Tournament: ESU | Round: 2 | Opponent: UMKF AF | Judge: Chase
1AC – plan text
United States Congress should enact legislation requiring offensive cyber operations funded, conducted, and/or directed by Department of Defense be conducted pursuant to Title 10 United States Code.
1AC – the Tower of Babel

The Air Force is currently centralizing DoD cyber infrastructure in an attempt to fully automate
Suzanne M. Vautrinot Fall 12
(Major General, USAF, commander of AFCYBER and Air Force Network Operations; “Sharing the Cyber Journey,” Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3)
*Gender modified

Every generation stands on the many shoulders of greatness that preceded¶ it. For
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around¶ an Air Force leadership dialog and Airmen’s fulfillment of these strategies.

The DoD is building a Tower of Babel that gets locked in – the plan prevents unpreparedness for longer conflicts which cedes escalation control
Jason Healey Fall 12
(Director of USAF Cyber Statecraft Initiative; “Claiming the Lost Cyber Heritage,” Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 6.3)

At least once before, the Air Force suffered similar “doctrinal lock in,”¶
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have attempted to solve things¶ organizationally and politically, not operationally.”17

Auto-retaliation is enabled by Title 50’s loophole – the plan changes DoD cost-benefit analysis toward higher-level planning which prevents mis-informed attribution and major power war
William A. Owens, et. al. 9
(*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities,” report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)

Recommendation 4: The U.S. government should have a clear, transparent
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for STRATCOM’s authority to conduct response actions is not known to the committee.

Cyber warfare is real and attacks against the US are increasing – a proportionate response key to prevent major power war
Eugene Habiger 2/1/10
(Retired Air Force General; “ CYBERWARFARE AND CYBERTERRORISM: THE NEED FOR A NEW U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH,” The Cyber Security Institute)

However, there are reasons to believe that what is going on now amounts
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based defenses, making us significantly more at risk of a major war.

Information is insufficient after any cyber-attack – auto-neutralization forces the US’s hand too quickly which prevents signaling commitment to de-escalation
Herbert Lin Fall 12
(PhD physics, MIT, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, where he has been study director of major projects on information technology including formerly serving as staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986–90); “Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termination in Cyberspace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol. 6.3)

Signaling Intentions in Cyber Conflict¶ Nothing in the set of options above is specific
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situation has obvious potential¶ for inappropriate and unintended escalation or kinetic response.

Auto-retal spills over to communication networks and muddies restraint signaling – independently, catalytic conflict causes escalation – launch-on-warning makes nuclear extinction inevitable
Stephen J. Cimbala Spring 11
(PhD, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University–Brandywine, formerconsultant for various US government agencies and private contractors; “Nuclear Crisis Management and “Cyberwar” Phishing for Trouble?” Strategic Studies Quarterly Vol 5.1)

Notwithstanding the preceding disclaimers, information warfare has the potential to attack or disrupt successful
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mistaken from a distance for the signature of a small nuclear warhead.25

Sloppy OCOs eliminate nuclear restraint and cause health care crises
James A. Lewis Sept 10
(Center for Strategic and International Studies “Thresholds for Cyberwar,” http://csis.org/files/publication/101001_ieee_insert.pdf)

Critical infrastructure is a normal target for military planners, to gain tactical or strategic
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In this sense, cyber attack is a tactical weapon with strategic consequences. 

Hindering response and surveillance makes epidemics uniquely likely
John T. Watson, Michelle Gayer, and Maire A. Connolly Jan 7
(*Medical epidemiologist with the Disease Control in Emergencies Program at the World Health Organization;  Coordinator for Surge and Crisis Support at World Health Organization; *World Health Organization; “Epidemics after Natural Disasters,” Emerg Infect Dis. 2007 January; 13(1): 1–5; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/)

Power cuts related to disasters may disrupt water treatment and supply plants, thereby increasing
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when needed, and to better quantify the risk for outbreaks after disasters.

Mutations ensure extinction
Yu 9
Victoria Yu, Dartmouth Journal of Undergraduate Science, “Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate”, 5-22-09 http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate

A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed
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could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

1AC – solvency

Splitting the same set of Offensive Cyber Operations between different statutory authorizations makes oversight incoherent – Congress must clarify that all DoD funded and operated operations are subject to Title 10.
Andru E. Wall 11
(Senior Associate with Alston and Bird LLP, former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central; “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities and Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 3)

There is no rigid separation between Title 10 and Title 50. A more¶
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why some military and intelligence activities look alike, yet remain¶ distinguishable.

Split authority imposes no restrictions on kinetic-level attacks globally – plan is the optimal balance between oversight and flexibility
Eric Lorber Jan 13
(J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science; “EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?” JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. 15:3; https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013)

If the United States did intend to hide a cyberattack, even though it was
AND
these areas—provide input would be useful in ¶ developing this understanding.

Current OCO debates are too obscured by bureaucracy to make citizen checks effective – limited and technical debates key
William A. Owens, et. al. 9
(*AEA Holdings, Inc. and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;Kenneth W. Dam, University of Chicago and co-chair of the Committee on Offensive Information Warfare;*Herbert S. Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies and Study Director; “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities,” report prepared by Committee on Offensive Information Warfare Computer Science and Telecommunications Board Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences of the National Research Council of the National Academies; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12651)

The possibility that the United States might choose to engage in cyberattacks to serve its
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in providing education and background is in our view its most important function.

Specifically, the Title 10/50 debate goes to the core of cyber ops oversight – contextual effects-based decisionmaking creates the best OCO policy
Robert Belk and Matthew Noyes 3/20/12
(*Naval aviator and Politico-Military Fellow, MPP international and global affairs @ Harvard Kennedy School, currently Naval
Operations staff in the Pentagon developing and executing Navy network and cybersecurity policy; MPP international security policy @ Harvard Kennedy School, BA Computer Science and Applied Computational Mathematics @ University of Washington, Senior Associate with the cybersecurity practice at Good Harbor Consulting; “On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities A Policy Analysis on Offensive US Cyber Policy,” advised by Professors Joseph Nye and Monica Tof; http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cybersecurity-pae-belk-noyes.pdf)

To correct this shortcoming, we have developed a framework that elucidates the critical considerations
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factor the national implications of possibly losing that operational capability in the future.

DoD decision-making can create accurate threat assessments with sufficient intel – systematic checks are key to accuracy
Earl C. Ravenal 9
(Distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato, professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget; Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1; Pp. 21-75)

Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny
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or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

Tournament: Wake | Round: 1 | Opponent: Cornell RR | Judge: Girouard
1AC – plan text

United States Congress should enact legislation requiring offensive cyber operations funded, conducted, and/or directed by Department of Defense be conducted pursuant to Title 10 United States Code.

Advantage 1 is split authority

Split authority makes DoD cyber planning incoherent – the plan enables sufficient intelligence integration to make cyber operations a true US force multiplier
Rosemary M. Carter, Brent Feick, and Roy C. Undersander Q3 12
(*Colonel, USA, Communications Officer on the Army Staff; Colonel, USAF, Senior Policy Advisor for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, Integration, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities; *Captain, USN, Executive Officer of Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida; “Offensive Cyber for the Joint Force Commander,” Joint Force Quarterly Vol. 66)

Operational Planning¶ Larger than the targeting process is¶ overall planning for an operation
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joint interagency coordination group¶ process to become a force multiplier for DOD.

Split authority will leave CYBERCOM scrambling for info to generate a Title 10 response – cyberattacks on infrastructure and military assets cause a reaction dead zone which is sufficient to degrade the U.S. economy, military ability, and leadership
Charles W. Douglass and James R. Greenburg 3/22/12
(*Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force; Commander, USAF and Project Advisor for US Army War College; “21ST CENTURY CYBER SECURITY: LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND REQUIREMENTS,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561641)

As the DoD grappled with these major cyber espionage events, DHS was designated the
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to operate offensively in cyberspace and cedes freedom of maneuver to an enemy.

US conventional war fighting is inevitable – ineffectiveness causes regional aggression and major power competition
Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon Spring 9
(*Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania; Senior Analyst at Lincoln Group, LLC; “The Future of War and American Military Strategy,”)

It is important to recognize at the outset two key points about United States strategy
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in which any debate about defense strategy occurs.  Pg.  307-308 

AND, status-seeking is inevitable – ambiguous hierarchies cause over-exertion and great power conflict – prefer overwhelming research consensus
William C. Wohlforth Jan 9
(Professor of government at Dartmouth College World Politics Volume 61, Number 1, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”)

SIT is often seen in a scholarly context that contrasts power-based and identity
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creativity are more plausible responses, neither of which leads to military conflict.

There are infinite causes of war – but only stabilizing perceptions consistently puts a ceiling on escalation – don’t make the good contingent on perfection
John Moore 4
(Chaired law prof, UVA, former first Chairman of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and as the Counselor on Int Law to the Dept. of State; “Beyond the Democratic Peace,”  44 Va. J. Int'l L. 341)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic
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in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased? 

Econ decline causes global escalation and extinction
Geoffrey Kemp 10
(Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East,” p. 233-4)

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first
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expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

Advantage 2 is EU

Online spying is destroying US – EU relations now. That kills diplomatic solutions
Newton-Small 10/4
(U.S. Allies Still Angry at Snowden’s Revelations of U.S. Spying¶ Relations with Europe, Brazil are tense and unlikely to ease soon¶ By Jay Newton-Small¶ Oct. 04, 2013 http://nation.time.com/2013/10/04/u-s-allies-still-angry-at-snowdens-revelations-of-u-s-spying/#ixzz2hKRUlCnq)kk
The European Parliament this week named Edward Snowden a finalist for its prestigious human rights
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never be guaranteed by violating fundamental human rights of citizens of another country.”

The aff is the critical concession to transparency. It prevents international backlash because of its perception, and gives the DoS credibility that the DoD can’t strip anymore. Its reverse causal.
Robert Belk and Matthew Noyes 3/20/12
(*Naval aviator and Politico-Military Fellow, MPP international and global affairs @ Harvard Kennedy School, currently Naval
Operations staff in the Pentagon developing and executing Navy network and cybersecurity policy; MPP international security policy @ Harvard Kennedy School, BA Computer Science and Applied Computational Mathematics @ University of Washington, Senior Associate with the cybersecurity practice at Good Harbor Consulting; “On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities A Policy Analysis on Offensive US Cyber Policy,” advised by Professors Joseph Nye and Monica Tof; http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/cybersecurity-pae-belk-noyes.pdf)
As mentioned in the domestic legal consideration section, cyber force is predominantly internationally focused
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10 vs. Title 50 authority will determine oversight requirements for cyber operations,

EU relations solve extinction
Rodrigues 2011
Maria João Rodrigues 11, Professor at the European Studies Institute-Université Libre de Bruxelles and at the Lisbon University Institute, Special Advisor on European Economic Policies, 2011, “Transatlantic cooperation for jobs and a new growth model,” in The Agenda for the EU-US strategic partnership, online: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Transatlantic2011.pdf
The strategic priorities previously described in this chapter do not constitute a wrong or a
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, urgently needs to be put higher on the agenda of transatlantic cooperation.

EU-US relations are key to Iran talks – that solves multiple avenues of prolif and terrorism
Tehran Times 10/22
(‘Reviving constructive relations with Iran matters greatly to EU’ Tuesday 22 October 2013 http://tehrantimes.com/politics/111659-reviving-constructive-relations-with-iran-matters-greatly-to-eu)kk
TEHRAN – A senior member of the European Parliament has said that reviving the past
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Tehran on Sunday is scheduled to hold various meetings with Iranian senior officials. 

Iran proliferation causes nuclear war
Edelman, distinguished fellow – Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ‘11
(Eric S, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January/February)
The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and
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would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

Extinction
Toon, chair – Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences – Colorado University, 4/19/’7
(Owen B, climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)
To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers,
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should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

1AC – solvency

Splitting the same set of Offensive Cyber Operations between different statutory authorizations makes oversight incoherent – the plan aligns the law with operational realities
Andru E. Wall 11
(Senior Associate with Alston and Bird LLP, former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central; “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities and Covert Action,” Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 3)

There is no rigid separation between Title 10 and Title 50. A more¶
AND
why some military and intelligence activities look alike, yet remain¶ distinguishable.

Split authority imposes no restrictions on kinetic-level attacks globally – the plan is the optimal balance between oversight and flexibility
Eric Lorber Jan 13
(J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science; “EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?” JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. 15:3; https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013)

If the United States did intend to hide a cyberattack, even though it was
AND
these areas—provide input would be useful in ¶ developing this understanding.