Tournament: GSU | Round: 1 | Opponent: na | Judge: na

The United States Congress should statutorily ban the preemptive use of large-scale offensive cyber operations by the President of the United States.

Cyber War

Scenario 1 is cyber prolif:

Status quo offensive cyber operations by the US has set a precedent that is being modeled by other countries – leads to proliferation of cyberweapons

Gjelten 13
(Tom Gjelten, correspondent for NPR, "Pentagon Goes On The Offensive Against Cyberattacks" February 11, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/02/11/171677247/pentagon-goes-on-the-offensive-against-cyber-attacks, KB)

With the Pentagon now officially recognizing cyberspace as a domain of warfare, U.
AND
officials ... have given speeches and spoken at conferences and other public events."

Cyberweapons are proliferating at a rapid pace – it makes attacks likely on the US and allies

Walsh 11
(Eddie Walsh, The Diplomat’s Pentagon (accredited) correspondent and a WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, "The Cyber Proliferation Threat" October 6, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2011/10/06/the-cyber-proliferation-threat/, KB)

The United States might not be quite as far ahead of other nations in terms
AND
number of potential targets is almost infinite and not limited by geography.’

US vulnerability is at an all-time high – sectors are interconnected and a cyberattack would collapse mission effectiveness

Liff 12
(ADAM P. LIFF, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Politics, Princeton University, "Cyberwar: A New ’Absolute Weapon’? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War" Journal of Strategic Studies¶ Volume 35, Issue 3, 2012 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2012.663252, KB)

Many argue that the most worrisome aspect of cyberwarfare is its¶ low cost,
AND
thereby¶ (potentially) further lowering the expected costs of an attack.

Loss of mission effectiveness causes nuclear war in every hotspot

Kagan and O’Hanlon 7 
Frederick, resident scholar at AEI and Michael, senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, "The Case for Larger Ground Forces", April 2007, http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but
AND
Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

An attack is likely - causes great power nuclear war

Fritz 9
Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament ~Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University, "Hacking Nuclear Command and Control," July, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf~~

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons.
AND
its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.  

Deterrence fails – a 3^rd party will instigate the conflict

Owens et al 9
(William A. Owens, as an Admiral in the United States Navy and later Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kenneth W. Dam, served as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 2001 to 2003, where he specialized in international economic development, Herbert S. Lin, Senior Scientist and Study, "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities" 4/27/2009, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NRC-Report.pdf, KB)

Catalytic conflict refers to the phenomenon in which a third party ¶ instigates conflict between
AND
might thus choose just such a time to conduct a catalytic ¶ cyberattack.

The plan solves – US norms against OCO’s is critical to reverse cyberweapon prolif

Goldsmith 10
Jack Goldsmith, teaches at Harvard Law School and is on the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and Law. He was a member of a 2009 National Academies committee, "Can we stop the cyber arms race?" February 01, 2010, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-01/opinions/36895669_1_botnets-cyber-attacks-computer-attacks, KB)

In a speech this month on "Internet freedom," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
AND
it might clamp down on in exchange for reciprocal concessions by our adversaries.

Banning large-scale preemptive attacks is key – provides international credibility and deters attack

Clarke and Knake ’12 (Richard (former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States) and Robert (Cybersecurity and homeland security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations), Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, Harper Collins Books, 2012, RSR)
Balancing our desire for military flexibility with the need to address the fact that cyber
AND
the conflict might thus be undermined and the potential for international sanctions increased.

Prez Powers Bad

No checks on executive-controlled cyber operations in squo

Opderbeck 12 (David, "Cybersecurity and Executive Power," Washington University Law Review, Vol 89: Issue 4, digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=102026context=lawreview)
Our discussion of cybersecurity and executive power thus far seems to ¶ leave us with
AND
courts construe "cyberspace" as on how they ¶ construe the Constitution.

Lack of congressional oversight on cyber operations undermines SOP

Lorber 13
~Eric, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University
Department of Political Science. Journal Of Constitutional Law 15.3 https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013. ETB~

Yet addressing these questions is increasingly important for two reasons. ¶ First, as
AND
-in-chief power15 and Congress’s war-making ¶ authority.16

Separation of powers key to the economy

Stevenson 5 (Dru Stevenson, Assistant Professor, South Texas College of Law (Houston), March 2005, Cardozo Law Review, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1535)
This is similar, of course, to the argument in the Federalist Papers for
AND
individual abuses¶ typically envisioned in the checks-and-balances discussions. 

Economic collapse triggers nuclear great power wars

Burrows and Harris ’09
(Mathew J. Burrows is a counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, Jennifer Harris is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit, "Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis", The Washington Quarterly, April,http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and
AND
frustrated and the current benefits they derive from a globalizing world turn negative.

Extra Prez Powers

Even small violations of separation of powers must be avoided like nuclear war risks

Redish and Cisar 91    professor of law at Northwestern and Law Clerk to Chief Judge William Bauer, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
Martin H. and Elizabeth J., December 1991, IF ANGELS WERE TO GOVERN" *: THE NEED FOR PRAGMATIC FORMALISM IN SEPARATION OF POWERS THEORY ,1992 Duke Law Journal, 41 Duke L.J. 449, p. 474
In summary, no defender of separation of powers can prove with certitude that,
AND
be forced into the position of saying, "I told you so."

Tyranny must be rejected

Petro 74 ~Sylvester Petro, professor of law at Wake Forest, Spring 1974, Toledo Law Review, p. 480~
However, one may still insist on echoing Ernest Hemingway – "I believe in
AND
every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

Solvency

NFU for large-scale attacks reduces the risk of cyberattack

Owens et al. ’9
~William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, editors, ¶ Committee on Offensive Information Warfare, National Research Council. http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NRC-Report.pdf ETB~
No first use of large-scale cyberattacks. Although weapons for cyberattack are valid
AND
would be a lower likelihood that it would experience such an ¶ attack.

Declaratory policy would functionally end OCO training, preventing their use

Owens et al. ’9
~William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, editors, ¶ Committee on Offensive Information Warfare, National Research Council. http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NRC-Report.pdf ETB~
Yet another related issue is whether another nation should believe ¶ a nation’s declaratory policy
AND
its leaders decide to act in violation of ¶ the stated declaratory policy.

Congressional action is critical to cyber expertise and preserves presidential flexibility

Dycus ’10
~Stephen, Professor, Vermont Law School. JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 26POLICY 4.155.
http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/11_Dycus.pdf ETB~
Congress’s active role in the development and implementation of cyber ¶ warfare policy is no
AND
to work together to meet these challenges, as the ¶ Framers intended.