NR - K Heg Bad |
Adanationals | 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Bagwell T - Restrict 2NR - K Heg Bad |
Adanationals | 4 | Opponent: Samford Kimball-Sessions | Judge: Weiner T - Restrict 2NC - T CP |
Adanationals | 6 | Opponent: Wake Forest Min-Quinn | Judge: Brown t - prohibit Block - K 2NR - K |
Bulldogdebates | 2 | Opponent: Wake Forest Clifford-Villa | Judge: Gibson OLC CP 2NC K Case 2NR Politics |
Bulldogdebates | 3 | Opponent: Samford Carley-Higgins | Judge: Holland 1NC 2NC 2NR Politics |
Bulldogdebates | 5 | Opponent: West Georgia Zapata-Mauro | Judge: Montee Queer Theory |
Bulldogdebates | 7 | Opponent: Georgia Boyce-Feinberg | Judge: Lee, Brass, Galloway 1NC 2NC 1NR |
Clarion | 2 | Opponent: Pittsburgh Markus-C- | Judge: Weiner 1AC -new aff |
Clarion | 3 | Opponent: James Madison Lepp-Miller | Judge: Young 1AC - Drones |
Clarion | 6 | Opponent: George Mason Brown-Woodward | Judge: Mistretta 1NC - Framework |
Clarion | Octas | Opponent: JMU PP | Judge: judge 1AC - endless drone warfare aff |
Clarion | Quarters | Opponent: Wayne State LM | Judge: 1AC - queer aff |
Fullerton | 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Davis 1AC - Drones AFF |
Fullerton | 4 | Opponent: Michigan State Butler-Strong | Judge: Najor 1NC - queer theory |
Fullerton | 6 | Opponent: Wayne State Justice-Slaw | Judge: Weil 1AC - drones |
GSU | 2 | Opponent: Wake MQ | Judge: Wunderlich, Carly T- Signature Strikes aren't Targeted Killing |
GSU | 5 | Opponent: Michigan AP | Judge: Antounicci 1AC Michigan Drones Legitimacy and Drone Prolif |
Gsu | 3 | Opponent: Wake Forest Cronin-Harris | Judge: Layton 1NC 2NR |
Gsu | 7 | Opponent: Vanderbilt Williford-Stothers | Judge: Shook 1NC 2NC 1NR 2NR |
JMU | 4 | Opponent: James Madison Lepp-Miller | Judge: Ridley 1NC T - Sig strikes T - restrict DA - Debt Ceiling DA - iran K - security CP - XO |
JMU | Octas | Opponent: Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Judge: Harper, OGorman, Warne 1NC - Trestrict debt cieling iran security K xo case |
Kentucky | 2 | Opponent: Michigan KK | Judge: Strauss 1NC |
Kentucky | 4 | Opponent: Texas Fitz-Makuch | Judge: Antonucci All the neg speeches Queer theory |
Kentucky | 4 | Opponent: Texas Fitz-Makuch | Judge: Antonucci All the neg speeches Queer theory |
Kentucky | 4 | Opponent: Texas Fitz-Makuch | Judge: Antonucci All the neg speeches Queer theory |
Kentucky | 6 | Opponent: Binghamton Sehgal-Smith | Judge: Bellon 1NC - Queer Theory |
Kentucky | 8 | Opponent: Michigan Allen-Pappas | Judge: Atchison 1NC - Queer Theory |
NDT | 8 | Opponent: Liberty BM | Judge: harris, young, short 1NC K Heteronormativity |
Navy | 1 | Opponent: Gonzaga Bauer-Johnson | Judge: Harper 1AC - Drone sig strikes |
Shirley | 2 | Opponent: Towson Ruffin-Johnson | Judge: Murray 1AC - Black Sapphire |
Shirley | 4 | Opponent: Southern California Nhan-Placido | Judge: Deming 1AC - drones |
Shirley | 6 | Opponent: Kansas City Kansas CC Ford-Glanzman | Judge: DeLong 1AC - Home AFF |
Shirley | 7 | Opponent: Houston Jennings-Jennings | Judge: Hennigan 1AC - Indigenous Rape AFF |
Texas | 1 | Opponent: Houston Asgari-Tari-Bockmon | Judge: Harris 1AC NFU 2NC 1NR 2NR |
Texas | 4 | Opponent: Florida Frank-Prescott | Judge: Shanahan 1AC 2NC |
Texas | 8 | Opponent: Harvard Xu-Herman | Judge: Green 1NC Block2NR Security |
Texas | 5 | Opponent: Georgia Caplan-Shanker | Judge: Davis T - prohibit 2NRBlock K |
Usc | 2 | Opponent: James Madison Panetti-Perez | Judge: Lundeen 1AC - Piglet AFF |
Usc | 4 | Opponent: Arizona State McDonald-Waxman | Judge: Glass 1AC - debate should be a communicative activity AFF |
Usc | 5 | Opponent: Kansas Campbell-Birzer | Judge: Cronin 1AC - Charming betsy |
Westpoint | 1 | Opponent: Binghamton George-Friedman | Judge: Roberts 1AC - wolf man |
Westpoint | 3 | Opponent: Binghamton Evans-Choudhury | Judge: Stone 1AC - Wolf Man K |
To modify or delete round reports, edit the associated round.
Entry | Date |
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1NC - Comprehensive Immigration ReformTournament: Navy | Round: 1 | Opponent: Gonzaga Bauer-Johnson | Judge: Harper His agenda tattered … million who are here.” Obama’s pushing immigration but it’ll be controversial – PC is key Perhaps the president …. would do something.” Restrictions on the Presidents war powers authority crush his credibility and derail his agenda Yet, manipulating public … her future power prospects. Comprehensive immigration reform is key to the economy and highly skilled workers Washington won’t get …. that’s economically efficient. | 1/19/14 |
1NC - Gendered LanguageTournament: Shirley | Round: 7 | Opponent: Houston Jennings-Jennings | Judge: Hennigan I'm not saying that….human beings otherwise? Sexist language is the root cause of patriarchy and causes loss of female agency. | 1/18/14 |
1NC - Immigration DATournament: Clarion | Round: 2 | Opponent: Pittsburgh Markus-C- | Judge: Weiner Obama on Monday…..already here illegally. Yet, manipulating public …. future power prospects. Comprehensive immigration reform is key to the economy and highly skilled workers Washington won’t get ….that’s economically efficient. Nuclear war The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global …. of the planet’s population. | 11/1/13 |
1NC - OLC CPTournament: Navy | Round: 1 | Opponent: Gonzaga Bauer-Johnson | Judge: Harper The CP is competitive and solves the case – OLC rulings do not actually remove authority but nevertheless hold binding precedential value on the executive On the other hand, …. of OLC’s decisions. | 1/19/14 |
1NC - T RestrictionTournament: Clarion | Round: 2 | Opponent: Pittsburgh Markus-C- | Judge: Weiner Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, the term "restriction" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and no such use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing shall be authorized by any permit or license. “In the area” means all of the activities
| 11/1/13 |
1NC - T SubstantialTournament: Clarion | Round: 2 | Opponent: Pittsburgh Markus-C- | Judge: Weiner "To increase substantially" | 11/1/13 |
1NC - T USFGTournament: Clarion | Round: 2 | Opponent: Pittsburgh Markus-C- | Judge: Weiner Based on both case law ….take effective action. | 11/1/13 |
1NC - T WPATournament: Clarion | Round: 2 | Opponent: Pittsburgh Markus-C- | Judge: Weiner Authority means expressly granted – assertions by the president don’t count 2. a power or right delegated or given; authorization: Who has the authority to grant permission? | 11/1/13 |
1NC Case v Agamben AFFTournament: Clarion | Round: 2 | Opponent: Pittsburgh Markus-C- | Judge: Weiner This notion of the state …. batch of difficulties. Indefinite detention key to stop terrorism The general framework …., that is, megaterrorists. A nuclear terrorist attack causes US-China-Russia war, environmental collapse, and extinction In a remarkable website ….use of strategic weapons Ethical decisions must be grounded in consequences Power is not a dirty …. undermines political effectiveness. Extinction outweighs the All attempts to listen …..fundamental moral commitment Systems of power are inevitable and universal—resistance from inside the system is possible and is the only possibility for transformative potential. One might well …. existence of freedom. Their theory of power is wrong—governmentality and biopolitical control are not homogenous or unified phenomena—cultures, identity politics, communities, and systems of inclusion and exclusion overlap—the alt relies on an essentialist notion and will fail. State-organized or state-supported …. there are strategies Biopolitics and sovereign power are good within a democratic nation-state—democratic citizenship maximizes political agency, mitigates coercion, and provides the necessary conditions of freedom. In short, the continuities ….movement of modern We won’t start wars just because we can temptation. For many advocates …. on this subject. IV. CONCLUSION: THE EXONERATED …. unilateral uses of force. | 11/1/13 |
1NC Michigan AP - Drone ProlifTournament: GSU | Round: 5 | Opponent: Michigan AP | Judge: Antounicci
OPERATOR: Our next question comes …. measures in the future. Anti-proliferation discourse obscures Western violence and masks the dangers of nuclear possession “Proliferation” is not a mere ….. be difficult to justify on rational security grounds. 2. No prolif – no major prolif over next 10 years – too costly and not effective enough Based on current trends, it is unlikely …… for armed drones in the near term. No war- economic realities, political actors, and lessons learned- Mumbai proves Hostility between India and Pakistan ……..e the same script as 2001-02, theyand#39;ll be mistaken.and#34; | 9/22/13 |
1NC Michigan AP - LegitimacyTournament: GSU | Round: 5 | Opponent: Michigan AP | Judge: Antounicci This is significant not only because …… in the context of presidential executions is really mystifying. Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy—-the most secure nation on earth sees threats to empire everywhere, which legitimizes constant violence—-you have an obligation to place the structural violence that hegemony renders invisibile at the core of your decision calculus By now it is fair to say that the ….. phantom. Those people were a kind of solution. hegemony monopolizes all legitimate forms of expression, which requires that suppressed antagonisms use radical tactics to negate the universalization of American norms-~--this is the root cause of terrorism and threats to global stability I submit that it is high time to ….. is, in fact, contributing US hegemony produces net instability-3 reasons Whatever its original … in its internal affairs. | 9/22/13 |
1NR Impact Framing v Agamben AFFTournament: Clarion | Round: 2 | Opponent: Pittsburgh Markus-C- | Judge: Weiner Extinction outweighs all other moral considerations - their generic util answers are unresponsive to the magnitude of this claim. What does a theory of rights …. to end the threat.) Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equal and unconditional human dignity We must not obscure …. to save many. In a nuclear world we have to weigh consequences The same argument ….. world not perish. | 11/1/13 |
2NC Case v Agamben AFFTournament: Clarion | Round: 2 | Opponent: Pittsburgh Markus-C- | Judge: Weiner In short, the ….e radically differing potentials. The state of nature makes exclusion inevitable—the alt’s project of eliminating the state of exception devolves to nihilism. Clearly, neither …. of the spectacle condemns it" (11). Status quo solves—liberalism presents a counter-rationality to sovereign power and criticizes the biopolitics of the state. Political reflexivity allows for citizens to make demands against the state. Lacombe, Professor at Simon Fraser University, 2005 The nature of the relation …. same technologies.' The concept of ‘bare life’ denies agency—the potentiality of being transcends the limits of power structures. Neilson, professor University of Western Sydney, 2004 In these articulations with Hardt, ….. of permanent innovation. The concept of bare life is epistemologically flawed—the value of life exceeds their pre-determined categories, and their analysis ends in a denial of all agency. Survival, in the sense ….. expression of the human. | 11/1/13 |
CP - Executive RestraintTournament: GSU | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake MQ | Judge: Wunderlich, Carly Executive action solves best – nations respond to behavior not legal standards But even without raising standards, …a legal and moral one as well. | 9/21/13 |
CP - XOTournament: Gsu | Round: 3 | Opponent: Wake Forest Cronin-Harris | Judge: Layton Executive action solves best – nations respond to behavior not legal standards But even without raising …..but a legal and moral one as well. | 10/9/13 |
CP - XO UDTournament: Adanationals | Round: 4 | Opponent: Samford Kimball-Sessions | Judge: Weiner Today the threat of new ………. operations the military is allowed to mount. Whether a given CNO …... What then? The executive alone can set international standards President Barack Obama, who …… laws of armed conflict to new military technologies. Counterplan sends the most powerful signal (while avoiding Congressional backlash) In foreign affairs, ……. exactly what Obama needs to do now. Even if it’s unpopular it doesn’t link – avoids the legislative process Executive Orders also …… action or agency regulatory rulemaking. CP doesn’t create backlash – dems will stand behind Obama and republicans don’t want to be labeled as obstructionists – empirics prove WASHINGTON — One Saturday last fall, …….. but they said it’s not a winner for us,” he said. Presidents who cede their power legitimize their actions- allows greater discretion in the future Thus, argue Posner and Vermeule, ………produce better outcomes. The most powerful signal of presidential cred is self-binding That Posner and Vermeule miss …… culture, is probably the President’s willingness to comply with law. | 3/20/14 |
DA - Flex - UGA UDTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 3 | Opponent: Samford Carley-Higgins | Judge: Holland President Obama’s surprise …..it before him. Syria won’t be the precedent – only risk that it increases presidential powers One of the most misleading …. every future president can simply add it to the existing body of AUMFs and congressional authorizations. | 2/7/14 |
DA - IranTournament: Kentucky | Round: 2 | Opponent: Michigan KK | Judge: Strauss That said, while the domestic … diplomacy toward the Middle East. Uncertainty over war powers kills negotiations- Obama needs independent empowerment Uncertainty about what the …..g good international outcomes. Iran proliferation causes nuclear war The reports of the ……. triggering a regional nuclear war. | 10/6/13 |
DA - Iran UD - JMUTournament: JMU | Round: Octas | Opponent: Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Judge: Harper, OGorman, Warne To answer this …. seem to be political suicide Iran getting close to having nuclear to launch- US key Israeli Prime Minister …… that will get their attention.” Iran further developing its nuclear program – tunnels prove Iran is building an ….. and medical research. The dissident ….. (Iran's) nuclear project". A2: Link Giving congress the ability to say no will tank negotiations by emboldening hardliners – this triggers Israeli strikes Still, for the opponents of … it will — and maybe it should. We will know soon enough. …….. managing a crisis. Congressional splits undermine commitment and signaling With respect to ….of the international legal order. Israel has the long range bombers and bunker busters to strike Iran The foregoing …. and individual calculation. Crossing the nuclear threshold causes unstable competition because of disparities in arsenal size and second strike capabilities – makes pressure to strike inevitable Given Israel's … would be unstable. Iran prolif destroys US cred and causes nuclear war Advocates of a "containment" ……… be fatal to more than his legacy. Conflict escalates- no communication hotlines, U.S. political pressure, Iran CandC weakness Kroenig's discussion of timing …….. to rebuild its program. | 10/14/13 |
DA - PQDTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake Forest Clifford-Villa | Judge: Gibson Sensitive to this historical perspective, …….—and several prudential reasons. Plan breaks the political question doctrine – triggers a slippery slope The legality of the extrajudicial assassination ……… as the President, would choose differently. PQD facilitates political branch deliberation that solves unconstrained executive My contention is not simply that courts ………...' 47 It can employ those checks without a permission slip from the courts. Nuclear war Nonetheless, foreign relations remain special, ……pecified Article I powers. | 2/7/14 |
DA - TradeoffTournament: Gsu | Round: 3 | Opponent: Wake Forest Cronin-Harris | Judge: Layton President Obama embraced ……. car bombing of Times Square in 2010. Restricting indefinite detention leads to an increase in drone strikes The convergence ……. of habeas corpus litigation. | 10/9/13 |
Indefinite Detention - AdventurismTournament: Gsu | Round: 3 | Opponent: Wake Forest Cronin-Harris | Judge: Layton The wise men (and woman……er inside Iraq will be the United States. No China war-too many conflict dampeners Will China and the US …. and war with the US? The answer is no. Restricting indefinite detention leads to an increase in drone strikes The convergence thesis ……. the alternative mechanisms. | 10/9/13 |
Indefinite Detention - Afghanistan WithdrawalTournament: Gsu | Round: 3 | Opponent: Wake Forest Cronin-Harris | Judge: Layton "We are drawing down, ……. public support for the Afghan war. Alt Cause to cred decline – US support for Israel – outweighs gains from the aff In a quick and angry …….. 'are ploughing the sea'! Obama won’t capitalize on the plan to boost US cred Early on the morning ……. it needs to come from the president. No perception – not key to cred It still might be …..the American government. India Pakistan tensions undermine Stability Like Pakistan and Iran, …… well-resourced proxies. Afghanistan won’t spillover to Central Asia No Impact – probability is 1 in 3.5 billon AND no loose nukes WASHINGTON -- There is an "almost …….. has been stolen. | 10/9/13 |
Indefinite Detention - SolvencyTournament: Gsu | Round: 3 | Opponent: Wake Forest Cronin-Harris | Judge: Layton In England, where ……. they will not be executed. Courts fail – 5 reasons This article argues ……. unilateral control over matters (Fisher 2004; Goldsmith 2007; Kassop 2007; Savage 2007; Wheeler 2008). Unenforceable – no popular support Unlike in domestic ……….ng national security. | 10/9/13 |
Indefinite Detention - Wake CV - Afghanistan AdvTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake Forest Clifford-Villa | Judge: Gibson For some time, both scholars and the ………….f substantive due process and judicial review. Judicial independence is a pipe dream – can’t solve judicial responsibility Judicial Independence and Judicial Responsibility In Afghan history, there is neither practical experience with judicial independence in the state system, nor a political ethos to support it. The ……..at has been the target of violence. Independent judiciary not key to Afghanistan Courts with judicial review ……..elevant or undermine democracy. Independent Afghan judiciary leads to activism – turns the aff Two recent events illustrate the ……….. rather than enforcing Afghan law. Judicial independence would collapse their government Finally, I understand that the commission is ………. conform to Islamic principles. No withdrawal "We are drawing down, not ………..for the Afghan war. No modeling – Afghanistan won’t follow norms The second benefit to ……… to trump domestic law. Afghani anti-Americanism proves no modeling The worldwide approval rate of …….monitoring the rights of children. AP | 2/7/14 |
Indefinite Detention - Wake CV - Arms Sales Advantage AnswersTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake Forest Clifford-Villa | Judge: Gibson Arms producers in the United States ……….. military spending and conflicts. No China war-too many conflict dampeners Will China and the US Go to War? ……. to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no. No escalation – we would crush them The United States may count on a ……. in their turn will escape the war unscathed. No U.S.-Russia war – conflicting interests aren’t sufficient and economic integration checks Fifth, there will inevitably be ……… whoever is in charge of Russia. | 2/7/14 |
Indefinite Detention Courts - Wake CV - SolvencyTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake Forest Clifford-Villa | Judge: Gibson By 2006, the Bush ………, not judicial orders or legal norms. Circumvention – plan will fail first challenge from the executive As our debate over Korematsu illustrates, …….. avoid similar decisions in the future. No spillover – all federal courts defer to executive on matters of war and terror – challenges are narrow in scope, and most cases aren’t even heard Although these procedural and jurisdictional ………… to review either case.109 | 2/7/14 |
Indefinite Detention NSC - CMRTournament: JMU | Round: Octas | Opponent: Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Judge: Harper, OGorman, Warne Obama and the public make CMR contentious inevitable Public criticism of …… potentially contentious. States will seek nuclear prolif as long as US has conventional superiority In today’s threat …. deterrent against U.S. power. Threat of piracy is declining and the status quo solves Pirate attacks declining – they’re scared of armed maritime security No impact to trade – industries and companies in the region are resilient Yet despite this image ….. and sustained operational concerns. Instability inevitable Last week’s coup the north of Mali. Instability inevitable – too many alt causes However, especially ……. support, and labeling Ethiopia’s claim as ‘baseless and unfounded.’(7) Brazil prolif inevitable Major spenders: Brazil, Chile, …… and Peru, might argue differently. Bad strategy planning affects military effectiveness and civil-military relations, not vice versa; solving civil-military relations won’t solve the United States’ strategic ineffectiveness Nearly twenty years after the ….. disconnected from the goals of the war. No modeling It seems to be part of our …..pretty crazy bankrupt.” | 10/14/13 |
Indefinite Detention NSC - Heg AdvantageTournament: JMU | Round: Octas | Opponent: Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Judge: Harper, OGorman, Warne The trend of the last …….. United States is leaking cash. Their perception internal links are academic junk These routine and unchallenged ….. to appease domestic audiences. U.S. can’t deploy heg to solve conflicts – public restraint, international relations, and deployment capabilities First, the domestic politics …. avoids acting like one.\ Heg doesn’t solve conflict. One potential explanation military expenditure are unrelated. | 10/14/13 |
Indefinite Detention NSC - SolvencyTournament: JMU | Round: Octas | Opponent: Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Judge: Harper, OGorman, Warne What the new president did ……. since the 2001 terrorist attacks. NSC doesn’t solve this approach suggests …. arbitrary judgment by government officials. Violates Geneva convention During an actual armed …… to incidents arising after its creation. Multilat fails- conflicting interests, more players, and new coalitions The changing landscape of …….curbing global warming. Global multilateralism is impossible, but regional solutions check the impact At a high-level academic …… not come close. | 10/14/13 |
K - Queer TheoryTournament: GSU | Round: 5 | Opponent: Michigan AP | Judge: Antounicci The twenty-first …….culminate in violent conflict. Society is haunted by the death drive – a drive towards nonexistence and death. The necessity intervention to save us from impending doom and fear of death is a fantasy of self-fulfillment that denies the existence of the death drive and projects anxiety onto queer bodies that are deemed futureless. For Edelman, reproductive ….. mechanisms in motion’ (69). The state only exists through otherizing gendered and othered bodies—the disruption of security undercut the the state and destroy its legitimacy. Identity is an inescapable ……..attuned to the issues. Heteronormativity operates within civil society by creating a universalized conscious and those queers that do not meet that conscious are made into the enemy of society Jeffrey Alexander defines …., into pure formand#34; (1992:290). The aff’s logic of security is based on a desire to control and manage that renders everything knowable and hence predictable. This static epistemology results in a static ontology of the self and politics, destroying personal agency in decision-making, reifying structural antagonisms, and culminating in limitless war and otherization. Vote neg to reject the logic of the 1AC. Only a radical negation can disrupt dominant epistemologies. I see such a drive for ontological ……. perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought? This is not mere word play – we are at war with the entire system that makes their aff meaningful. Use the ballot to identify with death, queerness, and negativity in the face of a politics that is only valuable through some reconciled, future order. Aligning oneself with negativity is the only way to reclaim life from constant deferral to the future. Instead of falling prey to …. was a setup—like all dichotomies, false. Security crisis representations neutralize dissent and resistance—the aff invokes insecurity as the prime motivator for political decision-making, paving the way for fascism. Eliding the distinction …. of the Communist system.54 Theoretical challenges maximize the pragmatic potential of politics—rejecting dominant discourse is key to open up alternate epistemologies and ignored questions—solves for serial policy failure. However widespread it might be, …… despite its abstraction. Their AFF assumes the USFG acts from a passive standpoint. Only rigorous criticism of technocratic militarism can lead to a productive debate about how weapons could/should be deployed The U.S. military-industrial …………., it must be clear that we are leaving the path of violence. Proliferation constructs the world in imperialist and Orientalist terms—this condemns the global South to violent intervention and discipline. The 1AC is part of a process of knowledge-creation that restricts our understanding of proliferation to Western ideology. David Mutimer (1997) has argued that the use ……. with an other it is unwilling to listen to. | 9/22/13 |
K - Queer Theory - WGA at UGATournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 5 | Opponent: West Georgia Zapata-Mauro | Judge: Montee The only possible relationship to have in this space is to steal away – to move to a maroon camp , the undercommons, a place where we are able to exist without oppressive structures. A place that allows us to exist in a new radical form that disrupts enlightenment perspective and biopolitical control…so we steal…we just stole your stuff… “To the university I’ll steal….. time, the only possible act. As there is no entity, no ….ecoming/s beyong being/s. | 2/7/14 |
K - Queer Theory UDTournament: Kentucky | Round: 4 | Opponent: Texas Fitz-Makuch | Judge: Antonucci Appeals to the state produce “normative homo,” complacent in perpetuating heteronormativity By scripting the way individuals are supposed to interact with institutions and with each other, these organizations are scripting a normative homo ideal that they hope will ……..non-citizens—or just bad queers. This surplus, compelling the Symbolic to ……one for whom that order is held in perpetual trust." Futurism necessitates the elimination of the queer in hopes of reaching perfection Our age is clearly an age of social fragmentation, ….. as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). The term “heteronormativity” designates ……. overlooked or lost. Queer theory is the discourse that explores those promises and risk Identity politics normalizes the queer in an attempt to reach an universalized struggle – this necessitates violence against difference Without a particular set of entrenched …….y to tactics of self-modification. Identity politics re-inscribes the oppression it attempts to solve – historicizing oppression through identity they create a nostalgia for the past that is used to ensure a salvific future. Critics have long complained ……. him, Nietzsche pronounces all of modernity to be shot | 10/6/13 |
K - Queer Theory UD - Texas Round 4Tournament: Texas | Round: 4 | Opponent: Florida Frank-Prescott | Judge: Shanahan In the project on subjugated …… to inscription. Survival requires forgetting – a will to memory is radical violence - creates violence towards those who have experienced those tradgeies In fact we can never really ….. by failing, losing, stumbling, remembering, and forgetting. Historical analysis relies on the concept of the Child – their metholdogy ensures we are always replicating desire where we are looking toward instead of becoming This surplus, compelling the ……. one for whom that order is held in perpetual trust." Historical projects are anti-negativity – only the alt solves Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, ……… of access onto the queer. | 2/8/14 |
K - SecurityTournament: GSU | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake MQ | Judge: Wunderlich, Carly Ahmed, Institute for Policy Research and Development director, 2012 The twenty-first century … that can culminate in violent conflict. The state only exists through otherizing gendered and othered bodies—the disruption of security undercut the the state and destroy its legitimacy. Identity is an inescapable dimension …. adequately attuned to the issues. The aff’s logic of security is based on a desire to control and manage that renders everything knowable and hence predictable. This static epistemology results in a static ontology of the self and politics, destroying personal agency in decision-making, reifying structural antagonisms, and culminating in limitless war and otherization. Vote neg to reject the logic of the 1AC. Only a radical negation can disrupt dominant epistemologies. Burke, New South Wales IR professor, 2007 I see such a drive for ontological … the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought? | 9/21/13 |
K - Security - Texas Round 5 UpdateTournament: Texas | Round: 5 | Opponent: Georgia Caplan-Shanker | Judge: Davis Unfortunately, orthodox IR ……..systemic context Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats-~--also causes political apathy which turns case Looked at critically, then, crisis discourse ……cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.” Culminates in mass wars to eliminate environmental threats In the literature on securitization it is implied …….. powers, thus leading to arms races. Energy predictions are in the pocket of industries and the media – reject them Energy policy justified through security perpetuates inequalities, environmental degradation, and inhibits their long-term development – must be examined prior to their enactment The pursuit of energy security …….. still cites 'ine uality of outcomes' as playing an important role in facilitating development. Their framing of disease privileges expertism and demonizing target populations as disease-carriers, while causing the very pandemics it seeks to prevent The problem with this paradigm of ……. are unlikely to achieve their expressed aims. | 2/13/14 |
K - Security - 2NC v Wake CVTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake Forest Clifford-Villa | Judge: Gibson However widespread it might be, the notion that …….. relevant despite its abstraction. Critiques of security lead to better policy-making—Focusing on critical theory instead of policy application generates better understandings of the world and transforms IR. Critical intellectualism is the key to solving—our alternative creates a counter-hegemonic discourse. The central political task of the , critical security studies Try or die calculus uses worst-case scenarios to motivate action—this leads to flawed policy action and perpetuates insecurity rhetoric. At a security conference recently, the ……………. there's no point in listening to them. Identifications of security crises in Asia are empirically disproven and a guise for continued securitization. Kang, Dartmouth government professor, 2003 Following the end of the Cold War ……. Asia is both a fruitful and a necessary theoretical exercise. Discursively constructing China as a threat to U.S. security essentializes and totalizes the Other, ensuring the maintenance of a security paradigm and war. Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled ……. ambitions of U.S. foreign policy | 2/7/14 |
K - Security - Link Update - SamfordTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 3 | Opponent: Samford Carley-Higgins | Judge: Holland However, the record of …… objective of international peace-building activities. The aff frames disease as a threat to security—Their analysis privileges expertism and demonises target populations as disease-carriers. The securitization of disease leads to pervasive government power masked as “crisis prevention” which destroys agency. Diprose, New South Wales school of history, 2008 The aff discourse of climate threat is a securitized view of the environment—it masks the complexity of environmental change and fuels neorealist policies. Unfortunately, orthodox IR approaches …………. crises precisely in their global systemic context. | 2/7/14 |
K - Security - Texas Round 8Tournament: Texas | Round: 8 | Opponent: Harvard Xu-Herman | Judge: Green The close relationship between the ….. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US state. There is no stable definition of ‘terrorism’ and government elites manipulate the definition to serve the interests of state power and the security regime. What is terrorism? Few ……….. was declared legitimate' / Defense of hegemony causes paranoid imperial violence. There are no global threats and violence is only inevitable because US scenario planning is grounded in pursuing constructed threats – causes error replication that culminate in eternal warfare. And here's the odd thing: in a sense, little has ……..o longer be altered. In other words, they can't help themselves Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy—-the most secure nation on earth sees threats to empire everywhere, which legitimizes constant violence—-you have an obligation to place the structural violence that hegemony renders invisibile at the core of your decision calculus By now it is fair to say …….Those people were a kind of solution. Global conflict can only emerge in a world of unipolarity---hegemony monopolizes all legitimate forms of expression, which requires that suppressed antagonisms use radical tactics to negate the universalization of American norms---this is the root cause of terrorism and threats to global stability I submit that it is high time ….. discourse is, in fact, contributing Hegemony causes paranoid imperial violence – there are no global threats – violence is inevitable because US scenario planning is grounded in pursuing constructed threats – causes error replication that culminate in eternal warfare And here's the odd thing: in …….. can evidently no longer be altered. In other words, they can't help themselves. The corporeal politics of space, ……….. surveillance and social control taken to the extreme. Ten years after the end of ……….t Reduction (CTR) Initiative, is limited. Predictions of Asian instability are based on cultural misunderstandings and have been repeatedly disproven Following the end of the ……… and a necessary theoretical exercise. | 2/13/14 |
K - Security - Update - HoustonTournament: Texas | Round: 1 | Opponent: Houston Asgari-Tari-Bockmon | Judge: Harris Having examined how the "China threat" ………. ambitions of U.S. foreign policy Anti-proliferation discourse obscures Western violence and masks the dangers of nuclear possession “Proliferation” is not a mere description or mirror of …. be difficult to justify on rational security grounds. | 2/8/14 |
K - Security UD - JMUTournament: JMU | Round: 4 | Opponent: James Madison Lepp-Miller | Judge: Ridley Why is surprise the permanent ……… of the actual, delayed cost. Their threats do not exist objectively in reality—They ignore the complexity of risk in favor of subjectively isolating particular potentialities as objectively dangerous. Danger is not an objective condition. …….. the military-industrial complex. 3. Perm can’t solve – The plan cannot be detached from the discourse and framing used to justify it—the juxtaposition of the plan and alternative masks the underlying logic of security. These frameworks are interrogated …….. wards off critique. Identifications of security crises in Asia are empirically disproven and a guise for continued securitization. Kang, Dartmouth government professor, 2003 Following the end of the ….. both a fruitful and a necessary theoretical exercise. The close relationship between the ……. function that this research serves for the US state. | 10/14/13 |
K - Security UD JMUTournament: JMU | Round: Octas | Opponent: Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Judge: Harper, OGorman, Warne And here's the odd thing: in a sense…… be altered. In other words, they can't help themselves Threat discourse about “failed states” is a violent securitization—It creates an oppositional political order based on “zones of peace” and “zones of chaos” which justify violent militarism and extermination of the Other. The further securitization of …… authorized responses to otherness.6 Realism is not inevitable or objective—the ontological and epistemological foundations of realism are never questioned from within the paradigm, and realism is a subjective rhetoric deployed to justify the security state. Neorealist and neoclassical ….. of national security conduct; it constitutes it. | 10/14/13 |
NDT RD 8 AT Norms AdvTournament: NDT | Round: 8 | Opponent: Liberty BM | Judge: harris, young, short Other countries can’t get the tech Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within Military tech tradeoff of drones cause more violenceLewis, Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University, 13 No drone prolif- their ev misunderstands the international system- political costs, air defenses, expenses, deployment, retal all preventSingh, researcher at the Center for a New American Security, 12 Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake No China war-too many conflict dampenersRosecrance, Berkeley political science professor, 2010 Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis No war or escalation over SenkaakuGivens, Center for Asian Democracy Researcher, ’12 There are many good reasons to believe that this conflict will not escalate into a war, or at least, not a wide-ranging one with disastrous consequences: First, and most simply, there will not be a war because it would be economically ruinous to both sides. "China accounted for 21 percent of Japan’s exports and imports in 2011," according to the Wall Street Journal, and the total value of annual trade between Japan and China was 24345 billion. By contrast, the estimated value of the annual production of the Chunxiao gas field, which is often cited as one of the reasons for the conflict, is a mere 241.1 billion (based on average 2011 wellhead prices). That is just under a third of one percent of annual trade between the two countries (see graph). Second, even if it did come to blows, there is no reason to believe that it would escalate to a full-scale war, much less a nuclear conflict. There have been lots of "conflicts" and "crises" over uninhabited islands, including the Perejil Island, Imia and Kardak, and the Picton, Lennox and Nueva islands, but none ever resulted in anything like a full-scale war. Even the Falklands war hardly resulted in disaster for the region. Third, not only does Japan still operate under a pacifist constitution, but China actually has a record of peacefully settling border disputes by agreeing to compromises. Even when border disputes precipitated a 32-day war with India in 1962 and a 28-day war with Vietnam in 1979, these have hardly led to regional instability or other serious consequences. Considering all this, why is the media full of bluster, vitriol and dire warnings? As I have pointed out before, all foreign correspondents in China are based in major cities and (generally through no fault of their own) have a difficult time reporting outside of them. Foreign reporters and their photographers were there to witness the anti-Japanese protests first hand and get lots of compelling pictures. On the other hand, they largely miss the tens of thousands of protests against land expropriation in China every year that a co-author and I examine in a forthcoming paper. By comparison, anti-Japanese protests are an easily handled blip and, at any rate, are partially stage-managed by the government. Indeed, the Shanghai police have successfully prevented significant damage of the Japanese consulate there, simply because they do not want to pick up the tab for repairs. For its part, the Japanese government bought the islands to prevent nationalists from "seizing control of the islands, a move which would be certain to further inflame nationalistic sentiment in China." Neither sounds like the action of a country ready to go to war. Norms fail – states won’t give up the technical advantageMegret, McGill University Faculty of Law Associate Prof, 13 A good classic example of this is the invention of the crossbow which conferred a Global drone norms are impossibleMcGinnis, Northwestern law professor, 10 It is hard to overstate the extent to which advances in robotics, which are China is aggressively pursuing cooperation.Fravel, MIT security studies professor, 2012 Their impact is alarmism—it’s not a sign of aggression 1nrNo Azerbaijan-Armenia war – recent events are just political posturing and international community checks the impactSumerinli et al, Zerkalo Newspaper defense affairs reporter, 13 While cross-border gunfire involving Azerbaijani and Armenian forces is all too common, Other alternatives are worse card – Lewis
Anti-proliferation discourse obscures Western violence and masks the dangers of nuclear possessionCohn et al., Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights director, 2005 "Proliferation" is not a mere description or mirror of a phenomenon that is No modeling – resource and culture differencesRabkin, GMU Law Prof, 13 All these complications are merely conceptual. If you want to measure influence you have Modeling of US norms is an empty concept – it provides political cover for western interventionism that produces structural violenceMattei, Law Professor-Hastings University, 2009 What we can identify as ’global law’ is not a single and coherent system Their peacekeeping advantage relies on flawed top-down models of development that results in structural violenceNewman, Birmingham political science senior lecturer, 2011 However, the record of peace building in terms of promoting durable and positive No SCS conflict-no escalation, leadership transition doesn’t matter and competition leads to compromise-experts on our sideWing, Voice of America, 9-4-12 But that doesn’t mean a war. Storey said an escalation into full-blown Discursively constructing China as a threat to U.S. security essentializes and totalizes the Other, ensuring the maintenance of a security paradigm and war.Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, 04 Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the | 3/30/14 |
NDT RD 8 AT Terrorism AdvTournament: NDT | Round: 8 | Opponent: Liberty BM | Judge: harris, young, short WASHINGTON — There is an "almost vanishingly small" likelihood that terrorists would ever be able to acquire and detonate a nuclear weapon, one expert said here yesterday (see GSN, Dec. 2, 2008). In even the most likely scenario of nuclear terrorism, there are 20 barriers between extremists and a successful nuclear strike on a major city, said John Mueller, a political science professor at Ohio State University. The process itself is seemingly straightforward but exceedingly difficult — buy or steal highly enriched uranium, manufacture a weapon, take the bomb to the target site and blow it up. Meanwhile, variables strewn across the path to an attack would increase the complexity of the effort, Mueller argued. Terrorists would have to bribe officials in a state nuclear program to acquire the material, while avoiding a sting by authorities or a scam by the sellers. The material itself could also turn out to be bad. "Once the purloined material is purloined, ~police are~ going to be chasing after you. They are also going to put on a high reward, extremely high reward, on getting the weapon back or getting the fissile material back," Mueller said during a panel discussion at a two-day Cato Institute conference on counterterrorism issues facing the incoming Obama administration. Smuggling the material out of a country would mean relying on criminals who "are very good at extortion" and might have to be killed to avoid a double-cross, Mueller said. The terrorists would then have to find scientists and engineers willing to give up their normal lives to manufacture a bomb, which would require an expensive and sophisticated machine shop. Finally, further technological expertise would be needed to sneak the weapon across national borders to its destination point and conduct a successful detonation, Mueller said. Every obstacle is "difficult but not impossible" to overcome, Mueller said, putting the chance of success at no less than one in three for each. The likelihood of successfully passing through each obstacle, in sequence, would be roughly one in 3 1/2 billion, he said, but for argument’s sake dropped it to 3 1/2 million. "It’s a total gamble. This is a very expensive and difficult thing to do," said Mueller, who addresses the issue at greater length in an upcoming book, Atomic Obsession. "So unlike buying a ticket to the lottery ... you’re basically putting everything, including your life, at stake for a gamble that’s maybe one in 3 1/2 million or 3 1/2 billion." Other scenarios are even less probable, Mueller said. A nuclear-armed state is "exceedingly unlikely" to hand a weapon to a terrorist group, he argued: "States just simply won’t give it to somebody they can’t control." Terrorists are also not likely to be able to steal a whole weapon, Mueller asserted, dismissing the idea of "loose nukes." Even Pakistan, which today is perhaps the nation of greatest concern regarding nuclear security, keeps its bombs in two segments that are stored at different locations, he said (see GSN, Jan. 12). Fear of an "extremely improbable event" such as nuclear terrorism produces support for a wide range of homeland security activities, Mueller said. He argued that there has been a major and costly overreaction to the terrorism threat — noting that the Sept. 11 attacks helped to precipitate the invasion of Iraq, which has led to far more deaths than the original event. Panel moderator Benjamin Friedman, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, said academic and governmental discussions of acts of nuclear or biological terrorism have tended to focus on "worst-case assumptions about terrorists’ ability to use these weapons to kill us." There is need for consideration for what is probable rather than simply what is possible, he said. Friedman took issue with the finding late last year of an experts’ report that an act of WMD terrorism would "more likely than not" occur in the next half decade unless the international community takes greater action. "I would say that the report, if you read it, actually offers no analysis to justify that claim, which seems to have been made to change policy by generating alarm in headlines." One panel speaker offered a partial rebuttal to Mueller’s presentation. Jim Walsh, principal research scientist for the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said he agreed that nations would almost certainly not give a nuclear weapon to a nonstate group, that most terrorist organizations have no interest in seeking out the bomb, and that it would be difficult to build a weapon or use one that has been stolen. Al Qaeda isn’t key to terrorism The above statistics are crystal clear: 78 of all global neo-jihadi terrorist plots in the West in the past five years came from autonomous homegrown groups without any connection, direction or control from al-Qaeda Core or its allies. The ’resurgent al-Qaeda’ in the West argument has no empirical foundation. The paucity of actual al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organization plots compared to the number of autonomous plots refutes the claims by some heads of the Intelligence Community ~4~ that all Islamist plots in the West can be traced back to the Afghan Pakistani border. Far from being the "epicenter of terrorism," this Pakistani region is more like the finishing school of global neo-jihadi terrorism, where a few amateur wannabes are transformed into dangerous terrorists. No accidents or miscalc with Russia – strategic forces have been de-targeted Heg doesn’t solve war or conflict- empirically proven One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer’s advice fit neatly with Fukuyama’s vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn’t be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama’s and Krauthammer’s early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison’s observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world’s leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism. U.S. can’t deploy heg to solve conflicts – public restraint, international relations, and deployment capabilitiesTalmadge, Staff Writer for the Harvard International Review, 2006 First, the domestic politics of the United States limit its international freedom of action. Although the president may have the world’s finest military at his command, he often lacks the combination of public and congressional support he needs to maximize its advantages. Foreign policy surveys show that US citizens remain casualty-averse unless vital US interests such as preventing terrorism seem to be at stake. And except for a brief period of bipartisanship after September 11, the notion of politics stopping at the water’s edge now seems as quaint and obsolete as Cold War air raid drills. Internal divisions frequently prevent the United States from acting as quickly, decisively, or forcefully as its material resources would allow. This reality does not go unnoticed by other nations: what seems like democratic debate to US citizens may appear to others as a lack of resolve or an opportunity for political manipulation, further complicating the execution of US foreign policy. Second, the complexity of international politics poses a serious challenge to the exercise of US power. Despite its military prowess, the United States remains fundamentally dependent on support from local allies when it operates abroad. The geographic position of a weak state may endow it with a powerful bargaining chip when the United States needs basing rights or access to airspace. This leverage requires diplomatic finesse and sensitivity to those foreign leaders’ own domestic constraints. Political skill turns out to be just as important as military strength—and, unfortunately for the United States, much more evenly distributed. Even relatively weak states can often exploit political cracks in the United States’ relationships with its allies, providing third parties with leverage over the United States despite their material inferiority. Third, even when the United States is capable of capturing an advantage by acting unilaterally, it often finds itself trapped in what Bruce Conin has called the "paradox of hegemony." The United States certainly has the ability to act as a great power and pursue its short-term interest in a particular case: for example, by intervening in a foreign country to secure oil. Actually doing so, however, would undermine its role as a hegemon trying to lead the international system according to a set of rules (in this case, the UN Charter) which benefit its long-term interests and help legitimize its power. Moreover, in pursuing its short-term interest of securing oil, the hegemon would undermine its provision of the public good of law and order that helps other states tolerate the hegemon’s power. Other states might then begin to balance more actively against the hegemon, hastening its decline. To stave off this type of backlash, which would damage broader US interests, the United States often imposes limits upon its own actions or gives in to the demands of weaker states. In order to remain the sole superpower, the United States avoids acting like one.\ US can’t project power nowParent et al., Miamia political science professor, 2011 The trend of the last decade is disturbing: as military spending soared, U.S. success abroad sagged. To be clear, the United States continues to field the best-armed, most skilled military in the world. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have bent, but not broken, the all-volunteer force, and the burden of maintaining this formidable force is not unacceptably onerous. The proposed 24553 billion base-line defense budget for 2012 represents just 15 percent of the federal budget and less than five percent of GDP. (TO put that figure in perspective, consider that the proposed 2012 budget for Social Security spending tops 24760 billion.) Yet current trends will make it harder for the United States to continue to purchase hegemony as easily as it has in the past. Changes in military tactics and technology are eroding the United States’ advantages. The proliferation of antiship cruise missiles makes it harder for the U.S. Navy to operate near adversaries’ shores. Advanced surface-to-air missiles likewise raise the cost of maintaining U.S. air superiority in hostile theaters. Nationalist and tribal insurgencies, fueled by a brisk small-arms trade, have proved difficult to combat with conventional ground forces. U.S. defense dominance is getting more expensive at a moment when it is becoming less expensive for other states and actors to challenge the sole superpower. Beyond these challenges to the country’s military dominance, a weakened economic condition is contributing to the decline of U.S. power. The U.S. economy remains the largest in the world, yet its position is in jeopardy. Between 1999 and 2009, the U.S. share of global GDP (measured in terms of purchasing power parity) fell from 23 percent to 20 percent, whereas China’s share of global GDP jumped from seven percent to 13 percent. Should this trend continue, China’s economic output will surpass the United States’ by 2016. China already consumes more energy than the United States, and calls are growing louder to replace the dollar as the international reserve currency with a basket of currencies that would include the euro and the yuan. The fiscal position of the United States is alarming, whether or not one believes that Standard 26 Poor’s was justified in downgrading U.S. Treasury bonds. Between 2001 and 2009, U.S. federal debt as a percentage of GDP more than doubled, from 32 percent to 67 percent, and state and local governments have significant debts, too. The United States’ reliance on imports, combined with high rates of borrowing, has led to a considerable current account deficit: more than six percent of GDP in 2006. Power follows money, and the United States is leaking cash. 1nrDoesn’t solve terrorismZakaria, Board of Directors for Amnesty International, 13 No ev as to what ligitaion is coming where they happen, when it happens. Zero ev the plan solves public backlash.No Impact – Al Qaeda’s decimatedZenko and Cohen, CFR Fellow and The New School International Affairs Director, ’12 Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped Discourse of a Russia threat is inflated security rhetoric—no objective threat exists, and there’s only a risk the aff creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.Rumer and Sokolsky, Senior Fellow at National Defense University and Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, 2001 Ten years after the end of the Cold War, mutual hopes that a comprehensive US can’t project power nowParent et al., Miamia political science professor, 2011 The trend of the last decade is disturbing: as military spending soared, U Hegemony causes paranoid imperial violence – there are no global threats – violence is inevitable because US scenario planning is grounded in pursuing constructed threats – causes error replication that culminate in eternal warfareEngelhardt, Nation Institute fellow, 2012 And here’s the odd thing: in a sense, little has changed since then US won’t exercise heg even if we can-A. Congressional gridlock and political appetitesKupchan, Georgetown IR professor, 12 Tectonic shifts in international affairs and in political and economic conditions within the United States B. Public isolationismKupchan, Georgetown IR professor, 12 A progressive grand strategy must help guide the United States from its current state of | 3/30/14 |
NDT RD 8 AT Title 50 Drone Shift SolvencyTournament: NDT | Round: 8 | Opponent: Liberty BM | Judge: harris, young, short The plan won’t be enforced – no incentive to enforce the aff These assumptions are all questionable. As a preliminary matter, there is not much causal evidence that supports the institutional constraints logic. As various commentators have noted, Congress’s bark with respect to war powers is often much greater than its bite. Significantly, skeptics like Barbara Hinckley suggest that any notion of an activist Congress in war powers is a myth and members of Congress will often use the smokescreen of "symbolic resolutions, increase in roll calls and lengthy hearings, ~and~ addition of reporting requirements" to create the illusion of congressional participation in foreign policy.10 Indeed, even those commentators who support a more aggressive role for Congress in initiating conflicts acknowledge this problem,11 but suggest conflict objectives and implement new tools for monitoring executive behavior during wartime.12 Yet, even if Congress were equipped with better institutional tools to constrain and monitor the President’s military initiatives, it is not clear that it would significantly alter the current war powers landscape. As Horn and Shepsle have argued elsewhere: "~N~either specificity in enabling legislation ... nor participation by interested parties is necessarily optimal or self- fulfilling; therefore, they do not ensure agent compliance. Ultimately, there must be some enforcement feature - a credible commitment to punish . . . ,"13 Thus, no matter how much well-intentioned and specific legislation Congress passes to increase congressional oversight of the President’s military initiatives, it will come to naught if members of Congress lack institutional incentives to monitor and constrain the President’s behavior in an international crisis. Various congressional observers have highlighted electoral disincentives that members of Congress might face in constraining the President’s military initiatives.14 Others have pointed to more institutional obstacles to congressional assertiveness in foreign relations, such as collective action problems.15 Generally, lawmaking is a demanding and grueling exercise. If one assumes that members of Congress are often obsessed with the prospect of reelection,16 then such members will tend to focus their scarce resources on district-level concerns and hesitate to second-guess the President’s response in an international crisis.17 Even if members of Congress could marshal the resources to challenge the President’s agenda on national issues, the payoff in electoral terms might be trivial or non-existent. Indeed, in the case of the President’s military initiatives where the median voter is likely to defer to the executive branch’s judgment, the electoral payoff for members of Congress of constraining such initiatives might actually be negative. In other words, regardless of how explicit the grant of a constitutional role to Congress in foreign affairs might be, few members of Congress are willing to make the personal sacrifice for the greater institutional goal. Thus, unless a grand reformer is able to tweak the system and make congressional assertiveness an electorally palatable option in war powers, calls for greater congressional participation in war powers are likely to fall on deaf ears ~be ignored~ Can’t solve Scholars and practitioners use the term "Title 10 authority" as a catchall phrase to describe the legal authority for military operations. Unfortunately, the use of the term in this way is misleading because "Title 10 – Armed Forces" does not contain actual operational authorities; it merely describes the organizational structure of the Department of Defense. In fact, the U.S. military’s true operational authority stems from the U.S. Constitution and the President’s Commander-in-Chief power. Like the term "Title 10 authority," Title 50 authority is a misnomer. Title 50 is often referred to as the CIA’s authority to conduct its intelligence operations and covert actions –like drone strikes. Yet Title 50 of the United States Code is actually titled "War and National Defense." Thus, it contains much more than just CIA authority. Military personnel can also act under Title 50 authority – a fact often overlooked in news articles and editorials. In fact, the DoD undertakes the majority of intelligence activities under Title 50 authorities. Like moving drone operations from the CIA to the DoD, the Title 10-Title 50 debate is really about oversight and accountability, particularly congressional oversight. Title 10 oversight lies with the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Executive Branch. In terms of operational oversight, it primarily consists of oversight over "traditional military activities." Traditional military activities are undertaken: 1) By military personnel; 2) Under the direction and control of a United States military commander; and 3) related to ongoing hostilities where the fact of the U.S. role in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly. With regard to drone operations, the keys aspects of this definition include who is undertaking the strikes and under what command structure; the strikes’ relationship to "ongoing hostilities;" and the level of secrecy involved. Current DoD drone operations in Afghanistan, for instance, would clearly fall under congressional oversight of traditional military operations. It is also clear that any CIA drone strikes would not fall under Title 10 oversight. However, there are multiple scenarios in which DoD drone operations would not fall under Title 10 oversight. Given the conjunctive, three-part test defining a traditional military activity, drone operations 1) outside the context of ongoing hostilities, 2) under CIA command and control, or 3) not acknowledged publicly, would not be considered traditional military activities, regardless of whether military personnel piloted the drone and pulled the trigger. Therefore, the Obama Administrations’ impending decision to move drone operations from the CIA to the DoD may have several loopholes. Indeed, these operations would likely be considered "covert actions" and held accountable to Title 50 oversight and accountability. A covert action is "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." Overall, Title 50 oversight may actually be more stringent, though less transparent, than Title 10 oversight. Drone operations classified as covert actions –whether undertaken by the CIA or the DoD- are subject to both a presidential finding and congressional notification requirement. Section 413(b) of Title 50 of the U.S. Code requires the President to keep the congressional intelligence committees "fully and currently informed" of all ongoing covert actions. It also requires the President to report his presidential finding to the intelligence committees "as soon as possible after such approval and before the initiation of the covert action." However, in "extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States," this prior notification requirement can be limited to the so-called "Gang of Eight." Although in these extreme cases the prior notification requirement is limited, it is important to note that, at least under the statutory authority, the President simply cannot refuse to notify Congress. Ultimately, as many of the recent editorials note, any shift in the operational authority over drone strikes from the CIA to the DoD may have little practical effect. This posting explains that the intended increase in accountability and transparency may actually be prevented by the Title 10-Title 50 legal framework meant to provide congressional oversight over drone operations. This is because Congress’ Title 50 oversight functions are meant to provide limited, yet timely information for those operations that, if made public, would prove damaging to U.S. national security or foreign relations. In contrast, Congress’ Title 10 oversight is less stringent because did not envision the military engaging in ongoing hostilities against a global terrorist threat. Given the legal framework governing operational oversight, the Obama Administration might consider providing more transparency and accountability through regularly scheduled, voluntary briefings rather than shifting operational command and control. Aff inevitable That is the title of Dan Klaidman’s important story: Three senior U.S. officials tell The Daily Beast that the White House is poised to sign off on a plan to shift the CIA’s lethal targeting program to the Defense Department. . . .The proposed plan would unify the command and control structure of targeted killings, and create a uniform set of rules and procedures. The CIA would maintain a role, but the military would have operational control over targeting. Lethal missions would take place under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which governs military operations, rather than Title 50, which sets out the legal authorities for intelligence activities and covert operations. 1nrPolitical costs are exaggerated – this card will smoke themSchauer, UVA Law professor, 12 Consider, for example, the legality of American involvement in Libya. Factually Obama will circumvent the plan – the past 5 years proveCohen, Century Foundation fellow, 12 This month marks the one-year anniversary of the onset of U.S Covert action allows total circumvention – the president can just assert that the CIA collected enough ev and that they didn’t only rely on the "signature"Lohmann, Harvard National Security Research Committee director, 13 The CAS mandates that the President inform the Senate and House Intelligence Committees of all | 3/30/14 |
NDT RD 8 K HeteronormativityTournament: NDT | Round: 8 | Opponent: Liberty BM | Judge: harris, young, short Jeffrey Alexander defines civil society as "a sphere of solidarity in which abstract universalism The state only has existence through performativity and repetition in discourse—the disruption and rejection of the state’s discursive abilities undercut the foundations of the state and destroy its legitimacy. The alt solves the disciplinary power of the state and the violence of exclusion. Identity is an inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it. 2ncFramingCritical intellectualism is the key to solving—our alternative creates a counter-hegemonic discourse.Jones, Aberystwyth University Professor of International Relations, 99 The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a Theoretical challenges maximize the pragmatic potential of politics—rejecting dominant discourse is key to open up alternate epistemologies and ignored questions—solves for serial policy failure.Reus-Smit, European University Institute IR professor, 2012 However widespread it might be, the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from excessive theorising rests more on vigorous assertion than weighty evidence. As noted above, we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance, and the difficulties establishing appropriate measures are all too apparent in the fraught attempts by several governments to quantify the impact of the humanities and social sciences more generally. Beyond this, though, we lack any credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory, even high theory, to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. Moreover, there is now a wealth of research, inside and outside IR, that shows that policy communities are not open epistemic or cognitive realms, simply awaiting well-communicated, non-jargonistic knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames. 10 Beyond this, however, there are good reasons to believe that precisely the reverse of the theory versus relevance thesis might be true; that theoretical inquiry may be a necessary prerequisite for the generation of practically relevant knowledge. I will focus here on the value of metatheory, as this attracts most contemporary criticism and would appear the most difficult of theoretical forms to defend. Metatheories take other theories as their subject. Indeed, their precepts establish the conditions of possibility for second-order theories. In general, metatheories divide into three broad categories: epistemology, ontology and meta-ethics. The first concerns the nature, validity and acquisition of knowledge; the second, the nature of being (what can be said to exist, how things might be categorised and how they stand in relation to one another); and the third, the nature of right and wrong, what constitutes moral argument, and how moral arguments might be sustained. Second-order theories are constructed within, and on the basis of, assumptions formulated at the metatheoretical level. Epistemological assumptions about what constitutes legitimate knowledge and how it is legitimately acquired delimit the questions we ask and the kinds of information we can enlist in answering them. 11 Can social scientists ask normative questions? Is literature a valid source of social-scientific knowledge? Ontological assumptions about the nature and distinctiveness of the social universe affect not only what we ’see’ but also how we order what we see; how we relate the material to the ideational, agents to structures, interests to beliefs, and so on. If we assume, for example, that individuals are rational actors, engaged in the efficient pursuit of primarily material interests, then phenomena such as faith-motivated politics will remain at the far periphery of our vision. 12 Lastly, meta-ethical assumptions about the nature of the good, and about what constitutes a valid moral argument, frame how we reason about concrete ethical problems. Both deontology and consequentialism are meta-ethical positions, operationalised, for example, in the differing arguments of Charles Beitz and Peter Singer on global distributive justice. 13 Most scholars would acknowledge the background, structuring role that metatheory plays, but argue that we can take our metatheoretical assumptions off the shelf, get on with the serious business of research and leave explicit metatheoretical reflection and debate to the philosophers. If practical relevance is one of our concerns, however, there are several reasons why this is misguided. Firstly, whether IR is practically relevant depends, in large measure, on the kinds of questions that animate our research. I am not referring here to the commonly held notion that we should be addressing questions that practitioners want answered. Indeed, our work will at times be most relevant when we pursue questions that policymakers and others would prefer left buried. My point is a different one, which I return to in greater detail below. It is sufficient to note here that being practically relevant involves asking questions of practice; not just retrospective questions about past practices – their nature, sources and consequences – but prospective questions about what human agents should do. As I have argued elsewhere, being practically relevant means asking questions of how we, ourselves, or some other actors (states, policymakers, citizens, NGOs, IOs, etc.) should act. 14 Yet our ability, nay willingness, to ask such questions is determined by the metatheoretical assumptions that structure our research and arguments. This is partly an issue of ontology – what we see affects how we understand the conditions of action, rendering some practices possible or impossible, mandatory or beyond the pale. If, for example, we think that political change is driven by material forces, then we are unlikely to see communicative practices of argument and persuasion as potentially successful sources of change. More than this, though, it is also an issue of epistemology. If we assume that the proper domain of IR as a social science is the acquisition of empirically verifiable knowledge, then we will struggle to comprehend, let alone answer, normative questions of how we should act. We will either reduce ’ought’ questions to ’is’ questions, or place them off the agenda altogether. 15 Our metatheoretical assumptions thus determine the macro-orientation of IR towards questions of practice, directly affecting the field’s practical relevance. Secondly, metatheoretical revolutions license new second-order theoretical and analytical possibilities while foreclosing others, directly affecting those forms of scholarship widely considered most practically relevant. The rise of analytical eclecticism illustrates this. As noted above, Katzenstein and Sil’s call for a pragmatic approach to the study of world politics, one that addresses real-world problematics by combining insights from diverse research traditions, resonates with the mood of much of the field, especially within the American mainstream. Epistemological and ontological debates are widely considered irresolvable dead ends, grand theorising is unfashionable, and gladiatorial contests between rival paradigms appear, increasingly, as unimaginative rituals. Boredom and fatigue are partly responsible for this new mood, but something deeper is at work. Twenty-five years ago, Sil and Katzenstein’s call would have fallen on deaf ears; the neo-neo debate that preoccupied the American mainstream occurred within a metatheoretical consensus, one that combined a neo-positivist epistemology with a rationalist ontology. This singular metatheoretical framework defined the rules of the game; analytical eclecticism was unimaginable. The Third Debate of the 1980s and early 1990s destabilised all of this; not because American IR scholars converted in their droves to critical theory or poststructuralism (far from it), but because metatheoretical absolutism became less and less tenable. The anti-foundationalist critique of the idea that there is any single measure of truth did not produce a wave of relativism, but it did generate a widespread sense that battles on the terrain of epistemology were unwinnable. Similarly, the Third Debate emphasis on identity politics and cultural particularity, which later found expression in constructivism, did not vanquish rationalism. It did, however, establish a more pluralistic, if nevertheless heated, debate about ontology, a terrain on which many scholars felt more comfortable than that of epistemology. One can plausibly argue, therefore, that the metatheoretical struggles of the Third Debate created a space for – even made possible – the rise of analytical eclecticism and its aversion to metatheoretical absolutes, a principal benefit of which is said to be greater practical relevance. Lastly, most of us would agree that for our research to be practically relevant, it has to be good – it has to be the product of sound inquiry, and our conclusions have to be plausible. The pluralists among us would also agree that different research questions require different methods of inquiry and strategies of argument. Yet across this diversity there are several practices widely recognised as essential to good research. Among these are clarity of purpose, logical coherence, engagement with alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons (empirical evidence, corroborating arguments textual interpretations, etc.). Less often noted, however, is the importance of metatheoretical reflexivity. If our epistemological assumptions affect the questions we ask, then being conscious of these assumptions is necessary to ensure that we are not fencing off questions of importance, and that if we are, we can justify our choices. Likewise, if our ontological assumptions affect how we see the social universe, determining what is in or outside our field of vision, then reflecting on these assumptions can prevent us being blind to things that matter. A similar argument applies to our meta-ethical assumptions. Indeed, if deontology and consequentialism are both meta-ethical positions, as I suggested earlier, then reflecting on our choice of one or other position is part and parcel of weighing rival ethical arguments (on issues as diverse as global poverty and human rights). Finally, our epistemological, ontological and meta-ethical assumptions are not metatheoretical silos; assumptions we make in one have a tendency to shape those we make in another. The oft-heard refrain that ’if we can’t measure it, it doesn’t matter’ is an unfortunate example of epistemology supervening on ontology, something that metatheoretical reflexivity can help guard against. In sum, like clarity, coherence, consideration of alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons, metatheoretical reflexivity is part of keeping us honest, making it practically relevant despite its abstraction. Nonsensible knowledge first – learning comes independent of ’teaching’Halberstam, USC American Studies, Ethnicity Studies, and Comparative Literature Professor, ’11 Second, Privilege the naïve or nonsensical (stupidity). Here we might argue for the nonsensible or nonconceptual over sense- making structures that are often embedded in a common notion of ethics. The naïve or the ignorant may in fact lead to a different set of knowledge practices. It certainly requires what some have called oppositional pedagogies. In pursuit of such pedagogies we must realize that, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick once said, ignorance is "as potent and multiple a thing as knowledge" and that learning often takes place completely independently of teaching (1991: 4). In fact, to speak personally for a moment, I am not sure that I myself am teachable21 As someone who never aced an exam, who has tried and tried without much success to become fluent in another language, and who can read a book without retaining much at all, I realize that I can learn only what I can teach myself, and that much of what I was taught in school left very little impression upon me at all. The question of unteachability arises as a political problem, indeed a national problem, in the extraordinary French documentary about a year in the life of a high school in the suburbs of Paris, The Class (Entre Les Murs, 2008, directed by Laurent Cantet). In the film a white schoolteacher, François Bégaudeau (who wrote the memoir upon which the film is based), tries to reach out to his disinterested and profoundly alienated, mostly African, Asian, and Arab immigrant students. The cultural and racial and class differences between the teacher and his students make effective communication difficult, and his cultural references (The Diary of Ann Frank, Molière, French grammar) leave the students cold, while theirs (soccer, Islam, hip- hop) induce only pained responses from their otherwise personable teacher. The film, like a Frederick Wiseman documentary, tries to just let the action unfold without any voice- of- God narration, so we see close up the rage and frustrations of teacher and students alike. At the end of the film an extraordinary moment occurs. Bégaudeau asks the students to think about what they have learned and write down one thing to take away from the class, one concept, text, or idea that might have made a difference. The class disperses, and one girl shuffles up to the front. The teacher looks at her expectantly and draws out her comment. "I didn’t learn anything," she tells him without malice or anger, "nothing. . . . I can’t think of anything I learned." The moment is a defeat for the teacher and a disappointment for the viewer, who wants to believe in a narrative of educational uplift, but it is a triumph for alternative pedagogies because it reminds us that learning is a two- way street and you cannot teach without a dialogic relation to the learner. Framework reifies colonial relation – we don’t need to be ’taught’Halberstam, USC American Studies, Ethnicity Studies, and Comparative Literature Professor, ’11 The Ignorant Schoolmaster advocates in an antidisciplinary way for emancipatory forms of knowledge that do not depend upon an overtrained pied piper leading obedient children out of the darkness and into the light. Jacotot summarizes his pedagogy thus: "I must teach you that I have nothing to teach you" (15). In this way he allows others to teach themselves and to learn without learning and internalizing a system of superior and inferior knowledges, superior and inferior intelligences. Like Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, which argues against a "banking" system of teaching and for a dialogic mode of learning that enacts a practice of freedom, Jacotot and then Ranciére see education and social transformation as mutually dependent. When we are taught that we cannot know things unless we are taught by great minds, we submit to a whole suite of unfree practices that take on the form of a colonial relation (Freire 2000). There are several responses possible to colonial knowledge formations: a violent response, on the order of Frantz Fanon’s claim that violent impositions of colonial rule must be met with violent resistance; a homeopathic response, within which the knower learns the dominant system better than its advocates and undermines it from within; or a negative response, in which the subject refuses the knowledge offered and refuses to be a knowing subject in the form mandated by Enlightenment philosophies of self and other. This book is in sympathy with the violent and negative forms of anticolonial knowing and builds on Moten’s and Harney’s opposition to the university as a site of incarcerated knowledge. Current policies perpetuate the rhetoric of crisis and security, and the linear scenario predictions of the security paradigm are flawed. This leads to bureaucratic compartmentalization and faulty policy-analysis. The impact is systematic otherization and militarized responses that culminate in war.Ahmed, Institute for Policy Research and Development director, 2012 The twenty-first century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While the structure of global economic activity is driving the unsustainable depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating greenhouse gas emissions resulting in global warming. Both global warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on global industrial food production, as well as on global financial and economic instability. Conventional policy responses toward the intensification of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as separate processes. Yet increasing evidence shows they are deeply interwoven manifestations of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is embedded. In this context, orthodox IR’s flawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their ’securitisation’, reifying the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conflicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the ’Otherisation’ of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy. Yet this relationship between global crises and conflict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a wider epistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes. In 2009, the UK government’s chief scientific adviser Sir John Beddington warned that without mitigating and preventive action ’drivers’ of global crisis like demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion could lead to a ’perfect storm’ of simultaneous food, water and energy crises by around 2030.1 Yet, for the most part, conventional policy responses from national governments and international institutions have been decidedly inadequate. Part of the problem is the way in which these crises are conceptualised in relation to security. Traditional disciplinary divisions in the social and natural sciences, compounded by bureaucratic compartmentalisation in policy-planning and decision-making, has meant these crises are frequently approached as largely separate processes with their own internal dynamics. While it is increasingly acknowledged that cross-disciplinary approaches are necessary, these have largely failed to recognise just how inherently interconnected these crises are. As Brauch points out, ’most studies in the environmental security debate since 1990 have ignored or failed to integrate the contributions of the global environmental change community in the natural sciences. To a large extent the latter has also failed to integrate the results of this debate.*" Underlying this problem is the lack of a holistic systems approach to thinking about not only global crises, but their causal origins in the social, political, economic, ideological and value structures of the contemporary international system. Indeed, it is often assumed that these contemporary structures are largely what need to be ’secured* and protected from the dangerous impacts of global crises, rather than transformed precisely to ameliorate these crises in the first place. Consequently, policy-makers frequently overlook existing systemic and structural obstacles to the implementation of desired reforms. In a modest effort to contribute to the lacuna identified by Brauch, this paper begins with an empiric ally-oriented, interdisciplinary exploration of the best available data on four major global crises — climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity and global financial instability — illustrating the systemic interconnections between different crises, and revealing that their causal origins are not accidental but inherent to the structural failings and vulnerabilities of existing global political, economic and cultural institutions. This empirical evaluation leads to a critical appraisal of orthodox realist and liberal approaches to global crises in international theory and policy. This critique argues principally that orthodox IR reifies a highly fragmented, de-historicised ontology of the international system which underlies a reductionist, technocratic and compartmentalised conceptual and methodological approach to global crises. Consequently, rather than global crises being understood causally and holistically in the systemic context of the structure of the international system, they are ’securitised* as amplifiers of traditional security threats requiring counter-productive militarised responses and/or futile inter-state negotiations. While the systemic causal context of global crisis convergence and acceleration is thus elided, this simultaneously exacerbates the danger of reactionary violence, the problematisation of populations in regions impacted by these crises and the naturalisation of the consequent proliferation of wars and humanitarian disasters. This moves us away from the debate over whether resource ’shortages* or ’abundance* causes conflicts, to the question of how either can generate crises which undermine conventional socio-political orders and confound conventional IR discourses, in turn radicalising the processes of social polarisation that can culminate in violent conflict. 5. Reject util-calculating lesser evils results in the more extreme systemic violence and state of exceptions.Weizman, London University spatial and visual cultures professor, 2011 The theological origins of the lesser evil argument still cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts - from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to maneuver through the paradoxes of aid - that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the term "˜good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the "˜good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the "˜War on terror, the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book The Lesser Evil Ignatieff suggested that in "˜balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extra juridical violence - which he saw as lesser evils - in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states. If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. "˜Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, "˜do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort. The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatic compromise a "tolerated sin" that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greatest harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace. More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves. Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture, to the use of (sometimes) non~ lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even "˜the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost. In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defense of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the "banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an "˜enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as "˜humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation bringing together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses mid gains, the concept of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated - and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulativelyThe aff’s description of rapid change in central Asia is based on false linear scenario predictionsStone, University of Wales PhD, ’12 Central Asia is constantly reorganized and (re)presented by commentators such as MTerrorism studies rely on politically motivated expertism that justifies the security state—reject their knowledge claims and prefer the structural MPX of the K.Raphael, Kingston IR professor, 2009 The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US state means Terrorism studies are methodologically bankrupt—They refuse to consider the militants perspective, are based on biased secondary information, and consider all civilians as terrorist supporters.Shika, Social Anthropology Ass. Professor, ’9 I concluded my ethnography on popular support for the IRA and INLA by arguing that while counter-insurgency and counterterrorism had become some-thing of a politico-military science redefined as ’terrorism studies,’ the social science and political theory of many so-called ’terrorism experts’ was frankly dismal. I identified at least four major weaknesses often found in the work of counter-insurgency specialists and the orthodox literature on terrorism. First, a near total failure to arrive at empirical conclusions derived from primary or first-hand research with the militants they define as ’terrorists’ or in the communities that supports them and a corresponding failure or refusal to look at the question from the participants point of view. These people’s views are rarely sought, and little effort is made to arrive at an empirical understanding of why they engage in or support political violence against the state. Second, their analyses and conclusions are based almost solely on mostly secondary information and interpretations provided by governments, intelligence agencies, and security’s forces actively involved in fighting the ’terrorists’ (see, also, Ranstorp and Raphael in this volume). This is not objective social science because no effort is made to establish the validity or verify the reliability of these mostly secondary data and interpretations received from ’official’ sources which it would be naïve or biased to accept at face value as objective and reliable. Third, they tend strongly to view the civilian populations which militants come from as being passive, ignorant, and manipulable, and as either ’terrorised’ dupes or ’terrorists supporters’. This preconceived notion shapes their fundamental approach, and yet no more attempt is made to establish its validity than is made to establish that of data and interpretation sreceived from ’official sources actively involved in counter-insurgency or counterterrorism. Fourth, not only do they generally approach their work from the perspective of those combating militants, there is nearly always an implicit moral assumption or judgement which reveals a state-centric bias, that states combating political militants they define as ’terrorists’ are inherently legitimate and moral (the ’good guys’) and the militants inherently illegitmate and immoral (evil, the ’bad guys’). There is rarely any suggestion that governments and security forces may be just as illegitmate, Machiavellian, cynical, and immoral in their use of violence, force, and terror as they generally presume the militants are, or that the violence of the militants is, from their perspective and usually an objective one as well, a reaction and form of resistance to their experiences of state terror, oppression, and injustice, which are among the root causes of anti-state violence. There is no stable definition of ’terrorism’ and government elites manipulate the definition to serve the interests of state power and the security regime.Hoffman, Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, 1998 What is terrorism? Few words have so insidiously worked their way into our everyday Discourse of a Russia threat is inflated security rhetoric—no objective threat exists, and there’s only a risk the aff creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.Rumer and Sokolsky, Senior Fellow at National Defense University and Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, 2001 Ten years after the end of the Cold War, mutual hopes that a comprehensive partnership would replace containment as the major organizing theme in U.S.-Russian relations have not been realized. The record of the 1990s has left both Russia and the United States unsatisfied. Russia looks back at the decade with bitterness and a feeling of being marginalized and slighted by the world’s sole remaining superpower. It is also disappointed by its experience with Western-style reforms and mistrustful of American intentions. The United States is equally disappointed with Russia’s lack of focus, inability to engage effectively abroad, and failure to implement major reforms at home. A comprehensive partnership is out of the question. Renewed competition or active containment are also not credible as organizing principles. Russia’s economic, military and political/ideological weakness makes it an unlikely target of either U.S. competition or containment. Not only is Russia no longer a superpower, but its status as a regional power is in doubt. Current thinking about Russia is divided among four basic approaches: Forget Russia, Enfant Terrible Russia, Evil Russia, and Russia First. The Forget Russia view holds that Russia is too weak, too corrupt, and too chaotic to matter. After 10 years of trying to help Russia, the United States should focus its resources and attention on more deserving and important world issues. The Enfant Terrible view holds that, although Russia has been an irresponsible and irritating partner, it is too weak to hurt the United States and therefore need not be feared in earnest. President Vladimir Putin’s visits to Cuba and North Korea, courtship of Slobodan Milosevic, and welcoming of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to Moscow are of little strategic consequence and thus not worth our attention. This view presupposes the existence of an important U.S.-Russian bilateral agenda and the need to protect it from childish and irresponsible Russian grandstanding. The Evil Russia view holds that Russian courtship of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea is a deliberate effort to undermine U.S. influence in the world and recreate the Soviet empire. Analysts embracing this view take less notice of Russia’s diminished capabilities than of ambitious rhetoric by Russian politicians. Given Russia’s evil purposes, the United States is already on a collision course with it and might as well do everything it can to box Russia in. The Russia First view holds that Russia still is the most important issue on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. It accepts the premise that the two sides have shared interests and that Russia, once reborn as a stable, prosperous democracy, can be a U.S. partner and ally. Therefore, the United States should actively assist Russia in its transformation and engage it in a broad and intense relationship with renewed vigor and creativity. There are shortcomings in all of these approaches. Notwithstanding its precipitous decline, to Forget Russia is clearly not an option: the country’s geographic expanse, nuclear arsenal, and proliferation potential simply make it impossible for U.S. policymakers to ignore. The Enfant Terrible view fails to take Russia seriously and ignores the very real problems that exist between the two countries. The Evil Russia view risks inflating the threat and making the myth of evil Russia a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Russia First view is not grounded in reality. After a decade of failure, it should be clear that neither the specter of Russia’s past nor the promise of its future warrants a position near the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The Need for Normalcy Russia’s external weakness and internal problems have left the United States without an effective interlocutor, either as partner or competitor. Thus, the United States should deal with Russia on a case-by-case basis to advance our interests, in much the same way we deal with most other countries. This path will sometimes lead toward partnership with Russia and at other times toward competition. It may even result in a situation where Russia and the United States find themselves as partners and competitors simultaneously in different parts of the world or on different issues. Given its size, history, strategic nuclear capabilities, and future potential, one is tempted to overstate the importance of relations with Russia and put them at the top of the U.S. national security agenda. Except for geography and nuclear weapons, however, there is little at this stage to justify making relations with Russia a top priority. Undoubtedly, Russia can inflict unacceptable damage on the United States. But fear of Russian nuclear weapons should not be the driving element of the relationship. The hostility and ideological differences that divided the superpowers during the Cold War are gone. The prospect of Russia consolidating and rebuilding itself under a militant authoritarian, nationalist regime is remote. Therefore, fears of a deliberate surprise (attack on the United States are unjustified. Despite a number of bilateral undertakings outside the Cold War-style security agenda, ranging from regional diplomacy in the Balkans to investment, U.S. engagement with Russia, with the notable exception of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Initiative, is limited. Discursively constructing China as a threat to U.S. security essentializes and totalizes the Other, ensuring the maintenance of a security paradigm and war.Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, 04 Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist, ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo)realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo)realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other," (45) and "All other states are potential threats." (46) In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other." (47) The (neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China’s military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the ~China threat~ debate is the assessment of China’s overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo)realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy." (50) And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy ~of America~ is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." (51) Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result?" (52) Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China’s political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger. (53) In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA ~People’s Liberation Army~ remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely.... Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences.... U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. (54) The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China," (55) argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable ’renegade state’ to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)." (56) It is mainly on the basis of this self-fashioning that many U.S. scholars have for long claimed their "expertise" on China. For example, from his observation (presumably on Western TV networks) of the Chinese protest against the U.S. bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, Robert Kagan is confident enough to speak on behalf of the whole Chinese people, claiming that he knows "the fact" of "what ~China~ really thinks about the United States." That is, "they consider the United States an enemy—or, more precisely, the enemy.... How else can one interpret the Chinese government’s response to the bombing?" he asks, rhetorically. (57) For Kagan, because the Chinese "have no other information" than their government’s propaganda, the protesters cannot rationally "know" the whole event as "we" do. Thus, their anger must have been orchestrated, unreal, and hence need not be taken seriously. (58) Given that Kagan heads the U.S. Leadership Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is very much at the heart of redefining the United States as the benevolent global hegemon, his confidence in speaking for the Chinese "other" is perhaps not surprising. In a similar vein, without producing in-depth analysis, Bernstein and Munro invoke with great ease such all-encompassing notions as "the Chinese tradition" and its "entire three-thousand-year history." (59) In particular, they repeatedly speak of what China’s "real" goal is: "China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia.... China aims at achieving a kind of hegemony.... China is so big and so naturally powerful that ~we know~ it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy." (60) Likewise, with the goal of absolute security for the United States in mind, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen argue: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island.... This is true because of geography; because of America’s reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China’s capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense. (61) By now, it seems clear that neither China’s capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China’s ~own~ security concerns in the current debate." (62) At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China experts that they know China better than do the Chinese themselves. (63) "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble Orientalists’ problematic distinction between the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point out, "It is enough for ’us’ to set up these distinctions in our own minds; ~and~ ’they’ become ’they’ accordingly." (64) It may be the case that there is nothing inherently wrong with perceiving others through one’s own subjective lens. Yet, what is problematic with mainstream U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of Chinese identity and subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from "us," a kind of certainty that denotes nothing but otherness and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile, amorphous China (65) or to recognize that China’s future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how "we" in the United States and the West in general want to see it as well as on how the Chinese choose to shape it. (66) Indeed, discourses of "us" and "them" are always closely linked to how "we" as "what we are" deal with "them" as "what they are" in the practical realm. This is exactly how the discursive strategy of perceiving China as a threatening other should be understood, a point addressed in the following section, which explores some of the practical dimension of this discursive strategy in the containment perspectives and hegemonic ambitions of U.S. foreign policy Their assertions of Chinese "aggression" is an imperialist, securitized view – it ignores the way the Japanese stole the land, re-named it, and turned it over to the US to control – independently their calling it by its Western name "Senkaku" legitimizes the theft of the land from ChinaShaw, Research Fellow, Research Center for International Legal Studies, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, 12 I’ve had a longstanding interest in the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the subject of a dangerous territorial dispute between Japan and China. The United States claims to be neutral but in effect is siding with Japan, and we could be drawn in if a war ever arose. Let me clear that I deplore the violence in the recent anti-Japan protests in China: the violence is reprehensible and makes China look like an irrational bully. China’s government should rein in this volatile nationalism rather than feed it. This is a dispute that both sides should refer to the International Court of Justice, rather than allow to boil over in the streets. That said, when I look at the underlying question of who has the best claim, I’m sympathetic to China’s position. I don’t think it is 100 percent clear, partly because China seemed to acquiesce to Japanese sovereignty between 1945 and 1970, but on balance I find the evidence for Chinese sovereignty quite compelling. The most interesting evidence is emerging from old Japanese government documents and suggests that Japan in effect stole the islands from China in 1895 as booty of war. This article by Han-Yi Shaw, a scholar from Taiwan, explores those documents. I invite any Japanese scholars to make the contrary legal case. – Nicholas Kristof Japan’s recent purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has predictably reignited tensions amongst China, Japan, and Taiwan. Three months ago, when Niwa Uichiro, the Japanese ambassador to China, warned that Japan’s purchase of the islands could spark an "extremely grave crisis" between China and Japan, Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro slammed Niwa as an unqualified ambassador, who "needs to learn more about the history of his own country". Ambassador Niwa was forced to apologize for his remarks and was recently replaced. But what is most alarming amid these developments is that despite Japan’s democratic and pluralist society, rising nationalist sentiments are sidelining moderate views and preventing rational dialogue. The Japanese government maintains that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are Japanese territory under international law and historical point of view and has repeatedly insisted that no dispute exists. Despite that the rest of the world sees a major dispute, the Japanese government continues to evade important historical facts behind its unlawful incorporation of the islands in 1895. Specifically, the Japanese government asserts, "From 1885 on, our government conducted on-site surveys time and again, which confirmed that the islands were uninhabited and there were no signs of control by the Qing Empire." My research of over 40 official Meiji period documents unearthed from the Japanese National Archives, Diplomatic Records Office, and National Institute for Defense Studies Library clearly demonstrates that the Meiji government acknowledged Chinese ownership of the islands back in 1885. Following the first on-site survey, in 1885, the Japanese foreign minister wrote, "Chinese newspapers have been reporting rumors of our intention of occupying islands belonging to China located next to Taiwan.… At this time, if we were to publicly place national markers, this must necessarily invite China’s suspicion.…" In November 1885, the Okinawa governor confirmed "since this matter is not unrelated to China, if problems do arise I would be in grave repentance for my responsibility". "Surveys of the islands are incomplete" wrote the new Okinawa governor in January of 1892. He requested that a naval ship Kaimon be sent to survey the islands, but ultimately a combination of miscommunication and bad weather made it impossible for the survey to take place. "Ever since the islands were investigated by Okinawa police agencies back in 1885, there have been no subsequent field surveys conducted," the Okinawa governor wrote in 1894. After a number of Chinese defeats in the Sino-Japanese War, a report from Japan’s Home Ministry said "this matter involved negotiations with China… but the situation today is greatly different from back then." The Meiji government, following a cabinet decision in early 1895, promptly incorporated the islands. Negotiations with China never took place and this decision was passed during the Sino-Japanese War. It was never made public. In his biography Koga Tatsushiro, the first Japanese citizen to lease the islands from the Meiji government, attributed Japan’s possession of the islands to "the gallant military victory of our Imperial forces." Collectively, these official documents leave no doubt that the Meiji government did not base its occupation of the islands following "on-site surveys time and again," but instead annexed them as booty of war. This is the inconvenient truth that the Japanese government has conveniently evaded. Japan asserts that neither Beijing nor Taipei objected to U.S. administration after WWII. That’s true, but what Japan does not mention is that neither Beijing nor Taipei were invited as signatories of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, from which the U.S. derived administrative rights. When Japan annexed the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 1895, it detached them from Taiwan and placed them under Okinawa Prefecture. Moreover, the Japanese name "Senkaku Islands" itself was first introduced in 1900 by academic Kuroiwa Hisashi and adopted by the Japanese government thereafter. Half a century later when Japan returned Taiwan to China, both sides adopted the 1945 administrative arrangement of Taiwan, with the Chinese unaware that the uninhabited "Senkaku Islands" were in fact the former Diaoyu Islands. This explains the belated protest from Taipei and Beijing over U.S. administration of the islands after the war. The Japanese government frequently cites two documents as evidence that China did not consider the islands to be Chinese. The first is an official letter from a Chinese consul in Nagasaki dated May 20, 1920 that listed the islands as Japanese territory. Neither Beijing nor Taipei dispute that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands — along with the entire island of Taiwan — were formally under Japanese occupation at the time. However, per post-WW II arrangements, Japan was required to surrender territories obtained from aggression and revert them to their pre-1895 legal status. The second piece evidence is a Chinese map from 1958 that excludes the Senkaku Islands from Chinese territory. But the Japanese government’s partial unveiling leaves out important information from the map’s colophon: "certain national boundaries are based on maps compiled prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War(1937-1945)." Qing period (1644-1911) records substantiate Chinese ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands prior to 1895. Envoy documents indicate that the islands reside inside the "border that separates Chinese and foreign lands." And according to Taiwan gazetteers, "Diaoyu Island accommodates ten or more large ships" under the jurisdiction of Kavalan, Taiwan. The right to know is the bedrock of every democracy. The Japanese public deserves to know the other side of the story. It is the politicians who flame public sentiments under the name of national interests who pose the greatest risk, not the islands themselves. Their peacekeeping advantage relies on flawed top-down models of development that results in structural violenceNewman, Birmingham political science senior lecturer, 2011 However, the record of peace building in terms of promoting durable and positive peace—based on sustainable economic growth, service delivery, selfsustaining institutions, inclusive democratic practices, personal security and the rule of law—has been much less positive, and perhaps even poor. The consequences, such as social unrest, political stagnation or volatility, weak state institutions, and the threat of insecurity, can be seen in Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Coˆ te d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and elsewhere. The reasons for such shortcomings, insofar as the role of the international peace-building and development community is concerned, may be found in two areas. First, the rationale behind the international peace-building agenda is increasingly driven by the belief that stability in fragile states is an international security imperative. Second, there are problems related to the liberal institutionalist models that guide the formulation and implementation of peace building in post-conflict settings. The next section will explore these themes. Despite noble intentions, peace building by international actors has often resulted in a heavy reliance on top-down approaches and—according to some observers—a lack of sensitivity towards local needs and desires. More importantly, although the importance of local ownership has been increasingly emphasised, there is still very limited knowledge or research about local opinions, perceptions and experiences that shape or react to externally led peace-building processes. The argument of this article is that these shortcomings cannot, as is usually done, be dismissed as an ’acceptable’ short-term limitation, peripheral to the overall objectives of peace building, namely, to maintain stability. Human insecurity—deprivation, alienation, exclusion—is a direct threat to peace-building processes and objectives, since these undermine the legitimacy of peace building and fuel the underlying sources of conflict. Indeed, the implication of a human security approach to peace building is that the overall integrity of peace-building and reconstruction projects is ultimately related to the everyday experience of individuals and communities, including their material well-being. A key problem which helps to explain why many of the objectives of sustainable peace building appear to be elusive relates to the motivations which drive these international interventions. There is wide—though not uncontested— agreement that unstable and conflict-prone societies pose a threat to international security and stability. Many analysts, especially after 9/11, now consider these situations as the primary security challenge of the contemporary era. Theories of conflict and instability also increasingly point to the weakness of the state as a key factor in the onset of violent conflict, and a merging of the security and development agendas.5 Among foreign policy elites this is a paradigm shift in security thinking: challenges to security ’come not from rival global powers, but from weak states’.6 According to Fukuyama, ’weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order’.7 The 2008 UK National Security Strategy—and many other sources within or close to policy circles—reflects similar thinking, arguing that a key driver of global insecurity in the contemporary world is poverty, inequality and poor governance. 8 It is debatable whether this view reflects ’reality’ or is rather a political construction.9 Nevertheless, greater efforts and resources have been forthcoming from powerful states to contain, resolve and to some extent prevent civil war. One analyst has therefore suggested that addressing failing and conflict-prone states has ’become one of the critical all-consuming strategic and moral imperatives of our terrorised time’.10 In recent years international peace-building activities in conflict-prone and post-conflict countries have increased in number and in complexity in line with this evolving security discourse. These activities have also become an exercise in state building, based upon the assumption that effective (preferably liberal) states form the greatest prospect for a stable international order. Peace building is therefore a part of the security agenda insofar as the pathologies of conflict-prone and underdeveloped states have been constructed as international threats.11 Viewing conflict, weak statehood and underdevelopment as a threat to international security has brought muchneeded resources, aid and capacity building to conflict-prone countries in the form of international assistance. This has arguably contributed to a reduction in the absolute numbers of civil wars and the consolidation of peace in many countries. However, ’peace building as security’ has also generated a number of critical challenges. This approach translates into peace-building policies which often ignore the underlying sources of conflict because the emphasis is upon stability and containment, rather than conflict resolution. It also results in conditional and coercive forms of peace-building assistance—most obviously for example in Bosnia and East Timor but more subtly in many other contexts. When international stability becomes the priority, rather than addressing local conflict or demands for justice, international peace building tends to rely on top-down mediation among power brokers and on building state institutions, rather than on bottom-up, community-driven peace building or the resolution of the underlying sources of conflict. Instead of promoting a sense of social justice and reconciliation, this can perpetuate the influence of sectarian leaders because international peace-building actors believe that the latter must be engaged with as the key to local control—a part of the ’facts on the ground’. This excludes or obstructs the emergence of alternative—potentially more conciliatory and cosmopolitan—leaders and civil society, and thus alternative visions of peace. The peace-building agenda itself often becomes an externally (often donor) driven exercise, because it is ultimately oriented towards the promotion of stability, often without a genuine understanding of local political culture, desires or needs. As a result, this approach can be insensitive towards—and exclude from the peace-building agenda—local traditions and institutions. Indeed, there are numerous reports of local opposition and civil society initiatives being discouraged by international peace-building agents because they apparently do not fit the ’agenda’.12 There is also evidence of peacebuilding actors—especially major UN operations—failing to recognise traditional social and political institutions in the countries in which they are working.13 Peace building is often reduced to a technical exercise, the implication being that peace-building assistance is essentially value-free and that it does not represent important choices and interests. Yet the apolitical model of peace building can miss the reality on the ground and fail to create conditions conducive to durable stability. Moreover, in this context there is a danger that state building may undermine traditional indigenous authority structures.14 This may be morally questionable and illegitimate, but also, if the new centralised agendas fail to take root, instability and conflict can ensue (as in East Timor in 2006). This raises the question: is the liberal peace being promoted in societies, such as Sierra Leone, East Timor and Coˆ te d’Ivoire, in which it may, for social or cultural reasons, be fundamentally inappropriate? The mixed record of peace building is therefore hostage to its prevailing rationale to promote strong states and contain conflict as a matter of international security, rather than to resolve conflicts or address its underlying sources. This is not to disparage the value of stability and ’negative’ peace: the ending of violence and establishing stability is a great achievement, and clearly the prerequisite to any further peace-building and reconstruction objectives. As noted above, it is not inconceivable that international peacebuilding interventions have contributed to a historical downward trend in the recurrence of intra-state conflict. Many policy analysts, in particular, would argue that the promotion of stability in conflict-prone societies is the realistic extent of what international peace-building can achieve. However, there is ample evidence that a negative peace can be a fragile peace; research shows that conflict is often recurrent in societies that have experienced conflict in the past, and this remains the case, despite the apparent downtrend in armed conflict.15 The tendency for international peace building to emphasise stability through brokering elite bargaining has meant that the sources of conflict—and the overall atmosphere of sectarianism in public life—have been perpetuated, which in the worst cases can make ’peace’ fragile. Although international peace building is often described as ’liberal’, this may be a misnomer. Is international peace building truly ’liberal’ when (in terms of conflict resolution) it tends to mediate—from the top down—between local power brokers, who are often politically extremist or exclusionary, and does not—despite the civil society empowerment programmes that are invariably a part of peace-building activities— sufficiently engage with grassroots community actors who are potentially more inclusive and moderate? Thus, the essential mechanism of a liberal social contract is generally absent in post-conflict states, which instead are held together by external actors. This also obstructs more progressive bottom-up forms of peace building that cultivate cosmopolitan peaceful forces and address underlying sources of conflict. So-called liberal peace building is indeed premised upon the idea of democracy, the free market and state institutions, yet the emphasis upon stability and security seems more akin to the promotion of a strong Hobbesian state than a Lockean liberal contract, because this serves international stability, an important objective of international peace-building activities. Modeling of US norms is an empty concept – it provides political cover for western interventionism that produces structural violenceMattei, Law Professor-Hastings University, 2009 What we can identify as ’global law’ is not a single and coherent system of law drawing legitimacy from a well-defined legal and political process. Rather, a mixture of international and transnational instruments and processes—non-democratic institutional settings, power/force relationships and ethnocentric intellectual attitudes—stand behind the legal rules that are adopted by public and private actors at the global and (consequently)2 at the local level. This is not a new phenomenon, although its magnitude has recently been increasing. Within this framework, Western law has constantly enjoyed a dominant position during the past centuries and today, thus being in the position to shape and bend the evolution of other legal systems worldwide. During the colonial era, continental Europe powers have systematically exported their own legal systems to the colonized lands. During the past decades and today, the United States have been dominating the international arena as the most powerful economic power, exporting their own legal system to the periphery, both by itself and through a set of international instituions, behaving as a neo-colonialist within the ideology known as neoliberalism. Western countries identify themselves as law-abiding and civilized no matter what their actual history reveals. Such identification is acquired by false knowledge and false comparison with other peoples, those who were said to ’lack’ the rule of law, such as China, Japan, India, and the Islamic world more generally. In a similar fashion today, according to some leading economists, Third World developing countries ’lack’ the minimal institutional systems necessary for the unfolding of a market economy. The theory of ’lack’ and the rhetoric of the rule of law have justified aggressive interventions from Western countries into non-Western ones. The policy of corporatization and open markets, supported today globally by the so-called Washington consensus3 , was used by Western bankers and the business community in Latin America as the main vehicle to ’open the veins’ of the continent—to borrow Eduardo Galeano’s metaphor4—with no solution of continuity between colonial and post-colonial times. Similar policy was used in Africa to facilitate the forced transfer of slaves to America, and today to facilitate the extraction of agricultural products, oil, minerals, ideas and cultural artifacts in the same countries. The policy of opening markets for free trade, used today in Afghanistan and Iraq, was used in China during the nineteenth century Opium War, in which free trade was interpreted as an obligation to buy drugs from British dealers. The policy of forcing local industries to compete on open markets was used by the British empire in Bengal, as it is today by the WTO in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Foreign-imposed privatization laws that facilitate unconscionable bargains at the expense of the people have been vehicles of plunder, not of legality. In all these settings the tragic human suffering produced by such plunder is simply ignored. In this context law played a major role in legalizing such practices of powerful actors against the powerless.5 Yet, this use of power is scarcely explored in the study of Western law. The exportation of Western legal institutions from the West to the ’rest’ has systematically been justified through the ideological use of the extremely politically strong and technically weak concept of ’rule of law’. The notion of ’rule of law’ is an extremely ambiguous one. Notwithstanding, within any public discussion its positive connotations have always been taken for granted. The dominant image of the rule of law is false both historically and in the present, because it does not fully acknowledge its dark side. The false representation starts from the idea that good law (which others ’lack’) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive and reactive rather than proactive: more succinctly, a technological framework for an ’efficient’ market. The rule of law has a bright and a dark side, with the latter progressively conquering new ground whenever the former is not empowered by a political soul. In the absence of such political life, the rule of law becomes a cold technology. Moreover, when large corporate actors dominate states (affected by a declining regulatory role), law becomes a product of the economy, and economy governs the law rather than being governed by it. Contemporary mass cultures operate within a short time-span. Most intellectuals do not acknowledge that it is exactly because of plunder of gold, silver, bioresources and so on that development accelerated in the West, so that underdevelopment is a historically produced victimization of weaker and more enclosed communities and not the disease of lesser people. Prevailing short-term and short-sighted opportunism must be overcome. An analysis of the imperial adventure rendered in legal terms opens up a possibility for a radical rethinking of a model of development defined by Western ideas of progress, development and economic efficiency. A reconfiguration would mean, first and foremost, a clear rejection of an ideology of inherent superiority of Western culture that does not recognize that the West is itself part of something much larger. Legal modeling produces economic inequality and poverty, which ensures backlash that guts solvencyTamanaha, Professor of law at Hammond, 2008 Despite positioning themselves as defenders of liberty -a claim that is merited on its own terms - this article has shown a consistent pattern of liberals in the classical vein trying to prevent, narrow, invalidate, or discredit democratically produced legislation that seeks to redistribute property or temper market mechanisms to further competing aims. At the turn of the 20th century this was evident in the actions of U.S. courts that struck or narrowed social welfare and labor legislation; at the turn of the 21st century this is evident in the neoliberal package of reforms imposed on developing countries seeking aid.123 For anyone who sees democracy -the exercise of political choice over one’s affairs - as an expression of liberty, this side of liberalism involves persistent attempts to invoke the rule of law to restrict the exercise of political liberty. This is the dark side of the rule of law within liberal theory. Those in the West who find solace in the fact that developing countries have thus far suffered the brunt of the aforementioned anti-democratic imposition of neoliberal reforms are perhaps unduly optimistic in thinking they have escaped a similar fate. This very same process, with similar anti-democratic tendencies, is taking place writ large around the globe as the imperatives of market capitalism increasingly dictate policies to national governments. 124 The "great transformation" Polanyi described involved the market coming to occupy the dominant organizing position within capitalist societies. 125 We may well be witnessing the completion of this transformation, not just in the sense that every individual nation comes to be organized in this fashion, but in the further sense that the entire community of nations (the global order) is increasingly organized in the same terms. Liberal mechanisms and institutions functioning at the transnational level (for example, the World Trade Organization) are already coalescing into a de facto kind of "economic constitutionalism" which, through the operation of the rule of law, constrains, overrides, and dictates to domestic law making in connection with liberal economic matters (affecting property rights, tariffs, subsidies, efforts to protect jobs). In the past, natural law, the common law, and constitutional provisions provided the controlling norms that were enforced by the rule of law. In the future, if current developments bear out, it will be unadulterated liberal economic norms that control world-wide. Liberals will view this prospect happily, but individuals and societies that prefer other values above (or equal to) material improvement will find it alienating and disempowering. There is also a dark side for the rule of law in this relationship. As I have argued elsewhere, 126 the rule of law originated prior to liberalism and can exist independent of liberalism. Liberals tend to obscure this in their jealous identification of the rule of law with liberalism. From a broader perspective, the singular achievement of the rule of law is its insistence that governments must act in accordance with the law -an essential restraint that is valuable in all societies regardless of their social, cultural, economic, or political orientation. In view of the awesome power and resources governments can wield, holding the government to legal restraints is a universal good. The risk in recent developments is that the rule of law is ripe to be tainted by its close identification with liberalism, particularly in developing countries. A number of these countries have suffered from the adverse consequences of neoliberal reforms; 127 the disparity in wealth has increased to new heights in many countries, without any evident improvement for the poor majority;’ 28 and in many of these societies the populace had little say over whether to accept or modify these reforms. International development organizations now divert money away from infrastructure projects in favor of rule of law projects, like training judges and police, and drafting and implementing legal codes that protect property and foreign investment. In all these various activities, the "rule of law" is put forth as the "front man" for the liberal package. If this initiative goes badly in any number of possible ways owing to an innumerable complex of local and global factors, as seems likely to occur in many places, if substantial pain is suffered without the promised economic benefits to the general public, if courts are perceived to defend the rich who enjoy increasing wealth while most in society are left wanting, the rule of law may be held responsible or tarnished, viewed by the populace with suspicion or cynicismmaking it all the harder to implant and build the rule of law. It would be a tragic paradox if the great liberal advocates for the rule of law contributed to preventing it from taking hold and spreading around the world. The impact is heteronormative violence coalesced around the drive for ontological certainty. This static epistemology results in a static violence against the self destroying personal agency culminating in otherization. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a ht? Democracy legitimizes the state’s ability to construct individual’s identities by creating an acceptable norm through institutions of power and denying individuals that refuse to engage with those institutions. Even assumed "minorities" are recognized as legitimate through democracy, while queers are continually erased.Warner, 93 The modern liberal state has an overt concern with coordinating and integrating different claims on resources and power. In this organic notion of governmentality, it makes sense to differentiate interests in order to place them under different forms of control that can be generally subsumed under a governing body whose legitimacy is staged through the appearance of consent in democratic representation. Here, "politics" is equated with state management and the direct process of achieving representation (elections, certainly, but also hiring power-"affirmative action"-through elective prositions assert power under the illusion of representativeness). The "social" means issues affecting daily life, extrarepresentational issues like equitable distribution of resources ("poverty"), the environment, and "lifestyle." If the modern state’s business was to legitimate its existence in the absence of theological justification, to produce itself as a visible, secular, central organizational force Focault describes so well, then the postmodern state seems concerned to recede so well, then the postmodern state seems concerned to recede from visibility, to operate blindly as a purely administrative apparatus to an apparent market democracy. If the modern state had to describe its existence in terms of reason, suggesting in one way or another that it was an outcome of the social contract, capable of organizing consent and policing deviation, the postmodern state has to pose itself as capable of administering an incoherent, incommensurable plurality of interests. The modern state integrates social factions to resolve conflict; the postmodern state holds pluralities apart. Instead of invoking an organicist logic that links the nation to the individual through increasingly smaller collectives like the province, the township, and the family, the postmodern state proposes lateral linkages, communities or consumption units held in relations to one another and operating through commercial logic of a free market that circulates rather than negotiates freedoms. If modernity conceived power in blocks that operate entropically, postmodern power circulates, disperses, intensifies. The fields of power operative in postmondernity may be more importantly about the constitution of governable subjectivities than they area about the constitution of a governing state. Certainly, the two are connected, ideologically and practically. However, the crucial difference lies in the constution of identities: it may be that essentialist and social constructionist claims are unadjudicable because a accession to power-the constituion of governmentality-is now accomplished through, rather than precondition of, making good on claims to identity. The crucial battle now for "minorities" and resistant subalterns is not achieving democratic representation but wresting control over the discourses concerning identity construction. The opponent is not the state as much as it is the other collectives attempting to set the rules for identity constitution in something like a "civil society." The problem is not one of cognitive or psychic dissonance-that is, that the right, for example, will not allow us to feel or be who we want to be, but that the terms for asserting identity are categories of political engagement. The discursive practices of identity and the actors who activate them produce the categories of governmentatlity that engender the administrative state apparatus, not vice versa. It is as important to look at the battles taking place within the field of power in which accomplishment of "identities" operates as political capital-say, between the right and gays-as it is see how their variously constituted identities interact with the administrative units. Thus, identity as an effect comes into play at the threshold of what de Certeau, following Derrida, calls the "proper," at the threshold of engagement with constituted social and political instutions. As I have tried to show, this narrow sense of identity involves perfomrativity, the ability to operate through citation within a field of power in which oppositional pairs are discernible against a backdrop of instutions and spaces. Insitutions could be history or the courts, and spaces could be the social, gender, the nation. This is the place in which the new right invokes homophobia but a homophobia contingent on the continued construction of isolatable "gay identities." If agents in possession of gay identities make demands for minority status within the political sphere, this is not because acquisition of gay identity strips away ideology and allows for a homosexual body to realize its desire for civil rights are simply waiting around for the asking. Rather, the demand for civil rights is an intrinsic effect of coming-out rhetoric, altering both the meaning of civil rights and the meaning of homoerotic practices. Coming-out rhetoric, in effect articulates gay identity to civil rights practices, articulates homoerotic practices to the political concept of minority. The person who takes up a post-Stonewall identity feels compelled to act in a way that will constitute her or himself as a subject appropriate to civil rights discourse, and thus, deserving of the status accruing to successful claims to minority status. In the process of queer enunciation, the meaning of civil rights, indeed, capacity to hold apart the political and social, the public and private, have been radically altered. The innovation of gay identity was not so much in making homosexuality seem acceptable to the homosexual, but in creating a crisis of duty in gays who could "come out" (in some sense leave the private/social). In linking the demand for acceptance by society with the instantiation of identity in oneself, gay liberationists want society to take a stand for or against specific or specifiably "gay" persons. All identities effect these deontic closures: in fact, as I have argued above, the achievement of identites is precisely the staking out of duties and alliances in a field of power. Postmodern mininarratives of individual and collective moral legitimacy are replacing the rational metanarratives-like the social contract, pluralism, and democracy-that characterized state legitimation in modernity The invisible center of norms for which heteronormativity is able to take charge and cause the normalization of the queers. This allows for the continued domination, marginalization, and eradication of individuals not seen as fit to be within its framework. In this passage, Simmons vividly describes the devastating persuasiveness of hatred and violence in her daily life based on being seen, perceived, labeled, and treated as an "Other." This process of othering creates individuals, groups, and communities that are deemed to be less important, less worthwhile, less consequential, less authorized, and less human based on historically situated markers of social formation such as race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and nationality. Othering and marginalization are results of an "invisible center" (Ferguson, 1990, p.3). The authority, position, and power of such a center are attained through normalization in an ongoing circular movement. Normalization is the process of constructing, establishing, producing, and reproducing a taken-for-granted and all-encompassing standard used to measure goodness, desirability, morality, rationality, superiority, and a host of other dominant cultural values. As such, normalization becomes one of the primary instruments of power in modern society (Foucault, 1978/1990). Normalization is a symbolically, discursively, psychically, psychologically, and materially violent form of social regulation and control, or as Warner (1993) more simply puts it, normalization is "the site of violence" (p.xxvi). Perhaps one of the most powerful forms of normalization in Western social systems is heteronormativity. Through heteronormative discourses, abject and abominable bodies, souls, persons, and life forms are created, examined, and disciplined through current regimes of knowledge and power (Foucault, 1978/1990). Heteronormativity, as the invisible center and the presumed bedrock of society, is the quintessential force creating, sustaining, marginalization, disempowerment, and oppression of sexual others. Heternormativity is ubiquitous in all spheres of social life yet remains largely invisible and elusive. According to Berlant and Warner (in Warner, 2002), heteronormativity refers to: "the institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent – that is, organized as a sexuality – but also a privileged. Its coherence is always provisional, and its privilege can take several (sometimes cotradictory) forms: unmarked as the basic idiom of the personal and the social; of marked as natural state; or projected as an ideal or moral accomplishment. It consists less of norms that could be summarized as a body of doctrine than of a sense of rightness produced in contradictory manifestations – often unconscious, immanent to practive or to institutions. (pg 309, my emphasis). Heteronormativity makes heterosexuality hegemonic through the process of normalization. Although it is experienced consciously or unconsciously and with different degrees of pain and suffering, this process of normalization is a site of violence in the lives of women, men, and transgenders – across the spectrum of sexualities – in modern Western Societies. Not unlike the experiences of children who must learn to survive in an emotionally and physically abusive environment where violence is the recipe for daily existence (Miller, 1990), 1991, 1998, 2001), individuals living in the heteronormative regime used to learn to conform, ignore, and banish their suffering to survive. The process of coping by repressing the pain and identifying with the perpetrator is, in my view, a powerful mechanism for heteronormativity to perpetuate itself in current forms of social organization. Drawing from the work of feminists and womanists, critical scholars, and mental health researchers, I identify and examine the injurious and violent nature of heteronormativity in this section. For purposes of discussion, I focus on the violence of heteronormativity enacted upon: (a) women inside the heteronormative borders, (b) men inside the heteronormative borders, (c) lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and queer people and (d) individuals living at the intersections of race, class, gender, and sexuality. The alternative is to vote negative to embrace a politics of illegibility. That’s key to disrupting logical forms of knowledge opens up new alternatives A radical take on disciplinarity and the university that presumes both the breakdown of the disciplines and the closing of gaps between fields conventionally presumed to be separated can be found in a manifesto published by Fred Moten and Stefano Harney in 2004 in Social Text titled "The University and the Undercommons: Seven Theses." Their essay is a searing critique directed at the intellectual and the critical intellectual, the professional scholar and the "critical academic professionals." For Moten and Harney, the critical academic is not the answer to encroaching professionalization but an extension of it, using the very same tools and legitimating strategies to become "an ally of professional education." Moten and Harney prefer to pitch their tent with the "subversive intellectuals," a maroon community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of "rigor," "excellence," and "productivity." They tell us to "steal from the university," to "steal the enlightenment for others" (112), and to act against "what Foucault called the Conquest, the unspoken war that founded, and with the force of law refounds, society" (113). And what does the undercommons of the university want to be? It wants to constitute an unprofessional force of fugitive knowers, with a set of intellectual practices not bound by examination systems and test scores. The goal for this unprofessionalization is not to abolish; in fact Moten and Harney set the fugitive intellectual against the elimination or abolition of this, the founding or refounding of that: "Not so much the abolition of prisons but the abolition of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society" (113). Not the elimination of anything but the founding of a new society. And why not? Why not think in terms of a different kind of society than the one that first created and then abolished slavery? The social worlds we inhabit, after all, as so many thinkers have reminded us, are not in evitable; they were not always bound to turn out this way, and what’s more, in the process of producing this reality, many other realities, fields of knowledge, and ways of being have been discarded and, to cite Foucault again, "disqualified." A few visionary books, produced alongside disciplinary knowledge, show us the paths not taken. For example, in a book that itself began as a detour, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1999), James C. Scott details the ways the modern state has run roughshod over local, customary, and undisciplined forms of knowledge in order to rationalize and simplify social, agricultural, and political practices that have profit as their primary motivation. In the process, says Scott, certain ways of seeing the world are established as normal or natural, as obvious and necessary, even though they are often entirely counterintuitive and socially engineered. Seeing Like a State began as a study of "why the state has always seemed to be the enemy of ’people who move around,’" but quickly became a study of the demand by the state for legibility through the imposition of methods of standardization and uniformity (1). While Dean Spade (2008) and other queer scholars use Scott’s book to think about how we came to insist upon the documentation of gender identity on all governmental documentation, I want to use his monumental study to pick up some of the discarded local knowledges that are trampled underfoot in the rush to bureaucratize and rationalize an economic order that privileges profit over all kinds of other motivations for being and doing In place of the Germanic ordered forest that Scott uses as a potent metaphor for the start of the modern imposition of bureaucratic order upon populations, we might go with the thicket of subjugated knowledge that sprouts like weeds among the disciplinary forms of knowledge, threatening always to overwhelm the cultivation and pruning of the intellect with mad plant life. For Scott, to "see like a state" means to accept the order of things and to internalize them; it means that we begin to deploy and think with the logic of the superiority of orderliness and that we erase and indeed sacrifice other, more local practices of knowledge, practices moreover that may be less efficient, may yield less marketable results, but may also, in the long term, be more sustaining. What is at stake in arguing for the trees and against the forest? Scott identifies "legibility" as the favored technique of high modernism for sorting, organizing, and profiting from land and people and for abstracting systems of knowledge from local knowledge practices. He talks about the garden and gardeners as representative of a new spirit of intervention and order favored within high modernism, and he points to the minimalism and simplicity of Le Corbusier’s urban design as part of a new commitment to symmetry and division and planning that complements authoritarian preferences for hierarchies and despises the complex and messy forms of organic profusion and improvised creativity. "Legibility," writes Scott, "is a condition of manipulation" (1999: 183). He favors instead, borrowing from European anarchist thought, more practical forms of knowledge that he calls metis and that emphasize mutuality, collectivity, plasticity, diversity, and adaptability. Illegibility may in fact be one way of escaping the political manipulation to which all university fields and disciplines are subject. While Scott’s insight about illegibility has implications for all kinds of subjects who are manipulated precisely when they become legible and visible to the state (undocumented workers, visible queers, racialized minorities), it also points to an argument for antidisciplinarity in the sense that knowledge practices that refuse both the form and the content of traditional canons may lead to unbounded forms of speculation, modes of thinking that ally not with rigor and order but with inspiration and unpredictability. We may in fact want to think about how to see unlike a state; we may want new rationales for knowledge production, different aesthetic standards for ordering or disordering space, other modes of political engagement than those conjured by the liberal imagination. We may, ultimately, want more undisciplined knowledge, more questions and fewer answers. Prefer rogue intellectualism – ’rigorous’ studies reify dominant discourses Any book that begins with a quote from SpongeBob SquarePants and is motored by wisdom gleaned from Fantastic Mr. Fox, Chicken Run, and Finding Nemo, among other animated guides to life, runs the risk of not being taken seriously. Yet this is my goal. Being taken seriously means missing out on the chance to be frivolous, promiscuous, and irrelevant. The desire to be taken seriously is precisely what compels people to follow the tried and true paths of knowledge production around which I would like to map a few detours. Indeed terms like serious and rigorous tend to be code words, in academia as well as other contexts, for disciplinary correctness; they signal a form of training and learning that confirms what is already known according to approved methods of knowing, but they do not allow for visionary insights or flights of fancy. Training of any kind, in fact, is a way of refusing a kind of Benjaminian relation to knowing, a stroll down uncharted streets in the "wrong" direction (Benjamin 1996); it is precisely about staying in well- lit territories and about knowing exactly which way to go before you set out. Like many others before me, I propose that instead the goal is to lose one’s way, and indeed to be prepared to lose more than one’s way. Losing, we may agree with Elizabeth Bishop, is an art, and one "that is not too hard to master / Though it may look like a disaster" (2008: 166–167). In the sciences, particularly physics and mathematics, there are many examples of rogue intellectuals, not all of whom are reclusive Unabomber types (although more than a few are just that), who wander off into uncharted territories and refuse the academy because the publish- or- perish pressure of academic life keeps them tethered to conventional knowledge production and its well- traveled byways. Popular mathematics books, for example, revel in stories about unconventional loners who are selfschooled and who make their own way through the world of numbers. For some kooky minds, disciplines actually get in the way of answers and theorems precisely because they offer maps of thought where intuition and blind fumbling might yield better results. In 2008, for example, The New Yorker featured a story about an oddball physicist who, like many ambitious physicists and mathematicians, was in hot pursuit of a grand theory, a "theory of everything." This thinker, Garrett Lisi, had dropped out of academic physics because string theory dominated the field at that time and he thought the answers lay elsewhere. As an outsider to the discipline, writes Benjamin Wallace- Wells, Lisi "built his theory as an outsider might, relying on a grab bag of component parts: a hand- built mathematical structure, an unconventional way of describing gravity, and a mysterious mathematical entity known as E8."1 In the end Lisi’s "theory of everything" fell short of expectations, but it nonetheless yielded a whole terrain of new questions and methods. Similarly the computer scientists who pioneered new programs to produce computer- generated imagery (CGI), as many accounts of the rise of Pixar have chronicled, were academic rejects or dropouts who created independent institutes in order to explore their dreams of animated worlds.2 These alternative cultural and academic realms, the areas beside academia rather than within it, the intellectual worlds conjured by losers, failures, dropouts, and refuseniks, often serve as the launching pad for alternatives precisely when the university cannot. This is not a bad time to experiment with disciplinary transformation on behalf of the project of generating new forms of knowing, since the fields that were assembled over one hundred years ago to respond to new market economies and the demand for narrow expertise, as Foucault described them, are now losing relevance and failing to respond either to real- world knowledge projects or student interests. As the big disciplines begin to crumble like banks that have invested in bad securities we might ask more broadly, Do we really want to shore up the ragged boundaries of our shared interests and intellectual commitments, or might we rather take this opportunity to rethink the project of learning and thinking altogether? Just as the standardized tests that the U.S. favors as a guide to intellectual advancement in high schools tend to identify people who are good at standardized exams (as opposed to, say, intellectual visionaries), so in universities grades, exams, and knowledge of canons identify scholars with an aptitude for maintaining and This book, a stroll out of the confines of conventional knowledge and into the unregulated territories of failure, loss, and unbecoming, must make a long detour around disciplines and ordinary ways of thinking. Let me explain how universities (and by implication high schools) squash rather than promote quirky and original thought. Disciplinarity, as defined by Foucault (1995), is a technique of modern power: it depends upon and deploys normalization, routines, convention, tradition, and regularity, and it produces experts and administrative forms of governance. The university structure that houses the disciplines and jealously guards their boundaries now stands at a crossroads, not of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, past and future, national and transnational; the crossroads at which the rapidly disintegrating bandwagon of disciplines, subfields, and interdisciplines has arrived offer a choice between the university as corporation and investment opportunity and the university as a new kind of public sphere with a different investment in knowledge, in ideas, and in thought and politics. | 3/30/14 |
NDT Round 2 - 1nrTournament: NDT | Round: 2 | Opponent: Cal MS | Judge: Murrillo, Stevenson, Lundberg This a tactic to legitimize the violence of the law—-the plan sanitizes expanding state violence—-their appeal to juridical legitimation results in malleable legal conventions that are ultimately meaninglessMorrissey, Lecturer in Political and Cultural Geography at the National University of Ireland, 11 Nearly two centuries ago, Prussian military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, observed how The affirmative use of law as a guiding standard fails to understand laws dependence on culture – the affirmative re-inscribes the normative culture of exclusion it attempts to alleviateFord, George E. Osborne Professor of Law at Stanford University, 2002 (Richard T., Reginald F. Lewis Fellow at Harvard Law School, a litigation associate with Morrison 26 Foerster, and a housing policy consultant for the City of Cambridge, Massachusetts, "Left Legalism/Left Critique: Beyond ’Difference’: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics", pp. 68-70, Duke University Press, accessed on 10/12/13, Ben) My critique thus far will provoke a predictable retort, similar but not identical to
In the first section of this essay I will briefly set out the core claims Second – legal institutions always create an environment where the executive can redefine the rules in the name of national security - turns the casePosner and Vermeule, Professors of Law at the University of Chicago and Harvard, 11 If Congress cannot regulate in advance of emergencies, might it not be able to The affirmative represents a strategy of lip service restraint re-affirms executive power granting legitimacy to sovereign manipulation of law Some commentators argue that the federal courts have taken over Congress’s role as an institutional And, indeed, for just that reason, Congress would never have refused its imprimatur and the Supreme Court would never have stood in the executive’s way. The major check on the executive’s power to declare an emergency and to use emergency powers is political. The affirmatives call for legal reformation is just a guise of leftist legalism – the affirmative results in cooptation, subjugation and a justification of continued exclusion and oppression turns your resistance args If we are right about the legalistic usurpation of many left political projects, then That causes endless warfare Today as never before in their history Americans are enthralled with military power. The CircumventionThe alternative is a prerequisite - the executive will redefine the law to violate and ignore the planPollack, MSU Geggenheim Fellow and Professor of history Emeritus, 13 Bisharat first addresses the transmogrification of international law by Israel’s military lawyers. We might President will ignore – Congress and Courts won’t hold him accountable A. President as Litigator-in-Chief First, debates over the applicability Overwhelming empirics prove circumvention – political reasons congress won’t object Running roughshod over Congress has becoming something of a norm within the Obama administration. | 3/28/14 |
NDT Round 2 - 2ncTournament: NDT | Round: 2 | Opponent: Cal MS | Judge: Murrillo, Stevenson, Lundberg These books come at an important moment in which the field of critical prison studies Legal liberalism reifies heterosexist violence – this card about giving homes – this home still creates the reproduction that we critizcize – doesn’t mean the state is good It would be a mistake to think that legal prohibition of dicriminations on the basis Once a performance has become stable and aborified it’s impossible to open up to possibilities and tracigns – the aff locked themselves into a strat Have we not, however, reverted to a simple dualism by contrasting maps to The permutation doesn’t solve. It just adds content to the framework of heteronormativity that leaves dominant structures unchallenged What I am proposing in this essay is not simply that we should discuss sexual | 3/28/14 |
NDT Round 2 - Heteronormativity KTournament: NDT | Round: 2 | Opponent: Cal MS | Judge: Murrillo, Stevenson, Lundberg "any risk logic" pervades the debate community—instead of "possibilistic thinking," we believe "probabilistic thinking" should be the frame for the debatePossibilistic thinking makes effective decision making impossible"imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis and fear for reason"you should prioritize probable systemic impacts over possibilistic spectacular impacts"The representational bias against slow violence has, furthermore, a critically dangerous impact on what counts as a casualty"unqualified sources give unrealistic impacts the appearance of legitimacy"the use of multi-chain internal link and scenarios eclipse reality by obscuring the actual likelihood of the impact...adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable."Democracy legitimizes the state’s ability to construct individual’s identities by creating an acceptable norm through institutions of power and denying individuals that refuse to engage with those institutions. Even assumed "minorities" are recognized as legitimate through democracy, while queers are continually erased. The modern liberal state has an overt concern with coordinating and integrating different claims on Appeals to the state produce "normative homo," complacent in perpetuating heteronormativity By scripting the way individuals are supposed to interact with institutions and with each other Optismism becomes a redeployed commodity – the queer is loss and failure which must be embraced Following Brooks’s aesthetics and Crisp’s advice to adjust to less light rather than seek Heteronormativity perpetuates the elimination of the queer In this passage, Simmons vividly describes the devastating persuasiveness of hatred and violence in Heteronormativity is privileged in this discussion by enforcing a mind-body split by making the debate space objective. Any discussion of our own subjectivity is automatically stigmatized. They banish queers to the private and establish rules forcing queer assimilation and elimination. As a lingering effect of Cartesian dualism, which assumes that the mind and body Queering the copy of the 1AC opens up spaces to reimagine normative relationshipsHalberstam, USC Professor, ’7 In this paper I turn to a contemporary queer band, Lesbians on Ecstasy Refusing to address the non-hetereosexist violence is complicity with hetereosexism Anti-racists, however, have confined their responses almost exclusively to those forms We queer the 1AC by using covers to disrupt heternormative temporalities staying outside normative modes of reproductionHalberstam, USC Professor, ’7 In queer subcultures, I am willing to propose, many performers reimagine gender | 3/28/14 |
NDT Round 2 - Risk Adv 1ncTournament: NDT | Round: 2 | Opponent: Cal MS | Judge: Murrillo, Stevenson, Lundberg CaseThe affirmative re-inscribes the primacy of liberal legalism as a method of restraint—that paradoxically collapses resistance to Executive excesses. In an observation more often repeated than defended, we are told that the attacks Legalism underpins the violence of empire and creates the conditions of possibility for liberal violence No discipline in the rationalized arsenal of modernity is as rational, impartial, objective Courts fail at accounting for trans-gendered bodies – even if the aff is good generally, it marginalize the queerSears, guest editor, Social Justice Journal, 11 In contrast to Pasko and VanNatta’s discussion of the ways in which correctional facilities discipline Heteronormativity operates within civil society by creating a universalized conscious and those queers that do not meet that conscious are made into the enemy of society Jeffrey Alexander defines civil society as "a sphere of solidarity in which abstract universalism Obama will redefine policies to sidestep detention restrictionsBecker and Shane, NYT, ’12 What the new president did not say was that the orders contained a few The president will circumvent the affMcNeal, Pen State Assistant Law Professor, ’08 3. Executive Forum-Discretion—Any reform which allows for adjudication of | 3/28/14 |
NDT Round 4 - 1NC - AnthroTournament: NDT | Round: 4 | Opponent: Indiana PS | Judge: Schultz, Johnson, Vanluvanlee There is an institutional bias in favor of speciesism-the AFF’s failure to directly challenge it allows hegemonic discourses to constrain the parameters of discussion and political activity which allows specieisism to continue. The institutionalization of expropriative arrangements yields multiple advantages to the dominant group. Most fundamentally Focus on narratives is speciesist- it elevates human linguistic capabilities and prioritizes a human mode of communication Although we acknowledge the important contribution of poststructuralism to analyses of oppression, privilege, Claims of dehumanized bodies legitimizes violence against nonhumans and guarantees human and non-human oppression – only a new discourse towards non-humans can solve Doing away with the subhuman If this role of contributing to contemporary manifestations of violence Silence on the human exploitative gaze towards non-humans ensures specieism continues We come to critical pedagogy with a background in environmental thought and education. Of Speciesism is root cause of oppression –domination of animals is origin of human hierarchy | 3/29/14 |
NDT Round 4 - 1NC CaseTournament: NDT | Round: 4 | Opponent: Indiana PS | Judge: Schultz, Johnson, Vanluvanlee The plan won’t be enforced – no incentive to enforce the aff These assumptions are all questionable. As a preliminary matter, there is not much President will ignore – A. President as Litigator-in-Chief First, debates over the applicability Only a risk that narratives are coopted- leads to victimization and exclusion of bodies that don’t conform to victimization These questions suggest that in legally codifying a fragment of an insurrectionary discourse as a This is a liberalism dressed up in post-structuralism – it situates politics against radical political action and denies the real conditions suffered by those excluded by the social order Butler's way of circumnavigating the material emerges in many other places in these essays. | 3/29/14 |
NDT Round 4 - 1NC Security CPTournament: NDT | Round: 4 | Opponent: Indiana PS | Judge: Schultz, Johnson, Vanluvanlee CP Text: Mary and I affirm that targeted killing practices should end The state only has existence through performativity and repetition in discourse. The affirmative’s rhetorical speech act of the State continuously props up the constitution of the state. Only the disruption and rejection of discourses of security undercut the discursive foundations of the state and destroy its legitimacy. The alt solves the disciplinary power of the state and the violence of exclusion. Identity is an inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it. | 3/29/14 |
NDT Round 4 - 1NR CaseTournament: NDT | Round: 4 | Opponent: Indiana PS | Judge: Schultz, Johnson, Vanluvanlee There is, of course, no such translation without contamination, but there is no mimetic displacement of the original without an appropriation of the term that separates it from its putative authority. Here is the way this problem unfolds politically: insurrection requires breaking silence about the | 3/29/14 |
NDT Round 4 - 2NC1NR AnthroTournament: NDT | Round: 4 | Opponent: Indiana PS | Judge: Schultz, Johnson, Vanluvanlee If humans have for so long failed to understand animal minds it is because their Their language of war masks and legitimizes a war against non-human animals In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, 2. The altenrative’s counter history is key to show that the standpoint of animals has been excluded to perpetuate oppression AND is not based off a sigle universal standpoint which makes it methodologically superior the AFF. In this way, I was led to follow an educational path that I remain A2: atl asovles No spillover from the AFF to specieism-rigid structure of academia. So, as for those who have burned their paper-thin veneer of detached Alternative – A2: Perm: Do Both (1/4)
Ethics-by-extension soon runs into the problem of diminishing returns. With 2. Perm severs the focus of the 1AC-severance should be rejected, creates moving targets which undermine education by making debates late breaking, hurts neg ground because the aff can be changed after they hear the 1NC and encourages vague AFFs that don’t ‘defend anything until the 2AC.’ 3. The perm reasons from the inside out, undermining our stance against Speciesism As heirs to several centuries of rampant individualism—culminating today in the frenetic pursuit Perm links – holding out for reform makes them complicit in the unethical violence in their political paradigm The banality of action hits against a central problem of social-political action within Alternative – A2: Perm: Do Both (2/4) 3. Have to tackle speciesism head on. Affirming animal liberation extrinsically leads to co-option. No spillover from the AFF to specieism-rigid structure of academia. So, as for those who have burned their paper-thin veneer of detached Cultural critics have painstakingly demonstrated the social constructedness of sexual, gender, and racial | 3/29/14 |
NFU - China Advantage AnswersTournament: Texas | Round: 1 | Opponent: Houston Asgari-Tari-Bockmon | Judge: Harris Will China and the US Go to War? If one ….. and war with the US? The answer is no. Fear of Russia drives modernization That China’s strategic posture seems now well suited to the ….. is approximately between 80 and 100.67
Beijing and Washington have a …….. of continued incidents at sea as well as in the air. Congressional involvement destroys war-fighting – guarantees war In wartime, however, it may be ………. the president to ask Congress time and time again to enact laws to advance the war effort. China has been modernizing all aspects of their arsenal for years. China’s current modernization efforts ……. then become effective for the first time. NPT fails - no legitimacy The nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) has ………. assert, more nuclear proliferation would not be inevitable. No US-China war – interdependence The impact of greater U.S. military ….. restrained behavior and may dampen competitive military dynamics to some degree. Even with projected …..of strong opposition may well prevail. | 2/8/14 |
NFU - Firebreak Advantage AnswersTournament: Texas | Round: 1 | Opponent: Houston Asgari-Tari-Bockmon | Judge: Harris These assumptions are all questionable. As a preliminary matter, ……….powers are likely to fall on deaf ears be ignored No first use is not seen as credible multiple reasons – If NFU is to be more than a declaratory ……… posture that has little or no capacity to be used first. An NFU would kill deterrence for chemical and bioweapons leading to attacks that kill millions In the past, the United States had ……… with anthrax than with a nuclear explosion. Bioweapons cause extinction Although human pathogens are often lumped …….. the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit. No miscalc – notions of a hair trigger aren’t real Advocates of other, more “physical,” measures often ……. protection against technical error. Overwhelming empirics prove circumvention – political reasons congress won’t object Running roughshod over Congress has ……… legacy of the U.S. intervention in Libya. A low firebreak deters large-scale conventional wars and makes deterrence more credible This raises the issue of …… not be certain of the outcome. | 2/8/14 |
NFU - Prolif Advantage AnswersTournament: Texas | Round: 1 | Opponent: Houston Asgari-Tari-Bockmon | Judge: Harris Weapons and strategies change the ………. that is a much simpler problem to solve. Prolif will be slow The risk of an arms race—with, say, other ……. to mellow behavior. Asian prolif increases stability The primary argument of this article …….. armament lies in political disputes. NPT doesn’t solve prolif-most countries wouldn’t have anyway and ones that do have succeeded. It is forty years since the nuclear non-proliferation ……. nuclear weapons, to do so. No arms racing-minimum deterrence is enough Dismissing the fear that …….ial gains of an attacker’. No impact to prolif- empirics and mutually assured destruction A growing and compelling body of research …. did what they had to do to avoid it. | 2/8/14 |
NSC - Credibility AdvantageTournament: Gsu | Round: 7 | Opponent: Vanderbilt Williford-Stothers | Judge: Shook In a quick and angry …..'are ploughing the sea'! No impact – allies won’t abandon us and adversaries can’t exploit it A perennial preoccupation of …. most cases little incentive to actually do it. it’s not anthropogenic – empirics AND their ev. is alarmist It's plausible that ………….originally done in the 1980s. No spillover – lack of cred in one commitment doesn’t affect others at all Second, pessimists …… of greater signiªcance. Won’t reverse perception The general …… cure for Gitmo. Your authors are biased - CO2 not key, no weather events, models fail, and other countries don’t model Massachusetts Institute of …….. are always fluctuating by tenths of a degree. Not credible - Process becomes politicized In addition, these proposals …airness and impartiality Credibility fails – Syria proves Even if Assad were so …. it would already have been done. Second, pessimists …….a of greater signiªcance. Won’t reverse perception The general perception …. geographic cure for Gitmo. | 10/9/13 |
NSC - ILaw AdvantageTournament: Gsu | Round: 7 | Opponent: Vanderbilt Williford-Stothers | Judge: Shook It is likely that some ….. committed to the rule of law. No chance the Courts enforce I-Law Foreign affairs legalists …… had tried to order state courts No bioweapons prolif - tacit knowledge gap and organization failure – assumes new tech advances Conclusion The U.S. ……and possibly cause its failure. No enforcement – congress has not recognized CIL We have argued that, … authorized to apply CIL as federal or state law. n345 *871 No biodiversity loss or extinction In a paper published in …… to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate." Multilateralism fails – consensus is impossible But to …… and, at times, messy than what we are used to. Restricting indefinite detention leads to an increase in drone strikes The convergence thesis …… habeas corpus litigation. Drone policy destroys international law – other countries follow suit The US policy of ….can be used more often Global emission reduction schemes fail – states won’t be willing to harm the economy Don't be fooled. ….. Hello, influence-peddling and sleaze. Best studies prove correlation While the U.S. ….. consequences of their decision-making processes. The worst case scenario happened – no extinction The second problem is …… any actual bioterrorists. Warming won’t cause extinction First, climate change …….. defense, but we would have done much more about it by now. His views deviate sharply … the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain." | 10/9/13 |
NSC - SolvencyTournament: Gsu | Round: 7 | Opponent: Vanderbilt Williford-Stothers | Judge: Shook What the new president did not ….. rights groups since the 2001 terrorist attacks. NSC doesn’t solve this approach suggests …… by government officials. Additionally, a national security ….. of the law to criminal accused. During an actual armed …… arising after its creation. Eliminating NDAA won’t solve – AUMF will continue indefinite detention Nearly 12 years since 9/11……. 9/11 magnitude on American soil. US will still detain through rendition Following the terrorist …. to the associated human rights violations. | 10/9/13 |
Politics - Debt CeilingTournament: GSU | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake MQ | Judge: Wunderlich, Carly Republicans seeking to … federal borrowing limit. Reducing Obama’s war powers causes a loss of cred- Republicans will put up a huge fight on the debt ceiling which would wreck the markets Currently, the government … "black swan" event. Global economic crisis causes another nuclear war Two neatly opposed scenarios … such as unbridled nationalism. | 9/21/13 |
Politics - Debt Ceiling - JMUTournament: JMU | Round: 4 | Opponent: James Madison Lepp-Miller | Judge: Ridley Debt ceiling will pass only outside controversy can derail it House Republicans remain …….some Republican lawmakers. Reducing Obama’s war powers causes a loss of cred- Republicans will put up a huge fight on the debt ceiling which would wreck the markets Currently, the government ……. "black swan" event. Global economic crisis causes another nuclear war Two neatly …… such as unbridled nationalism. Our ev postdates by almost 3 weeks Syria No Vote allowed Obama to shift focus his PC on the debt ceiling (Reuters) - Putting off a ……. over the borrowing limit. Any fight does irrevocable damage to the economy There are two different ………what it is: “economic sabotage.” Economic collapse causes nuclear war and extinction History bears out that desperate nations ……., at least for many decades. The US is key-biggest market and no one could fill the gap. The United States is indeed …. remains a distinct possibility. Debt Ceiling Will Pass A senior House GOP aide said …… soared 323 points Thursday. Obama’s pressuring the GOP with a strong display of Presidential strength and staying on message – the GOP will blink President Barack Obama started ….. as people rethink this.” Debt Ceiling key to prevent economic collapse If the debt ceiling isn’t …..anything we’ve seen in the past several years. Default crushes the economy and collapses bond markets- current conditions exacerbate the impact Squabbling in Washington over …….. Treasuries due to mature in 2013. Collapses global financial markets In many ways, the ….. play in the global economy. by instilling confidence that Obama will cave – Seeking alpha Restrictions on the Presidents war powers authority crush his credibility and derail his agenda Yet, manipulating public opinion ….. for his or her future power prospects. President has to spend political capital defending war powers But political representation ….. can matter in war-making. Plan UNIQUELY links to politics WASHINGTON -- Two influential U.S. ……. to be convinced that the military would carry it out that way." | 10/14/13 |
Politics - Debt Ceiling - KentuckyTournament: Kentucky | Round: 2 | Opponent: Michigan KK | Judge: Strauss President Barack Obama … suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.” Reducing Obama’s war powers causes a loss of cred- Republicans will put up a huge fight on the debt ceiling which would wreck the markets Currently, the government …… must be prepared for this "black swan" event. Global economic crisis causes another nuclear war Two neatly ……… as unbridled nationalism. Any fight does irrevocable damage to the economy There are two different …….. has to be seen for what it is: “economic sabotage.” Economic collapse causes nuclear war and extinction History bears out that desperate ….most of the biosphere, at least for many decades. Turns democracy Most criticism of …… their populations aspire. Turns Heg I'm going to leave ….maintaining U.S. hegemony? Turns Warming Public concern about …..perceptions changed. Turns Mexico - Econ Decline leads to failed states The crisis eats away at the …... national interests worldwide. Leadership means it’ll get fixed As we once again experience ….. to blame the other guys for disaster? Obama is holding the line now President Obama will …… the government to oppose ObamaCare. Will get done – but will be a fight – don’t assume uniqueness overwhelms To the seasoned finance blogger, ……. running again helps lead to a deal on the debt ceiling. A2: PC PC is finite – especially true with debt ceilings The country will crash into ……wants to accomplish, one at a time. . There is fierce opposition from both republicans and democrats concerning drone courts-concerns of it not being a judicial question and national security concerns FISA established ………. hampering the president. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-Mich.) said some kind of “independent SOP is obsolete and incapable of regulating the executive- other branches lack capacity We begin with the constitutional framework, …….. executive and administrative behavior. Court action is too slow and encourages position taking which hurts future foreign affairs cooperation Whatever the merits of . frustrate orderly judicial disposition. ….. | 10/6/13 |
Politics - Iran - Texas Round 1Tournament: Texas | Round: 1 | Opponent: Houston Asgari-Tari-Bockmon | Judge: Harris The push for new sanctions on ….. resolution on Iran. Turns prolif Might the impending nuclearization …….. in South Asia significantly more dangerous Disad other two advantages What would it mean if such a ………… defined by anti-Western hatred and religious fanaticism. Yes, PC key, and won’t pass Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., says the Obama ………. the final endgame with Tehran. Won’t pass now – PC key, dems back Obama, AND AIPAC ineffective Meanwhile, 42 Republicans sent Senate Majority Leader Harry …….. Democrats to a warm welcome at its annual policy conference. No, it’s partisan On Thursday, 42 Republican senators sent a letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) demanding an immediate vote on sanctions against Iran, an effort President Barack Obama has threatened to …………. matter before its appropriate time.” Numerous proposals have been brought ………..either quickly or substantially. NFU posture would be politically contentious Over the next two weeks, President Obama is expected to make several critical decisions about nuclear policy, so Mr. Biden’s speech avoided some of the most contentious issues, including whether the United States would make a vow of “no first use” of a nuclear weapon. Mr. Obama’s decisions will complete what is known as the Nuclear Posture Review, conducted by each new administration. Officials say that for the first time the review will include American policy for dealing with nuclear threats from terrorists and other nonstate actors. NFU costs capital – military-industrial complex. Therefore, for states that …….. and would form an obstacle to NFU policy President has to spend political capital defending war powers But political representation ………… propriety, congressional voice can matter in war-making. Wins not key- public is sour, GOP spin and lag between adoption and concrete benefits Anxious and angry, Americans are not in a …….. great victories or achievements," Mann said. Wins don’t lead to success- Obama will refuse to take credit- empirically proven Still, the Democratic performance this year …………. publicize her idea. Dahlkemper lost. | 2/8/14 |
Politics - Iran - UGA Samford UDTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 3 | Opponent: Samford Carley-Higgins | Judge: Holland To state the obvious, Americans do not ……. power between the judiciary and the political branches. Obama Gets blame for court action There's a chance that the Democrats' ………. time, he likely will receive some of the blame. Obama’s appointments give him a judicial legacy (Reuters)—President Barack Obama's nomination of ……. of conservative judges to the bench. Supreme Court rulings get blamed on Obama While the Supreme Court …… of the public. | 2/7/14 |
Politics - Iran SanctionsTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake Forest Clifford-Villa | Judge: Gibson Democratic leadership in …….. perhaps derail it completely. B. Plan is a perceived loss for Obama that saps his capital Declining political ……….. processes and affect the character of policy decisions. C. Impacts - Sanctions destroy Iran negotiations kills US cred and alliances Iran has …………., and for the right goals. Great-power war, collapses trade and spreads economic nationalism and protectionism This does not necessarily ……… inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy. 1NR: Both the troubled history between …….f an alternative external security guarantor. Nuclear Iran results in geopolitical shock that hurts the economy – link turns arms sales The biggest threat to recovery in ………. It's already been all used up. The plan doesn’t solve – it collapses the deal and negotiations U.S. diplomacy must take ……. and avoid missteps or traps. Turns case – sets a precedent to delegate authority – draws us into war The American people should ………. which is bending over backward to demonstrate that its nuclear program has no military aims. / A2: UQ Sanctions won’t pass- Obama push is key and influential Dems are relenting It sounds like President Obama ………..without the risks of war." Momentum against sanctions now- Obama PC key A controversial Iran sanctions bill ……., some of which are practically impossible. Even the introduction kills talks Sanctions legislation ……..tightening economic noose. Talks with Iran down but not out – complexities could ruin deal Iran and the United ……. person saying it," Zarif said. / Plan is unpopular seen as hurting War on Terror WASHINGTON -- The U.S. House …. to the Untied States and recruit terrorists on U.S. soil." Capital isn’t regenerated – structural barriers Like many, I expect much from Obama, who for the time being, is my political beast of burden with whom every other politician in the world is unfavourably compared. As a political scientist, I however know that given the structure of …….. 15 million strong constituency in cyberspace (the latent "Obama Party"). Overloading the agenda undermines political capital Obama may be capable of …… for the remainder of his presidency. Wins dissipate too fast---doesn’t generate sustainable capital In a 2007 Fox News interview, … like: "Hey, guys, the water’s up to your knees." Wins not key- public is sour, GOP spin and lag between adoption and concrete benefits Anxious and angry, ………. inclined to see great victories or achievements," Mann said. Wins don’t lead to success- Obama will refuse to take credit- empirically proven Still, the Democratic performance this ……….. publicize her idea. Dahlkemper lost. | 2/7/14 |
Politics - Minimum WageTournament: Adanationals | Round: 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Bagwell President Barack Obama hit the …… for having a higher minimum wage than the rest of the country.” PC is key – Obama has to use his bully pulpit to rally support Earlier this month President ….. all workers to $10.10 an hour. President has to spend political capital defending war powers But political representation ….. matter in war-making. Minimum wage key to solve consumer spending and inequalities – that’s key to continued recovery Want to be a U.S. ……. enough purchasing power to keep the economy going,” he said. Less intuitive is how periods of ….. should be considered ancillary to those views. | 3/20/14 |
Politics - Minimum WageTournament: Adanationals | Round: 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Bagwell President Barack Obama hit the …… for having a higher minimum wage than the rest of the country.” PC is key – Obama has to use his bully pulpit to rally support Earlier this month President ….. all workers to $10.10 an hour. President has to spend political capital defending war powers But political representation ….. matter in war-making. Minimum wage key to solve consumer spending and inequalities – that’s key to continued recovery Want to be a U.S. ……. enough purchasing power to keep the economy going,” he said. Less intuitive is how periods of ….. should be considered ancillary to those views. | 3/20/14 |
Politics - Minimum Wage - Block ADATournament: Adanationals | Round: 4 | Opponent: Samford Kimball-Sessions | Judge: Weiner As explained in our original analysis ….. incremental increases. Collapse turns ME stability and Hegemony-forces US to renege on commitments For nearly two decades, the U.S. has been viewed as a global hegemon -- vastly more powerful than any major country in the …… the status quo. Turns north korea – Economic collapse causes nuclear war Pressures to cut defense …. from internal travails with external adventures. It’ll pass – Republicans will get on board to win women’s vote President Obama …. GOP in droves. It’s top of the docket Will pass – GOP will get on board for election gains Republican strategists …… of touch, the consultant says. Minimum wage will pass – Obama’s PC is mobilizing grassroots pressure – it’ll happen pre-election The White House is ………. “This will be less of a partisan issue,” he said. Links Restrictions on the Presidents war powers authority crush his credibility and derail his agenda Yet, manipulating public …… for his or her future power prospects. Economic crisis coming now – global threat Have you been paying …. the rear view mirror. Obama’s using his bully pulpit on minimum wage Barack Obama announced ….. about 20 less than when Ronald Reagan took office.” Minimum wage took the focus off of healthcare Obama Minimum …… pay people more money." | 3/20/14 |
Queer Theory UDTournament: Kentucky | Round: 6 | Opponent: Binghamton Sehgal-Smith | Judge: Bellon So I wouldn’t say ……—a perverse form of productivity. The permutation tries to make our radical negativity into something meaningful and positive in the world – our negativity is so powerful because it does not seek to secure the future and is deemed unintelligent by the social order. Only such stubborn …….. indivisible, identical to one another—and immortal."49 The permutation makes a saint out of radical negativity – we must divorce ourselves from their affirmation and salvation of life in order to disrupt social order The sinthomosexual, …….., therefore, as an obstacle to fantasy as such. Incorporating futurist politics into psychoanalytic politics means that its co-opted and just makes psychoanalysis one more string in series of signifiers. As Ernesto Laclau has put it, ………. Well, it doesn’t sound like a very good deal. The permutation is self-defeating and the status quo – combining recognition of antagonism and futurism still necessitates the elimination of queerness for a reconciled future order. Since, however, Lacanian political …… use of a psychoanalytic vocabulary. | 10/9/13 |
Queer Theory UDTournament: Kentucky | Round: 8 | Opponent: Michigan Allen-Pappas | Judge: Atchison On the one hand, critical ….. imaginative reach and vigor. | 10/9/13 |
Signature Strikes - Solvency AnswersTournament: GSU | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake MQ | Judge: Wunderlich, Carly 6. Presidential Access to and … powers will again increase. Congressional oversight fails- removes president’s ability to act quickly Presidential power also has …effectively unchecked. | 9/21/13 |
Signature Strikes - Legitimacy Advantage AnswersTournament: GSU | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake MQ | Judge: Wunderlich, Carly So why has opinion shifted so … world than any other state. US can’t project power now The trend of the last …States is leaking cash. U.S. can’t deploy heg to solve conflicts – public restraint, international relations, and deployment capabilities First, the domestic politics of the … United States avoids acting like one.\ Military actions don’t affect credibility – social and economic change is key AND Syria should have triggered the link It seems to me U.S. credibility is a key … someone is really trying to clean up America. No impact to heg collapse- peaceful, liberal order is durable | 9/21/13 |
Signature Strikes - Pakistan Advantage AnswersTournament: GSU | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake MQ | Judge: Wunderlich, Carly It is sharply contested, to say the …have lost the Civil War. No Impact – probability is 1 in 3.5 billon AND no loose nukes WASHINGTON -- There is an "almost vanishingly … that has been stolen. No Indo-Pak war – US and Crumbling Pakistan government ensure Two, this is not the right time … to salvage its pride? Alt cause – border skirmishes Indian troops have shot … city, were closed Friday. Decreasing US drone strikes increases Pakistan instability Now, as President Obama’s landmark … will become very confident.” Squo solves – fewer casualties, rule of law, and no alternative But there is a simpler explanation: Perhaps … better alternative, drones are here to stay. Casualty studies are wrong AND other tech fill in is worse A recent Stanford/NYU study … and deny it control of territory in the tribal areas. | 9/21/13 |
T - Armed ForcesTournament: Texas | Round: 1 | Opponent: Houston Asgari-Tari-Bockmon | Judge: Harris As discussed above, critical to the …..t trigger the War Powers Resolution. | 2/8/14 |
T - Ground SpecTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 7 | Opponent: Georgia Boyce-Feinberg | Judge: Lee, Brass, Galloway Opinions also permit readers to ….. the result. Non-specification undermines solvency and tanks court legitimacy – turns the aff The published judicial opinion 1 ….. decision or fail to reach a unanimous decision. They make legal research impossible – conceded argument since grounds are the basis for legal opinions A published … would be impossible for attorneys and judges. 150 | 2/7/14 |
T - RestrictTournament: Gsu | Round: 3 | Opponent: Wake Forest Cronin-Harris | Judge: Layton Restrictions. …. by any permit or license. “In the area” means all of the activities
Violation: The aff is only supervision Voters:
2. Ground - Only prohibitions on authority guarantee neg ground---their interpretation lets affs no link the best neg offense like deference | 10/9/13 |
T - Sig Strikes UDTournament: JMU | Round: 4 | Opponent: James Madison Lepp-Miller | Judge: Ridley Interp: Targeted killing requires an identified target and a name on a kill list – signature strikes are distinct We must begin with clear terms, …….. government to mislead the public. 2. Precision – they conflate drones and targeted killing From the US standpoint, ….. of this draft chapter on SSRN.) “Drone operations” include surveillance | 10/14/13 |
T - Signature Strikes Targeted KillignTournament: GSU | Round: 2 | Opponent: Wake MQ | Judge: Wunderlich, Carly We must begin with clear terms, and … difficult for the government to mislead the public. they conflate drones and targeted killing From the US standpoint, it is partly … of this draft chapter on SSRN.) | 9/21/13 |
T - SubsTournament: Kentucky | Round: 2 | Opponent: Michigan KK | Judge: Strauss "To increase substantially"… per cent.. | 10/6/13 |
Targeted Killing - Drone Court - Saudi Arabia AdvTournament: Adanationals | Round: 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Bagwell This view has ….. in formulating its legal views. Alt cause – Egypt Hence, we can ………. the US and Obama’s administration for abandoning its key Egyptian ally. High prices are the main driver behind Russian growth Whatever the eventual …. outbreak of social unrest. Russian economic collapse spreads globally and goes nuclear If internal war does strike …. a Russian civil war. Retrenchment solves Based on our universe of cases, … with the benefit of hindsight. U.S. leadership isn’t key to international stability What if that hegemony is ….. be just as effective. US can’t project power now The trend of the last /, and the United States is leaking cash. Hegemony triggers conflicts around the globe and undermines cooperation-culminates in extinction. A potentially …– are certain to be disastrous. *1NR Drone strikes undermine Pakistan democracy causing backlash Pakistan recently …….. values that the United States so fervently champions. Drones ineffective on terrorists networks Drones have arguably been ……….ern Afghanistan. Drones cause anti-American sentiment, sectarianism and violence – only completely stopping them solves Drone strikes like Wednesday’s, in Waziristan, are destroying already weak tribal structures and throwing communities into disarray …… hundred years said, I took it quickly.” Drone strikes massively increase terrorism It should be noted that much of ……. a “hit rate of less than 2 percent” (2009: 18-19). Oil prices: Despite a fourfold increase in oil prices over …….. hydro, nuclear and renewables accounting for the remaining 10 percent. US primacy ensures conflict with China So what should the United States do about China? If the United States per¬sists with its strategy of primacy, the odds of a Sino-American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy. The United States' desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China. As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be orga¬nized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tension—or worse—exists. Moreover, as I already have demon¬strated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—with China in the vanguard—in the form of counter-hegemonic balancing. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to China's rise. Hegemony causes continuous interventions and overextension There is another road …..off more than they can chew. | 3/20/14 |
Targeted Killing - Drone Court - Saudi Arabia AdvTournament: Adanationals | Round: 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Bagwell This view has ….. in formulating its legal views. Alt cause – Egypt Hence, we can ………. the US and Obama’s administration for abandoning its key Egyptian ally. High prices are the main driver behind Russian growth Whatever the eventual …. outbreak of social unrest. Russian economic collapse spreads globally and goes nuclear If internal war does strike …. a Russian civil war. Retrenchment solves Based on our universe of cases, … with the benefit of hindsight. U.S. leadership isn’t key to international stability What if that hegemony is ….. be just as effective. US can’t project power now The trend of the last /, and the United States is leaking cash. Hegemony triggers conflicts around the globe and undermines cooperation-culminates in extinction. A potentially …– are certain to be disastrous. *1NR Drone strikes undermine Pakistan democracy causing backlash Pakistan recently …….. values that the United States so fervently champions. Drones ineffective on terrorists networks Drones have arguably been ……….ern Afghanistan. Drones cause anti-American sentiment, sectarianism and violence – only completely stopping them solves Drone strikes like Wednesday’s, in Waziristan, are destroying already weak tribal structures and throwing communities into disarray …… hundred years said, I took it quickly.” Drone strikes massively increase terrorism It should be noted that much of ……. a “hit rate of less than 2 percent” (2009: 18-19). Oil prices: Despite a fourfold increase in oil prices over …….. hydro, nuclear and renewables accounting for the remaining 10 percent. US primacy ensures conflict with China So what should the United States do about China? If the United States per¬sists with its strategy of primacy, the odds of a Sino-American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy. The United States' desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China. As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be orga¬nized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tension—or worse—exists. Moreover, as I already have demon¬strated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—with China in the vanguard—in the form of counter-hegemonic balancing. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to China's rise. Hegemony causes continuous interventions and overextension There is another road …..off more than they can chew. | 3/20/14 |
Targeted Killing - Inform Congress Aff Samford - IranTournament: Adanationals | Round: 4 | Opponent: Samford Kimball-Sessions | Judge: Weiner One of the first things I ………. tempted to make a first strike - even if it fears an Israeli one. They have not read a piece of evidence about how they solve this scenario Obama has already renewed sanctions for the next year and it didn’t derail negotiations US President Barack Obama …… Iranian nation and its national interests. Sanctions don’t cause war Sanctions work. They ….. failure to act in good faith. | 3/20/14 |
Targeted Killing - Inform Congress Aff Samford - Multilat AdvTournament: Adanationals | Round: 4 | Opponent: Samford Kimball-Sessions | Judge: Weiner In a quick and angry ….. 'are ploughing the sea'! The need for multilateralism is obvious. ………r of the statute despite U.S. objections.9 Doesn’t solve war Besides the influence of …… commitment to the norms embodied in them.126 | 3/20/14 |
Targeted Killing - Inform Congress Aff Samford - North KoreaTournament: Adanationals | Round: 4 | Opponent: Samford Kimball-Sessions | Judge: Weiner But is North Korea …….l destruction. Deterrence fails- 10 reasons
Yet, while the numbers of forces ….. by ground fire, but air power). | 3/20/14 |
Targeted Killing - Inform Congress Aff Samford - SolvencyTournament: Adanationals | Round: 4 | Opponent: Samford Kimball-Sessions | Judge: Weiner These assumptions are all questionable. …….. to fall on deaf ears be ignored State secret doctrine means no checks –we don’t need to win open noncompliance The war on terror has …….. wrongdoing retain their due process rights. No impact – allies won’t abandon us and adversaries can’t exploit it A perennial preoccupation ….. to actually do No spillover – lack of cred in one commitment doesn’t affect others at all Second, pessimists …….. an area of greater signiªcance. | 3/20/14 |
Targeted Killing Court Drone - SolvencyTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 3 | Opponent: Samford Carley-Higgins | Judge: Holland By 2006, the Bush administration had …… driven by political imperatives, not judicial orders or legal norms. Circumvention – plan will fail first challenge from the executive As our debate over Korematsu illustrates, … will avoid similar decisions in the future. | 2/7/14 |
Targeted Killing Court Drones - Drone Prolif Adv AnswersTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 3 | Opponent: Samford Carley-Higgins | Judge: Holland Based on current trends, it is unlikely… …. drones in the near term. No drone prolif- their ev misunderstands the international system- political costs, air defenses, expenses, deployment, retal all prevent Bold predictions of a …… and security risks associated with their use. Deterrence fails- 10 reasons
Judicial restrictions on president’s ability to use force kill military effectiveness It is important to keep this in mind /………… toward the death of common sense. Loss of readiness collapses primacy The preservation of today's Pax …….logic of primacy. Guarantees great power war This does not necessarily mean ………. in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy. | 2/7/14 |
Targeted Killing Court Drones - ILawAdvantage AnswersTournament: Bulldogdebates | Round: 3 | Opponent: Samford Carley-Higgins | Judge: Holland Bush Sr. chose to give the speech at …… it's happening from the bottom up rather than the top down. No chance the Courts enforce I-Law Foreign affairs legalists make sweeping claims ………. n125 Bush had tried to order state courts No impact to air pollution- studies prove The EPA attributes well over 90 percent of the …. occur in the United States. Legal limitations on war fail and a laundry list of military invasions thump their internal link. Inter arma enim silent leges, said the Romans—……. invoke the law, they don’t actually believe what they are saying. Global emission reduction schemes fail – states won’t be willing to harm the economy Don't be fooled. The dirty secret about global ……..or exceptions and special treatment. Hello, influence-peddling and sleaze. International institutions encourage nations to develop water treaties, nullifying any risk of water war While this study is motivated by …….. conflict (Wolf, Yoffe and Giordano, 2003). Warming won’t cause extinction First, climate change does not ……., but we would have done much more about it by now. Co-evolution and adaptation prevents risk of extinction Whenever a new disease appears ……just a touch of plague. Global drone norms are impossible It is hard to overstate the extent to which ……. no richer than colleges and perhaps would require even less substantial resources. One ruling doesn’t solve The other side of the coin is represented by …., thus enhancing its stature on the international legal stage. Multilat fails- conflicting interests, more players, and new coalitions The changing landscape of global …. on trade liberalisation and curbing global warming. US won’t exert effective diplomacy Watching the musical chairs …….. to say, speak for themselves. Can’t solve climate For more than two decades, ……. political gridlock. x His views deviate sharply from those of ….. whose result remains uncertain." | 2/7/14 |
Targeted Killing Federal Courts - Human Rights Adv AnswersTournament: Kentucky | Round: 2 | Opponent: Michigan KK | Judge: Strauss Jakobs replies I this argument. He argues …… for the validity of a norm. No HR solvency – too many alt causes and institutional barriers While abuses carried out ……Guantánamo look like the easy part. Authoritarian states don’t follow norms Accountability problems still exist with drone courts Critics of the drone ……… executions and remedy for victims,” he says. Norms fail- nations pick and choose and only cite norms to cover decisions The second benefit to foreigners of ………… international law to trump domestic law. Peace theory wrong-either historical cases disprove it OR the theory is watered down to the point it doesn’t explain anything. In this section I evaluate ………. exception to the finding. Congressional involvement destroys war-fighting – extinction In wartime, however, it ….. laws to advance the war effort Turns heg Weakness in American …mbodies weakness and indecision. | 10/6/13 |
Targeted Killing Federal Courts - Legalism Adv AnswersTournament: Kentucky | Round: 2 | Opponent: Michigan KK | Judge: Strauss This point ……… This does not mean, ….. relationship with the United States. Warming won’t cause extinction First, climate change ……. much more about it by now. Federal courts turn due process In the wake of the recent ………….: A search warrant is not a death warrant. Turn- drone courts lead executive to rely on signature strikes First, the court would be ……… staffers have in mind. 2NC – Transparency Fails Perception links are based on flawed cognitive biases – other nations dismiss the aff These routine and unchallenged ……. made to appease domestic audiences. Transparency doesn’t check secret interpretations of law – FISA proves Your authors are biased - CO2 not key, no weather events, models fail, and other countries don’t model Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor ……… by tenths of a degree. Congressional restrictions kill presidential credibility – tanks flexibility and invites attacks – their ev A claim previously advanced from a ….. of presidential threats to escalate. Executive power key to effective deployment of forces Domestically, Congress often works best ……especially on the use of force. n66 Strong presidential leadership key Weakness in American …… weakness and indecision. Drone courts fail – violates Constitution and zero accountability Washington's idea of the week is a secret …… the drone-strike decision. Drone courts fail and disrupt military effectiveness – turns the aff The U.S. drone program and its practices regarding targeted strikes against al-Qaeda and its associated forces are lawful. They are lawful because the United States is currently engaged in an armed conflict with those terrorist entities and because the United States has an inherent right to defend itself against imminent threats to its security. Moreover, the available evidence indicates that U.S. military and intelligence forces conduct targeted strikes in a manner consistent with international law. Military and intelligence officials go to great lengths to identify al-Qaeda operatives that pose an imminent threat and continually reassess the level of that threat. Decisions on each potential target are debated among U.S. officials before the target is placed in the “disposition matrix.” In conducting targeted strikes U.S. forces strive to minimize civilian casualties, although such casualties cannot always be prevented. The United States will continue to face asymmetric threats from non-state actors operating from the territory of nations that are either unwilling or unable to suppress the threats. To confront these threats, the United States must retain its most effective operational capabilities, including targeted strikes by armed drones, even if U.S. forces degrade al-Qaeda and its associated forces to such an extent that the United States no longer considers itself to be in a non-international armed conflict. Moreover, the United States must continue to affirm its inherent right to self-defense to eliminate threats to its national security, regardless of the presence or absence of an armed conflict recognized by international law. To that end, the United States should: Continue to affirm existing use-of-force authorities. During the past three years, senior officials of the Obama Administration have publicly set out in significant detail U.S. policies and practices regarding drone strikes. The Administration should continue to do so, emphasizing that U.S. policies adhere to widely recognized international law. Critics of the United States will continue to claim that a lack of transparency surrounds U.S. policy and actions. Such critics will likely never be satisfied, not even with full disclosure of the relevant classified legal memoranda, and their criticism will not cease until the United States abandons its practice of targeting terrorist threats in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere. However, consistent repetition of the U.S. legal position on targeted drone strikes may blunt such criticism. Not derogate from the AUMF. At the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, NATO agreed that the vast majority of U.S. and other NATO forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, a time frame that President Obama confirmed during this year’s State of the Union address. Some critics of U.S. drone policy will inevitably argue that due to the drawdown the United States may no longer credibly claim that it remains in a state of armed conflict with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and its associated forces, whether they are located in Afghanistan, the FATA, or elsewhere. Congress should pass no legislation that could be interpreted as a derogation from the AUMF or an erosion of the inherent right of the United States to defend itself against imminent threats posed by transnational terrorist organizations. Not create a drone court. The concept of a drone court is fraught with danger and may be an unconstitutional interference with the executive branch’s authority to wage war. U.S. armed forces have been lawfully targeting enemy combatants in armed conflicts for more than 200 years without being second-guessed by Congress or a secret “national security court.” Targeting decisions, including those made in connection with drone strikes, are carefully deliberated by military officers and intelligence officials based on facts and evidence gathered from a variety of human, signals, and imagery intelligence sources. During an armed conflict, all al-Qaeda operatives are subject to targeting; therefore, a drone court scrutinizing targeting decisions would serve no legitimate purpose. Rather than creating a special tribunal that is ill equipped to pass judgment on proportionality and military necessity, and that will never fully assuage the concerns of the critics of drone strikes, Congress should continue to leave decisions pertaining to the disposition of al-Qaeda terrorists—including U.S. citizens—with military and intelligence officials. Accountability problems still exist with drone courts Critics of the drone program, however, are generally not reassured by the notion of oversight from a special drone court. They note that the FISA courts, on which the drone courts would be modeled, operate largely in secret, doing little to improve accountability to the public. What’s more, they say, national and international laws are already in place governing when drone strikes are legal. Those laws, they add, offer greater transparency than would a secret court. “I’m not big on this,” Sarah Holewinski, executive director of the Center for Civilians in Conflict, says of the drone courts. “The fact is, we have international laws. We have domestic laws. I would focus on those and say, ‘Look, here’s the due diligence you need to do in targeting a combatant. Here’s what you need to do in order to avoid civilians. Here’s what proportionality looks like.’ ” Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International’s Security and Human Rights Campaign, argues that drone courts would do little to change critics' fundamental concerns about drone strikes. “What’s needed on drones is not a ‘kill court,’ but a rejection of the radical redefinition of ‘imminence’ used to expand who can be killed – as well as independent investigations of alleged extrajudicial executions and remedy for victims,” he says. Drone Courts fail- no precedent But the drone court idea is a mistake. It is hard to think of something less suitable for a federal judge to rule on than the fast-moving and protean nature of targeting decisions. Fortunately, a better solution exists: a “national security court” housed within the executive branch itself. Experts, not generalists, would rule; pressing concerns about classified information would be minimized; and speedy decisions would be easier to reach. There is, of course, a role for federal courts in national security. In 2006, I argued and won Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a Supreme Court case that struck down President George W. Bush’s use of military tribunals at Guantánamo Bay. But military trials are a far cry from wartime targeting decisions. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which reviews administration requests to collect intelligence involving foreign agents inside the country and which some have advocated as a model for the drone court, is likewise appropriately housed within the judicial system — it rules on surveillance operations that raise questions much like those in Fourth Amendment “search and seizure” cases, a subject federal judges know well. But there is no true precedent for interposing courts into military decisions about who, what and when to strike militarily. Putting aside the serious constitutional implications of such a proposal, courts are simply not institutionally equipped to play such a role. There are many reasons a drone court composed of generalist federal judges will not work. They lack national security expertise, they are not accustomed to ruling on lightning-fast timetables, they are used to being in absolute control, their primary work is on domestic matters and they usually rule on matters after the fact, not beforehand. Even the questions placed before the FISA Court aren’t comparable to what a drone court would face; they involve more traditional constitutional issues — not rapidly developing questions about whether to target an individual for assassination by a drone strike. Courts subvert ocnsitition by sending drones into places they can’t go and there’s no accountability – there is no precedent and courts can’t act quickly enough tot solve - that’s epps Mexico-US relations resilient- growing military cooperation Under Presidents George W. Bush ……. is unprecedented and will likely continue to grow. Mexico relations are resilient- Felipe Calderon's presidency . and aspirations. B. Self-interest- Mexico needs the US …..more Given the tremendously …… the United States. n619 C. Conflict dispute mechanisms, self-interest, and public support This does not mean, …… relationship with the United States. | 10/6/13 |
Targeted Killing Neg - Drone Courts - China AdvantageaTournament: Adanationals | Round: 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Bagwell BLAIR: I think we've … defensive measures in the future. No Chinese aggression- political constraints Indeed, the time to …….. with its own drone programme. No impact—drones make wars less intense It is not as if in ……. must also be counted as a benefit. Global drone norms are impossible It is hard to overstate ……less substantial resources. No aggression-China knows it will backfire Despite what opinion ……. secure a better negotiating stance. | 3/20/14 |
Targeted Killing Neg - Drone Courts - China AdvantageaTournament: Adanationals | Round: 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Bagwell BLAIR: I think we've … defensive measures in the future. No Chinese aggression- political constraints Indeed, the time to …….. with its own drone programme. No impact—drones make wars less intense It is not as if in ……. must also be counted as a benefit. Global drone norms are impossible It is hard to overstate ……less substantial resources. No aggression-China knows it will backfire Despite what opinion ……. secure a better negotiating stance. | 3/20/14 |
Targeted Killing Neg - Drone Courts - SolvencyTournament: Adanationals | Round: 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Bagwell These assumptions are all …….. to fall on deaf ears be ignored Drone courts fail – violates Constitution and zero accountability Washington's idea of the …. for the drone-strike decision. | 3/20/14 |
Targeted Killing Neg - Drone Courts - SolvencyTournament: Adanationals | Round: 2 | Opponent: Mary Washington McElhinny-Pacheco | Judge: Bagwell These assumptions are all …….. to fall on deaf ears be ignored Drone courts fail – violates Constitution and zero accountability Washington's idea of the …. for the drone-strike decision. | 3/20/14 |
Targeted Killing Title 10 - Drone Prolif AdvantageTournament: JMU | Round: 4 | Opponent: James Madison Lepp-Miller | Judge: Ridley The implications of the ……..respects a study in irony. No spillover – lack of cred in one commitment doesn’t affect others at all Second, pessimists …….. greater signiªcance. No drone norms – nations will not unilateral relinquish any tech especially coutnries with different systems of voernment Bold predictions of a ……. requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use. De facto constraints solve presidential adventurism Demography and the Administrative State……. hypothesis for further research. No impact to drone prolif BLAIR: I think we've ……. measures in the future. China’s drone development is slow—ensures U.S. lead Dozens of Chinese ….. operational niches than others. No war or escalation over Senkaaku There are many good ….. ready to go to war. No Impact – probability is 1 in 3.5 billon AND no loose nukes WASHINGTON -- There is an "almost …….. or use one that has been stolen. | 10/14/13 |
Targeted Killing Title 10 - SolvencyTournament: JMU | Round: 4 | Opponent: James Madison Lepp-Miller | Judge: Ridley Can’t solve transparency Scholars and practitioners ….. briefings rather than shifting operational command and control. | 10/14/13 |
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