Tournament: UNLV | Round: 1 | Opponent: USC NP | Judge: Alyssa Lucas-Bolin
Inherency
US policy is vague on defining the threat of a cyber-attack.
Adkisson et al. 12 Carnagie Mellon University (CDR James Adkisson, Mr. Tokunbo Davies, LT Brian Evans,¶ Mr. Rick Lanchantin, Ms. Patty Walters, “Law of Armed Conflict:¶ Implications for Navy Cyber Strategy¶ Masters of Information Technology Strategy¶ Practicum – 2012”, http://www.cmu.edu/mits/files/random/mits-cohort1-practicumfinal-lawarmedconflict-implications-aug-2012.pdf)
The uncertain definition of the ‘use of force’…
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…ECO is conducted under U.S. Title 50 authorities that govern the operations of the Intelligence Community (IC).
No legal framework that governs cyber-attacks
Loon 12 (Collin Engelbert Peter van Loon Royal Netherlands Army , “Offensive Cyber What are the possibilities of the use of offensive cyber as an offensive capability within the existing international legal framework?”, https://cyberwar.nl/d/MSc-thesis_Offensive-Cyber_Collin-van-Loon_June-2012.pdf)
Offensive cyber operations are not covered by …
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…makes the need for a general international accepted cyber legal framework even more necessary
Plan Text
Plan: The United States Congress should substantially increase statutory restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by prohibiting non-retaliatory armed attacks in cyberspace authorized by the President of the United States.
Solvency
Equating destructive OCOs to armed attacks solves – States will be deterred
Waxman ’11 (Matthew C, Spring 2011, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy, Yale Journal of International Law, “Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4),” http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/36-2-waxman-cyber-attacks-and-the-use-of-force.pdf, pg 431-433) BVG
To whatever extent Article 2(4)’s meaning was settled and stable by the…
And
…giving rise to the right of military self-defense.54¶
Congressional restrictions on OCOs solve reckless use of OCOs
Bastby 12 (Chairwoman of the American Bar Association’s Privacy and Computer Crime Committee (Judy, CEO of Global Cyber Risk, “U.S. Administration's Reckless Cyber Policy Puts Nation at Risk” June 4, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jodywestby/2012/06/04/u-s-administrations-reckless-cyber-policy-puts-nation-at-risk/2/)
Perhaps more important than being out of the cyber coordination…
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…our nation at risk and demonstrates cyber irresponsiblity, not cyber leadership.
Norms are essential to solve — they can’t be created unless OCOs are addressed
Goldsmith 10 (Professor of Law at Harvard, Can we stop the Cyber Arms Race, Jack Goldsmith teaches at Harvard Law School and is on the Hoover Institution's Task Force on National Security and Law. He was a member of a 2009 National Academies committee that issued the report "Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities.", http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-01/opinions/36895669_1_botnets-cyber-attacks-computer-attacks)
In a speech this month on "Internet freedom," Secretary of State Hillary…
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…private cyber arms race in an arena where the offense already has a natural advantage.
Congress must initiate the restriction — anything else is perceived as abdication
Hansen and Friedman 9 (Professors at the New England School of Law, (Victor and Lawrence, The Case for Congress: Separation of Powers and the War on Terror, p.130)
The problem, of course, is that much of this congressional involvement has…
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…for Congress to stand up to an assertive and aggressive president.
Adv 1: Infrastructure
Current preemptive OCO policy backfires- creates priority confusion and drains cyber-defense resources
Healey ’13 (Jason Healey, 03/08/13, director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, US News and World Report, “Obama's Cyberwarfare Strategy Will Backfire,” http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/08/clandestine-american-strategy-on-cyberwarfare-will-backfire) ETB
America's generals and spymasters have…
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…resources dedicated for defense but overtakes other priorities as well.
Current focus on cyber-attack capability trades off with fixing critical cyber vulnerabilities
Rid 13 (Thomas Rid, 02/04/13, reader at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, “Cyber Fail
The Obama administration's lousy record on cyber security,” http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112314/obama-administrations-lousy-record-cyber-security#) ETB
But the rhetoric of war doesn't accurately describe much of what happened…
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…would have made some progress towards that goal, the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, has stalled indefinitely in the Senate.
First is the grid:
Grid attacks take out C and C – kills mission effectiveness and risks nuke war.
Tilford ’12 (Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, “Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast” 2012, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa)
To make matters worse a cyber attack that…
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…That could include the use of “nuclear weapons”, if authorized by the President.
Loss of mission effectiveness causes nuclear war in every hotspot – Key 2 Heg
Kagan and O’Hanlon 7
Frederick, resident scholar at AEI and Michael, senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April 2007, http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf
We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly…
AND
…at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.
Hegemony solves nuclear war and extinction – even if multipolarity is inevitable, US power is key to peaceful transition.
Barnett ‘11 (Thomas P.M., 03/07/11, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis and Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads) BVG
Events in Libya are a further reminder for…
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…setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.
Second are nuclear reactors:
Nuclear reactors are equipped with SCADA systems – SCADA systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks
Olson ’12 (Thomas Olson, 10/24/12, Staff Writer for TribLIVe, TribLIVe.com,” Westinghouse, McAfee to equip nuclear plants with new cybersecurity systems,” http://triblive.com/business/headlines/2830771-74/systems-nuclear-westinghouse-cyber-plants-control-power-attacks-cybersecurity-digital#axzz2AiqpCYsE) BVG
Amid growing concern about cyber attacks on America‘s infrastructure…
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…The company employs about 14,000 people, including about 6,000 in Western Pennsylvania, mostly at its headquarters.
Cyber attack causes multiple meltdowns
Modern Survival ’10 (Ken, Modern Survival, a blog based around the threats in the 21st century and how to survive them, “Cyber Terrorism – Nuclear Power Plants – Grid,” http://modernsurvivalblog.com/nuclear/cyber-terrorism-nuclear-power-plants-grid/) BVG
The recent discovery of the “Stuxnet” computer worm cyber-weapon…
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…changing world of uncertain times.
Meltdowns cause extinction
Lendman ’11 (Stephen, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization, 03/ 13, “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan,”, The People’s Voice http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan)
Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly…
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… impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event.
Adv 2: Satellites
US satellites vulnerable to hacking – commercial and defense satellites most vulnerable
Kurtin ’13 (Owen D, 05/08/13, Attorney focused on Biotech and Life Sciences, Communications and Media, IT, Satellites and Space; also Founder and Principal of investment firm The Vinland Group, Kurtin PLLC, The firm’s practice focuses on corporate, commercial, and regulatory representation for both mature and early stage companies, investors and lenders in the Biotechnology and Life Sciences, Communications and Media, Information Technologies and Satellites and Space sectors, “CLIENT ADVISORY: SATELLITE HACKING AND CYBERSECURITY,” http://www.kurtinlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Kurtin-PLLC-Satellite-Hacking-and-Cybersecurity-Client-Advisory.pdf) BVG
The growing threat of cyber-attacks and network hacking…
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…and perhaps even after it does, satellite hacking remains a credible and serious threat.
Cyber-attacks takeout satellites
Donahue, 10 – USAF Major (Jack, “CATASTROPHE ON THE HORIZON: A SCENARIO-BASED FUTURE EFFECT OF ORBITAL SPACE DEBRIS,” https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_af691818-359f-4999-be24-f88ca154bd94/display.aspx?rs=enginespage)
Another unpredictable driving force that needs to be considered is…
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…could significantly impact space systems for years.90
Loss of satellites risks miscalculation -~-- unique escalation to nuclear war
Tyson 07 (Rhianna Tyson, Program Officer of the Global Security Institute, “Advancing a Cooperative Security Regime in Outer Space,” Global Security Institute, May 2007, http://www.worldacademy.org/files/Advancing20a20Cooperative20Security20Regime20in20Outer20Space.pdf)
Beyond the severe economic repercussions resulting from disrupted commercial…
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…governments may resort to using nuclear weapons.
Independently undermines the balance of deterrence and leads to global preemptive aggression
Burke, 6 – Lt Col, USAF, command space professional with operational experience in missile operations, space surveillance, space control, missile warning, and command and control (Alan, “SPACE THREAT WARNING: FOUNDATION FOR SPACE SUPERIORITY, AVOIDING A SPACE PEARL HARBOR,” https://www.afresearch.org/skins/RIMS/display.aspx?moduleid=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153andmode=userandaction=researchprojectandobjectid=07acf878-3a5f-4a2c-8259-4a34c0717e9b)
The erosion of the US ability to execute the space threat…
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…awareness which decreased fratricide and facilitating search and rescue operations and reinforcement operations.49
Space-based cyber-warfare leads to space weaponization
Bowcott ’13 (Owen, 09/11/13, legal affairs correspondent, The Guardian, “Outer space demilitarisation agreement threatened by new technologies,” http://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/sep/11/outer-space-demilitarisation-weapons-technologies) BVG
Developments in satellite technologies and cyber-warfare are threatening…
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…Banks, telecommunications, power and many infrastructures could fail,
Space Weaponization ensures Arms Race – States will weaponize
Blazejewski ‘08 (Kenneth S, Spring 2008, private practice in New York City, focusing primarily on international ¶ corporate and financial transactions, master’s degree in public affairs from the Woodrow ¶ Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University School of Law, The Air University: Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf) BVG
First, if the United States proceeds with space weaponization China will …
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… decision not to launch the first space weapons program.
Space Weapons lead to all forms of war – causes extinction
Mitchell ‘01 (Dr. Gordon, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, “Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads”, No. 6 July, http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html)
A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of…
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…in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.
The lack of settled framework makes the threat of retaliation and counterstrike impossible – allowing counterstrikes solves
Kesan and Hayes 12 * Professor, H. Ross and Helen Workman Research Scholar, and Director of the Program in Intellectual Property and Technology Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Research Fellow, University of Illinois College of Law Jay P. Kesan* and Carol M. Hayes, MITIGATIVE COUNTERSTRIKING: SELF-DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE IN CYBERSPACE, Spring, 2012, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 25 Harv. J. Law and Tec 415
Ideas, computers, and intellectual property have become extremely important in the modern Information AgE…
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… approaches in order to afford these private parties more protection against these threats.
This solve future cyber conflict. Which escalates
Kramer et. al 12 (Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University. He served as the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1996 to 2001. Stuart H. Starr is also a distinguished research fellow in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University. He concurrently serves as the president of the Barcroft Research Institute. Larry Wentz is a senior research fellow in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University., “Cyberpower and National Security”)
Cyber attacks—hacking of various kinds—are a fact of modern life. …
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…in Iraq, seems different than dealing with a new problem where force has not already been used.
Mission failure is inevitable without Congressional deliberation
Griffin 12 – Professor of Constitutional Law @ Tulane University Stephen Griffin, “The Tragedy of the War Power: Presidential Decisionmaking from Truman to Obama,” APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper…
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…been used to approve wars since 1945.232 The question for the future is whether such a process is possible. Pg. 31-37
