Tournament: UMKC | Round: 7 | Opponent: Washburn JL | Judge: Cancro, Pete

Torture

Only democracy can solve their impact – prevents social and political control.

Lawrence Hatab, Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Old Dominion University, 1995, A Nietzschean defense of democracy: an experiment in postmodem politics, pp.235-6

If there is one existential attitude that is worth promoting again and again in democratic
AND
unscripted by any primal story, a political experiment ungoverned by any theory.

CP

Court inactivism causes congress to fear the executive will manipulate their authorizations and means they go from restricted authorizations to no authorizations at all—that slays executive authority

Jinks and Katyal 7 ~April, 2007, Derek Jinks is Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. Neal Kumar Katyal is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, "Disregarding Foreign Relations Law", 116 Yale L.J. 1230~

If adopted, one of the most dangerous byproducts of Posner and Sunstein’s theory may
AND
our intelligence activities that Congress and our enemies do not currently know.) n177

Doesn’t solve Judicial Globalism

Separation of Powers—judicial action is key restore the balance with the executive by asserting judicial strength and countering perceptoins judicial irrelevance—that’s Milko and Vaughn and Williams—the impact is our Flaherty evidence and CJA evidence—prevents stable democratic transitions globally

Globalization—only the plan is modeled—Judiciary’s participate in transnational conferences and interactions and are looked to by foreign governments—that’s Flaherty, Suto, and Kersch—those are key to encourage judicial independence and strength in new states

Legislative action fails—isn’t globalized and doesn’t check the executive

Flaherty 11, Professor of International Law
~2011, Martin S. Flaherty is a Leitner Professor of International Law, Fordham Law School; Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, "Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11", 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 119~
2. Legislative Globalization This pro-executive conclusion becomes even harder to resist given
AND
matter of rights protection must remain the courts. ~*143~ 3.

DA

Obama already spent capital on Syria and it was perceived as a loss

Bohan, 9/11 (Caren, 9/11/2013, "Delay in Syria vote frees Obama to shift to hefty domestic agenda," http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/usa-obama-agenda-idUSL2N0H716N20130911-http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/usa-obama-agenda-idUSL2N0H716N20130911))

WASHINGTON, Sept 11 (Reuters) - Putting off a decision on military strikes on Syria allows President Barack Obama to shift his attention back to a weighty domestic agenda for the fall that includes budget fights, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve.
Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people.
But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition.
The push for a vote on Syria - which has now been delayed - had threatened to crowd out the busy legislative agenda for the final three months of 2013 and drain Obama’s political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities.
But analysts said a proposal floated by Russia, which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria’s weapons under international control may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with minimal political damage.
"He dodges a tough political situation this way," said John Pitney, professor of politics at Claremont McKenna College in California.
Pitney said the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, will now be able to shift their attention to other matters.
He said Obama could suffer some weakening of his leverage with Congress. The administration’s "full court press" to try to persuade lawmakers to approve military force on Syria was heavily criticized and did not yield much success.
"He probably has suffered some damage in Congress because there are probably many people on (Capitol Hill) who have increasing doubts about the basic competence of the administration and that’s a disadvantage in any kind of negotiation," Pitney said.

GOP will inevitably fold

Bolton, 9/14 (Alexander, 9/14/2013, "Confident Dems want separate showdowns on fiscal battles," http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/322247-confident-democrats-want-separate-showdowns-on-shutdown-and-debt-limit))
"If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I’m virtually certain they’ll blink," said Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking member of the Senate Democratic leadership. "They know they shouldn’t be playing havoc with the markets."
Schumer said Republicans are on stronger political ground if there’s a government shutdown, but warned "even on that one, they’re on weak ground because the public sort of is finally smelling that these guys are for obstructing."

Shutdown will give Obama leverage to resolve debt ceiling

Sanghoee, 9/12 —- has worked at leading investment banks as well as at a multi-billion dollar hedge fund (9/12/2013, Sanjay, "Why Obama Should Let the Government Shut Down," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sanjay-sanghoee/why-obama-should-let-the-_b_3916099.html)-http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sanjay-sanghoee/why-obama-should-let-the-_b_3916099.html))
While the debate over Syria may have overshadowed the expected battle in Washington over budget cuts, the logjam between Democrats and Republicans on fiscal matters is far from being resolved, and is likely going to get worse. However, this also presents President Obama with a unique opportunity to obtain real leverage with Republicans this fall, and to break the logjam permanently.
To do this, he needs to let the government shut down.
If that sounds extreme, consider the recent decision by conservative members of the House
AND
despite the silliness of expecting the president to defund his own signature law.
But even if Obamacare was not the main issue and even if the House approves
AND
the only way to really do that is by calling the opposition’s bluff.
There are several reasons why a government shutdown would actually work in Obama’s favor:
    A government shutdown may be the most potent weapon in the GOP’s arsenal but once invoked, it really cannot be used again in the near future (not without severe political carnage); and so by letting it happen, Obama can finally eliminate the biggest threat that Republicans have used to derail his agenda. Getting rid of this Democles’ Sword hanging over his administration would benefit Obama on all issues, not just fiscal ones.
    A recent CNN/ORC International Poll shows that 51 percent of Americans consider
AND
hit — largely because of their sustained obstructionism over the past five years.
    The U.S. government shutdown on December 16, 1995 (that lasted for 28 days) under President Clinton over similar budget battles with the Republican party, though frightening, did not destroy the nation, and even though the public initially seemed to blame the president for the impasse, Clinton’s approval ratings shot up dramatically after the shutdown was resolved, and the Republicans were excoriated for their obstinacy. In hindsight, it was a win for Clinton.
    By refusing to let the GOP use Obamacare or the debt ceiling to secure spending cuts, the president will have demonstrated his resolve not to let policy decisions be influenced by political blackmail, hopefully changing the style of governing in Washington for the better.
    A shutdown would also show the Tea Party base of the GOP, which
AND
when the results of such a revolution hit the personal welfare of voters.
With three years left in his term, President Obama is at a crucial crossroads
AND
he needs to act proactively here, and really force the GOP’s hand.
By not being afraid to shut down Washington.

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 6 | Opponent: Stanford LS | Judge: Archer

T

Interpretation – A restriction limits allowable action

Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary – 2013, http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/dictionary/restriction-http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/dictionary/restriction
restriction NOUN
1 ~countable~
a rule or law that limits what you can do or what can happen
import/speed/travel, etc. restrictions
restriction on something to impose/place a restriction on something
The government has agreed to lift restrictions on press freedom.
There are no restrictions on the amount of money you can withdraw.
2 ~uncountable~
the act of limiting or controlling somebody/something
sports clothes that prevent any restriction of movement
A diet to lose weight relies on calorie restriction in order to obtain results.
3 ~countable~
a thing that limits the amount of freedom you have
the restrictions of a prison

War power is the power to conduct war successfully

HIRABAYASHI v. UNITED STATES - SUPREME COURT - June 21, 1943, Decided, 320 U.S. 81; 63 S. Ct. 1375; 87 L. Ed. 1774; 1943 U.S. LEXIS 1109
The war power of the national government is "the power to wage war successfully
AND
review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.

DA

The aff is an internal link turn to the DA – a strong causes developing democracies to develop more like autocracies, which risks war to a larger degree. Seperation of powers solves peace better.

Defer to rejecting deference—if the court overreaching, Congress can fill in and ensure executive authority, but there’s no comparable check on executive overreaching—star this argument

Jinks and Katyal 7 ~April, 2007, Derek Jinks is Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. Neal Kumar Katyal is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, "Disregarding Foreign Relations Law", 116 Yale L.J. 1230~

Courts say that the nation must speak in "one voice" in its foreign
AND
striking and provides a lopsided view of what would happen under their proposal.

Executive flexibility leads to detention policy failure—organizational insulation ensures it

Pearlstein 9, Visiting Scholar and Lecturer at Princeton
~July, 2009, Deborah N. Pearlstein is a Visiting Scholar and Lecturer in Public and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public 26 International Affairs, Princeton University, "Form and Function in the National Security Constitution", 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1549~
Examples of excessive flexibility producing adverse consequences are ample. Following Hurricane Katrina, one
AND
something more than arbitrary attention has been paid before transcendent priorities are overridden.

Their DA relies on an outmoded theory of IR—prefer the turn

Knowles 9 ~Spring, 2009, Robert Knowles is a Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, "American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution", ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87~

How should the balance of power in the world affect the separation of powers under
AND
realist balancing, they cannot, in most situations, justify special deference.

2AC Congress CP

Judicial action is key to judicial globalization

Flaherty—executive
Key to Modeling—Suto, CJA, and Kersch
Cleveland – courts legitimate govt policy

Habeas is uniquely key—respect for legal norms is a key avenue for legitimacy and the perception of the great writ is intimately tied to that—that’s Sidhu

Boumediene’s credibility is key—the perception of Boumediene restored faith in the effectiveness of US constitutional checks—that’s Knowles

Court inactivism causes congress to fear the executive will manipulate their authorizations and means they go from restricted authorizations to no authorizations at all—that slays executive authority

Jinks and Katyal 7 ~April, 2007, Derek Jinks is Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. Neal Kumar Katyal is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, "Disregarding Foreign Relations Law", 116 Yale L.J. 1230~

If adopted, one of the most dangerous byproducts of Posner and Sunstein’s theory may
AND
our intelligence activities that Congress and our enemies do not currently know.) n177

Doesn’t solve Judicial Globalism

Separation of Powers—judicial action is key restore the balance with the executive by asserting judicial strength and countering perceptoins judicial irrelevance—that’s Milko and Vaughn and Williams—the impact is our Flaherty evidence and CJA evidence—prevents stable democratic transitions globally

Globalization—only the plan is modeled—Judiciary’s participate in transnational conferences and interactions and are looked to by foreign governments—that’s Flaherty, Suto, and Kersch—those are key to encourage judicial independence and strength in new states

Legislative action fails—isn’t globalized and doesn’t check the executive

Flaherty 11, Professor of International Law
~2011, Martin S. Flaherty is a Leitner Professor of International Law, Fordham Law School; Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, "Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11", 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 119~
2. Legislative Globalization This pro-executive conclusion becomes even harder to resist given
AND
matter of rights protection must remain the courts. ~*143~ 3.

Perm do both

Perm do the CP

2AC Security

The aff resolves the worst example of the link – ending indefinite detention is preventative security because it structurally reduces the magnitude and risk of war through global liberal norms – the alternative is reactive security which responds to flash-point crises through Iraq-style intervention or sanctions on proliferating countries – causes greater levels of conflict and structural violence

====That’s most ethical – failure of preventative action and predictions drives structural violence and inequality, only actions that act to preserve future generations can resolve power relations====
Kurasawa’4,
(Fuyuki, Assistant Prof. of Sociology @ York University, Cautionary Tales, Constellations Vol. 11, No. 4, Blackwell Synergy)

In the previous section, I described how the capacity to produce, disseminate,
AND
the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight. 

pdb

Even if security and risk calculation are flawed, engaging in them creates discourse of social welfare and promotes a democratic civic culture that checks political exclusion and loss of value to life

Loader – Criminology Prof at Oxford – 7
(Civilizing Security, Pg. 5)

Faced with such inhospitable conditions, one can easily lapse into fatalistic despair, letting
AND
social democratic politics, even for renewing the activity of politics at all. 

Rejection of current IR paradigm magnifies hierarchy – emancipation rhetoric gives powerful states a basis for intervention and robs the Third World of agency – traditional security models solve their impacts better

McCormack 10 – Lecturer in International Politics
Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security
AND
the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

Transition to the alternative guarantees war – radical changes in existing security architecture collapse threat perception

Yoon 03 – Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea (Young-Kwan, "Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations", International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8)
In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late
AND
major war, not the nature of a particular type of international system.

A focus on policy is necessary to learn the pragmatic details of powerful institutions – acting without this knowledge is doomed to fail in the face of policy professionalists who make the decisions that actually affect outcomes

McClean, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Molloy College in New York, ’1 (David E., "The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope", Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/)
Or we might take Foucault who, at best, has provided us with what
AND
critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."  

Tournament: Gonzaga | Round: 1 | Opponent: Whitman BM | Judge: Alyssa Lucas-Bolin

T

ID

 no defined duration====
Ulysses S. Smith - Winter, 2007, Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2007, "More Ours than Theirs" n1: The Uighurs, Indefinite Detention, and the Constitution, 40 Cornell Int’l L.J. 265, LexisNexis
The Court has found indefinite detention, a deprivation of liberty with no defined scope
AND
to the battlefield - can no longer be met, detention must cease.

CP

Judicial action is key to judicial globalization

Flaherty—executive
Key to Modeling—Suto, CJA, and Kersch
Cleveland – courts legitimate govt policy

Perm do both—solves the NB because Obama will be seen as taking the lead

2009 proves the CP links to politics

Fisher, 13 —- served four decades in the Library of Congress as senior specialist in separation of powers at the Congressional Research Service and specialist in constitutional law at the Law Library (7/1/2013, Louis, The National Law Journal, "Closing Guantanamo  http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Guantanamo-NLJ-2013.pdf))

On January 22, 2009, on his second day in office, Obama issued
AND
was the type of unilateral action that backfired on George W. Bush.

Executive control reduces courts to political tools and prevents litigation of human rights issues

Free 3 (Brian C., Washington State Supreme Court, edit-in-chief Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, "Awaiting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.: Advocating the Cautious Use of Executive Opinions in
Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation," Pacific Rim Law 26 Policy Journal, 2003, http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/731/12PacRimLPolyJ467.pdf?sequence=1-http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/731/12PacRimLPolyJ467.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 2013)
Although executive opinions are necessary for judicial consideration in certain cases, the separation of
AND
objective determinations made according to established principles of law, courts would determine litigants’

Deference

Defer to rejecting deference—if the court overreaching, Congress can fill in and ensure executive authority, but there’s no comparable check on executive overreaching—star this argument

Jinks and Katyal 7 ~April, 2007, Derek Jinks is Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. Neal Kumar Katyal is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, "Disregarding Foreign Relations Law", 116 Yale L.J. 1230~

Courts say that the nation must speak in "one voice" in its foreign
AND
striking and provides a lopsided view of what would happen under their proposal.

Executive control reduces courts to political tools and prevents litigation of human rights issues

Free 3 (Brian C., Washington State Supreme Court, edit-in-chief Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, "Awaiting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.: Advocating the Cautious Use of Executive Opinions in
Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation," Pacific Rim Law 26 Policy Journal, 2003, http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/731/12PacRimLPolyJ467.pdf?sequence=1-http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/731/12PacRimLPolyJ467.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 2013)
Although executive opinions are necessary for judicial consideration in certain cases, the separation of
AND
objective determinations made according to established principles of law, courts would determine litigants’

Executive flexibility leads to detention policy failure—organizational insulation ensures it

Pearlstein 9, Visiting Scholar and Lecturer at Princeton
~July, 2009, Deborah N. Pearlstein is a Visiting Scholar and Lecturer in Public and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public 26 International Affairs, Princeton University, "Form and Function in the National Security Constitution", 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1549~
Examples of excessive flexibility producing adverse consequences are ample. Following Hurricane Katrina, one
AND
something more than arbitrary attention has been paid before transcendent priorities are overridden.

Politics

GOP will inevitably fold

Bolton, 9/14 (Alexander, 9/14/2013, "Confident Dems want separate showdowns on fiscal battles," http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/322247-confident-democrats-want-separate-showdowns-on-shutdown-and-debt-limit))
"If push comes to shove on debt ceiling, I’m virtually certain they’ll blink," said Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.), the third-ranking member of the Senate Democratic leadership. "They know they shouldn’t be playing havoc with the markets."
Schumer said Republicans are on stronger political ground if there’s a government shutdown, but warned "even on that one, they’re on weak ground because the public sort of is finally smelling that these guys are for obstructing."

No internal link to shutdown

Shutdown is good —- reduces chance of default that will wreck the economy

Green, 9/27 —- national correspondent at Bloomberg Businessweek (9/27/2013, Joshua, The Boston Globe, "Root for a shutdown ; It’s the best way to jolt Washington back to its senses," Factiva))
If Congress could maintain even a semblance of functionality, then no one should want the government to shut down. According to the Congressional Research Service, the back-to-back shutdowns brought on by Newt Gingrich in 1995 and 1996 cost the country 241.4 billion. But it’s now clear that Congress can’t operate smoothly and even a conclusive national election won’t break the cycle of dysfunction.
That’s why I’m rooting for a shutdown and you should be too — at this point, it’s the safest way to jolt Washington back to its senses.
Here are three reasons why:
1.
A shutdown would be far less costly than default. Unless Congress acts, most
AND
default would almost certainly snuff out the recovery and bring on another recession.
2.
We’d quickly find out which party Americans support. One powerful driver of Washington dysfunction
AND
is right and who is wrong, removing the temptation for another showdown.
3.
Congress might start working again. The severity (and danger) of budget crises
AND
the old, saner way of doing things will probably look much better.

Their DA never says extinction – their ev is so bad prefer ours it’s much better about how autocracies will go to war.

K

Liberal democracy is best – rejection of sovereignty guarantees people can be seen as without value

Dean  ’1 (Mitchell-, Finn-, States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State, ed. by Thomas Blom Hansen 26 Finn Stepputat , P. 61-63)
There is no necessity that means that our most general rationalities of rule such as
AND
complacency for those who find themselves occupying the position of the good despot.

Pragmatic approaches to limit violence are good

Narveson 12, Professor Emeritus at University of Waterloo, Canada, Pacifism—Fifty Years Later, http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.10072Fs11406-013-9461-2.pdf-http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.10072Fs11406-013-9461-2.pdf
Is this reasonable? I think not. We should, of course, be
AND
as "pacifism" is a non-option in the near run.

The perm is the best middle ground—the alternative goes too far—democratic liberalism and associated interventionism are necessary prevent atrocities

Krauthammer 4 – Charles is a Pulitzer Prize–winning syndicated columnist, political commentator, and research fellow at a variety of think tanks. "In Defense of Democratic Realism," The National Interest, Fall 2004; 77, http://people.cas.sc.edu/rosati/krauthammer.demrealism.ni.f04.htm**
On February 10, 2004, I delivered the Irving Kristol Lecture to the American
AND
be left? If that is not an existential threat, nothing is.

The impact is genocide

Rieff, World Policy Institute, ’99 (David- New York Institute for the Humanities and Council on Foreign Relations, Summer, "A New Age of Liberal Imperialism?" World Policy Journal, Vol XVI No 2, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/rieff2.html)**
Finessing the Disaster And yet in Kosovo (this had almost happened in Bosnia),
AND
the genocide militarily; but it is a fact. And analogous situations were

Tournament: UMKC | Round: 2 | Opponent: Baylor MS | Judge: Coleman

UMKC 1AC

Plan

Plan: The United States federal judiciary should require that detained individuals who are unlawfully detained or who have been denied any due process be released and prevented from transference by the executive.

Torture

1) Status quo Supreme Court fails to rule on torture cases

Entin 12 Law Professor (Jonathan L., "Presidential Powers and Foreign Affairs: Presidential Power to Implement International Law after Medellin: War Powers, Foreign Affairs, and the Courts: Some Institutional Considerations", Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 45 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 443, Fall 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=58NV-MTK0-00CV-B0B126csi=14837526hl=t26hv=t26hnsd=f26hns=t26hgn=t26oc=0024026perma=true-http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=58NV-MTK0-00CV-B0B126csi=14837526hl=t26hv=t26hnsd=f26hns=t26hgn=t26oc=0024026perma=true, accessed 2013)
Meanwhile, other challenges to post-2001 terrorism policies also have failed, and
AND
from both rulings, n108 the Supreme Court declined to review either case.

2) Humans are guaranteed protection from torture under international law – practices of our detention centers violate human rights

Bernaz 13 Ph. D University Paul Cezanne (Nadia, "Life Imprisonment and the Prohibition of Inhuman Punishments in International Human Rights Law: Moving the Agenda Forward", Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, May 2013, pp. 487-488)

The right not to be subjected to torture and inhuman or degrading treatments is entrenched
AND
of detention,113 and the so-called death row phenomenon.114

3) Torture destroys an individual’s agency and therefore value to life

Sussman 5 Ass. Philosophy Professor University of Illinois (David, "What’s Wrong with Torture", Philosophy 26 Public Affairs, vol. 33, Issue 1, pp. 1-33, Jan 2005, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00023.x/full-http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00023.x/full, accessed 2013)

The orthodox Kantian can go a little farther toward accommodating the special significance of pain
AND
the very annihilation of such agency itself, if only temporarily or incompletely.

4) Torture renders societies dysfunctional

Twiss 7 Distinguished Professor of Human Rights (Sumner B., prof. Emeritus @ Brown University, "Torture, Justification, and Human Rights: Toward an Absolute Proscription", Human Rights Quarterly, 29.2 pp. 346-367)

A statement such as this is just the tip of an iceberg involving well-
AND
and to a social order in which all rights can be fully realized.

5) Indefinite detention is torture that violates human rights and undermines U.S. credibility

Goering, 7/27 —- executive director of the Center for Victims of Torture, an international nongovernmental organization (7/27/2013, Curt, "End indefinite detention now," http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/313761-end-indefinite-detention-now-http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/313761-end-indefinite-detention-now))

The recent Senate hearing on closing Guantanamo, under the leadership of Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), shed much needed light on the symbol of injustice and cruelty this prison has become.
Members heard compelling testimony from experts on how Guantanamo undermines the U.S. commitment to the rule of law, weakens national security and runs contrary to our country’s global leadership in upholding international human rights standards.
In written testimony, the Center for Victims of Torture (CVT) addressed the human rights implications of indefinite detention of prisoners held at Guantanamo. The continued indefinite detention of individuals at Guantanamo – some of whom have been held over 11 years without being charged or tried – is inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations and constitutional principles.
Indefinite detention is an unlawful practice that rises to the level of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in direct violation of U.S. laws and our obligations under international laws, including the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, signed by the United States 25 years ago during President Reagan’s final year in office.
Placing prisoners in custody indefinitely without charge or trial has absolutely no place in our laws. As Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) said during the hearing, "Countries that champion the rule of law and human rights do not lock away prisoners indefinitely without charge or trial."
We oppose indefinite detention on behalf of torture survivors, because among those we care for are survivors who have suffered while being imprisoned without charge or trial and without being told when, if ever, they might be released.
From our experience healing survivors of torture and war related atrocities, we know indefinite
AND

and damage to the body’s immune, cardiovascular and central nervous systems.
Many of the survivors we serve who were imprisoned without trial or charge speak of the absolute despair they felt, never knowing if their detention would come to an end. CVT clinicians who work with survivors of torture that have been indefinitely detained tell us that with no defined end, survivors feel there is no guarantee there will ever be an end. This creates severe, chronic emotional distress: hopelessness, debilitation, uncertainty, and powerlessness.
The hunger strike among the detainees at Guantanamo underscores the despair among prisoners facing indefinite detention. Hunger strikes are a form of expression by individuals who have no other way of making their demands known.

6) U.S. moral and political leadership are key to the global spread of democracy and human rights

Goldstone, 7 —- retired as a Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, his experience ranges from war crimes prosecution to fact-finding missions, from international investigations to human rights advocacy (Fall 2007, Justice Richard J. Goldstone, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, "THE J. BYRON MCCORMICK LECTURE*: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNITED STATES ABDICATING ITS MORAL AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE FREE WORLD, 24 Ariz. J. Int’l 26 Comp. Law 587))

The sad reality is that the United States is no longer providing moral and political
AND
of all people subject to the authority or power of the United States.
Make this the card after the spreading democracy card – 00:30

7) Because democracies possess checks to keep international peace with other democracies, the spread of democratic rule is key to global peace

Delahunty 26 Yoo 9 Law Professors (Robert, ass. professor of law University of St. Thomas, John, former deputy ass. US Attorney General and law professor UC Berkeley, "Kant, Habermas, and Democratic Peace", 10 Chi. J. Int’l. L. 437, 2009, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/42/-http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/42/, accessed 2013) Our theory of the democratic peace carries a second implication, one involving the types of regimes that the US and its allies should prefer. While predicting the consequences of constitutional design is not easy,139 a democratic nation may favor in the constitutions of other nations certain provisions that would improve their ability to send costly signals and to make reliable commitments. In the area of signals, a constitution could create multiple channels to make foreign policy and national security decisions. Nations could choose the more costly method when it wishes to send meaningful signals as part of bargaining in an international dispute. To take an example from the US, the President has waged war without congressional authorization sometimes (for example, Korea), and with authorization at other times (for example, Iraq). It is politically costly for the President to seek legislative authorization for war, though the amount of those costs is a matter of degree depending, in part, on whether Congress is controlled by the opposition party. If the President wishes to send a meaningful signal about the willingness and capability of the US to go to war, he can choose to go through Congress. If there is nothing to be gained from such a signal, the President can still act on his own.’ 4 0 With commitments, a constitution could disperse decision-making authority over certain forms of international agreements between different branches. A treaty requiring independently elected executive and legislative branches to concur would represent greater commitment than, for example, a treaty signed by a parliamentary government in which the majority party in the legislature also controls the executive branch. A constitution that places implementation of an international agreement in different branches may well make it more difficult for a nation to withdraw from its international commitments. The non-self-execution doctrine in American law, for example, allows the President and Senate to make the treaty, but requires Congress to implement provisions that require appropriations or changes in domestic law. Once these spending decisions or regulations are enacted, the executive branch cannot terminate them along with a treaty since they rest on Congress’s independent legislative authorities.14 ’ Congressional-executive agreements bear this same characteristic. Since Congress enacts them as legislation, the President cannot terminate them unilaterally. ’ 42 These examples are only meant to be suggestive, rather than definitive. We only wish to highlight that the mechanisms of the democratic peace bear important implications for constitutional design. The important point is that if democracies do not wage war with each other because of their ability to send signals or make commitments, then certain features of their constitutions and political systems will perform those functions better than others. Nations that spread democracy in order to enhance their security will have an interest in promoting those constitutional features as well. IV. CONCLUSION There are two basic ways in which the Kantian project may be carried forward. One way is Habermas’: that of starting from existing international or regional organizations such as the UN or the EU, and working for their evolution into some form of globalized government. The other way is to work forward from Kant’s powerful insights into the possibility of a democratic peace. Habermas’ version of the project may well be truer to Kant’s original thought, but it seems likely to result in a world that risks being neither peaceful nor free. The root problem in Habermas’ highly institutionalized approach is that the global governmental structures he envisages will lack real democratic legitimization. The approach we advocate instead has the advantage, among others, of "cutting with the grain." In promoting democratic government in particular states, the world’s leading democratic powers will be serving their own security needs and, as a welcome by-product, producing the circumstances in which respect for human rights and friendly relations between states are likely to spread.

8) Current rulings lay the groundwork for SCOTUS to smash the executive later – now just lets us stop the torture of detainees sooner

Fallon 10 Harvard Constitutional Law Prof (Richard H. Jr., "The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science", Columbia Law Review 110 Colum. L. Review, 2010, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults26handle=hein.journals/clr11026id=36726size=226collection=journals26terms=Supreme20Court~|Court26termtype=phrase26set_as_cursor=~23366-http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?men_tab=srchresults26handle=hein.journals/clr11026id=36726size=226collection=journals26terms=Supreme20Court|Court26termtype=phrase26set_as_cursor=, accessed 2013)

Third, even though the Court’s jurisdictional rulings have not entailed the recognition of substantive
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that which existed in the months and years immediately after 9/11. 

9) The courts legitimate government policy when they apply domestic law to detention

Cleveland et. al. 12 Professor Constitutional Rights Columbia Law (Sarah H., I can’t list all her quals so here’s her wiki page: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarah_Cleveland-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarah_Cleveland, WAR, TERROR, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS, TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFERENCE*: ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS’ SECTION ON FEDERAL COURTS PROGRAM AT THE 2012 AALS ANNUAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C., American University Law Review, 61 Am. U.L. Rev. 1253, June 2012, http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=563M-8640-00CW-G07K26csi=737326hl=t26hv=t26hnsd=f26hns=t26hgn=t26oc=0024026perma=true-http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=563M-8640-00CW-G07K26csi=737326hl=t26hv=t26hnsd=f26hns=t26hgn=t26oc=0024026perma=true, lexisnexis, accessed 2013)

And so I think the courts, at least some have not adequately appreciated the
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a national security context. I just spoke to Bivens but that’s enough.

Judicial Globalism

1) In the Kiyemba decisions, the court has ruled that the right to habeas corpus doesn’t endow it with the power to release a detainee or stop a detainee from being transferred

Milko 12
~Winter, 2012, Jennifer L. Milko, "Separation of Powers and Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Roles of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases and the Need for Supreme Guidance", 50 Duq. L. Rev. 173~
After the Boumediene and Munaf cases, it was clear that the United States district
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Court denied the writ on March 22, 2010. n93 ~*186~ 

2) These rulings make habeas useless—the judiciary has allowed for excess deference and abdicated its key role in checking executive war powers

Milko 12
~Winter, 2012, Jennifer L. Milko, "Separation of Powers and Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Roles of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases and the Need for Supreme Guidance", 50 Duq. L. Rev. 173~
A. Arguments for a Remedy By urging deference to the Executive Branch, the
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being improperly limited, as they are not utilizing their constitutional power properly.

3) The Kiyemba decisions have created a model of runaway executive power undermining the global rule of law

Vaughn and Wiliams, Professors of Law, 13 ~2013, Katherine L. Vaughns B.A. (Political Science), J.D., University of California at Berkeley. Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, and Heather L. Williams, B.A. (French), B.A. (Political Science), University of Rochester, J.D., cum laude, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, "OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: 1 KIYEMBA V. OBAMA AND THE MEANING OF FREEDOM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE RULE OF LAW TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11", Asian American Law Journal, Vol. 20, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148404~~

When it denied certiorari in Kiyemba III, the Supreme Court missed the opportunity to
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the separation of powers out of balance—and tilting dangerously toward unilateralism.

4) US action determines the global separation of powers—status quo trends towards executive authority get modeled and expand global executive power—a strong judicial assertion is critical to check

Flaherty 11, Professor of International Law
~2011, Martin S. Flaherty is a Leitner Professor of International Law, Fordham Law School; Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, "Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11", 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 119~
That "old-time" separation of powers should be enough to turn back
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in the matter of rights protection must remain the courts. ~*143~ 

5) New democratic states are forming now—judicial influence determines the state of their transitions

Suto 11, Research Associate at Tahrir Institute and J.D.  
~07/15/11, Ryan Suto is a Research Associate at Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, has degrees in degrees in law, post-conflict reconstruction, international relations and public relations from Syracuse Law, "Judicial Diplomacy: The International Impact of the Supreme Court", http://jurist.org/dateline/2011/07/ryan-suto-judicial-diplomacy.php~~
The Court is certainly the best institution to explain to scholars, governments, lawyers
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key legal concepts. This is an opportunity that should not be wasted.

6) Promoting a strong judiciary is necessary to make those transitions stable and democratic—detention policies specifically allow for global authoritarianism

CJA 3, Center for Justice and Accountability
~OCTOBER 2003, The Center for Justice 26 Accountability ("CJA") seeks, by use of the legal systems, to deter torture and other human rights abuses around the world., "BRIEF OF the CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, the INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, and INDIVIDUAL ADVOCATES for the INDEPENDENCE of the JUDICIARY in EMERGING DEMOCRACIES as AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS", http://www.cja.org/downloads/Al-Odah_Odah_v_US___Rasul_v_Bush_CJA_Amicus_SCOTUS.pdf~~
A STRONG, INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STABLE GOVERNANCE IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES AROUND THE WORLD. A. Individual Nations Have Accepted and Are Seeking to Implement Judicial Review By A Strong, Independent Judiciary. Many of the newly independent governments that have proliferated over the past five decades have adopted these ideals. They have emerged from a variety of less-than-free contexts, including the end of European colonial rule in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former Soviet Union in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the continuing turmoil in parts of Africa, Latin America and southern Asia. Some countries have successfully transitioned to stable and democratic forms of government that protect individual freedoms and human rights by means of judicial review by a strong and independent judiciary. Others have suffered the rise of tyrannical and oppressive rulers who consolidated their hold on power in part by diminishing or abolishing the role of the judiciary. And still others hang in the balance, struggling against the onslaught of tyrants to establish stable, democratic governments. In their attempts to shed their tyrannical pasts and to ensure the protection of individual rights, emerging democracies have consistently looked to the United States and its Constitution in fashioning frameworks that safeguard the independence of their judiciaries. See Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 Law 26 Soc. Inquiry 91, 92 (2000) (stating that of the "~m~any countries . . . ~that~ have engaged in fundamental constitutional reform over the past three decades," nearly all adopted "a bill of rights and establishe~d~ some form of active judicial review") Establishing judicial review by a strong and independent judiciary is a critical step in stabilizing and protecting these new democracies. See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 605, 605-06 (1996) (describing the judicial branch as having "a uniquely important role" in transitional countries, not only to "mediate conflicts between political actors but also ~to~ prevent the arbitrary exercise of government power; see also Daniel C. Prefontaine and Joanne Lee, The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (1998) ("There is increasing acknowledgment that an independent judiciary is the key to upholding the rule of law in a free society . . . . Most countries in transition from dictatorships and/or statist economies recognize the need to create a more stable system of governance, based on the rule of law."), available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/RuleofLaw. pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). Although the precise form of government differs among countries, "they ultimately constitute variations within, not from, the American model of constitutionalism . . . ~a~ specific set of fundamental rights and liberties has the status of supreme law, is entrenched against amendment or repeal . . . and is enforced by an independent court . . . ." Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 707, 718 (2001). This phenomenon became most notable worldwide after World War II when certain countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, embraced independent judiciaries following their bitter experiences under totalitarian regimes. See id. at 714- 15; see also United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) ("Since World War II, many countries have adopted forms of judicial review, which — though different from ours in many particulars — unmistakably draw their origin and inspiration from American constitutional theory and practice. See generally Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989)."). It is a trend that continues to this day. It bears mention that the United States has consistently affirmed and encouraged the establishment of independent judiciaries in emerging democracies. In September 2000, President Clinton observed that "~w~ithout the rule of law, elections simply offer a choice of dictators. . . . America’s experience should be put to use to advance the rule of law, where democracy’s roots are looking for room and strength to grow." Remarks at Georgetown University Law School, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2218 (September 26, 2000), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/09/2000-09-26- remarks-by-president-at-georgetown-international-lawcenter.html. The United States acts on these principles in part through the assistance it provides to developing nations. For example, the United States requires that any country seeking assistance through the Millenium Challenge Account, a development assistance program instituted in 2002, must demonstrate, among other criteria, an "adherence to the rule of law." The White House noted that the rule of law is one of the "essential conditions for successful development" of these countries. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).12 A few examples illustrate the influence of the United States model. On November 28, 1998, Albania adopted a new constitution, representing the culmination of eight years of democratic reform after the communist rule collapsed. In addition to protecting fundamental individual rights, the Albanian Constitution provides for an independent judiciary consisting of a Constitutional Court with final authority to determine the constitutional rights of individuals. Albanian Constitution, Article 125, Item 1 and Article 128; see also Darian Pavli, "A Brief ’Constitutional History’ of Albania" available at http://www.ipls.org/services/others/chist.html (last visited Janaury 8, 2004); Jean-Marie Henckaerts 26 Stefaan Van der Jeught, Human Rights Protection Under the New Constitutions of Central Europe, 20 Loy. L.A. Int’l 26 Comp. L.J. 475 (Mar. 1998). In South Africa, the new constitutional judiciary plays a similarly important role, following generations of an oppressive apartheid regime. South Africa adopted a new constitution in 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Explanatory Memorandum. It establishes a Constitutional Court which "makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional." Id. at Chapter 8, Section 167, Item (5), available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/constitution/saconst.html?r ebookmark=1 (last visited January 8, 2004); see also Justice Tholakele H. Madala, Rule Under Apartheid and the Fledgling Democracy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: The Role of the Judiciary, 26 N.C. J. Int’l L. 26 Com. Reg. 743 (Summer 2001). Afghanistan is perhaps the most recent example of a country struggling to develop a more democratic form of government. Adoption by the Loya Jirga of Afghanistan’s new constitution on January 4, 2004 has been hailed as a milestone. See http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/02/world/main59111 6.shtml (Jan 7, 2004). The proposed constitution creates a judiciary that, at least on paper, is "an independent organ of the state," with a Supreme Court empowered to review the constitutionality of laws at the request of the Government and/or the Courts. Afghan Const. Art. 116, 121 (unofficial English translation), available at http://www.hazara.net/jirga/AfghanConstitution-Final.pdf (last visited January 8, 2004). See also Ron Synowitz, Afghanistan: Constitutional Commission Chairman Presents Karzai with Long-Delayed Draft Constitution (November 3, 2003), available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/11/03112003164239.as p (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). B. Other Nations Have Curtailed Judicial Review During Times Of Crisis, Often Citing the United States’ Example, And Individual Freedoms Have Diminished As A Result. While much of the world is moving to adopt the institutions necessary to secure individual rights, many still regularly abuse these rights. One of the hallmarks of tyranny is the lack of a strong and independent judiciary. Not surprisingly, where countries make the sad transition to tyranny, one of the first victims is the judiciary. Many of the rulers that go down that road justify their actions on the basis of national security and the fight against terrorism, and, disturbingly, many claim to be modeling their actions on the United States. Again, a few examples illustrate this trend. In Peru, one of former President Alberto Fujimori’s first acts in seizing control was to assume direct executive control of the judiciary, claiming that it was justified by the threat of domestic terrorism. He then imprisoned thousands, refusing the right of the judiciary to intervene. International Commission of Jurists, Attacks on Justice 2000-Peru, August 13, 2001, available at http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=258726lang=en (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe’s rise to dictatorship has been punctuated by threats of violence to and the co-opting of the judiciary. He now enjoys virtually total control over Zimbabweans’ individual rights and the entire political system. R.W. Johnson, Mugabe’s Agents in Plot to Kill Opposition Chief, Sunday Times (London), June 10, 2001; International Commission of Jurists, Attacks on Justice 2002— Zimbabwe, August 27, 2002, available at http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=269526lang=en (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). While Peru and Zimbabwe represent an extreme, the independence of the judiciary is under assault in less brazen ways in a variety of countries today. A highly troubling aspect of this trend is the fact that in many of these instances those perpetuating the assaults on the judiciary have pointed to the United States’ model to justify their actions. Indeed, many have specifically referenced the United States’ actions in detaining persons in Guantánamo Bay. For example, Rais Yatim, Malaysia’s "de facto law minister" explicitly relied on the detentions at Guantánamo to justify Malaysia’s detention of more than 70 suspected Islamic militants for over two years. Rais stated that Malyasia’s detentions were "just like the process in Guantánamo," adding, "I put the equation with Guantánamo just to make it graphic to you that this is not simply a Malaysian style of doing things." Sean Yoong, "Malaysia Slams Criticism of Security Law Allowing Detention Without Trial," Associated Press, September 9, 2003 (available from Westlaw at 9/9/03 APWIRES 09:34:00). Similarly, when responding to a United States Government human rights report that listed rights violations in Namibia, Namibia’s Information Permanent Secretary Mocks Shivute cited the Guantánamo Bay detentions, claiming that "the US government was the worst human rights violator in the world." BBC Monitoring, March 8, 2002, available at 2002 WL 15938703. Nor is this disturbing trend limited to these specific examples. At a recent conference held at the Carter Center in Atlanta, President Carter, specifically citing the Guantánamo Bay detentions, noted that the erosion of civil liberties in the United States has "given a blank check to nations who are inclined to violate human rights already." Doug Gross, "Carter: U.S. human rights missteps embolden foreign dictators," Associated Press Newswires, November 12, 2003 (available from Westlaw at 11/12/03 APWIRES 00:30:26). At the same conference, Professor Saad Ibrahim of the American University in Cairo (who was jailed for seven years after exposing fraud in the Egyptian election process) said, "Every dictator in the world is using what the United States has done under the Patriot Act . . . to justify their past violations of human rights and to declare a license to continue to violate human rights." Id. Likewise, Shehu Sani, president of the Kaduna, Nigeriabased Civil Rights Congress, wrote in the International Herald Tribune on September 15, 2003 that "~t~he insistence by the Bush administration on keeping Taliban and Al Quaeda captives in indefinite detention in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, instead of in jails in the United States — and the White House’s preference for military tribunals over regular courts — helps create a free license for tyranny in Africa. It helps justify Egypt’s move to detain human rights campaigners as threats to national security, and does the same for similar measures by the governments of Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Burkina Faso." Available at http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=10992726owner=(IHT)26dat e=20030121123259. In our uni-polar world, the United States obviously sets an important example on these issues. As reflected in the foundational documents of the United Nations and many other such agreements, the international community has consistently affirmed the value of an independent judiciary to the defense of universally recognized human rights. In the crucible of actual practice within nations, many have looked to the United States model when developing independent judiciaries with the ability to check executive power in the defense of individual rights. Yet others have justified abuses by reference to the conduct of the United States. Far more influential than the words of Montesquieu and Madison are the actions of the United States. This case starkly presents the question of which model this Court will set for the world. CONCLUSION Much of the world models itself after this country’s two hundred year old traditions — and still more on its day to day implementation and expression of those traditions. To say that a refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case will have global implications is not mere rhetoric. Resting on this Court’s decision is not only the necessary role this Court has historically played in this country. Also at stake are the freedoms that many in emerging democracies around the globe seek to ensure for their peoples. 

7) That makes war impossible—liberal democratic norms through judicial globalization cause global peace

Kersch 6, Assistant Professor of Politics
~2006, Ken I. Kersch, Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University. B.A., Williams; J.D., Northwestern; Ph.D., Cornell. Thanks to the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University, where I was a visiting research scholar in the fall of 2005, and to the organizers of, and my fellow participants in, the Albany Law School Symposium, Albany Law School, "The Supreme Court and international relations theory.", http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Supreme+Court+and+international+relations+theory.-a0151714294~~
Liberal theories of international relations hold that international peace and prosperity are advanced to the
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. The liberal foreign policy outlook will thus fortify them against contemporary criticism.

8) The alternative is nuclear war

Muravchik 1
Joshua Muravchik, resident scholar The American Enterprise Institute, July 11-14, 2001
http://www.npec-web.org/syllabi/muravchik.htm
The greatest impetus for world peace — and perforce of nuclear peace — is the
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yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still more remote. 

9) The plan solves—making habeas meaningful is a critical avenue for the judiciary to reassert its role

Vaughn and Williams, Professors of Law, 13
~2013, Katherine L. Vaughns B.A. (Political Science), J.D., University of California at Berkeley. Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, and Heather L. Williams, B.A. (French), B.A. (Political Science), University of Rochester, J.D., cum laude, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, "OF CIVIL WRONGS AND RIGHTS: 1 KIYEMBA V. OBAMA AND THE MEANING OF FREEDOM, SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND THE RULE OF LAW TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11", Asian American Law Journal, Vol. 20, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148404~~
Just as significant as what Boumediene does do, is what it does not.
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important 2005 article, Cass Sunstein termed this phenomenon "National Security Fundamentalism."

10) Judicial action is critical to resolve the Kiyemba decisions and establish legitimate habeas laws

Milko 12
~Winter, 2012, Jennifer L. Milko, "Separation of Powers and Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Roles of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases and the Need for Supreme Guidance", 50 Duq. L. Rev. 173~
In light of the compelling arguments on both sides, several important issues have ambiguous
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potential of making this important right just a phrase with no underlying force.

11) Judicial globalism is inevitable—the only question is how the US shapes it—resting authority in the executive models judicial inaction

Krotoszynski 9, John C. Stone Chair, Director of Faculty Research, and Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law
~2009, Ronald J. Krotoszynski is a John C. Stone Chair, Director of Faculty Research, and Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law, "The Perils and the Promise of Comparative Constitutional Law: The New Globalism and the Role of the United States in Shaping Human Rights", 61 Ark. L. Rev. 603~
In thinking about the reality and effects of the new globalism, we should be
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Federal Constitutional Court to abdicate responsibility for articulating and enforcing local legal imperatives.