Tournament: Vanderbilt | Round: 1 | Opponent: West Georgia MZ | Judge: Kristen Porter
1AC—Plan
1AC—LOAC
Dycus 10 (Professor Stephen Dycus is an internationally recognized authority on national security law and environmental law. The courses he has taught at Vermont Law School include Public International Law, National Security Law, Estates, Property, and Water Law. He was founding chair of the National Security Law Section of the Association of American Law Schools. He is the lead author of "National Security Law" (the field’s leading casebook) and "Counterterrorism Law", and he was founding co-editor in chief of the Journal of National Security Law 26 Policy. (Stephen, "Congress’ Role in Cyber Warfare," National Security Journal, Volume 4, Issue 155, 2010 http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/11_Dycus.pdf)
The term "cybersecurity" might be understood to refer to defense against cyber attacks
AND
require a prompt and full account of every significant use of cyber weapons.
Second – Clandestine nature of Obama’s policies
Loon 12 (Collin Engelbert Peter van Loon Royal Netherlands Army , "Offensive Cyber What are the possibilities of the use of offensive cyber as an offensive capability within the existing international legal framework?", https://cyberwar.nl/d/MSc-thesis_Offensive-Cyber_Collin-van-Loon_June-2012.pdf)
Offensive cyber operations are not covered by an international agreed legal framework. The consequence
AND
on the other (Dam et al., 2009, s. 22).
The lack of a decent legal framework also endangers a decent distinction between cyber attacks
AND
makes the need for a general international accepted cyber legal framework even more necessary
Adkisson et al. 12 Carnagie Mellon University (CDR James Adkisson, Mr. Tokunbo Davies, LT Brian Evans, Mr. Rick Lanchantin, Ms. Patty Walters, "Law of Armed Conflict: Implications for Navy Cyber Strategy Masters of Information Technology Strategy Practicum – 2012", http://www.cmu.edu/mits/files/random/mits-cohort1-practicumfinal-lawarmedconflict-implications-aug-2012.pdf)
The uncertain definition of the ’use of force’ is increasingly problematic when analyzing cyber
AND
weapons. These are the issues that commanders and military planners must balance when
conducting operations in cyberspace.
In a February 2012 testimony to Congress, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) stated that cyber security ranks among the top national security concerns. They also indicated that current policy requires revision to address how the use of force in cyberspace conforms to national and international law, including LOAC.
The previous section reviewed the applicability of LOAC to cyber operations. This section builds on that understanding and reviews national policy that impact DoD operations in cyberspace.
B. Defining Policy
The DoD does not expressly define the term ’policy’. A standard dictionary definition implies that policy provides guidance for solving problems without explicitly defining the solution.2 Accordingly, policy for cyber operations should offer a means to arrive at solutions for achieving the established operational objectives within cyberspace.
While DoD policy is designed to guide the decision-making process, the policies
AND
in "legally acceptable plans and orders that support national security objectives." 5
While there is significant debate regarding cyber operations amongst the international community, the U
AND
Title 50 authorities that govern the operations of the Intelligence Community (IC).
They uniquely antagonize china and make mutual drawdown impossible
Sanger 9/1/13 (David, A 1982 graduate of Harvard College, Sanger has been writing for the Times for 30 years covering foreign policy, globalization, nuclear proliferation, and the presidency., He has been a member of two teams that won the Pulitzer Prize, and has been awarded numerous honors for national security and foreign policy coverage. "Documents detail U.S. cyber-espionage plans", http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/documents-detail-us-cyberespionage-plans/article5083012.ece)
231 operations planned for 2011 – both small scale and large scale
Newly disclosed budget documents for America’s intelligence agencies show how aggressively the United States is conducting offensive cyber-operations against other states, even while the Obama administration protests attacks on U.S. computer networks by China, Iran and Russia.
The documents, obtained by The Washington Post from Edward J. Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor, indicate 231 such operations in 2011, a year after the first evidence emerged of a U.S.-and Israeli-led cyberattack against Iran’s nuclear-enrichment centre.
It suggests that President Barack Obama was not deterred by the disclosure of the Iranian operation, which became evident because of a technological error, and is pressing ahead on using cyber-weapons against a variety of targets.
The Post had said it has withheld most of the 178 pages of documents at the request of government officials because of the sensitivities of the spying operations they describe.
Unlike drone attacks, which the administration has begun to acknowledge publicly and provide legal justifications for, cyberattacks are still regarded as part of a secret arsenal.
The attacks described in the budget documents appear to be on a far smaller scale than the series of attacks on Iran, which were part of a classified operation called "Olympic Games".
The Post talked of a parallel effort, code-named GENIE, which it described as an effort by U.S. intelligence officials working for the NSA and the military’s Cyber Command to insert surreptitious controls into foreign computer networks. That computer code, a form of malware, allows U.S. officials to hijack the computers or route some of their data to servers that enable U.S. espionage.
It is unclear how many, if any, of those 231 operations are merely for espionage or data manipulation, and how many may be intended to destroy or disable infrastructure. Mr. Obama, in an executive order signed last year, has reserved the right to decide when the United States should conduct such operations. It is not clear how many of the 231 he approved.
Diplomatically, the disclosure of the latest Snowden documents poses a new challenge to Mr. Obama. He has pressed China to cease its own cyber-operations in the United States, many of which are aimed at the theft of intellectual property — including corporate secrets and plans for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the country’s most expensive new weapons system.
The Chinese have responded that America also conducts extensive cyber-operations — including against China — and will doubtless use the most recent disclosures to press that case. So far, Mr. Obama’s effort to get the Chinese engaged in a deeper dialogue on cyberissues has yielded discussions, but little fruit.
VornDick 6/30/13 (Wilson VornDick is a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy, where he is assigned to the Pentagon. Previously, he worked at the Chinese Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. , "The Real U.S.-Chinese Cyber Problem", http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-real-us-chinese-cyber-problem-8796?page=2-http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-real-us-chinese-cyber-problem-8796?page=2)
Recent waves of cyber attacks emanated from China despite their vehement denial that they possess
AND
the norms guiding the use of cyber forces have yet to be established.
One crucial point lost amid the backdrop of the new digitized battlefield is the lack
AND
or China could steer them into a cyber collision with horrendous conventional consequences.
General Escalation of Force, Proportionality and Rules of Engagement Concepts in War
Jus in bello (just conduct in war) is the set of general laws
AND
Convention. These embody the modern concept of the law of armed conflict.
U.S. Experience with the LOAC
The U.S. Department of Defense leadership has a vast experience with these
AND
This is to avoid confusion and miscalculation before, during and after hostilities.
The Army’s Escalation of Force Handbook defines EOF as "sequential actions that begin with
AND
The Army has a uniform Standard Rules of Engagement dictating engagement of force.
Since September 11, U.S. policy makers and military strategists have been
AND
to shape frameworks to govern the nebulous and proliferating world of cyber warfare.
The Tallinn Manual and Emerging Cyber Norms The law-of-armed-conflict
AND
rather than later, lest they push each other over the digital edge.
Austin 26 Gady 12 (Greg Austin – phD in International Relations, Vice President for the Worldwide Security Initiative, including a leadership role in the institute’s work on cybersecurity, is now a Professorial Fellow. Greg has a 30-year career in international affairs, including senior posts in academia and government., Franz Stefan Gady — M.A. in Strategic Studies/International Economics from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University., "CYBER DETENTE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA: Shaping the Agenda, http://www.ewi.info/system/files/detente.pdf)
In sum, China is probably engaged in cyber warfare planning for operations against the
AND
-ops of the classic kind, including through fifth- column policies.
The scale and intensity of United States offensive cyber operations aimed at China on a day-to–day basis may be lower than vice versa, but without access to classified material it would be hard to characterize the difference between the potential disruptive effects of American and Chinese capabilities. This lack of clarity, in an environment of exceedingly low transparency peculiar to cyberspace compared with land, air, sea and space operations, aggravates insecurities on both sides.
The two most urgent tasks for bilateral discussions would therefore appear to be clarifying the relationship between offensive and defensive cyber operations at the strategic and operational levels of war (the thresholds of response), and clarifying the link between these thresholds and traditional notions of strategic nuclear and conventional force deterrence.
Moss 4/19/13 (Trefor, covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009 The Diplomat- - "Is Cyber War the New Cold War?", http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/19/is-cyber-war-the-new-cold-war/3/)
Cyberspace matters. We know this because governments and militaries around the world are scrambling to control the digital space even as they slash defense spending in other areas, rapidly building up cyber forces with which to defend their own virtual territories and attack those of their rivals.
But we do not yet know how much cyberspace matters, at least in security terms. Is it merely warfare’s new periphery, the theatre for a 21st century Cold War that will be waged unseen, and with practically no real-world consequences? Or is it emerging as the most important battle-space of the information age, the critical domain in which future wars will be won and lost?
For the time being, some states appear quite content to err on the side
AND
inclined to retaliate, either legally, virtually, or perhaps even kinetically.
The United States, in particular, appears to have run out of patience with the stream of cyber attacks targeting it from China – Google and The New York Times being just two of the most high-profile victims – and which President Obama has now insisted are at least partly state-sponsored.
Although setting up a cybersecurity working group with China, Washington has also signaled it
AND
the military’s regional commands; and a third to conduct national offensive operations.
As cyber competition intensifies between the U.S. and China in particular,
AND
, the risk of it spilling over into kinetic hostilities will only grow.
O’Hanlon 07 (Michael, adjunct professor at John Hopkins and lecturer at Princeton and Bush, "A war like no other: the truth about China’s challenge to America", p. 99-100)
War between China and Taiwan is a distinct possibility. Such a war could easily drag in the United States, pitting the worlds only superpower against its main rising power and thus leading to the first serious conflict in history between nuclear weapons states.
It seems inconceivable, in this day and age, that the United States and China could really wind up in war. Their mutual interests in cooperating are so strong, their economies are so intertwined, the dangers of war are so enormous, and the number of other problems for them to worry about is so great that it would seem the height of foolishness for the two huge powers ever to come to blows.
There is much truth to this, Indeed, as we have argued in chap
AND
getting extremely serious—but also why it could be tough to control.
The overall message is sobering. Even if the chances of war between the United
AND
that, even if unlikely already, must be rendered more unlikely still.
In short, the reasons whv that war could occur, are as follows:
First. China really does consider Taiwan its own, and even as it has arguably adopted a more subtle and sophisticated approach to the Taiwan challenge in recent years, it has explicitly kept the threat of force on the table.1
Second, Chinas military capabilities are growing last even as Taiwan’s begin to stagnate, meaning that Beijing could sense an opportunity—if it can keep the United States out of the light
Third, Taiwan could push the sovereignty’ issue in a way that China interprets as the pursuit of full independence. While China would probably be wrong in reaching any such con- clusion, perceptions could matter more than reality in such a situation.
Fourth, while Washington’s commitment to Taiwan is long- standing, it is also somewhat ambiguous, so leaders in China might convince themselves that the United States real21)’ would sit out a China-Taiwan war.
Weston 91 – Chair of the International and Comparative Law Program @ The University of Iowa ~Weston, Burns H., "Logic and Utility of a Lawful United States Foreign Policy," Transnational Law 26 Contemporary Problems, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 1-14
George Will and others like him are right, of course, that the rhetoric
AND
is generally the best policy. It enhances power used under its aegis.
In the pages following, I suggest six concrete reasons why the United States-indeed, all nations- should take international law seriously, even when others do not. Viewed in isolation, they may not persuade the hardened realpolitiker. Viewed together, however, they should.
- Respect for International Law Assists Human Survival
To begin with, it is not healthy for people (and for other living
AND
them, with frightening ease and speed, to almost anywhere on earth.
In sum, it is respect (or lack of respect) for international law
AND
of choice. It is, quite simply, a matter of survival.
2. Respect for International Law Enhances International Stability
Living as we do in the twilight years of the global Middle Ages, characterized
AND
what we call international law-are observed rather well on the whole.
On the other hand, when States bend, twist, or otherwise show disrespect
AND
rule of law there could be no assurance of inter-governmental stability.
Of course, States-especially the major powers-are perfectly capable of unilaterally resisting the doctrines, principles, and rules of international law without necessarily feeling directly the destabilizing impact that their noncompliance ultimately has on the wider structure of international law and order itself. The probability of being formally punished for violating international law is usually so slim that foreign policy strategists commonly give little or no weight to the cost of decision-making marked by dubious legality.
However, the increasingly interdependent and interpenetrating character of today’s world is of such magnitude
AND
law, but rather, the stability of our world public order itself.
3. Respect for International Law Advances Our Geopolitical Interests
Allowing principles of international law and multilateral cooperation to inform our foreign policy also serves
AND
and indeed walk away from the rule of law in international affairs?"18
In recent years, however, during the Reagan presidency especially, the United States has come before the world community more to bury international law than to praise it. Selectively displaying its military strength to the general disregard of international law, it has chosen, at least when the risks have been low, to advance several broadly defined but narrowly determined national interests:
(1) demonstrating American will to act with decisiveness and reinforcing deterrence against the Soviet Union in the Third World; (2) displaying the ability of U.S. armed forces to defend American and allied interests; (3) inducing countries that challenge the U.S. to cease and desist; and (4) enhancing in the broadest terms an international perception of the U.S. as the great world power. 19
But to favor such special interests over the common interest of a world rule of
AND
obligations under international law that are in our interest for them to fulfill.
The point is depressingly simple to illustrate. If we can unilaterally reinterpret and abrogate
AND
by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations? 28 And so forth.
Such partisan uses of international law are illustrative of what, during the 1980s,
AND
justice extremely unsafe for the geopolitical interests of even the most powerful States.
Thus, if the United States wants to insist upon compliance with international law to protect American interests, it will be to its advantage to obey international law, even when its application proves inconvenient. If we want meaningful international law to be available when we find it useful, we must respect it even when we do not.
4. Respect for International Law Promotes Policy Efficacy
A failure to adhere to international law-in particular the prohibitions against the threat
AND
paramilitary activitiesfrom Palestinian, Shiite, and other groups throughout the Middle East.
Consider also the refusal of the United States to accept the jurisdiction of the International
AND
questionable assistance to Saddam Hussein during and after the Iran-Iraq war.
But the efficacy argument is perhaps best demonstrated by noting the large-scale political
AND
pragmatic or efficient policies-and they are useful even to a superpower.
To put it all another way, we abandoned lynching parties on the western frontier not only because they turned into orgies of wasteful bloodlust but also because they simply did not stop horse thieves. International law violations, like violations of law in general, have a dubious pragmatic record at best.
5. Respect for International Law Safeguards Domestic Society
Disregard of international law and institutions tends to be self destructive as well as destructive
AND
of our citizens who do not share the government’s ideology in domestic affairs?
In other words, when we show contempt for international law and cooperation, we
AND
arena is predictable. The government soon loses the support of the people.
Our Founding Fathers established that ours is a society of laws, not of men
AND
double standard erodes our claim to moral leadership in the international community.42
6. Respect for International Law Ennobles Our National Rectitude
As evidenced by the U.N. General Assembly’s declaration of the 1990s as the "Decade of International Law,"43 there is a growing realization that an effective system of international law is fundamental to the achievement of a world public order of human dignity. It is essential to peace and security, and it is indispensable for just solutions to the many complex and urgent problems that otherwise currently make up the human agenda.
International law provides, potentially, the most durable framework for undertaking cooperative action toward
AND
realized"),4 is the key to all that is right and good.
To insist upon respect for international law and cooperation is, thus, the morally
AND
. It is a reputation that cannot-must not-be squandered.
Most importantly, however, the United States has an especial obligation in this regard
AND
historically unique moral responsibility. Pg. 4-13 AT: K
Bradbury 11 (Steven Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Vol.-2_Bradbury_Final1.pdf)
Evolving customary law. This approach also accommodates the reality that how the U.
AND
to understand and appreciate the choices made on both sides of the question.
Healey and Wilson 13 - Jason Healey is the director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council. A.J. Wilson is a visiting fellow at the
Atlantic Council (Jason, and A.J. "Cyber Conflict and the War Powers Resolution: Congressional Oversight of Hostilities in the Fifth Domain," Atlantic Council Cyber Statecraft Initiative, February 2013)
The administration’s interpretation of "hostilities" should go beyond the risk to American lives
AND
application. Even in cyberspace, there is a voice for both branches.
Bastby 12 (Judy, Chairwoman of the American Bar Association’s Privacy and Computer Crime Committee, CEO of Global Cyber Risk, "U.S. Administration’s Reckless Cyber Policy Puts Nation at Risk" June 4, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/06/04/u-s-administrations-reckless-cyber-policy-puts-nation-at-risk/2/-http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/06/04/u-s-administrations-reckless-cyber-policy-puts-nation-at-risk/2/)
Perhaps more important than being out of the cyber coordination loop, is the how
AND
, they will turn to the other two," observes Dr. Amin.
The U.S. Administration’s failure to develop a strong foreign policy with respect
AND
private sector Americans who were present, including myself, it was embarrassing.
If in fact the Administration did authorize targeting Iranian nuclear systems with Stuxnet and/
AND
Sanger’s information came from loose-lipped persons involved with the Stuxnet operation.
Before pulling a trigger (or launching malware) a nation should assess its strengths and resources and its correlation of vulnerabilities, which, in 2012, includes understanding what an adversary can do when firing back using cyber capabilities. In addition, before launching covert operations, such as Stuxnet, a nation also should ensure that the secrecy of the intelligence operations can be maintained.
Conversations with Hill staffers indicate that Congress believes the State Department’s 2011 appointment of Coordinator
AND
put our nation at risk and demonstrates cyber irresponsiblity, not cyber leadership.
1AC—Deterrence
Healey and Wilson 13 - Jason Healey is the director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council. A.J. Wilson is a visiting fellow at the
Atlantic Council (Jason, and A.J. "Cyber Conflict and the War Powers Resolution: Congressional Oversight of Hostilities in the Fifth Domain," Atlantic Council Cyber Statecraft Initiative, February 2013)
Even as the Obama administration is pushing Congress to pass strong legislation to avert a
AND
remote warfare, cyber operations, are also not covered by the WPR.
Kramer et. al 12 (Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished research fellow
AND
National Defense University., "Cyberpower and National Security", p. 318)
No cyber deterrence strategy can hope to be airtight to prevent all minor attacks.
AND
-probability events and to provide practically 100 percent deterrence of major attacks.
A cyber deterrence strategy could contribute to other key defense activities and goals, including
AND
States and its allies, the dangers of actual cyber aggression will diminish.
How would a cyber deterrence strategy operate, and how can its potential effectiveness be
AND
-preservation, nor because the logic of deterrence had lost its relevance.
Kramer et. al 12 (Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished research fellow
AND
National Defense University., "Cyberpower and National Security", p. 318)
Ends, Ways, and Means
The goal of a cyber deterrence strategy would be to influence an adversary’s decisionmaking calculus
AND
unacceptable damage on Iran in return, in the cyber realm or elsewhere.
The same strategic calculus applies to Chinese use of cyber threats and attacks, as well as actions by other plausible adversaries in the cyber domain. Potential U.S. counteractions in such situations are encapsulated in the three principal ways of pursuing deterrence articulated in the JOC model: deterrence by denying benefits, deterrence by imposing costs, and deterrence by offering incentives for adversary restraint.
Deterrence by denying benefits entails credibly threatening to deprive the attacker of the benefits or
AND
the adversary that not attacking will result in an acceptable, attractive outcome.
Rothkopf 11 (David, Visiting Scholar at Carnegie, "Where Fukushima meets Stuxnet: The growing threat of cyber war", 3/17/11, http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/17/where_fukushima_meets_stuxnet_the_growing_threat_of_cyber_war)
The Japanese nuclear crisis, though still unfolding, may, in a way, already be yesterday’s news. For a peek at tomorrow’s, review the testimony of General Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command. Testifying before Congress this week and seeking support to pump up his agency budget, the general argued that all future conflicts would involve cyber warfare tactics and that the U.S. was ill-equipped to defend itself against them.
Alexander said, "We are finding that we do not have the capacity to do everything we need to accomplish. To put it bluntly, we are very thin, and a crisis would quickly stress our cyber forces. ... This is not a hypothetical danger."
The way to look at this story is to link in your mind the Stuxnet
AND
their knees, put societies in the dark, or undercut national defenses.
Those infrastructures might well be nuclear power systems and the results could be akin to
AND
sophistication or resources to anticipate, prepare for or manage the growing threats.)
Importantly, not only does the apparent success of the Stuxnet worm demonstrate that such
AND
a real cyber intrusion — just the perception that one might have happened.
What makes the nuclear threat so unsettling to many is that it is invisible.
AND
obscured by this week’s news it should only have been amplified by it.
Donahue, 10 – USAF Major (Jack, "CATASTROPHE ON THE HORIZON: A SCENARIO-BASED FUTURE EFFECT OF ORBITAL SPACE DEBRIS," https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_af691818-359f-4999-be24-f88ca154bd94/display.aspx?rs=enginespage)
Another unpredictable driving force that needs to be considered is adversary exploitation of space vulnerabilities
AND
a small number of incidents could significantly impact space systems for years.90
Tyson 07 (Rhianna Tyson, Program Officer of the Global Security Institute, "Advancing a Cooperative Security Regime in Outer Space," Global Security Institute, May 2007, http://www.worldacademy.org/files/Advancing20a20Cooperative20Security20Regime20in20Outer20Space.pdf)
Beyond the severe economic repercussions resulting from disrupted commercial satellite communications, hostile actions in
AND
false reading of an attack, governments may resort to using nuclear weapons.
Independently undermines the balance of deterrence and leads to global preemptive aggression
Burke 06 – Lt Col, USAF, command space professional with operational experience in missile operations, space surveillance, space control, missile warning, and command and control (Alan, "SPACE THREAT WARNING: FOUNDATION FOR SPACE SUPERIORITY, AVOIDING A SPACE PEARL HARBOR," https://www.afresearch.org/skins/RIMS/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a15326mode=user26action=researchproject26objectid=07acf878-3a5f-4a2c-8259-4a34c0717e9b)
The erosion of the US ability to execute the space threat warning mission has serious
AND
which decreased fratricide and facilitating search and rescue operations and reinforcement operations.49
The lack of settled framework makes the threat of retaliation and counterstrike impossible – the aff makes counterstrike effective
Kesan 26 Hayes 12 * Professor, H. Ross 26 Helen Workman Research Scholar, and Director of the Program in Intellectual Property 26 Technology Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Research Fellow, University of Illinois College of Law ~Jay P. Kesan* and Carol M. Hayes, MITIGATIVE COUNTERSTRIKING: SELF-DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE IN CYBERSPACE, Spring, 2012, Harvard Journal of Law 26 Technology, 25 Harv. J. Law 26 Tec 415~
Ideas, computers, and intellectual property have become extremely important in the modern Information Age. The Internet has become so essential to modern life that several countries have declared Internet access to be a fundamental right. n4 But the importance of technology in the Information Age comes with a downside: the vulnerability of modern society and the global economy to minimally funded cyberat-tacks from remote corners of the world.
In the 1950s, American school children were taught to "duck and cover"
AND
. n8 "Duck and cover," however, had no deterrent effect.
The Cold War ended about two decades ago, but new threats have emerged.
AND
do not present enough of a practical threat to deter potential attackers. n14
The weaknesses of the current reliance on employing passive defense methods and seeking help from
AND
are needed to ensure that responsive actions can be grounded in sound policy.
Because of the inadequacy in current means to address cyber threats, this Article examines other possible methods to deter cyberattacks, specifically the use of cyber counterstrikes as part of a model of active defense. Active defense involves (1) detecting an intrusion, (2) tracing the intruder, and (3) some form of cyber counterstrike. n19
~*420~ Though intrusion detection and tracing are essential, counterstriking is key
AND
"mitigative counterstriking," respectively, to the counterstriking component of active defense.
In the cyber context, a "counterstrike" can involve any number of actions
AND
offensive cyber technologies that can have applications in the context of counterstriking. n22
The goal of a counterstrike can vary, from punishing the attacker to simply mitigating
AND
whatever measures are deployed must be justifiable under a mitigation frame-work.
Cyber counterstrikes, however, are currently controversial, and it can be difficult under
AND
criminal enforcement or civil litigation for a number of reasons we discuss below.
Currently, the biggest barrier to defending against cyberattacks is the lack of a legal
AND
of retributive counterstriking and the employment of self-help through mitigative counterstriking.
We thus propose a new policy and legal regime to address the threat of cyberattacks
AND
approaches in order to afford these private parties more protection against these threats.
Kramer et. al 12 (Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished research fellow
AND
Security Policy at the National Defense University., "Cyberpower and National Security")
Cyber attacks—hacking of various kinds—are a fact of modern life.
AND
far occurred. The capacity to deter such attacks would be enormously valuable.
Cyber deterrence has been considered challenging because of the difficulty of attributing the source of cyber attacks. While attribution unquestionably is a consequential issue, we believe that deterrence in the context of cyber is a viable strategy and one on which the United States ought to embark much more advertently. The components of such a strategy would consist of the following elements, some of which would require development as discussed below.
First, any approach to deterrence of cyber attacks needs to be considered in an
AND
would be at a time, place, and manner of our choosing.
In generating policy, some important differentiations could be consequential. State actors generally act
AND
, and, for terrorists, classic counterterrorist techniques may be most effective.
One important question is whether there is a threshold at which more significant responses become
AND
than dealing with a new problem where force has not already been used.
AND, they can’t win an impact turn – mission failure is inevitable without Congressional deliberation
Griffin 12 – Professor of Constitutional Law @ Tulane University ~Stephen Griffin, "The Tragedy of the War Power: Presidential Decisionmaking from Truman to Obama," APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, July 15, 2012, Pg. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2107467
As a comparison of the relative ability of the executive and legislative branches to make
AND
in 1947 to establish the NSC to coordinate policy within the executive branch.
During the Cold War and after, the pre-Pearl Harbor constitutional order was
AND
or not, it introduced deep tensions into the American system of governance.
The case studies presented above show that the interagency process taking place inside the executive
AND
Congress escaped both a valuable learning experience and the blame for the war.
In addition, the case studies show that there is considerable evidence that the executive
AND
publicly provides a significant incentive for the president to insist on a unified approach
to policy. It is plausible that repeated iterations of oversight would build up
AND
future is whether such a process is possible. Pg. 31-37
AT: Circumvention
Congressional opposition to the authority curbs Presidential action – robust statistical and empirical proof
Kriner 10 Assistant professor of political science at Boston University ~Douglas L. Kriner, "After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War", page 228-231~
Conclusion The sequence of events leading up to the sudden reversal of administration policy and
AND
the likelihood of congressional opposition and adjust their conduct of military operations accordingly.
2AC Consult Not Restriction
We meet and CI — statutory restrictions include 5 things
KAISER 80 The Official Specialist in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress ~Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the Legislative Veto; Kaiser, Frederick M., 32 Admin. L. Rev. 667 (1980)~
In addition to direct statutory overrides, there are a variety of statutory and nonstatutory
AND
interjecting novel procedural requirements along with different perspectives and influences into the process.
It is also valuable to examine nonstatutory controls available to the Congress:
- legislative, oversight, investigative, and confirmation hearings;
2. establishment of select committees and specialized subcommittees to oversee agency rulemaking and enforcement
AND
. inter-agency consultation requirements; and 5. congressional prior notification provisions
2AC Ableism
And—changing language doesn’t subvert ableism—their critique of language choices prevents genuine contestation of ableist oppression.
Perpetually Myself 11 — Perpetually Myself—a blog by an anonymous author self-described as "a historian, cat lover, autistic woman, Yankee fan, neurodiversity advocate, feminist, Harry Potter fan, Hunger Games fan, fantasy/science fiction reader, and general supporter of social justice," 2011 ("It’s not enough to call out ableist language," Perpetually Myself—a blog, May 2nd, Available Online at http://allies-person.tumblr.com/post/5141183778/its-not-enough-to-call-out-ableist-language, Accessed 03-02-2012)
Language is important, but more important still are the underlying assumptions which shape our
AND
has stopped at language—which is in many ways the easiest part.
Take stigma against people with intellectual disabilities. I am glad that it’s no longer
AND
assumptions in place while giving lip service to equality. It’s very troubling.
Truly examining one’s ableism does not mean renaming the tags on your blog so that
AND
not simply people-seen-as-lesser whom are condescended to.
They dichotomize the able and disabled—turns the K
Bickenbacha et al WHO, Division of Mental Health and Prevention of Substance Abuse, Assessment and Classification Unit 1999 Jerome Models of disablement, universalism and the international classification of impairments, disabilities and handicaps Social Science 26 Medicine 48.9 Science Direct
Zola noticed that, quite unintentionally, the minority group approach tended to reinforce salient
AND
not features that make sense when disabilities are fully contextualized in people’s lives.
As it happens, the developing sciences of rehabilitative and occupational therapy have moved away
AND
this is precisely what Zola doubted could be done in any nonarbitrary manner.
Alt cannot overcome attitudes and impairments that contribute to societal inaccessibility
Burleson ’11 ~Elizabeth is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, "Perspective on Economic Critiques of Disability Law: The Multifaceted Federal Role in Balancing Equity and Efficiency" 1/1~
A. Administrative and Judicial Enforcement
It is important to ensure not only a strong, well-funded, and
AND
cultural weight of disability, and the longterm impact of societal inaccessibility.105
Rejecting discourse does nothing and leaves attitudes unchanged.
Kelly, 12/98 Peace Review
One might ask, in "listening" to violent language and to the people
AND
, then perhaps she will be less likely to use it around me.
Henry Giroux, prof of edu and cultural studies at Penn State, 6 (Comparative Studies of South Asia)
Abstracted from the ideal of public commitment, the new authoritarianism represents a political and
AND
the chances of humanity are inscribed, and can be nowhere else.59
2AC LOJ
David Cole Law @ Georgetown 12 "The Politics of the Rule of Law: The Role of Civil Society in the Surprising Resilience of Human Rights in the Decade after 9/11" http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Cole201.12.12.pdf p. 51-53
As I have shown above, while political forces played a significant role in checking
AND
but on a vibrant civil society dedicated to reinforcing and defending constitutional values.
David Cole Law @ Georgetown 12 "The Politics of the Rule of Law: The Role of Civil Society in the Surprising Resilience of Human Rights in the Decade after 9/11" http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Cole201.12.12.pdf p. 44-49
If political pressure from civil society, rather than the force of law itself or
AND
that organizing and advocacy in turn can affect the outcomes of legal disputes.
Politics, however, is not sufficient on its own. In The Executive Unbound, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule maintain that a robust political process is sufficient to deter executive abuse in times of crisis. They argue that in the modern era, the rule of law cannot effectively constrain the executive, especially in emergencies, but that the executive is sufficiently limited by political checks. 82
82 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic
AND
such concerns, we would not need a constitution in the first place.
Adopting a prescriptive realist theory as a guide for foreign policy is critical to correct policy errors and minimize violence
Rosato and Schuessler 11 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame AND Assistant Professor of Strategy and International Security at the Air War College (Sebastian and John, "A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States", Perspectives on Politics December 2011 Vol. 9 No. 4)
With these requirements in mind, we describe and defend a prescriptive realist theory
AND
while simultaneously minimizing the likelihood that it will become embroiled in future wars.
2AC Security
Shane 12 ~Peter, Jacob E. Davis and Jacob E. Davis II Chair of Law at Ohio State University, June 26, "Cybersecurity Policy as if ’Ordinary Citizens’ Mattered: The Case for Public Participation in Cyber Policy Making," I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 211, p. 433-6~
The total abdication of cybersecurity policy to "experts," however, has been,
AND
no understanding of what they are being asked to do or to support.
Finally, the concern over decision-making competence is easy to overstate. The
AND
answers to the general question, "What should the government do?"4
Indeed, I would argue that an administration explicitly committed to unprecedented levels of both
AND
model for how to deepen the meaning of citizenship in the digital age.
In Part I of this essay, I will revisit the other contributions to this
AND
precedent for the institutionalization of collaborative public involvement in policy making more generally.
The obvious threshold difficulty in creating a cybersecurity regime that resembles a "kinetic world
AND
terms of what Americans have at stake in the framing of cyber policy.
As a starting point, it is useful to note the contrast that the National
AND
by the kinds of public anxiety stirred up by cyber attack scenarios.10
Policy making with regard to potential cyber attack from both an offensive and defensive posture
AND
civilian networks as one that should be discussed "openly and frequently."12
Andrew Leonard Senior Technology Writier @ Salon 8-21-09 "Hu Jintao is no Kaiser Wilhelm" http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2009/08/21/hu_jintao_is_the_new_kaiser_wilhelm/
I don’t think Hu Jintao makes a good Kaiser Wilhelm and I think it is
AND
side interprets the other’s moves in the darkest way and responds in kind.)
Pickin 12 (Matthew, MA War Stuides – Kings College, "What is the securitization of cyberspace? Is it a problem?", http://www.academia.edu/3100313/What_is_the_securitization_of_cyberspace_Is_it_a_problem)
In analysing the problems of securitization, major issues have been raised. Threat inflation
AND
issue is de-securitized, for now securitization is a necessary evil.
Perm solves—a catch all security possibly makes action impossible and matters worse – we must combine cyber policy with the alternative strategically – conceptualizing security in terms of intention is a viable vision for change
Anderson 12 (NICHOLAS D. ANDERSON Georgetown University M.A., Security Studies, 2012, ""Re re defining" International Security", The Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies Summer 2012, Volume 4, PDF, http://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume4/volume4_anderson.pdf, NICHOLAS D. ANDERSON Georgetown University M.A., Security Studies, 2012, ""Re re defining" International Security", The Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies Summer 2012, Volume 4, PDF, http://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume4/volume4_anderson.pdf, KENTUCKY)
First, too expansive a definition for security would make comparing similar policies essentially impossible
AND
reactor accidents, even meltdowns, no matter how threatening, should not.
Owen 2 (David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium, Vol 31, No 3)
Commenting on the ’philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ’~a~
AND
the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.
Kallberg and Thuraisingham 13 ~Jan, PhD from the University of Texas at Dallas, and Bhavani, University of Texas at Dallas, March, "From Cyber Terrorism to State Actors’ Covert Cyber Operations," http://works.bepress.com/jan_kallberg/12/~~
Cyber is already by definitions and doctrine a war-fighting domain even if only
AND
because there is a perceived opportunity and potential future gain for these powers.
1AR Ableism
Kinzel 11 — Lesley Kinzel, blogger and social justice writer, has written for Newsweek and Marie Claire, was named one of the Feminist Press’s "40 Feminists Under 40," 2011 ("On our difficult language, and the calling-out of," Two Whole Cakes—a blog about body politics, social justice activism, and pop-cultural criticism from a feminist perspective, March 30th, Available Online at http://blog.twowholecakes.com/2011/03/on-our-difficult-language-and-the-calling-out-of-same/, Accessed 03-02-2012)
We throw "that’s ableist" or "that’s racist" or "that’s fatphobic
AND
another does nothing to change the destructive use of said power against us.
This practice of shaming people into behaving a certain way or using certain language does
AND
is little we can do while still holding on to the master’s tools.
Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society’s definition of acceptable women
AND
women who still define the master’s house as their only source of support.
Ideally, people should stop using certain language because they have developed an understanding of
AND
. These are the things that put us here in the first place.
We are sincerely sorry—Apologies are effective and best
Latiff 01 (81 B.U.L. Rev. 289, p ln)
A coerced apology can mitigate anger even if it is perceived as insincere, and
AND
. Accordingly, the offender’s social esteem and communal attachments may suffer. n178
LOJ
Schwartz 2, Lecturer in Philosophy of Medicine at the Department of General Practice at the University of Glasgow ’02 (Lisa, , Medical Ethic: A case-based approach, Chapter 6: A Value to Life: Who Decides and How?, www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf)
The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for
AND
ought to be made only by the person concerned and not by others.
Consequences matter – the tunnel vision of moral absolutism generates evil and political irrelevance
Issac 02 (Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring, 2002)
Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power
AND
not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
Boulding 90 (Kenneth E., Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution, Ed: John Burton, pg. 40-41)
I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25
AND
or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things.
