Tournament: James Madison University | Round: 1 | Opponent: Anybody | Judge: Jane Doe
Observation 1: Inherency
The United States is very willing to attack civilian infrastructure but won’t say it outright
Burghardt 10 (Tom Burghardt is a researcher and activist based in the San Francisco Bay Area. His articles are published in many venues. He is the editor of Police State America: U.S. Military "Civil Disturbance" Planning, distributed by AK Press. Pentagon’s Cyber Command: Civilian Infrastructure a “Legitimate” Target by Tom Burghardt / April 19th, 2010 http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-pentagon-s-cyber-command-civilian-infrastructure-is-a-legitimate-target/18721 NVM)

Alexander’s equivocal written responses were hardly comforting, nor did they blunt criticism that the
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 and the president and would normally come with supplemental rules of engagement.

Regulations of OCOs undeveloped, Congress should set up guidelines

Dycus ‘10
Stephen, Professor, Vermont Law School. JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW andPOLICY 4.155.
http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/11_Dycus.pdf ETB

Similarly, if cyber warfare is regarded as an intelligence activity, the ¶ intelligence
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in kind and degree, still could be widespread ¶ and indiscriminate.49

Observation 2:Harms
China Adv.
The US-China relationship is the most important in the world, and the cyber domain is its biggest issue
Brookings Institute 12 Paper | February 23, 2012 Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations By: Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Peter W. Singer http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/02/23-cybersecurity-china-us-singer-lieberthal
There is perhaps no relationship as significant to the future of world politics as that
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, human rights, cross-Strait relations, and regional territorial disputes).

Chinas perceives cyber attacks on civilians as one of the biggest threats to their national security
Wang 12 (Peiran, visiting researcher at the Center for Economic Law and Governance, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium, since September 2010, April 10 2012) Transcript of International Collaborative Responses to Cyber Incidences Panel 4 Institute for Law, Science, and Global Security’s “International Engagement in Cyberspace 2012” conference http://journal.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/243-270-Conference-Panel-4.pdf
What’s the cyber threat from China’s perspective? One, the most important involves the
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advantage  to conquer China’s cyber, it’s very dangerous for the national security.

The Administration has adjusted before and must do so again with cyber operations specifically for individual rights to improve relations
China Daily 13 Thursday, June 13, 2013, 07:59 Unjustified US intelligence http://www.chinadailyasia.com/opinion/2013-06/13/content_15075814.html

Last month, in a wide-ranging speech on foreign policy, US President
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its counterterrorism policies so that infringements on individual rights are not as expansive.

Cyber Relations with China have turned into the modern day Cold War
Hirsch and Adelman 13 (Jordan and Sam, May 31 2013)
New York Times “An Elizabethan Cyberwar” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/opinion/an-elizabethan-cyberwar.html?pagewanted=alland_r=0
Next week’s summit takes place amid reports of increasingly sophisticated Chinese cyberespionage. Earlier this
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to treat any escalating cyberconflict as a latter-day Cuban missile crisis.

US-China Relations are reaching a boiling point. Armed Conflict Coming if things don’t change soon
Perlez 12 The New York Times April 3, 2012 Tuesday Late Edition – Final Chinese Insider Offers Rare and Candid Glimpse of U.S.-China Friction BYLINE: By JANE PERLEZ SECTION: Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 4 LENGTH: 1006 words lexis)
BO'AO, China -- The senior leadership of the Chinese government increasingly views the competition
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consequence of mutual antagonism,'' Mr. Lieberthal said in an interview.

Chinese and US leaders treat cyber operations as a cold war. Any cyber conflict would be escalated to a modern Cuban Missile Crisis.
Chandler and Adelsburg 13 (Jordan and Sam, May 31st 2013)
“An Elizabethan Cyberwar” New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/opinion/an-elizabethan-cyberwar.html?pagewanted=alland_r=0
AS Barack Obama and China’s president, Xi Jinping, prepare to meet in California
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to treat any escalating cyberconflict as a latter-day Cuban missile crisis.

Extinction
Wittner 11—Professor of History @ State University of New York-Albany Lawrence S. Wittner, “Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?” Huntington News, Monday, November 28, 2011—18:37 pg. http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used
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that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

Civilian Adv

Cyber War is blurring the distinctions between combatants and civilian
Taddeo 12 (in the department of philosophy at U of Hertfordshire( An Analysis For A Just¶ Cyber Warfare Mariarosaria Taddeo1¶  m.taddeo@herts.ac.uk  2012 4th International Conference on Cyber Confl icthttp://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/3_5_Taddeo_AnAnalysisForAJustCyberWarfare.pdf

In classic warfare, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants reflects the distinction
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Information Ethics will be introduced as the suitable ethical framework for this purpose.

War without limits are bad and no one wins them, protecting civilians key
Dunlap 12 (Charles J.,former deputy judge advocate general of the United States Air Force, Law professor of Duke University. “Lawless Cyber? Not if You Want to Win”American Bar Association www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/law_national_security/patriot_debates2/the_book_online/ch9/ch9_ess2

Obviously, if cyber weaponry is technically difficult for the world’s foremost military to use
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NATO forces, observed in 2003, “very legalist and very complex.”

A cyber attack could kill millions of people by sending a country into chaos. Economic collapse, blackouts, and cut off of basic needs
Blake and Imburgia 10 (WING COMMANDER DUNCAN BLAKE * and LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH S
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States Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb. Lexis) NVM 

The cyber world is yet another domain in which the world powers are developing capabilities
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means or method of warfare will help answer the appropriateness of the response.

This can cause injury and death to civilians
Lucas ‘11 (George, Class of 1984 Distinguished Chair in Ethics at the Stockdale Center for Ethics, U.S.
Naval Academy and Professor of Ethics and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate
School, “Permissible Preventive Cyberwar: Restricting Cyber Conflict to Justified Military
Targets”, Presentation at Society of Philosophy and Technology, RSR)
Rowe primarily discusses the status of cyber
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injury and death, on civilian personnel and infrastructure.6

Attacking Civilians deprives them of humanity and dignity and we have a moral imperative to protect them from war
Rothbart, Korostelina, and Cheraoui 12 (Civilians and Modern War: Armed Conflict and the Ideology of Violence
edited by Daniel Rothbart, Karina Korostelina, Mohammed Cherkaoui http://books.google.com/books?id=Z0AzvUJwWu0Candpg=PA320andlpg=PA320anddq=civilians+in+combat+protect+22moral+imperative22andsource=blandots=IE73S3PMn9andsig=pLrGRwkm7Nqfm26kNWgMqiwu46Eandhl=enandsa=Xandei=RYsSUv-wF5SqyQGsxYHoDwandved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepageandqandf=false)

Civilian victims considered "collateral damage," however, have no channel fur redress from
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and highlights the critical need for new behavior in the conduct of warfare.

Loss of being is the biggest impact of all—outweighs nuclear war and extinction.
Michael Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy, Tulane University, Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, 1997, p.119-120.

Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being,
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species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

Blowback Advantage
The US is incredibly dependent on the cyber world
Clapper 13 (Clapper R., Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community March 12 2013 http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence20Reports/201320ATA20SFR20for20SSCI201220Mar202013.pdf)
Looking at the cyber threat environment, it is clear that adversaries of the U
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thrive, can also be used to efficiently undermine U.S. security

Use of offensive cyber attacks risks those same viruses coming back to bite us

2 internal links
1 Cyber attacks are too uncontrollable. We cannot prevent viruses from coming back to infect our own computers
JACKSON 10 (William, Nov 29 2010)
“In cyberspace, a good offense is NOT always the best defense” http://gcn.com/articles/2010/11/29/stuxnet-reveals-cyber-war-folly.aspx

Analysts in government and industry are learning more about the complex Stuxnet worm, a sophisticated and apparently purposely-built cyber weapon designed to attack specific automated industrial control systems. But we still don’t know who built it and what its target is.
We can make guesses about its target — Iranian nuclear fuel enrichment plants — and
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have a robust defense. And that does not always mean an offense.

2: Any offensive attacks we carry out can be used as a blueprint and be modified for enemies to attack us
Gjelten 11 (Tom, NPR reporter since 1982 author of Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper Under Siege, and Professionalism in War Reporting: A Correspondent's View and a contributor to Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know, November 2 2011)
National Public Radio “Stuxnet Raises 'Blowback' Risk In Cyberwar” http://www.npr.org/2011/11/02/141908180/stuxnet-raises-blowback-risk-in-cyberwar
But for people who worry about the security of critical U.S. facilities
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how to recover from events that we simply can't protect these systems from."

The biggest cyber threats are those aimed at civilian infrastructure
Chareleston Gazzette 13 http://www.wvgazette.com/Opinion/Editorials/201304080087
Delivering the yearly Worldwide Threat Assessment to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, National
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one day could disrupt nearly $6.5 billion worth of transactions."

Plan: The USFG should statutorily ban the President from enacting offensive cyber operations on civilians and civilian infrastructure

Observation 3: Solvency

Lucas 11 (George R., Jr.) "Permissible Preventive Cyberwar: Restricting Cyber Conflict to Justified Military
Targets." http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/downloads/Permissible20Preventive20Cyberwar20UNESCO202011.pdf /bgb 9/5/13

Evaluations of cyber war and weapons range from denunciations of their widespread and indiscriminate destructiveness
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to no avail, and further delay would only make the situation worse.

A recent New York Times article revealed that the Pentagon briefly considered engaging in cyberwarfare
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use them, and where the line should be drawn, even in cyberspace
Banning attacks against civilian targets solves all our cyber war impacts.
Clarke and Knake ‘12 (Richard (former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States) and Robert (Cybersecurity and homeland security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations), Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, Harper Collins Books, 2012, RSR)
Limiting U.S. cyber attacks to military targets would mean that we could
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war with escalating results, the limits of which we cannot¶ know.
This ban solves all national security tradeoff arguments.
Clarke and Knake ‘12 (Richard (former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States) and Robert (Cybersecurity and homeland security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations), Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, Harper Collins Books, 2012, RSR)
Later, after experience with CWLT One, we could examine whether to expand its
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to us we would consider¶ it as a demonstration of hostile intent.

The US must be able to take the lead on international cyber norms
Papadopoulos and Sugarman 13 (Emilian Papadopoulos is chief of staff at Good Harbor, a cyberrisk consulting firm. He previously worked at Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs. Eli Sugarman is a Truman fellow and senior director of Gryphon Partners. He previously worked at the State Department. April 9th 2013) “4 Ways US can Boost Cybersecurity” Christian Science Monitor http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0409/4-ways-US-can-boost-cyber-security/Start-where-countries-agree
3. Be more proactive
Assembling friendly states and developing a set of global norms would give the US more
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will solidify American leadership in cyberspace, foster international cooperation, and discourage cyberattacks