Tournament: GSU | Round: 1 | Opponent: na | Judge: na

Plan – v. 1.0

The United States Congress should restrict the authority of the President of the United States to introduce nuclear weapons first into hostilities.

Threats Fail

Despite promises to the contrary, the Obama Administration recently reaffirmed the nuclear force posture of the United States Armed Forces – they will keep forward deployed Launch on Alert nuclear forces that holds other nuclear forces at risk in a highly offensive posture

Kristensen 6/29 (Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of Atomic Scientists, "New Nuclear Weapons Employment Guidance Puts Obama’s Fingerprint on Nuclear Weapons Policy and Strategy," 6/20/13 http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/06/nukeguidance/~~23more-6076)

President Barack Obama’s Berlin speech failed to capture the nuclear disarmament spirit of the Prague
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to nuclear warheads that will prompt many to ask what has actually changed.

Nuclear first use has no strategic or deterrent value.

Reif 9/17/13 Kingston Reif is the director of nuclear nonproliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. A recipient of a Marshall Scholarship, he was awarded a prestigious Scoville Peace Fellowship in 2008. He blogs about nuclear weapons policy at Nukes of Hazard. http://thebulletin.org/would-united-states-ever-actually-use-nuclear-weapons

The Syrian regime’s large-scale use of chemical weapons has prompted a vigorous discussion
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Ensuring that the tradition of nuclear non-use continues depends on it.

And, this nuclear posture increases the risk of nuclear use in conflict and miscalculation. The plan solves.

MODERATOR: JAMES ACTON, ASSOCIATE, NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT SPEAKERS: MICHAEL S. GERSON, RESEARCH ANALYST, CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES JEFFREY G. and LEWIS, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION 9-29-2009 "RETHINKING U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE" online
Another argument for retaining the option to use nuclear weapons first, in addition to
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the purposes, ultimately, of trying to de-escalate the conflict.

Only Congressional restriction creates a credible and consistent no first use posture.

Schultz 2004 PREEMPTING PREEMPTION: NUCLEAR FIRST-USE AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS JEFFREY L. SCHULTZ Mr. Schultz is an associate at Armstrong Teasdale LLP in St. Louis. Schultz is engaged in the practice of business litigation, with significant experience in trade secret, non-compete, unfair competition and intellectual property matters Kennedy School Review;2004, Vol. 5, p27 

Under uninterrupted constitutional practice since the use of the first nuclear weapons by the United
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nuclear preemptive strike, it had better say so by means of legislation.

Congressional restrictions are more credible signals.

Gallagher 2011 Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication Joseph V. Gallagher III served as an F/A-18C Pilot, Air Officer, and F/A-18C/D Flight Instructor in the US Marine Corps operating forces. He worked Security Assistance initiatives for the US European Command and most recently as a Joint Planner in the USEUCOM J3 and J5. Gallagher is currently assigned to the Joint Staff, PakistanAfghanistan Coordination Cell. http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2011summer/gallagher.pdf

As the practice of declaring war has become passé, American strategy has likewise become
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American people’s collective will in their efforts to subvert our national strategy.67

Only Credible 26 enforceable declaratory policy solves.

Miller, 2002 (Steven, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, London UK 15-17 November, The utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of No-First Use. Pugwash Meeting no. 279)

If NFU is to be more than a declaratory policy, then it must be
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if others are to be convinced that NFU is more than declaratory policy.¶ 

China

US nuclear posture causes Chinese modernization and nuclear risk-taking. Only NFU solves.

George Perkovich 2013 George Perkovich is vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. OP-ED FEBRUARY 26, 2013 POLITICO http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/26/white-house-should-target-transparent-nuclear-policy/fm6b
Neither has done like China and relied on deterrence through retaliation with a relatively small
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when it comes to drones but not U.S. nuclear weapons.

And, this posture eviscerates US-China nuclear diplomacy because we can’

Kulacki 2011 Chickens Talking With Ducks: The U.S.-Chinese Nuclear Dialogue Gregory Kulacki is a senior analyst and the China project manager in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). Since joining the UCS in 2002, he has focused on promoting and conducting dialogue between Chinese and U.S. experts on nuclear arms control and space security. Gregory Kulacki 2011 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_10/U.S._Chinese_Nuclear_Dialogue

Talks between China and the United States on the countries’ respective nuclear weapons programs are
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a basic confidence-building commitment that a much weaker China finds acceptable.

And lack of communication is particularly dangerous given other tensions and disagreements in US-China relations – these conflicts will escalate without the plan.

Colby 26 Denmark 2013, March Elbridge A. Colby, cochair, is a principal analyst and division lead for global strategic affairs at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Previously, he served as policy adviser to the secretary of defense’s representative for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, as an expert adviser to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, as a staff member on the President’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S. Regarding WMD, and in a number of other government positions. Abraham M. Denmark, cochair, is vice president for political and security affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and is an Asia-Pacific security adviser at the Center for Naval Analyses. "Nuclear Weapons and US China Relations a way forward" A report of the poni working group on u.s.- china nuclear dynamics CSIS – online
Unfortunately, significant sources of tension and disagreement between the United States and its allies
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questions about the future stability of U.S-China nuclear relations.

The plan stabilizes US China crisis management.

George Perkovich 2013 April Do Unto Others: Toward a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/01/do-unto-others-toward-defensible-nuclear-doctrine/fxax

The benefits of confining the use of nuclear weapons to retaliation against forces committing aggression
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disarming first strikes against China’s retaliatory nuclear forces and command and control centers.

Diplomacy is critical to solve crisis instability.

Chase 2013 michael s. chase is an Associate Professor in the Warfare Analysis and Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College China’s Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States Michael S. Chase Asia Policy, 

Diplomacy will also play a key role in maintaining a strategically stable U.S
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serve as a basis for Chinese participation in future multilateral arms-control negotiations

A breakdown of US-China strategic relations causes major power war.

Ratner, 2013 Dr. Ely Ratner is the Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.  Dr. Ratner recently served in the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs at the State Department as the lead political officer covering China’s external relations in Asia. "Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China." The Washington Quarterly 36.2 (2013): 21-38.

China’s foreign policies have for decades reflected the principles of biding time, pursuing a
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—are chief among the tasks of U.S. China policy.

Proliferation

Without a policy of no first use American proliferation leadership is doomed to failure. This will collapse the 2015 NPT review conference.

Perkovich 2013 George Perkovich is vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. April Do Unto Others: Toward a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/01/do-unto-others-toward-defensible-nuclear-doctrine/fxax

The timing of this intervention may seem peculiar. It was only three years ago
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.S. policy and possible alternatives may encourage movement in this direction.

====The plan is a critical step in reviving US non-proliferation leadership. ====
Korb 26 Rothman 2012 Lawrence J. Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and served as assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration from 1981–1985. Alexander H. Rothman is a special assistant with the national security and international policy team at the Center for American Progress. "No first use: The way to contain nuclear war in South Asia" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March/April 2012 vol. 68 no. 2 34-42

A US decision to declare a no-first-use policy would have benefits
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US nuclear attack would reduce pressure for them to acquire a nuclear deterrent.

Only an unambiguous, universal NFU solves international perception - exceptions are perceived to get looser and looser which undermines the pledge

The administrator and primary writer for this website is Kirk C. Bansak.  B.A. degree from Harvard University, where he majored in social anthropology, with a specialization in the anthropology of science and international relations2009 http://weaponsandhope.com/archives/367

The U.S. continues to try to make the case to all new
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a paper pledge not to."  No nation on earth would forget that.

Proliferation leadership is critical now – Iran 26 North Korea

COLLINA 26 KIMBALL 9/19 2013 Tom Z. Collina is research director and Daryl G. Kimball is executive director at the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC. "Keep Cutting Nukes
Four reasons why presidents have pushed for nuclear cuts for decades — and why there’s no reason to stop now." http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/19/keep_cutting_nukes?page=full

Curbing proliferation. Today’s most pressing security threat is not nuclear war with Russia or
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and only provides them with a cynical excuse to sidestep their nonproliferation commitments.

Additionally, NPT collapse causes rapid global proliferation.

Bromley et al  02 ~Mark, British American Security Information Council analyst, July 2002  Bunker Busters: Washington’s Drive for New Nuclear Weapons, p. 71 http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2002BB.pdf~~
Of all the international regimes to be affected by the NPR, the NPT may
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131 The dangers posed by a weakened NPT are real and universally recognised.

Proliferation will cause nuclear use and extinction

Utgoff 02 Victor, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival, Summer pp. 87-90

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out
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a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

Nuclear arms races escalate.

Guzansky, and Lindenstrauss. 2013 Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. Gallia Lindenstrauss, a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, specializes in Turkish foreign policy. She completed her Ph.D. in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University.
"Toward a Nuclear Middle East?." Strategic Survey for Israel 2012-2013: 61. 

A key argument guiding the international effort to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability
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security, and economic freedom in a multi-polar nuclear Middle East.