Tournament: GSU | Round: 1 | Opponent: na | Judge: na
Dycus 10 (Professor Stephen Dycus is an internationally recognized authority on national security law and environmental law. The courses he has taught at Vermont Law School include Public International Law, National Security Law, Estates, Property, and Water Law. He was founding chair of the National Security Law Section of the Association of American Law Schools. He is the lead author of "National Security Law" (the field’s leading casebook) and "Counterterrorism Law", and he was founding co-editor in chief of the Journal of National Security Law 26 Policy. (Stephen, "Congress’ Role in Cyber Warfare," National Security Journal, Volume 4, Issue 155, 2010 http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/11_Dycus.pdf)
The term "cybersecurity" might be understood to refer to defense against cyber attacks
AND
require a prompt and full account of every significant use of cyber weapons.
Second – Clandestine nature of Obama’s policies
Loon 12 (Collin Engelbert Peter van Loon Royal Netherlands Army , "Offensive Cyber What are the possibilities of the use of offensive cyber as an offensive capability within the existing international legal framework?", https://cyberwar.nl/d/MSc-thesis_Offensive-Cyber_Collin-van-Loon_June-2012.pdf)
Offensive cyber operations are not covered by an international agreed legal framework. The consequence
AND
on the other (Dam et al., 2009, s. 22).
The lack of a decent legal framework also endangers a decent distinction between cyber attacks
AND
makes the need for a general international accepted cyber legal framework even more necessary
Adkisson et al. 12 Carnagie Mellon University (CDR James Adkisson, Mr. Tokunbo Davies, LT Brian Evans,¶ Mr. Rick Lanchantin, Ms. Patty Walters, "Law of Armed Conflict:¶ Implications for Navy Cyber Strategy¶ Masters of Information Technology Strategy¶ Practicum – 2012", http://www.cmu.edu/mits/files/random/mits-cohort1-practicumfinal-lawarmedconflict-implications-aug-2012.pdf)
The uncertain definition of the ’use of force’ is increasingly problematic when analyzing cyber
AND
weapons. These are the issues that commanders and military planners must balance when
conducting operations in cyberspace.
In a February 2012 testimony to Congress, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) stated that cyber security ranks among the top national security concerns. They also indicated that current policy requires revision to address how the use of force in cyberspace conforms to national and international law, including LOAC.
The previous section reviewed the applicability of LOAC to cyber operations. This section builds on that understanding and reviews national policy that impact DoD operations in cyberspace.
B. Defining Policy
The DoD does not expressly define the term ’policy’. A standard dictionary definition implies that policy provides guidance for solving problems without explicitly defining the solution.2 Accordingly, policy for cyber operations should offer a means to arrive at solutions for achieving the established operational objectives within cyberspace.
While DoD policy is designed to guide the decision-making process, the policies
AND
in "legally acceptable plans and orders that support national security objectives."¶ 5
While there is significant debate regarding cyber operations amongst the international community, the U
AND
Title 50 authorities that govern the operations of the Intelligence Community (IC).
They uniquely piss of china and make mutual drawdown impossible
Sanger 9/1/13 (David, A 1982 graduate of Harvard College, Sanger has been writing for the Times for 30 years covering foreign policy, globalization, nuclear proliferation, and the presidency., He has been a member of two teams that won the Pulitzer Prize, and has been awarded numerous honors for national security and foreign policy coverage. "Documents detail U.S. cyber-espionage plans", http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/documents-detail-us-cyberespionage-plans/article5083012.ece)
231 operations planned for 2011 – both small scale and large scale
Newly disclosed budget documents for America’s intelligence agencies show how aggressively the United States is conducting offensive cyber-operations against other states, even while the Obama administration protests attacks on U.S. computer networks by China, Iran and Russia.
The documents, obtained by The Washington Post from Edward J. Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor, indicate 231 such operations in 2011, a year after the first evidence emerged of a U.S.-and Israeli-led cyberattack against Iran’s nuclear-enrichment centre.
It suggests that President Barack Obama was not deterred by the disclosure of the Iranian operation, which became evident because of a technological error, and is pressing ahead on using cyber-weapons against a variety of targets.
The Post had said it has withheld most of the 178 pages of documents at the request of government officials because of the sensitivities of the spying operations they describe.
Unlike drone attacks, which the administration has begun to acknowledge publicly and provide legal justifications for, cyberattacks are still regarded as part of a secret arsenal.
The attacks described in the budget documents appear to be on a far smaller scale than the series of attacks on Iran, which were part of a classified operation called "Olympic Games".
The Post talked of a parallel effort, code-named GENIE, which it described as an effort by U.S. intelligence officials working for the NSA and the military’s Cyber Command to insert surreptitious controls into foreign computer networks. That computer code, a form of malware, allows U.S. officials to hijack the computers or route some of their data to servers that enable U.S. espionage.
It is unclear how many, if any, of those 231 operations are merely for espionage or data manipulation, and how many may be intended to destroy or disable infrastructure. Mr. Obama, in an executive order signed last year, has reserved the right to decide when the United States should conduct such operations. It is not clear how many of the 231 he approved.
Diplomatically, the disclosure of the latest Snowden documents poses a new challenge to Mr. Obama. He has pressed China to cease its own cyber-operations in the United States, many of which are aimed at the theft of intellectual property — including corporate secrets and plans for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the country’s most expensive new weapons system.
The Chinese have responded that America also conducts extensive cyber-operations — including against China — and will doubtless use the most recent disclosures to press that case. So far, Mr. Obama’s effort to get the Chinese engaged in a deeper dialogue on cyberissues has yielded discussions, but little fruit.
VornDick 6/30/13 (Wilson VornDick is a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy, where he is assigned to the Pentagon. Previously, he worked at the Chinese Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. , "The Real U.S.-Chinese Cyber Problem", http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-real-us-chinese-cyber-problem-8796?page=2)
Recent waves of cyber attacks emanated from China despite their vehement denial that they possess
AND
the norms guiding the use of cyber forces have yet to be established.
One crucial point lost amid the backdrop of the new digitized battlefield is the lack
AND
or China could steer them into a cyber collision with horrendous conventional consequences.
General Escalation of Force, Proportionality and Rules of Engagement Concepts in War
Jus in bello (just conduct in war) is the set of general laws
AND
Convention. These embody the modern concept of the law of armed conflict.
U.S. Experience with the LOAC
The U.S. Department of Defense leadership has a vast experience with these
AND
This is to avoid confusion and miscalculation before, during and after hostilities.
The Army’s Escalation of Force Handbook defines EOF as "sequential actions that begin with
AND
The Army has a uniform Standard Rules of Engagement dictating engagement of force.
Since September 11, U.S. policy makers and military strategists have been
AND
to shape frameworks to govern the nebulous and proliferating world of cyber warfare.
The Tallinn Manual and Emerging Cyber Norms The law-of-armed-conflict
AND
rather than later, lest they push each other over the digital edge.
Austin 26 Gady 12 (Greg Austin – phD in International Relations, Vice President for the Worldwide Security Initiative, including a leadership role in the institute’s work on cybersecurity, is now a Professorial Fellow. Greg has a 30-year career in international affairs, including senior posts in academia and government., Franz Stefan Gady — M.A. in Strategic Studies/International Economics from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University., "CYBER DETENTE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA: Shaping the Agenda, http://www.ewi.info/system/files/detente.pdf)
In sum, China is probably engaged in cyber warfare planning for operations against the
AND
-ops of the classic kind, including through fifth- column policies.
The scale and intensity of United States offensive cyber operations aimed at China on a day-to–day basis may be lower than vice versa, but without access to classified material it would be hard to characterize the difference between the potential disruptive effects of American and Chinese capabilities. This lack of clarity, in an environment of exceedingly low transparency peculiar to cyberspace compared with land, air, sea and space operations, aggravates insecurities on both sides.
The two most urgent tasks for bilateral discussions would therefore appear to be clarifying the relationship between offensive and defensive cyber operations at the strategic and operational levels of war (the thresholds of response), and clarifying the link between these thresholds and traditional notions of strategic nuclear and conventional force deterrence.
Moss 4/19/13 (Trefor, covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009 The Diplomat- - "Is Cyber War the New Cold War?", http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/19/is-cyber-war-the-new-cold-war/3/)
Cyberspace matters. We know this because governments and militaries around the world are scrambling to control the digital space even as they slash defense spending in other areas, rapidly building up cyber forces with which to defend their own virtual territories and attack those of their rivals.
But we do not yet know how much cyberspace matters, at least in security terms. Is it merely warfare’s new periphery, the theatre for a 21st century Cold War that will be waged unseen, and with practically no real-world consequences? Or is it emerging as the most important battle-space of the information age, the critical domain in which future wars will be won and lost?
For the time being, some states appear quite content to err on the side
AND
inclined to retaliate, either legally, virtually, or perhaps even kinetically.
The United States, in particular, appears to have run out of patience with the stream of cyber attacks targeting it from China – Google and The New York Times being just two of the most high-profile victims – and which President Obama has now insisted are at least partly state-sponsored.
Although setting up a cybersecurity working group with China, Washington has also signaled it
AND
the military’s regional commands; and a third to conduct national offensive operations.
As cyber competition intensifies between the U.S. and China in particular,
AND
, the risk of it spilling over into kinetic hostilities will only grow.
O’Hanlon 07 (Michael, adjunct professor at John Hopkins and lecturer at Princeton and Bush, "A war like no other: the truth about China’s challenge to America", p. 99-100)
War between China and Taiwan is a distinct possibility. Such a war could easily drag in the United States, pitting the worlds only superpower against its main rising power and thus leading to the first serious conflict in history between nuclear weapons states.
It seems inconceivable, in this day and age, that the United States and China could really wind up in war. Their mutual interests in cooperating are so strong, their economies are so intertwined, the dangers of war are so enormous, and the number of other problems for them to worry about is so great that it would seem the height of foolishness for the two huge powers ever to come to blows.
There is much truth to this, Indeed, as we have argued in chap
AND
getting extremely serious—but also why it could be tough to control.
The overall message is sobering. Even if the chances of war between the United
AND
that, even if unlikely already, must be rendered more unlikely still.
In short, the reasons whv that war could occur, are as follows:
First. China really does consider Taiwan its own, and even as it has arguably adopted a more subtle and sophisticated approach to the Taiwan challenge in recent years, it has explicitly kept the threat of force on the table.1
Second, Chinas military capabilities are growing last even as Taiwan’s begin to stagnate, meaning that Beijing could sense an opportunity—if it can keep the United States out of the light
Third, Taiwan could push the sovereignty’ issue in a way that China interprets as the pursuit of full independence. While China would probably be wrong in reaching any such con- clusion, perceptions could matter more than reality in such a situation.
Fourth, while Washington’s commitment to Taiwan is long- standing, it is also somewhat ambiguous, so leaders in China might convince themselves that the United States real21)’ would sit out a China-Taiwan war.
Weston 91 – Chair of the International and Comparative Law Program @ The University of Iowa ~Weston, Burns H., "Logic and Utility of a Lawful United States Foreign Policy," Transnational Law 26 Contemporary Problems, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 1-14
George Will and others like him are right, of course, that the rhetoric
AND
is generally the best policy. It enhances power used under its aegis.
In the pages following, I suggest six concrete reasons why the United States-indeed, all nations- should take international law seriously, even¶ when others do not. Viewed in isolation, they may not persuade the hardened realpolitiker. Viewed together, however, they should.
- Respect for International Law Assists Human Survival
To begin with, it is not healthy for people (and for other living
AND
them, with frightening ease and speed, to almost anywhere on earth.
In sum, it is respect (or lack of respect) for international law
AND
of choice. It is, quite simply, a matter of survival.
2. Respect for International Law Enhances International Stability
Living as we do in the twilight years of the global Middle Ages, characterized
AND
what we call international law-are observed rather well on the whole.
On the other hand, when States bend, twist, or otherwise show disrespect
AND
rule of law there could be no assurance of inter-governmental stability.
Of course, States-especially the major powers-are perfectly capable of unilaterally resisting the doctrines, principles, and rules of international law without necessarily feeling directly the destabilizing impact that their noncompliance ultimately has on the wider structure of international law and order itself. The probability of being formally punished for violating international law is usually so slim that foreign policy strategists commonly give little or no weight to the cost of decision-making marked by dubious legality.
However, the increasingly interdependent and interpenetrating character of today’s world is of such magnitude
AND
law, but rather, the stability of our world public order itself.
3. Respect for International Law Advances Our Geopolitical Interests
Allowing principles of international law and multilateral cooperation to inform our foreign policy also serves
AND
and indeed walk away from the rule of law in international affairs?"18
In recent years, however, during the Reagan presidency especially, the United States has come before the world community more to bury international law than to praise it. Selectively displaying its military strength to the general disregard of international law, it has chosen, at least when the risks have been low, to advance several broadly defined but narrowly determined national interests:
(1) demonstrating American will to act with decisiveness and reinforcing deterrence against the Soviet Union in the Third World; (2) displaying the ability of U.S. armed forces to defend American and allied interests; (3) inducing countries that challenge the U.S. to cease and desist; and (4) enhancing in the broadest terms an international perception of the U.S. as the great world power. 19
But to favor such special interests over the common interest of a world rule of
AND
obligations under international law that are in our interest for them to fulfill.
The point is depressingly simple to illustrate. If we can unilaterally reinterpret and abrogate
AND
by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations? 28 And so forth.
Such partisan uses of international law are illustrative of what, during the 1980s,
AND
justice extremely unsafe for the geopolitical interests of even the most powerful States.
Thus, if the United States wants to insist upon compliance with international law to protect American interests, it will be to its advantage to obey international law, even when its application proves inconvenient. If we want meaningful international law to be available when we find it useful, we must respect it even when we do not.
4. Respect for International Law Promotes Policy Efficacy
A failure to adhere to international law-in particular the prohibitions against the threat
AND
paramilitary activitiesfrom Palestinian, Shiite, and other groups throughout the Middle East.
Consider also the refusal of the United States to accept the jurisdiction of the International
AND
questionable assistance to Saddam Hussein during and after the Iran-Iraq war.
But the efficacy argument is perhaps best demonstrated by noting the large-scale political
AND
pragmatic or efficient policies-and they are useful even to a superpower.
To put it all another way, we abandoned lynching parties on the western frontier not only because they turned into orgies of wasteful bloodlust but also because they simply did not stop horse thieves. International law violations, like violations of law in general, have a dubious pragmatic record at best.
5. Respect for International Law Safeguards Domestic Society
Disregard of international law and institutions tends to be self destructive as well as destructive
AND
of our citizens who do not share the government’s ideology in domestic affairs?
In other words, when we show contempt for international law and cooperation, we
AND
arena is predictable. The government soon loses the support of the people.
Our Founding Fathers established that ours is a society of laws, not of men
AND
double standard erodes our claim to moral leadership in the international community.42
6. Respect for International Law Ennobles Our National Rectitude
As evidenced by the U.N. General Assembly’s declaration of the 1990s as the "Decade of International Law,"43 there is a growing realization that an effective system of international law is fundamental to the achievement¶ of a world public order of human dignity. It is essential to peace and security, and it is indispensable for just solutions to the many complex and urgent problems that otherwise currently make up the human agenda.
International law provides, potentially, the most durable framework for undertaking cooperative action toward
AND
realized"),4 is the key to all that is right and good.
To insist upon respect for international law and cooperation is, thus, the morally
AND
. It is a reputation that cannot-must not-be squandered.
Most importantly, however, the United States has an especial obligation in this regard
AND
historically unique moral responsibility. Pg. 4-13 AT: K
Bradbury 11 (Steven Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Vol.-2_Bradbury_Final1.pdf)
Evolving customary law. This approach also accommodates the reality that how the U.S. chooses to use its armed forces will significantly influence the development of customary international law.
As the label implies, customary law can evolve depending on the accepted conduct of major nations like the United States. The real-world practice of the United States in adapting the use of its military to the new challenges raised by computer warfare will (and should) help clarify the accepted customs of war in areas where the limits are not clearly established today.
And if you just review the literature on cyber war, you quickly see that that’s where we are: precisely how the laws and customs of war should apply to offensive cyber operations is not yet crystallized in key respects.
For example, there aren’t always bright lines to tell us when a cyber attack on computer systems constitutes an "armed attack" or a "use of force" that justifies a nation in launching a responsive military strike under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Some questions are easy: Hacking into a sensitive government computer system to steal information is an act of espionage, not an armed attack. It’s clearly not prohibited by the laws and customs of war.
On the other hand, if the cyber intrusion inflicts significant physical destruction or loss of life by causing the failure of critical infrastructure, like a dam or water supply system, then it obviously would constitute an armed attack under the law of war and would justify a full military response if it could be attributed to a foreign power. Where committed as an offensive act of aggression, such an attack may violate international law.
If significant enough, the effect of the attack will determine its treatment, not necessarily whether the attack is delivered through computer lines as opposed to conventional weapons systems. In these cases, the laws and customs of war provide a clear rule to apply.
But there will be gray areas in the middle. Thus, it’s far less clear that a computer assault that’s limited to deleting or corrupting data or temporarily disabling or disrupting a computer network or some specific equipment associated with the network in a way that’s not life threatening or widely destructive should be considered a use of force justifying military retaliation, even if the network belongs to the military or another government agency.
This was the case with the "distributed denial of service" attacks experienced by Estonia in 2007, which severely disrupted the country’s banking and communications systems. Suspecting that Russia was behind it, Estonia suggested that NATO declare that Estonia’s sovereignty had been attacked, which would have triggered the collective self-defense article of the NATO Treaty, but that suggestion was rebuffed on the ground that a cyber attack is not a clear military action.12
There’s an echo of that reasoning in Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, which says that a "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communications" is not a "measure . . . involving armed force."
And what about Stuxnet? As I understand it from public reports, Stuxnet was
AND
to understand and appreciate the choices made on both sides of the question.
Healey and Wilson 13 - Jason Healey is the director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council. A.J. Wilson is a visiting fellow at the
Atlantic Council (Jason, and A.J. "Cyber Conflict and the War Powers Resolution: Congressional Oversight of Hostilities in the Fifth Domain," Atlantic Council Cyber Statecraft Initiative, February 2013)
The administration’s interpretation of "hostilities" should go beyond the risk to American lives
AND
application. Even in cyberspace, there is a voice for both branches.
Bastby 12 (Judy, Chairwoman of the American Bar Association’s Privacy and Computer Crime Committee, CEO of Global Cyber Risk, "U.S. Administration’s Reckless Cyber Policy Puts Nation at Risk" June 4, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/06/04/u-s-administrations-reckless-cyber-policy-puts-nation-at-risk/2/)
Perhaps more important than being out of the cyber coordination loop, is the how
AND
, they will turn to the other two," observes Dr. Amin.
The U.S. Administration’s failure to develop a strong foreign policy with respect
AND
private sector Americans who were present, including myself, it was embarrassing.
If in fact the Administration did authorize targeting Iranian nuclear systems with Stuxnet and/
AND
Sanger’s information came from loose-lipped persons involved with the Stuxnet operation.
Before pulling a trigger (or launching malware) a nation should assess its strengths and resources and its correlation of vulnerabilities, which, in 2012, includes understanding what an adversary can do when firing back using cyber capabilities. In addition, before launching covert operations, such as Stuxnet, a nation also should ensure that the secrecy of the intelligence operations can be maintained.
Conversations with Hill staffers indicate that Congress believes the State Department’s 2011 appointment of Coordinator
AND
put our nation at risk and demonstrates cyber irresponsiblity, not cyber leadership.
Healey and Wilson 13 - Jason Healey is the director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council. A.J. Wilson is a visiting fellow at the
Atlantic Council (Jason, and A.J. "Cyber Conflict and the War Powers Resolution: Congressional Oversight of Hostilities in the Fifth Domain," Atlantic Council Cyber Statecraft Initiative, February 2013)
Even as the Obama administration is pushing Congress to pass strong legislation to avert a
AND
remote warfare, cyber operations, are also not covered by the WPR.
Kramer et. al 12 (Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished research fellow
AND
National Defense University., "Cyberpower and National Security", p. 318)
No cyber deterrence strategy can hope to be airtight to prevent all minor attacks.
AND
-probability events and to provide practically 100 percent deterrence of major attacks.
A cyber deterrence strategy could contribute to other key defense activities and goals, including
AND
States and its allies, the dangers of actual cyber aggression will diminish.
How would a cyber deterrence strategy operate, and how can its potential effectiveness be
AND
-preservation, nor because the logic of deterrence had lost its relevance.
Kramer et. al 12 (Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished research fellow
AND
National Defense University., "Cyberpower and National Security", p. 318)
Ends, Ways, and Means
The goal of a cyber deterrence strategy would be to influence an adversary’s decisionmaking calculus
AND
unacceptable damage on Iran in return, in the cyber realm or elsewhere.
The same strategic calculus applies to Chinese use of cyber threats and attacks, as well as actions by other plausible adversaries in the cyber domain. Potential U.S. counteractions in such situations are encapsulated in the three principal ways of pursuing deterrence articulated in the JOC model: deterrence by denying benefits, deterrence by imposing costs, and deterrence by offering incentives for adversary restraint.
Deterrence by denying benefits entails credibly threatening to deprive the attacker of the benefits or
AND
the adversary that not attacking will result in an acceptable, attractive outcome.
Rothkopf 11 (David, Visiting Scholar at Carnegie, "Where Fukushima meets Stuxnet: The growing threat of cyber war", 3/17/11, http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/17/where_fukushima_meets_stuxnet_the_growing_threat_of_cyber_war)
The Japanese nuclear crisis, though still unfolding, may, in a way, already be yesterday’s news. For a peek at tomorrow’s, review the testimony of General Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command. Testifying before Congress this week and seeking support to pump up his agency budget, the general argued that all future conflicts would involve cyber warfare tactics and that the U.S. was ill-equipped to defend itself against them.
Alexander said, "We are finding that we do not have the capacity to do everything we need to accomplish. To put it bluntly, we are very thin, and a crisis would quickly stress our cyber forces. ... This is not a hypothetical danger."
The way to look at this story is to link in your mind the Stuxnet
AND
their knees, put societies in the dark, or undercut national defenses.
Those infrastructures might well be nuclear power systems and the results could be akin to
AND
sophistication or resources to anticipate, prepare for or manage the growing threats.)
Importantly, not only does the apparent success of the Stuxnet worm demonstrate that such
AND
a real cyber intrusion — just the perception that one might have happened.
What makes the nuclear threat so unsettling to many is that it is invisible.
AND
obscured by this week’s news it should only have been amplified by it.
Donahue, 10 – USAF Major (Jack, "CATASTROPHE ON THE HORIZON: A SCENARIO-BASED FUTURE EFFECT OF ORBITAL SPACE DEBRIS," https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_af691818-359f-4999-be24-f88ca154bd94/display.aspx?rs=enginespage)
Another unpredictable driving force that needs to be considered is adversary exploitation of space vulnerabilities
AND
a small number of incidents could significantly impact space systems for years.90
Tyson 07 (Rhianna Tyson, Program Officer of the Global Security Institute, "Advancing a Cooperative Security Regime in Outer Space," Global Security Institute, May 2007, http://www.worldacademy.org/files/Advancing20a20Cooperative20Security20Regime20in20Outer20Space.pdf)
Beyond the severe economic repercussions resulting from disrupted commercial satellite communications, hostile actions in
AND
false reading of an attack, governments may resort to using nuclear weapons.
Independently undermines the balance of deterrence and leads to global preemptive aggression
Burke, 6 – Lt Col, USAF, command space professional with operational experience in missile operations, space surveillance, space control, missile warning, and command and control (Alan, "SPACE THREAT WARNING: FOUNDATION FOR SPACE SUPERIORITY, AVOIDING A SPACE PEARL HARBOR," https://www.afresearch.org/skins/RIMS/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a15326mode=user26action=researchproject26objectid=07acf878-3a5f-4a2c-8259-4a34c0717e9b)
The erosion of the US ability to execute the space threat warning mission has serious
AND
which decreased fratricide and facilitating search and rescue operations and reinforcement operations.49
The lack of settled framework makes the threat of retaliation and counterstrike impossible – the aff makes counterstrike effective
Kesan 26 Hayes 12 * Professor, H. Ross 26 Helen Workman Research Scholar, and Director of the Program in Intellectual Property 26 Technology Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Research Fellow, University of Illinois College of Law ~Jay P. Kesan* and Carol M. Hayes, MITIGATIVE COUNTERSTRIKING: SELF-DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE IN CYBERSPACE, Spring, 2012, Harvard Journal of Law 26 Technology, 25 Harv. J. Law 26 Tec 415~
Ideas, computers, and intellectual property have become extremely important in the modern Information Age. The Internet has become so essential to modern life that several countries have declared Internet access to be a fundamental right. n4 But the importance of technology in the Information Age comes with a downside: the vulnerability of modern society and the global economy to minimally funded cyberat-tacks from remote corners of the world.
In the 1950s, American school children were taught to "duck and cover"
AND
. n8 "Duck and cover," however, had no deterrent effect.
The Cold War ended about two decades ago, but new threats have emerged.
AND
do not present enough of a practical threat to deter potential attackers. n14
The weaknesses of the current reliance on employing passive defense methods and seeking help from
AND
are needed to ensure that responsive actions can be grounded in sound policy.
Because of the inadequacy in current means to address cyber threats, this Article examines other possible methods to deter cyberattacks, specifically the use of cyber counterstrikes as part of a model of active defense. Active defense involves (1) detecting an intrusion, (2) tracing the intruder, and (3) some form of cyber counterstrike. n19
~*420~ Though intrusion detection and tracing are essential, counterstriking is key
AND
"mitigative counterstriking," respectively, to the counterstriking component of active defense.
In the cyber context, a "counterstrike" can involve any number of actions
AND
offensive cyber technologies that can have applications in the context of counterstriking. n22
The goal of a counterstrike can vary, from punishing the attacker to simply mitigating
AND
whatever measures are deployed must be justifiable under a mitigation frame-work.
Cyber counterstrikes, however, are currently controversial, and it can be difficult under
AND
criminal enforcement or civil litigation for a number of reasons we discuss below.
Currently, the biggest barrier to defending against cyberattacks is the lack of a legal
AND
of retributive counterstriking and the employment of self-help through mitigative counterstriking.
We thus propose a new policy and legal regime to address the threat of cyberattacks
AND
approaches in order to afford these private parties more protection against these threats.
Kramer et. al 12 (Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished research fellow
AND
Security Policy at the National Defense University., "Cyberpower and National Security")
Cyber attacks—hacking of various kinds—are a fact of modern life.
AND
far occurred. The capacity to deter such attacks would be enormously valuable.
Cyber deterrence has been considered challenging because of the difficulty of attributing the source of cyber attacks. While attribution unquestionably is a consequential issue, we believe that deterrence in the context of cyber is a viable strategy and one on which the United States ought to embark much more advertently. The components of such a strategy would consist of the following elements, some of which would require development as discussed below.
First, any approach to deterrence of cyber attacks needs to be considered in an
AND
would be at a time, place, and manner of our choosing.
In generating policy, some important differentiations could be consequential. State actors generally act
AND
, and, for terrorists, classic counterterrorist techniques may be most effective.
One important question is whether there is a threshold at which more significant responses become
AND
than dealing with a new problem where force has not already been used.
AND, They can’t win an impact turn. Mission failure is inevitable without Congressional deliberation
Griffin 12 – Professor of Constitutional Law @ Tulane University ~Stephen Griffin, "The Tragedy of the War Power: Presidential Decisionmaking from Truman to Obama," APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, July 15, 2012, Pg. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2107467
As a comparison of the relative ability of the executive and legislative branches to make
AND
in 1947 to establish the NSC to coordinate policy within the executive branch.
During the Cold War and after, the pre-Pearl Harbor constitutional order was
AND
or not, it introduced deep tensions into the American system of governance.
The case studies presented above show that the interagency process taking place inside the executive
AND
Congress escaped both a valuable learning experience and the blame for the war.
In addition, the case studies show that there is considerable evidence that the executive
AND
future is whether such a process is possible. Pg. 31-37
Dunlap 12 (Major General and Former Deputy Judge Advocate General , "Lawless Cyberwar? Not If You Want to Win", www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/law_national_security/patriot_debates2/the_book_online/ch9/ch9_ess2.html-http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/law_national_security/patriot_debates2/the_book_online/ch9/ch9_ess2.html)
Military commanders have seen the no-legal-limits movie before and they do
AND
this mindset was their endorsement of interrogation techniques now widely labeled as torture.
The results of the no-legal-limits approach were disastrous. The ill
AND
Iraq Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez labeled as a "clear defeat."
Infused with illegalities, Abu Ghraib became the greatest reversal America has suffered since 9
AND
because they have hard experience with the consequences of failing to do so.
Why, then, are Mr. Baker and others so troubled? Actually,
AND
that represents the most daunting issue; to them, it is policy.
For example, retired Air Force Gen. Michael Hayden, the former head of the National Security Agency and later director of the CIA, told Congress in October 2011 that America’s cyberdefenses were being undermined because cyberinformation was "horribly overclassified." That issue is not sourced in lawyers but in policymakers who could solve the classification problem virtually overnight if they wanted.
That same month, Gen. Keith B. Alexander, commander of U.
AND
challenges exist in discerning the facts and circumstances to apply to the law.
This gets to the "act of war" question Mr. Baker complains about. The law does provide a framework; it is up to decision-makers to discern the facts to apply to that framework. Hard to do? Absolutely. But frankly, such "fog of war" issues are not much different from those military commanders routinely confront in the other domains of conflict where difficult decisions frequently must be made on imperfect information.
