Tournament: tournament | Round: 4 | Opponent: Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Judge: Autry
Transitioning countries model US Judicial Review and Separation of Powers
Stumpf 13 István , Justice on the Constitutional Court of Hungary, Model, Resource, or Outlier? What Effect Has the U.S. Constitution Had on the Recently Adopted Constitutions of Other Nations?, 5/29/13, http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2013/05/model-resource-or-outlier-what-effect-has-the-us-constitution-had-on-the-recently-adopted-constitutions-of-other-nations

In summary, let me say that Hungary, of course, has different legal traditions from that of the United States. The American Founding could start from scratch; no continental European nation has had an opportunity to do that. In the last 20 years, Hungarian legal scholars and practitioners have developed much stronger ties with European academia—the German influence is particularly strong—but as you have seen, there is a very strong interest in the American constitutional heritage, and we should by no means underestimate the United States Constitution as a model for other nations. The basic notions of rule of law, separation of powers, natural law, judicial review, and human rights came to life thanks to the example of the United States in the last 225 years, which in turn has influenced the entirety of Western civilization, including Hungary. The theoretical foundations of American constitutionalism, the works of American legal scholars, and the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court are valuable resources and strong points of reference for lawyers in Hungary and all over the world. I am confident that it is for the benefit of the American academia to study from time to time how the concepts and institutions of American constitutionalism flourish or face difficulties in other countries. It is an honor for me to be here and take part in this conversation. As Hungary sets out to solidify its commitment to truths that are self-evident, to the protection of unalienable rights, to a limited but effective government, and to a renewed constitutionalism, I am convinced that we may in the future inspire one another. Let me close with this thought: There is much talk about a post-American era and American decline. As a young scholar visiting America since the 1980s, I got to know this country through road trips across the heartland as well as Ivy League university lecture halls, and I can tell you that the ideals of the Founding Fathers, the principles of the U.S. Constitution, and the Declaration of Independence were not and are not in decline. On the contrary, democracies around the world, old and new, need them now more than ever. As Chief Justice John Marshall said, “The people made the Constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their own will, and lives only by their will.”
Now is the key time – Egypt will model US judiciary in the wake of its overthrow of Morsi
Krayewski 13 (July 9, Ed, assistant editor at Reason and former producer for Fox and NBC, http://reason.com/archives/2013/07/09/egypt-should-adopt-the-us-constitution)

In theory, a constitution governs the relationship between the state and the people. Constitutions can be stocked with positive rights, in which the government promises to provide something, or negative rights, in which the government refrains from interfering. The Egyptian constitution somehow managed to turn even the rights of the press into a statement of obligation, requiring the media to "contribute to shaping and directing public opinion in accordance with the basic principles of the State and society." When she was in Egypt last year, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg told Egyptians that while the U.S. Constitution contained “grand general ideas,” she wouldn’t look to it in drafting a constitution today because of its exclusion of so many groups at the beginning. Instead, she called South Africa’s constitution a “really great piece of work” to learn from. Yet while the South African government boasts that its constitution “enjoys high acclaim internationally,” the African National Congress’s emerging de facto one-party rule is an obstacle to the country becoming a stable democracy. When the ANC ousted Thabo Mbeki as the party’s president, effectively vetoing his attempt to seek a third term, the ANC itself had to become a check on power; a more robust opposition is necessary. Here, despite Justice Ginsberg’s dismissal, the U.S. Constitution could offer a model for Egyptians. Its system of checks and balances has lasted more than 200 years. Yes, it failed to fully apply the principle of legal equality; it was a flawed document from a flawed time that was improved as its society evolved. Yet the fundamental mechanics of America’s federal government have been the same through more than two centuries of relative political stability. (The great exception to that stability, of course, is the Civil War. But we came out of that conflict with more improvements to the Constitution: The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were the most important additions to the document outside the original Bill of Rights.) Many of our constitutional rights are now under assault—the First Amendment, the Second Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, even the Third Amendment. Yet the rights enshrined in those articles are still there to put up a fight about. And despite the ruling party's constant protests about an “obstructionist” Congress, the legislature's ability to thwart an often unpopular presidential agenda is actually a constitutional feature in action. And it might be what Egypt needs. Rather than seeking to draft a constitution that outlines what government ought to do for (and to) people, Egyptians need a constitution that limits the power of government. The Muslim Brotherhood was targeted by the Egyptian state throughout the rule of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak; it in turn was overthrown largely on the perception that it was imposing an Islamist agenda on the Egyptian State. Though modern Egyptian constitutions have declared Islam as the religion of the nation and the latest one called on it as a source of law, Egyptians may find a constitution that protects the state from the mosque and the mosque from the state works better. Such a separation could both protect the Muslim Brotherhood from government persecution and also prevent it from trampling on the rights of women and non-Muslims. Drafting a constitution and establishing democratic institutions is no easy task. The coup itself came in the context of a popular revolt, a right implied in the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and mentioned explicitly in a number of state constitutions. The anti-Morsi protests that preceded the president's overthrow were backed by petitions with more than 22 million signatures, far more than the number of votes received by either Morsi or the 2012 constitution. Insofar as the government’s core function is the protection of rights (from itself), the military arguably performed that role in deposing the president. What came after, however, illustrates the importance of also bringing the military within a constitutional regime of checks and balances. The armed forces' all-too-familiar crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which included the killing yesterday of 51 pro-Morsi supporters, is just the kind of display of excessive and unaccountable power that sparked Egypt's contemporary revolutionary fervor in the first place. And the crackdown follows a decades-long pattern of repression that put the Muslim Brothers in a strong position to curry public favor and take political advantage of a democratic moment. Mercifully, Egypt’s experiment with democracy has not yet ended with a return to one-man, or one-party, rule. As Egyptians move to restart the process of drafting a constitution, they could look to America’s and consider whether they might be able to secure a republic capable of protecting them from the excesses of either democratic or undemocratic institutions.
Consolidation of power to the executive in Egypt ensures continued instability
Ackerman 13 Bruce, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University,To Save Egypt, Drop the Presidency, 7/10/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/opinion/to-save-egypt-drop-the-presidency.html?pagewanted=alland_r=1and

AS violence escalates, Egypt’s military is trying to bridge a widening political gap by promising a rapid return to civilian rule. But its gesture of accommodation does not get to the heart of the problem: the presidential system, inherited from the Mubarak era, virtually guarantees a repetition of the tragic events of the past year. A democratic breakthrough requires a more fundamental constitutional redesign, in which the contending sides compete for power in a European-style parliamentary system. If Egypt had made that switch in the interim Constitution adopted two years ago, or in the revisions that Mohamed Morsi, as president, rammed through last year, it could well have avoided the current upheaval and bloodshed in the first place. The presidency is a winner-take-all office. This may be acceptable in countries like the United States, where well-organized parties contend for the prize. But it is a recipe for tyranny in places like Egypt, where Islamists have powerful organizational advantages in delivering the vote. Because their opponents will have great difficulties uniting behind a single candidate, Islamists could probably parlay their strong minority support into another presidential victory. To prevent that result, it is predictable that the military will suppress the political efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood and similar groups — transforming the next election into a democratic farce. The next president would not only emerge with an illegitimate mandate. His victory would convert the Islamists into undying opponents of the regime. Only a parliamentary system provides a realistic path to a more stable, inclusive future. Even if Islamist parties won a substantial share of the vote, they would not be able to monopolize power. Consider the Brotherhood’s best-case scenario: Although millions of Egyptians took part in the street demonstrations that preceded President Morsi’s ouster, the Muslim Brotherhood could still win a quarter of the seats in the parliamentary elections, with the more orthodox Salafists gaining another 15 percent. In contrast, the non-Islamist forces are fractured into a number of different factions, ranging from Christian to social democratic. Although the Brotherhood might well emerge with more seats than any other single party, its non-Islamist opponents might nevertheless cobble together a governing coalition. Even if its opponents failed, the Brotherhood could not form a coalition either, unless it reached out to some secularists for support — especially since the Brotherhood could not count on the Salafists to always back it. Under either scenario, Islamists would remain a significant factor in the political game, as they deserve to be in a democracy; their influence would undercut the arguments of religious zealots who claim that democracy is a sham. But this need for cooperation across the religious-secular divide wouldn’t be met under any presidential scenario. Once the military assures the election of an acceptable president, Islamists would probably walk out of the legislature. Even if they remained, they would predictably use their parliamentary platform to denounce Mr. Morsi’s replacement as illegitimate. If they tried to block legislation, the new president could push through his program without their support by greasing the wheels with political patronage and outright corruption. If that failed, he could make aggressive use of his executive powers — generating cycles of alienation that would, over time, undermine the very ideal of democracy. Parliamentary government is no cure-all, but a good design can remedy the most serious pathologies. Some systems, like the Italian, require a government to fall whenever a majority of representatives votes “no confidence” — leading to notorious episodes of instability. Others, like the German system, keep the old government in power until the new majority can actually agree on a replacement. That is by far the better approach for Egypt. While momentary majorities may say no to government initiatives, they should show that they have the sustained support of Parliament as a body before they can establish themselves in power. Egypt’s future will depend on the statesmanship of its leaders and the effectiveness of its policies. But a decisive move in the direction of a well-designed parliamentary democracy would create a constitutional order that encourages democrats of all persuasions to reach out to one another. The military’s current transition plan doesn’t contemplate such a breakthrough. But it doesn’t preclude it either. The “constitutional declaration” issued by the provisional president, Adli Mansour, establishes a committee of 10 jurists to propose constitutional amendments that will set the stage for a new round of elections. Before these proposals are presented to the voters in a referendum, they must be vetted by a 50-person committee appointed by social and governmental institutions, as well as by the provisional government. The timeline set by the military invites discussion of the fundamental issue. It schedules the new amendments to go before the people in about three months, followed within two more months by parliamentary elections. It then provides for the new parliament to call for presidential elections during the first week of its session. Given this sequence, reformers can simply argue for the elimination of the final stage in the process, demanding that the military turn over power to civilians once a governing coalition gains the support of a parliamentary majority. In making this move, the protagonists would not simply be aping European models. They would be taking sides in a vibrant debate within the Islamic world. When Turks mobilized in protest against their government last month, one of their larger grievances was Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s effort to replace Turkey’s system of parliamentary government, through a constitutional amendment that would allow him to gain direct election as a powerful president. The demonstrators rightly saw this as a move by Mr. Erdogan to consolidate his power, and their mass opposition may well have put an end to his authoritarian initiative. The question now is whether Egyptians will join in this broader popular movement to repudiate presidentialism, before it dooms their country’s great experiment in democracy.
Egyptian instability spills over throughout the region
Friedman 13 Thomas, Pulitzer Prize Winning Foreign Affairs Correspondent for the New York Times, Egypt at the Edge, 7/9/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/friedman-egypt-at-the-edge.html?

In every civil war there is a moment before all hell breaks loose when there is still a chance to prevent a total descent into the abyss. Egypt is at that moment. The Muslim holy month of Ramadan starts this week, and it can’t come too soon. One can only hope that the traditional time for getting family and friends together will provide a moment for all the actors in Egypt to reflect on how badly they’ve behaved — all sides — and opt for the only sensible pathway forward: national reconciliation. I was a student at the American University in Cairo in the early 1970s and have been a regular visitor since. I’ve never witnessed the depth of hatred that has infected Egypt in recent months: Muslim Brotherhood activists throwing a young opponent off a roof; anti-Islamist activists on Twitter praising the Egyptian army for mercilessly gunning down supporters of the Brotherhood in prayer. In the wake of all this violent turmoil, it is no longer who rules Egypt that it is at stake. It is Egypt that is at stake. This is an existential crisis. Can Egypt hold together and move forward as a unified country or will it be torn asunder by its own people, like Syria? Nothing is more important in the Middle East today, because when the stability of modern Egypt is at stake — sitting as it does astride the Suez Canal, the linchpin of any Arab peace with Israel and knitting together North Africa, Africa and the Middle East — the stability of the whole region is at stake.
Egyptian instability causes conflict in the Mediterranean, Africa, and Middle East --- collapsing the Suez Canal
Copley 11 (Gregory O., Editor – Global Information System and Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, “Strategic Ramifications of the Egyptian Crisis”, World Tribune, 2-1, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/ WTARC/2011/me_egypt0088_02_01.asp)

In the preface to the Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook on Egypt, in 1995, I noted: If Egypt remains strong, and in all senses a power in its regional contexts, then world events will move in one direction. If Egypt's strength is undermined, then world events (and not merely those of the Middle East) will move along a far more uncertain and violent path.  It is significant that Egypt began to fail to be strong, internally, within a few years of that 1995 book. It became less resilient as Mubarak became more isolated and the inspiration offered by Sadat began to erode. This resulted in the rise in Egypt of the Islamists who had killed Sadat, and the growing empowerment of the veteran Islamists from the Afghan conflict, including such figures as Osama bin Laden (who had spent considerable time living in Egypt), and Ayman al-Zawahiri, et al. The reality was that Mubarak's management-style presidency could not offer the requisite hope because hope translates to meaning and identity to Egyptian society as it was transitioning from poverty and unemployment to gradually growing wealth.  What are the areas of strategic concern, then, as Egypt transforms? The following are some considerations:  --  Security and stability of Suez Canal sea traffic: Even temporary disruption, or the threat of disruptions, to traffic through the Suez Canal would disturb global trade, given that the Canal and the associated SUMED pipeline (which takes crude oil north from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean) are responsible for significant volumes of world trade, including energy shipments. Threats of delays or closure of the Canal and/or the SUMED, or hints of increased danger to shipping, would significantly increase insurance costs on trade, and would begin to have shippers consider moving Suez traffic, once again, to the longer and more expensive Cape of Good Hope seaway.  --  Disruption of Nile waters negotiations and matters relating: Egypt's support for the emerging independence of South Sudan was based on that new state s control over a considerable stretch of the White Nile, at a time when Egypt has been attempting to dominate new treaty discussions regarding Nile (White and Blue Nile) water usage and riparian rights. Already, Egyptian ability to negotiate with the Nile River states has entered an hiatus, and unless the Egyptian Government is able to re-form quickly around a strong, regionally-focused model, Egypt will have lost all momentum on securing what it feels is its dominance over Nile water controls. In the short term, the Egyptian situation could provide tremors into northern and South Sudan, and in South Sudan this will mean that the U.S., in particular, could be asked to step up support activities to that country's independence transition.  Such a sudden loss of Egypt's Nile position will radically affect its long-standing proxy war to keep Ethiopia which controls the headwaters and flow of the Blue Nile, the Nile's biggest volume input landlocked and strategically impotent. This means that Egypt's ability to block African Union (AU) and Arab League denial of sovereignty recognition of the Republic of Somaliland will decline or disappear for the time being. Already Egypt's influence enabled an Islamist takeover of Somaliland, possibly moving that state toward re-integration with the anomic Somalia state. Equally importantly, the interregnum in Egypt will mean a cessation of Cairo's support for Eritrea and the proxy war which Eritrea facilitates but which others, particularly Egypt, pay against Ethiopia through the arming, logistics, training, etc., of anti-Ethiopian groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), etc.  -- Overall security of the Red Sea states and SLOC: Egypt has been vital to sustaining the tenuous viability of the state of Eritrea, because Cairo regarded Eritrean loyalty as a key means of sustaining Egyptian power projection into the Red Sea (and ensuring the security of the Red Sea/Suez Sea Lane of Communication), and to deny such access to Israel. Absent Egyptian support, the Eritrean Government of President Isayas Afewerke will begin to feel its isolation and economic deprivation, and may well, on its own, accelerate new pressures for conflict with Ethiopia to distract local populations from the growing deprivation in the country.  --  The Israel situation: A protracted interregnum in Egypt, or a move by Egypt toward Islamist or populist governance could bring about a decline in the stability of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, and provide an opening of the border with the Hamas-controlled Gaza region of the Palestinian Authority lands. This would contribute to the ability of Iran to escalate pressures on Israel, and not only further isolate Israel, but also isolate Jordan, and, to an extent, Saudi Arabia. The threat of direct military engagement between Israel and Egypt may remain low, but a move by Egypt away from being a predictable part of the regional peace system would, by default, accelerate the growth of the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah-Hamas ability to strategically threaten Israel. Moreover, the transforming situation would also inhibit the West Bank Palestinian Authority Government.  --  Eastern Mediterranean stability: The instability, and the possible move toward greater Islamist influence, in Egypt reinforces the direction and potential for control of the regional agenda by the Islamist Government of Turkey. It is certainly possible that the transformed mood of the Eastern Mediterranean could inhibit external investment in the development of the major gas fields off the Israeli and Cyprus coasts. This may be a gradual process, but the overall sense of the stability of the region particularly if Suez Canal closure or de facto closure by any avoidance of it by shippers due to an Islamist government in Cairo would be jeopardized if the area is no longer the world s most important trade route.  -- Influence on Iran's position: It should be considered that any decline in Egypt's ability to act as the major influence on the Arab world enhances Iran's de facto position of authority in the greater Middle East. It is true that Egypt's position has been in decline in this regard for the past decade and more, and that even Saudi Arabia has worked, successfully to a degree, to compete with Egypt for regional (ie: Arab) leadership. Without strong Egyptian leadership, however, there is no real counterweight to Iran's ability to intimidate. During the period of the Shah's leadership in Iran (until the revolution of 1979 and the Shah's departure, ultimately to his death and burial, ironically, in Cairo), Iran and Egypt were highly compatible strategic partners, stabilizing the region to a large degree. The Shah's first wife was Egyptian. Absent a strong Egypt (and, in reality, we have been absent a strong Egypt for some years), we can expect growing Iranian boldness in supporting such groups as those fighting for the so-called Islamic Republic of Eastern Arabia.  --  U.S. interests: A stable Egypt is critical for the maintenance of U.S. strategic interests, given its control of the Suez; its partnership in the peace process with Israel; and so on. Why, then, would the Barack Obama administration indicate that it would support the masses in the streets of Egyptian cities at this point. There is no question that Washington has supported moves to get Mubarak to provide for a smooth succession over recent years: that would have been beneficial for Egypt as well as for the U.S. But for the U.S. to actively now support as Barack Obama has done the street over orderly transition of power lacks strategic sense. It is true that the State Dept., and even the strategically-challenged Vice President Joe Biden, have urged caution on the Egyptian people, but Obama has effectively contradicted that approach, as he did in Tunisia, where he literally supported the street revolution against its president earlier in January. If Egypt moves to anti-Western, anti-U.S. governance, the U.S. will be required to re-think its entire strategic approach to the Middle East, Africa, and the projection of power through the Eastern Mediterranean and into the Indian Ocean. It would give a strong boost of importance to the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which is responsible for U.S. projection the Indian Ocean. CENTCOM (Central Command) would need to be re-thought, as would USAFRICOM (U.S. African Command).  -- Impact on the U.S. positions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: The loss of Egypt and the questionable ability which the U.S. could have over projection through the Suez Canal if it came to that would certainly impact U.S. ability to support the final military operations it has in Iraq, and Afghanistan. A loss (or jeopardizing) of U.S. military access via Egyptian-controlled areas such as the Red Sea/Suez would absolutely fragment the way in which the U.S. can project power globally. Even the accession of an Islamist state in Egypt, as opposed to closure of the Suez Canal, would achieve much of this. What is clear is that the U.S. did not adequately prepare for the end of the Mubarak era, even though it was absolutely obvious that it was coming. Now, only by luck will the U.S. see the Egyptian armed forces re-assert control over Egypt and introduce a new generation of leadership to bridge the transition until the re-emergence of a charismatic leader.
Middle East war causes global nuclear war
Primakov 9 (Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry – Russian Federation, Member – Russian Academy of Science, “The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations”, Russia in Global Affairs, 3, July/September, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13593)

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict.  The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

Shutdown of the Suez Canal causes economic collapse
PE 11 (Peak Effect, “Suez Canal Oil Choke Point,” 1-29, http://www.thepeakeffect.com/2011/01/suez-canal-oil-choke-point.html)

Transitioning countries model US Judicial Review and Separation of Powers
Stumpf 13 István , Justice on the Constitutional Court of Hungary, Model, Resource, or Outlier? What Effect Has the U.S. Constitution Had on the Recently Adopted Constitutions of Other Nations?, 5/29/13, http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2013/05/model-resource-or-outlier-what-effect-has-the-us-constitution-had-on-the-recently-adopted-constitutions-of-other-nations

In summary, let me say that
AND
and lives only by their will.”
Now is the key time – Egypt will model US judiciary in the wake of its overthrow of Morsi
Krayewski 13 (July 9, Ed, assistant editor at Reason and former producer for Fox and NBC, http://reason.com/archives/2013/07/09/egypt-should-adopt-the-us-constitution)

In theory, a constitution
AND
democratic or undemocratic institutions.
Consolidation of power to the executive in Egypt ensures continued instability
Ackerman 13 Bruce, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University,To Save Egypt, Drop the Presidency, 7/10/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/opinion/to-save-egypt-drop-the-presidency.html?pagewanted=alland_r=1and

AS violence escalates,
AND
experiment in democracy.
Egyptian instability spills over throughout the region
Friedman 13 Thomas, Pulitzer Prize Winning Foreign Affairs Correspondent for the New York Times, Egypt at the Edge, 7/9/13, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/friedman-egypt-at-the-edge.html?

In every civil war there is a
AND
region is at stake.
Egyptian instability causes conflict in the Mediterranean, Africa, and Middle East --- collapsing the Suez Canal
Copley 11 (Gregory O., Editor – Global Information System and Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, “Strategic Ramifications of the Egyptian Crisis”, World Tribune, 2-1, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/ WTARC/2011/me_egypt0088_02_01.asp)

In the preface to the Defense and Foreign
AND
of a charismatic leader.
Middle East war causes global nuclear war
Primakov 9 (Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry – Russian Federation, Member – Russian Academy of Science, “The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations”, Russia in Global Affairs, 3, July/September, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13593)

The Middle East conflict is
AND
rule out such a possibility.

Shutdown of the Suez Canal causes economic collapse
PE 11 (Peak Effect, “Suez Canal Oil Choke Point,” 1-29, http://www.thepeakeffect.com/2011/01/suez-canal-oil-choke-point.html)

Why the recent developments
AND
already feeble economy.
Nuclear war
Harris and Burrows, 09 – *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict
AND
more dog-eat-dog world.

Nuclear war
Harris and Burrows, 09 – *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

Tournament: GSU | Round: 1 | Opponent: Minnesota CE | Judge: Aaron Hardy
Plan Text: The United States federal judiciary should rule that the President of the United States lacks the authority to detain individuals indefinitely.