The executive’s current definition of imminence is so vague and broad it makes overuse and abuse of drones inevitable. Ex post judicial review restricts authority to use broad definitions of "imminent" – any other process locks in existing errors.
The argument for some form of judicial review is compelling, not least because AND whose constitutional rights have been infringed but also the obligation to do so.
Statutory cause of action is key to refine the definition of imminence – remedies check errors which cause blowback
Jonathan Hafetz 3/8/13 (Former senior attorney at the ACLU’s National Security Project, a litigation director at NYU’s Brennan Center for Justice, and a John J. Gibbons Fellow in Public Interest and Constitutional Law at Gibbons, P.C, "Reviewing Drones," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-hafetz/reviewing-drones_b_2815671.html)
The better course is to ensure meaningful review after the fact. To this end AND If a drone strike satisfies these requirements, the suit should be dismissed.
Results in a balanced definition of imminence that still allows decapitation and out-of-battlefield operations – Hamdi proves
Lindsay Kwoka 11 (J.D. UPenn, "TRIAL BY SNIPER: THE LEGALITY OF TARGETED KILLING IN THE WAR ON TERROR" Accessed at HeinOnline)
But this is not the end of the inquiry. Even if a targeted individual AND need to protect citizen’s constitutional rights while affording sufficient deference to the executive.
Specifically, unaccountable drone strikes strengthen AQAP and destabilize Yemen – cause of action key
Jacqueline Manning 12/9/12 (Senior Editor of International Affairs Review; "Free to Kill: How a Lack of Accountability in America’s Drone Campaign Threatens U.S. Efforts in Yemen," http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/450)
Earlier this year White House counter-terrorism advisor, John Brennan, named al AND only acknowledge them, but also pay amends to families of the victims.
Accountability for drones shifts US to stability focus – provides cover for transition success and solves aid rejection
The US has played a significant role in Yemen’s transition, which ensured the exit AND - built on transparency, accountability and a demonstrated commitment to their future.
Yemeni transition reversal risks multiple scenarios for escalation
Lt Col Nicholas Hedberg June 10 (US Navy, paper submitted in fulfillment of a MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA) at the Naval Postgraduate School; "THE EXPLOITATION OF A WEAK STATE: AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA IN YEMEN," http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA52465526Location=U226doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
This chapter will address three major reasons why AQAP has come to the forefront of AND legitimacy, respect, and authority in the eyes of the public.179
Scenario 1 – arms control
Yemen instability undercuts the effectiveness of Middle East arms control measures – spills over globally
Dr. Ahmed Saif et al May 12 (Executive Director of the Sheba Centre for Strategic Studies (SCSS), Sana’a, AND Yemen_and_the_Middle_East_Conference.pdf)
Yemen’s ongoing domestic crisis has profound regional and global implications. This is due to AND which the region’s state actors might contemplate as part of the envisioned MEC.
Arms control is key to prevent escalating global warfare
Harold Müller Summer 2k (Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University, "Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement", The Nonproliferation Review, 7(2))
In this author’s view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms AND level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation.
Scenario 2 – India-Pakistan war
Yemen instability causes terrorist strikes on India
In this context, Al Qaeda and its emerging connections in Yemen have become very AND take due note of other threats as well and exercise the requisite caution.
Terrorist attack on India causes Indo-Pak nuclear war
In 1914, a terrorist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo - unleashing geopolitical forces AND for broader geopolitical crises may be the greatest threat we face from terrorism.
1AC – legal regimes
Using the Courts as an accountability mechanism empirically refines war powers cases into stabilizing norms – makes hegemony sustainable and comparatively outweighs the slight reduction in flexibility – deference causes counter-balancing and major power war
Robert Knowles 9 (Assistant Professor at NYU Law; "Article: American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution," 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87, Lexis)
First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U. AND courts to reduce the "deference gap" between foreign and domestic cases.
Specifically, executive discretion over targeted killing legal standards is hollowing out this framework now
Rosa Brooks 4/23/13 (Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, Former Counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Department of Defense; "The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing," Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights; http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf)
5. Setting Troubling International Precedents ¶ Here is an additional reason to worry about AND them to justify the killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities?
US is driving a global shift in strategic doctrines – erodes legal restraints on all violence and causes preventive nuclear war – reversal is key to preserve norms on force
Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer M. Ramos 4/15/13 (*Visiting assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Loyola Marymount University, PhD in Political Science from Claremont Graduate University; Assistant Professor of Political Science at Loyola Marymount University, PhD in Political Science from UC Davis, "Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm," International Studies Perspectives, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/doi/10.1111/insp.12013/full)
Preventive self-defense entails waging a war or an attack by choice, in AND it continues to provide other states with the justification to do the same.
Only ex post judicial review can verify compliance with the laws of war – solves preventive war shift
Avery Plaw Dec 7 (Associate Prof of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, PhD in Political Science from McGill University, "Terminating Terror: The Legality, Ethics and Effectiveness of Targeting Terrorists," Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, No. 114, War and Terror, Pp. 1-27)
To summarize, the general policy of targeting terrorists appears to be defensible in principle AND robustly upheld, a role that could be effectively performed by a court.
Statutory cause of action creates a sustainable judicial mechanism to signal compliance – restrains future executives
While some experts have argued for court oversight of drone strikes before they’re carried out AND more generally that our policies are in compliance with rule of law norms."
It’s reverse-causal – credible external oversight gets modeled and allows the US to effectively crack down on other abusive practices
Omar S. Bashir 9/24/12 (Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University and a graduate of the Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT, "Who Watches the Drones?" Foreign Affairs,www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138141/omar-s-bashir/who-watches-the-drones)
Further, the U.S. counterterrorism chief John Brennan has noted that the AND oversight to their own drone campaigns would reveal their disregard for humanitarian concerns.
Text
The United States federal government should statutorily and judicially restrict the President’s war powers authority to assert, on behalf of the United States, immunity from judicial review by establishing a cause of action allowing civil suits brought against the United States by those unlawfully injured by targeted killing operations, their heirs, or their estates in security cleared legal proceedings before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Solvency
Congressional cause of action key – delineations solve disads like circumvention, secrecy, and chilling effect
Stephen I. Vladeck 14 (Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University Washington College of Law; "Targeted Killing and Judicial Review," THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO Vol. 82)
As noted above,70 such review is best provided after the fact, rather AND would merely provide a judicial remedy for violations of already existing federal law.
Ex post judicial review solves credibility deficits to executive statements and increases drone effectiveness – offsets cognitive biases and improves imminence assessments
Cassandra Burke Robertson 12 (Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; "ARTICLE: DUE PROCESS IN THE AMERICAN IDENTITY," Alabama Law Review, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 255, lexis)
As a policy matter, offering a heightened level of due process may have positive AND of who we are as a nation and who we want to be.
3/26/14
Cause of action drones aff - districts rd 6
Tournament: Districts | Round: 6 | Opponent: MoSt MR | Judge: E Robinson
1AC – ex post
1AC – imminence
The executive’s current definition of imminence is so vague and broad it makes overuse and abuse of drones inevitable
Glenn Greenwald 2/5/13 (J.D. from NYU, award-winning journalist; "Chilling legal memo from Obama DOJ justifies assassination of US citizens," www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/05/obama-kill-list-doj-memo)
4. Expanding the concept of "imminence" beyond recognition The memo claims that AND vaguely defined, and it’s easy to see how they could be manipulated."
Cause of action is key to refine the definition of imminence – checks errors which cause blowback
Jonathan Hafetz 3/8/13 (Former senior attorney at the ACLU’s National Security Project, a litigation director at NYU’s Brennan Center for Justice, and a John J. Gibbons Fellow in Public Interest and Constitutional Law at Gibbons, P.C, "Reviewing Drones," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-hafetz/reviewing-drones_b_2815671.html)
The better course is to ensure meaningful review after the fact. To this end AND If a drone strike satisfies these requirements, the suit should be dismissed.
Results in a balanced definition of imminence that still allows decapitation and out-of-battlefield operations – Hamdi proves
Lindsay Kwoka 11 (J.D. UPenn, "TRIAL BY SNIPER: THE LEGALITY OF TARGETED KILLING IN THE WAR ON TERROR" Accessed at HeinOnline)
But this is not the end of the inquiry. Even if a targeted individual AND need to protect citizen’s constitutional rights while affording sufficient deference to the executive.
Judiciary is key to the observer effect – the threat of review deters executive errors and abuse
Ashley Deeks Oct 13 (Associate Prof of Law at the University of Virginia Law School; "The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference," Fordham Law Review Vol. 82, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338667)
In another sense, though, much of substance has been decided since 2002— AND as with the Guantánamo habeas cases in the D.C. Circuit.
Scenario 1 – Yemen
Unaccountable drone strikes strengthen AQAP and destabilize Yemen – cause of action key
Jacqueline Manning 12/9/12 (Senior Editor of International Affairs Review; "Free to Kill: How a Lack of Accountability in America’s Drone Campaign Threatens U.S. Efforts in Yemen," http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/450)
Earlier this year White House counter-terrorism advisor, John Brennan, named al AND only acknowledge them, but also pay amends to families of the victims.
Plan shifts US in Yemen to stability focus – provides cover for transition success and solves aid rejection
The US has played a significant role in Yemen’s transition, which ensured the exit AND - built on transparency, accountability and a demonstrated commitment to their future.
Yemen instability undercuts the effectiveness of Middle East arms control measures – spills over globally
Dr. Ahmed Saif et al May 12 (Executive Director of the Sheba Centre for Strategic Studies (SCSS), Sana’a, AND Yemen_and_the_Middle_East_Conference.pdf)
Yemen’s ongoing domestic crisis has profound regional and global implications. This is due to AND which the region’s state actors might contemplate as part of the envisioned MEC.
Arms control is key to prevent global warfare and escalating violence
Harold Müller Summer 2k (Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University, "Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement", The Nonproliferation Review, 7(2))
In this author’s view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms AND level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation.
Under the new approach, U.S. officials have told their Pakistani counterparts AND , depending on whether the CIA can pinpoint targets, the officials said.
High-tempo strikes in Pakistan empowers insurgents and collapses the government – scaling back is key to stability
The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few AND scale¶ of drone attacks than it was during the Bush administration.81
Pakistan collapse causes Indo-Pak nuke war and terrorist nuke acquisition – experts
The Washington Post has revealed the intense concern of the U.S. intelligence AND covering Pakistan will continue to lose sleep for a long time to come.
Most likely nuclear war and extinction
Lawrence Korb March/April 12 (Senior Fellow Center for American Progress, Assistant Secretary of Defense under Reagan; "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol 68 No 2, Pp. 34-42, SagePub)
In the twenty-first century, the Indian subcontinent has surpassed Europe as the AND no guarantees that it would choose to restrain itself after another such incident.
Nuke terror causes US-Russia miscalc that collapses the ecosphere – extinction
Anthony Barrett et al. 6/24/13 (*PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the AND and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor 26 Francis)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, AND making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16
1AC – legal regimes
US legal justifications for targeted killing will spill over to erode legal restraints on all violence and legitimize preventive war
Craig Martin 11 (Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law, "Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defence, and the Jus Ad Bellum Regime," Ch 8 in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW 26 MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD, Pp. 223, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1956141)
IV. The potential impact of the targeted killing policy on international law The United States has been engaging in this practice of using drone-mounted missile AND a threat that is much less serious in the grand scheme of things.
That causes an endless, global series of wars that go nuclear
Ariel Colonomos 13 (Director of Research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, Ph.D. in political science from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, "The Gamble of War: Is it Possible to Justify Preventive War?" p 72-75, google books)
John Yoo holds that the American interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq fulfilled the criteria of AND United States to its new enemies and of their greater number and dispersal.
Only ex post judicial review can verify compliance with the laws of war – solves preventive war shift
Avery Plaw Dec 7 (Associate Prof of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth, PhD in Political Science from McGill University, "Terminating Terror: The Legality, Ethics and Effectiveness of Targeting Terrorists," Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, No. 114, War and Terror, Pp. 1-27)
To summarize, the general policy of targeting terrorists appears to be defensible in principle AND robustly upheld, a role that could be effectively performed by a court.
Statutory cause of action creates a sustainable judicial mechanism to signal compliance – restrains future executives
While some experts have argued for court oversight of drone strikes before they’re carried out AND more generally that our policies are in compliance with rule of law norms."
Using the Courts as an accountability mechanism turns war powers cases into stabilizing norms – makes hegemony sustainable and comparatively outweighs the slight reduction in flexibility – deference causes counter-balancing and major power war
Robert Knowles 9 (Assistant Professor at NYU Law; "Article: American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution," 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87, Lexis)
First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U. AND is heavily influenced by the politics of one nation—the United¶ S
tates.411 As an institution of that same government, the courts are wellpositioned AND courts to reduce the "deference gap" between foreign and domestic cases.
Text
The United States federal government should statutorily and judicially restrict the President’s war powers authority to assert, on behalf of the United States, immunity from judicial review by establishing a cause of action allowing civil suits brought against the United States by those unlawfully injured by targeted killing operations, their heirs, or their estates in security cleared legal proceedings before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Solvency
Congressional cause of action key – delineations solve disads like circumvention, secrecy, and chilling effect
Stephen I. Vladeck 14 (Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University Washington College of Law; "Targeted Killing and Judicial Review," THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO Vol. 82)
As noted above,70 such review is best provided after the fact, rather AND would merely provide a judicial remedy for violations of already existing federal law.
Accountability over "imminence" standards is impossible via internal executive measures – no one trusts Obama on drones – only the plan’s court action solves
For official secrecy abroad to work, the secrets must be kept at home as AND altogether with the growing mistrust of the administration’s oblique representations about secret war.
The president cannot establish trust in the way of the knife through internal moves AND , even if it means that secret war abroad is harder to conduct.
The ’Revolution in Military Affairs’ initiated a trajectory towards immateriality in warfare – increasing reliance on technologically mediated decision-making promotes a form of disembodiment that eschews agency and treats war as a natural phenomenon Miller 10 ~Miller, Charles Oliver, B.A. Texas Tech, The mean, green, war machine, Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty at the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master in Arts, Diss. uga, 2010.~
At the end of the Cold War, Hardt and Negri argue, the United AND ground the project’s discussion of visuality and aesthetics in the age of Netwar.
AND, vulnerability is constructed simultaneously as risk assessments feign understanding of infinitely complex human systems. Framing decision-making in terms of control is responsible for the excesses of the War on Terror. Amoore and De Goede 8 (Louise and Markieke, Durham Geography, Amsterdam European Studies, Introduction: Governing by Risk in the War on Terrorism, Risk and the War on Terror, ed. Amoore and De Goede, p. 9-10, JK)
The central question for risk society, as Ulrich Beck sees it, is ’’ AND , information driven utopia of governance’’ (Valverde and Mopas 2004: 239).
AND, the status quo’s justification-driven orientation toward planning ensures failure – accidents simply defy models and foresight. This fantasy of order enables elites to lay the groundwork for failed interventions like Iraq and Afghanistan. Jillian Smith Sept 8 (North Florida English Dept, Tolerating the Intolerable, "Enduring the Unendurable: Representing the Accident in Driver’s Education Films," Postmodern Culture 19:1)
In emphasizing Freud’s comment that "accumulation puts an end to the impression of chance AND time with a sensible end, but rather has opened multiplicity without end.
AND, policymakers have displaced ethical decisions about warfare by confusing the instrumental means of precision technology with military objectives and strategic planning Kaag and Kaufman 9 ~Kaag, John, and Whitley Kaufman (University of Massachusetts Lowell), "Military frameworks: technological know-how and the legitimization of warfare." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22.4 (2009): 585-606.~
So what is this essence of technology and why must tacticians re main wide- AND of relying on technical precision to make moral distinctions in the targeting cycle.
AND, the confirmation makes risk assessments generate severe social costs outside our immediate focus – humans are not neutral machines capable of iterative prediction Nassim Nicholas Taleb 7 (Dean’s Professor in the Sciences of Uncertainty at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, author of Fooled By Randomness; "The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable," Pp. 51-56)
As much as it is ingrained in our habits and conventional wisdom, confirmation¶ AND can find¶ traffic to increase the fare, even on a holiday.
SPECIFICALLY, drone technology reconfigures the socio-technical context in which we perceive and understand ourselves, others, and the world by elevating a detached form of knowledge at the expense of directly engaged bodily experience – this bars empathetic bridging and renders the ’enemy’ an object that is ’standing-to-be-killed’ Coeckelbergh 13 ~Coeckelbergh, Mark (Ph.D. University of Birmingham, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Twente-Netherlands, "Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote fighting." Ethics and Information Technology (2013): 1-12.~
For my question what kind of knowledge is generated in this practice, it is AND But is this an adequate analysis of the actual practice of drone fighting?
AND, enframing knowledge-as-observation enables broader domination and epistemic violence – the collapse of "knowing about" into "knowing who" legitimizes domination of non-atomic knowledges Dwight Conquergood Summer 2 (Professor of performance studies at Northwestern University, is an ethnographer who has conducted extensive ?eld research in refugee camps overseas and in immigrant neighborhoods in Chicago. Conquergood has coproduced two award-winning documentaries based on his Chicago urban ?eld research: Between Two Worlds: The Hmong Shaman in America(1985) and The Heart Broken in Half (1990). He has consulted with the International Rescue Committee and other human rights organizations working on the death penalty, as well as with public defenders working on capital cases. He has taught at the Bryan R. Shechmeister Death Penalty College, School of Law, Santa Clara University; "Performance Studies Interventions and Radical Research," The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002, New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; http://www.culturaldevelopment.net.au/downloads/DwightConquergood.pdf)
The dominant way of knowing in the academy is that of empirical observation¶ and AND the writing machine of the law" (de Certeau 1984:141).
AND, drone warfare enacts a type of ’ethnic cleansing’ by means of a scientific gaze that transmutes targeted subjects into an anonymous simulacrum of digital data which renders them an object to be exterminated Pugliese 11 ~Joseph (Associate Professor in the Department of Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, "Prosthetics of law and the anomic violence of drones." Griffith L. Rev. 20 (2011): 931.~
The military term ’pattern of life’ is inscribed with two intertwined systems of scientific conceptuality AND both international law and the sovereignty of nations such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.
AND, allowing precision targeting technology – such as drones – to determine the meaning of security, politics, and warfare produces a new form of imperialism that abides by the same logic which undergirded the development and use of nuclear weapons Kaag and Kaufman 9 ~Kaag, John, and Whitley Kaufman (University of Massachusetts Lowell), "Military frameworks: technological know-how and the legitimization of warfare." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22.4 (2009): 585-606.~
Heidegger suggests that such a danger is real and present. Modernity has already allowed AND language of ethics and justice, ethicists face greater and more nuanced challenges.
AND, the loss of Being that defines our historical epoch shapes the dominant social imaginary through instrumental reasoning – this denies intrinsic value to other beings and the natural world which legitimates the practices and institutionalization of war, structural violence, and environmental destruction Chwastiaka and Lehmanb 8 ~Michele University of New Mexico, Anderson School of Management, United States, Glen, School of Accounting, University of South Australia, "Accounting for war," Accounting Forum,Volume 32, Issue 4, December 2008, Pages 313–326~
Many peace researchers argue that the sources for physical violence can be found in passive AND by denying the intrinsic value of others starting with expansionistic logic of capitalism.
Text
Michael and I advocate ontological inquiry into restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States to use drone strikes for targeted killing.
Contention Two
Ontological Inquiry
Analyzing the epistemic and ethical implications of drone warfare is critical toward re-shaping public discussions and political deliberations Coeckelbergh 13 ~Coeckelbergh, Mark (Ph.D. University of Birmingham, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Twente-Netherlands, "Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote fighting." Ethics and Information Technology (2013): 1-12.~
Explicit moral reflection can play a role at several levels. To begin with the AND sanitized video game’ (Bumiller 2012). I will further explain below why.
AND, evaluate ontology first – failure to prioritize ontological inquiry is tantamount to a "loss of Being" which impoverishes understanding while locating social-political institutions as isolated from their natural context and eliminates an authentic relationship to Being – destroying value to life and causing unchecked environmental destruction Magrini 12 ~J.M., Professor at the College of DuPage – Illinois, Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heideger, Technology, and the Poietic Attunement of Literature, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Volume 44, Issue 5, Pages 500-521, July 2012~
Writing in 1927, Heidegger uses the term Dasein to describe the human in his AND , causing us to understand and discourse about our lives in impoverished ways.
1/11/14
Heidegger drones aff - UK rd 6
Tournament: UK | Round: 6 | Opponent: Georgetown KU | Judge: W Mosley-Jensen
1AC
Contention One
Immateriality and Warfare
The ’Revolution in Military Affairs’ initiated a trajectory towards immateriality in warfare – increasing reliance on technologically mediated decision-making promotes a form of disembodiment that eschews agency and treats war as a natural phenomenon Miller 10 ~Miller, Charles Oliver, B.A. Texas Tech, The mean, green, war machine, Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty at the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master in Arts, Diss. uga, 2010.~
At the end of the Cold War, Hardt and Negri argue, the United AND ground the project’s discussion of visuality and aesthetics in the age of Netwar.
AND, vulnerability is constructed simultaneously as risk assessments feign understanding of infinitely complex human systems. Framing decision-making in terms of control is responsible for the excesses of the War on Terror. Amoore and De Goede 8 (Louise and Markieke, Durham Geography, Amsterdam European Studies, Introduction: Governing by Risk in the War on Terrorism, Risk and the War on Terror, ed. Amoore and De Goede, p. 9-10, JK)
The central question for risk society, as Ulrich Beck sees it, is ’’ AND , information driven utopia of governance’’ (Valverde and Mopas 2004: 239).
AND, the status quo’s justification-driven orientation toward planning ensures failure – accidents simply defy models and foresight. This fantasy of order enables elites to lay the groundwork for failed interventions like Iraq and Afghanistan. Jillian Smith Sept 8 (North Florida English Dept, Tolerating the Intolerable, and#34;Enduring the Unendurable: Representing the Accident in Driver’s Education Films,and#34; Postmodern Culture 19:1)
In emphasizing Freud’s comment that and#34;accumulation puts an end to the impression of chance AND time with a sensible end, but rather has opened multiplicity without end.
AND, policymakers have displaced ethical decisions about warfare by confusing the instrumental means of precision technology with military objectives and strategic planning Kaag and Kaufman 9 ~Kaag, John, and Whitley Kaufman (University of Massachusetts Lowell), and#34;Military frameworks: technological know-how and the legitimization of warfare.and#34; Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22.4 (2009): 585-606.~
So what is this essence of technology and why must tacticians re main wide- AND of relying on technical precision to make moral distinctions in the targeting cycle.
SPECIFICALLY, drone technology reconfigures the socio-technical context in which we perceive and understand ourselves, others, and the world by elevating a detached form of knowledge at the expense of directly engaged bodily experience – this bars empathetic bridging and renders the ’enemy’ an object that is ’standing-to-be-killed’ Coeckelbergh 13 ~Coeckelbergh, Mark (Ph.D. University of Birmingham, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Twente-Netherlands, and#34;Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote fighting.and#34; Ethics and Information Technology (2013): 1-12.~
For my question what kind of knowledge is generated in this practice, it is AND But is this an adequate analysis of the actual practice of drone fighting?
AND, enframing knowledge-as-observation enables broader domination and epistemic violence – the collapse of and#34;knowing aboutand#34; into and#34;knowing whoand#34; legitimizes domination of non-atomic knowledges Dwight Conquergood Summer 2 (Professor of performance studies at Northwestern University, is an ethnographer who has conducted extensive ?eld research in refugee camps overseas and in immigrant neighborhoods in Chicago. Conquergood has coproduced two award-winning documentaries based on his Chicago urban ?eld research: Between Two Worlds: The Hmong Shaman in America(1985) and The Heart Broken in Half (1990). He has consulted with the International Rescue Committee and other human rights organizations working on the death penalty, as well as with public defenders working on capital cases. He has taught at the Bryan R. Shechmeister Death Penalty College, School of Law, Santa Clara University; and#34;Performance Studies Interventions and Radical Research,and#34; The Drama Review 46, 2 (T174), Summer 2002, New York University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; http://www.culturaldevelopment.net.au/downloads/DwightConquergood.pdf)
The dominant way of knowing in the academy is that of empirical observation¶ and AND the writing machine of the lawand#34; (de Certeau 1984:141).
AND, drone warfare enacts a type of ’ethnic cleansing’ by means of a scientific gaze that transmutes targeted subjects into an anonymous simulacrum of digital data which renders them an object to be exterminated Pugliese 11 ~Joseph (Associate Professor in the Department of Media, Music, Communication and Cultural Studies at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, and#34;Prosthetics of law and the anomic violence of drones.and#34; Griffith L. Rev. 20 (2011): 931.~
The military term ’pattern of life’ is inscribed with two intertwined systems of scientific conceptuality AND both international law and the sovereignty of nations such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.
AND, the loss of Being that defines our historical epoch shapes the dominant social imaginary through instrumental reasoning – this denies intrinsic value to other beings and the natural world which legitimates the practices and institutionalization of war, structural violence, and environmental destruction Chwastiaka and Lehmanb 8 ~Michele University of New Mexico, Anderson School of Management, United States, Glen, School of Accounting, University of South Australia, and#34;Accounting for war,and#34; Accounting Forum,Volume 32, Issue 4, December 2008, Pages 313–326~
Many peace researchers argue that the sources for physical violence can be found in passive AND by denying the intrinsic value of others starting with expansionistic logic of capitalism.
Text
Michael and I advocate ontological inquiry into restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States to use drone strikes for targeted killing.
Contention Two
Ontological Inquiry
Analyzing the epistemic and ethical implications of drone warfare is critical toward re-shaping public discussions and political deliberations Coeckelbergh 13 ~Coeckelbergh, Mark (Ph.D. University of Birmingham, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Twente-Netherlands, and#34;Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral epistemology of remote fighting.and#34; Ethics and Information Technology (2013): 1-12.~
Explicit moral reflection can play a role at several levels. To begin with the AND sanitized video game’ (Bumiller 2012). I will further explain below why.
AND, debate’s current model of detatched switch-side increasingly causes people to leave or be unable to adapt after graduation because of the emphasis on a and#34;winand#34; as the sole end of debates – the rush to bad, contradictory positions, large impacts, and rational atomized arguments punishes discussions about intrinsic value that resolve disputes outside of this space Tom Fulkerson and Wes Lotz 13 (Partners and founders, Fulkerson Lotz LLC, and former policy policy debaters; and#34;GOOD HABITS AND BAD HABITS: THE RECYCLING OF COMPETITIVE DEBATERS INTO TRIAL LAWYERS,and#34; Houston Law Review; http://www.houstonlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/4-Fulkerson-Lotz.pdf)
The manner in which competitive debate is conducted and ¶ judged produces certain common attributes AND and relationships, ¶ developing synthesis from analysis, and selecting the jury.
AND, evaluate ontology first – failure to prioritize ontological inquiry is tantamount to a and#34;loss of Beingand#34; which impoverishes understanding while locating social-political institutions as isolated from their natural context and eliminates an authentic relationship to Being – destroying value to life and causing unchecked environmental destruction Magrini 12 ~J.M., Professor at the College of DuPage – Illinois, Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heideger, Technology, and the Poietic Attunement of Literature, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Volume 44, Issue 5, Pages 500-521, July 2012~
Writing in 1927, Heidegger uses the term Dasein to describe the human in his AND , causing us to understand and discourse about our lives in impoverished ways.
AND, the ontological inquiry of the 1AC is a form of counter-education that provides a starting point from which we can engage normalizing education that prioritizes disinterested instrumental rationality in politics as well as debate – instead of focusing on the successful imposition of policy we should begin from a position of transcendence that allows reflection on the meanings, identities, and quests of technological thought Gur-Ze’ev 2 ~Ilan, The University of Haifa, Martin Heidegger, transcendence, and the possibility of counter-education, Heidegger, Education and Modernity, 2002~
So even in face of the success of modern science and technology, even in AND does not satisfy itself by successful imposition on the things in the world;
it does not fulfills itself as technological success or social cooperation and solidarity. AND and banal manifestations of reality and the politics of the distribution of evils.
1/11/14
Iqbal aff - UK rd 2
Tournament: UK | Round: 2 | Opponent: Rutgers RS | Judge: S Elliott
Contention 1
As Giovanni angles states in 2011 Giovanni Angles March 2011 (Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.A., Political Science, Florida International University, 2007; "NO SUIT FOR YOU21 IQBAL’S EFFECT ON POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS CASES AND THE "COMPOUND ALLEGATIONS" SOLUTION," 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 795)
Just follow the ordering procedure and you will be fine... . As you walk AND court’s order to allow staged discovery in lieu of dismissing the claim. n77
The pattern of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and World War II’s Korematsu v. United States is indicative of a selective closure of legal recourse to discriminated communities. We choose not to view Iqbal’s claims in a vacuum, but as part of a larger framework of blame against minority popualtions Dawinder S. Sidhu Apr 2010 (J.D., George Washington University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, amicus brief author in support of Javaid Iqbal; "First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination," 58 Buffalo L. Rev. 419)
Also supporting affirmance was a group of five civil rights and public interest organizations AND differently as a result. n217 We hoped to remind the Justices that,
Iqbal picked up the gun loaded by Korematsu – racialized preventive detention justifies any discriminatory policy under the new pleading standards Dawinder S. Sidhu Apr 10 (J.D., George Washington University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, amicus brief author in support of Javaid Iqbal; "First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination," 58 Buffalo L. Rev. 419)
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that Iqbal’s complaint only "plausibly suggests . AND classified as ’of interest’ to the post-September-11th investigation." n461
Understanding the unpredictable new pleading standard is vitally important for all of us – studies prove Iqbal has enabled judges to uncritically lock the court house doors to challenging discrimination in the home, university, workplace and government Raymond H. Brescia 2011/2012 (Visiting Clinical Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School, J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Fordham University; "The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation," 100 Ky. L.J. 235)
II. The Impact of the New Pleading Standards on Employment and Housing Discrimination¶ AND dismissed, either in whole or in part, rose dramatically after Iqbal.
Michael and I are reminded that we will never lose a job or be detained due to another white person’s actions – codifying culture as the basis for law is a white-washeded universalism that denies agency to and distances those who embody cultural characteristics – this enables government to portray detention as rehabilitation when it is homogenization Leti Volpp 1/1/10 (Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; "Excesses of Culture: On Asian American Citizenship and Identity," 17 Asian L.J. 63 (2010); http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/253)
Behavior that is considered problematic is blamed on racialized¶ culture in a selective way AND ¶ considerable difficulty in being chosen to symbolize We, the people.70
Advocacy statement
Michael and I advocate that Ashcroft v. Iqbal should not be the law.
Contention 2
Is solvency
Iqbal’s high standard of proof is a reminder and creator of the legal system’s racist false presumption of neutrality – we must make a conscious attempt to align the Courts with discriminated communities by removing decision-making from formulaic standards – the hope of an independent judiciary is worth fighting for Victor C. Romero 10 (Maureen B. Cavanaugh Distinguished Faculty Scholar 26 Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University; "Interrogating Iqbal: Intent, Inertia, and (a lack of) Imagination," PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 114:4; http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612252)
Though perhaps less than obvious, the parallels between Plyler and Iqbal are striking. AND an independent judiciary reveals the promise of a democracy more just and fair.
Our militant hope articulates a different world that is possible, an escape from the cynicism of politics under the thumb of the military-industrial-complex. The 1AC acknowledges its own short-term futility; but this is why we struggle. We must be critical, but also abandon cynicism and imagine institutional change – that process begins with our pedagogy here in this debate. Henry Giroux 13 (McMaster University Cultural Studies; "Hope in the time of permanent war," http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/18578-hope-in-a-time-of-permanent-war)
The war drums are beating loudly, and America is once more mobilizing its global AND which the struggle for a new democratic global social order can be constructed.
10/5/13
NDT r4
Tournament: NDT | Round: 4 | Opponent: Oklahoma LM | Judge: Haynal, Kaitlyn Fifelski, Kurt Vega, Matthew
1AC
1AC – the Tower of Babel
Air Force is currently centralizing DoD cyber infrastructure in an attempt to fully automate
Suzanne M. Vautrinot Fall 12 (Major General, USAF, commander of AFCYBER and Air Force Network Operations; "Sharing the Cyber Journey," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3) *Gender modified
Every generation stands on the many shoulders of greatness that preceded¶ it. For AND around¶ an Air Force leadership dialog and Airmen’s fulfillment of these strategies.
DoD is building a Tower of Babel – this doctine gets locked in, which ensures high-tempo escalation – plan is key to maintain cyber escalation control
Jason Healey Fall 12 (Director of USAF Cyber Statecraft Initiative; "Claiming the Lost Cyber Heritage," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3)
At least once before, the Air Force suffered similar "doctrinal lock in,"¶ AND have attempted to solve things¶ organizationally and politically, not operationally."17
Information is insufficient after any cyber-attack – auto-neutralization forces the US’s hand too quickly which prevents signaling commitment to de-escalation
Herbert Lin Fall 12 (PhD physics, MIT, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, where he has been study director of major projects on information technology including formerly serving as staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986–90); "Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol. 6.3)
Signaling Intentions in Cyber Conflict¶ Nothing in the set of options above is specific AND situation has obvious potential¶ for inappropriate and unintended escalation or kinetic response.
Auto-retaliation spills over to communication networks and makes restraint signaling impossible – catalytic conflict makes escalation inevitable – launch-on-warning causes accidental war
Stephen J. Cimbala Spring 11 (PhD, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University–Brandywine, formerconsultant for various US government agencies and private contractors; "Nuclear Crisis Management and "Cyberwar" Phishing for Trouble?" Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 5.1)
Notwithstanding the preceding disclaimers, information warfare has the potential to attack or disrupt successful AND mistaken from a distance for the signature of a small nuclear warhead.25
Sloppy OCOs eliminate nuclear restraint and causes health care crises
Critical infrastructure is a normal target for military planners, to gain tactical or strategic AND In this sense, cyber attack is a tactical weapon with strategic consequences.
1AC – plan text
United States Congress should statutorily prohibit Presidential war powers authority to conduct and/or direct offensive cyber operations pursuant to Title 50 United States Code.
1AC – solvency
The plan solves
Three internal links –
First is split authority – current offensive cyber doctrine splits DoD authority for effectively the same actions between different statutory authorizations, which makes reporting impossible – Congress must specify that all DoD funded and directed operations are subject to Title 10.
Andru E. Wall 11 (Senior Associate with Alston 26 Bird LLP, former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central; "Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities 26 Covert Action," Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 3)
There is no rigid separation between Title 10 and Title 50. A more¶ AND why some military and intelligence activities look alike, yet remain¶ distinguishable.
Second is loopholes – the worst auto-retaliation is enabled by T50’s loophole – plan changes DoD cost-benefit analysis toward higher-level planning – prevents mis-informed attribution and major power war
William A. Owens, et. al. 9 (*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities," report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)
Recommendation 4: The U.S. government should have a clear, transparent AND for STRATCOM’s authority to conduct response actions is not known to the committee.
Third is bureaucratic friction – plan solves the perception of cyber weapons as "sub-lethal" substitutes – false confidence in covert actions lowers threshold for use
William A. Owens, et. al. 9 (*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities," report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)
Finding 19: Early use of cyberattack may be easy to contemplate in a pre AND inclination to intervene simply because the risks of detection are seen as lower.
Our method is key
We control uniqueness – expertism controls OCO policy now – only precise policy simulations spill-over to create a precedent of public dissensus over DoD authorization
Peter Shane 6/26/12 (Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair of Law at Ohio State University; "Cybersecurity Policy as if ’Ordinary Citizens’ Mattered: The Case for Public Participation in Cyber Policy Making," I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 211, p. 433-6, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2012/02/9.Shane_.pdf)
The total abdication of cybersecurity policy to "experts," however, has been, AND the inertia of inside-the-Beltway politics-as-usual.
Resist the urge to under-weigh inevitable miscalculated cyber war – scholarly debates advocating specific restrictions on OCO authority is a pre-req to solving pre-emption incentives and lack of bureaucratic friction – only advocating the plan solves nuclear war
Timothy J. Junio 13 (Doctoral candidate of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a predoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. He also develops new cyber capabilities at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); "How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate," Journal of Strategic Studies, 36:1, Pp. 125-133)
Two recent articles in the pages of this journal contribute to an¶ important debate AND prerequisite to reducing the incidence of cyber¶ conflict and avoiding cyber war.
DoD decision-making can create accurate threat assessments with sufficient intel – systematic checks are key to prevent threat construction
Earl C. Ravenal 9 (Distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato, professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget; Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1; Pp. 21-75)
Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny AND or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.
Specifically, the Title 10/50 debate goes to the core of cyber ops oversight – contextual effects-based decisionmaking creates the best OCO policy
Robert Belk and Matthew Noyes 3/20/12 (*Naval aviator and Politico-Military Fellow, MPP international and global affairs @ Harvard Kennedy School, currently Naval Operations staff in the Pentagon developing and executing Navy network and cybersecurity policy; MPP international security policy @ Harvard Kennedy School, BA Computer Science and Applied Computational Mathematics @ University of Washington, Senior Associate with the cybersecurity practice at Good Harbor Consulting; "On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities A Policy Analysis on Offensive US Cyber Policy," advised by Professors Joseph Nye and Monica Tof; http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cybersecurity-pae-belk-noyes.pdf)
To correct this shortcoming, we have developed a framework that elucidates the critical considerations AND factor the national implications of possibly losing that operational capability in the future.
2AC
Case
AT: state link
Liberal legal restraints work – the K’s thesis is self-serving and wrong
William E. Scheuerman 6 (Professor of Political Science at Indiana University; "Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, Constellations," Volume 13, Issue 1)
Yet this argument relies on Schmitt’s controversial model of politics, as outlined eloquently but AND to develop a legal apparatus suited to the special problem of irregular combatants.
Talking about the state doesn’t grant it legitimacy – gotta speak its language to change bad policies
Mervyn Frost 96 ~Professor, University of Kent, Ethics In International Relations A Constitutive Theory, pp. 90-91, JT~
A first objection which seems inherent in Donelan’s approach is that utilizing the modern state AND such as citizenship, rights under law, representative government and so on.
AT: nuclear reps link
Nuclear focus creates self-denying prophecies not self-fulfilling prophecies – leads to large scale aversion to war
Robert Jervis 9, the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University, "Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying", The National Interest, November/December, 10.27.2009, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22356 Unlike Mueller, many attribute this long peace to wise policies and adept statesmen. AND from it, that are responsible for our living in a safer world.
Nuclear extinction framing solves fear of difference and numbing
Joanna Macy 2k (Adjunct professor at the California Institute of Integral Studies; "Environmental Discourse and Practice: A Reader," Pp. 243)
The move to a wider ecological sense of self is in large part a function AND as a species – be immune to what we do to other beings.
Simulation K
Debating specific policies is a good form of agency in debate
The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law AND undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.
Their refusal to engage the state is the ultimate form of ressentiment.
Saul Newman 2k (postdoctoral fellow at Macquarie University). "Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment." Theory and Event 4:3.
Can this paradoxical relationship of reflection and opposition be seen as a form of ressentiment AND ’evil’. Nietzsche would see in this an attitude of ressentiment par excellence.
Reality outweighs hyper-reality
Luke, Chair, Political Science Dept – Virginia Tech, ’91 (Timothy W, "Power and politics in hyperreality: The critical project of Jean Baudrillard," Social Science Journal, Vol. 28 Issue 3, p347)
Baudrillard’s critical project clearly outlines a fascinating and innovative appraisal of the often confusing and AND he never really demonstrates definitely how this all works with carefully considered evidence.
Cyber K
Our utilitarian causal chains are key to analyze OCO split authority specifically – governments make security decisions with limited resources, not academic moralizing – the alt results in knee-jerk rejection of negative action
First, too expansive a definition for security would make comparing similar policies essentially impossible AND and understanding the causal chain¶ that leads to international security problems. The
re is no doubt that an earthquake can¶ lead to a breakdown of social AND ¶ sound formation of theory and policy regarding these all-important issues.
These considerations show that we must create our own meaning for our lives regardless of AND as the value that we find in living and thus would be irrelevant.
Method/Ontology first is a bad method – it’s only a means.
James Fearon and Alexander Wendt 2k (*Professor of Poli Sci at Stanford; Professor of IR at Ohio State; "Handbook of International Relations," ed. Carlsnaes, Pp. 68)
It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method AND , but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.
Will to power doesn’t make our impacts inevitable – only the plan affirms life – embracing the struggle against our genetic predisposition towards violence through resisting nuclear war is key
Barash and Lipton 85 David P., Professor of Psychology at the University of Washington (Seattle) and Judith Eve, psychiatrist at the Swedish Medical Center in Washington, "The Caveman and the Bomb" p.261-267
Fortunately, whatever genetic imperatives operate in Homo sapiens, they are unlikely to extend AND Neanderthal mentality and thereby transcend, if not overcome, our biology itself.
Allowing death bad
You don’t get to decide that humans die for your academic jollies – turns ontology
Craig Paterson 3 (Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island; "A Life Not Worth Living?" Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)
Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that AND the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82
2AC – Ketels
They justify apathy towards atrocities – voting aff is key to ethics
Ketels 96 ~Violet. Prof of English @ Temple. "Havel to the Castle21" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 548, No 1. Nov 1996~JFS
Intellectuals can choose their roles, but cannot not choose, nor can we evade AND and may have a lasting effect on the consciousnesses of some among us.
Perm do both – must take action even with uncertainty
Molly Cochran 99 (Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology; "Normative Theory in International Relations," Pp. 272)
To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are AND pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.
Our specific impacts aren’t constructed until they prove it.
Yudkowsky 6 Eliezer Yudkowsky, Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence that has published multiple peer-reviewed papers on risk assessment. Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic. August 31, 2006.
Every true idea which discomforts you will seem to match the pattern of at least AND real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball.
Reps don’t turn case – worst-case cyber simulations reduce chances of cyber war
Richard Alan Clarke and Robert K. Knake 10 (*Former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States; Former international affairs fellow in residence at CFR. "Cyber War")
In the seminal 1983 movie about computers and war, War Games, ¶ starring AND period of rising ¶ tensions between the U.S. and China.
Predictions are possible – it’s not all chaos and uncertainty
Nations are eccentric. But they also have threads of repeated history through which we AND and from that derive the likely direction if not the outcome of events.
Even if security is flawed, engaging it creates discourse of social welfare that checks political exclusion and loss of value to life
Loader 7 (Criminology Prof at Oxford; "Civilizing Security," Pp. 5)
Faced with such inhospitable conditions, one can easily lapse into fatalistic despair, letting AND social democratic politics, even for renewing the activity of politics at all.
1ar
No link to giving up agency – simulations affirm life
It is shocking to me how, after literally a DECADE of debates, no AND the stupid phrases "pre-fiat" and "post-fiat."
3/29/14
OCO aff - NDT rd 1
Tournament: NDT | Round: 1 | Opponent: Towson TW | Judge: J Kurr, L VanLuvanee, S Godbey
1AC – the Tower of Babel
Air Force is currently centralizing DoD cyber infrastructure in an attempt to fully automate
Suzanne M. Vautrinot Fall 12 (Major General, USAF, commander of AFCYBER and Air Force Network Operations; "Sharing the Cyber Journey," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3) *Gender modified
Every generation stands on the many shoulders of greatness that preceded¶ it. For AND around¶ an Air Force leadership dialog and Airmen’s fulfillment of these strategies.
DoD is building a Tower of Babel – this doctine gets locked in, which ensures high-tempo escalation – plan is key to maintain cyber escalation control
Jason Healey Fall 12 (Director of USAF Cyber Statecraft Initiative; "Claiming the Lost Cyber Heritage," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3)
At least once before, the Air Force suffered similar "doctrinal lock in,"¶ AND have attempted to solve things¶ organizationally and politically, not operationally."17
Information is insufficient after any cyber-attack – auto-neutralization forces the US’s hand too quickly which prevents signaling commitment to de-escalation
Herbert Lin Fall 12 (PhD physics, MIT, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, where he has been study director of major projects on information technology including formerly serving as staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986–90); "Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol. 6.3)
Signaling Intentions in Cyber Conflict¶ Nothing in the set of options above is specific AND situation has obvious potential¶ for inappropriate and unintended escalation or kinetic response.
Auto-retaliation spills over to communication networks and makes restraint signaling impossible – catalytic conflict makes escalation inevitable – launch-on-warning causes accidental war
Stephen J. Cimbala Spring 11 (PhD, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University–Brandywine, formerconsultant for various US government agencies and private contractors; "Nuclear Crisis Management and "Cyberwar" Phishing for Trouble?" Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 5.1)
Notwithstanding the preceding disclaimers, information warfare has the potential to attack or disrupt successful AND mistaken from a distance for the signature of a small nuclear warhead.25
Sloppy OCOs eliminate nuclear restraint and causes health care crises
Critical infrastructure is a normal target for military planners, to gain tactical or strategic AND In this sense, cyber attack is a tactical weapon with strategic consequences.
1AC – plan text
United States Congress should statutorily prohibit Presidential war powers authority to conduct and/or direct offensive cyber operations pursuant to Title 50 United States Code.
1AC – solvency
The plan solves
Three internal links –
First is split authority – current offensive cyber doctrine splits DoD authority for effectively the same actions between different statutory authorizations, which makes reporting impossible – Congress must specify that all DoD funded and directed operations are subject to Title 10.
Andru E. Wall 11 (Senior Associate with Alston 26 Bird LLP, former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central; "Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities 26 Covert Action," Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 3)
There is no rigid separation between Title 10 and Title 50. A more¶ AND why some military and intelligence activities look alike, yet remain¶ distinguishable.
Second is loopholes – the worst auto-retaliation is enabled by T50’s loophole – plan changes DoD cost-benefit analysis toward higher-level planning – prevents mis-informed attribution and major power war
William A. Owens, et. al. 9 (*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities," report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)
Recommendation 4: The U.S. government should have a clear, transparent AND for STRATCOM’s authority to conduct response actions is not known to the committee.
Third is bureaucratic friction – plan solves the perception of cyber weapons as "sub-lethal" substitutes – false confidence in covert actions lowers threshold for use
William A. Owens, et. al. 9 (*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities," report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)
Finding 19: Early use of cyberattack may be easy to contemplate in a pre AND inclination to intervene simply because the risks of detection are seen as lower.
Our method is key
We control uniqueness – expertism controls OCO policy now – only precise policy simulations spill-over to create a precedent of public dissensus over DoD authorization
Peter Shane 6/26/12 (Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair of Law at Ohio State University; "Cybersecurity Policy as if ’Ordinary Citizens’ Mattered: The Case for Public Participation in Cyber Policy Making," I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 211, p. 433-6, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2012/02/9.Shane_.pdf)
The total abdication of cybersecurity policy to "experts," however, has been, AND the inertia of inside-the-Beltway politics-as-usual.
Resist the urge to under-weigh inevitable miscalculated cyber war – scholarly debates advocating specific restrictions on OCO authority is a pre-req to solving pre-emption incentives and lack of bureaucratic friction – only advocating the plan solves nuclear war
Timothy J. Junio 13 (Doctoral candidate of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a predoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. He also develops new cyber capabilities at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); "How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate," Journal of Strategic Studies, 36:1, Pp. 125-133)
Two recent articles in the pages of this journal contribute to an¶ important debate AND prerequisite to reducing the incidence of cyber¶ conflict and avoiding cyber war.
DoD decision-making can create accurate threat assessments with sufficient intel – systematic checks are key to prevent threat construction
Earl C. Ravenal 9 (Distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato, professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget; Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1; Pp. 21-75)
Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny AND or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.
Specifically, the Title 10/50 debate goes to the core of cyber ops oversight – contextual effects-based decisionmaking creates the best OCO policy
Robert Belk and Matthew Noyes 3/20/12 (*Naval aviator and Politico-Military Fellow, MPP international and global affairs @ Harvard Kennedy School, currently Naval Operations staff in the Pentagon developing and executing Navy network and cybersecurity policy; MPP international security policy @ Harvard Kennedy School, BA Computer Science and Applied Computational Mathematics @ University of Washington, Senior Associate with the cybersecurity practice at Good Harbor Consulting; "On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities A Policy Analysis on Offensive US Cyber Policy," advised by Professors Joseph Nye and Monica Tof; http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cybersecurity-pae-belk-noyes.pdf)
To correct this shortcoming, we have developed a framework that elucidates the critical considerations AND factor the national implications of possibly losing that operational capability in the future.
United States Congress should enact legislation requiring offensive cyber operations funded, conducted, and/or directed by Department of Defense be conducted pursuant to Title 10 United States Code § 484.
1AC – auto-retaliation
Air Force is currently centralizing DoD cyber infrastructure in an attempt to fully automate Suzanne M. Vautrinot Fall 12 (Major General, USAF, commander of AFCYBER and Air Force Network Operations; "Sharing the Cyber Journey," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3) *Gender modified
Every generation stands on the many shoulders of greatness that preceded¶ it. For AND around¶ an Air Force leadership dialog and Airmen’s fulfillment of these strategies.
Auto-retaliation enabled by T50’s loophole – plan changes DoD cost-benefit analysis toward higher-level planning – prevents mis-informed attack attribution and major power war William A. Owens, et. al. 9 (*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities," report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)
Recommendation 4: The U.S. government should have a clear, transparent AND for STRATCOM’s authority to conduct response actions is not known to the committee.
Gets locked in – plan prevents unpreparedness for longer conflicts which cedes escalation control Jason Healey Fall 12 (Director of USAF Cyber Statecraft Initiative; "Claiming the Lost Cyber Heritage," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3)
At least once before, the Air Force suffered similar "doctrinal lock in,"¶ AND have attempted to solve things¶ organizationally and politically, not operationally."17
Auto-retal spills over to communication networks and muddies restraint signaling – independently, catalytic conflict causes escalation – launch-on-warning makes nuclear extinction inevitable Stephen J. Cimbala Spring 11 (PhD, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University–Brandywine, formerconsultant for various US government agencies and private contractors; "Nuclear Crisis Management and "Cyberwar" Phishing for Trouble?" Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 5.1)
Notwithstanding the preceding disclaimers, information warfare has the potential to attack or disrupt successful AND mistaken from a distance for the signature of a small nuclear warhead.25
Information is insufficient after any cyber-attack – auto-neutralization forces the US’s hand too quickly which prevents signaling commitment to de-escalation Herbert Lin Fall 12 (PhD physics, MIT, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, where he has been study director of major projects on information technology including formerly serving as staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986–90); "Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol. 6.3)
Signaling Intentions in Cyber Conflict¶ Nothing in the set of options above is specific AND situation has obvious potential¶ for inappropriate and unintended escalation or kinetic response.
Independently, auto-retaliation undermines perception of responsible US OCO policy – sets an unrestrained model that causes escalation and collapses soft power Robert Belk and Matthew Noyes 3/20/12 (*Naval aviator and Politico-Military Fellow, MPP international and global affairs @ Harvard Kennedy School, currently Naval Operations staff in the Pentagon developing and executing Navy network and cybersecurity policy; MPP international security policy @ Harvard Kennedy School, BA Computer Science and Applied Computational Mathematics @ University of Washington, Senior Associate with the cybersecurity practice at Good Harbor Consulting; "On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities A Policy Analysis on Offensive US Cyber Policy," advised by Professors Joseph Nye and Monica Tof; http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cybersecurity-pae-belk-noyes.pdf)
The primary executional consideration for cyber counterattack centers on the area of responsibility. By AND operations in order to better balance the need for operational security with transparency.
Power always depends on context, and in today’s world, it is distributed in AND even the largest country cannot achieve its aims without the help of others.
1AC – split authority
Split authority makes DoD cyber planning incoherent – plan enables sufficient intelligence integration to make cyber operations a true US force multiplier Rosemary M. Carter, Brent Feick, and Roy C. Undersander Q3 12 (*Colonel, USA, Communications Officer on the Army Staff; Colonel, USAF, Senior Policy Advisor for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, Integration, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities; *Captain, USN, Executive Officer of Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida; "Offensive Cyber for the Joint Force Commander," Joint Force Quarterly Vol. 66)
Operational Planning¶ Larger than the targeting process is¶ overall planning for an operation AND joint interagency coordination group¶ process to become a force multiplier for DOD.
Split authority will leave CYBERCOM scrambling for info to generate a T10 response – cyberattacks on infrastructure and military assets cause a reaction dead zone – sufficient to degrade the US econ, military ability, and leadership Charles W. Douglass and James R. Greenburg 3/22/12 (*Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force; Commander, USAF and Project Advisor for US Army War College; "21ST CENTURY CYBER SECURITY: LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND REQUIREMENTS," http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561641)
As the DoD grappled with these major cyber espionage events, DHS was designated the AND to operate offensively in cyberspace and cedes freedom of maneuver to an enemy.
Sudden loss of mission effectiveness causes nuclear war in every hotspot Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon Apr 7 (*Resident scholar at AEI; Senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings; "The Case for Larger Ground Forces," http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf)
We live at a time when wars not only rage¶ in nearly every region AND missions such as the ones now under¶ way in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Heg decline causes lash-out, collapses global trade and crisis management Michael Beckley 12 (Assistant professor of political science at Tufts, research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; PhD dissertation: "The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited")
One danger is that declinism could prompt trade conflicts and immigration restrictions. The results AND and disease, which may fester without a leader to rally collective action.
Infinite causes of war – only hegemony consistently prevents spill-over and puts a ceiling on escalation – don’t make the good contingent on perfection John Moore 4 (Chaired law prof, UVA, former first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State; "Beyond the Democratic Peace," 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 341)
If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic AND in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?
Econ decline causes global escalation and extinction Geoffrey Kemp 10 (Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East," p. 233-4)
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first AND expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.
1AC – solvency
Splitting the same set of Offensive Cyber Operations between different statutory authorizations makes oversight incoherent – plan aligns the law with operational realities Andru E. Wall 11 (Senior Associate with Alston 26 Bird LLP, former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central; "Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities 26 Covert Action," Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 3)
There is no rigid separation between Title 10 and Title 50. A more¶ AND why some military and intelligence activities look alike, yet remain¶ distinguishable.
Split authority imposes no restrictions on kinetic-level attacks globally – plan is the optimal balance between oversight and flexibility Eric Lorber Jan 13 (J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science; "EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?" JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. 15:3; https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013)
If the United States did intend to hide a cyberattack, even though it was AND these areas—provide input would be useful in ¶ developing this understanding.
United States Congress should enact legislation requiring offensive cyber operations funded, conducted, and/or directed by Department of Defense be conducted pursuant to Title 10 United States Code § 484.
1AC – auto-retaliation
Air Force is currently centralizing DoD cyber infrastructure in an attempt to fully automate Suzanne M. Vautrinot Fall 12 (Major General, USAF, commander of AFCYBER and Air Force Network Operations; "Sharing the Cyber Journey," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3) *Gender modified
Every generation stands on the many shoulders of greatness that preceded¶ it. For AND around¶ an Air Force leadership dialog and Airmen’s fulfillment of these strategies.
Auto-retaliation enabled by T50’s loophole – plan changes DoD cost-benefit analysis toward higher-level planning – prevents mis-informed attack attribution and major power war William A. Owens, et. al. 9 (*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities," report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)
Recommendation 4: The U.S. government should have a clear, transparent AND for STRATCOM’s authority to conduct response actions is not known to the committee.
Gets locked in – plan prevents unpreparedness for longer conflicts which cedes escalation control Jason Healey Fall 12 (Director of USAF Cyber Statecraft Initiative; "Claiming the Lost Cyber Heritage," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3)
At least once before, the Air Force suffered similar "doctrinal lock in,"¶ AND have attempted to solve things¶ organizationally and politically, not operationally."17
Cyber warfare is real and attacks against the US are increasing – proportionate response key to prevent major power war Eugene Habiger 2/1/10 (Retired Air Force General; " CYBERWARFARE AND CYBERTERRORISM: THE NEED FOR A NEW U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH," The Cyber Security Institute)
However, there are reasons to believe that what is going on now amounts AND based defenses, making us significantly more at risk of a major war.
Information is insufficient after any cyber-attack – auto-neutralization forces the US’s hand too quickly which prevents signaling commitment to de-escalation Herbert Lin Fall 12 (PhD physics, MIT, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, where he has been study director of major projects on information technology including formerly serving as staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986–90); "Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol. 6.3)
Signaling Intentions in Cyber Conflict¶ Nothing in the set of options above is specific AND situation has obvious potential¶ for inappropriate and unintended escalation or kinetic response.
Auto-retal spills over to communication networks and muddies restraint signaling – independently, catalytic conflict causes escalation – launch-on-warning makes nuclear extinction inevitable Stephen J. Cimbala Spring 11 (PhD, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University–Brandywine, formerconsultant for various US government agencies and private contractors; "Nuclear Crisis Management and "Cyberwar" Phishing for Trouble?" Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 5.1)
Notwithstanding the preceding disclaimers, information warfare has the potential to attack or disrupt successful AND mistaken from a distance for the signature of a small nuclear warhead.25
OCO spill-over eliminates nuclear restraint and causes health care crises James A. Lewis Sept 10 (Center for Strategic and International Studies "Thresholds for Cyberwar," http://csis.org/files/publication/101001_ieee_insert.pdf)
Critical infrastructure is a normal target for military planners, to gain tactical or strategic AND In this sense, cyber attack is a tactical weapon with strategic consequences.
Hindering response and surveillance makes epidemics uniquely likely John T. Watson, Michelle Gayer, and Maire A. Connolly Jan 7 (*Medical epidemiologist with the Disease Control in Emergencies Program at the World Health Organization; Coordinator for Surge and Crisis Support at World Health Organization; *World Health Organization; "Epidemics after Natural Disasters," Emerg Infect Dis. 2007 January; 13(1): 1–5; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/)
Power cuts related to disasters may disrupt water treatment and supply plants, thereby increasing AND when needed, and to better quantify the risk for outbreaks after disasters.
A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed AND could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).
1AC – solvency
Splitting the same set of Offensive Cyber Operations between different statutory authorizations makes oversight incoherent – plan aligns the law with operational realities Andru E. Wall 11 (Senior Associate with Alston 26 Bird LLP, former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central; "Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities 26 Covert Action," Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 3)
There is no rigid separation between Title 10 and Title 50. A more¶ AND why some military and intelligence activities look alike, yet remain¶ distinguishable.
Split authority imposes no restrictions on kinetic-level attacks globally – plan is the optimal balance between oversight and flexibility Eric Lorber Jan 13 (J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science; "EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?" JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. 15:3; https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013)
If the United States did intend to hide a cyberattack, even though it was AND these areas—provide input would be useful in ¶ developing this understanding.
Current OCO debates are too obscured by bureaucracy to make citizen checks effective – debates like the aff are key William A. Owens, et. al. 9 (*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities," report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)
The possibility that the United States might choose to engage in cyberattacks to serve its AND in providing education and background is in our view its most important function.
Specifically, the Title 10/50 debate goes to the core of cyber ops oversight – contextual effects-based decisionmaking creates the best OCO policy Robert Belk and Matthew Noyes 3/20/12 (*Naval aviator and Politico-Military Fellow, MPP international and global affairs @ Harvard Kennedy School, currently Naval Operations staff in the Pentagon developing and executing Navy network and cybersecurity policy; MPP international security policy @ Harvard Kennedy School, BA Computer Science and Applied Computational Mathematics @ University of Washington, Senior Associate with the cybersecurity practice at Good Harbor Consulting; "On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities A Policy Analysis on Offensive US Cyber Policy," advised by Professors Joseph Nye and Monica Tof; http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cybersecurity-pae-belk-noyes.pdf)
To correct this shortcoming, we have developed a framework that elucidates the critical considerations AND factor the national implications of possibly losing that operational capability in the future.
DoD decision-making can create accurate threat assessments with sufficient intel – systematic checks are key to accuracy Earl C. Ravenal 9 (Distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato, professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget; Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1; Pp. 21-75)
Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny AND or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.
9/17/13
OCO aff - Weber RR rd 1
Tournament: Weber RR | Round: 1 | Opponent: UMKC CJ | Judge: M Bausch
1AC – Weber RR rd 1 vs. UMKC CJ
1AC – the Tower of Babel
Air Force is currently centralizing DoD cyber infrastructure in an attempt to fully automate
Suzanne M. Vautrinot Fall 12 (Major General, USAF, commander of AFCYBER and Air Force Network Operations; "Sharing the Cyber Journey," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3) *Gender modified
Every generation stands on the many shoulders of greatness that preceded¶ it. For AND around¶ an Air Force leadership dialog and Airmen’s fulfillment of these strategies.
DoD is building a Tower of Babel – this doctine gets locked in, which ensures high-tempo escalation – plan is key to maintain cyber escalation control
Jason Healey Fall 12 (Director of USAF Cyber Statecraft Initiative; "Claiming the Lost Cyber Heritage," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3)
At least once before, the Air Force suffered similar "doctrinal lock in,"¶ AND have attempted to solve things¶ organizationally and politically, not operationally."17
Information is insufficient after any cyber-attack – auto-neutralization forces the US’s hand too quickly which prevents signaling commitment to de-escalation
Herbert Lin Fall 12 (PhD physics, MIT, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, where he has been study director of major projects on information technology including formerly serving as staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986–90); "Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol. 6.3)
Signaling Intentions in Cyber Conflict¶ Nothing in the set of options above is specific AND situation has obvious potential¶ for inappropriate and unintended escalation or kinetic response.
Auto-retaliation spills over to communication networks and makes restraint signaling impossible – catalytic conflict makes escalation inevitable – launch-on-warning causes nuclear extinction
Stephen J. Cimbala Spring 11 (PhD, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University–Brandywine, formerconsultant for various US government agencies and private contractors; "Nuclear Crisis Management and "Cyberwar" Phishing for Trouble?" Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 5.1)
Notwithstanding the preceding disclaimers, information warfare has the potential to attack or disrupt successful AND mistaken from a distance for the signature of a small nuclear warhead.25
Split cyber authority leads to extreme delegation and a lack of effective targeting – only the plan prevents imprecise cyber attacks that cause critical infrastructure collapse
Rosemary M. Carter, et. al. Q3 12 (*Colonel, USA, Communications Officer on the Army Staff; Brent Feick, Colonel, USAF, Senior Policy Advisor for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, Integration, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities; *Roy C. Undersander, Captain, USN, Executive Officer of Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida; "Offensive Cyber for the Joint Force Commander," Joint Force Quarterly Vol. 66)
The Need for Rules¶ U.S. policy, authorities, and doctrine AND the targeting community catches up with new¶ policies and the supporting technology.
Sloppy OCOs eliminate nuclear restraint and causes health care crises
Critical infrastructure is a normal target for military planners, to gain tactical or strategic AND In this sense, cyber attack is a tactical weapon with strategic consequences.
Hindering response and surveillance makes epidemics uniquely likely
John T. Watson, Michelle Gayer, and Maire A. Connolly Jan 7 (*Medical epidemiologist with the Disease Control in Emergencies Program at the World Health Organization; Coordinator for Surge and Crisis Support at World Health Organization; *World Health Organization; "Epidemics after Natural Disasters," Emerg Infect Dis. 2007 January; 13(1): 1–5; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/)
Power cuts related to disasters may disrupt water treatment and supply plants, thereby increasing AND when needed, and to better quantify the risk for outbreaks after disasters.
A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed AND could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).
1AC – plan text
United States Congress should statutorily prohibit Presidential war powers authority to conduct and/or direct offensive cyber operations pursuant to Title 50 United States Code.
1AC – solvency
The plan solves
Three internal links –
First is split authority – current offensive cyber doctrine splits DoD authority for effectively the same actions between different statutory authorizations, which makes reporting impossible – Congress must specify that all DoD funded and directed operations are subject to Title 10.
Andru E. Wall 11 (Senior Associate with Alston 26 Bird LLP, former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central; "Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities 26 Covert Action," Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 3)
There is no rigid separation between Title 10 and Title 50. A more¶ AND why some military and intelligence activities look alike, yet remain¶ distinguishable.
Second is loopholes – the worst auto-retaliation is enabled by T50’s loophole – plan changes DoD cost-benefit analysis toward higher-level planning – prevents mis-informed attribution and major power war
William A. Owens, et. al. 9 (*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities," report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)
Recommendation 4: The U.S. government should have a clear, transparent AND for STRATCOM’s authority to conduct response actions is not known to the committee.
Third is bureaucratic friction – plan solves the perception of cyber weapons as "sub-lethal" substitutes – false confidence in covert actions lowers threshold for use
William A. Owens, et. al. 9 (*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities," report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)
Finding 19: Early use of cyberattack may be easy to contemplate in a pre AND inclination to intervene simply because the risks of detection are seen as lower.
Our method is key
We control uniqueness – expertism controls OCO policy now – only precise policy simulations spill-over to create a precedent of public dissensus over DoD authorization
Peter Shane 6/26/12 (Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair of Law at Ohio State University; "Cybersecurity Policy as if ’Ordinary Citizens’ Mattered: The Case for Public Participation in Cyber Policy Making," I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 211, p. 433-6, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2012/02/9.Shane_.pdf)
The total abdication of cybersecurity policy to "experts," however, has been, AND the inertia of inside-the-Beltway politics-as-usual.
Resist the urge to under-weigh inevitable miscalculated cyber war – scholarly debates advocating specific restrictions on OCO authority is a pre-req to solving pre-emption incentives and lack of bureaucratic friction – only advocating the plan solves nuclear war
Timothy J. Junio 13 (Doctoral candidate of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a predoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. He also develops new cyber capabilities at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); "How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate," Journal of Strategic Studies, 36:1, Pp. 125-133) "C2" refers to cyber "command and control" Two recent articles in the pages of this journal contribute to an¶ important debate AND prerequisite to reducing the incidence of cyber¶ conflict and avoiding cyber war.
DoD decision-making can create accurate threat assessments with sufficient intel – systematic checks are key to accuracy
Earl C. Ravenal 9 (Distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato, professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget; Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1; Pp. 21-75)
Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny AND or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.
Specifically, the Title 10/50 debate goes to the core of cyber ops oversight – contextual effects-based decisionmaking creates the best OCO policy
Robert Belk and Matthew Noyes 3/20/12 (*Naval aviator and Politico-Military Fellow, MPP international and global affairs @ Harvard Kennedy School, currently Naval Operations staff in the Pentagon developing and executing Navy network and cybersecurity policy; MPP international security policy @ Harvard Kennedy School, BA Computer Science and Applied Computational Mathematics @ University of Washington, Senior Associate with the cybersecurity practice at Good Harbor Consulting; "On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities A Policy Analysis on Offensive US Cyber Policy," advised by Professors Joseph Nye and Monica Tof; http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cybersecurity-pae-belk-noyes.pdf)
To correct this shortcoming, we have developed a framework that elucidates the critical considerations AND factor the national implications of possibly losing that operational capability in the future.
1/26/14
OCO aff - Weber RR rd 5
Tournament: Weber RR | Round: 5 | Opponent: Wyoming MP | Judge: M Gordon
1AC – Weber RR rd 5 vs. Wyo MP
Adv 1 – terrorism
Cyberterror attacks easy and probable – inadequate long-term response strategies causes miscalculated or proxy nuclear war including Russia’s Dead Hand
Jason Fritz July 9 (Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, MA international relations @ Bond U, "Hacking Nuclear Command and Control," http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf)
This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. AND its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.
AND, that causes extinction – cyberterror makes communication breakdowns likely and destroys the firebreak in minutes including the Samson Option
Dennis Morgan Nov 9 (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea; Futures, "World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race," Science Direct)
In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ’’Is AND , to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.
AND, split executive OCO authority leads to jurisdictional battles which create time for terrorists to evade individualized counter-ops – ensures successful cyberterror attacks against the US
John W. Brennan and Charles Dunlap 3/15/12 (*Lieutenant Colonel @ US Army; Professor of the Practice of Law and Executive Director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security @ Duke, former deputy judge advocate general of the United States Air Force; "United States Counter Terrorism Cyber Law and Policy, Enabling or Disabling?" http://nsfp.web.unc.edu/files/2012/09/Brennan_UNITED-STATES-COUNTER-TERRORISM-CYBER-LAW-AND-POLICY.pdf)
One of the key (and most difficult) tasks in destroying terrorist organizations overseas AND of the proposed CT cyber operation was to thwart an impending attack.60
Adv 2 – warfighting
Scen 1 – auto-retaliation
Air Force is currently centralizing DoD cyber infrastructure in an attempt to fully automate
Suzanne M. Vautrinot Fall 12 (Major General, USAF, commander of AFCYBER and Air Force Network Operations; "Sharing the Cyber Journey," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3) *Gender modified
Every generation stands on the many shoulders of greatness that preceded¶ it. For AND around¶ an Air Force leadership dialog and Airmen’s fulfillment of these strategies.
AND, this doctrine promotes speed over accuracy, which gets locked in and causes high-tempo escalation – plan is key to maintain cyber escalation control
Jason Healey Fall 12 (Director of USAF Cyber Statecraft Initiative; "Claiming the Lost Cyber Heritage," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3)
At least once before, the Air Force suffered similar "doctrinal lock in,"¶ AND have attempted to solve things¶ organizationally and politically, not operationally."17
AND, auto-retaliation spills over to communication networks and muddies restraint signaling – independently, catalytic conflict causes escalation – launch-on-warning makes nuclear extinction inevitable
Stephen J. Cimbala Spring 11 (PhD, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University–Brandywine, formerconsultant for various US government agencies and private contractors; "Nuclear Crisis Management and "Cyberwar" Phishing for Trouble?" Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 5.1)
Notwithstanding the preceding disclaimers, information warfare has the potential to attack or disrupt successful AND mistaken from a distance for the signature of a small nuclear warhead.25
AND, auto-retaliation is enabled by T50’s loophole – plan changes DoD cost-benefit analysis toward higher-level planning which solves miscalculated major power war
William A. Owens, et. al. 9 (*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities," report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)
Recommendation 4: The U.S. government should have a clear, transparent AND for STRATCOM’s authority to conduct response actions is not known to the committee.
Scen 2 – modeling
Current offensive cyber doctrine splits DoD authority for effectively the same actions between different statutory authorizations, which makes oversight incoherent – Congress must specify that all DoD funded and directed operations are subject to Title 10.
Andru E. Wall 11 (Senior Associate with Alston 26 Bird LLP, former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central; "Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities 26 Covert Action," Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 3)
There is no rigid separation between Title 10 and Title 50. A more¶ AND why some military and intelligence activities look alike, yet remain¶ distinguishable.
AND, brink of explosive OCO development is now – best data proves CyberCom’s statutory authorization structure will be cemented globally – plan’s model locks in clear brightlines for cyber escalation which solves extinction
Chris C. Demchak and Peter Dombrowski Spring 11 (*Former Army Reserve officer, received her PhD in political science from UC Berkeley AND of a Cybered Westphalian Age," Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 5.1)
From the RMA to net-centric warfare, the United States has a history AND beyond traditional physical domains of land, air, sea, and space.
AND, lack of bureaucracy makes nuclear war inevitable
The United States is racing for the technological frontier in military and intelligence uses of AND be every bit as reasonable given their anxiety about unconstrained American cyber superiority.
Scen 3 – pre-emption
Plan’s statutory OCO guidelines solve the "Traditional Military Activity" loophole in Title 50 – that hides poorly-planned pre-emptive cyber operations which make miscalculated escalation inevitable – there are far fewer checks than direct nuclear war
(Someone’s finally reading Dycus in context21) Stephen Dycus 10 (Professor, Vermont Law School; "Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare," JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 26 POLICY Vol. 4:155)
The Defense Department is heavily engaged in preparations for cyber¶ warfare, having recently AND require a prompt and full account of every significant use of cyber weapons.
AND, China and Russia will respond with escalatory cyber attacks – wrecks the firebreak in minutes
Richard A. Clarke and Steve Andreasen 6/14/13 (*Chairman @ Good Harbor Security Risk Management, former special adviser to the president for cybersecurity in the George W. Bush administration; Consultant @ Nuclear Threat Initiative, former National Security Council staff director for defense policy and arms control; "Cyberwar’s threat does not justify a new policy of nuclear deterrence," http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-14/opinions/39977598_1_nuclear-weapons-cyber-attack-cyberattacks)
President Obama is expected to unveil a new nuclear policy initiative this week in Berlin AND is prepared to use nuclear weapons very early in response to a major cyberattack
— and is maintaining nuclear forces on "prompt launch" status to do so AND risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch, would also probably stall.
1AC – plan text
United States Congress should substantially increase its statutory restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by statutorily
—prohibiting Presidential Title 50 United States Code war power authority for offensive cyber operations, including Traditional Military Activities and Operational Preparation of the Environment.
—prohibiting offensive cyber operations about which Congress has not been notified, except in response to the use of cyber weapons that can be traced with high confidence to a state, person or organized sponsor.
And
—prohibiting offensive cyber operations for which a prompt and full account of use could not feasibly be issued to Congress.
1/26/14
Pain drones aff - CEDA doubles
Tournament: CEDA | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Vermont BB | Judge: D Quigley, P Samuels, K Ortiz, B Manuel, M Antonucci
1AC
Check out this awesome idea from the champs over at Georgetown:
Plan: The United States Federal Government should restrict the President’s authority for targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
Well, maybe it’s better to go the James Madison route… after all, they weren’t part of any scandals21
Plan: The United States federal government should switch supervision of the drone program to Title 10 of the United States Code.
Even further West, UNLV has some ideas, too21
Plan: The United States Federal Government ought to substantially increase judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by designating District Court judges to approve or reject targeted killings involving the use of drone strikes based on a strict scrutiny test.
You know Cal State Chico is on that bandwagon21
Plan: The United States congress should establish a federal court with jurisdiction over targeted killing orders.
Even Michael and I dabbled in that drone-y goodness.
Plan: The United States federal government should statutorily restrict Presidential war powers authority for targeted killing using uninhabited aerial vehicles as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
Or maybe not.
Forget the way this topic asks teams to affirm the resolution. Advocating things like drone courts and other statutory and legal restrictions is a liberal response to the atrocities we all know the US is committing overseas. This is a bankrupt strategy that simply plays into the hands of power, solidifying their control over worldwide resources via endless racist warfare.
Obama was supposed to be the people’s savior but now is outdoing Bush. Why AND in the wider wars they’re planning and the next world war to come.
We think that the way the American public and debate community debates about drones too often focuses on whether they are "doing their job" – these are the wrong questions to be asking. Instead we should call attention to the human suffering inflicted by our drone programs. A good place to start would be somewhere like North Waziristan, one of those so-called tribal areas that America can’t quite comprehend, where all aspects of cultural and communal life are under assault from above.
Much of the public debate about drone strikes in Pakistan has focused narrowly on whether AND such strikes have on those hit, those near, and their families.
Our ironically named targeted killing program has inflicted thousands of painful injuries on all sorts of people who we never even targeted.
Some would say Sadaullah is lucky to be alive. When missiles from US drones AND injuries. ’Neither injury appeared to be life-threatening’, APreported.
In addition to physical pain, drone strikes have created conditions of endless psychological trauma in areas they frequent. Interviews with people who have been struck or know people who have been struck paint a terrifying picture.
One of the few accounts of living under drones ever published in the US came AND middle of the night screaming because they are hallucinating about drones."~227~
Meanwhile, in the United States, former drone pilots like Brandon Bryant are starting to tell their story – one of psychological distancing ending in mass PTSD and borderline official worship of drones.
A soldier sets out to graduate at the top of his class. He succeeds AND , Virginia, the CIA controls operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.
Neoliberal war-mongers are waging war not only globally, but internally by using our body’s own self-defenses to render us passive. The anxiety, PTSD, and psychological trauma generated by drone warfare short-circuit subjectivity by turning experience into a biopolitical zone of annihilation. Only challenging this auto-immunity can undermine the suicidal war machine’s affective legitimacy.
Pasi Valiaho 3/15/12 (Senior Lecturer in Film and Screen Studies at Goldsmiths University of London; "Affectivity, Biopolitics and the Virtual Reality of War," Theory, Culture 26 Society 2012, Vol. 29(2): 63-83)
In this regard, the control of memory and affectivity in virtual environments¶ coincides AND makes the subject violently attack¶ any element of threat, even itself.
We want you to consider the impact of pain as possibly more important than just about any other factor in the debate – it makes everything worse.
Hogshire in 2001 (Jim, Author of Books, "Poppycock" You are Being Lied to ed Russ Kick, p. 252)
The poppy’s central and indispensable position in our civilization makes access to it as important AND wrong with you, guaranteed the addition of pain will make it WORSE.
The resolution isn’t a passive object of knowledge but an apparatus of production and reproduction of bodies and other "objects" of knowledge – our affirmation is one that affirms the topic as an active, meaning-generating apparatus of bodily production.
Haraway 2007 (Donna, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, From Technoscience: the Politics of Interventions, Unipub)
So I will close with a final category useful to a feminist theory of situated AND the world as coding trickster with whom we¶ must learn to converse.
3/26/14
Pain drones aff - Weber RR rd 4
Tournament: Weber RR | Round: 4 | Opponent: UNT AK | Judge: R Cheek
1AC – Weber RR rd 4 vs. UNT AK
Contention 1 – war
The way this topic is currently approached asks teams to affirm a bankrupt conception of political action. Advocating things like drone courts and other partial restrictions is a liberal response to the atrocities we all know the US is committing overseas. This is a bankrupt strategy that simply plays into the hands of power, solidifying their control over worldwide resources via endless racist warfare.
Obama was supposed to be the people’s savior but now is outdoing Bush. Why AND in the wider wars they’re planning and the next world war to come.
We think this is because the way the American public and debate community debates about drones too often focuses on whether they are "doing their job" – these are the wrong questions to be asking. Instead we should call attention to the human suffering inflicted by our drone programs. A good place to start would be somewhere like North Waziristan, one of those so-called tribal areas that America can’t quite comprehend, where all aspects of cultural and communal life are under assault from above.
Much of the public debate about drone strikes in Pakistan has focused narrowly on whether AND such strikes have on those hit, those near, and their families.
Our ironically named targeted killing program has inflicted thousands of painful injuries on all sorts of people who we never even targeted.
Some would say Sadaullah is lucky to be alive. When missiles from US drones AND injuries. ’Neither injury appeared to be life-threatening’, APreported.
In addition to physical pain, drone strikes have created conditions of endless psychological trauma in areas they frequent. Interviews with people who have been struck or know people who have been struck paint a terrifying picture.
One of the few accounts of living under drones ever published in the US came AND middle of the night screaming because they are hallucinating about drones."~227~
Meanwhile, in the United States, former drone pilots like Brandon Bryant are starting to tell their story – one of psychological distancing ending in mass PTSD and borderline official worship of drones.
A soldier sets out to graduate at the top of his class. He succeeds AND , Virginia, the CIA controls operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.
Neoliberal war-mongers are waging war not only globally, but internally by using our body’s own self-defenses to render us passive. The anxiety, PTSD, and psychological trauma generated by drone warfare short-circuit subjectivity by turning experience into a biopolitical zone of annihilation. Only challenging this auto-immunity can undermine the suicidal war machine’s affective legitimacy.
Pasi Valiaho 3/15/12 (Senior Lecturer in Film and Screen Studies at Goldsmiths University of London; "Affectivity, Biopolitics and the Virtual Reality of War," Theory, Culture 26 Society 2012, Vol. 29(2): 63-83)
In this regard, the control of memory and affectivity in virtual environments¶ coincides AND makes the subject violently attack¶ any element of threat, even itself.
We want you to consider the impact of pain as possibly more important than just about any other factor in the debate – it makes everything worse.
Hogshire in 2001 (Jim, Author of Books, "Poppycock" You are Being Lied to ed Russ Kick, p. 252)
The poppy’s central and indispensable position in our civilization makes access to it as important AND wrong with you, guaranteed the addition of pain will make it WORSE.
Text
Michael and I advocate that the United States federal government should statutorily and judicially prohibit presidential war powers authority for targeted killing.
Contention 2 – solvency
Legal authorization makes targeted killing immune from checks which creates detached forms of knowledge production – resolving civil detatchment is a pre-requisite to preventing destructive drone policy
The practical effects of this move toward a technology-driven, and¶ therefore AND conducive¶ to the formation of a substantial check on presidential action.134
Our advocacy isn’t a passive object of knowledge but an apparatus of production and reproduction of bodies and other "objects" of knowledge – our affirmation is one that affirms the topic as an active, meaning-generating apparatus of bodily production.
Haraway 2007 (Donna, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, From Technoscience: the Politics of Interventions, Unipub)
So I will close with a final category useful to a feminist theory of situated AND the world as coding trickster with whom we¶ must learn to converse.
We are all complicit in the normalization of not only drone warfare, but drone mentality and detatched modes of understanding – do not displace pedagogical responsibility for re-orientating collegiate debates away from immaterial warfare
Hughes 12 (Evin, Georgia Southern Univ. "Float Like a Plane, Sting Like a Bomb: The Ethics of US Drone Attacks," www.ncte.org/library/NCTEFiles/About/Awards/.../Hughes_Evin.pdf)
What Ali was able to do through his nonviolent rhetoric that is still relevant to AND to be "locked into violences we cannot escape" (Amy 69).
1/26/14
Zones drones aff - UNT octas
Tournament: UNT | Round: Octas | Opponent: Baylor BE | Judge: S Topp, M Kearney, M Moore
1AC – UNT octas
1AC – northeast Africa
CT focus trades off with aid effectiveness and spills over to the Horn – a shift in Yemen is key to solve attacks on the Mandab Strait and oil shocks
Alexander Atarodi 10 (Swedish Defence Research Agency; "Yemen in Crisis – Consequences for the Horn of Africa," http://www.foi.se/upload/asia/FOI-R—2968—SE.pdf)
Widespread poverty, high unemployment, scarce water resources, declining oil¶ reserves, AND . Since¶ Yemen controls the narrow Mandeb Strait, through which more than
It’s reverse-causal and now is key – plan provides cover for Yemeni transition progress and solves aid rejection – unfettered drones are destroying reform credibility
The US has played a significant role in Yemen’s transition, which ensured the exit AND - built on transparency, accountability and a demonstrated commitment to their future.
AND, oil shocks undermine crisis management – economic posturing causes miscalculated major power war
Asia, the most dynamic region in the world, is dependent on energy originating AND will become a more urgent strategic priority for a number of regional navies.
Independently, the impact to Yemeni transition reversal is global conflict
Lt Col Nicholas Hedberg June 10 (US Navy, paper submitted in fulfillment of a MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA) at the Naval Postgraduate School; "THE EXPLOITATION OF A WEAK STATE: AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA IN YEMEN," http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA52465526Location=U226doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
This chapter will address three major reasons why AQAP has come to the forefront of AND legitimacy, respect, and authority in the eyes of the public.179
1AC – drones
US drone policy creates a borderless global war – the lack of statutory limits triggers unnecessary attacks
Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; "THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE," 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis)
Recent statements by administration officials suggest that while, as a matter of law, AND seems to belie a policy of individualized assessments of "significant threat." n63
Scenario 1 – norms
Plan’s key to influence drone norms – the impact is accidental global wars
Alan W. Dowd Winter-Spring 13 (Writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security, writings have appeared in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland; "Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings," Parameters 42(4)/43(1))
In short, it seems Washington has been seduced by the Jupiter Complex. Being AND spawned a new era of danger for the United States and its allies.
Independently, a global drone battlefield signals executive uncertainty that causes accidents and nuclear war
Adriana Dean 13 (Degree from the University of Southern California in Philosophy, Politics and Law, Chapter Officer of Young Americans for Liberty, an organization with over 125,000 members nationwide; "Targeted Killings Behind the Veil of Ignorance," http://www.academia.edu/3832442/Targeted_Killings_Behind_the_Veil_of_Ignorance)
While there are some justifiable points for the targeted killing program that individuals behind the AND haunt not only the executive, but the United States as a whole.
Scenario 2 – legitimacy
Plan prevents the worst consequences of drone use – preserves legitimacy and heg
The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term AND protect its interests later when we are no longer the world’s only superpower.
Scenario 3 – Turkey
Turkey follows US precedent to strike the PKK – collapses negotiations and Erdogans presidency
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently re-intiated peace talks with Abdullah Ocalan AND the perspective of AKP political operatives, help them grow their voter base.
Reversing regional perception on Edrogan and Kurdish conflict key to the Turkish model – solves Middle East instability
Kemal Kiri?ci 8/15/13 (TÜS?AD senior fellow and director of the Center on the United States and Europe’s Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies; " The Rise and Fall of Turkey as a Model for the Arab World," Brookings Institution)
As the Arab Spring spread from Tunisia to the rest of the Middle East early AND East rather than an inspiration for pluralist democracy, consensus building and tolerance.
ME instability goes nuclear
James A. Russell Spring 9 (Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School; "Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East," IFRI, Proliferation Papers, ~2326, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf)
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) AND the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.
And, Turkish intervention goes nuclear
Michael T. Snyder 6/28/11 (Graduate of the McIntire School of Commerce at the University of Virginia and has two law degrees from the University of Florida, attorney that has worked for some of the largest and most prominent law firms in Washington D.C. and who now resides outside of Seattle, Washington. He is a very active blogger and is also a respected researcher, writer, speaker and activist, "Could We Actually See A War Between Syria And Turkey?" endoftheamericandream.com/archives/could-we-actually-see-a-war-between-syria-and-turkey)
In recent days, there have been persistent rumors that we could potentially be on AND .¶ More war in the Middle East would not be good for anyone.
Kurdish crackdowns escalates to global conflict
Gulriz Gokcek 2 (Faculty at the Department of Political Science at UC Santa Barbara; "Ethnic Conflict and Interstate War: An Analysis of the Kurdish Problem," prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/gokcek.html)
The tensions over the Kurdish conflict, which eventually escalated to the brink of war AND the Arabs, Persians, and Turks, a viable solution is needed.
Spills over to Nagorno-Karabakh – triggers war between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan
The Kurdish issue, specifically the matter of establishing a homeland for Kurds, has AND stated publicly that Baku would consider military operations to root out Kurdish militants.
A protracted war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is sure to affect the geopolitical and economic AND tied to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict that may blunder unintentionally into war.
1AC – solvency
The United States federal government should statutorily restrict Presidential war powers authority for targeted killing using uninhabited aerial vehicles as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
Solves without hamstringing presidential power or military capabilities
Rosa Brooks 5/16/13 (Law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation, served as a counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary for policy from 2009 to 2011 and previously served as a senior advisor at the U.S. State Department, 2013; "The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force May 16, 2013 Statement for the Record Submitted the Senate Committee on Armed Services", http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Brooks_05-16-13.pdf)
For this reason, I believe that if Congress wishes to refine or clarify the AND principles of self-defense rather than by the law of armed conflict.
It’s squo policy, but codifying is critical to sustainable consensus-building on targeted killing standards
Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; "THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE," 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis)
Legal scholars, policymakers, and state actors are embroiled in a heated debate about AND , and foreign policy gains make acceptance of this framework a worthy endeavor.
Nobody will trust the exec’s current policy without Congress – key to precedent
Anthony Dworkin July 13 (Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; "Drones And Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position," http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf)
Two further points are worth noting. First, the administration has acknowledged that in AND to serve as a precedent for other states that wish to claim it.
3/3/14
Zones drones aff - UNT plan text
Tournament: UNT | Round: 4 | Opponent: KU KS | Judge: S Elliott The United States federal government should statutorily restrict Presidential war powers authority for targeted killing using uninhabited aerial vehicles as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
3/3/14
Zones drones aff - UNT rd 2
Tournament: UNT | Round: 2 | Opponent: Baylor SW | Judge: M Kearney
1AC – norms
US drone policy creates a borderless global war – the lack of statutory limits triggers unnecessary attacks
Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; "THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE," 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis)
Recent statements by administration officials suggest that while, as a matter of law, AND seems to belie a policy of individualized assessments of "significant threat." n63
Plan’s key to influence drone norms – the impact is accidental global wars
Alan W. Dowd Winter-Spring 13 (Writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security, writings have appeared in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland; "Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings," Parameters 42(4)/43(1))
In short, it seems Washington has been seduced by the Jupiter Complex. Being AND spawned a new era of danger for the United States and its allies.
Perhaps, the most important difference between the torture and drone debates has to do AND of state-centric logic and the grandiose schemes of the geopolitical mentality.
Independently, a global drone battlefield signals executive uncertainty that causes accidents and nuclear war
Adriana Dean 13 (Degree from the University of Southern California in Philosophy, Politics and Law, Chapter Officer of Young Americans for Liberty, an organization with over 125,000 members nationwide; "Targeted Killings Behind the Veil of Ignorance," http://www.academia.edu/3832442/Targeted_Killings_Behind_the_Veil_of_Ignorance)
While there are some justifiable points for the targeted killing program that individuals behind the AND haunt not only the executive, but the United States as a whole.
Unrestricted drone use breaks down checks on accidental nuclear war in the Caucuses – draws in Israel, Russia and Iran
Nick Clayton10/23/12 (Worked in several publications, including the Washington Times the Asia Times and Washington Diplomat, currently the senior editor of Kanal PIK TV’s English Service (a Russian-language channel), lived in the Caucuses for several years; "Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war," www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war)
Armenia and Azerbaijan could soon be at war if drone proliferation on both sides of AND ~ will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of."
Lack of norms causes Chinese drone aggression in maritime disputes – plan’s model prevents accidental escalation
It’s now been a year since Japan’s previously ruling liberal government purchased three of the AND political leadership, these technologies could very well lead the region into war.
Causes US-China war – extinction
Lawrence S. Wittner 11/28/11 (Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews, former editor of Peace 26 Change from 1984 to 1987, a journal of peace research; "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?" www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. AND —destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
1AC – Afghanistan
US is gaining ground in Afghanistain, but failure of the 2014 light footprint strategy reverses everything – causes Afghan collapse
Katherine Zimmerman 9/18/13 (Senior analyst and the al Qaeda and Associated Movements Team Lead for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, focused on al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Gulf of Aden region and associated movements in western and northern Africa, specializes in the Yemen-based group, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, has testified in front of Congress and briefed Members and congressional staff, as well as members of the defense community, has written analyses of U.S. national security interests related to the threat from the al Qaeda network for the Weekly Standard, National Review Online, and the Huffington Post, among others, graduated with distinction from Yale University with a B.A. in Political Science and Modern Middle East Studies; Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, "AQAP’s role in the al Qaeda network," http://www.aei.org/speech/foreign-and-defense-policy/terrorism/al-qaeda/aqaps-role-in-the-al-qaeda-network/)
Afghanistan is extremely important to al Qaeda and the global jihad movement because of its AND in Afghanistan would be a significant boost to the overall al Qaeda network.
If last week’s Senate hearing for Pentagon nominee Chuck Hagel was a chance for neoconservatives AND programme could be the person to get the agency out of the business.
Drones outside warzones is the key reason – plan solves
David Wood 2/14/13 (Has been a journalist since 1970, a staff correspondent successively for Time Magazine, the Los Angeles Times, Newhouse News Service, The Baltimore Sun and Politics Daily, his 10-part series on the severely wounded of Iraq and Afghanistan won the 2012 Pulitzer Prize for national reporting, A Pulitzer Prize finalist, he has won the Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished Defense Reporting and other national awards, has lectured at the U.S. Army Eisenhower Fellows Conference, the Marine Staff College, the Joint Forces Staff College and Temple University; "Drone Attacks Spur Legal Debate On Definition Of ’Battlefield’," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/14/drone-attacks-legal-debate_n_2687980.html)
WASHINGTON — After a CIA Predator drone released its guided bomb high over Yemen on AND ? Could an al Qaeda terrorist protect himself by becoming an American citizen?
The impacts are NATO collapse, Pakistan collapse, Iran expansionism and Asian stability
Paul D. Miller March/April 12 (Served as director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Bush and Obama, assistant professor of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University and director for the Afghanistan-Pakistan program at the College of International Security Affairs; "It’s Not Just Al-Qaeda: Stability in the Most Dangerous Region," http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/itE28099s-not-just-al-qaeda-stability-most-dangerous-region)
Neither President Barack Obama nor the Republicans competing to run against him are eager to AND in Afghanistan. Defeating them is a vital interest of the United States.
NATO solves nuclear war
Zbigniew Brzezinski Sept/Oct 9 (U.S. National Security Adviser from 1977 to 1981, most recent book is Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower; Foreign Affairs, SECTION: Pg. 2 Vol. 88 No. 5, "An Agenda for NATO Subtitle: Toward a Global Security Web," lexis)
ADJUSTING TO A TRANSFORMED WORLD And yet, it is fair to ask: Is AND and focused aroused Muslim resentments on the United States and the West more generally
Pakistan collapse causes loose nukes and Indian intervention – nuclear war
Michael O’Hanlon 4/27/5 (Senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and director of research for the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies PhD in public and international affairs from Princeton; "Dealing with the Collapse of a Nuclear-Armed State: The Cases of North Korea and Pakistan," http://www.princeton.edu/~~ppns/papers/ohanlon.pdf)
Were Pakistan to collapse, it is unclear what the United States and like- AND Indian Army, nuclear dangers have long been considered to run very high.
Central Asia escalates to global nuclear war
Dr. Hooman Peimani 2 (Head of Energy Security and Geopolitics at the Energy Studies Institute; "Failed Transition and Bleak Future? War and Instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus," http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o26d=101331065)
If the existing negative trend continues, the entire Caucasus and Central Asia will likely AND could escalate and affect the stability of the international system and global peace.
Plan
The United States federal government should restrict Presidential war powers authority for targeted killing using uninhabited aerial vehicles as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
1AC – solvency
Solves without hamstringing presidential power or military capabilities
Rosa Brooks 5/16/13 (Law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation, served as a counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary for policy from 2009 to 2011 and previously served as a senior advisor at the U.S. State Department, 2013; "The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force May 16, 2013 Statement for the Record Submitted the Senate Committee on Armed Services", http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Brooks_05-16-13.pdf)
For this reason, I believe that if Congress wishes to refine or clarify the AND principles of self-defense rather than by the law of armed conflict.
It’s squo policy, but codifying is critical to sustainable consensus-building on targeted killing standards
Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; "THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE," 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis)
Legal scholars, policymakers, and state actors are embroiled in a heated debate about AND , and foreign policy gains make acceptance of this framework a worthy endeavor.
Nobody will trust the exec’s current policy without Congress – key to precedent
Anthony Dworkin July 13 (Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; "Drones And Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position," http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf)
Two further points are worth noting. First, the administration has acknowledged that in AND to serve as a precedent for other states that wish to claim it.
The United States federal government should statutorily restrict Presidential war powers authority for targeted killing using uninhabited aerial vehicles as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
1AC – norms
US drone policy creates a borderless global war – the lack of statutory limits triggers unnecessary attacks
Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; "THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE," 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis)
Recent statements by administration officials suggest that while, as a matter of law, AND seems to belie a policy of individualized assessments of "significant threat." n63
Plan’s key to influence drone norms – the impact is accidental global wars
Alan W. Dowd Winter-Spring 13 (Writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security, writings have appeared in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland; "Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings," Parameters 42(4)/43(1))
In short, it seems Washington has been seduced by the Jupiter Complex. Being AND spawned a new era of danger for the United States and its allies.
Independently, a global drone battlefield signals executive uncertainty that causes accidents and nuclear war
Adriana Dean 13 (Degree from the University of Southern California in Philosophy, Politics and Law, Chapter Officer of Young Americans for Liberty, an organization with over 125,000 members nationwide; "Targeted Killings Behind the Veil of Ignorance," http://www.academia.edu/3832442/Targeted_Killings_Behind_the_Veil_of_Ignorance)
While there are some justifiable points for the targeted killing program that individuals behind the AND haunt not only the executive, but the United States as a whole.
It’s reverse-causal and key to future crisis management – lets the US pressure those who flaunt the norm
Micah Zenko Jan 13 (Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, previously worked at Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning; "Reforming US Drone Strike Policies," Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 65)
History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities¶ is often influenced AND future, the United States should undertake the following specific policy¶ recommendations.
Specifically, solves Turkish "kill-chain" strikes on the Kurds – collapses negotiations and support for Erdogan
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently re-intiated peace talks with Abdullah Ocalan AND the perspective of AKP political operatives, help them grow their voter base.
Reversing regional perception on Edrogan and Kurdish conflict is key to the Turkish model – solves Middle East instability
Kemal Kiri?ci 8/15/13 (TÜS?AD senior fellow and director of the Center on the United States and Europe’s Turkey Project at Brookings, with an expertise in Turkish foreign policy and migration studies; " The Rise and Fall of Turkey as a Model for the Arab World," Brookings Institution)
As the Arab Spring spread from Tunisia to the rest of the Middle East early AND East rather than an inspiration for pluralist democracy, consensus building and tolerance.
ME instability goes nuclear
James A. Russell Spring 9 (Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School; "Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East," IFRI, Proliferation Papers, ~2326, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf)
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) AND the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.
Gulriz Gokcek 2 (Faculty at the Department of Political Science at UC Santa Barbara; "Ethnic Conflict and Interstate War: An Analysis of the Kurdish Problem," prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/gokcek.html)
The tensions over the Kurdish conflict, which eventually escalated to the brink of war AND the Arabs, Persians, and Turks, a viable solution is needed.
And, it spills over to Nagorno-Karabakh – triggers war between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan
The Kurdish issue, specifically the matter of establishing a homeland for Kurds, has AND stated publicly that Baku would consider military operations to root out Kurdish militants.
A protracted war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is sure to affect the geopolitical and economic AND tied to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict that may blunder unintentionally into war.
1AC – Europe
US-EU military relations are collapsing – restricting drones to zones of active hostilities revitalizes them
Anthony Dworkin 7/18/13 (Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; "Actually, drones worry Europe more than spying," ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_actually_drones_worry_europe_more_than_spying)
Relations between the United States and Europe hit a low point following revelations that Washington AND associated force could lawfully be killed with a drone strike at any time.
Zones is already squo policy, but allies think Obama is all talk – only codifying the zones standard solves
Obama’s Concession to European Views¶ In a speech on the subject last autumn, AND that seems particularly hard to justify under an imminence test outside battlefield conditions.
The plan aligns US justifications with the EU and catalyzes security cooperation
Anthony Dworkin July 13 (European Council on Foreign Relations senior policy fellow, Policy Brief; "Drones and Targeted Killing: Defining a European Position," http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf)
Outside an armed conflict, the default European assumption would be that the threat of AND will be watching to see how far he matches his words with action.
Absent the plan, individual CT legal disagreements will spill over to end EU relations
Having said this, it is instructive to recall David Cole’s observation that ’the AND of incompatible practices among the grand total of transatlantic counterterrorism activities appears secondary.
Security cooperation with Europe solves nuclear war and is key to every transnational threat
There is no doubt that US-European relations are in a period of transition AND force Europe to conclude that the costs of continued alliance outweigh its benefits.
Independently, aligned US-EU security doctrine enables interoperability – that solves US overreach
John Cogbill 5/25/9 (Appointed by President Bush in June 2001 and served as NCPC chairman until the end of Bush’s presidency, earned a B.S from the U.S. Military Academy in 1970 and a J.D. in 1979 from the T. C. Williams School of Law at the University of Richmond; "Crafting a Sustainable Transatlantic Security Partnership: Focusing on Comparative Advantages," http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic706700.files/Crafting_a_Sustainable_Transatlantic_Security_Partnership.pdf)
Even aside from ideological differences and bruised egos, there are larger, more complex AND clearly maintains a comparative advantage in the more capital-intensive warfighting tasks.
Overreach inevitable with unilateral force projection – a hard landing risks hostile challengers and nuclear war
Dennis Florig Oct 10 (Professor in the Division of International Studies at Hankuk (Korean) University of Foreign Studies; "Hegemonic Overreach vs. Imperial Overstretch," Review of International Studies, Vol 36.4; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1548783)
IV. Potential Sources of Hegemonic Breakdown and Future Challenges to Hegemony Despite the belief AND or other WMD by the rising number of powers who possess them looms.
Infinite causes of war – only stabilizing power perceptions puts a ceiling on escalation – don’t make the good contingent on perfection
John Moore 4 (Chaired law prof, UVA, former first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State; "Beyond the Democratic Peace," 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 341)
If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic AND in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?
1AC – solvency
A zone approach solves – it’s squo policy, but codifying is the perfect middle ground, which resolves downsides like circumvention and safe-havens
Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; "THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE," 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis)
II. A New Approach: Zones of Active Hostilities and Beyond¶ The current AND of fighting, or preparation for fighting. This test is fact-intensive
and will depend on both the conditions on the ground and preexisting state and administrative AND -of-war detention that take place outside zones of active hostilities.
3/3/14
Zones drones aff - UTD 2
Tournament: UTD | Round: 2 | Opponent: Baylor BE | Judge: K Haynal Advantage 1 is norms
US drone policy creates a borderless global war – the lack of statutory limits triggers unnecessary attacks Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; “THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE,” 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis)
Recent statements by administration officials suggest that while, as a matter of law, AND seems to belie a policy of individualized assessments of "significant threat." n63
Plan’s key to influence drone norms – the impact is accidental global wars Alan W. Dowd Winter-Spring 13 (Writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security, writings have appeared in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland; “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters 42(4)/43(1))
In short, it seems Washington has been seduced by the Jupiter Complex. Being AND spawned a new era of danger for the United States and its allies.
Status quo drone model locks in extinction Richard Falk 2/13/12 (Chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Professor Emeritus at Princeton University; “The Menace of Present and Future Drone Warfare,” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db_article.php?article_id=328)
Perhaps, the most important difference between the torture and drone debates has to do AND of state-centric logic and the grandiose schemes of the geopolitical mentality.
Independently, a global drone battlefield signals executive uncertainty that causes accidents and nuclear war Adriana Dean 13 (Degree from the University of Southern California in Philosophy, Politics and Law, Chapter Officer of Young Americans for Liberty, an organization with over 125,000 members nationwide; “Targeted Killings Behind the Veil of Ignorance,” http://www.academia.edu/3832442/Targeted_Killings_Behind_the_Veil_of_Ignorance)
While there are some justifiable points for the targeted killing program that individuals behind the AND haunt not only the executive, but the United States as a whole.
In his second term, President Obama has an opportunity to reverse course¶ and AND to shrug off the loss of life that drones inflict on others today.
US norms restricting prez war powers empricially make US leadership legitimate and sustainable – no alt causes – reversal sparks global war Robert Knowles 9 (Assistant Professor at NYU Law; “Article: American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87, Lexis)
American unipolarity has created a challenge for realists. Unipolarity¶ was thought to be AND tort claims among non-citizens in U.S.¶ courts.353
The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term AND protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.
Infinite causes of war – only stabilizing power perceptions puts a ceiling on escalation – don’t make the good contingent on perfection John Moore 4 (Chaired law prof, UVA, former first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State; “Beyond the Democratic Peace,” 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341)
If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic AND in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased? Advantage 2 is the northeast Africa
Executive overreliance on drones causes instability in Yemen and Somalia – guarantees escalating terror attacks Leila Hudson 11 (Associate professor of anthropology and history in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies at the University of Arizona and director of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts; “Drone Warfare: Blowback From the New American Way of War,” http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/drone-warfare-blowback-new-american-way-war)
It is possible that the exchange of personnel among the military, the intelligence community AND scope for the civic reform that the Arab Spring in Yemen demands.37
CT focus trades off with aid effectiveness and spills over to north africa – a shift in Yemen is key to solve attacks on the Mandab Strait Alexander Atarodi 10 (Swedish Defence Research Agency; “Yemen in Crisis – Consequences for the Horn of Africa,” http://www.foi.se/upload/asia/FOI-R~-~-2968~-~-SE.pdf)
Widespread poverty, high unemployment, scarce water resources, declining oil¶ reserves, AND . Since¶ Yemen controls the narrow Mandeb Strait, through which more than
AQAP uses expanding US drone strikes to gain the support from Al-Shabaab necessary for Strait closure and oil shocks – Yemen is the key staging ground Matthew Thomas 5/8/11 (MA Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies; “Al Qaeda in the Land of Faith and Wisdom: The Fall of Saleh and March on Al-Aqsa,” Monterey Institute of International Studies)
AQAP is well aware of the positive implications of Yemen’s strategic location in the Gulf AND already struggling to recover from rampant political revolutions could follow Yemen into chaos.
New AQAP/Al-Shabaab merger proves the risk is high Matthew J. Thomas 8/8/13 (Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Exposing and exploiting weaknesses in the merger of Al- Qaeda and Al-Shabaab”, http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20)
Still, the merger may pose new challenges that amplify the threat of al- AND nations in order carry out and/or incite domestic terrorist attacks.29
The US has played a significant role in Yemen’s transition, which ensured the exit AND - built on transparency, accountability and a demonstrated commitment to their future.
Towards the end of July, the leader of AQAP, Nasir al Wuhayshi, AND world) with Al Shabaab’s reach can make for a particularly challenging situation.
AND, oil shocks undermine crisis management – economic posturing causes miscalculated major power war Malcolm Cook et. al. June 10 (East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy; MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute: Raoul Heinrichs, Rory Medcalf, Andrew Shearer, “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures,” http://asiasecurity.macfound.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futures_-_final_version.pdf)
Asia, the most dynamic region in the world, is dependent on energy originating AND will become a more urgent strategic priority for a number of regional navies.
AND, econ decline causes extinction – oil shocks make it mutually reinforcing Geoffrey Kemp 10 (Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East,” p. 233-4)
The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first AND expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.
Independently, the impact to Yemeni transition reversal is global conflict Lt Col Nicholas Hedberg June 10 (US Navy, paper submitted in fulfillment of a MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA) at the Naval Postgraduate School; “THE EXPLOITATION OF A WEAK STATE: AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA IN YEMEN,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA524655andLocation=U2anddoc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
This chapter will address three major reasons why AQAP has come to the forefront of AND legitimacy, respect, and authority in the eyes of the public.179
plan The United States federal government should restrict Presidential war powers authority for targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
Solvency
Solves without hamstringing presidential power or military capabilities Rosa Brooks 5/16/13 (Law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation, served as a counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary for policy from 2009 to 2011 and previously served as a senior advisor at the U.S. State Department, 2013; “The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force May 16, 2013 Statement for the Record Submitted the Senate Committee on Armed Services”, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Brooks_05-16-13.pdf)
For this reason, I believe that if Congress wishes to refine or clarify the AND principles of self-defense rather than by the law of armed conflict.
It’s squo policy, but codifying is critical to sustainable consensus-building on targeted killing standards Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; “THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE,” 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis)
Legal scholars, policymakers, and state actors are embroiled in a heated debate about AND , and foreign policy gains make acceptance of this framework a worthy endeavor.
Nobody will trust the exec’s current policy without Congress – key to precedent Anthony Dworkin July 13 (Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; “Drones And Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position,” http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf)
Two further points are worth noting. First, the administration has acknowledged that in AND , imminent threat to US persons”. And there must be “near certainty
that non-combatants will not be injured or killed”.¶ In some respects, AND to serve as a precedent for other states that wish to claim it.
These questions require difficult political calculations. However, the sources cited above suggest that AND itself a certain deformation of the IHL concept of hostilities and armed conflict.
Only Congressional action on the scope of hostilities sends a clear signal that the US abides by the laws of armed conflict Kenneth Anderson 3/18/10 (Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Member of its Task Force on National Security and the Law; “Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War,” digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002andcontext=pub_disc_cong)
• First, the United States government urgently needs publicly to declare the legal rationale AND of their use, including both their use and their limits in law.
3/3/14
Zones drones aff - UTD 5
Tournament: UTD | Round: 5 | Opponent: Trinity VY | Judge: J Kurr The advantage is drones
US drone policy creates a borderless global war – the lack of statutory limits triggers unnecessary attacks Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; “THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE,” 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis) Recent statements by administration officials suggest that while, as a matter of law, AND seems to belie a policy of individualized assessments of "significant threat." n63
Scenario 1 – norms Plan’s key to influence drone norms – the impact is accidental global wars Alan W. Dowd Winter-Spring 13 (Writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security, writings have appeared in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland; “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings,” Parameters 42(4)/43(1))
In short, it seems Washington has been seduced by the Jupiter Complex. Being AND spawned a new era of danger for the United States and its allies.
Status quo drone model locks in extinction Richard Falk 2/13/12 (Chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Professor Emeritus at Princeton University; “The Menace of Present and Future Drone Warfare,” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db_article.php?article_id=328)
Perhaps, the most important difference between the torture and drone debates has to do AND of state-centric logic and the grandiose schemes of the geopolitical mentality.
Independently, a global drone battlefield signals executive uncertainty that causes accidents and nuclear war Adriana Dean 13 (Degree from the University of Southern California in Philosophy, Politics and Law, Chapter Officer of Young Americans for Liberty, an organization with over 125,000 members nationwide; “Targeted Killings Behind the Veil of Ignorance,” http://www.academia.edu/3832442/Targeted_Killings_Behind_the_Veil_of_Ignorance)
While there are some justifiable points for the targeted killing program that individuals behind the AND haunt not only the executive, but the United States as a whole.
Unrestricted drone use breaks down checks on accidental nuclear war in the Caucuses – draws in Israel, Russia and Iran Nick Clayton 10/23/12 (Worked in several publications, including the Washington Times the Asia Times and Washington Diplomat, currently the senior editor of Kanal PIK TV's English Service (a Russian-language channel), lived in the Caucuses for several years; "Drone violence along Armenian-Azerbaijani border could lead to war,” www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/121022/drone-violence-along-armenian-azerbaijani-border-could-lead-war)
Armenia and Azerbaijan could soon be at war if drone proliferation on both sides of AND will not be small. That’s the one thing I’m sure of.”
Is the world about to see a "drone race" among the United States AND policymakers should perhaps devote a touch more attention to the precedent they're setting.
Scenario 2 – legitimacy Plan prevents the worst consequences of drone use – preserves legitimacy and heg Michael J. Boyle 13 (Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence; “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf)
In his second term, President Obama has an opportunity to reverse course¶ and AND to shrug off the loss of life that drones inflict on others today.
US norms restricting prez war powers empricially make US leadership legitimate and sustainable – no alt causes – reversal sparks global war Robert Knowles 9 (Assistant Professor at NYU Law; “Article: American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution,” 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87, Lexis)
American unipolarity has created a challenge for realists. Unipolarity¶ was thought to be AND tort claims among non-citizens in U.S.¶ courts.353
The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term AND protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.
AND, status-seeking is inevitable – ambiguity causes great power conflict – prefer overwhelming research consensus William C. Wohlforth Jan 9 (Professor of government at Dartmouth College World Politics Volume 61, Number 1, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”)
IT is often seen in a scholarly context that contrasts power-based and identity AND creativity are more plausible responses, neither of which leads to military conflict.
Infinite causes of war – only stabilizing power perceptions puts a ceiling on escalation – don’t make the good contingent on perfection John Moore 4 (Chaired law prof, UVA, former first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State; “Beyond the Democratic Peace,” 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341)
If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic AND in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?
Legitimate heg is key and it’s sustainable – historical analysis doesn’t apply to the modern state system Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry and John Wohlforth Jan/Feb 13 (*Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College; Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul; *Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College; Foreign Affairs, “Lean Forward,” EBSCO)
Another argument for retrenchment holds that the United States will fall prey to the same AND need to present much more evidence before their case can¶ be convincing.
plan The United States federal government should restrict Presidential war powers authority for targeted killing as a first resort outside zones of active hostilities.
1AC – solvency
Solves without hamstringing presidential power or military capabilities Rosa Brooks 5/16/13 (Law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation, served as a counselor to the U.S. defense undersecretary for policy from 2009 to 2011 and previously served as a senior advisor at the U.S. State Department, 2013; “The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force May 16, 2013 Statement for the Record Submitted the Senate Committee on Armed Services”, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Brooks_05-16-13.pdf)
For this reason, I believe that if Congress wishes to refine or clarify the AND principles of self-defense rather than by the law of armed conflict.
It’s squo policy, but codifying is critical to sustainable consensus-building on targeted killing standards Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; “THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE,” 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis)
Legal scholars, policymakers, and state actors are embroiled in a heated debate about AND , and foreign policy gains make acceptance of this framework a worthy endeavor.
A zone of active hostilities is wherever there is ongoing fighting – that’s the best standard Jennifer Daskal Apr 13 (Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law; “THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE,” 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165, Lexis)
This task is both necessary and inherently difficult. It is an attempt to develop AND identifying the zone of active hostilities, at least over the short term.
Obama will comply – the plan walks the fine-line David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman 8 (*Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; “THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB — FRAMING THE PROBLEM, DOCTRINE, AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING,” Harvard Law Review, Vol.121: 689)
In addition to offering important guidance concerning the congressional role, our historical review also AND the executive branch itself for most of our history of war powers development.
All relevant officials will comply with the plan Jack Goldsmith 3/19/12 (Harvard Law professor and a member of the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law, served in the Bush administration as assistant attorney general in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel; “Fire When Ready,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire_when_ready?page=full) When the Obama administration made the decision to kill Awlaki, it did not AND inclination to do so, and it appears to support the current arrangement.
Nobody will trust the exec’s current policy without Congress – key to precedent Anthony Dworkin July 13 (Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; “Drones And Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position,” http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_DRONES_BRIEF.pdf)
Two further points are worth noting. First, the administration has acknowledged that in AND to serve as a precedent for other states that wish to claim it.
These questions require difficult political calculations. However, the sources cited above suggest that AND itself a certain deformation of the IHL concept of hostilities and armed conflict.
Only Congressional action on the scope of hostilities sends a clear signal that the US abides by the laws of armed conflict Kenneth Anderson 3/18/10 (Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Member of its Task Force on National Security and the Law; “Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War,” digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002andcontext=pub_disc_cong)
• First, the United States government urgently needs publicly to declare the legal rationale AND of their use, including both their use and their limits in law.
