Tournament: SFSU | Round: 1 | Opponent:  | Judge: 
Plan: The United States Congress should statutorily ban the preemptive use of offensive cyber operations by the President of the United States. 

Adv 1- Cyber War

Scenario 1 is cyber prolif:
Status quo offensive cyber operations by the US has set a precedent that is being modeled by other countries – leads to proliferation of cyberweapons
Gjelten 13
(Tom Gjelten, correspondent for NPR, “Pentagon Goes On The Offensive Against Cyberattacks” February 11, 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/02/11/171677247/pentagon-goes-on-the-offensive-against-cyber-attacks, KB)

With the Pentagon now officially recognizing cyberspace as a domain of warfare…

AND

…have given speeches and spoken at conferences and other public events.and#34;
Cyberweapons are proliferating at a rapid pace – it makes attacks likely on the US and allies
Walsh 11
(Eddie Walsh, The Diplomatand#39;s Pentagon (accredited) correspondent and a WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, “The Cyber Proliferation Threat” October 6, 2011, http://thediplomat.com/new-leaders-forum/2011/10/06/the-cyber-proliferation-threat/, KB)

The United States might not be quite as far ahead of other nations in…

AND

…the number of potential targets is almost infinite and not limited by geography.’

US vulnerability is at an all-time high – sectors are interconnected and a cyberattack would collapse mission effectiveness
Liff 12
(ADAM P. LIFF, Doctoral Candidate, Department of Politics, Princeton University, “Cyberwar: A New ‘Absolute Weapon’? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War” Journal of Strategic Studies¶ Volume 35, Issue 3, 2012 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2012.663252, KB)

Many argue that the most worrisome aspect of …

AND

…thereby¶ (potentially) further lowering the expected costs of an attack.
Loss of mission effectiveness causes nuclear war in every hotspot
Kagan and O’Hanlon 7
Frederick, resident scholar at AEI and Michael, senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April 2007, http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every…

AND

…measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.
An attack is likely - causes great power nuclear war
Fritz 9
Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament Jason, researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, former Army officer and consultant, and has a master of international relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” July, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in…

AND

…the need for compromising command and control centres directly.  

The plan solves – US norms against OCO’s is critical to reverse cyberweapon prolif
Goldsmith 10
Jack Goldsmith, teaches at Harvard Law School and is on the Hoover Institutionand#39;s Task Force on National Security and Law. He was a member of a 2009 National Academies committee, “Can we stop the cyber arms race?” February 01, 2010, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-01/opinions/36895669_1_botnets-cyber-attacks-computer-attacks, KB)

In a speech this month on and#34;Internet freedom…

AND

…exchange for reciprocal concessions by our adversaries.

?
Banning preemptive attacks is key – provides international credibility and deters attack

Clarke and Knake ‘12 (Richard (former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States) and Robert (Cybersecurity and homeland security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations), Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, Harper Collins Books, 2012, RSR)
Balancing our desire for military flexibility…

AND

…potential for international sanctions increased.

Scenario 2 is preemption:
Squo offensive cyber doctrine leads to preemptive attacks and arms races

Xu 2013 (Xu Longdi, PhD and Associate Research Fellow at the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing, April 10, 2013, “Obama Intensifies Cybersecurity Measures,” China Institute for International Studies, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-04/10/content_5864549.htm)
Intense moves by the U.S. are the newest in its assiduous efforts…

AND

…However, it is doubtful whether it could achieve this much-needed legitimacy for preemption.

Preemptive strikes cause escalation to shooting war

Clarke 2009 (Richard Clarke, special adviser to the president for cybersecurity in the George W. Bush administration and chairman of Good Harbor Consulting, November/December 2009, “War from Cyberspace,” The National Interest, http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/coursereading2011/Clarkecyber.pdf)
As in the 1960s, the speed of war is rapidly accelerating…

AND

…might well respond with “kinetic activity.”

That causes nuclear miscalc due to hair-trigger response

Clark and Andreasen 13
(Richard A. Clarke, the chairman of Good Harbor Security Risk Management, was special adviser to the president for cybersecurity in the George W. Bush administration. Steve Andreasen, a consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, was the National Security Council’s staff director for defense policy and arms control from 1993 to 2001, “Cyberwar’s threat does not justify a new policy of nuclear deterrence” June 14, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-14/opinions/39977598_1_nuclear-weapons-cyber-attack-cyberattacks, KB)

President Obama is expected to unveil a new nuclear policy initiative…

AND

…centers could ultimately lead to shared approaches to cybersecurity, including agreements related to limiting cyberwar.

Banning preemptive attacks solves

Clarke and Knake ‘10
Richard Alan Clarke is the former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States. Robert K. Knake, Former international affairs fellow in residence @ CFR. Cyber War. ETB

In nuclear war strategy, the Soviet Union proposed that we and…

AND

…not want to provoke a cyber phase to a war.

Adv 2- SOP

Lack of congressional oversight on cyber operations undermines SOP
Lorber 13
Eric, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University
Department of Political Science. Journal Of Constitutional Law 15.3 https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013. ETB

Yet addressing these questions is increasingly important for two reasons…

AND

…executive’s commander-in-chief power15 and Congress’s war-making ¶ authority.16

Constraining a militarized cyberwar policy is key to soft power.

Belk and Noyes ‘12
(Robert (Naval aviator and Politico-Military Fellow, studying international and global affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School) and Matthew (studies international security policy and is a senior associate with the cybersecurity practice at Good Harbor Consulting), “On the Use of Offensive Cyber Capabilities: A Policy Analysis on Offensive US Cyber Policy”, 3-20-12, Office of Naval Research, RSR)

Over the past decade, hard power has dominated U.S…

AND

…drive the way it is perceived ¶ abroad and hence the way such an operation affects American soft power.

Soft power prevents extinction – disease, climate change, terrorism, and great power war
Joseph Nye 8 is professor of international relations at Harvard University, “American Power After the Financial Crises,” http://www.foresightproject.net/publications/articles/article.asp?p=3533, DOA: 7-23-13, y2k
Power always depends on context, and in todayand#39;s world, it is distributed in a pattern…

AND

…country cannot achieve its aims without the help of others.

Even small violations of separation of powers must be avoided like nuclear war risks
Redish and Cisar 91    professor of law at Northwestern and Law Clerk to Chief Judge William Bauer, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
Martin H. and Elizabeth J., December 1991, IF ANGELS WERE TO GOVERNand#34; *: THE NEED FOR PRAGMATIC FORMALISM IN SEPARATION OF POWERS THEORY ,1992 Duke Law Journal, 41 Duke L.J. 449, p. 474
In summary, no defender of separation of powers…

AND

…forced into the position of saying, “I told you so.”

Early SOP key to prevent escalation of prez powers and massive inter-branch conflict
Taylor- Robinson and Ura 12 (Michelle M, Joseph, and#34;Public opinion and conflict in the separation of powers: Understanding the Honduran coup of 2009,and#34; Journal of Theoretical Politics, Oct 9, jtp.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/07/0951629812453216.full.pdf)
Finally, our model shows that once inter-institutional…

AND

…to resolving a con?ict¶ once it has emerged.

Interbranch conflict causes extinction
Linda S. Jamison, Deputy Director of Governmental Relations @ CSIS, Spring 1993, Executive-Legislative Relations after the Cold War, Washington Quarterly, v.16, n.2, p. 189

Indeed there are very few domestic issues that do not…

AND

…an intense political dialogue that goes beyond the executive branch (Mann 1990, 28-29).
Congressional failure to act leads to massive expansion in prez power- action needed now
Dycus 10
Stephen, Professor, Vermont Law School. JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW andPOLICY 4.155.
http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/11_Dycus.pdf ETB

If Congress now fails to enact guidelines for…

AND

…participate in the formulation of national policy.

Even small violations of separation of powers must be avoided like nuclear war risks
Redish and Cisar 91    professor of law at Northwestern and Law Clerk to Chief Judge William Bauer, United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
Martin H. and Elizabeth J., December 1991, IF ANGELS WERE TO GOVERNand#34; *: THE NEED FOR PRAGMATIC FORMALISM IN SEPARATION OF POWERS THEORY ,1992 Duke Law Journal, 41 Duke L.J. 449, p. 474
In summary, no defender of separation of powers…

AND

...into the position of saying, “I told you so.”
Tyranny must be rejected 

Petro 74 Sylvester Petro, professor of law at Wake Forest, Spring 1974, Toledo Law Review, p. 480
However, one may still insist on echoing Ernest…

AND

…emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

Solvency

NFU for large-scale attacks reduces the risk of cyberattack

Owens et al. ‘9
William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, editors, ¶ Committee on Offensive Information Warfare, National Research Council. http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NRC-Report.pdf ETB

No first use of large-scale cyberattacks…

AND

…lower likelihood that it would experience such an ¶ attack.

Congressional action is critical to cyber expertise and preserves presidential flexibility

Dycus ‘10
Stephen, Professor, Vermont Law School. JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW andPOLICY 4.155.
http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/11_Dycus.pdf ETB

Congress’s active role in the development and implementation of…

AND

…expertise and experiences to work together to meet these challenges, as the ¶ Framers intended.
Congressional oversight solves cyberwar -  creates checks and transparency.
Healey and Wilson ‘13 (Jason (director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council) and A.J. (visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council), “Cyber Conflict and the War Powers¶ Resolution: Congressional Oversight¶ of Hostilities in the Fifth Domain”, Atlantic Council, Issue Brief, February 2013, RSR)
The administration’s interpretation of “hostilities…

AND

…Even in¶ cyberspace, there is a voice for both branches.