Tournament: Sunshine State Showdown | Round: 1 | Opponent: Miami | Judge:
Advantage 1: International Law
Cyber tensions between the US and China are escalating rapidly. The brink is now.
Yi 13 Xiaoxiong Yi is the director of Marietta College's China Program. June 22, 2013 “The coming of China-U.S. cyber war” http://www.mariettatimes.com/page/content.detail/id/552547.html
The cyber warfare between Washington and Beijing
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electronic arms race and a developing cyber war.
Even innocent data collection can be misinterpreted as an attack, only a matter of time
Williams 11 (Robert D. Williams, J.D. Harvard Law School… “(Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection, and Covert Action”… June 2011… The George Washington Law Review… LexisNexis… 8/1/13… RTV)
A cyber intrusion may be characterized as
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intrusion to be - raises serious questions,
Oversight solves escalation
Lin 10 “Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force”; 4 J. Nat'l Sec. L. and Pol'y pg63 (2010) Lin, Herbert S. (chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National
Research Council of the National Academies)
If the United States launches an offensive
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under conditions of great uncertainty and intense time pressure.
Cyber espionage would be misread as an attack – US or China would respond with nukes
Clarke 13(Richard Clarke, the chairman of Good Harbor Security Risk Management, was special adviser to the president for cybersecurity in the George W. Bush administration. Steve Andreasen, a consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, was the National Security Council's staff director for defense policy and arms control from 1993 to 2001…. “The perils of linking cyberwar to nuclear war”… 6/16/2013 … The Washington Post… LexisNexis Academic… 8/13/13… RTV)
The Pentagon's Defense Science Board concluded this year
And
more countries would surely take the same approach.
Title 50 framework clarifies Cyber ops and forces compliance with the LOAC
Williams 11
(Robert D. Williams, J.D. Harvard Law School… “(Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection, and Covert Action”… June 2011… The George Washington Law Review… LexisNexis… 8/1/13. AJM
Treating an increased number of cyber exploitations
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means of influencing political, economic, or military conditions abroad.
LOAC doesn’t cover cyber ops in the squo
Kodar 12 (Erki Kodar is a professor of law at the University of Tartu, and also the Director of the Legal Department of the Estonian Ministry… “APPLYING THE LAW OF ARMEDCONFLICT TO CYBER ATTACKS:FROM THE MARTENS CLAUSE TOADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I”… http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_15_5_Kodar.pdf ... 9/1/13… RTV)
Applying LOAC norms to cyber attacks is only possible in the
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cyber attacks is a must, as not all attacks would be regulated by LOAC.
LOAC has worked, and is key to stop collapse of society
IOLD 12
(The International and Operational Law Department is part of the Library of Congress’s graduate studies program, specializing in the Law of Armed Conflict… 2012… “Law or Armed Conflict Deskbook”… The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School… http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2012.pdf ... 9/15/13… RTV)
Although critics of the regulation of warfare cite examples
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hands of the enemy; and (3) assist in restoring the peace.
The development of international law is based on modeling – comes before treaties and conventions
Brown and Poellet 12 (Colonel Gary Brown, JD Senior Legal Counsel for U.S. Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland and Keira Pollet, JD and LLM Judge Advocate General and former Operations Law Attorney at US CYBERCOM, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Fall 2012, The Customary International Law of Cyberspace, Accessed 8/30/13) (www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/fall/brown-poellet.pdf?) /ejc\
The body of international law is a jumble of
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nations may take actions they deem appropriate.3
The US has the authority to establish precedent as a member of the U.N. Security Council
Melnitzky 12 (Alexander B. Melnitzky, Associate at The Serbagi Law Firm, P.C. Former Associate Editor of Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law. He earned his J.D. from Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University and a B.A. in History from NYU.) /ejc\ (https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplayandcrawlid=1anddoctype=citeanddocid=20+Cardozo+J.+Int27l+26+Comp.+L.+537andsrctype=smiandsrcid=3B15andkey=e30e49aa22650c3c135d44854f)
"The current international legal paradigm predates cyberspace and cannot *568
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disruptions or damage' will set a precedent for the rest of the world." n209
Advantage 2: Turf War
Interagency turf wars have blocked reorganization of cyber policies
Biggs 12
(Zachary Fryer-Biggs is a Washington Staff Writer for DefenseSystems, a news source focusing on national security matters… 5/7/12… http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120507/DEFREG02/305070004 “Debate Slows New U.S. Cyber Rules” … 9/17/13)
Despite the ongoing concern about the escalating pace
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United States government and the world as we know it,” he said.
Interagency convergence disrupts the decision making process and kills response time to cyber attacks
Chesney 2012. “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate” (Charles I. Francis Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law) http://jnslp.com/wp- content/uploads/2012/01/Military-Intelligence-Convergence-and-the-Law-of-the-Title-10Title-50-Debate.pdf
The first way in which cyberspace is especially prone to convergence has to do
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as cooperation between the CIA and the military.
Non-state actors are targeting the US now – these attacks risk nuclear meltdowns and stock market crashes
Sharp 2010. “National Leadership, Individual Responsibility: The Past, Present, and Future of Cybersecurity” (Walter Gary Sharp Sr. Senior Associate Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense; Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) 4 J. Nat'l Security L. and Pol'y 13. AMon
Popular media productions such as 24 n7 and Live Free or Die Hard n8 have depicted
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to use the Internet to cause acts of terrorism
Response time is key – a cyber attack could shut down the US economy
AAP 13 AAP (Australian Associated Press) 06/12/13, Cyber wars would cripple economies: experts, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/news/2013/6/12/global-news/cyber-wars-would-cripple-economies-experts, (08/13/13)#HBK
Cyber attackers have the power to shut down
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For any other part of the world it's similar destruction."
Even the possibility of cyber-attack has the potential to shake business confidence and destroy the economy
Cornish 11 Paul Cornish(Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Exeter. He was educated at the London School of Economics (MSc Econ, International Relations). He completed his PhD at the University of Cambridge, Lecturer in Defence Studies at the UK Defence Academy (King’s College London) and then Lecturer in International Security at the University of Cambridge, Cornish also spent several years as Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London.) June 2011, The Velnerabilities of Developed States to Economic Cyber Warfare, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/0611wp_cornish.pdf, (p. 12) (08/13/13)#HBK
Nonstate actors such as terrorist groups
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upon which a national economy depends.
US economic decline triggers global decline, that escalates to conflict
Tilford 2008 – PhD in history from George Washington University, served for 32 years as a military officer and analyst with the Air Force and Army (Earl, “Critical mass: economic leadership or dictatorship”, Cedartown Standard, lexis)
If the American economy collapses,
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the world could devolve to that point very quickly.
PLAN:
The United States Congress should enact legislation requiring offensive cyber operations be funded, conducted, and/or directed pursuant to Title 50 United States Code § 413b.
Solvency
Prefer Covert Action Statute of Title 50, agencies are more careful with ops
Brecher 12 “Cyberattacks and the Covert Action Statute: Toward a Domestic Legal Framework for Offensive Cyberoperations” by Aaron P. Brecher (J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School), December 2012 – Michigan Law Review VED
prefer the covert action statute to military legal authority.
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reporting their activities to the congressional committees.
Clarifying cyber operations under covert action under a framework of congressional notification solves.
Chesney 12 Robert M. Chesney is an American lawyer and the Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at The University of Texas School of Law, where he serves as the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and teaches courses relating to U.S. national security and constitutional law.1 Chesney addresses issues involving national security and law, including matters relating to military detention, the use of force, terrorism-related prosecutions, the role of the courts in national security affairs, and the relationship between military and intelligence community activities.2 He is a co-founder and contributor to the Lawfare Blog February 2012 “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate” http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Military-Intelligence-Convergence-and-the-Law-of-the-Title-10Title-50-Debate.pdf date accessed 8-13-2013 NNF
Operations constituting “covert action” must be
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as a significant operational domain.
Congressional oversight is key – but congress has to take the lead (on policymaking)
Dycus 10 J. Nat'l Sec. L. and Pol'y 4 pg155 (2010) Congress's Role in Cyber Warfare; Dycus, Stephen (Professor, Vermont Law School.)
Congress obviously cannot
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anticipated and actual uses of cyber weapons.
In cyberspace, magnitude outweighs probability
Lin 12 (I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society – by Herbert Lin (Dr. Herbert Lin is chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, where he has been study director of major projects on public policy and information technology. Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.) VED
threats in cyberspace are much more tenuous,
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capabilities and/or to reconstitute them quickly.