### 1st Off

#### Sexual difference must come first- the ethical informs the political and this politics refuses the reduction of woman to the male subject

Braidotti 2011

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

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This implies the redefinition of the relationship of power to knowledge within feminism: as women of ideas devoted to the elaboration of the theory and practice of sexual difference, we are responsible for the very notions that we enact and empower. Thinking justly— of justness and not only of justice— is a top item in our agenda. This ethical dimension is for me as important as the political imperative. Feminist thinking cannot be purely strategic, i.e., the expression of a political will, it must rather attempt to be adequate as a representation of experience. Feminist theorizing must be adequate conceptually, as well as being suitable politically: one’s relationship to thinking is the prototype of a different relationship to alterity altogether. If we lose sight of this ethical, relational foundation of thinking, that is to say, the bond that certain discourses create among us, we are indeed in danger of homologation and therefore of purely strategic or instrumental kinds of thought. There can be no justice without justness, no political truth without adequation of our words, our ideas, and consequently our thought to the project of redefining female subjectivity in a nonlogocentric mode. As a consequence, the first priority for feminist theory today is to redefine the subject as a gendered unity inextricably connected to the other. For feminism, in the beginning there is alterity, the nonone, a multiplicity. The founding agent is the common corpus of female subjects who posit themselves theoretically and politically as a collective subject. This communal bond comes first— then and only then there arises the question of what political line to enforce. It is the ethical that defines the political and not vice versa: hence the importance of positing the feminist audience as the receptive, active participant in a discursive exchange that aims at changing the very rules of the game. This is the feminist community to which the “she-I” makes herself accountable. The paradox of the ontological basis of desire is that not only is it intersubjective, but it also transcends the subject. Desire also functions as the threshold for a redefinition of a new common plane of experience: “each woman is the woman of all women . . . ” The recognition of a common ground of experience as women mutually engaged in a political task of resistance to “Woman”—the dominant view of female subjectivity— lays the foundation for new images and symbolizations of the feminist subject. If we take as our starting point sexual difference as the positive affirmation of my facticity as a woman, working through the layers of complexity of the signifier “I, woman,” we end up opening a window onto a new genderized bond among different women. Identity politics is, in feminism, a collective project. By genderized collective subjectivity I mean a symbolic dimension proper to women in recognition of the nonreductability of the feminine to the masculine and yet, at the same time, of the indestructible unity of the human as an embodied self structurally linked to the other. It is the complex intersecting of never-ending levels of differing of self from other and self from self. As Adriana Cavarero (1990) put it: what is at stake in this is the representability of a feminine subject as a self-representing entity. It is less a question of founding the subject than of elucidating the categories by which the female feminist subject can be adequately represented. This is an important political gesture because thinking through the fullness of one’s complexity in the force of one’s transcendence is something women have never historically been able to afford. What seems to be at stake in the project of sexual difference, through the extreme sexualization of the subject, is a Nietzschean transmutation of the very value we give to the human and to a universal notion of commonness, of common belonging. I will want to argue that the aim of this transmutation of values is to be able to bring the multilayered structure of the subject to the fore. As Lispector points out: “the life in me does not have my name, “I” is not the owner of the portion of being that constitutes his being. To the extent that “she-I” accepts this, can “she-I” become the woman of all women and be accountable for her humanness? Only this highly defined notion of singularity can allow us to posit a new general sense of being: only situated perspectives can legitimate new general standpoints. In this sense, the experience of utter singularity that G.H. undergoes in her microcosm remains emblematic of the process of women becoming other than the “Woman” they were expected and socialized into being. G.H. shows us paths of transcendence specific to our gender and to women’s own, discontinuous time of becoming.

#### Deliberation and democracy are founded upon the exclusion of women- the “public sphere” acts as a marker of the universal bourgeois, male class

Fraser 90

[Nancy Fraser. Rethinking the Public Sphere. Social Text. No 25/26.]

Now, let me juxtapose to this sketch of Habermas's account an alternative account that I shall piece together from some recent revisionist historiography. Briefly, scholars like Joan Landes, Mary Ryan, and Geoff Eley contend that Habermas's account idealizes the liberal public sphere. They argue that, despite the rhetoric of publicity and accessibility, that official public sphere rested on, indeed was importantly constituted by, a number of significant exclusions. For Landes, the key axis of exclusion is gender; she argues that the ethos of the new republican public sphere in France was constructed in deliberate opposition to that of a more woman- friendly salon culture that the republicans stigmatized as "artificial," "effeminate," and "aristocratic." Consequently, a new, austere style of public speech and behavior was promoted, a style deemed "rational," "virtuous," and "manly." In this way, masculinist gender constructs were built into the very conception of the republican public sphere, as was a logic that led, at the height of Jacobin rule, to the formal exclusion from political life of women.4 Here the republicans drew on classical traditions that cast femininity and publicity as oxymorons; the depth of such traditions can be gauged in the etymological connection between "public" and "pubic," a graphic trace of the fact that in the ancient world possession of a penis was a requirement for speaking in public. (A similar link is preserved, incidentally, in the etymological connection between "testimony" and "testicle.")5 Extending Landes's argument, Geoff Eley contends that exclusion are operations were essential to liberal public spheres not only in France but also in England and Germany, and that in all these countries gender exclusions were linked to other exclusions rooted in processes of class formation. In all these countries, he claims, the soil that nourished the liberal public sphere was "civil society," the emerging new congeries of voluntary associations that sprung up in what came to be known as "the age of societies." But this network of clubs and associations-philanthropic, civic, professional, and cultural-was anything but accessible to everyone. On the contrary, it was the arena, the training ground, and eventually the power base of a stratum of bourgeois men, who were coming to see themselves as a "universal class" and preparing to assert their fitness to govern. Thus, the elaboration of a distinctive culture of civil society and of an associated public sphere was implicated in the process of bourgeois class formation; its practices and ethos were marker of "distinction" in Pierre Bourdieu's sense,6 ways of defining an emerge elite, setting it off from the older aristocratic elites it was intent on displacing, on the one hand, and from the various popular and plebeian strata it aspired to rule, on the other. This process of distinction, more over, helps explain the exacerbation of sexism characteristic of the liberal public sphere; new gender norms enjoining feminine domesticity and a sharp separation of public and private spheres functioned as key signifier of bourgeois difference from both higher and lower social strata. It is a measure of the eventual success of this bourgeois project that these norms later became hegemonic, sometimes imposed on, sometimes embraced by, broader segments of society.7 Now, there is a remarkable irony here, one that Habermas's account of the rise of the public sphere fails fully to appreciate.s A discourse of publicity touting accessibility, rationality, and the suspension of status hierarchies is itself deployed as a strategy of distinction. Of course, in and of itself, this irony does not fatally compromise the discourse of publicity; that discourse can be, indeed has been, differently deployed in different circumstances and contexts. Nevertheless, it does suggest that the relationship between publicity and status is more complex than Habermas intimates, that declaring a deliberative arena to be a space where extant status distinctions are bracketed and neutralized is not sufficient to make it so.

#### Men in feminism, even queer activists and theorists, cannot participate in feminism because they have not experienced the historical oppression on the basis of sex-results in metaphysical cannibalism in which men become subversive at the expense of the subjectivity of woman

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In spite of my commitment to joyful, positive affirmation of alternative values, according to the Dionysian spirit of nomadic philosophy, there are times when a dose of resentful criticism appears as irresistible as it is necessary. Such is the case whenever I cast an ironic glance at “male-stream” poststructuralist philosophy. The question I will start of with is what is the position of men in feminism. How does the nomadic feminist look upon this issue? There is something both appealing and suspect in the notion of “men in feminism,” like many of the other contributors, my gaze lingers on the preposition “IN” wondering about the spatial dimension it throws open. Is it the battleground for the eternal war of the sexes? Is the space where bodily sexed subjectivities come to a head-on collision? I can only envisage this topic as a knot of interconnected tensions, an area of intense turmoil, a set of contradictions. Somewhere along the line, I am viscerally opposed to the whole idea: men aren’t and shouldn’t be IN feminism: the feminist space is not theirs and not for them to see. Thus the discursive game we are trying to play is either profoundly precarious or perversely provocative— or both at once. A sort of impatience awakens in me at the thought of a whole class/caste of men who are fascinated, puzzled, and intimidated by the sight of a penhandling female intelligentsia of the feminist kind. I do not know what is at stake in this for them and thus, to let my irony shine through between the lines, I am tempted to de/reform a sign and write, instead of phallic subtexts, “men in Pheminism.” Why insist on a letter, for instance? Contextual Constraints Of all Foucault ever taught me, the notion of the “materiality of ideas” has had the deepest impact. One cannot make an abstraction of the network of truth and power formations that govern the practice of one’s enunciation; ideas are sharp-edged discursive events that cannot be analyzed simply in terms of their propositional content. There is something incongruous for me to be sitting here in ethnocentric messed up Europe, thinking about “men in Pheminism.” I cannot say this is a major problem in my mind or in the context within which I am trying to live. There is something very American, in a positive sense, about this issue. The interest that American men display in feminism reflects a specific historical and cultural context: one in which feminist scholarship has made it to the cutting edge of the academic scene. This is not the case in Europe yet. As a European feminist I feel both resistant to and disenchanted with the reduction of feminism to “feminist theory” and the confining of both within academic discourse. This attitude points out a danger that the pioneers of women’s studies courses emphasized from the start: that our male “allies” may not be able to learn how to respect the material foundations, experiential bases, and hence the complexity of the issues raised by feminism. Following a century-old mental habit that Adrienne Rich (1977) analyzes so lucidly, men-in-feminism, however, cannot resist the temptation of short-circuiting this complexity. In a drive to straighten out feminist theory and practice, they streamline the feminist project in a mold. Blinded by what they have learned to recognize as “theory,” they bulldoze their way through feminism as if it were not qualitatively different from any other academic discipline. They are walking all over us. “They” are those white, middle-class male intellectuals who have “got it right” in that they have sensed where the subversive edge of feminist theory is. “They” are a very special generation of postbeat, preneoconfortyto-fifty-year-old men who have “been through” the upheavals of the 1960s and have inherited the values and the neuroses of that period. “They” are the “new men” in the “postfeminist” context of the politically reactionary 1990s. “They” are the best male friends we’ve got, and “they” are not really what we had hoped for. “They” can circle round women’s studies departments in crisis-struck arts faculties, knowing that here’s one of the few areas of the academy tht is still expanding financially with student enrollment at both undergraduate and graduate levels. “They” play the academic career game with great finesse, knowing the rule about feminist politics of locations and yet ignoring it. “They” know that feminist theory is the last bastion of constructive radical thought amidst the ruins of the postmodern gloom. “They” are conscious of the fact that the debate about modernity and beyond is coextensive with the woman question. Some of them are gay theorists and activists whose political sensibility may be the closest to feminist concerns. Next are heterosexual “ladies men,” whose preoccupation with the feminine shines for its ambiguity. What the heterosexual men are lacking intellectually— the peculiar blindness to sexual difference for which the term sexism is an inadequate assessment— is a reflection on their position in history. The politics of location is just not part of their genealogical legacy. They have not inherited a world of oppression and exclusion based on their sexed corporal being; they do not have the lived experience of oppression because of their sex. Thus most of them fail to grasp the specificity of feminism in terms of its articulation of theory and practice, of thought and life. Maybe they have no alternative. It must be very uncomfortable to be a male, white, middle-class, heterosexual intellectual at a time in history when so many minorities and oppressed groups are speaking up for themselves; a time when the hegemony of the white knowing subject is crumbling. Lacking the historical experience of oppression on the basis of sex, they paradoxically lack a minus. Lacking the lack, they cannot participate in the great ferment of ideas that is shaking up Western culture: it must be very painful, indeed, to have no option other than being the empirical referent of the historical oppressor of women, asked to account for his atrocities. The problem, in my perspective, is that the exclusion of women and the denigration of the feminine— or of blackness— are not just a small omission that can be fixed with a little good will. Rather, they point to the underlying theme in the textual and historical continuity of masculine self-legitimation and ideal self-projection (Lloyd 1985; Benjamin 1980). It’s on the woman’s body— on her absence, her silence, her disqualification— that phallocentric discourse rests. This sort of “metaphysical cannibalism,” which Ti-Grace Atkinson (1974) analyzed in terms of uterus envy, positions the woman as the silent groundwork of male subjectivity— the condition of possibility for his story. Psychoanalytic theory, of the Freudian or the Lacanian brand, circles around the question of origins— the mother’s body— by elucidating the psychic mechanisms that make the paternal presence, the father’s body, necessary as a figure of authority over her. Following Luce Irigaray, I see psychoanalysis as a patriarchal discourse that apologizes for and provides a political anatomy of metaphysical canni­ balism: the silencing of the powerfulness of the feminine (potentia). Refusing to dissociate the discourse about the feminine, the maternal, from the historical realities of the condition and status of women in Western culture, Irigaray equates the metaphorization of women (the feminine, the maternal) with their victimization or historical oppression. One does not become a member of the dark continent, one is born into it. The question is how to transform this century-old silence into a presence of women as subjects in every aspect of existence. I am sure “they” know this, don’t “they”?

#### The Jirga is a sexist and male dominated institution women are blocked from meaningful participation

Saferworld, 2012

[CAMP (Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme) and Saferworld, The Jirga: justice and conflict transformation, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/The%20Jirga%20justice%20and%20conflict%20transformation.pdf] /Wyo-MB

Currently, the Jirga system is not representative or inclusive of the communities it ¶ serves, with marginalised and vulnerable groups, including women and minority ¶ groups, excluded from directly participating in and influencing Jirga decisions.¶ At present, women are not allowed to participate directly in Jirga, however they can be ¶ represented by entrusting a male member to advocate for them. Women’s engagement ¶ has traditionally been constrained by the predominance of male Jirga members and ¶ their reluctance to encourage female participation. As one respondent noted, “The ¶ Jirga, a purely male institution, neither sanctions women as member, nor witness or a ¶ complainant. Women may access Jirga only through a male relative. In case of grievances ¶ against her male relatives, no recourse whatsoever is available”.50

#### Splitting of the atom is a symptom of man’s persistence in his refusal to reunite with and affirm his body and the female body-only through this affirmation does the destruction of humynkind become unthinkable

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

To forget being is to forget the air, this first fluid given us gratis and free of interest in the mother's blood, given us again when we are born, like a natural profusion that raises a cry of pain: the pain of a being who comes into the world and is abandoned, forced henceforth to live without the immediate assistance of another body. Unmitigated mourning for the intrauterine nest, elemental homesickness that man will seek to assuage through his work as builder of worlds, and notably of the dwelling which seems to form the essence of his maleness: language. In all his creations, all his works, man always seems to neglect thinking of himself as flesh, as one who has received his body as that primary home (that Gestell, as Heidegger would say, when, in "Logos," the seminar on Heraclitus, he recognizes that what metaphysics has not begun to address is the issue of the body) which determines the possibility of his coming into the world and the potential opening of a horizon of thought, of poetry, of celebration, that also includes the god or gods. The fundamental dereliction in our time may be interpreted as our failure to remember or prize the element that is indispensable to life in all its manifestations: from the lowliest plant and animal forms to the highest. Science and technology are reminding men of their careless neglect by forcing them to consider the most frightening question possible, the question of a radical polemic: the destruction of the universe and of the human race through the splitting of the atom and its exploitation to achieve goals that are beyond our capacities as mortals.

#### The alternative:

#### The United States federal government should affirm the opposition of the female only Jirga to the authority of the President of the United States to conduct targeted killing in Pakistan.

#### We must start with female only Jirga’s—it is key to resist gender oppression without interference from men

AFP, 7-11-13

[News service, Women challenge men in Pakistan's first female Jirga, http://tribune.com.pk/story/575530/women-challenge-men-in-pakistans-first-female-jirga/] /Wyo-MB

Then they were sent a message by the local jirga, a group of male tribal elders that functions as a decision-making council in Pashtun society, advising them to marry one of their sons to one of Khan’s sisters by way of recompense for Tahira.

Bano refused to do so and was still fuming when she heard that a group of female activists had set up a women’s only jirga in Saidu Sharif, the twin town of Mingora, the largest city in Swat.

“We’re fed up with male-only jirgas which decide only in favour of men and sacrifice women for their own mistakes,” said Tabbassum Adnan, 35, head of the 25-member jirga.

“We simply can’t leave women at the mercy of the male jirgas,” she told AFP at the jirga’s small office.

Adnan raised Bano’s case and organised protests demanding legal action against Tahira’s husband in connection with her murder.

Her efforts persuaded police to register a case against Khan but he has since gone on the run. Adnan has provided Bano with a lawyer to fight her daughter’s case.

Fighting for women’s rights

Dissatisfaction with mainstream justice is common in Pakistan, where it can take years to process a case through the courts.

Taliban insurgents were emboldened by complaints that the courts were too corrupt and too slow, and tribal jirgas present the most viable alternative.

But they typically ignore or discriminate against women’s rights. Women are often sold in marriage to seek forgiveness for men’s crimes, their fates decided without consultation.

Adnan says she first asked to join the main Swat Qaumi Aman Jirga to ensure justice for women, but they refused.

“So, we have formed our own jirga now and we will decide cases involving women,” she said, wearing a traditional black veil that covers her hair and body.

“Our only aim is to provide legal support to women which we are doing by involving police and government authorities,” she added.

Adnan, who divorced her husband after 20 years of what she called a troubled marriage, said her jirga is called Khwaindo Tolana, which means “sister’s group”.

It was born out of the result of a women’s empowerment programme run by a local aid group.

“The tremendous response by women motivated us to organise a separate jirga to fight for their rights,” Adnan said.

She claims to far have helped 11 women get justice.

But the response from the men’s jirga has been lukewarm at best.

Ahmed Shah, a spokesman for Swat Qaumi Aman Jirga, confirmed to AFP that the women had tried to approach them, asking to join but he said this was “impossible” in Pashtun society.

In private, many members of the male jirga dismiss the women’s effort as ridiculous.

The conviction rate is also so weak in Pakistan, which others say will limit the jirga’s influence if its decisions are not enforced.

But for Saima Anwar, who claims to be the first female lawyer to have practised in Swat, it is a vital first step.

“This jirga is a good effort. It will provide women a platform and help them win their rights without fear or the interference of men,” she said.

We must reinterpret everything through the lens of sexual difference to allow for a fecund relationship between all beings

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

Sexual difference is one of the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age. According to Heidegger, each age has one issue to think through, and one only. Sexual difference is prQbably the issue in our time which could be our "salvation" if we thought it through. But, whether I turn to philosophy, to science, or to religion, I find this underlying issue still cries out in vain for our attention. Think of it as an approach that would allow us to check the many forms that destruction takes in our world, to counteract a nihilism that merely affirms the reversal or the repetitive proliferation of status quo values-whether you call them the consumer society, the circularity of discourse, the more or less cancerous diseases of our age, the unreliability of words, the end of philosophy, religious despair or regression to religiosity, scientis tic or technical imperialism that fails to consider the living subject. Sexual difference would constitute the horizon of worlds more fecund than any known to date-at least in the West-and without reducing fecundity to the reproduction of bodies and flesh. For loving partners this would be a fecundity of birth and regeneration, but also the production of a new age of thought, art, poetry, and language: the creation of a new poetics. Both in theory and in practice, everything resists the discovery and affirmation of such an advent or event. In theory, philosophy wants to be literature or rhetoric, wishing either to break with ontology or to regress to the ontological. Using the same ground and the same framework as "first philosophy," working toward its disintegration but without proposing any other goals that might assure new foundations and new works. In politics, some overtures have been made to the world of women. But these overtures remain partial and local: some concessions have been made by those in power, but no new values have been established. Rarely have these measures been thought through and affirmed by women themselves, who consequently remain at the level of critical demands. Has a worldwide erosion of the gains won in women's struggles occurred because of the failure to lay foundations different from those on which the world of men is constructed? Psychoanalytic theory and therapy, the scenes of sexuality as such, are a long way from having effected their revolution. And with a few exceptions, sexual practice today is often divided between two parallel worlds: the world of men and the world of women. A nontraditional, fecund encounter between the sexes barely exists. It does not voice its demands publicly, except through certain kinds of silence and polemics. A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if the work of sexual difference is to take place. We need to reinterpret everything concerning the relations between the subject and discourse, the subject and the world, the subject and the cosmic,' the microcosmic and the macrocosmic. Everything, beginning with the way in which the subject has always been written in the masculine form, as man, even when it claimed to be universal or neutral. Despite the fact that man-at least in French-rather than being neutral, is sexed.

### Case

#### Aff can’t solve- public deliberation on war policies will inevitably fail because governments distort their knowledge

Keller and Mitchell 06

(William Walton and Gordon R., Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy, Pg. 117//wyo-mm)

Administration critics claim that the failure to find nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons in Iraq quite strongly suggests that the administration distorted the prewar debate about Iraq. This is a very serious concern. Government participants in national security debates can undercut the purpose of public deliberation by employing what communications scholar Gordon Mitchell calls “strategic deception.”5 Such governmental trickery is troublesome on matters of war and peace because official participants in public debates about national security policy have substantial advantages over nongovernmental participants. Their job titles grant them authority and credibility, which is further secured by their unique access to classified information.16’ Public debate about national security will be greatly distorted in their favor if authoritative figures exploit their advantages by dubiously overemphasizing evidence that supports their arguments and by ignoring and/or blocking the release of countervailing evidence and caveats. Many political theorists and analysts argue that open and inclusive political debate rewards the ideas that best withstand critical scrutiny in the political mar ketplace.’7 Indeed, this is a position often taken by classic liberal theorists like John Stuart Mill and Frankfurt-school critical theorists such as Jürgen Habermas. The evidence presented in this chapter substantiates the great danger of distorted debate about the alleged need for preventive war.

#### Drones are intimately tied to the masculine gaze- like rape, drone warfare is normalized violence that we are terrified of and yet culture legitimates the use of rape and drones as tools of war- taking back the archetypes of drones and sexual difference is key

Rothstein 2012

[Adam Rothstein, November 23rd, 2012, regular contributor at The State, The New Inquiry, and Thizome, and The Atlantic Tech, , uwyo//amp]

The ethical problem with voyeurism is not simply that rape may follow. And the ethical problem with drone warfare is not simply that it is asymmetric, inhumane, imperialist, or a war crime. Behaviors, technology, and strategies that exploit the distribution of power to cause pain and suffering has existed for a long time. But there is a difference with drones. Unlike earlier horrors–atom bombs, mustard gas, machine guns, etc–we conceive of this new sort of terror technology as somehow normal, even though it is distinctly new. It is not thought of as a killing machine. it is just computers, cameras, GPS, apps, and radio-controlled aircraft. This is what makes it New Aesthetic–it stands out as terrible and shocking, but while remaining incredibly familiar. We are supposedly “terrified” of the reality of drone warfare, and yet we like drones. We want to ban drones in the same way we want to ban guns–we propose a solution that we know very well is impossible. We hate drones and love them at the same time, like our booze, like our drugs, and like our violent, occular sex.¶ In the discourse of psychoanalysis, the gaze is a primarily a means for visually recording knowledge and interpolating it into our thought processes. Luce Irigaray criticized Freud and Lacan for rooting this gaze in the presence or absence of the phallus–automatically putting women at a disadvantage in this distribution of knowledge.¶ “Nothing to be seen is equivalent to having no thing. No being and no truth.” – Irigaray, The Sex Which Is Not One¶ The ethical flaw of both drones and the gaze is in its distribution and its control. Outside of the discourse of psychoanalysis, distribution is still controlled by privileged power regime. Drones are controlled by the State, and the supporters of rape culture control the gaze. These do not have to be tools of violence, but because of who holds the controls, they are made to be. It is a fact that technology allows us to observe, record, and track each other. But it is through the archetype of Drones that we have internalized the notion that the State can be the arbiter of this power. It is a fact that sex is visual, and visual performance is the means by which we will always read and express our desire. But it is through the archetypes of culturally abstracted sex that we have internalized the idea that if you see something you can touch it, if you observe a sexuality, it is yours to own. By dealing with these abstractions as ideas rather than accessible behaviors and technologies, we limit our ability to reorient their distribution to benefit our own bodies, and those of our consenting partners and communities. We only know drones the way the State knows drones. We only see sex the way rape culture sees sex. Internalizing these distributions in the abstract, we do what these power regimes would already have us do. We ignore the sexuality of others if it is not a visible thing–we equate what one-can-see to all-that-is. Contemporary politics ignores democracy that does include surveillance–If you’re not doing anything wrong, you should not be hiding, and if you are not voting, you should not be speaking. It is not that drones and the gaze are part of politics and sexuality, it is that by reducing our awareness of these things to their archetypes, there cannot be any surplus politics or sexuality outside of these limited terrains which we are allowed to control. With seeing, comes a notion of being. We are beginning to call it telepresence–our ability to be in a space or travel through a space constituted by our technological visual engagement with that space. But what we require, just as we always have, is a deeper engagement with the environment. We require telepraxis. It is not enough to simply observe the archetype, we must engage and perform with it to the point of fetish–the point at which it is no longer simply a signifier for what culture decides that it means, but it is part of a living relationship and performance with individuals other than ourselves.¶ This is a difficult thing to do right, and rape culture and drone wars are the sign of our continuing failure. These archetypes, like Foucault’s Panopticon, do not just symbolize a particular way that things might happen, but signify a strong magnetic tendency of culture, pulling all signification in line with this particular regime. Like the phallus of psychoanalysis, the only meaning given credence is meaning translated through this regime. This is not an idle pattern, but feedback loop reinforcing itself. “The discipline of the workshop, while remaining a way of enforcing respect for the regulations and authorities, of preventing thefts or losses, tends to increase aptitudes, speeds, output and therefore profits; it still exerts a moral influence over behavior, but more and more it treats actions in terms of their results, introduces bodies into a machinery, forces into an economy.” – Foucault, Discipline and Punish¶ Just because there is lots of money and privilege tied up into rape culture and the surveillance state, is not the reason we say this is a class issue. Like an economic class, these systems exist solely to perpetuate themselves, and those who benefit by them, at the expense of others. Nor is it enough to say that these systems disproportionately harm lower economic classes. Each is in fact, it’s own sort of class–a technological and epistemological class. Rape culture is a class. Surveillance culture is a class. It is not enough to find the way that drones and the gaze are being maligned, subverted, and distributed in order to harm others and criticize it. One cannot simply point out the existence of a class. Class is something that must be fought. We must create a contesting praxis, that will pull the sexual gaze and drones back from these power regimes, and use them to smash the negative archetypes. This is a terrain worth fighting over, because it is the only terrain on which human beings live and knows themselves.

#### Concentration of executive power, indefinite detention, military invasion, etc. are all derivative of the phallocentric economy’s desire to protect the phallus via fetishism- through the denigration of woman, the phallus is praised and naturalized-in the same way, the US is able to make blatant human rights abuses while renarrativizing the U.S. as a beacon for justice

Chanter 2011

[Tina Chanter, 2011, Whose Antigone? The Marginalization of Slavery, uwyo//amp]

If, as Michel Foucault suggests, the operation of power should no longer be framed in terms of state, sovereignty, and the law, but rather in terms of biopolitics and technologies of the self, Antigone’s conflict with Creon might seem to have lost its relevance to the modern democratic state. 2 Yet if Giorgio Agamben is right to suggest that “the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power . . . cannot be separated” and if “the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original— if concealed— nucleus of sovereign power,” we cannot afford to neglect the processes by which sovereignty seeks to maintain itself, as illusory as the fictions of sovereignty might prove to be. 3 Neither has it escaped notice that the progressive abandonment of the rule of law in the United States under George Bush’s presidency was accompanied by an extraordinary concentration of executive power, to the point where the safeguards intended to be guaranteed by constitutional separation of powers, like so much else under his administration, no longer seemed to retain their efficacy. This consolidation of power, while not perhaps identical with sovereign power, begins to look an awful lot like it. This in turn suggests an amendment to Agamben’s rejoinder to Foucault. Agamben cites Aristotle’s distinction between the head of an estate ( oikonomos ) and the head of the family ( despote ¯s ) on the one hand, and the politician on the other hand. 4 This is the very distinction that Creon’s relation to Antigone puts into question, since he is both her kurios , or guardian, and her king. It is the rigidity of this distinction between ruler of the household, or estate— which includes not only goods but also slaves— and the ruler of the polis that Agamben displaces when he locates in the differentiation between the two the hidden origin of the logic according to which those who are excluded from the polis and consigned to bare life are in a certain sense also incorporated into or included within the political. 5 Such a logic anticipates the transformation of politics into biopolitics, where the bare life of the subject comes to be administered not by the state, but by subjects themselves, through subjectivation. By making the concentration camp the “hidden matrix,” the “nomos” of the political space in which we are still living (HS 166), Agamben both remains beholden to narratives that insist on identifying Europe as the originating locus of our political and philosophical paradigms— as if Europe’s trauma must be the foundational, orchestrating trauma— and at the same time declines any serious consideration of the gendered dynamics that underlie the separation of bare life from the proper forms of life as politically and ethically defined by Aristotle. This is despite the fact that the hallmark of the “simple natural life” that is “excluded from the polis in the strict sense” and “confined” to the “oikos, home” is reproduction (HS 2). Given that reproductive life is definitive of life understood as zoe ¯ , that is, “the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods),” rather than life understood as “ bios , which indicated the form or way of being proper to an individual or group” (HS 2) and given how crucial this differentiation becomes for understanding bare life, one might have expected the presuppositions that designated some individuals as only suitable for the administration of life in the home, while others were designated as suited for the political life of the community, to become a matter of interrogation. That is, one might have expected the assumptions about women and slaves that informed their confinement to the private sphere of the household, and their exclusion from participation in political life, to become a theme for investigation. One might have hoped for a critical interrogation of exactly why women and slaves were considered only fit for those aspects of life concerned with reproduction and subsistence, and unfit for political life. Yet no such interrogation is forthcoming from Agamben, who might appear to preclude such critical examination, precisely insofar as he constitutes bare life as that which is equated to animality, to the repetitive, cyclical, reproductive level of subsistence life, which is thus consigned to silence, of which there is nothing more to be said. Yet it is one thing to assign these characteristics to the private sphere of the oikos and quite another to refuse to interrogate the mechanisms by which some individuals are, by definition, consigned to this sphere of life, and some are— precisely in and through the confinement of some to it— freed from it. Indeed it might be said that the very “structure of the exception” that Agamben delineates, and the question he poses as to “why Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life” (HS 7) calls for and necessitates the interrogation of such mechanisms and assumptions. The fact that those consigned to bare life, in ancient Greece women and more particularly slaves, left no written record of such life, renders all the more important Sophocles’ inscription of the character Antigone and her public differentiation of her brother from a slave— a declaration that also differentiates herself from slaves. The lasting power of the figure of Antigone, a figure whose extraordinary inspiration lives on, lies not only in her own insistence upon being heard, but also in her failure to indict slavery, and in her implicit endorsement of it. Insofar as Agamben acquiesces to the unquestioned centrality of Europe— and of the critically unexamined version of ancient Athens that is taken to be its precursor— as the originating matrix of conceptual and cultural meaning, Agamben joins in the uncritical glorification of the philosophical masterpieces of ancient Athens, construed as the crucible of European culture, but fails to confront the significance of the system of chattel slavery that afforded the philosophers and tragic poets the leisure to create their philosophical treatises and theatrical masterpieces, which nonetheless owe their existence to the system of slavery. Agamben thereby perpetuates a Eurocentric discourse of race, based on an idealized version of ancient Greece that plays down the gendered implications of his own intervention, even as his focus on race in the modern state (albeit a Eurocentric account of race) provides a necessary corrective to Irigaray’s equally problematic and Eurocentric account of sexual difference as foundational. At the same time, Irigaray’s focus on sexual difference serves as a corrective to Agamben’s exclusive focus on race. Agamben advances the “idea of an inner solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism” (HS 10). The tyrannical aspects of Bush’s reign were not lost on Seamus Heaney, who points out in the appendix to his poetic interpretation of Antigone that Bush’s notorious declaration that you are either “with us or against us” is reminiscent of Creon. 6 Just as Creon makes it clear that anyone who supports Antigone’s belief in her right to bury Polynices, whom Creon regards as a traitor, will be tarred with the same brush, so Bush fostered an atmosphere in which those of us who opposed the war in Iraq were made to feel that we were unpatriotic (despite the fact that we were ostensibly going to war in order to defend, among other things, freedom of speech). Antigone takes on a renewed relevance, appearing, as new versions of Antigone tend to do, at a time when an unjust system is in danger of becoming the norm. Now, more than ever, Agamben tells us, in the “urgency of catastrophe” (HS 12), the exception seems to have become the rule (see HS 9). Post 9/11, the rhetoric of an apparently— although oxymoronic— permanent emergency has been fuelled by the constant appeal to the need to be vigilant in the form of what was designated the “war on terror.” The threat to peace and security and the climate of fear that accompanies it, has, in the popular imaginary, become the norm, and has in turn been used to justify the suspension of rights that had previously been considered central to the fabric of democracy. In her reflections on the infamous Adolf Eichmann trial, Hannah Arendt states the following: “Eichmann was indeed normal insofar as he was ‘no exception within the Nazi regime.’ However, under conditions of the Third Reich only ‘exceptions’ could be expected to react ‘normally.’ ” 7 Arendt is thus the philosopher to have anticipated Agamben’s association of the state of exception with the concentration camp (see HS 20), although it is Carl Schmidt, rather than Arendt, whom Agamben cites in his discussion of the state of exception. Agamben construes the camp “as the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space (insofar as it is founded solely on the state of exception).” Accordingly he sees the camp “as the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity whose metamorphoses and disguises we will have to learn to recognize” (HS 123). Given his analysis in Homo Sacer of the writ of habeas corpus as an implicit “first recording of bare life as the new political subject” (HS 123), it was not surprising that critics were quick to take up Agamben’s analysis in applying it to the suspension of habeas corpus at Guantánamo an application later endorsed by Agamben (2008, 4). 8 Nor is it entirely surprising to find that Agamben’s analysis— despite the anachronism of the Roman figure of homo sacer —can be mapped on to the dilemma of Antigone . Agamben draws attention to the dynamic of the sovereign exception, invoking the distinction between “ zoe ¯ , which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios , which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group” (HS 1). As Clifton Spargo puts it, “Especially in times of crisis, sovereignty reverts to its constitutive principle of power as a capacity to enact such determinations, and this is the role Creon would reserve for himself as king.” 9 Creon interprets his mandate as sovereign in the light of the crisis that has befallen Thebes. Not only is there the immediate crisis precipitated by the civil war in which Eteocles and Polynices have killed one another. 10 There is also the more pervasive crisis, which extends to a crisis in the legitimation of sovereignty itself, a crisis brought on by the curse under which the family of Oedipus and Antigone labors. 11 Given the ways in which political boundaries are drawn, for the Greek polis, Antigone is always already in a state of exemption, by virtue of her disenfranchised position as a woman. As Spargo says, Among the crucial markers of sovereignty is the crude power it exhibits in determining which human lives are included in law, which unprotected by it— or in deciding who will be protectively subjected to the State’s constitutive violence, who relinquished again to the violence of the so-called natural world. In acting against Creon’s law Antigone not only imaginatively places herself outside of law, but by anticipating and embracing the violence Creon might exercise against the bare life which has been devoted to him as political life ( zoon politkon ), she arrogates to herself the very function of sovereign. This may be her greatest offense against her uncle, who believes himself the proper vehicle for sovereignty in Thebes. 12 In committing suicide, and thereby denying Creon the right he assumes as his prerogative either to take her life or grant her a reprieve, Antigone usurps the right that Creon assumes as sovereign at the same time as she contests his idea of politics. While I do not question the relevance and importance of applying Agamben’s analysis to Antigone , I want to suggest that there are slippages in Agamben’s own analysis that need addressing, and that the reading of Antigone I develop here can help to illuminate these slippages. In particular, the state of exception is in need of a more variegated and nuanced treatment than Agamben himself extends to it. I do not think adequate attention is paid to the gendered dynamics underlying the state of exception. In this respect, I am in agreement with both Andrew Benjamin and Ewa Ziarek, who develop such critiques, albeit in different idioms. 13 If I am, on balance, persuaded that Agamben offers a useful corrective to Foucault on the issue of the stances of sovereignty being less separable from the biopolitical than Foucault might have imagined, I am less than persuaded that sacrificial logics have been as thoroughly supplanted by the logic of homo sacer as Agamben maintains. 14 For Agamben, “In modernity, the principle of the sacredness of life is . . . completely emancipated from sacrificial ideology” (HS 114). I would argue, however, that he is too quick to suggest that “we are all virtually homines sacri ” (HS 115), and that his analysis suffers from a certain leveling out that ignores precisely the continuing ruses by which sovereignty continues to assert itself, to which his own analysis points, but which he does not develop. Agamben sees a proliferation of zones of indistinction, yet his pronouncements on this issue are made not from the point of view of those who have carried the burdens of bare life. I am concerned that Agamben allows his view that “the exception everywhere becomes the rule” (HS 9) to slide into an assumption that everyone is in the same boat with regard to the state of exception, and that there are no significant differentiations between nations, or sectors of national populations. If, as Penelope Deutscher has shown persuasively, there are various legal bases upon which states of exception are construed, so¶ too there are various socially determined sediments that stratify populations in such a way as to constitute some as more liable to exceptionality than others. 15 I suggest that his appeal to a vocabulary of revelation, while it needs to be problematized on one level, in fact points to an issue that Agamben’s own analysis forecloses, one that constitutes its condition, and one that Irigaray’s analysis of Antigone helps to elaborate. 16 As part of his attempt to correct or complete Foucault, Agamben claims to have discovered that which escaped Foucault (HS 9). Invoking the language of concealment, secrecy, and hiddenness, Agamben appeals to the “ concealed nucleus of sovereign power,” to the “ hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested,” and to the “ secret tie uniting power and bare life,” which is “the inclusion of bare life in the political realm [my italics]” (HS 6). “At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested [my italics]” (HS 9). The secret link between bare life and politics is what renders indiscernible the difference between right/left, private/ public, absolutism/democracy (see HS 4), and unlocking this secret will even enable us to bring “the political out of its concealment” (HS 5). This rhetoric of revelation is bound up with Agamben’s claim to go beyond a blind spot in Foucault, who failed to discern the “ hidden point of intersection between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power [my italics]” (HS 6). Skepticism has been expressed about what Paul Patton calls Agamben’s “conceptual fundamentalism,” or what Ernesto Laclau identifies as his legitimation of “the genealogy of a term, a concept or an institution.” 17 In effect, as Laclau puts it, Agamben “jumps too quickly” from such a genealogy “to determine its actual working in a contemporary context;” for Agamben “in some sense the origin has a secret determining priority over what follows from it.” 18 While I share this suspicion, I want to develop it in another direction, one that gives some historical specificity and substance to Agamben’s claims of secrecy and concealment, but which in doing so also alters them, by acknowledging the political exclusions on which rests the viability of the distinction from which Agamben takes his bearings, namely that of zoe ¯ and bios . 19 While Agamben never attends to it, there is of course a politicized subtext to the separation of oikos and polis , spheres that Arendt thematized in terms of private and public, the arenas in which biological life on the one hand and the pursuit of an individual or collective form of life on the other are respectively undertaken. 20 Excluded from participation in the political realm, an array of animalistic others have populated the realm that Arendt conceived as that of necessity, as distinct from the political sphere of freedom, the oikos as opposed to the polis . If slaves and women were required to meet the repetitive, cyclical daily needs of free citizens who were destined for higher things than that of the animal , or if you prefer homo laborans in ancient Greece, in the contemporary times of¶ the western world, the life of the mind or the vita activa is reserved for those of us who benefit from multinational outsourcing in a global economy that depends upon an international division of labor, which is both racialized and feminizing. Such exploitation of human labor has long been accompanied by exploitation of raw materials, such as oil reserves, by imperial powers. Perhaps it could have been foreseen that one more step would be taken in this direction, in the form of the wholesale military invasion of Iraq. If in one sense the forces determining such a step were already well ensconced, in another sense, this step nonetheless amounted to a decisive and qualitative leap in cynical exploitation. The point I wish to emphasize is that if, in Agamben’s words, “Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life,” it does so— and this is what Agamben fails to thematize— by exploiting and resignifying the gendering of women, or the racializing of Iraqis, whose lives are already marked as insignificant politically by hegemonic, Western ideology. 21 There is, in the words of Irigaray, “an absorption of other into self.” 22 What this absorption facilitates is nothing other than the operation of the law— which includes the right of sovereign exception, the right to suspend the law. The stories that both Foucault and Agamben tell about the biopolitical stand in need of a crucial supplement. 23 If the biopolitical became the focal point of the modern administrative and bureaucratic state, so that reproductive processes, levels of fertility, and a host of measures germane to population control, and the administration of life itself proliferated, with the result that bodies were subjected, and subjects subjected themselves, to ever more minute regulation, this does not mean that there was no control of such processes hitherto. Rather, the agencies and location of that control were differently specified. Previous strategies of control might not have been biopolitical— but there is no doubt that they existed. Take the polis of ancient Greece, for example— the background against which the original performance of Sophocles’ Antigone was staged— where such strategies might not have taken place in the full light of day, and might have been far more crude insofar as they coalesced with the boundary separating the political from the nonpolitical as such. Women’s movements were carefully curtailed by the ingeniously simple expedient of keeping them indoors. Indeed— to draw on the conventional codes of theatrical performance in fifth century BCE Athens, in which the first staging of Antigone took place, being indoors and being female were practically synonymous with one another. A fair or untanned skin was one of the codes that signaled to audiences at the festival of Dionysus that a given character was a woman; if necessary, the actors— all male— used white lead to give their skin the appropriate appearance. 24 One need not speculate long in order to arrive at the reason women were largely confined to indoor spaces, which was not merely so that they could oversee the smooth running of the oikos , but rather precisely in order to ensure strict supervision of, and knowledge of, their reproductive activities. We should not underestimate the enormous significance that overseeing the reproductive activity of women must have had for the polis . We might even surmise that it was the greatest barrier preventing women from partaking in political life. How could the necessary measures of control over women’s sexual activity be maintained, if women had the freedom to come and go as they pleased, as did men? In short, I am suggesting that the reason that the biopolitical emerges as a uniquely modern form of power is intimately connected with the redrawing of political boundaries that organized the freedom of women’s movement and speech, boundaries that at the same time controlled reproductive freedom. The control of women’s reproductive freedom, in turn, was intimately connected in fifth century BCE Athens with preserving the purity of genealogy and heredity, such that, for example, aristocratic lineage could be clearly distinguished from any contamination with slavishness. The historical trend away from exogamy and toward endogamy that characterizes Sophocles’ Athens is bound up with the symbolic importance of establishing the legitimacy of one’s genealogy. These issues permeate the Oedipal quest to reconstruct the events of his life in order to understand his familial origins, and they infuse Antigone’s insistence upon distinguishing her brother from a slave. If, prior to modernity, the state did not exert biopolitical control, in the case of reproductive processes, this was not only because the state itself was still emergent, still nascent, but also because there was no need for it to do so explicitly, since it could rely on the gendered conventions that were already in place to accomplish its work, without having to regulate such conventions. Ostensibly concerned with the cultural virtues of chastity and modesty, the confinement of women within the home, and the restriction of women’s movement this imposed, had everything to do with controlling women’s reproductive activity, and with ensuring the purity of male lines of inheritance. In effect, the complete exclusion of women from the life of the political was the corollary of their containment within the walls of the oikos . At the same time, the spatial inclusion of these contained, domestic spaces within the physical boundary of the polis, together with the political exclusion of the inhabitants thus contained, amounted to a system of domination that on the one hand can be described as a variation of Agamben’s exclusion that is also an inclusion. On the other hand, there is more to be said: this geographical inclusion and confinement, hand in hand with a political exclusion/dominance accomplished a usurpation, appropriation, or re-signification of that which the polis found productive, and a simultaneous casting out, banishing as unsignifiable or unrepresentable that which it encountered as dangerous. The only representation granted women’s sexuality was, needless to say, that which made it productive for the polity, namely its reproductive power, a power that had to be harnessed to the name of the father. That which is productive is the clarity of lines of inheritance. What is dangerous is anything that threatens such clarity: women’s freedom of movement and speech, for example, women’s inclusion in the political system (which might result, among other things, in the contesting of restrictions placed on women’s movement, challenging the limitations of their capacity to be heard). The very organization of political space as exclusive of women sufficed to exert control over women’s reproduction, and moreover it did so almost as a side effect. Assumptions about the sexuality of women, and the need to contain their apparently ravenous sexual appetite, derived— it is not hard to see— not so much from any traits women might have exhibited, but rather from the tremendous fear men must have had about their inability to determine their own progeny, without meticulous oversight of their wives or sexual partners. 25 Hence, the polis necessitated that women should be cast out of the political realm and banned from public debate, precisely because of the importance of overseeing their reproductive capacity, which assured the continuation and longevity both of wealth in the form of goods within the oikos and of power in form of the lines of kinship and descent assuring royal lineage. Uninterrupted and unproblematic generation of the family or genos assured both the identity of the family as a unit, and the stability of the rule of law, by establishing clear lines of inheritance. The events that unfold in the Oedipus cycle put into crisis the claims of inheritance based on generation both at the level of the family and that of political leadership. This is, after all, not just a family, not just any family, but the Oedipal family, an incestuous, patricidal, royal family. Any crisis in distinguishing the familial positions of mother from wife (Oedipus’s wife, Joacasta), or brother from uncle or nephew (Polynices), or sister from aunt or niece (Antigone), also constituted a crisis of political authority. The fact that it is Antigone who brings to light this crisis by her insistence on burying Polynices as a brother and nothing else , means that the questions posed by Antigone are not restricted to the order of: what does it mean to be a brother as distinct from a father?—or for any familial position to be distinct from any other— but also extend to the legitimacy of political claims to be ruler. 26 If the freedom of women was feared because a failure to contain them, to have their physical whereabouts known at all times, amounted to a failure to know for sure the identity— the name— of the father, the chaos that threatened to break out in the Oedipal cycle was not confined to a crisis in private inheritance, but rather extended to a crisis of political leadership. 27It is against this heteronormative background with its reproductive logic, I suggest, that Sophocles’ Theban dramas must be read, and it is in this context that Irigaray’s account of Antigone as an excluded yet facilitating other both has such pertinence, and stands in need of supplement. Irigaray’s initial reference to Antigone in Speculum is not in relation to Hegel, but in her discussion of Freud, specifically in relation to fetishism. In fact the entire “ Hegelian dream ”of Antigone can be read in terms of the fetishistic logic of compensation: it is “already the effect of a dialectic produced by the discourse of patriarchy. It is a consoling fancy.” 28 As Irigaray points out, fetishism involves an overvaluation and a corresponding veiling of that which is made to occupy the role of a lesser value: the value associated with conception, for instance. 29 Fetishism involves a compensatory mechanism, fuelled by a threat of otherness that cannot be integrated into one’s preconceptions without altering those preconceptions. It is in discussing the importance of venerating the phallus that Antigone enters the scene for Irigaray: “Preserving it from derision, insignificance, and devaluation. Even if woman must die in the attempt, she will carry out her mission. Virgin? Her deed will be all the more exemplary. Condemned by the king? She will have shown all the more clearly the contradictions in the system. As the ruler’s unworthy anger shows . . . the patriarchal regime could scarcely be expected to tolerate Antigone’s loud assertions.” 30 It is thus a consideration of the “fetishistic economy” that sets the context for Irigaray’s analysis of Antigone , who “remains the very ground in which manifest mind secretly sets its roots and draws its strength,” as the excluded yet facilitating other. 31 Through “assimilating the external other into and for the self . . . man absorbs the other into himself.” Due to “its desire to return to sameness,” difference has already been excluded. 32 Quoting Freud, Irigaray says, “We know how children react to their first impressions of the absence of the penis. They disavow the fact and believe that they do [ SE , italics] see a penis, all the same . They gloss over the contradiction between observation and preconception. ” 33 Irigaray comments, “Almost imperceptibly . . . Nature and her work” is brought “into the fetishistic economy by hiding all she is capable of producing and preventing us from appreciating it. Beliefs and preconceptions, from now on, are supported. And kept away from the contradiction of observation” (116). Bearing this fetishistic economy in mind, let me return to one of the most important political sleights of hand to have been committed in recent history. I want to sketch what I take to be a pervasive political strategy of political self-representation in the United States of its own policy under the Bush administration, which I think can usefully be conceptualized in terms of the structure of fetishistic disavowal. U.S. politicians are still invested in certain mythical preconceptions about what the United States must be, despite all the evidence to the contrary. On the one hand they insist on seeing America as a country that upholds the law, a country that does not merely participate in international law, but is exemplary in its moral standing and leadership. The United States sees itself as a beacon of justice, one that respects the rights of sovereign nations, embodies the ideals of true democracy, and fosters free speech, a country in which everyone has the right to due process including a fair trial, and the rights entailed by the writ of habeas corpus , a country that is distinguished by the fact that it extends such rights, rather than endorsing the barbaric practices of allegedly less civilized nations such as Iraq, countries which— precisely because of the extent of their so-called barbarism— require us to suspend the usual rules of engagement. On the other hand, we were ruled by a president who lied to the citizens to whom he was beholden, not about an event that happened in his private life concerning consensual extra-marital sex, but about the political justification for taking the United States to war, which is probably the most serious lie a president— as a president— can tell. When the United States declared war on Iraq, it violated the sovereignty of a secular country, and when even the most diehard supporters of the war could no longer maintain that weapons of mass destruction existed, it justified this preemptive war by pointing to Iraq’s abuses of human rights, such as torture, which, it turns out, the U.S. government routinely sanctions, as became painfully clear first when the photographs of Abu Ghraib finally surfaced, and again with revelations about waterboarding. (That torture is a common practice by the U.S. government was already clear for those who wished to know). Not only did the U.S. government see fit to suspend the writ of habeas corpus at Guantanámo Bay, but it also pushed through the surveillance bill, which, among other things, retroactively changed the law so that leading telecommunications companies were absolved for capitulating to the government’s demand that it facilitate routine and pervasive spying on its own citizens. The fact that somehow the belief that the United States stands for freedom, democracy, and benevolence sustains itself in the face of all the evidence to the contrary, suggests not so much that the myth of the superiority of the West outweighs the facts on the ground, but rather that that there is something about the myth of American superiority that makes what has been called the “fact based community” simply irrelevant. Whatever evidence could be adduced to the contrary, the belief in the superiority of the United States remains untouched, since the facts are beside the point. What is important is that we maintain the preconception of the United States as unassailable and unimpeachable. If the facts get in the way, the easiest way to proceed is to destroy the evidence. Given this investment in the benevolence and good intentions of U.S. supremacy, evidence to the contrary seems to be simply beside the point. The casualties of this irrelevance continue to mount, as political instability and continued violence haunts Iraq. The lesson here, like that of fetishism, seems to be clear enough. If the facts on the ground don’t match up with our preconceptions, we remake history to make it fit, and this substitute reality suffices. (If there is no penis, as we had expected there to be, fabricate a substitute one— hence the fetish). If the mirroring function of the world around us doesn’t reflect our own idea of what it should be, we manipulate the reflection until it accords to this idea. If evidence begins to get in the way, it can be disappeared, and a new ­eality r erected in its stead. If we don’t control the resources we want, we simply get rid of those who do, by declaring war on them and establishing bases in their country, under the pretense of exporting democracy— as if we still knew what that might mean. There seems to be something important to us in the maintenance of the fiction of the goodness and purity of our intentions in all of this— something crucial in evoking the democratic myth. It is not enough to have declared a permanent war on terror as a way of justifying the suspension of law; at the same time, there is a robust investment in the denial of this state of affairs, a denial that displaces the blame for the state of exception. A double exemption is at work here, one that invokes a perfect future in which we will no longer be forced by the terrorists to abandon democratic principles— and Derrida’s discourse on the autoimmunity of democracy comes into its own here. 34 This future, however, depends on the terrorists’ suspension of terrorism— and one cannot prove definitively that the amorphous threat of terrorism will ever be in abeyance. The strategy of overvaluing the power of the phallus and its fetishistic substitutes functions as an undervaluing of the powers of conception, suggesting that the gendering and racializing processes that perform the subtext of that which has been theorized under the heading of the state of exception require our attention. Equally demanding of our attention is the dynamic underlying the invasion of Iraq, an insidious confluence of racism and the U.S. belief in its sovereign right to control the terms on which the earth’s resources are extracted in support of consumerist lifestyles that proceed in oblivion to environmental concerns. The hubris that Creon exhibits in his belief that his power over his dominion is absolute, and his downfall is bound up with the fact that it extends even to what Hegel calls the elemental. 35 Creon has no respect for the earth to which Antigone wants to return the body of Polynices, just as the Bush administration maintained a cavalier attitude toward the environment, whether it was a question of extracting oil or refusing to sign the Kyoto agreement.

#### Colonialism occurs because of hyper-masculine conception of international relations as a collection of threats which can only be emasculated by extending our political and military domination. Their demand for hegemony over the world logically extends to “the elimination of all that is foreign”

Steans 98 [Jill: Senior Lecturer in International Relations Theory, Director of the Graduate School for the University of Birmingham, *Gender and International Relations, An Introduction*, page 108-109]

Critical approaches to International Relations criticize the state centrism of realism, not only because it is inherently reductionist, but also because it presents a view of the state as a concrete entity with interests and agency. Not only does the state act, but the state acts in the national interest. Those who adopt critical approaches view the state in dynamic rather than static terms, 15 as a ‘process’ rather than a ‘thing’. The ‘state’ does not exist in any concrete sense; rather it is ‘made’. The state is made by the processes and practices involved in constructing boundaries and identities, differentiating between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’. Andrew Linklater has recently argued that critical approaches to the study of International Relations centre around understanding the processes of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’, which have in a sense always been the central concerns of the discipline. However, as Linklater contends, critical theorists understand that these processes have also worked to ‘include’ and ‘exclude’ people on the basis of race, class and gender. In the ‘making’ of the state the construction of the hostile ‘other’ which is threatening and dangerous is central to the making of identities and the securing of boundaries. Indeed, David Campbell argues that the legitimation of state power demands the construction of danger ‘outside’. The state requires this ‘discourse of danger’ to secure its identity and for the legitimation of state power. The consequence of this is that threats to security in realist and neo-realist thinking are all seen to be in the external realm and citizenship becomes synonymous with loyalty to the nation-state and the elimination of all that is foreign. Jean Elshtain has argued that the problems of war and the difficulties of achieving security in the so-called ‘anarchy’ of the international realm, should not be seen as problems which are not rooted in the compulsion of interstate relations as such. Rather, they arise from ‘the ordering of modern, technological society’ in which political elites have sought to control the masses by the implementation of ‘the mechanism of the perfect army’. Elshtain argues that to see war as a continuation of politics by other means, is to see a continuation of the ‘military model’ as a means of preventing civil disorder. In critiquing dominant conceptions of security in International Relations, feminists have, to some extent, echoed the arguments of non-feminist critical thinkers, but have been concerned to show what is lost from our understanding of security when gender is omitted. As was noted in chapter 4, feminist political theorists have demonstrated that in much Western political thought the conception of politics and the public realm is a ‘barracks community’, a realm defined in opposition to the disorderly forces which threaten its existence.22 This same conception of politics is constructed out of masculine hostility towards the female ‘Other’. One sees in the development of this political discourse a deeply gendered subtext in which the citizen role is in all cases identified with the male.23 Hartsock believes that this sets a hostile and combative dualism at the heart of the community men construct and by which they come to understand their lives.24

#### And the alt is a prerequisite to the aff—key to greater social justice

Saferworld, 2012

[CAMP (Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme) and Saferworld, The Jirga: justice and conflict transformation, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/The%20Jirga%20justice%20and%20conflict%20transformation.pdf] /Wyo-MB

As this report explores even local respondents who use the institution recognise that ¶ there are limitations with the Jirga. In some instances its weaknesses, including a lack ¶ of representation of women and minorities, poor implementation of human rights and ¶ a lack of clarity on its status in the wider judicial system, have allowed militant groups ¶ to espouse and find support for alternatives, as illustrated by the Taliban’s imposition ¶ of their version of Sharia (Islamic) courts. These flaws need to be addressed as part ¶ of efforts to improve the entire judicial system – a system that provides poor and 2 the jirga: justice and conflict transformation¶ inconsistent access to justice through formal and informal mechanisms. Potentially ¶ beneficial linkages between formal and informal justice mechanisms need to be better ¶ understood and, where appropriate, strengthened so that one of the key drivers of ¶ conflict in the region – § Marked 08:26 § the lack of access to timely and impartial justice to address ¶ social and political grievances – is dealt with holistically and without delay, leading to ¶ greater justice for all in Pakistan. ¶ “Jirga also needs to be brought in conformity with the modern world dynamics such as ¶ issues pertaining to peace and stability, human rights and violence against women.”¶ Interview, Swat ¶ The concerns raised above have also been identified by key international partners such ¶ as the United Nations (UN), Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank (WB) and ¶ European Union (EU) which, along with the Pakistan government, conducted in 2010 ¶ the Post Crisis Needs Assessment of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally ¶ Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This report identified four key strategic areas ¶ which need to be addressed, including the need to “Build [the] responsiveness and ¶ effectiveness of the State to restore citizen trust” and to “Counter radicalisation and ¶ foster reconciliation.”1 The Jirga is a critical, but underrepresented, component of ¶ achieving those objectives.¶ This report highlights areas of concern with regard to the Jirga and justice provision ¶ in PATA and identifies three main outcomes based on the research:¶ 1 Reform of the wider judicial system is crucial for preventing future conflict: ¶ strengthen the functional linkages between formal and informal mechanisms and ¶ clarify the status and potential of Jirga to complement the judicial system.¶ 2 A more representative and inclusive Jirga system will improve access to ¶ justice for all members of society and reduce local tensions and conflicts in ¶ PATA: adapt the customary system to include marginalised and vulnerable groups.

#### And we need to challenge the social relations that promote sexism—they dominate and shape the Jirga process

Saferworld, 2012

[CAMP (Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme) and Saferworld, The Jirga: justice and conflict transformation, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/The%20Jirga%20justice%20and%20conflict%20transformation.pdf] /Wyo-MB

While there are some general human rights concerns about the use of Jirga, there are ¶ some specific issues relating to women’s rights which primarily focus on issues of ¶ access, participation, representation, fairness and the use of punishments and practices ¶ such as Swara. The reality is that local leadership outside of the district headquarters is ¶ almost entirely dominated by men and, as a result of the fact that the Jirga is the main ¶ social system which regulates all facets of Pakhtun life, those who control the Jirga ¶ control society. The concerns about women’s access to Jirga will be examined in the section below ¶ focusing on the challenge of inclusivity. Looking at women’s rights, in this region there ¶ are deeply entrenched social values where Pakhtun men have the right to regulate a ¶ woman’s body, thoughts and emotions. So while there is an admixture of Islam within ¶ Pakhtunwali, the latter has been interpreted and practiced to exercise, justify and ¶ reinforce patriarchal authority. As one respondent explained, “If a woman approaches ¶ (which is rarely) to a Jirga it brushes them off, saying, ‘domestic issues need to be ¶ resolved within the family.’ The attachment of the matter of honour with the body and ¶ behaviour of the women has further complicated such a situation for women, because ¶ it is the male who decides in the tribal society as to which appearance and act of the ¶ women is bringing honour and which one is bringing dishonour for him and the family ¶ as whole.”48¶

#### And the alt solves—studies show participants want female only Jirgas

Saferworld, 2012

[CAMP (Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme) and Saferworld, The Jirga: justice and conflict transformation, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/The%20Jirga%20justice%20and%20conflict%20transformation.pdf] /Wyo-MB

Despite this, both male and female participants from Swat strongly advocated for ¶ female participation in Jirga, saying that “Today women face various challenges and ¶ they are more educated and aware of their problems and therefore should get an ¶ opportunity to participate in the Jirga decision process”.51 In fact, there was a strong ¶ trend among most respondents groups that women’s participation can benefit not ¶ only women but the Jirga more generally, as long as it is in-line with overriding social ¶ mores. As a participant pointed out, “…logically women can take part in Jirga; if they ¶ can appear in courts before strangers, they should be able to become Jirga members and ¶ participate in a system where they feel and get more respect.”52 Female participants ¶ added: “Women make up half of the population, therefore, a major portion of problems ¶ and disputes are directly linked with this half of the population. Women, therefore, ¶ have a natural right of representation”.53 Another female participant added: “The ¶ modern woman is very different, she is the best person to understand her own ¶ problems, given Jirga is the best mechanism for justice, she should be given direct ¶ Inclusivity ¶ representation in the Jirga”.54 Some research participants indicated support for the ¶ creation of separate, women-only Jirgas, or possibly mixed Jirgas.

# 2NC

#### AND the Phallogocentrism of the aff inflects irreparable loss on all female subjectivity

Braidotti 2011

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

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Irigaray is one of the few thinkers who places full emphasis on radical heterosexuality and the need to reconstruct a heterosexual social-symbolic contract that does not rest on feminophobia, hence not on a patriarchal social unconscious. A fully trained psychoanalyst, Irigaray denounces the delusional nature of identities postulated on the phallogocentric signifier and digs deeper than the sociological expressions of everyday sexism and culturally enforced discrimination. Her critique touches upon the in-depth roots of misogyny in a subject whose foundations rest on the rejection of the feminine from the material maternal body that constitutes our site of origin and inflicts a wound on each and every subject. At the beginning of the self, there is a separation from the totality one enjoyed as part of the mater or matrix. This causes an irreparable loss and hence an inexpressible grief. This structure of “unrepresentability” is a crucial part of psychoanalytic theories of subject formation. It rests on two key ideas: first, that the original loss of (the illusion of) totality, which translates into a wound, becomes a constitutive element of our subjectivity. One incorporates the loss, so to speak, and folds over it by deploying all possible cognitive and emotional forms of compensation. The pain of it never goes away— it just gets formatted into mourning and melancholia (Freud) or gratitude and reciprocity (Melanie Klein). Irigaray argues that the sense of originary loss has to be replaced by self-love and love for the Woman one could become.

#### Treating war as an event that only happens when people are being shot or fighting is fundamentally flawed – it ignores multiple forms of war due like womyn’s oppression and ecological violence.

Cuomo 96[Chris, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and Director of the Institute for Women's Studies at the University of Georgia, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence” Published in *Hypatia* 11.4, p. 30-46]

Although my position is in agreement with the notion that war and militarism are feminist issues, I argue that approaches to the **ethics of war and peace which do not consider “peacetime” military violence are inadequate for feminist and environmentalist concerns**. Because **much of the military violence done to women and ecosystems happens outside the boundaries of declared wars, feminist and environmental philosophers ought to emphasize the significance of everyday military violence**. Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifi­cations for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, **most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event**—an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typi­cally marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, **wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states.** But **many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gen­dered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists;** **how** **it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies—cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events**. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions. In "Gender and 'Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event-based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and onto­logical dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the every­day effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. **These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects** of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world **results in** theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant pres­ence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and **current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems.**

#### The crisis-based politics of the status quo serve to quiet activism by appealing to threats to security as the most deserving of consideration. In order to combat violence, we have to rethinking our understanding of crisis.

Cuomo 96[Chris, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, and Director of the Institute for Women's Studies at the University of Georgia, “War Is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence” Published in *Hypatia* 11.4, p. 30-46]

**Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses.** For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, **crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives**. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. **The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control.** Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declara­tions of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. **Seeing war as necessarily embed­ded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state**. **Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance**. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, **one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connec­tions among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.**

## ROB v. K affs

#### Our role of the ballot is to vote for the team with the best strategy to solve violence and oppression-

#### Sexual difference must come first- the ethical informs the political and this politics refuses the reduction of woman to the male subject

Braidotti 2011

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

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This implies the redefinition of the relationship of power to knowledge within feminism: as women of ideas devoted to the elaboration of the theory and practice of sexual difference, we are responsible for the very notions that we enact and empower. Thinking justly— of justness and not only of justice— is a top item in our agenda. This ethical dimension is for me as important as the political imperative. Feminist thinking cannot be purely strategic, i.e., the expression of a political will, it must rather attempt to be adequate as a representation of experience. Feminist theorizing must be adequate conceptually, as well as being suitable politically: one’s relationship to thinking is the prototype of a different relationship to alterity altogether. If we lose sight of this ethical, relational foundation of thinking, that is to say, the bond that certain discourses create among us, we are indeed in danger of homologation and therefore of purely strategic or instrumental kinds of thought. There can be no justice without justness, no political truth without adequation of our words, our ideas, and consequently our thought to the project of redefining female subjectivity in a nonlogocentric mode. As a consequence, the first priority for feminist theory today is to redefine the subject as a gendered unity inextricably connected to the other. For feminism, in the beginning there is alterity, the nonone, a multiplicity. The founding agent is the common corpus of female subjects who posit themselves theoretically and politically as a collective subject. This communal bond comes first— then and only then there arises the question of what political line to enforce. It is the ethical that defines the political and not vice versa: hence the importance of positing the feminist audience as the receptive, active participant in a discursive exchange that aims at changing the very rules of the game. This is the feminist community to which the “she-I” makes herself accountable. The paradox of the ontological basis of desire is that not only is it intersubjective, but it also transcends the subject. Desire also functions as the threshold for a redefinition of a new common plane of experience: “each woman is the woman of all women . . . ” The recognition of a common ground of experience as women mutually engaged in a political task of resistance to “Woman”—the dominant view of female subjectivity— lays the foundation for new images and symbolizations of the feminist subject. If we take as our starting point sexual difference as the positive affirmation of my facticity as a woman, working through the layers of complexity of the signifier “I, woman,” we end up opening a window onto a new genderized bond among different women. Identity politics is, in feminism, a collective project. By genderized collective subjectivity I mean a symbolic dimension proper to women in recognition of the nonreductability of the feminine to the masculine and yet, at the same time, of the indestructible unity of the human as an embodied self structurally linked to the other. It is the complex intersecting of never-ending levels of differing of self from other and self from self. As Adriana Cavarero (1990) put it: what is at stake in this is the representability of a feminine subject as a self-representing entity. It is less a question of founding the subject than of elucidating the categories by which the female feminist subject can be adequately represented. This is an important political gesture because thinking through the fullness of one’s complexity in the force of one’s transcendence is something women have never historically been able to afford. What seems to be at stake in the project of sexual difference, through the extreme sexualization of the subject, is a Nietzschean transmutation of the very value we give to the human and to a universal notion of commonness, of common belonging. I will want to argue that the aim of this transmutation of values is to be able to bring the multilayered structure of the subject to the fore. As Lispector points out: “the life in me does not have my name, “I” is not the owner of the portion of being that constitutes his being. To the extent that “she-I” accepts this, can “she-I” become the woman of all women and be accountable for her humanness? Only this highly defined notion of singularity can allow us to posit a new general sense of being: only situated perspectives can legitimate new general standpoints. In this sense, the experience of utter singularity that G.H. undergoes in her microcosm remains emblematic of the process of women becoming other than the “Woman” they were expected and socialized into being. G.H. shows us paths of transcendence specific to our gender and to women’s own, discontinuous time of becoming.

#### Our scholarship is good and ethical- sexual difference constitutes the first and ever-forgotten symbol that is deployed to systematically exclude women from access to the symbolic and thus, their own subjectivity

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

Nietzsche used to say that we would continue to believe in God as long as we believed in grammar. Yet even, or perhaps particularly after the fall of a certain God, discourse still defends its untouchable status. To say that discourse has a sex, especially in its syntax, is to question the last bastion of semantic order. It amounts to taking issue with the God of men in his most tradi-tional form. Even if language is emptied of meaning-or perhaps the more it is emptied of meaning?-respect for its technical architecture must remain intact. Discourse would be the erection of the totem and the taboo of the world of man. And the more man strives to analyze the world, the universe, himself, the more he seems to resist upsetting the foundations of discourse. His analysis would serve only to confirm and double discourse's immutability. From the start, discourse would be for man that other of nature, that mother, that nature-womb, within which he lived, survived, and risked being lost. The discourse that had been intended as his tool for breaking ground and cultivating the world changed into an intangible, sacred horizon for him. That which is most his own and yet most alien to him? His home within the universe. And, inside that tentacular technical machine that man has made, a machine that threatens him today, not only in stark reality but also by assimilation to his fantasies and the nightmares he has of a devouring mother, man seems to cling ever tighter to that semblance of familiarity he finds in both his everyday and his scientific discourse. As if that technical universe and that language were not his creation, which, because of its failure to preserve the other, fails to preserve him too. The work of his hand, in which he cannot even recognize himself, in which he has drowned the other, now threatens to drown him in turn. He has all the animist fears of a child in the face of nature. He is afraid to touch his machine in case it is activated by his approach, as if it were a mechanism owed respect because of its transcendence. Language, in all its shapes and sizes, would dimly represent for man the allpowerful and ever-unknown mother as well as the transcendent God. Both. Man cannot or will not recognize or reinterpret in his symbols this duality in his technical productions The most obvious symbol, that closest to hand and also most easily forgotten, is the living symbol of sexual difference. But theory would claim that this symbolizes only itself. And women would serve only as a potential symbol to be exchanged by men, by peoples, and would never achieve symbolism or be able to use symbols. 11 Does the symbol constituted by sexual difference implacably split into two? The female would fall into the category of fallow land, matter to be made into a product, or currency symbol, mother or virgin without any identity as a woman. The masculine would no longer enter into. the body or the flesh of the symbol but fashion it or pass it from hand to hand from the outside. The bond between or the function shared by the pieces would be achieved secretly thanks to the female; the exchange of symbols would be assured by the masculine. By serving in this way as mediation from within the symbol, the feminine would have no access to sharing, exchanging, or coining symbols. In particular, the mother-daughter relationship, the attraction between mother and daughter, would be hidden in the symbol. Daughters, wives, and indeed mothers would not have, or would no longer have, signs available for their own relationships, or the means of designating a reality transcendent to themselves-their Other, their God or divine being. No articulated language would help women escape from the sameness of man or from an uninhabitable sameness of their own, lacking a passage from the inside to the outside of themselves, among themselves. Because they are used in mediation, as mediators, women can have within themselves and among themselves a same, an Other only if they move out of the existing systems of exchange. Their only recourse is flight, explosion, implosion, into an immediate relationship to nature or to God.

### AT: Male judges=alt can’t solve

#### Irigaray and Braidotti don’t say men can’t AFFIRM a project of radical sexual difference- male judges can agree that a female subject needs to be articulated in order to solve for patriarchal violence- that doesn’t mean they ought to be involved in determining what the articulation of the subject ought to be- this is a necessary distinction-our role of the ballot means the judge is endorsing a strategy, not the boundaries or limits of that strategy

### AT TRANS

#### Sex Difference doesn’t erase the transsexual- queer theory disregards lived experience of transsexuals and ignores that they long to belong to a specific pole of the gender/sex bianry

Braidotti 2011

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Andrijasevic: The discussion on sexuality has mainly been taken up by queer theory and activism. Theoretical explorations of gay, lesbian, and queer sexualities do not speak of shifts of the imaginary or address the issue of how desire is constituted in the space between bodies. As in Judith Butler’s work, much emphasis is being put on the critique of heteronormativity and the rights of transsexual and intersexed persons. It’s well known that you are not a queer theorist, but don’t you think that there might be a convergence between your interest in rethinking desires and the queer project of destabilizing the categories of sex, gender, and desire? Braidotti: It is absolutely true that my nomadic subject is very compatible with queering practices, so long as we agree on the terms and the structure of the exercise. Sexuality for me is not linguistically mediated, but rather an embodied practice of experimentation with multiple relations in an affirmative manner. I have devoted a large amount of my book Metamorphoses to a critique of queer theory in Butler’s work, and she responded in Undoing Gender. This has often led to some sort of polarization among younger theorists, as if one felt compelled to choose either/or. Neither of us agrees with easy polarizations, but we do work with different paradigms. For me the transsexual paradigm is inadequate. There are three main reasons: first, this paradigm is culture specific, and it derives from the now hegemonic lesbian critique of heteronormativity that runs from Gayle Rubin to Teresa de Lauretis via the Californian phase of Monique Wittig. This does not easily translate back into the history and concepts of European feminisms, to which I, as you know, am deeply committed. Second, I have a serious conceptual disagreement with queer theory on heteronormativity being the matrix of power. Heteronormativity, as I see it, is one model of power, not necessarily the main one. Power relations cannot be reduced to compulsory heterosexuality only. Power has no matrix; it is not a centralized notion, but rather a weblike pervasive situation of controls and regulations. Foucault, of course, has been here! The negative or confining aspects of power operate, as Deleuze and Guattari suggested, as a sort of reduction of the multiple potentials of our bodies and our desires at all levels. Power enacts a sort of generalized theft of our intensities and our polymorphous perversity, which is something other than just the setup of the gender binary, though the latter is a major component of this takeover. The only way to counteract this violent dispossession is to imagine and enact alternative ways of experimenting with our bodies in multiple relations with others. Sexuality is work-in-progress, risk and exploration. Third, the transsexual paradigm does not convince me as a paradigm, for two reasons. The first is that most of the research I have read on this shows that transsexual people long for sexual clarity and want to belong unequivocally to the pole of the gender binary they recognize as affirming their identity. This means that the idea of sexual indeterminacy as a paradigm actually disregards the desires of real-life transsexuals and constrains their lived experience into a tidy metaphor. Moreover, the emphasis on degrees of indeterminacy, or in-betweenness, is a form of identity politics that is endemic to advanced capitalism, with its emphasis on individualism narrowly defined as the right to choose. All I see here is a quantitative proliferation of pluralist options for one’s identity and lifestyle. This, coupled with the often implicit suggestion that the aim of both feminist and gay and lesbian struggles should be the destruction of the “gender system,” makes for a heady and in my eyes unsustainable set of ideas.

## 1NR

#### And we need to challenge the social relations that promote sexism—they dominate and shape the Jirga process

Saferworld, 2012

[CAMP (Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme) and Saferworld, The Jirga: justice and conflict transformation, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/The%20Jirga%20justice%20and%20conflict%20transformation.pdf] /Wyo-MB

While there are some general human rights concerns about the use of Jirga, there are ¶ some specific issues relating to women’s rights which primarily focus on issues of ¶ access, participation, representation, fairness and the use of punishments and practices ¶ such as Swara. The reality is that local leadership outside of the district headquarters is ¶ almost entirely dominated by men and, as a result of the fact that the Jirga is the main ¶ social system which regulates all facets of Pakhtun life, those who control the Jirga ¶ control society. The concerns about women’s access to Jirga will be examined in the section below ¶ focusing on the challenge of inclusivity. Looking at women’s rights, in this region there ¶ are deeply entrenched social values where Pakhtun men have the right to regulate a ¶ woman’s body, thoughts and emotions. So while there is an admixture of Islam within ¶ Pakhtunwali, the latter has been interpreted and practiced to exercise, justify and ¶ reinforce patriarchal authority. As one respondent explained, “If a woman approaches ¶ (which is rarely) to a Jirga it brushes them off, saying, ‘domestic issues need to be ¶ resolved within the family.’ The attachment of the matter of honour with the body and ¶ behaviour of the women has further complicated such a situation for women, because ¶ it is the male who decides in the tribal society as to which appearance and act of the ¶ women is bringing honour and which one is bringing dishonour for him and the family ¶ as whole.”48¶

#### And the alt solves—studies show participants want female only Jirgas

Saferworld, 2012

[CAMP (Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme) and Saferworld, The Jirga: justice and conflict transformation, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/The%20Jirga%20justice%20and%20conflict%20transformation.pdf] /Wyo-MB

Despite this, both male and female participants from Swat strongly advocated for ¶ female participation in Jirga, saying that “Today women face various challenges and ¶ they are more educated and aware of their problems and therefore should get an ¶ opportunity to participate in the Jirga decision process”.51 In fact, there was a strong ¶ trend among most respondents groups that women’s participation can benefit not ¶ only women but the Jirga more generally, as long as it is in-line with overriding social ¶ mores. As a participant pointed out, “…logically women can take part in Jirga; if they ¶ can appear in courts before strangers, they should be able to become Jirga members and ¶ participate in a system where they feel and get more respect.”52 Female participants ¶ added: “Women make up half of the population, therefore, a major portion of problems ¶ and disputes are directly linked with this half of the population. Women, therefore, ¶ have a natural right of representation”.53 Another female participant added: “The ¶ modern woman is very different, she is the best person to understand her own ¶ problems, given Jirga is the best mechanism for justice, she should be given direct ¶ Inclusivity ¶ representation in the Jirga”.54 Some research participants indicated support for the ¶ creation of separate, women-only Jirgas, or possibly mixed Jirgas.

#### And, Oppression D/A-The permutation is not an act of love-it rejects woman’s attempt to stand outside of the masculine universal, undifferentiated, and demands her oppression

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

One configuration remains in latency, in abeyance: that of love among women. A configuration that constitutes a substrate that is sometimes mute, sometimes a disturbing force in our culture. A very live substrate whose outlines, shapes, are yet blurred, chaotic, or confused. Traditionally, therefore, this love among women has been a matter of rivalry with: - the real mother, - an all-powerful prototype of maternity, - the desire of man: of father, son, brother. This involves quantitative estimates of love that ceaselessly interrupt love's attraction and development. When we hear women talking to each other, we tend to hear expressions like the following: -like you; - me too; - me more (or me less). Such nagging calculations (which may be unconscious or preconscious) paralyze the fluidity of affect. We harden, borrow, situate ourselves on the edges of the other in order to "exist." As proofs of love, these comparatives eliminate the possibility of a place among women. We prize one another by standards that are not our own and which occupy, without inhabiting, the potential place of our identity. These statements bear witness to affects which are still childish or which fail to survive the death struggle of a narcissism that is always put off: to infinity or else to the hands of a third party as judge. One of the remarks you often hear one woman say to another woman who is a little better situated in her identity is: just like everyone else. Here we have no proof of love, but a judgmental statement that prevents the woman from standing out from an undifferentiated grouping, from a sort of primitive community of women, unconscious utopias or atopias that some women exploit at times to prevent one of their number from affirming her identity. Without realizing it, or willing it, in most cases, women constitute the most terrible instrument of their own oppression: they destroy anything that emerges from their undifferentiated condition and thus become agents of their own annihilation, their reduction to a sameness that is not their own. A kind of magma, of "night in which all the cats are gray," from which man, or humanity, extracts for free what he needs for food, lodging, and survival. These like you J me too J me more (or less) J just like everyone else kinds of remarks have little to do with a loving ethics. They are trace-symptoms of the polemos7 among women. There is no with you in this economy. But there may be a fusional state out of which nothing emerges or should emerge, or else a blind competition to occupy a place or space that is ill-defined but which arouses attraction, envy, passion. It is still not another woman who is loved but merely the place she occupies, that she creates, and that must be taken away from her, rather than respected. This tends to be the way with passions among women. We have to move against the current of history for things to be any different. Which does happen. And constitutes one of the most essential places for an ethics of the passions: no love oj other without love oj same.

#### And, As woman announced the Pentecost woman must share equally in the divine- the permutation is an attempt at assimilation that denies equal partnership

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

The spirit is not to be imprisoned only in the Father-son duality. The spirit eludes this "couple." This event is announced in the Gospel itself: the female, the women partake not in the Last Supper but in the Pentecost, and it is they who discover and announce the resurrection. This seems to say that the body of man can return to life when woman no longer forgets that she has a share in the spirit. In·this way her transfiguration would take place. The moment of her glorification, finally without masochism. Without the infliction of wounds. Without the need for her body to be opened over and again to pleasure, to jouissance, or to conception. The body would be enveloped in her flesh. Inside-outside. Even for conception, the cradle would in some sense be ready. The nest for the child would be possible if the female had its own nest. If woman had her own territory: her birth, her genesis, her growth. With the female becoming in self and for self as Hegel would say. An in self and a for self that are not closed off in the self-sufficiency of a consciousness or a mind. An in self and a for self that always also remain for the other and in a world and a universe that are partway open. For woman to affirm that her desire proceeds or wills thus, woman must be born into desire. She must be longed for, loved, valued as a daughter. An other morning, a new parousia that necessarily accompanies the coming of an ethical God. He respects the difference between him and her, in cosmic and aesthetic generation and creation. Sharing the heaven and the earth in all their elements, potencies, acts.

#### And, Incrementalism D/A-doesn’t solve-language and subjectivity is fundamentally disparately sexuate- a radical affirmation of difference is a prerequisite

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

Up to this point, my reading and my interpretation of the history of philosophy agree with Merleau-Ponty: we must go back to a moment of prediscursive experience, recommence ev~ rything, all the categories by which we understand things, the world, subject-object divisions, recommence everything and pause at the "mystery, as familiar as it is unexplained, of a light which, illuminating the rest, remains at its source in obscurity. ""If we could rediscover within the exercise of seeing and speaking some of the living references that assign themselves such a destiny in a language, perhaps they would teach us how to form our new instruments, and first of all to understand our research, our interrogation themselves." (P. 130). This operation is absolutely necessary in order to bring the maternal-feminine into language: at the level of theme, motif, subject, articulation, syntax, and so on. Which requires passage through the night, a light that remains in obscurity.

#### Reformism fails-surrounds the world with substitute “containers” meant to represent the originary womb, guaranteeing failure

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

And even as man, consciously or unconsciously, feeds on and exploits the maternal-feminine in order to live, survive, inhabit, work, he forgets the other and his own becoming. He arrests his growth and repeats, endlessly, searching for the moment when the separation of memory and forgetting was lost to him. But, the more he repeats, the more he surrounds himself with envelopes, containers, "houses" which prevent him from finding either the other or himself. His nostalgia for a first and last dwelling prevents him from meeting and living with the other. Nostalgia blocks the threshold of the ethical world. It does so with the currency-tool which is used for inhabiting and sheltering the other. But money cannot support life. However necessary, money is no substitute for life. Giving money to the other is no payment for the still virgin, available creature [etant] that the other uses to provide you with support, nourishment, space, and matter for creation, that creature that the other-male or female-would need and desire in return: to build an identity, a language, a body of work.

#### Radical heterosexuality is key- replaces originary loss and deconstructs the phallogocentric model that makes space for homosexuality

Braidotti 2011

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

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Irigaray is one of the few thinkers who places full emphasis on radical heterosexuality and the need to reconstruct a heterosexual social-symbolic contract that does not rest on feminophobia, hence not on a patriarchal social unconscious. A fully trained psychoanalyst, Irigaray denounces the delusional nature of identities postulated on the phallogocentric signifier and digs deeper than the sociological expressions of everyday sexism and culturally enforced discrimination. Her critique touches upon the in-depth roots of misogyny in a subject whose foundations rest on the rejection of the feminine from the material maternal body that constitutes our site of origin and inflicts a wound on each and every subject. At the beginning of the self, there is a separation from the totality one enjoyed as part of the mater or matrix. This causes an irreparable loss and hence an inexpressible grief. This structure of “unrepresentability” is a crucial part of psychoanalytic theories of subject formation. It rests on two key ideas: first, that the original loss of (the illusion of) totality, which translates into a wound, becomes a constitutive element of our subjectivity. One incorporates the loss, so to speak, and folds over it by deploying all possible cognitive and emotional forms of compensation. The pain of it never goes away— it just gets formatted into mourning and melancholia (Freud) or gratitude and reciprocity (Melanie Klein). Irigaray argues that the sense of originary loss has to be replaced by self-love and love for the Woman one could become. Second, the unrepresentable expresses the patriarchal unconscious’s unease with all the attributes, qualities, and entitlements that are cast/ projected on the feminine: embodiment, relation, natality, and hence mortality, generative powers, affectivity, and sexual vitality. How to recast these elements in a new sociosymbolic contract is the question that lies at the core of Irigaray’s feminist politics calling for a radically new form of female sexuality. In Irigaray’s scheme of things, the other-woman (including the mother-daughter dyad) is like a data bank of missing information from which the feminist subject can draw. This exchange repairs ontological losses and accelerates the state of change, transforming the collective space between politicized women into a laboratory of becoming. This is not to say that the subject draws only from other women; on the contrary, Irigaray’s heterosexual scheme gives ample margin and a high priority to the wealth of exchanges that are possible between the sexes. The ethics of sexual difference has to do with more than differences within each woman and among women: it is marked by sets of irreducible differences that construct the singularity of the subject. In other words, identification with the feminine and the masculine is necessary for the constitution of female and male subjects respectively, but it is not sufficient. More is needed— such as concrete and imaginary relations to ethnicity, religion, and other variables— the “other” remains, for Irigaray, a moving, ungraspable horizon. The yearning for the other— or desire— is also described by Irigaray as the passion of wonder. In other words, for Irigaray, both heterosexual and homosexual identities are equally problematic in a phallocentric system that reduces everything to the criteria of evaluation and selection of sexual Sameness or the power of One. Irigarays’ emphasis on heterosexuality stresses radical difference and the role it can play in the constitution of sexuality; feminism provided a break from the male homosocial bonding induced by the reduction of all human sexualities to a phallic model. The dissymmetry between heterosexuality and homosexuality is made more complex by Irigaray, who instead introduces the notion of differentiation within different forms of homosexuality— first and foremost the difference between homosexuality in women and homosexuality in men.This radical position also grants a significant role to men in reconstructing their own attachment to phallic parameters of sexual identity. Far as this may sound from the claims of deconstruction and sexual in-betweenness that are advanced by queer theorists, Irigaray’s political project is neither incompatible with nor opposed to homosexual, gay, and lesbian discourses (Braidotti 2002). Her position refuses to place all the burden of transformation onto gay and queer people and instead calls into question the great majority of self-perpetuating sexually “normal” individuals. Irigaray shows both the intrinsic dysfunctionality and enduring violence of heterosexual love under the power of the phallic signifier and calls for a drastic realignment of all parties concerned. In so doing, she emphasizes the extent to which feminophobia still functions in our world and the ways in which some feminist theories are complicitous with it.

#### Sex difference politics uniquely key in the academic sphere- economic impoverishment disparities between male scholars and female scholars proves

Braidotti 2011

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Alphonso Lingis’s work is an interesting term of comparison to Massumi’s. Equally creative, but far more hysterical in his assimilation of the master’s voice, Lingis’s texts strike me as exacerbations of Deleuze’s style. They push some of his premises to the extreme, often with great poetic force, which, however, reads at times like parody. Lingis reminds me of another loyal Deleuzian, the Italian Bifo (Franco Berardi), former leader of the 1977 political movements. In his recent writings on globalization, nomadology, and the politics of the new technologies (Berardi 1997), Bifo adopts a rather prophetic or visionary mode. Inspired by Nietzsche, like Lingis, Bifo mixes poetic with theoretical voices within the same text. This, in my opinion, healthy disregard for coherence goes hand in hand with a flair for discontinuities in graphic layout and chronological sequences. At times his texts precipitate an apocalyptic tone, mostly, however, they run at a high level of intensity. They constitute singular expressions of a nomadic sensibility that laughs with tragic seriousness at “Splatterkapitalismus” (Berardi 1997:7) as a horror show and at the not less horrific inertia of its lawful subjects sealed in “Prozacnation” (Berardi 1997:21). Significantly, whereas Lingis incorporates and mimes the feminine, Bifo leaves it alone and highlights instead the relevance of male nomadic subjects in quest for a radical politics in an era that seems to want to yield none. Massumi’s work, on the other hand, differs from both Lingis’s and Bifo’s in that he is mercifully free of any self-referential constraints: he is kind of egoless. This allows him to trace patterns of becoming that are less representational and hence higher in creative energy. Intrinsically political, Massumi’s texts are constructed both geologically and genealogically as multilayered strata that do not fit into any predictable symmetry. His political theory texts (Massumi 1992a, 1992b) enact diachronic interventions upon the social unconscious and the kind of flows of desire that both construct it and sustain it. Massumi’s work is diagrammatic in that he draws the flowcharts of desiring subjects, both the Majority-subject and His “others” or minorities. He also underscores the interconnections between single events or actors, texts, historical contexts, and other effects. This focus on the effects of the text, of the affectivity it enacts and on the material interrelations that sustain it, are all central to the cartographic concerns that I value so highly. It triggers off what I consider the most important effect of all: it destabilizes readers and, like a diagonal line in Mondrian’s paintings, it evokes the becoming-minoritarian, it makes readers yearn for it. This desire is crucial to the Deleuzian diagrams, or “abstract machines,” that function in the cartographic mode of flowcharts. In his disobedience or, rather, his disregard for orthodoxy, Massumi does not even attempt oedipal loyalty and dutiful imitation, thus expressing perfectly the conceptual core of Deleuze’s philosophy. In an advanced queer era, it may even seem inadequate to still speak of men and women, let alone of their respective relationships to feminism. Yet, in the competitive context of the contemporary social and academic labor market, torn between “theory wars” and multiple “races for theory,” these seemingly old-fashioned categories have acquired a new salience. The statistics of male-to-female career practices speak for themselves and the term backlash does not even begin to sketch the extent of the political obstacles put in the way of the fulfillment of feminist ideals and practices. The “brothers” may have learned to appreciate complexity and multiplicity in theory, but they are far from practicing generous encounters with positive differences in practice. Institutions themselves have delayed the implementation of feminist and antidiscriminatory practices, with the result that the economic impoverishment of female academics is higher than that of their male counterparts. The long march through institutions proved to be fraught with more horizontal resistance as well as vertical hierarchies than my generation had expected. Let this not be a sad ending, however, but rather a thoughtful reflection along the long and winding road of feminist empowerment in every aspect of social life, including my beloved field of scholarly research, teaching, and philosophical thought. The struggle does go on. So as to avoid the pitfalls of ready-made essentialism, of positing woman as originally and constitutionally other— so as to avert her plural lips repeating a certain uniformity— we feminists asserted clearly the need for a nomadic political project, a practice, a movement. We need to put the “active” back into “activism.” Difference, to be operative, has to be acted ON and acted OUT, collectively, in the here and now of our common world. This ideal should also be the core of male feminism and its “pheminist” acolytes in the third millennium. Beyond the principle of envy and ingratitude— the ethics of sexual difference: I therefore am and shall proudly remain a human, sexed, mortal being of the female Italo-Australo-Franco-Dutch kind, endowed with many a language and multiple locations and belonging. Just call me— if you will— woman as nomadic work-in-process.