Tournament: Pre-Shirley Disclosure | Round: Quads | Opponent: NULL | Judge: NULL

Democracy

Advantage 1 is Democracy -

Status quo has mass violations of separation of powers

Ackerman and Hathaway, Yale professors, 11
Ackerman, Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale, and Hathaway, Professor of International Law, Yale (Bruce and Oona, "Limited war and the Constitution: Iraq and the crisis of presidential Legality", 1 February 2011, Michigan Law Review, Volume 109; Issue 4, twm)

The recent Iraq war exemplifies this challenge. When *Congress* authorized the invasion
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congressional limits has eroded over the course of two centuries. (3)

Plan is key to prevent cascading presidential authority – risking U.S. democratic collapse

Shane 9 ~Peter M. - Chair in Law at the Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law, internationally recognized authority on constitutional and administrative law. May 2009, Excerpt from "Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy," http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/749396.html 

For the last quarter century, the checks and balances of American government have been
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accurate reading of what our constitutional Framers historically intended. It is not. 

D-Rule

Carter 87
Carter, law prof at Yale, explained in 1987—William Nelson Cromwell prof
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Young University Law Review No. 3, p. 751-2)
 The problem with this use of our burgeoning public policy science, an inevitable
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– can be justified through reference to the policy itself as the end. 

Global democratic transitions are inevitable—-the only way for the US to bolster democracies is constitutionalism—-prevents war

Fareed Zakaria 97, PhD Poli Sci @ Harvard, Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs, 1997, Lexis
Of course cultures vary, and different societies will require different frameworks of government.
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next century, our task is to make democracy safe for the world.   

Democratic liberalism is backsliding now—-the US model of an unrestrained executive causes collapse

Larry Diamond 9, Professor of Political Science and Sociology @ Stanford, "The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Democracy", Presented to the SAIS-CGD Conference on New Ideas in Development after the Financial Crisis, Conference Paper that can be found on his Vita
Concern about the future of democracy is further warranted by the gathering signs of a
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and for the effective restoration of democracy in countries like Thailand and Nepal.

Engagement

Advantage 2 is deliberation

Obama is pursuing endless war in the Middle East

Landler 9/24
~Mark Landler, 9/24/13, "Obama Defends U.S. Engagement in the Middle East," http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/us/politics/obama-iran-syria.html?_r=0~~ MJ
UNITED NATIONS — President Obama on Tuesday laid down a retooled blueprint for America’s role
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exemplar of the kind of economic development that has eluded the Arab world.

Unilateral executive war powers leads to groupthink – leads to prolonged wars and more errors

Fleischman 10
~Matthew Fleischman, J.D. Candidate at New York University School of Law, "A Functional Distribution of War Powersand", New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 13 N.Y.U. J. Legis. 26 Pub. Pol’y 137, Lexis~
While Nzelibe and Yoo’s model is clearly plausible, it misses certain critical institutional constructs
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it is the institutional design that would better accommodate functionalists’ concerns and desires.

America is retrenching and countries are rising - selective engagement is the best strategy to avoid great power wars – comparative evidence

Ashley 12 
~Sean, 8/9/12, "What is the Best Grand Strategy for the United States in 2012?" http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/09/what-is-the-best-grand-strategy-for-the-united-states-in-2012/~~ MJ
First, the global "diffusion of economic and technological capabilities"~15~, have
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era of resource conflict and American retrenchment, is more acute than ever.

Plan leads to selective engagement.

Ackerman and Hathaway, Yale professors, 11—Ackerman, Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale, and Hathaway, Professor of International Law, Yale (Bruce and Oona, "Limited war and the Constitution: Iraq and the crisis of presidential Legality", 1 February 2011, Michigan Law Review, Volume 109; Issue 4, twm)

As long as the costs of defiance seem very high at Period Three, they
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the purse to promote ongoing democratic deliberation over the conduct of limited war.

The offensive foreign policy of the United States has caused free-riding from allies and risks involvement in unnecessary wars

Posen 13
~Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1/6/13, "Pull Back The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138466/barry-r-posen/pull-back~~ MJ
Another problematic response to the United States’ grand strategy comes from its friends: free
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serious impediment to improved U.S. relations with the Arab world.

Excess Presidential power causes aggressive preemption

Fincher 3
~Charles Pugsley Fincher, October 26, 2003,http://www.thadeusandweez.com/cam03/10.26.03..html~~
The United States Congress has gone missing. Before the rise of the "imperial
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Congress are elected in the first place — to represent the American people.

Preemption ruins U.S. diplomatic leverage —- risks escalation

Wheeler 3
~Nicholas J. Wheeler, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation, and Security at the University of Birmingham, "The Bush Doctrine: The Dangers of American Exceptionalism in a Revolutionary Age", Asian Perspective, 27(4), p. 201~
India’s belief, for example, that Pakistan is complicit in terrorist attacks against Indian
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cases where governments are deliberating over the merits of launching an anticipatory attack.

Nuke War

New York Times 2013 ~January 16, "Another Face-Off for Nuclear-Armed Rivals" http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/opinion/another-face-off-for-india-and-pakistan.html?_r=0 RS~
One of the likeliest flash points for a nuclear war is the enduring conflict between
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government is besieged on multiple fronts just a few months ahead of elections. 

SCS conflict causes WW3

Arthur Waldron 97, "HOW NOT TO DEAL WITH CHINA", Commentary, 00102601, Mar1997, Vol. 103, Issue 3, EBSCO
Then there is Southeast Asia, which, having weathered the Vietnam war and a
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—Russia, or India, or Japan—or the United States.

Goes nuclear—-only if the U.S. is involved

Nikkei Weekly, 95 (7-3, Lexis)
Mahathir sees Asia developing in three possible ways in future. In his worst-case scenario, Asian countries would go to war against each other, possibly over disputes such as their conflicting claims on the Spratly Islands. China might then declare war on the U.S., leading to full-scale, even nuclear, war.

Plan

United States Congress should adopt Rules for Limited War as specified by Ackerman and Hathaway.

The strategic use of emergency appropriations allowed the president to engage in “bait-and-switch” tactics that undermined effective democratic control over the use of military force. Following the Iraq precedent, future presidents will be able to “bait” Congress and the American people into approving a limited war, and then “switch” to a much longer war with more ambitious objectives. Serious congressional consideration of these escalat- ing war aims will be short-circuited by the repeated use of the “emergency” appropriations device. This diagnosis suggests the need for an institutional remedy. The Iraq case shows that it is not enough for the initial authorization of force to specify the limited purposes of the war. It must also specify the limited time period for the conflict, requiring the president to return for an explicit reauthorization if he wishes to extend the war beyond the preset period. This can be accomplished by either the House or the Senate using its constitutional authority to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” The Constitution gives either chamber the authority to change its rules governing future authorizations for the use of force. Under our proposed “Rules for Limited War,” all future authorizations will be valid for only two years unless the House or Senate sets a different time-limit—or declares that the war should continue, without limit, until victory is achieved. But unless Congress makes this decision explicit in its initial authorizing resolution, the two-year term will serve as a default rule. The new rules will be enforced through a prohibition on all war appropriations after the congressional dead- line, except for money needed to wind down the mission over the course of one year. Our proposal is designed to be both politically feasible and instrumen-tally effective in controlling the democratic pathologies of a presidential bait-and-switch. It builds on precedents developed by Congress to control the use of the appropriations power. Even if only a single chamber adopts the new rules, this action will catalyze a recalibration of our real-world sys- tem of checks and balances. The rules will have a significant impact on congressional–presidential relations long before matters reach the moment of final confrontation—when the president, after failing to convince Con-gress to authorize a further extension of the war effort, confronts a one-year “wind up” appropriation for the orderly withdrawal of troops from the battle zone. It is important to analyze the options available to the president and Con-gress at this “showdown stage,” when the appropriations cut-off becomes operational. But it is no less important to consider how the prospect of a “final showdown” fundamentally alters incentives at earlier stages in the war- making process—starting with the moment the president asks Congress for an initial war authorization, and continuing through the period when the cut-off date begins to loom large on the horizon. In a properly designed system, the new rules will generate a far more candid and democratic process during these earlier periods, without the president and Congress ever pushing the matter to a final showdown. And the president will be confronted with very unattractive options if he forces a showdown by trying to extend the war unilaterally after the final one-year wind-up appropriation has expired. Once one chamber adopts the new rules, its counterpart will be pressed to give them serious consideration and it may adopt the reform or join the effort through a concurrent resolution or statute. Our multiperiod analysis permits a more precise assessment of the extent to which these supportive efforts by the second chamber will enhance the system’s operation. We also offer our framework as a more general model for the analysis of separation- of-powers problems—which typically content themselves with a static analysis without self-consciously considering the way rule systems affect institutional dynamics over time. 

Plan solves

Ackerman and Hathaway, Yale professors, 11—Ackerman, Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale, and Hathaway, Professor of International Law, Yale (Bruce and Oona, "Limited war and the Constitution: Iraq and the crisis of presidential Legality", 1 February 2011, Michigan Law Review, Volume 109; Issue 4, twm)
A distinctive pattern emerges from the modern experience. The constitu- tional legitimacy of
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stop in the Oval Office. It stops with the House and Senate. 

Failure to grasp national will and create coherent strategies causes failures in foreign policies – congressional authorization key

Gallagher 11
~Lieutenant Colonel Joseph V. Gallagher III, United States Marine Corps, "Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication", Parameters, Summer, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2011summer/gallagher.pdf~~
Since World War II, a wide gap has developed between Congress and the executive
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wage fewer of them—and be far better positioned to win them.

Tournament: Pre-Shirley Disclosure | Round: Quads | Opponent: NULL | Judge: NULL
This is this team's first tournament. Below are the cites to the Ackerman Aff that Georgia Tech JS has read. If you want more info, you should check out Georgia Tech JS's page because they are running the same stuff that we are. 

-Ricardo