Tournament: Gonzaga | Round: 1 | Opponent: Puget Sound BQ | Judge: Ryan Cheek

1AC Plan

The United States federal judiciary should require that the president cannot continue the detention of personnel that have successfully won a habeas corpus hearing.
 

1AC Legitimacy

Contention One is Legitimacy
The Kiyemba court ruled the right to habeas doesn’t give the power to release a detainee or stop transfer
Milko 12
~Winter, 2012, Jennifer L. Milko, "Separation of Powers and Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Roles of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases and the Need for Supreme Guidance", 50 Duq. L. Rev. 173~
After the Boumediene and Munaf cases, it was clear that the United States district
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Court denied the writ on March 22, 2010. n93 ~*186~
These rulings make habeas useless—this abdicates their key role
Milko 12 ~Winter, 2012, Jennifer L. Milko, "Separation of Powers and Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Roles of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases and the Need for Supreme Guidance", 50 Duq. L. Rev. 173~
A. Arguments for a Remedy By urging deference to the Executive Branch, the
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being improperly limited, as they are not utilizing their constitutional power properly.
Kiyemba decisions undermined legitimacy of our commitment to the rule of law globally
Vaughn and Williams, Professors of Law, 13 ~2013, Katherine L. Vaughns B.A. (Political Science), J.D., University of California at Berkeley. Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, and Heather L. Williams, B.A. (French), B.A. (Political Science), University of Rochester, J.D., cum laude, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, "OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: 1 KIYEMBA V. OBAMA AND THE MEANING OF FREEDOM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE RULE OF LAW TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11", Asian American Law Journal, Vol. 20, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148404~~
In 2007, Ninth Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima observed that the rule of
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better—the Constitution, and those who drafted it, demand so.
The aff is key—perception of US provision of habeas rights is critical to US soft power—the vital aspect of US legal jurisprudence—court action is key
Sidhu 11 
~2011, Dawinder S. Sidhu, J.D., The George Washington University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, Judicial Review as Soft Power: How the Courts Can Help Us Win the Post-9/11 Conflict", NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF, Vol. 1, Issue 1 http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=100326context=nslb~~
The "Great Wall" The writ of habeas corpus enables an individual to challenge
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unique and modern circumstances of the post-9/11 con? ict.
Indefinite detention is the key factor — prefer statistical data
Welsh 11, J.D. from University of Utah and Doctoral student
~March, 2011, David Welsh has a J.D. from the University of Utah. He is currently a doctoral student in the Eller School of Business at the University of Arizona where his research focuses on organizational fairness and ethics, "Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally Unfair Treatment of Detainees on Perceptions of Global Legitimacy", 9 U.N.H. L. Rev. 261~
Today, many individuals throughout the world question whether the United States has engaged in
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with the unique procedural issues created by a growing number of suspected terrorists.
Legitimacy is critical to make US leadership durable and effective—judicial action on indefinite detention is crucial
Knowles 9 ~Spring, 2009, Robert Knowles is a Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, "American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution", ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87~
American unipolarity has created a challenge for realists. Unipolarity was thought to be inherently
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the same project that the courts constantly grapple with in adjudicating domestic disputes.
Judicial action clarifying a meaningful right to habeas is key
Knowles 9 ~Spring, 2009, Robert Knowles is a Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, "American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution", ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87~
The Bush Administration’s detainee policy made clear that - due to America’s power - the
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and reinforces the sense that our constitutional values reflect universal human rights. n449
US benevolent hegemony is critical to global peace—the alternative causes massive wars
Kromah 9, Masters in IR
~February 2009, Lamii Moivi Kromah, UN Civil Affairs Officer, Researcher @ Institute for Peace and Security Studies, MA from University of the Witwatersrand, "The Institutional Nature of U.S. Hegemony: Post 9/11", http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/7301/MARR2009.pdf~~
A final major gain to the United States from the benevolent hegemony has perhaps been
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to facilitate its ability to extract contributions from other members of the system.
Robust empirical and statistical data proves — hegemony stops extinction
Barnett 11 Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis 26 Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, "The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads," March 7 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads
It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of
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the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding. 

1AC Democracy

Contention two is Democracy:
Kiyemba created a model of runaway executive power undermining the global rule of law
Vaughn and Wiliams, Professors of Law, 13 ~2013, Katherine L. Vaughns B.A. (Political Science), J.D., University of California at Berkeley. Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, and Heather L. Williams, B.A. (French), B.A. (Political Science), University of Rochester, J.D., cum laude, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, "OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: 1 KIYEMBA V. OBAMA AND THE MEANING OF FREEDOM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE RULE OF LAW TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11", Asian American Law Journal, Vol. 20, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148404~~
When it denied certiorari in Kiyemba III, the Supreme Court missed the opportunity to
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they both undoubtedly implicate individual constitutional rights and the separation of powers.
Democratic transitions are coming now — Supreme Court influence is the determining factor
Suto 11, Research Associate at Tahrir Institute and J.D.  
~07/15/11, Ryan Suto is a Research Associate at Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, has degrees in degrees in law, post-conflict reconstruction, international relations and public relations from Syracuse Law, "Judicial Diplomacy: The International Impact of the Supreme Court", http://jurist.org/dateline/2011/07/ryan-suto-judicial-diplomacy.php~~
The Court is certainly the best institution to explain to scholars, governments, lawyers
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key legal concepts. This is an opportunity that should not be wasted.
Promoting a strong judiciary is necessary to make those transitions stable and democratic—detention policies guarantee global authoritarianism
CJA 3, Center for Justice and Accountability
~OCTOBER 2003, The Center for Justice 26 Accountability ("CJA") seeks, by use of the legal systems, to deter torture and other human rights abuses around the world., "BRIEF OF the CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, the INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, and INDIVIDUAL ADVOCATES for the INDEPENDENCE of the JUDICIARY in EMERGING DEMOCRACIES as AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS", http://www.cja.org/downloads/Al-Odah_Odah_v_US___Rasul_v_Bush_CJA_Amicus_SCOTUS.pdf~~
A STRONG, INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STABLE GOVERNANCE IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES AROUND THE WORLD. A. Individual Nations Have Accepted and Are Seeking to Implement Judicial Review By A Strong, Independent Judiciary. Many of the newly independent governments that have proliferated over the past five decades have adopted these ideals. They have emerged from a variety of less-than-free contexts, including the end of European colonial rule in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former Soviet Union in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the continuing turmoil in parts of Africa, Latin America and southern Asia. Some countries have successfully transitioned to stable and democratic forms of government that protect individual freedoms and human rights by means of judicial review by a strong and independent judiciary. Others have suffered the rise of tyrannical and oppressive rulers who consolidated their hold on power in part by diminishing or abolishing the role of the judiciary. And still others hang in the balance, struggling against the onslaught of tyrants to establish stable, democratic governments. In their attempts to shed their tyrannical pasts and to ensure the protection of individual rights, emerging democracies have consistently looked to the United States and its Constitution in fashioning frameworks that safeguard the independence of their judiciaries. See Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 Law 26 Soc. Inquiry 91, 92 (2000) (stating that of the "~m~any countries . . . ~that~ have engaged in fundamental constitutional reform over the past three decades," nearly all adopted "a bill of rights and establishe~d~ some form of active judicial review") Establishing judicial review by a strong and independent judiciary is a critical step in stabilizing and protecting these new democracies. See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 605, 605-06 (1996) (describing the judicial branch as having "a uniquely important role" in transitional countries, not only to "mediate conflicts between political actors but also ~to~ prevent the arbitrary exercise of government power; see also Daniel C. Prefontaine and Joanne Lee, The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (1998) ("There is increasing acknowledgment that an independent judiciary is the key to upholding the rule of law in a free society . . . . Most countries in transition from dictatorships and/or statist economies recognize the need to create a more stable system of governance, based on the rule of law."), available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/RuleofLaw. pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). Although the precise form of government differs among countries, "they ultimately constitute variations within, not from, the American model of constitutionalism . . . ~a~ specific set of fundamental rights and liberties has the status of supreme law, is entrenched against amendment or repeal . . . and is enforced by an independent court . . . ." Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 707, 718 (2001). This phenomenon became most notable worldwide after World War II when certain countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, embraced independent judiciaries following their bitter experiences under totalitarian regimes. See id. at 714- 15; see also United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) ("Since World War II, many countries have adopted forms of judicial review, which — though different from ours in many particulars — unmistakably draw their origin and inspiration from American constitutional theory and practice. See generally Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)."). It is a trend that continues to this day. It bears mention that the United States has consistently affirmed and encouraged the establishment of independent judiciaries in emerging democracies. In September 2000, President Clinton observed that "~w~ithout the rule of law, elections simply offer a choice of dictators. . . . America’s experience should be put to use to advance the rule of law, where democracy’s roots are looking for room and strength to grow." Remarks at Georgetown University Law School, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2218 (September 26, 2000), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/09/2000-09-26- remarks-by-president-at-georgetown-international-lawcenter.html. The United States acts on these principles in part through the assistance it provides to developing nations. For example, the United States requires that any country seeking assistance through the Millenium Challenge Account, a development assistance program instituted in 2002, must demonstrate, among other criteria, an "adherence to the rule of law." The White House noted that the rule of law is one of the "essential conditions for successful development" of these countries. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).12 A few examples illustrate the influence of the United States model. On November 28, 1998, Albania adopted a new constitution, representing the culmination of eight years of democratic reform after the communist rule collapsed. In addition to protecting fundamental individual rights, the Albanian Constitution provides for an independent judiciary consisting of a Constitutional Court with final authority to determine the constitutional rights of individuals. Albanian Constitution, Article 125, Item 1 and Article 128; see also Darian Pavli, "A Brief ’Constitutional History’ of Albania" available at http://www.ipls.org/services/others/chist.html (last visited Janaury 8, 2004); Jean-Marie Henckaerts 26 Stefaan Van der Jeught, Human Rights Protection Under the New Constitutions of Central Europe, 20 Loy. L.A. Int’l 26 Comp. L.J. 475 (Mar. 1998). In South Africa, the new constitutional judiciary plays a similarly important role, following generations of an oppressive apartheid regime. South Africa adopted a new constitution in 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Explanatory Memorandum. It establishes a Constitutional Court which "makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional." Id. at Chapter 8, Section 167, Item (5), available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/constitution/saconst.html?r ebookmark=1 (last visited January 8, 2004); see also Justice Tholakele H. Madala, Rule Under Apartheid and the Fledgling Democracy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: The Role of the Judiciary, 26 N.C. J. Int’l L. 26 Com. Reg. 743 (Summer 2001). Afghanistan is perhaps the most recent example of a country struggling to develop a more democratic form of government. Adoption by the Loya Jirga of Afghanistan’s new constitution on January 4, 2004 has been hailed as a milestone. See http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/02/world/main59111 6.shtml (Jan 7, 2004). The proposed constitution creates a judiciary that, at least on paper, is "an independent organ of the state," with a Supreme Court empowered to review the constitutionality of laws at the request of the Government and/or the Courts. Afghan Const. Art. 116, 121 (unofficial English translation), available at http://www.hazara.net/jirga/AfghanConstitution-Final.pdf (last visited January 8, 2004). See also Ron Synowitz, Afghanistan: Constitutional Commission Chairman Presents Karzai with Long-Delayed Draft Constitution (November 3, 2003), available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/11/03112003164239.as p (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). B. Other Nations Have Curtailed Judicial Review During Times Of Crisis, Often Citing the United States’ Example, And Individual Freedoms Have Diminished As A Result. While much of the world is moving to adopt the institutions necessary to secure individual rights, many still regularly abuse these rights. One of the hallmarks of tyranny is the lack of a strong and independent judiciary. Not surprisingly, where countries make the sad transition to tyranny, one of the first victims is the judiciary. Many of the rulers that go down that road justify their actions on the basis of national security and the fight against terrorism, and, disturbingly, many claim to be modeling their actions on the United States. Again, a few examples illustrate this trend. In Peru, one of former President Alberto Fujimori’s first acts in seizing control was to assume direct executive control of the judiciary, claiming that it was justified by the threat of domestic terrorism. He then imprisoned thousands, refusing the right of the judiciary to intervene. International Commission of Jurists, Attacks on Justice 2000-Peru, August 13, 2001, available at http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=258726lang=en (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe’s rise to dictatorship has been punctuated by threats of violence to and the co-opting of the judiciary. He now enjoys virtually total control over Zimbabweans’ individual rights and the entire political system. R.W. Johnson, Mugabe’s Agents in Plot to Kill Opposition Chief, Sunday Times (London), June 10, 2001; International Commission of Jurists, Attacks on Justice 2002— Zimbabwe, August 27, 2002, available at http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=269526lang=en (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). While Peru and Zimbabwe represent an extreme, the independence of the judiciary is under assault in less brazen ways in a variety of countries today. A highly troubling aspect of this trend is the fact that in many of these instances those perpetuating the assaults on the judiciary have pointed to the United States’ model to justify their actions. Indeed, many have specifically referenced the United States’ actions in detaining persons in Guantánamo Bay. For example, Rais Yatim, Malaysia’s "de facto law minister" explicitly relied on the detentions at Guantánamo to justify Malaysia’s detention of more than 70 suspected Islamic militants for over two years. Rais stated that Malyasia’s detentions were "just like the process in Guantánamo," adding, "I put the equation with Guantánamo just to make it graphic to you that this is not simply a Malaysian style of doing things." Sean Yoong, "Malaysia Slams Criticism of Security Law Allowing Detention Without Trial," Associated Press, September 9, 2003 (available from Westlaw at 9/9/03 APWIRES 09:34:00). Similarly, when responding to a United States Government human rights report that listed rights violations in Namibia, Namibia’s Information Permanent Secretary Mocks Shivute cited the Guantánamo Bay detentions, claiming that "the US government was the worst human rights violator in the world." BBC Monitoring, March 8, 2002, available at 2002 WL 15938703. Nor is this disturbing trend limited to these specific examples. At a recent conference held at the Carter Center in Atlanta, President Carter, specifically citing the Guantánamo Bay detentions, noted that the erosion of civil liberties in the United States has "given a blank check to nations who are inclined to violate human rights already." Doug Gross, "Carter: U.S. human rights missteps embolden foreign dictators," Associated Press Newswires, November 12, 2003 (available from Westlaw at 11/12/03 APWIRES 00:30:26). At the same conference, Professor Saad Ibrahim of the American University in Cairo (who was jailed for seven years after exposing fraud in the Egyptian election process) said, "Every dictator in the world is using what the United States has done under the Patriot Act . . . to justify their past violations of human rights and to declare a license to continue to violate human rights." Id. Likewise, Shehu Sani, president of the Kaduna, Nigeriabased Civil Rights Congress, wrote in the International Herald Tribune on September 15, 2003 that "~t~he insistence by the Bush administration on keeping Taliban and Al Quaeda captives in indefinite detention in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, instead of in jails in the United States — and the White House’s preference for military tribunals over regular courts — helps create a free license for tyranny in Africa. It helps justify Egypt’s move to detain human rights campaigners as threats to national security, and does the same for similar measures by the governments of Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Burkina Faso." Available at http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=10992726owner=(IHT)26dat e=20030121123259. In our uni-polar world, the United States obviously sets an important example on these issues. As reflected in the foundational documents of the United Nations and many other such agreements, the international community has consistently affirmed the value of an independent judiciary to the defense of universally recognized human rights. In the crucible of actual practice within nations, many have looked to the United States model when developing independent judiciaries with the ability to check executive power in the defense of individual rights. Yet others have justified abuses by reference to the conduct of the United States. Far more influential than the words of Montesquieu and Madison are the actions of the United States. This case starkly presents the question of which model this Court will set for the world. CONCLUSION Much of the world models itself after this country’s two hundred year old traditions — and still more on its day to day implementation and expression of those traditions. To say that a refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case will have global implications is not mere rhetoric. Resting on this Court’s decision is not only the necessary role this Court has historically played in this country. Also at stake are the freedoms that many in emerging democracies around the globe seek to ensure for their peoples.
The plan is key — indefinite detention emboldens global destruction of rights protection
Chaffee 9, Advocacy Counsel at Human Rights First, Dismantling Guantanamo: Facing the Challenges of Continued Detention and Repatriation: The Cost of Indefinitely Kicking the Can: Why Continued "Prolonged" Detention Is No Solution To Guantanamo, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?-http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?
The Guantanamo detentions have shown that assessments of dangerousness based not on overt acts,
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schemes that the U.S. criticizes as authorized arbitrary detention. n18-http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.30065.19597620660426target=results_DocumentContent26returnToKey=20_T1820087175426parent=docview26rand=137972004968426reloadEntirePage=true
Indefinite detention regimes aimed at preventing security risks are known to foster human rights abuses
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governments to circumvent the protections guaranteed in criminal trials by citing security concerns.
Democratic backsliding causes great power war and authoritarianism
Gat 11, Professor at Tel Aviv University, Ezer Weizman Professor of National Security at Tel Aviv University, Azar 2011, "The Changing Character of War," in The Changing Character of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, p. 30-32
Since 1945, the decline of major great power war has deepened further. Nuclear
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, they may vary less than seemed likely only a short while ago.

No circumvention
Landau 9, associate professor at Fordham Law
(Joseph, Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School. MUSCULAR PROCEDURE: CONDITIONAL DEFERENCE IN THE EXECUTIVE DETENTION CASES Washington Law Review Vol. 84:661, 2009)
The executive detention cases of the past several years have prompted renewed debate over the
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undisturbed, would violate a judicially imposed standard requiring lucid, intelligible procedures.

Tournament: Wake | Round: 1 | Opponent: Johnson County CC SW | Judge: Aaron Weathers

US detention policy is an act of Islamophobia informed by a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice

Koenigsknecht 12, Public History MA Candidate

~~~October 04, 2012, Theresa Koenigsknecht is Public History MA Candidate at Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, "Perspectives on Post 9/11 Prejudices: Islamophobia", http://blog.gitmomemory.org/2012/10/04/perspectives-on-post-911-prejudices-islamophobia/~~~~~~
Have the September 11th terrorist attacks changed how you view or treat others? For
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or treat those around them and in time provide an antidote for Islamophobia. 

====This detention of Islamic bodies establishes a form of constant dehumanization and perpetual warfare—the deeming of people as "dangerous" creates a free license for capture that establishes detention sites as a space of perpetual warfare====
Butler 6, Professor at UC Berkeley
(Judith, "Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence" Ch. 3: Indefinite Detention, pg 50)
If a person is simply deemed dangerous, then it is no longer a matter
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sovereign right to self-protection outflanks any and all recourse to law.

These constructions create a broader state of violence against Islamic bodies and bodies that are racially marked to look like them—this manifests itself in xenophobic profiling and immigration policies

Wing 3, Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law
~~~Spring 2003, Adrien Katherine Wing is a Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law. A.B. Princeton, 1978; M.A. UCLA, 1979; J.D. Stanford, 1982. This paper was presented at the Civil Rights symposium of the Louisiana State"Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism", ~~http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=598726context=lalrev26sei-redir=126referer=http3A2F2Fscholar.google.com2Fscholar3Fq3Dguantanamo2B2522critical2Brace2Btheory252226btnG3D26hl3Den26as_sdt3D0252C526as_vis3D1~~~~23search=22guantanamo20critical20race20theory22-http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=598726context=lalrev26sei-redir=126referer=http3A2F2Fscholar.google.com2Fscholar3Fq3Dguantanamo2B2522critical2Brace2Btheory252226btnG3D26hl3Den26as_sdt3D0252C526as_vis3D1~~~~, 63 La. L. Rev. (2003)~~~
To illustrate how race can be socially constructed, I will use myself as an
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then. The next part will show how CRT can offer some solutions.

Islamophobia shapes US foreign policy—notions of western superiority are a critical tool to drum up support for militaristic and elitist interventions

Kumar 13
~~~09/11/13, Deepa Kumar is an Associate Professor of Media Studies and Middle Eastern Studies at the Rutgers University. She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire and Outside the Box: Corporate Media, Globalization, and the UPS Strike being interviewed by Jessica Desvarieux, The Real News Network, "Twelve Years Post 9/11, Islamophobia Still Runs High", http://truth-out.org/video/item/18759-twelve-years-post-9-11-islamophobia-still-runs-high~~~~~~

KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that larger numbers of conservative
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Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11.

This dehumanization of foreign populations establishes material conditions of violence that result in extinction—the way we conceive of and discuss foreign bodies matters

Collins and Glover 2 (John Collins, Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence, and Ross Glover, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, 2002, Collateral Language, p. 6-7, The Real Effects of Language)
As any university student knows, theories about the "social con¬struction" and social
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less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

Failure to reject the institutionalized hatred of Islamophobia makes extinction possible—violence is acceptable against anyone as all "others" become the enemy

Munjid, 11 (3/27, Achmad, president of the Nahdlatul Ulama community in North America, "Overcoming Islamophobia in the United States,"
~~http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/27/overcoming-islamophobia-united-states.html-http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/27/overcoming-islamophobia-united-states.html~~~~)
Remember, as institutionalized hatred, Islamophobia has become a cultural product that is transferable
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"others" become the enemy. Everybody knows what the consequences are.

We advocate a critical praxis centered on challenging islamophobic indefinite detention policies.

Centering our praxis in this space is key—interrogating islamophobia in educational settings is critical to establish a critical consciousness that enables larger political projects

Housee 12, Senior Lecturer in Sociology
~~~Jan. 04 2012, Shirin Housee works at the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, University of Wolverhampton, UK "What~’s the point? Anti-racism and students~’ voices against Islamophobia", Volume 15, Issue 1~~~
Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the student comments, I
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is to education that our attention should be directed.~’ (162)

Deconstructing and interrogating flawed assumptions be hind Islamphobia is critical to establish a transformative and liberatory pedagogy that enables us as agents to challenge racist dynamics

Zine 4, Professor of Sociology and Equity Studies
~~~2004, Jasmin Zine is a researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora. She teaches graduate courses in the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto in the areas of race and ethnicity, anti-racism education and critical ethnography., "Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from the Educational Front Lines", American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3~~~
As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from
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" is important to exposing how power operates through the politics of representation.

As ethical agents we must act to speak up against instances of Islamophobia EVEN IF it doesn~’t directly affect us

Elver 12
~~~Spring 2012, Hilal Elver is a "TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: RETHINKING COUNTERTERRORISM: Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia", 21 Transnat~’l L. 26 Contemp. Probs. 119~~~

Scholars who are sensitive about the danger of Islamophobia have written about it extensively.
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, and there was no one left to speak out for me. n297

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 1 | Opponent: CSUF BS | Judge: Sam Maurer

Contention one is Cyber War:

The cyber arms race is accelerating — major attacks are inevitable this year — the best data proves

Goldman 13, CNN Writer, Nations Prepare for Cyberwar, http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/07/technology/security/cyber-war/index.html-http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/07/technology/security/cyber-war/index.html
Security analysts are predicting that 2013 is when nation-sponsored cyberwarfare goes mainstream —
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are particularly vulnerable, according to numerous assessments delivered to Congress last year.

Specifically, OCO-driven retaliatory cycles and arms races

Moss 13, Columnist at The Diplomat Trefor Moss is an independent journalist based in Hong Kong. He covers Asian politics, defence and security, and was Asia-Pacific Editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly until 2009, Is Cyber War the New Cold War?, 4/19/13, http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/19/is-cyber-war-the-new-cold-war/2/-http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/19/is-cyber-war-the-new-cold-war/2/
Although setting up a cybersecurity working group with China, Washington has also signaled it
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, the risk of it spilling over into kinetic hostilities will only grow.

Cyber arms race causes world war — there are no checks on escalation, deterrence doesn’t apply, and only a certain commitment to the plan solves

CSM 11, Christian Science Monitor
(3/7, Mark Clayton, The new cyber arms race, www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0307/The-new-cyber-arms-race)
The new cyber arms race Tomorrow’s wars will be fought not just with guns,
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use of cyberattack is ill-formed, undeveloped, and highly uncertain.and#34;

Congressional OCO oversight is key to stop the arms race — otherwise nuclear war is inevitable from arms-racing, command and control hacking, crisis instability, and fracturing nuclear agreements

Austin, 8/6, Director of Policy Innovation at the EastWest Institute, Costs of American Cyber Superiority, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/costs-of-american-cyber-superiority/-http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/costs-of-american-cyber-superiority/
The United States is racing for the technological frontier in military and intelligence uses of
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be every bit as reasonable given their anxiety about unconstrained American cyber superiority.

The mere perception of Presidential control of OCOs fuels foreign uncertainty – that causes extinction

Rothschild 13, Editor of Progressive Magazine, Matthew Rothschild is the editor of The Progressive magazine, which is one of the leading voices for peace and social justice in this country. Rothschild has appeared on Nightline, C-SPAN, The O’Reilly Factor, and NPR, and his newspaper commentaries have run in the Chicago Tribune, the L.A. Times, the Miami Herald, and a host of other newspapers. Rothschild is the host of and#34;Progressive Radio-http://www.progressive.org/progressive_radio,and#34; a syndicated half-hour weekly interview program. And he does a two-minute daily radio commentary, entitled and#34;Progressive Point of View-http://www.progressive.org/progressive_pov,and#34; which is also syndicated around the country. Rothschild is the author of You Have No Rights: Stories of America in an Age of Repression (New Press, 2007). He also is the editor ofDemocracy in Print: The Best of The Progressive, 1909-2009(University of Wisconsin Press, 2009)., The Dangers of Obama’s Cyber War Power Grab, http://progressive.org/dangers-of-obama-cyber-war-power-grab-http://progressive.org/dangers-of-obama-cyber-war-power-grab
There are no checks or balances when the President, alone, decides when to
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successors. They, too, worry about the temptations of a President.

====Guaranteed to escalate – ====

====Misperceptions====
Rosenzweig 9, Professor at Georgetown Law 
(Paul, founder of Reid Branch Consulting, specializing in homeland security, senior advisor to the Chertoff Group, Carnegie Fellow at Northwestern, professor at National Defense University, Editorial board at the Journal of National Security Law 26 Policy, deputy assistant secretary for policy at the US Department of Homeland Security, and#34;National Security Threatsin Cyberspaceand#34; merican Bar Association Standing Committee on Law andNational Security And National Strategy Forum, September 2009, www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue2088.7/Jensen/fn137.Rosenwieg.pdf-http://www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue 88.7/Jensen/fn137.Rosenwieg.pdf)
Offensive dominance creates a great risk of cyber arms races. State and non-
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it came from a third party, could also  ignite a conflict.124

====Disproportionality====
Sanger 9 
(David E., and#34;U.S. Steps Up Effort on Digital Defensesand#34; April 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28cyber.html?pagewanted=all26_r=0-http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28cyber.html?pagewanted=all26_r=0)
In the rare case where the preparations for an attack are detected in a foreign
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senior Defense Department official said, and#34;and that’s a little bit dangerous.and#34;

c) Instant timeframe

Dycus 10, Professor of National Security Law,  Stephen is a Professor of national security law at Vermont Law School, former member of the National Academies committee on cyber warfare, LLM, Harvard University, LLB, BA, Southern Methodist University, and#34;Congress’ Role in Cyber Warfare,and#34; Journal of National Security Law 26 Policy, 4(1), 2010, p.161-164, http://www.jnslp.com/read/vol4no1/11_Dycus.pdf-http://www.jnslp.com/read/vol4no1/11_Dycus.pdf
In other ways, cyber weapons are critically different from their nuclear counterparts. For one thing, the time frame for response to a cyber attack might be much narrower. A nuclear weapon delivered by a land-based ICBM could take 30 minutes to reach its target. An electronic attack would arrive instantaneously, and leave no time to consult with or even inform anyone outside the executive branch before launching a counterstrike, if that were U.S. policy.

1AC – Alliances

Contention 2 is alliances

====Congressional oversight necessary for allied credibility— restoring legitimacy to OCOs is key to cyber coalitions====
Dunlap 12, Major General and Former Deputy Judge Advocate General
(Lawless Cyberwar? Not If You Want to Win, www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/law_national_security/patriot_debates2/the_book_online/ch9/ch9_ess2.html-http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/law_national_security/patriot_debates2/the_book_online/ch9/ch9_ess2.html)
Military commanders have seen the no-legal-limits movie before and they do
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impact on coalition support that the mere perception of American lawlessness can have.

The small concession of the plan is key — it increases key flexibility and secures cyberspace

Lord et al 11, Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security
(Kristin M., Travis Sharp is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is University Distinguished Service Professor at the Kennedy School of  Government at Harvard University. Mike McConnell is Executive Vice President of Booz Allen Hamilton and former Director of  National Intelligence and Director of the National Security Agency. Gary McGraw is Chief Technology Officer of Cigital, Inc., a software security consultancy, and  author of eight books on software security. Nathaniel Fick is Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security. Thomas G. Mahnken is Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security  at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced  International Studies. Gregory J. Rattray is a Partner at Delta Risk LLC and Senior Vice President for Security at BITS, the  technology policy division of The Financial Services Roundtable. Jason Healey is Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council and Executive  Director of the Cyber Conflict Studies Association. Martha Finnemore is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George  Washington University. David A. Gross is a Partner at Wiley Rein LLP and a former Ambassador and Coordinator for  International Communications and Information Policy at the State Department. Nova J. Daly is a Public Policy Consultant at Wiley Rein LLP and former Deputy Assistant Secretary  for Investment Security in the Office of International Affairs at the Treasury Department. M. Ethan Lucarelli is an Associate at Wiley Rein LLP. Roger H. Miksad is an Associate at Wiley Rein LLP. James A. Lewis is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the  Center for Strategic and International Studies. Richard Fontaine is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Will Rogers is a Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security. Christopher M. Schroeder is an Internet entrepreneur, Chief Executive Officer of HealthCentral.com  and a member of the Center for a New American Security’s board of advisors. Daniel E. Geer, Jr. is Chief Information Security Officer of In-Q-Tel, the independent investment firm  that identifies innovative technologies in support of the missions of the U.S. intelligence community. Robert E. Kahn is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation for National Research  Initiatives and co-inventor of the TCP/IP protocol that is the foundation of the modern Internet. Peter Schwartz is Co-Founder and Chairman of Global Business Network and a member of the  Center for a New American Security’s board of directors, and#34;America’s Cyber Future Security and Prosperity in the Information Age volume Iand#34; June 2011, http:// www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume20I_0.pdf-http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume I_0.pdf)
The United States should lead a broad, multi-stakeholder international cyber security coalition
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in a way that defends the nation without subverting what it stands for. 

Chinese anti-access capabilities critically depend on cyber — allied cooperation is key to counter them

Kazianis 12, Assistant Editor for The Diplomat and a non-resident fellow at the Pacific Forum
(Harry, and#34;A Plea for an Alliance-Based ’AirSeaCyber’ Joint Operational Conceptand#34; July 17, 2012, http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/article-a-plea-for-an-alliance-based-airseacyber-joint-operational-concept-108240342.html-http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/article-a-plea-for-an-alliance-based-airseacyber-joint-operational-concept-108240342.html)
In Pacific Forum’s PacNet ~2341 issue, Mihoko Matsubara correctly asserts that and#34;countering
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create a strong force multiplier effect and should be considered a top priority.

China’s rapidly modernizing its military for an A2AD strategy — that fuels territorial disputes

RTT 13, China’s Anti-access And Area-denial Capabilities Bolstered: Pentagon Report, http://www.rttnews.com/2111200/china-s-anti-access-and-area-denial-capabilities-bolstered-pentagon-report.aspx-http://www.rttnews.com/2111200/china-s-anti-access-and-area-denial-capabilities-bolstered-pentagon-report.aspx
A new report of the U.S. Defense Department says that China is
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and has other territorial disputes with regional neighbors in the South China Sea.

PLA doctrine proves Chinese aggression against Taiwan and the South China Sea are inevitable — A2AD is the linchpin of this capability

Yoshihara 10 (Dr. Toshi Yoshihara, Associate Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, former Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air War College, Ph.D. International Relations, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, M.A. International Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, B.S. International Relations, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and#34;Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Operational View from Beijing,and#34; Naval War College Review, 7-1-2010, (... denotes non-US-ASCII text omitted) http://www.faqs.org/periodicals/201007/2046727461.html-http://www.faqs.org/periodicals/201007/2046727461.html)
In recent years, defense analysts in the United States have substantially revised their estimates of China’s missile prowess. A decade ago, most observers rated Beijing’s ballistic missiles as inaccurate, blunt weapons limited to terrorizing civilian populations. Today, the emerging consensus within the U.S. strategic community is that China’s arsenal can inflict lethal harm with precision on a wide range of military targets, including ports and airfields. As a consequence, many observers have jettisoned previously sanguine net assessments that conferred decisive, qualitative advantages to Taiwan in the cross-strait military balance. Indeed, the debates on China’s coercive power and Taiwan’s apparent inability to resist such pressure have taken on a palpably fatalistic tone. A 2009 RAND monograph warns that China’s large, modern missile and air forces are likely to pose a virtually insurmountable challenge to Taiwanese and American efforts to command the air over the strait and the island. The authors of the report believe that massive ballistic-missile salvos launched against Taiwan’s air bases would severely hamper Taipei’s ability to generate enough fighter sorties to contest air superiority. They state: and#34;As China’s ability to deliver accurate fire across the strait grows, it is becoming increasingly difficult and soon may be impossible for the United States and Taiwan to protect the island’s military and civilian infrastructures from serious damage.and#34;1 As a result, the authors observe, and#34;China’s ability to suppress Taiwan and local U.S. air bases with ballistic and cruise missiles seriously threatens the defense’s ability to maintain control of the air over the strait.and#34;2 They further assert, and#34;The United States can no longer be confident of winning the battle for the air in the air. This represents a dramatic change from the first five-plus decades of the China- Taiwan confrontation.and#34;3 An unclassified Defense Intelligence Agency report assessing the state of Taiwan’s air defenses raises similar concerns. The study notes that Taiwanese fighter aircraft would be unable to take to the air in the absence of well-protected airfield runways, suggesting a major vulnerability to the island’s airpower. The agency further maintains that Taiwan’s capacity to endure missile attacks on runways and to repair them rapidly will determine the integrity of the island’s air-defense system.4 While the report withholds judgment on whether Taipei can maintain air superiority following Chinese missile strikes in a conflict scenario, a key constituent of the U.S. intelligence community clearly recognizes a growing danger to Taiwan’s defense. China’s missiles also threaten Taiwan’s ability to defend itself at sea. William Murray contends that China could sink or severely damage many of Taiwan’s warships docked at naval piers with salvos of ballistic missiles. He argues that and#34;the Second Artillery’s ~China’s strategic missile command’s~ expanding inventory of increasingly accurate ~short-range ballistic missiles~ probably allows Beijing to incapacitate much of Taiwan’s navy and to ground or destroy large portions of the air force in a surprise missile assault and follow-on barrages.and#34;5 These are stark, sobering conclusions. Equally troubling is growing evidence that China has turned its attention to Japan, home to some of the largest naval and air bases in the world. Beijing has long worried about Tokyo’s potential role in a cross-strait conflagration. In particular, Chinese analysts chafe at the apparent American freedom to use the Japanese archipelago as a springboard to intervene in a Taiwan contingency. In the past, China kept silent on what the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would do in response to Japanese logistical support of U.S. military operations. Recent PLA publications, in contrast, suggest that the logic of missile coercion against Taiwan could be readily applied to U.S. forward presence in Japan. The writings convey a high degree of confidence that China’s missile forces could compel Tokyo to limit American use of naval bases while selectively destroying key facilities on those bases. These doctrinal developments demand close attention from Washington and Tokyo, lest the transpacific alliance be caught flat-footed in a future crisis with Beijing. This article is a first step toward better understanding how the Chinese evaluate the efficacy of  missile coercion against American military targets in Japan. This article focuses narrowly on Chinese assessments of U.S. naval bases in Japan, excluding the literature on such other key locations as the Kadena and Misawa air bases. The writings on the American naval presence are abundant and far more extensive than studies on the land and air components of U.S. basing arrangements. The dispatch of two carrier battle groups to Taiwan’s vicinity during the 1996 cross-strait crisis stimulated Beijing’s reevaluation of its military strategy toward the island. Not surprisingly, the Chinese are obsessed with the U.S. aircraft carrier, including the facilities and bases that support its operations. It is against this rich milieu that this study explores how the Chinese conceive their missile strategy to complicate American use of military bases along the Japanese archipelago. This article first explores the reasons behind Beijing’s interest in regional bases and surveys the Chinese literature on the U.S. naval presence in Japan to illustrate the amount of attention being devoted to the structure of American military power in Asia. Chinese analysts see U.S. dependence on a few locations for power projection as a major vulnerability. Second, it turns to Chinese doctrinal publications, which furnish astonishing details as to how the PLA might employ ballistic missiles to complicate or deny U.S. use of Japanese port facilities. Chinese defense planners place substantial faith in the coercive value of missile tactics. Third, the article assesses China’s conventional theater ballistic missiles that would be employed against U.S. regional bases. Fourth, it critiques the Chinese writings, highlighting some faulty assumptions about the anticipated effects of missile coercion. Finally, the study identifies some key operational dilemmas that the U.S.-Japanese alliance would likely encounter in a PLA missile campaign. EXPLAINING CHINA’S INTEREST IN REGIONAL BASES Taiwan remains the animating force behind China’s strategic calculus with respect to regional bases in Asia. Beijing’s inability to respond to the display of U.S. naval power at the height of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis proved highly embarrassing. There is evidence that the PLA had difficulty in monitoring the movement of the two carrier battle groups, much less in offering its civilian leaders credible military options in response to the carrier presence. This galling experience steeled Beijing’s resolve to preclude U.S. naval deployments near Taiwan in a future crisis. Notably, the Yokosuka-based USS Independence (CV 62) was the first carrier to arrive at the scene in March 1996, cementing Chinese expectations that Washington would dispatch a carrier from Japan in a contingency over Taiwan. Beyond Taiwan, other territorial disputes along China’s nautical periphery could involve U.S. naval intervention. A military crisis arising from conflicting Sino-Japanese claims over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands northwest of Taiwan could compel an American reaction. While doubts linger in some Japanese policy circles as to whether foreign aggression against the islands would trigger Washington’s defense commitments as stipulated by the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, joint allied exercises and war games since 2006 suggest that the U.S. military is closely watching events in the East China Sea. Farther south, Chinese territorial claims over large swaths of the South China Sea could also be sources of regional tensions. If a local tussle there escalated into a larger conflagration that threatened international shipping, the U.S. Navy might be ordered to maintain freedom of navigation. In both scenarios, the U.S. carrier based in Japan and other strike groups operating near Asian waters would be called upon as first responders. Concrete territorial disputes that have roiled Asian stability are not the only reasons that American naval power would sortie from regional bases to the detriment of Chinese interests. More abstract and esoteric dynamics may be at work. For example, Chinese leaders fret about the so-called Malacca dilemma. China’s heavy dependence on seaborne energy supplies that transit the Malacca Strait has set off Chinese speculation that the United States might seek to blockade that maritime choke point to coerce Beijing.6 This insecurity stems less from judgments about the possibility or feasibility of such a naval blockade than from the belief that a great power like China should not entrust its energy security to the fickle goodwill of the United States. If the U.S. Navy were ever called upon to fulfill an undertaking of such magnitude, forward basing in Asia would undoubtedly play a pivotal role in sustaining what could deteriorate into a protracted blockade operation. Chinese analysts have also expressed a broader dissatisfaction with America’s self-appointed role as the guardian of the seas. Sea-power advocates have vigorously pushed for a more expansive view of China’s prerogatives along the maritime periphery of the mainland. They bristle at the U.S. Navy’s apparent presumption of the right to command any parcel of the ocean on earth, including areas that China considers its own nautical preserves. Some take issue with the 2007 U.S. maritime strategy, a policy document that baldly states, and#34;We will be able to impose local sea control wherever necessary, ideally in concert with friends and allies, but by ourselves if we must.and#34;7 Lu Rude, a former professor at Dalian Naval Academy, cites this passage as evidence of U.S. and#34;hegemonic thinking.and#34; He concludes, and#34;Clearly, what is behind ’cooperation’ is America’s interests, having ’partners or the participation of allies’ likewise serves America’s global interests.and#34;8 Some Chinese, then, object to the very purpose of U.S. sea power in Asia, which relies on a constellation of regional bases for its effects to be felt (see map). Long-standing regional flash points and domestic expectations of a more assertive China as it goes to sea suggest that Beijing’s grudging acceptance of U.S. forward presence could be eroding even more quickly than once thought. Against this backdrop of increasing Chinese ambivalence toward American naval power, U.S. basing arrangements in Japan have come into sharper focus. CHINESE VIEWS OF U.S. NAVAL BASES IN JAPAN Some Chinese strategists appraise Washington’s military posture in the Asia-Pacific region in stark geopolitical terms. Applying the and#34;defense perimeter of the Pacificand#34; logic elaborated by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the early Cold War, they see their na - tion enclosed by concentric, layered and#34;island chains.and#34; The United States and its allies, they argue, can encircle China or blockade the Chinese mainland from island strongholds, where powerful naval expeditionary forces are based. Analysts who take such a view conceive of the island chains in various ways. Yu Yang and Qi Xiaodong, for example, describe U.S. basing architecture in Asia as a and#34;three line configuration ~...~.and#34;9 The first line stretches in a sweeping arc from Japan and South Korea to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, forming a and#34;zone of forward bases~...~.and#34; This broad notion that the U.S. presence in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean constitutes a seamless, interlocking set of bases is widely shared in Chinese strategic circles.10 The second line connects Guam and Australia. The last line of bases runs north from Hawaii through Midway to the Aleutians, terminating at Alaska. While these island chains may bear little resemblance to actual U.S. thinking and planning, that the Chinese pay such attention to the geographic structure of American power in Asia is quite notable. These observers discern a cluster of mutually supporting bases, ports, and access points along these island chains. Among the networks of bases in the western Pacific, those located on the Japanese archipelago-the northern anchor of the first island chain-stand out, for the Chinese. Modern Navy, a monthly journal published by the Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, produced a seven-part series on Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force in 2004 and 2005. Notably, it devoted an entire article to Japan’s main naval bases, including Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kure, and Maizuru.11 The depth of the coverage of these bases is rather remarkable, especially when compared to the sparse reporting on similar topics in the United States and in Japan. Perhaps no other place captures the Chinese imagination as much as Yokosuka, which analysts portray as the centerpiece of U.S. basing in Asia.12 One analysis depicts a and#34;Northeast Asian base group ~...~and#34; radiating outward from Yokosuka to Sasebo, Pusan, and Chinhae.13 Writers provide a wide range of details about the Yokosuka naval base, including its precise location, the surrounding geography, the number of piers (particularly those suitable for aircraft carriers), the types and number of maintenance facilities, and the storage capacity of munitions, fuel, and other supply depots.14 Wu Jian, for instance, finds the geographic features of Yokosuka comparable to those of Dalian, a major base of the Chinese navy’s North Sea Fleet.15 Beyond physical similarities, Yokosuka evokes unpleasant memories for the Chinese. One commentator recalls the U.S. transfer of 203 mm heavy artillery from Yokosuka to Nationalist forces on Jinmen during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis.16 Tracking more recent events, another observer notes that the Kitty Hawk Strike Group’s deployments from Yokosuka to waters near Taiwan invariably coincided with the presidential elections on the island, in 2000, 2004, and 2008.17 As Pei Huai opines, and#34;Yokosuka has all along irritated the nerves of the Chinese people.and#34;18 Moreover, Chinese analysts are keenly aware of Yokosuka’s strategic position. As Du Chaoping asserts: Yokosuka is the U.S. Navy’s main strategic point of concentration and deployment in the Far East and is the ideal American stronghold for employing maritime forces in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions. A carrier deployed there is akin to the sharpest dagger sheathed in the Western Pacific by the U.S. Navy. It can control the East Asian mainland to the west and it can enter the Indian Ocean to the southwest to secure Malacca, Hormuz, and other important thoroughfares.19 Ma Haiyang concurs: The Yokosuka base controls the three straits of Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima and the sea and air transit routes in the Indian Ocean. As the key link in the and#34;island chain,and#34; it can support ground operations on the Korean Peninsula and naval operations in the Western Pacific. It can support combat in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions while monitoring and controlling the wide sea areas of the Indian Ocean. Its strategic position is extremely important.20 It is notable that both Du and Ma conceive of Yokosuka as a central hub that tightly links the Pacific and Indian oceans into an integrated theater of operations. Intriguingly, some Chinese commentators view Yokosuka as the front line of the U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation on missile defense. They worry that Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) systems based in Yokosuka could erode China’s nuclear deterrent. Indeed, analysts see concentrations of sea-based BMD capabilities falling roughly along the three island chains described above. Ren Dexin describes Yokosuka as the first line of defense against ballistic missiles, while Pearl Harbor and San Diego provide additional layers.21 Yokosuka is evocatively portrayed as the and#34;forward battlefield positionand#34; (...), the indispensable vanguard for the sea-based BMD architecture.22 For some Chinese, these concentric rings or picket lines of sea power appear tailored specifically to bring down ballistic missiles fired across the Pacific from locations as diverse as the Korean Peninsula, 1mainland China, India, or even Iran.23 Specifically, Aegis ships in Yokosuka, Pearl Harbor, and San Diego would be positioned to shoot down missiles in their boost, midcourse, and terminal phases, respectively.24 Chinese observers pay special attention to Aegis deployments along the first island chain. Some believe that Aegis ships operating in the Yellow, East, and South China seas would be able to monitor the launch of any long-range ballistic missile deployed in China’s interior and perhaps to intercept the vehicle in its boost phase. Dai Yanli warns, and#34;Clearly, if Aegis systems are successfully deployed around China’s periphery, then there is the possibility that China’s ballistic missiles would be destroyed over their launch points.and#34;25 Ji Yanli, of the Beijing Aerospace Long March Scientific and Technical Information Institute, concurs: and#34;If such ~seabased BMD~ systems begin deployment in areas such as Japan or Taiwan, the effectiveness of China’s strategic power and theater ballistic-missile capabilities would weaken tremendously, severely threatening national security.and#34;26 Somewhat problematically, the authors seemingly assume that Beijing would risk its strategic forces by deploying them closer to shore, and they forecast a far more capable Aegis fleet than is technically possible in the near term. The indispensability of the ship-repair and maintenance facilities at Yokosuka emerges as another common theme in the Chinese literature. Analysts in China often note that Yokosuka is the only base west of Hawaii that possesses the wherewithal to handle major carrier repairs. Some have concluded that Yokosuka is irreplaceable as long as alternative sites for a large repair station remain unavailable. Li Daguang, a professor at China’s National Defense University and a frequent commentator on naval affairs, casts doubt on Guam as a potential candidate, observing that the island lacks the basic infrastructure and economies of scale to service carriers.27 China’s Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships) published a translated article from a Japanese military journal, Gunji Kenkyu (Japan Military Review), to illustrate the physical limits of Guam as a permanent home port for carriers.28 Chinese analysts also closely examine Sasebo, the second-largest naval base in Japan. Various commentators call attention to its strategic position near key sea-lanes and its proximity to China.29 As Yu Fan notes, and#34;This base is a large-scale naval base closest to our country. Positioned at the intersection of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan, it guards the southern mouth of the Korea Strait. This has very important implications for controlling the nexus of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan and for blockading the Korea Strait.and#34;30 It is clear, then, that Chinese strategists recognize the importance of U.S. naval bases in Japan for fulfilling a range of regional and extraregional responsibilities. Indeed, some believe that the American strategic position in Asia hinges entirely on ready military access to bases on the Japanese islands. Tian Wu argues that without bases in Japan, U.S. forces would have to fall back to Guam or Hawaii. Tian bluntly asserts: If the U.S. military was ever forced to withdraw from Okinawa and Japan, then it would be compelled to retreat thousands of kilometers to set up defenses on the second island chain. Not only would it lose tremendous strategic defensive depth, but it would also lose the advantageous conditions for conducting littoral operations along the East Asian mainland while losing an important strategic relay station to support operations in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East through the South China Sea.31 This emerging discourse offers several clues about Beijing’s calculus in regard to U.S. naval basing arrangements in Japan. Chinese strategists see these bases as collectively representing both a threat to Chinese interests and a critical vulnerability for the United States. Bases in Japan are the most likely locations from which the United States would sortie sea power in response to a contingency over Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese are acutely aware of the apparent American dependence on a few bases to project power. Should access to and use of these bases be denied for political or military reasons, they reason, Washington’s regional strategy could quickly unravel. While the commentaries documented above are by no means authoritative in the official sense, they are clearly designed to underscore the strategic value and the precariousness of U.S. forward presence in Japan. U.S. BASES IN JAPAN AND CHINESE MISSILE STRATEGY Authoritative PLA documents correlate with this emerging consensus that U.S. bases on the Japanese home islands merit close attention in strategic and operational terms. Indeed, Chinese doctrinal writings clearly indicate that the American presence in Japan would likely be the subject of attack if the United States were to intervene in a cross-strait conflict. The unprecedented public availability of primary sources in China in recent years has opened a window onto Chinese strategic thought, revealing a genuinely competitive intellectual environment that has substantially advanced Chinese debates on military affairs. This growing literature has also improved the West’s understanding of the PLA. In an effort to maximize this new openness in China, this article draws upon publications closely affiliated with the PLA, including those of the prestigious Academy of Military Science and the National Defense University, that address coercive campaigns against regional bases in Asia.32 Some are widely cited among Western military analysts as authoritative works that reflect current PLA thinking. Some likely enjoy official sanction as doctrinal guidance or educational material for senior military commanders. The authors of the studies are high-ranking PLA officers who are either leading thinkers in strategic affairs and military operations or boast substantial operational and command experience. These works, then, collectively provide a sound starting point for examining how regional bases in Asia might fit into Chinese war planning. Among this literature, The Science of Military Strategy stands out in Western strategic circles as an authoritative PLA publication. The authors, Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, advocate an indirect approach to fighting and prevailing against a superior adversary in and#34;future local wars under high-technology conditions.and#34;33 To win, the PLA must seek to avoid or bypass the powerful field forces of the enemy while attacking directly the vulnerable rear echelons and command structures that support frontline units. Using the human body as an evocative metaphor for the adversary, Peng and Yao argue, and#34;As compared with dismembering the enemy’s body step by step, destroying his brain and central nerve system is more meaningful for speeding up the course of the war.and#34;34 To them, the brain and the central nervous system of a war machine are those principal directing and coordinating elements without which the fighting forces wither or collapse. The aim, then, is to conduct offensive operations against the primary sources of the enemy’s military power, what the authors term the and#34;operational system.and#34; They declare, and#34;After launching the war, we should try our best to fight against the enemy as far away as possible, to lead the war to enemy’s operational base, even to his source of war, and to actively strike all the effective strength forming the enemy’s war system.and#34;35 In their view, operational systems that manage command and control and logistics (satellites, bases, etc.), are the primary targets; they relegate tactical platforms that deliver firepower (warships, fighters, etc.) to a secondary status. To illustrate the effects of striking the source of the enemy’s fighting power, Peng and Yao further argue: To shake the stability of enemy’s war system so as to paralyze his war capabilities has already become the core of the contest between the two sides in the modern hightech local war. So, more attention should be paid to striking crushing blows against the enemy’s structure of the operational system . . . especially those vulnerable points which are not easy to be replaced or revived, so as to make the enemy’s operational system seriously unbalanced and lose initiative in uncontrollable disorder.36 The authors are remarkably candid about what constitutes the enemy’s operational system. Particularly relevant to this study is their assertion that the supply system emerges as a primary target: The future operational center of gravity should not be placed on the direct confrontation with the enemy’s assault systems. We should persist in taking the information system and support system as the targets of first choice throughout. . . . In regard to the supply system, we should try our best to strike the enemy on the ground, cut the material flow of his efficacy sources so as to achieve the effect of taking away the firewood from the caldron.37 Destruction of the supply system in effect asphyxiates the adversary. In order to choke off the enemy’s capacity to wage war, Peng and Yao contend, a and#34;large part of the supply systems must be destroyed.and#34;38 Their prescriptions for winning local high-tech wars suggest that the horizontal escalation of a conflict to U.S. regional bases in Asia is entirely thinkable. Even more troubling, some Chinese appear to envision the application of substantial firepower to pummel the U.S. forward presence. While The Science of Military Strategy should not be treated as official strategic guidance to the PLA, its conceptions of future conflict with a technologically superior adversary provide a useful framework for thinking about what a Chinese missile campaign against regional bases might entail. There is substantial evidence in Chinese doctrinal writings that PLA defense planners anticipate the possibility of a sizable geographic expansion of the target set, to include U.S. forward presence in East Asia. Although the documents do not explicitly refer to naval bases in Japan, they depict scenarios strongly suggesting that Yokosuka is a primary target. In the hypothetical contingencies posited in these writings, U.S. intervention is a critical premise, if not a given. In particular, Chinese planners expect Washington to order the deployment of carrier strike groups near China’s coast, a prospect that deeply vexes Beijing. It is in this context of a highly stressful (though by no means inconceivable) scenario that U.S. military bases come into play in Chinese operational thinking. For PLA planners, the primary aims are to deter, disrupt, or disable the employment of carriers at the point of origin, namely, the bases from which carriers would sortie. Given the limited capability, range, and survivability of China’s air and sea power, most studies foresee the extensive use of long-range conventional ballistic missiles to achieve key operational objectives against U.S. forward presence. In Intimidation Warfare, Zhao Xijun proposes several novel missile tactics that could be employed to deter the use of naval bases in times of crisis or war.39 Zhao proposes demonstration shots into sea areas near the enemy state to compel the opponent to back down. Zhao explains, and#34;Close-in (near border) intimidation strikes involve firing ballistic missiles near enemy vessels or enemy states (or in areas and sea areas of enemy-occupied islands). It is a method designed to induce the enemy to feel that it would suffer an unbearable setback if it stubbornly pursues an objective, and thus abandons certain actions.and#34;40 One tactic that Zhao calls a and#34;pincer, close-in intimidation strikeand#34; is particularly relevant to missile options against U.S. military bases. Zhao elaborates: and#34;Pincer close-in intimidation strikes entail the firing of ballistic missiles into the sea areas (or land areas) near at least two important targets on enemy-occupied islands (or in enemy states). This enveloping attack, striking the enemy’s head and tail such that the enemy’s attention is pulled in both directions, would generate tremendous psychological shock.and#34;41 Zhao also proposes an and#34;island over-flight attackand#34; as a variation of the pincer strike. He states: For high-intensity intimidation against an entrenched enemy on an island, an island over-flight attack employs conventional ballistic missiles with longer range and superior penetration capabilities to pass over the enemy’s important cities and other strategic targets to induce the enemy to sense psychologically that a calamity will descend from the sky. This method could produce unexpected effects.42 While these missile tactics are primarily aimed at coercing Taiwan, they could also, in theory, be applied to any island nation. Reminiscent of the 1996 crossstrait crisis, the PLA could splash single or multiple ballistic missiles into waters near Yokosuka (shot across Honshu Island, over major metropolitan cities) in the hopes that an intimidated leadership in Tokyo would stay out of a contingency over Taiwan, deny American access to military facilities, or restrict U.S. use of naval bases in Japan. Should deterrence through intimidation fail, the Chinese may seek to complicate U.S. naval operations originating from bases located in the Japanese home islands. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, the most authoritative work on the PLA’s strategic rocket forces, furnishes astonishingly vivid details on the conditions under which China might seek to conduct conventional missile operations against outside intervention.43 

Taiwan crisis is imminent and causes nuclear war — it’s the most probable

Colby et al 13, Elbridgc A. Colby. cochair, is a principal analyst and drvison lead for global strategic affairs at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). where he focuses on strateg deterrence, nuclear weapons, and related issues. Previously, he served as policy adviser to the secretary of defense’s representative for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, as an expert adviser to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, as a staff member on the President’s Commission on the Intdhgcnce Capa biLities of the US. Regarding WMD. and in a number of other government positions. Mr. Colby also serves or has served as a consultant to a number of U.S government bodies. He publishes and speaks regularly on strategic issues in the United States. Europe, and Asia. Mr. Colby is a graduate of Harvard College and Yale Law School and is a member of the Council on Foreign Rdations (term) and of the International Institute of Strategic Studies Abraham M. Denmark. cochair. is vice president for political and security affairs at the National Bure-au of Asian Research (NBR) and is an Asia-Pacific security adviser at the Center for Naval Analyses. He manages NBR research programs, dialogues, projects, and initiatives reLated to po. litical and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. He has experience both inside and outside of government, having previously worked as a fellow at the Center for a New American Security and as country director for China affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Deknse. Mr. Denmark holds an MA. in international security from the Josef Korbel Schoel of International Studies at the University of Denver and has studied at China’s Foreign Atfairs University and Peking Universit, Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations, http://csis.org/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf-http://csis.org/files/publication/130307_Colby_USChinaNuclear_Web.pdf
Taiwan.  Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict
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of U.S. defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.

So does conflict over the South China Sea

Rehman 13, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Iskander Rehman was an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow. His research focuses on security and crisis stability in Asia, specifically the geopolitical ramifications of naval nuclearization in the Indian Ocean, 3/9/13, Dragon in a Bathtub: Chinese Nuclear Submarines and the South China Sea, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/09/dragon-in-bathtub-chinese-nuclear-submarines-and-south-china-sea/fpjl-http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/09/dragon-in-bathtub-chinese-nuclear-submarines-and-south-china-sea/fpjl
Despite America’s best efforts to construct stronger ties with China, relations in-between
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is also rapidly morphing into one of the world’s most sensitive nuclear hotspots.

North Korea collapse inevitable – causes global nuclear war

Gompert 13, Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the United States Naval Academy
(David C., He was Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence in the first Obama administration, and has served as a senior official in several prior administrations and as a senior business executive, and#34;North Korea: Preparing for the Endand#34; Survival, Vol. 55 No. 3, July 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.802849)
In considering scenarios for collapse, one place to start is with food – or
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Korea and the United States would work any better than a compromising one.

====Allied cyber operations with South Korea key to prevent escalation====
Gompert 13, Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the United States Naval Academy
(David C., He was Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence in the first Obama administration, and has served as a senior official in several prior administrations and as a senior business executive, and#34;North Korea: Preparing for the Endand#34; Survival, Vol. 55 No. 3, July 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2013.802849)
As already noted, the political aims that US military action should serve are to
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Korea, China and, of course, North Korea) as variable.

1AC — Solvency

The plan solves –

====Establishes Congressional notifications – it’s the perfect middle ground====
Lorber 13, JD candidate at UPenn and PhD candidate at Duke
(Eric, EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?, www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013)
Should these statutes be adjusted (or new ones created) that give Congress additional
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and other nations develop and employ these capabilities with ever-greater frequency.

This is key –

First, norm-setting — all eyes are on the U.S. —other countries model our use of OCOs — clear restrictions on use are essential

Bradbury 11, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel
(Steven, The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Vol.-2_Bradbury_Final1.pdf-http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Vol.-2_Bradbury_Final1.pdf)
Evolving customary law. This approach also accommodates the reality that how the U.
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norms. I think that’s the way we should want it to work.

Norms are essential to solve — they can’t be created unless OCOs are addressed

Goldsmith 10, Professor of Law at Harvard, Can we stop the Cyber Arms Race, Jack Goldsmith teaches at Harvard Law School and is on the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and Law. He was a member of a 2009 National Academies committee that issued the report and#34;Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities-http://www.anagram.com/berson/nrcoiw.pdf.and#34;, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-01/opinions/36895669_1_botnets-cyber-attacks-computer-attacks-http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-01/opinions/36895669_1_botnets-cyber-attacks-computer-attacks
In a speech this month on and#34;Internet freedom-http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm,and#34; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
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arms race in an arena where the offense already has a natural advantage.

====It’s reverse causal — lack of norms guarantee escalatory conflict — the U.S. is key====
Lewis 11, Senior Fellow at CSIS (James Andrew, Confidence-building and international agreement in cybersecurity, citizenlab.org/cybernorms2012/Lewis2011.pdf)
Alternatives to a formal cyber treaty began to appear as early as 2008. Rejecting
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which states might concede a degree of sovereignty in exchange for greater security.

Second it solves perception — Congressionally initiated restriction is necessary to reverse the signal of independent presidential authority— now is key

Dycus 10, Professor of National Security Law Stephen is a Professor of national security law at Vermont Law School, former member of the National Academies committee on cyber warfare, LLM, Harvard University, LLB, BA, Southern Methodist University, and#34;Congress’ Role in Cyber Warfare,and#34; Journal of National Security Law 26 Policy, 4(1), 2010, p.161-164, http://www.jnslp.com/read/vol4no1/11_Dycus.pdf-http://www.jnslp.com/read/vol4no1/11_Dycus.pdf
In his celebrated concurring opinion in The Steel Seizure Case, Justice Jackson cautioned that
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in order to be able to participate in the formulation of national policy.

Congressional restrictions on OCOs send a global signal of cyber leadership that solves reckless use of OCOs

Bastby 12, Chairwoman of the American Bar Association’s Privacy and Computer Crime Committee (Judy, CEO of Global Cyber Risk, and#34;U.S. Administration’s Reckless Cyber Policy Puts Nation at Riskand#34; June 4, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/06/04/u-s-administrations-reckless-cyber-policy-puts-nation-at-risk/2/-http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/06/04/u-s-administrations-reckless-cyber-policy-puts-nation-at-risk/2/)
Perhaps more important than being out of the cyber coordination loop, is the how
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put our nation at risk and demonstrates cyber irresponsiblity, not cyber leadership.

Congress must initiate the restriction — anything else is perceived as abdication

Hansen 26 Friedman 9, Professors at the New England School of Law, (Victor and Lawrence, The Case for Congress: Separation of Powers and the War on Terror, p.130)
The problem, of course, is that much of this congressional involvement has come
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more difficult for Congress to stand up to an assertive and aggressive president.

1AC — Plan

Plan: The legislative branch of the United States federal government should prohibit offensive cyber operations about which Congress has not been notified.

Tournament: USC | Round: 3 | Opponent: Vanderbilt SW | Judge: Gordon, Ross

2AC Congress CP

Doesn’t solve legitimacy –

a) Stable interp – US structures unique for credibility, stability of law key because countries know they can rely on them, that’s Sidhu and Knowles

b) Accountability - uniquely accessible because its seen as an avenue for countries to lodge complaints against the US, that’s Knowles

Doesn’t solve democracy –

a) Deference – k2 restore balance between executive and counters view of judicial irrelevance, otherwise risks new states taking over their judiciaries, becomes authoritarian and prevents stable transition. That’s Milko, CJA, and Vaughn

b) Modelling – translational judiciary conferences and networks means only the judiciary is perceived by foreign governments, that encourages judicial independence, that’s Suto and Kersch

Legislative action fails—isn’t globalized and doesn’t check the executive

Flaherty 11, Professor of International Law
~2011, Martin S. Flaherty is a Leitner Professor of International Law, Fordham Law School; Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, "Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11", 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 119~
2. Legislative Globalization This pro-executive conclusion becomes even harder to resist given
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matter of rights protection must remain the courts. ~*143~ 3.

Perm do both—solves the NB because Obama will be seen as taking the lead

Perm do the CP

CP doesn’t solve and links to the net-benefit- Congressional statues would be reviewed by the Supreme Court, but wouldn’t be effective and would take years to solidify

Eviatar 10 (Daphne- Senior Associate in Human Rights First’s Law and Security Program, June 10, "Judges to Congress: Don’t Legislate Indefinite Detention", http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daphne-eviatar/judges-to-congress-dont-l_b_607801.html)
For months now, certain commentators and legislators have been arguing that Congress needs to
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they say they’re after: a clear and reliable statement of the law.

Tournament: Gonzaga | Round: 4 | Opponent: ASU RV | Judge: Christian Bato

2AC Court Capital DA

Multiple controversies thump—the Court is taking an activist stance

Blum 9-5 (Bill, 9-5-13, "Supreme Court Preview: A Storm Is on the Horizon" Truth Dig) www.truthdig.com/report/page2/supreme_court_preview_a_storm_is_on_the_horizon_20130905/
They’re b-a-c-k21 As the war clouds gather over
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or both cases stand a strong chance of being added to the docket. 

Capital is bulletproof

Gibson 12 (James L. Gibson, Sidney W. Souers Professor of Government (Department of Political Science), Professor of African and African-American Studies, and Director of the Program on Citizenship and Democratic Values (Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy) at Washington University in St. Louis; and Fellow at the Centre for Comparative and International Politics and Professor Extraordinary in Political Science at Stellenbosch University (South Africa), 7/15/12, "Public Reverence for the United States Supreme Court: Is the Court Invincible?", http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107587-http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2107587)
Political scientists and legal scholars continue to be obsessed with the so-called countermajoritarian
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Court may be one of the most legitimate high courts in the world. 

====Public supports the plan====
Reuters 13 (Quoting John McCain, Republican Senator, 6-9-13, "Support growing to close Guantanamo prison: senator" Reuters) www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/09/us-usa-obama-guantanamo-idUSBRE9580BL20130609
Republican Senator John McCain said on Sunday there is increasing public support for closing the
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symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law."

That boosts legitimacy

Durr et al 2K (Robert, "Ideological Divergence and Public Support for the Supreme Court,", American Journal of Political Science, Volume 44, No. 4, October, p. 775)
We expect our improve measure of aggregate Supreme Court support will be useful to other
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proclamations, necessarily carried out by other actors and institutions (Caldeira 1986). 

Judges don’t consider capital when deciding.

Landau, JD Harvard and clerk to US CoA judge, 2005
(David Landau, JD Harvard Law, clerk to Honorable Sandra L. Lynch, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,  2005, "THE TWO DISCOURSES IN COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: A NEW APPROACH TO MODELING JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR IN LATIN AMERICA" 37 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 687)
Theoretically, attitudinalists could argue that judges rule in accordance with their own ideological preferences
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, what matters is the outcome, not the reasoning of the case.

Tournament: Gonzaga | Round: 4 | Opponent: ASU RV | Judge: Christian Bato

2AC Executive DA

Our internal link outweighs—hegemonic stability is based on security guarantees and trade relationships fostered by the US—ensuring the durability of that system depends states’ acceptance of the hegemon’s role—maintaining the order through military power alone exhausts resources and lead to counterbalancing

Our evidence is comparative—the hegemonic model reduces the need for executive branch flexibility, and the institutional competence terrain shifts toward the courts—because a governance in a hegemonic system depends on voluntary acquiescence, the courts are critical

Their DA relies on an outmoded theory of IR—prefer the turn

Knowles 9 ~Spring, 2009, Robert Knowles is a Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, "American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution", ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87~
How should the balance of power in the world affect the separation of powers under
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realist balancing, they cannot, in most situations, justify special deference.

Defer to rejecting deference—if the court overreaching, Congress can fill in and ensure executive authority, but there’s no comparable check on executive overreaching—star this argument

Jinks and Katyal 7 ~April, 2007, Derek Jinks is Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. Neal Kumar Katyal is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, "Disregarding Foreign Relations Law", 116 Yale L.J. 1230~

Courts say that the nation must speak in "one voice" in its foreign
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domains. These themes merit some elaboration.¶ Exigency does not compel a rejection

n of the status quo. Indeed, Posner and Sunstein’s article is not concerned
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striking and provides a lopsided view of what would happen under their proposal.

There’s no impact even if a Court messes up foreign policy

Knowles 9 ~Spring, 2009, Robert Knowles is an Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, "American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution", ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87~
But there are limits. Although speed matters a great deal during crises, its
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.S. government to "speak in different voices" at once.

Tournament: Gonzaga | Round: 1 | Opponent: Puget Sound BQ | Judge: Ryan Cheek

2AC Framework

The role of the ballot is to decide between a plan or a competitive policy option
It creates relevant strategies for change that are predictable and allow the aff to get offense against
The alternative isn’t a relevant consideration to whether the plan’s action should occur — voting issue, only opportunity costs should be evaluated to teach cost-benefit analysis
And, debating about the aff is key to solve it—we must keep Guantanamo in the public consciousness in order to organize effective strategies
Cole 12, Professor of Law
~2012, David Cole is a Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, "Legal Affairs: Dreyfus, Guantanamo, and the Foundation of the Rule of Law, 29 Touro L. Rev. 43~
Moreover, while district courts exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction initially ruled in favor of the
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values of the Constitution, the rule of law, and human rights.

Working within the government key – their alt fails 
McClean 01 SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY – GRADUATE AND PHILOSOPHER – NYU, "THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE", http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/200120Conference/Discussion20papers/david_mcclean.htm~~
Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury
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critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

Case outweighs
Hegemony – statistics and empirics prove most peaceful, necessary create institutions and interconnectedness
Democracy – standards of rights and norms. New democracies = torture and detain based on US, plan k2 establish territorial peace spills over

Wight

Analysis of social institutions key – larger structures
Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6
(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50 

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as
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upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

Owen

No prior questions—focus on critical theory makes it impossible to describe the world and act
David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton,  Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7
Commenting on the ’philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ’~a~
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the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

2AC Extinction 1st

Moral equality means even a small risk of preventing extinction outweighs structural violence—this answers their probability argument
*people shouldn’t be valued more just because they exist close to us in time
Bostrom, 2012 (Mar 6, Nick, director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Gannon Award, "We’re Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction," interview with Ross Andersen, freelance writer in D.C., http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/-http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)
Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity’s existing problems
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eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

2AC Guantanamo Good

Litigation matters – brings public authority

Lobel 4, Professor of Law
~December 2004, Jules Lobel is a Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School, "Courts as Forums for Protest", 52 UCLA L. Rev. 477~
~*556~ I conclude with a discussion of the litigation brought on behalf of
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society and governmental actors to remedy an injustice which otherwise will continue unchecked.

Even when the court gets it wrong, mobilization matters
Lobel 4, Professor of Law
~December 2004, Jules Lobel is a Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School, "Courts as Forums for Protest", 52 UCLA L. Rev. 477~
Important, recent work by social scientists raises questions about both the traditional legal model
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the case, and eventually reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 

2AC Drone DA

Drone strikes are inevitable—any wind-downs are only rhetoric
Mazzetti and Landler 8/2
~08/02/13, Mark Mazzetti and Mark Landler, "Despite Administration Promises, Few Signs of Change in Drone Wars", http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/us/politics/drone-war-rages-on-even-as-administration-talks-about-ending-it.html?pagewanted=all26_r=0~~
WASHINGTON — There were more drone strikes in Pakistan last month than any month since
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Pakistan," Mr. Zenko said, "or Yemen for that matter."

The aff only maintains the effectiveness of Boumediene—that doesn’t result in targeted killings
Vladeck 12 ~10/01/12, Professor Stephen I. Vladeck of the Washington College of Law at American University, "Detention Policies: What Role for Judicial Review?", http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/detention_policies_what_role_for_judicial_review/-http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/detention_policies_what_role_for_judicial_review/)~~

The short chapter that follows aims to take Judge Brown’s suggestion seriously. As I
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Judge Brown to identify "take no prisoners" as Boumediene’s true legacy. 

No tradeoff
Robert Chesney 11, Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at the UT School of Law as well as a non-resident Senior Fellow at Brookings, "Examining the Evidence of a Detention-Drone Strike Tradeoff", October 17, www.lawfareblog.com/2011/10/examining-the-evidence-of-a-detention-drone-strike-tradeoff/
Yesterday Jack linked to this piece by Noah Feldman, which among other things advances
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detention versus targeting, but something much more complex and difficult to measure.

Drone arms race inevitable  
USA Today 13
(1/9, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/08/experts-drones-basis-for-new-global-arms-race/1819091/, "Experts: Drones basis for new global arms race")
The success of U.S. drones in Iraq and Afghanistan has triggered a
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used to target terrorist leaders with missiles that are fired from miles away.

Executive Circumvention 2AC

No circumvention –
a) strategy
Stimson 9
~09/25/09, Cully Stimson is a senior legal fellow at the Heritage Foundation and an instructor at the Naval Justice School former American career appointee at the Pentagon. Stimson was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, "Punting National Security To The Judiciary", http://blog.heritage.org/2009/09/25/punting-national-security-to-the-judiciary/~~
So what is really going on here? To those of us who have either
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the administration close Gitmo without taking the heat for actually releasing detainees themselves.
b) informal mechanisms
Bradley and Morrison 13 (Curtis, Professor of Law, Duke Law School, and Trevor, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School , "Presidential Power, Historical Practice, And
Legal Constraint" Duke Law Scholarship Repository)  http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=545126context=faculty_scholarship
One of the grounds of skepticism about whether the presidency is constrained by law concerns
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of law and politics does not by itself negate the importance of law.

c) fidelity to law
Bradley and Morrison 13 (Curtis, Professor of Law, Duke Law School, and Trevor, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School , "Presidential Power, Historical Practice, And
Legal Constraint" Duke Law Scholarship Repository)  http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=545126context=faculty_scholarship
Insisting on a sharp distinction between the law governing presidential authority that is subject to
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than an internal sense of fidelity to law (or judicial review).120

d) fear of censure
Saikrishna Prakash 12, professor of law at the University of Virginia and Michael Ramsey, professor of law at San Diego, "The Goldilocks Executive" Feb, SSRN
We accept that the President’s lawyers search for legal arguments to justify presidential action,
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bounds of law would trigger censure from Congress, courts, and the public

AT Alt Discuses Guantanamo

The plan’s discussion is critical—Individual methods fail—participating in organizations checks impulses to care about short-term personal issues
Cole 2011 - Professor, Georgetown University Law Center (Winter, David, "WHERE LIBERTY LIES: CIVIL SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AFTER 9/11," 57 Wayne L. Rev. 1203, Lexis)

But the engagement that "civil society constitutionalism" identifies as essential has a more
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Constitution, or you may find it wanting when it is needed most.

Alt Fails

Making truth claims is inevitable – the alternative is a bankrupt strategy that stagnates politics
Houghton, Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida, ’8 (David, "Positivism ’vs’ Postmodernism: Does Epistemology Make a Difference?" International Politics, Vol 45, p 115-128)
Discussions of the role of subjectivity by postmodernists in our understanding of the world do
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during the 1960s, has long been a thing of the past. Postmodernists hence do the discipline a disservice when they continue to attack the overly optimistic
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an ’orthodoxy’ in the field of IR today, this is surely it.

Tournament: Gonzaga | Round: 4 | Opponent: ASU RV | Judge: Christian Bato

2AC National Security Court CP

Habeas is uniquely key—respect for legal norms is a key avenue for legitimacy and the perception of the great writ is intimately tied to that—that’s Sidhu

Boumediene’s credibility is key—the perception of Boumediene restored faith in the effectiveness of US constitutional checks—that’s Knowles

Perm do both

Statistics prove that it remains the critical obstacle to restoring goodwill—US legitimacy is derived from international law, consensual decisionmaking, moderation, and the preservation of peace—our detention policies directly erodes all four of those pillars—that’s Welsh

1) NSC’s relaxed procedural and evidentiary rules undermine commitment to the rule of law – turns the aff

Cole 08, Professor of Law at Georgetown
(David, A CRITIQUE OF "NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS, www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Critique_of_the_National_Security_Courts.pdf)
Most importantly, there is the intrinsic and inescapable problem of definition. Whereas the
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a showing would also enable it to proceed via the traditional criminal process. 

2) NSC due process deprivations spillover to the rest of the judicial system – magnifies rule of law degradation

Cole 08, Professor of Law at Georgetown
(David, A CRITIQUE OF "NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS, www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Critique_of_the_National_Security_Courts.pdf)
National security courts for criminal prosecutions are not just unnecessary; they are also dangerous
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not be the basis for abandoning these fundamental tenets of justice and fairness.

3) NSC’s discriminatory policy undermines international perception of legal legitimacy and devastates soft power

Shulman 09, Law Prof at Pace
(Mark, NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS: STAR CHAMBER OR SPECIALIZED JUSTICE?, ssrn.com/abstract=1328427)
National security or terrorist courts in other countries offer troubling lessons, mostly because of
AND
"public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic government."

AT: Terror

The aff is key to win over muslim moderates—that’s critical to victory

Sidhu 11 
~2011, Dawinder S. Sidhu, J.D., The George Washington University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, Judicial Review as Soft Power: How the Courts Can Help Us Win the Post-9/11 Conflict", NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF, Vol. 1, Issue 1 http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=100326context=nslb~~
For soft power to move from the shadows to a place of prominence in American
AND
.65 Therefore, legal soft power must address and convince these moderates.

Tournament: USC | Round: 2 | Opponent: George Mason BW | Judge: Gliniecki, Tom

2AC Yancy K

The role of the ballot is to decide between a plan or a competitive policy option
It creates relevant strategies for change that are predictable and allow the aff to get offense
The alternative isn’t a relevant consideration to whether the plan’s action should occur — voting issue, only opportunity costs should be evaluated to teach cost-benefit analysis

Discussions of structure should precede substance Guantanamo issues require a more detailed focus on the legal system—student advocacy enables us to make change

Dominant doctrinalism – looking at doctrine and not how the law works in practice
Bad form of pedagogy
Guantanamo = best example, doesn’t follow doctrine
Need understanding of "on the ground" beaurocratic structures that make up the legal system
External actors
Marguiles 11, Professor of Law
~February 9, 2011, Peter Margulies is Professor of Law, Roger Williams University., "The Ivory Tower at Ground Zero: Conflict and Convergence in Legal Education’s Responses to Terrorism"Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 60, p. 373, 2011, Roger Williams Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 100~
If timidity in the face of government overreaching is the academy’s overarching historical narrative,
AND
Students need more guidance on what to look for when structure shapes substance. 

Working within the government key – their alt fails 
McClean 01 SOCIETY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY – GRADUATE AND PHILOSOPHER – NYU, "THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE", http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/200120Conference/Discussion20papers/david_mcclean.htm~~
Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury
AND
critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

Case outweighs
Hegemony – statistics and empirics prove most peaceful, necessary create institutions and interconnectedness
Democracy – standards of rights and norms. New democracies = torture and detain based on US, plan k2 establish territorial peace spills over

2AC Perm

The perm’s effective—-no cooption as "their cause" can become "our cause"

Bhambra 10—U Warwick—AND—Victoria Margree—School of Humanities, U Brighton (Identity Politics and the Need for a ’Tomorrow’, http://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity_Politics_and_the_Need_for_a_Tomorrow_)
We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put forward
AND
" since they are produced by very real actions, practices and projects.  

AT: Domestic First

To claim that domestic racism should proceed the "international" violence the US commits against foreign bodies is unethical—their overly broad focus on white supremacy cannot explain particulars of interethnic conflicts and undermines effective racial politics

Sunstrom 8, Associate Professor of Philosophy
~2008, Ronald R. Sunstrom is a black Associate Professor of Philosophy at
AND
America and the Evasion of Social Justice", pp. 65-92~

It would be odd and troubling for the nation to merrily work toward justice at
AND
debts and expand in a cosmopolitan direction the very idea of social justice.

Tournament: Wake | Round: 1 | Opponent: Johnson County CC SW | Judge: Aaron Weathers

Perm

The affirmative’s challenge to islamophobic indefinite detention policies creates an ideal intersectional space to build coalitions against racial violence—general claims to racial injustice are insufficient—we must coalesce around particular projects where there is a commonality of interest LIKE THE ADVOCACY

Wing 3, Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law
~Spring 2003, Adrien Katherine Wing is a Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law. A.B. Princeton, 1978; M.A. UCLA, 1979; J.D. Stanford, 1982. This paper was presented at the Civil Rights symposium of the Louisiana State"Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism", http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=598726context=lalrev26sei-redir=126referer=http3A2F2Fscholar.google.com2Fscholar3Fq3Dguantanamo2B2522critical2Brace2Btheory252226btnG3D26hl3Den26as_sdt3D0252C526as_vis3D1~~23search=22guantanamo20critical20race20theory22-http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=598726context=lalrev26sei-redir=126referer=http3A2F2Fscholar.google.com2Fscholar3Fq3Dguantanamo2B2522critical2Brace2Btheory252226btnG3D26hl3Den26as_sdt3D0252C526as_vis3D1, 63 La. L. Rev. (2003)~
Because of the various problems with coalition building, several scholars do not endorse it
AND
groups competing for crumbs while majoritarian rule continue~s~ unabated? 22

Buddhism

We must cultivate a belief in the world that goes beyond merely negative breaks with the features of the world we abhor

Connolly 11
(William E., A World of Becoming, Duke University Press)

Such a characterization, as stated, is broad and not subjected to the pertinent
AND
but by challenging them as we come to terms with the larger trends. 

Analysis must include
Bryant, 2012 (Mar 5, Levi, Philosophy Professor at Collin, "Entropy and Me," http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/03/05/entropy-and-me/)**
The answer to this question is that for Lucretius questions of the nature of physical
AND
directed at this end, not at the world and persons about us.

Economies of Suffering

Linklater, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, ’7 (Andrew, "Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations" International Politics, Vol 44, p 19-36)
Conclusions  A traditional problem for cosmopolitans is explaining how human beings can be expected to
AND
that have the primary task of implementing cosmopolitan obligations to reduce distant suffering.

2AC Separation

Being able to talk about your personal issues is the privilege—who is here to speak about their experience at Guantanamo?—their kritik mirrors acts of distancing that say we should only focus on what’s in our purview—indefinite detention has maintained its legitimacy precisely because we view it as out there and not affecting us—we must bring the voices of those who can’t speak for themselves here

Park 10
~2010, James Park, "EFFECTUATING PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN ENDING INDEFINITE DETENTION: HISTORICAL REPETITION AND THE CASE OF THE UYGHURS", 31 Whittier L. Rev. 785~
George Orwell once wrote in The Road to Wigan Pier regarding empire and the complicity
AND
after years of imprisonment without the subject of their innocence ever being addressed.

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 1 | Opponent: CSUF BS | Judge: Sam Maurer

China

The threat is real:

Modernization — they’re massively expanding military capabilities — that’s Kazianis and RTT

Bellicosity — RTT says they’re increasingly assertive in territorial disputes

Internal documents prove — none of their epistemology args apply — Kazianis and Yoshihara cite official PLA doctrine — anti-access attacks are a crucial part of their strategy and it’s a key objective to expand to Taiwan and the South China Sea

China’s expansion to South China Sea is rooted in historical national identity — the alternative is naiive

Prabhakar 11 Dr.W.Lawrence S.,  Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai, India; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Centre for Asian Strategic Studies, New Delhi, India; Guest Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology-Madras., and#34; The Evolving Geopolitics in the South China Seaand#34;, PDF
Sovereignty Concerns and the apprehension of sovereignty violations by contending states both regional and extra
AND
and aerial staging points in a sea of contending territorial and resources disputes.
Mutual threat construction is an institutional reality — we should engage it
Gries 7 (Peter Hayes, Harold J. 26 Ruth Newman Chair in U.S.-China Issues and Director of the Institute for U.S.- China Issues at the University of Oklahoma, and#34;Harmony, Hegemony 26 U.S.-China Relationsand#34;, World Literature Today, July 2007 issue)
Furthermore, the new Chinese Occidentalism depicts Americans as an aggressive, militaristic, and
AND
discourses of difference and threat that undermine U.S.-China relations.

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 6 | Opponent: UTSA CR | Judge: Sarah Topp

Colonialism

2AC FW

The role of the ballot is to decide between a plan or a competitive policy option
It creates relevant strategies for change that are predictable and allow the aff to get offense against
The alternative isn’t a relevant consideration to whether the plan’s action should occur — voting issue, only opportunity costs should be evaluated to teach cost-benefit analysis
Our discussion raises awareness of cyber militarism and spills over to policy
NRC 9, WILLIAM A. OWENS, AEA Holdings, Inc., Co-
AND
CSTB LYNETTE I. MILLETT, Senior Program Officer NANCY GILLIS, Program Officer
ENITAA. WILLIAMS, Associate Program Officer MORGAN R. MOTTO, Program Associate SHENAE BRADLEY, Senior Program Assistant ERIC WHITAKER, Senior Program Assistant, Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES, http://www.anagram.com/berson/nrcoiw.pdf-http://www.anagram.com/berson/nrcoiw.pdf
A historical analogy might be drawn to the study of nuclear issues.  In many
AND
in providing education and background is in our view its most important function.
Engaging policy is key
McClean, Professor – Philosophy, Rutgers, 1
(THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/200120Conference/Discussion20papers/david_mcclean.htm)
Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury
AND
critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called and#34;managerial class.and#34;

Case Outweighs

Case outweighs –

1) Miscalc – other countries perceive US cyber ops as a pretext to nuclear strike, so preemptively launch their weapons. Forced to retaliate causes escalating war
2) Centralization of control - example of praetorian power that breaks down nuclear agreements and causes escalatory measures

More likely than their impacts
1) misperceptions because so new
2) disproportional response because no norms
3) timeframe = instantaneous decisions

Alt can’t s – doesn’t stop cyber ops

AT: Epistemology

Their epistemology K is flawed – social constructions are knowable – they pre-exist individuals and constrain action in predictable ways – prefer the specificity of the aff to broad philosophical indictments

Fluck, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth, ’10 (Matthew, November, and#34;Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theoryand#34; Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 39 No 2, SagePub)
Critical Realists arrive at their understanding of truth by inverting the post-positivist attitude
AND
. 44 It therefore remains possible to pursue the truth about social reality.

Don’t reject 1AC scholarship – the context ideas are produced in does not affect validity

Halliday, Professor – IR – London School of Economics, 93
(Orientalism and its Critics, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20 (2) p. 159-16)
A third difficulty with Said’s approach is the methodological assumption it makes about the relation
AND
, have some idea of who you can suborn from within the organization.

AT: Discourse First

Discourse can’t break down institutions

Tuathail, Professor of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 96  (Gearoid, Political Geography, Vol 15 No 6-7, p. 664, Science Direct)
While theoretical debates at academic conferences  are important to academics, the discourse and concerns
AND
needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is  human history.

Link Debate

Plan is a decrease in colonialist power

1) alliances
2) decreases US power

Plan prevents worst forms of militarism –
The alternative to cyber ops is to put boots on the ground, kills more civilians and extends colonialism more 

Taylor ev lists a ton of alt causes – things the alt doesn’t solve and overwhelm link

1NC didn’t read a link – even though the plan has the USFG perform an action, it is not based on a preference of the US, it’s a global view that opens up coalitions and alliances 

Alternative cannot do the mandate of the plan text
Infinitely regressive
Lose all offense
Reason perm s 

Perm

Permutation do the plan and delink from Western epistemology

Wholesale rejection of securitization fails – adopting an issue-specific consequentialist evaluation prevents their impacts without allowing millions to die for the sake of moral purity.

Rita Floyd, University of Warwick, 2007 Review of International Studies, Vol 33 p 327-250)
Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security  Considering the two brief overviews of the different schools
AND
they be promoted or in non-consequentialist fashion that they be honoured,

Perm NB

China and NK are net benefits to the perm –

1) external example of why the plan is necessary – sometimes state matters because ~~
2) link turns – key to prevent china from colonizing Taiwan, inevitable absent the aff 

AT: Imperialism

Economics and past interventions limit US imperialism

Ben Ami, VP of Toledo International Centre for Peace, ’11 (Shlomo, July 1, and#34;Arab Spring, Western Falland#34; Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/benami55/English)
The old vocation of what Rudyard Kipling called the and#34;White Man’s Burdenand#34; –
AND
building constabulary designed to chase guerrillas, build schools, or sip tea.and#34;

The excuse of distance and inaction is a cop-out. There is no neutral position from which this takes place. Their self-effacing gesture reinforces privilege and only requires the subaltern to achieve political change

Kapoor, 2008 (Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, and#34;The Postcolonial Politics of Development,and#34; p. 45-46)
But Spivak is quick to examine the other side of the equation. She reproaches
AND
privileged group’s own ability to speak and be heard’ (1991: 26).

AT: Root Cause

No single cause of conflict – be suspicious of their and#34;master variableand#34;, authors exaggerate problems their programs have the best chance of solving

Barnett et al 7 
Michael, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell, Laura Sitea, Global Governance, and#34;Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?and#34;, Questia

Because there are multiple contributing causes of conflict, almost any international assistance effort that
AND
there are good bureaucratic reasons for claiming that they are an invaluable partner.

Alt

 Bad (Spivak)===

the alternative’s utopian rejection places the negative in a superior position of purity – we must recognize we are complicit with structures of power and work within them to oppose colonialism

Kapoor, 2008 (Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, and#34;The Postcolonial Politics of Development,and#34; p. 54-55)
Taking Derrida’s lead, Spivak insists that deconstruction and critique are only made possible by
AND
Fanon), ’conscientization’ (Freire), and ’accountable positioning’ (Haraway).

C. Purity – postcolonialism’s total negativity makes deciding between greater and lesser evils impossible – makes producing a better world impossible

Kapoor, 2008 (Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, and#34;The Postcolonial Politics of Development,and#34; p. 57-58)
But while I disagree with the criticisms of Spivak on these points, I believe
AND
distinguish between complicities to assess if these NGO activities are more benign than tho

se World Bank ones, and hence decide where efforts and resources are better spent
AND
ecstatic character that is at odds with her otherwise Marxist-deconstructivist leanings.

Tournament: UMKC | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Northwestern MV | Judge: Frappier, Gliniecki, Zendeh

2AC Cyber Deterrence DA

No link — the plan is a notification requirement — Lorber says that doesn’t trigger the disad

Non-unique — cyber arms race and use is inevitable now — I did that analysis on case — it’s try or die for a restrained strategy — active defense causes Cyberwar

McGraw 12, Member of the IEEE Computer Society Board of Governors, Gary McGraw
AND
, Gary McGraw has served on the IEEE Computer Society-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEEE_Computer_Society Board of Governors.
Creating a cyber-rock is cheap. Buying a cyber-rock is even cheaper since zero-day attacks exist on the open market for sale to the highest bidder. In fact, if the bad guy is willing to invest time rather than dollars and become an insider, cyber-rocks may in fact be free of charge, but that is a topic for another time.
Given these price tags, it is safe to assume that some nations have already developed a collection of cyber-rocks, and that many other nations will develop a handful of specialized cyber-rocks (e.g., as an extension of many-year-old regional conflicts). If we follow the advice of Hayden and Chabinsky, we may even distribute cyber-rocks to private corporations.
Obviously, active defense is folly if all it means is unleashing the cyber-rocks from inside of our glass houses since everyone can or will have cyber-rocks. Even worse, unlike very high explosives, or nuclear materials, or other easily trackable munitions (part of whose deterrence value lies in others knowing about them), no one will ever know just how many or what kind of cyber-rocks a particular group actually has.
Now that we have established that cyber-offense is relatively easy and can be accomplished on the cheap, we can see why reliance on offense alone is inadvisable. What are we going to do to stop cyberwar from starting in the first place? The good news is that war has both defensive and offensive aspects, and understanding this fundamental dynamic is central to understanding cyberwar and deterrence.
The kind of defense I advocate (called and#34;passive defenseand#34; or and#34;protectionand#34; above) involves security engineering — building security in as we create our systems, knowing full well that they will be attacked in the future. One of the problems to overcome is that exploits are sexy and engineering is, well, not so sexy.

Deterrence doesn’t apply to cyberspace

Weiner 12, research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues, Boss, Internally cites Dr. Lewis who is the director of the Center for Homeland Security and Defense, https://www.hsdl.org/hslog/?q=node/9216-https://www.hsdl.org/hslog/?q=node/9216 Note: Sarah Weiner is Cal debate coach, however this evidence relies upon Dr. Lewis’s findings and was written before the announcement of the topic 
Others vehemently disagree with this presupposition.  Jim Lewis, for example, argued-http://www.stimson.org/about/news/jim-lewis-of-csis-speaks-at-stimson-on-cyber-deterrence/ earlier
AND
use of force is so disproportionate that it is not a credible threat.  
If the US instead decides to use cyber capabilities to deter cyber-attacks,
AND
is an unexpected attack, and that does nothing for signaling or deterrence.

No link — the plan is just oversight, not a ban on OCOs — executive control makes deterrence unstable since other countries perceive irrationality when OCOs are controlled by one person — that’s Rothschild

Otherwise organizational confusion OCOs fail

GAO 11, Defense Department Cyber Efforts: DOD Faces Challenges In Its Cyber Activities, http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321824.html-http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321824.html
DOD has assigned authorities and responsibilities for implementing cyberspace operations among combatant commands, military
AND
forces globally and in building unity of effort for carrying out cyberspace operations. 

Turn — norms make deterrence stable — only the plan solves — that’s CSM

Turn — Miscalc — only the plan solves deterrence failures

Lord et al 11, Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security
(Kristin M., Travis Sharp is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is University Distinguished Service Professor at the Kennedy School of  Government at Harvard University. Mike McConnell is Executive Vice President of Booz Allen Hamilton and former Director of  National Intelligence and Director of the National Security Agency. Gary McGraw is Chief Technology Officer of Cigital, Inc., a software security consultancy, and  author of eight books on software security. Nathaniel Fick is Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security. Thomas G. Mahnken is Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security  at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced  International Studies. Gregory J. Rattray is a Partner at Delta Risk LLC and Senior Vice President for Security at BITS, the  technology policy division of The Financial Services Roundtable. Jason Healey is Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council and Executive  Director of the Cyber Conflict Studies Association. Martha Finnemore is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George  Washington University. David A. Gross is a Partner at Wiley Rein LLP and a former Ambassador and Coordinator for  International Communications and Information Policy at the State Department. Nova J. Daly is a Public Policy Consultant at Wiley Rein LLP and former Deputy Assistant Secretary  for Investment Security in the Office of International Affairs at the Treasury Department. M. Ethan Lucarelli is an Associate at Wiley Rein LLP. Roger H. Miksad is an Associate at Wiley Rein LLP. James A. Lewis is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the  Center for Strategic and International Studies. Richard Fontaine is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Will Rogers is a Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security. Christopher M. Schroeder is an Internet entrepreneur, Chief Executive Officer of HealthCentral.com  and a member of the Center for a New American Security’s board of advisors. Daniel E. Geer, Jr. is Chief Information Security Officer of In-Q-Tel, the independent investment firm  that identifies innovative technologies in support of the missions of the U.S. intelligence community. Robert E. Kahn is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation for National Research  Initiatives and co-inventor of the TCP/IP protocol that is the foundation of the modern Internet. Peter Schwartz is Co-Founder and Chairman of Global Business Network and a member of the  Center for a New American Security’s board of directors, and#34;America’s Cyber Future Security and Prosperity in the Information Age volume Iand#34; June 2011, http:// www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume20I_0.pdf-http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume I_0.pdf)
 The Department of Defense, the intelligence community, the Department of Justice,  
AND
attributed to them, which will help deter  them in the first place.

Turn — organization confusion dooms OCOs now — only statutory legislation solves

Chesney 12, Charles I. Francis Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10 Title 50 debate, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Military-Intelligence-Convergence-and-the-Law-of-the-Title-10Title-50-Debate.pdf-http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Military-Intelligence-Convergence-and-the-Law-of-the-Title-10Title-50-Debate.pdf
That architecture is a complex affair, including what might be described as and#34;framework
AND
action, or other operations within another state’s territory in the first place.

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 3 | Opponent: Kansas BC | Judge: Chris Loghry

Obama already spent capital on Syria and it was perceived as a loss

Bohan, 9/11 (Caren, 9/11/2013, and#34;Delay in Syria vote frees Obama to shift to hefty domestic agenda,and#34; http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/usa-obama-agenda-idUSL2N0H716N20130911-http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/usa-obama-agenda-idUSL2N0H716N20130911))

WASHINGTON, Sept 11 (Reuters) - Putting off a decision on military strikes on Syria allows President Barack Obama to shift his attention back to a weighty domestic agenda for the fall that includes budget fights, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve.
Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people.
But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition.
The push for a vote on Syria - which has now been delayed - had threatened to crowd out the busy legislative agenda for the final three months of 2013 and drain Obama’s political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities.
But analysts said a proposal floated by Russia, which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria’s weapons under international control may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with minimal political damage.
and#34;He dodges a tough political situation this way,and#34; said John Pitney, professor of politics at Claremont McKenna College in California.
Pitney said the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, will now be able to shift their attention to other matters.
He said Obama could suffer some weakening of his leverage with Congress. The administration’s and#34;full court pressand#34; to try to persuade lawmakers to approve military force on Syria was heavily criticized and did not yield much success.
and#34;He probably has suffered some damage in Congress because there are probably many people on (Capitol Hill) who have increasing doubts about the basic competence of the administration and that’s a disadvantage in any kind of negotiation,and#34; Pitney said.
 

Immigration push makes the link inevitable

Hughes, 9/11 —- White House Correspondent at Washington Examiner (Brian, 9/11/2013, and#34;Syria push imperils Obama’s fall agenda,and#34; http://washingtonexaminer.com/syria-push-imperils-obamas-fall-agenda/article/2535611)-http://washingtonexaminer.com/syria-push-imperils-obamas-fall-agenda/article/2535611))

Obama will also face a difficult challenge reviving immigration reform, which stalled in the GOP-controlled House after senators approved a bipartisan bill. In his State of the Union address, Obama said immigration reform would be a key priority of his second term.

Zero risk Obama pushes the plan — it restrains his powers

Vote No — the plan’s been introduced and Obama lost capital

No link — the plan’s not controversial

Perera 6/26, SACS calls for new oversight of Cyber Command, David Perera is executive editor of the FierceMarkets Government Group, which includes FierceGovernment, FierceGovernmentIT, FierceHomelandSecurity, and FierceMobileGovernment. He has reported on all things federal since January 2004 and is co-author of Inside Guide to the Federal IT Market-http://store.brightkey.net/mconcepts_ebiz/OnlineStore/ProductDetail.aspx?ProductId=201530, a book published in October 2012., http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/sasc-calls-new-oversight-cyber-command/2013-06-26-http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/sasc-calls-new-oversight-cyber-command/2013-06-26
The Senate Armed Services Committee says it has concerns that oversight of Cyber Command and the cyber mission within the Defense Departments and#34;is fragmented and weak,and#34; calling for creation of a Senate-confirmed position within the undersecretary of defense for policy to supervise and manage the funds of offensive cyber forces.
The Senate committee voted 23-3 on June 14 to report its version of the fiscal 2014 national defense authorization act (S. 1197-http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.113s1197), detailing its intentions in a newly released legislative report -http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113srpt44/pdf/CRPT-113srpt44.pdf(.pdf).

It’s super popular

Bradbury 11, Steven G. Bradbury is an attorney at the Washington, D.C office of Dechert LLP-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dechert_LLP.
Bradbury was head of the Office of Legal Counsel-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Legal_Counsel (OLC) in the United States Department of Justice-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justice during the George W. Bush administration-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush_administration, 2005-January 2009. Appointed the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for OLC in April 2004, he became the Acting Assistant Attorney General in 2005. He was nominated by President George W. Bush-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush to be the Assistant Attorney General for OLC in June 2005. His nomination was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Judiciary_Committee in November 2005 but was never voted on by the full Senate, The Developing Legal Framework for Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations, This speech was the Keynote address at the Harvard National Security Journal Symposium, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Vol.-2_Bradbury_Final1.pdf-http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Vol.-2_Bradbury_Final1.pdf
Congressional reporting. The National Security Act also ¶ requires the President and DNI to
AND
have oversight jurisdiction, and they all jealously guard their respective ¶ domains.

Not an opportunity cost because a rational policymaker could do both— that’s best for decision-making which is a portable skill and outweighs

The plan’s not perceived

Schmitt 13, co-director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at AEI and the director of AEI’s Program on American Citizenship. Mr. Schmitt is a former staff director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He was executive director of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during President Ronald Reagan’s second term. Mr. Schmitt’s security work focuses on longer-term strategic issues that will affect America’s security at home and its ability to lead abroad, while his work in the area of citizenship focuses on challenges to maintaining and sustaining a strong civic culture. His books include Of Men and Materiel: The Crisis in Military Resources (AEI Press, 2007), to which he was a contributing author and editor with Tom Donnelly; Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (Brassey’s, 2002), coauthored with Abram Shulsky and now in its third edition; and U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (Brassey’s, 1995), a coedited volume to which he is a contributing author. His two most recent books, to which he is also editor and contributing author, are The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition (Encounter Books, May 2009) and Safety, Liberty and Islamist Terrorism: American and European Approaches to Domestic Counterterrorism (AEI Press, 2010), http://www.aei-ideas.org/2011/12/authorization-for-cyber-attacks/-http://www.aei-ideas.org/2011/12/authorization-for-cyber-attacks/
The press (and the White House) has been obsessed by the detention provision in the recently agreed upon FY2012 Defense Authorization bill, but one of the items that slipped under the radar is language authorizing the American military to engage in offensive operations in cyberspace. Under Sec. 954,
Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, allies and interests.

2AC AT: Debt Ceiling Impact

Debt ceiling will inevitably be increased

Sahadi, 9/12 (Jeanne, and#34;The never-ending charade of debt ceiling fights,and#34; http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/12/news/economy/debt-ceiling/?source=cnn_bin)-http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/12/news/economy/debt-ceiling/?source=cnn_bin))

Lawmakers are tied up in knots over increasing the debt ceiling this fall. But they eventually will. The only question is how messy the process will be.
Why assume they’ll raise it? Because they have no real choice if they want to avoid a U.S. default. A default would hurt the economy and markets, and most lawmakers know this. That’s why they regularly raise the debt ceiling before it comes to that.
In fact, since 1940, Congress has effectively approved 79 increases to the debt ceiling. That’s an average of more than one a year.
How do they raise it? Sometimes lawmakers have raised it by small amounts, other times by large amounts. And sometimes they’ve raised it and#34;temporarilyand#34; with provisions for a and#34;snap-backand#34; to a lower level.
Since it’s a politically tough vote, they occasionally devise clever ways to tacitly approve increases without ever having to publicly record a and#34;yesand#34; vote.
For example, as part of the deal to resolve the 2011 debt ceiling war, Congress approved a plan that let President Obama raise the debt limit three times unless both the House and Senate passed a and#34;joint resolution of disapproval.and#34; Such a measure never materialized. And even if it had, the president could have vetoed it.
Then this past February, lawmakers decided to temporarily and#34;suspendand#34; the debt ceiling.
Under this scheme, Treasury was able to continue borrowing to pay the country’s bills until May 19. At that point, the debt limit automatically reset to the old cap plus whatever Treasury borrowed during the suspension period.
Related: Debt ceiling ’X’ date could hit Oct. 18
What does raising the debt ceiling accomplish? Despite some politicians’ incorrect assertions, raising the debt ceiling does not give the government a and#34;license to spend more.and#34;
It simply lets Treasury borrow the money it needs to pay all U.S. bills in full and on time. Those bills are for services already performed and entitlement benefits already approved by Congress. In other words, it’s a license to pay the bills the country incurs as a result of past decisions made by lawmakers from both parties over the years.
Refusing to raise the debt ceiling is and#34;not like cutting up your credit cards. It’s like cutting up your credit card bills,and#34; said historian Joseph Thorndike, who has written about past debt crises.
How high is it today? The debt ceiling was reset at 2416.699 trillion on May 19, up from the 2416.394 trillion where it was before the suspension.
Since then, Treasury has been forced to use and#34;extraordinary measuresand#34; to keep the country from breaching the limit.
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said those measures will be exhausted by mid-October, after which he will only have 2450 billion on hand, plus incoming revenue to pay what’s owed. Sounds like a lot, but it won’t last long.
How long will it last? An analysis by the Bipartisan Policy Center estimates that the Treasury will no longer be able to pay all bills in full and on time at some point between Oct. 18 and Nov. 5.
So, you’re saying they only have a few weeks to work this out? Yup.
House Republicans say they will demand spending cuts and fiscal reforms in exchange for their support of a debt ceiling increase. The White House, meanwhile, has said it won’t negotiate quid pro quos.
The question is when will Republicans or the White House — or both - bend in the standoff? If recent history is any guide it likely will be just in the nick of time.
And there’s no telling how creative the deal they cut will be.
But any bad blood created along the way almost certainly would poison other budget negotiations. To top of page 

AT: Econ Impact

No link between the economy and war – history proves

Ferguson 6 (Ferguson, Niall. and#34;The Next War of the World.and#34; Foreign Affairs 85.5 (Sept-Oct 2006): 61. Expanded Academic ASAP.)
There are many unsatisfactory explanations for why the twentieth century was so destructive. One
AND
economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars. 

The global economy will grow inevitably and is no longer driven by the U.S.

AAP 9-28- 10 
(Australian Associated Press, and#34;No double dip recession in US: Forbesand#34;, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-business/-http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-business/no-double-dip-recession-in-us-forbes-20100928-15vwc.html)**
And while billionaire US investor Ken Fisher told the conference the US could expect a coming decade of prosperity, its lead as the world’s biggest economy would be whittled away.
The Fisher Investments chief executive said the and#34;disorganisedand#34; and and#34;chaoticand#34; emerging nations were firmly in the driver’s seat of the world economy, leaving the US to play second fiddle.
and#34;The world right now is being led by the emerging markets, not by America,and#34; Mr Fisher said.
and#34;The US is going to be big and important, but it is secondary, it is no longer what it once was.and#34;
and#34;If you read the media from 1991 it sounds just like it does today,and#34; he told the Forbes CEO Conference on Tuesday.
and#34;We’re chimpanzees with no memory.
and#34;Our problems in this environment, that we think are so unique, so abnormal.
and#34;It is the same stupid old normal we’ve always had.and#34;
and#34;We keep chewing the cud. We go over the same stupid wrong pessimistic stories... ruminating on them again and again.and#34;
Mr Fisher said he was bullish about the future, unlike five out of six US investors who and#34;believe we are going sideways or going downand#34;.
and#34;I believe the next 10 years will be just as good as the 1990s,and#34; Mr Fisher told delegates.
and#34;In my mind, I think the period we have ahead of us is as good as we have ever had ahead of us, at a time when people believe we have a lacklustre world ahead at best.and#34;
Mr Fisher, a self-proclaimed democracy despiser, argued the and#34;bailout conceptand#34; that led to such high government debt was wrong.
and#34;The bailout concept is wrong,and#34; he told journalists.
and#34;Many of them (US companies) should have been left to fail.
and#34;And others, like Lehman, were not left to fail, they were killed.
and#34;The US government killed Lehman.and#34;
Mr Fisher said scepticism and pessimism were normal sentiments for investors 18 months after the market had bottomed.

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 1 | Opponent: CSUF BS | Judge: Sam Maurer

Deleuze K

The role of the ballot is to decide between a plan or a competitive policy option
It creates relevant strategies for change that are predictable and allow the aff to get offense against
The alternative isn’t a relevant consideration to whether the plan’s action should occur — voting issue, only opportunity costs should be evaluated to teach cost-benefit analysis
Our discussion raises awareness of cyber militarism and spills over to policy
NRC 9, WILLIAM A. OWENS, AEA Holdings, Inc., Co-
AND
CSTB LYNETTE I. MILLETT, Senior Program Officer NANCY GILLIS, Program Officer
ENITAA. WILLIAMS, Associate Program Officer MORGAN R. MOTTO, Program Associate SHENAE BRADLEY, Senior Program Assistant ERIC WHITAKER, Senior Program Assistant, Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES, http://www.anagram.com/berson/nrcoiw.pdf-http://www.anagram.com/berson/nrcoiw.pdf
A historical analogy might be drawn to the study of nuclear issues.  In many
AND
in providing education and background is in our view its most important function.
Engaging policy is key
McClean, Professor – Philosophy, Rutgers, 1
(THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/200120Conference/Discussion20papers/david_mcclean.htm)
Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury
AND
critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called and#34;managerial class.and#34;

Arugment about why there are multiple different moves under the table is why this should be brought out in the open

The plan is a link turn -
Cyber war is happening and is offense against the alt
Inevitable because the chess game is inevitable
Expansion as a reaction to the US 

The plan brings this out into the open understand 

2 pieces of offense
Miscalculation – Rothschild – countries perceive it as a prerequisite to a nuclear attack so they use their own nukes
Centralization of control – combo of NSA and US Cybercom with 0 oversight means decisions can be madea t the will of 1 man – plan k2 break down hierarchy
Only the aff changes these actions which happen at the highest level of govenremnt - 

Warfare is inevitable – should be a form that provides checks and balances which causes the minimum amount of violence

Our aff is proof of why the secret is bad ~

Turn — discussion of global problems stops crisis-driven responses and fosters empathy
Ungar 5, president – Goucher College, 2005 ~Sanford, and#34;compassion fatigue: the next wave?and#34;, winter, www.goucher.edu/x4726.xml~
There is a temptation to worry that before long, we will be hit by
AND
and figurative, to help us figure out what is really going on.

Reform is good – blowing up the board does nothing

Ferguson 11, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford
(James, The Uses of Neoliberalism, Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184)
If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do,
AND
some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

Society functions absent the individuals – we cannot solely focus on the relation to eachother
Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6
(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50
One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as
AND
upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

Their argument denies the value to our experience because it erases the line between life and death- even if death is valuable and there are great things going on there, simply embracing death denies the possibility of agency for choice and sucks the meaning from our current reality

Kymlicka ’3
(Will, professor of philosophy @ Queens University. Contemporary Political Thought:  A Reader And Guide.  Edited by Alan Finlayson, pp. 496-498)
The defining feature of liberalism is that it ascribes certain fundamental freedoms to each individual
AND
judge what is valuable, and to learn about other ways of life.

Their argument leaves us oscillating between life and death- were people in death to embrace the meaning of death, then logically it would create an equally vampiric rel

ationship towards life- establishing a balance between life and death would drain the value from both, which might be even worse

Ensuring humanities survival into technological maturity unlocks new modes of experience and understanding we can’t even comprehend right now

Bostrom, 2012 (Mar 6, Nick, director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Gannon Award, and#34;We’re Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction,and#34; interview with Ross Andersen, freelance writer in D.C., http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/-http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)**
If I wanted some sort of scheme that laid out the stages of civilization,
AND
of that cathedral having only the most limited sense of what is possible. 

Faith is good- while we cannot know for certain the effects of our actions, nor be certain of the cosmology they occur within, we can make reasonable approximations- taking that leap of faith is justified because it allows us to connect positively with others and engage in projects that prevent nihilism

Giman-Olpasky 11
Richard Gilman-Opalsky is Assistant Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Springfield. He is the author of Unbounded Publics: Transgressire Public Spheres, Zapatismo, and Political Theory. Spectacular Capitalism Guy Debord and the Practice of Radical Philosophy
http://www.scribd.com/doc/58299096/3/Chapter-1-Selectively-Forgetting-Baudrillard-http://www.scribd.com/doc/58299096/3/Chapter-1-Selectively-Forgetting-Baudrillard**
Simulacra are, by definition, indistinguishable from real events. Nevertheless, the actual
AND
these things? It is no misuse or abuse of Baudrillard’s work too bse

rve that his arguments do in fact distance us from a political consideration of the
AND
, and where one hopes that the best heads will enter the fray.

Threats do exist, and your skepticism is nothing more than a psychological trick that assumes humans are invincible- your willful ignorance allows terrible atrocities to occur

David W. Orr- Professor of Environmental Studies and Politics @  Oberlin College- 4 AUG 2008, The Psychology of Survival, Conservation Biology, Volume 22, Issue 4, pages 819–822, August 2008, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1523-1739.2008.01008.x/full**
Capable of great feats of imagination and invention as well as generating less agreeable behavior
AND
, perhaps, are not so much rational creatures as very proficient rationalizers.

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 3 | Opponent: Kansas BC | Judge: Chris Loghry

2AC XO CP

Counter plans can’t fiat the object of the resolution — it divorces debate from real-world lit since fiat resolves solvency deficits and moots the 1AC

DAs to the CP –
1) Miscalc – uncertainties of unitary control cause miscalculation. Perception that OCO framework can be changed by Obama causes misperception and nuclear escalation – that’s Rothschild

2) Alliances – perception of legal legitimacy is key or abuses devastate allied cooperation — executive control creates an illegitimate legal framework — Abhu Ghraib proves — that’s Dunlap, causes NK nuclear collapse and China war

====It gets rolled back — also can’t solve legal norms====
Swanson 9, Chair of accountability and prosecution working group of United for Peace and Justice 
(David, 1/25, Dangerous Executive Orders, www.opednews.com/articles/Dangerous-Executive-Orders-by-David-Swanson-090125-670.html)
The Center for Constitutional Rights has expressed concern that President Obama’s executive order banning torture
AND
the other violated laws for which no such formal orders have been given?

Congress key to norms –

1) Stable framework – k2 framework that’s perceived as verifiable, Congress must define the rules for itself to and#34;own the gameand#34; that’s Lorber, Harmon, and Rothschild, 

2) Reassurance – presidents push the envelope, other countries perceive executive action as insincere — only Congressionally initiated statutory requirements can re-assure, that’s Dycus

3) Starting point – Congress must start the discussion, otherwise perceived as reactionary and subject to executive whim, that’s Hansen

Absent norms arms race and instability are inevitable

Perm — do both

Congress is key to transparency

Butler 4/26, Appellate Advocacy Counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, When Cyberweapons End Up On Private Networks: Third Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257078-http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257078
A. Authority: Congress Must Be Involved in Establishing Any Framework for the Authorization
AND
that could intrude upon civilian systems; only Congress can authorize such quartering.

Transparency’s key to Russian relations and developing global cybersecurity

Ibrahim, Research Intern at CSIS, 13, Karina G. Ibrahim is a research intern with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a recent graduate from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. http://csis.org/blog/arms-race-cyber-space-us-russian-relations-and-prospects-cyber-warfare-http://csis.org/blog/arms-race-cyber-space-us-russian-relations-and-prospects-cyber-warfare
In the month of June, the already strained U.S.-Russia relationship
AND
confidence-building and increase transparency to address the emergence of cybersecurity threats.
The failure of a U.S.-Russia cybersecurity partnership to develop stems from a history of mistrust, further exacerbated by the ongoing allegations of cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage (collectively referred to as cyberwarfare). 

An increase in network probes and hacking attempts-http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf suggests that Russia is either attempting to carry out cyber-intrusions against U.S. systems, or at least sanctioning such acts. Recently, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive indicated-http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf that and#34;Russia’s intelligence services are conducting a range of activities to collect economic information and technology from U.S. targets.and#34; However, the Russian government denies involvement in these alleged cyber-intrusions.
Similarly, recent developments in the Snowden case have undermined the potential for mutual cooperation
AND
the development of a successful cyber defense initiative to mitigate global cybersecurity challenges.

Relations solve nuclear war

Allison 26 Blackwill 11, Fellow for Foreign Policy @ Council on Foreign Relations
~Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, Robert D., Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy — Council on Foreign Relations, served as U.S. ambassador to India and as deputy national security adviser for strategic planning in the Bush administration, both co-chairmen of the Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests, co-sponsored by the Belfer Center and the Center for the National Interest, 10-30-11 Politico, and#34;10 reasons why Russia still matters,and#34; http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6-http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6~~
That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S
AND
in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order

. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting
AND
.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.

2AC AT: Brecher CP

Perm do the counter plan — it’s an example of how the aff can be implemented — their author

Brecher 12, JD candidate at Michigan Law (Aaron P., Cyberattacks and the Covert Action Statute: Toward a Domestic Legal Framework for Offensive Cyberoperations, www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/111/3/Brecher.pdf)
This Part argues that the federal government should adopt the presumption that cyberattacks will be
AND
—enacting legislation—because of the practical difficulties of passing new legislation.

2AC AT: Ptx NB

Perm creates Congressional involvement: a congressionally led process is more likely to generate support —- executive orders are more controversial

Corcoran 11 —- Professor of Law and Director at University of New Hampshire School of Law (March 2011, Erin M., University of New Hampshire Law Review, and#34;Obama’s Failed Attempt to Close Gitmo: Why Executive Orders Can’t Bring About Systemic Change,and#34; 9 U.N.H. L. Rev. 207))
Finally, this example highlights that issuing unilateral executive orders, and then asking Congress
AND
have been committed to making sure they had the votes to pass it.
Overall, if the Obama Administration wants to close Guantanamo Bay, it must get
AND
and can use this knowledge when advancing the President’s future controversial policy changes.

Tournament: UMKC | Round: Doubles | Opponent: Northwestern MV | Judge: Frappier, Gliniecki, Zendeh

2AC T - Notification

We meet — we remove covert OCOs as an option for the President

It’s a check on presidential power

Gaul 8, Matthew J. Gaul is a partner in Steptoe’s New York office.  A former insurance regulator and securities enforcement attorney for the state of New York, Mr. Gaul represents insurance companies and other financial institutions in government investigations and complex regulatory matters, http://faculty.lls.edu/manheim/ns/gaul2.htm-http://faculty.lls.edu/manheim/ns/gaul2.htm
The president may circumvent the specified waiting period by stating in his certification that a
AND
to major arms licenses for export deals totaling 2450 million or more.

Restrict is to check free activity — they confuse it with restraint

Oklahoma Attorney General Opinions - 3/19/2004, Question Submitted by: The Honorable Mark Campbell, District Attorney, 19th District; The Honorable Jay Paul Gumm, State Senator, District 6, 2004 OK AG 7, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=43849-http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=438494
Accordingly, we must look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.
AND
are intended to restrain or prevent certain conduct of the person subject thereto.

They create worse limits — allows ban a certain type of drone in one country —

They over-limit — the War Powers Resolution wouldn’t be topical

Be reasonable — good is good enough — competing interpretations is infinitely regressive and crowds out substance — justifies counter-interpretation only our case is topical and counter-interpretation their interp + our aff

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 3 | Opponent: Kansas BC | Judge: Chris Loghry

We meet — we remove covert OCOs as an option for the President

We meet – overturns the past law which provides the president the title 10/title 50 loophole

It’s a check on presidential power

Gaul 8, Matthew J. Gaul is a partner in Steptoe’s New York office.  A former insurance regulator and securities enforcement attorney for the state of New York, Mr. Gaul represents insurance companies and other financial institutions in government investigations and complex regulatory matters, http://faculty.lls.edu/manheim/ns/gaul2.htm-http://faculty.lls.edu/manheim/ns/gaul2.htm
The president may circumvent the specified waiting period by stating in his certification that a
AND
to major arms licenses for export deals totaling 2450 million or more.

c/a interp from other T

not extra T – words of the resolution in the plan text, just specifying what type

They create worse limits — allows ban a certain type of drone in one country —

Wouldn’t meet increase – overturning a law isn’t a direct increase, means our aff is the only topical version of your aff

Be reasonable — good is good enough — competing interpretations is infinitely regressive and crowds out substance — justifies counter-interpretation only our case is topical and counter-interpretation their interp + our aff

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 3 | Opponent: Kansas BC | Judge: Chris Loghry
====We meet their first interp – we are a restriction on a type of OCO====

Restrict is to check free activity — they confuse it with restraint

Oklahoma Attorney General Opinions - 3/19/2004, Question Submitted by: The Honorable Mark Campbell, District Attorney, 19th District; The Honorable Jay Paul Gumm, State Senator, District 6, 2004 OK AG 7, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=43849-http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=438494
Accordingly, we must look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.
AND
are intended to restrain or prevent certain conduct of the person subject thereto.

Their UN evidence defines and#34;activities in the area ofand#34; referring to a physical area – that’s distinct from and#34;authority in the area ofand#34; 

====We meet their authority interp====

====C/I - Area means a field ====
American Heritage Dictionary 2k
(http://www.thefreedictionary.com/area-http://www.thefreedictionary.com/area)
area

1. A roughly bounded part of the space on a surface; a region: a farming area; the New York area.
   2. A surface, especially an open, unoccupied piece of ground: a landing area; a playing area.
   3. A distinct part or section, as of a building, set aside for a specific function: a storage area in the basement.
   4. A division of experience, activity, or knowledge; a field: studies in the area of finance; a job in the health-care area.
   5. An open, sunken space next to a building; an areaway.
   6. Abbr. A The extent of a planar region or of the surface of a solid measured in square units.
   7. Computer Science A section of storage set aside for a particular purpose.

We’re substantial – that’s sufficient

Overlimits – 4 possible affs, destroys aff innovation, no offense against the XO CP

They over-limit — the War Powers Resolution wouldn’t be topical

No link to limits – substantially and the executive CP both check
No link to ground loss – always have DAs based on statuatory or judicial action, and the rez focuses your research on areas
No link to bidirect – tradeoff advantages can expand war powers, that’s inevitable under your interp

Reason 

Be reasonable — good is good enough — competing interpretations is infinitely regressive and crowds out substance — justifies counter-interpretation only our case is topical and counter-interpretation their interp + our aff