### 1st Off

#### OUR INTERPRETATION: The resolution asks a yes/no question as to the desirability of the United States Federal Government action. The role of the ballot should be to affirm or reject the actions and outcomes of the plan.

#### 1. THE TOPIC IS DEFINED BY THE PHRASE FOLLOWING THE COLON – THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE AGENT OF THE RESOLUTION, NOT THE INDIVIDUAL DEBATERS

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2K

<http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### 2. “RESOLVED” EXPRESSES INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary 2K

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### 3. “SHOULD” DENOTES AN EXPECTATION OF ENACTING A PLAN

American Heritage Dictionary – 2K

[www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

#### 4. THE U.S.F.G. is the three branches of government

Dictionary.com 2k6 [<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united+states+government>]

|  |
| --- |
| noun |
| the executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of the United States |

#### Simulated national security law debates preserve agency and enhance decision-making---avoids cooption

Laura K. Donohue 13, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11, “National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations”, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying doctrinal material and creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. This is the most important determination, because the substance of the doctrinal portion of the course and the simulation follows from this decision. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. This, then, becomes a guide for the doctrinal part of the course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised in the current conversation. Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion simulations, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may provide an important way forward. Such simulations also cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it does provide a starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

#### Switch side debate is good-direct engagement, not abstract relation, with identities we do not identify with is critical to us to overcome the existential resentment we feel towards those with whom we disagree. Lack of switch-side facilitates a refusal to accept that our position is within question

Glover 10

[Robert, Professor of Political Science at University of Connecticut, Philosophy and Social Criticism, “Games without Frontiers?: Democratic Engagement, Agonistic Pluralism, and the Question of Exclusion”, Vol. 36, p. asp uwyo//amp]

In this vein, Connolly sees the goal of political engagement as securing a positive ‘ethos of engagement’ in relation to popular movements which alter existing assumptions, that is, a positive attitude towards attempts at pluralization. Connolly suggests we do so through thecultivation of two essential virtues: agonistic respect and critical responsiveness. 88 Agonistic respect is defined as a situation whereby each political actor arrives at an appreciation for the fact that their own self-definition is bound with that of others, as well as recognition of the degree to which each of these projections is profoundly contestable. 89 While Connolly notes that agonistic respect is a ‘kissing cousin’ of liberal tolerance, he distinguishes it by saying that the latter typically carries ‘the onus of being at the mercy of a putative majority that often construes its own position to be beyond question.’ 90 Thus, agonistic respect is a reciprocal democratic virtue meant to operate across relations of difference, and Connolly deploys it as a regulative ideal for the creation agonistic democratic spaces. 91 In a somewhat related way, the virtue of ‘critical responsiveness’ also attempts to move beyond liberal tolerance. 92 Critical responsiveness entails ‘ careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognition, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.’ 93 Critical responsiveness is not pity, charity, or paternalism but implies an enhanced degree of concern for others, driven by the cultivation of reciprocal empathic concern 21 for that which you are not. 94 This attitude cannot be developed in an abstract relation to these new and existing forms of radical cultural, political, religious, and philosophical difference. Critical responsiveness above all requires that one ‘get[s] a whiff of experiences heretofore alien to [us]’, recognizing that while this may be unsettling or cause discomfort, direct engagement is the means by which you, ‘work tactically on yourself and others to overcome existential resentment of this persistent condition of human being.’

### 2nd Of

#### Tiel, ni asertas limo pensante subfosi la epistemología kiu pravigas la misuzoj de milito potencoj en la unua loko.

THE COUNTERPLAN SPILLS OVER – EACH USE OF ESPERANTO PROVIDES A SITE FOR JUSTIFICATION OF FUTURE USE, AND USE of English results in LINGUISTIC HEGEMONY THAT RELIES ON DOMINATION OF THE FEW OVER THE MANY – FLIPS THE AFF

Pierre Janton (Prof. of English language and literature at the University of Clermont-Ferrand, in France) 1993

[Esperanto: Language, Literature, and Community, p. 131-2, loghry]

Outside the movement, Esperanto may profit from circumstances favoring an international language. The need for rapid and frequent worldwide communication reflects a growing trend toward unity and cooperation. Esperantists must bring pressure to bear, in every possible way, on the European Parliament, since as the European Community is transformed into an authentic political federation, with ten or a dozen major languages, Esperanto will be afforded a unique chance unavailable in other parts of the world. For the same reason they should join the battle, alongside the countries of the third world, for those countries' linguistic independence. The linguistic imperialism of a few major powers has denied most nations their own adequate means of expression, forcing English and French on them, along with their respective cultures. If the third world wishes to acquire linguistic independence and also communicate with the world, it needs a language at least as international in character as the languages of the former colonists. That language could be Esperanto. The essential message of Esperanto is that an international language should belong to everyone, and not only a few privileged people, nations, or sections of the population. Its very conception implies the denial of elitism, hegemony, and all forms of dominance by the few over the many. Esperanto has been called the Latin of modern democracy because people need a common language to become and remain free. It is already apparent, wherever Esperanto is used, that it serves not only as a means of communication, but also as a means of opening new avenues for information, contacts, exchanges-in short, as a way of achieving a more rational, aware and comprehensive culture and society. Herein lies its unique educational value. The fact that, among all previous and subsequent projects, Esperanto alone became a living language, spoken by more people than 95 percent of the known languages of the world, is an arresting linguistic fact, making Esperanto unique among planned languages. 1 On the other hand, Esperanto stands apart from the ethnic languages in that it alone is capable of fully performing the role of an international language: a given national language will not lose its specifically national characteristics (phonology, structure, logic) just because it is used as an interlanguage among people of different nationalities. If we understand that internationality is not limited to contacts among the few (for example, in professional or business circles, or among a few peoples or areas), and if we define internationality in its universal sense, then we are forced to acknowledge that all ethnic languages remain essentially national, based on national cultures, while Esperanto is essentially universal.

### 3rd Off

#### Using imperialism as a focus point kills any chance at change —capital is transnational and imperialism is a byproduct - this ends any chance at a perm and makes the impacts worse by affirming institutions of global capital.

Robinson 7 (Professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, William, 2007, “Beyond the Theory of Imperialism: Global Capitalism and the Transnational State” Societies Without Borders, 2 (2007) 5-26 p. 9-16, RSR)

Harvey offers no explicit conception of the state but he acknowledges that state behavior has “depended on how the state has been constituted and by whom.” 17 Yet dual logics of state and capital ignore the real-world policymaking process in which the state extends backward, is grounded in the forces of civil society, and is fused in a myriad of ways with capital itself. It is incumbent to ask in what ways transnational social forces may influence a reconstitution of state institutions. To the extent that civil society – social forces – and capital are transnationalizing our analysis of the state cannot remain frozen at a nation-state level. The essential problematic that should concern us in attempting to explain phenomena associated with the “new imperialism” is the political management – or rule – of global capitalism. The theoretical gauntlet is how to understand the exercise of political domination in relation to the institutions available to dominant groups and sets of changing historical relations among social forces – that is, how are the political and the economic articulated in the current era? This requires a conception of agency and institutions. But instead of offering an ontology of agency and how it operates through historically constituted institutions, much of the “new imperialism” literature reifies these institutions. Institutions are but institutionalized – that is, codified – patterns of interaction among social forces that structure different aspects of their material relations. When we explain global dynamics in terms of institutions that have an existence or agency independent of social forces we are reifying these institutions. Critical state theories and Gramscian IPE 18 have taught us, despite their limitations, that the story starts – and ends – with historically situated social forces as collective agents. To critique a nation-state framework of analysis as I do, is not, as my critics claim19 to dismiss the nation-state but to dereify it. Reifying categories leads to realist analyses of state power and the inter-state system. Realism presumes that the world economy is divided up into distinct national economies that interact with one another. Each national economy is a billiard ball banging back and forth on each other. This billiard image is then applied to explain global political dynamics in terms of nation-states as discrete interacting units (the inter-state system). The state, says Harvey, in reverting to the realist approach, “struggles to assert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large.” 20 But Harvey does not stop with this reification of the state. He introduces an additional territorial reification, so that territorial relations become immanent to social relations. “The wealth and well-being of particular territories are augmented at the expense of others,” writes Harvey. 21 This is a remarkably reii ed image – “territories” rather than social groups have “wealth” (accumulated values) and enjoy “well being.” Harvey gives space in this way an independent existence as a social/political force in the form of territory in order to advance his thesis of the “new imperialism.” It is not how social forces are organized both in space and through institutions that is the focus. Rather, for Harvey, territory acquires a social existence of its own, an agentic logic. We are told that “territorial entities” engage in practices of production, commerce, and so on. Do “territorial entities” really do these things? Or is it not that in the real world, individuals and social groups engage in production, commerce, and so on? And they do so via institutions through which they organize, systematize, and demarcate their activities as agents. Social groups became aggregated and organized in the modern era through the particular institutional form of the territorial-based nation state. But this particular institutional form does not acquire a life of its own and neither is it immutable. Nation-states continue to exist but their nature and meaning evolve as social relations and structures become transformed; particular, as they transnationalize. Drawing on insights from Lafebvre, Marx, Luxemburg, and others, Harvey earlier introduced the highly fertile notion of spatial (or spatial-temporal) fixes to understand how capital momentarily resolves contradictions (particularly, crises of overaccumulation) in one place by displacing them to other places through geographic expansion and spatial reorganization. Following Marx’ famous observation that the expanded accumulation of capital involves the progressive “annihilation of space through time,” he also coined the term “time-space compression” in reference to globalization as a process involving a new burst of time-space compression in the world capitalist system. 22 But “places” have no existence or meaning in and of themselves. It is people living in particular spaces that do this dis-placing (literally), these spatiotemporal fixes. The “asymmetric exchange relations” that are at the heart of Harvey’s emphasis on the territorial basis of the “new imperialism” must be for Harvey territorial exchange relations. But not only that: they must be nation-state territorial exchanges. But exchange relations are social relations, exchanges among particular social groups. There is nothing in the concept of asymmetric exchanges that by i at gives them a territorial expression; no reason to assume that uneven exchanges are necessarily exchanges that take place between distinct territories, much less specifically between distinct nation states. That they do or do not acquire such an expression is one of historical, empirical, and conjunctural analysis. Certainly spatial relations among social forces have historically been mediated in large part by territory; spatial relations have been territorially-dei ned relations. But this territorialization is in no way immanent to social relations and may well be fading in significance as globalization advances. Any theory of globalization must address the matter of place and space, including changing spatial relations among social forces and how social relations are spatialized. This has not been satisfactorily accomplished, despite a spate of theoretical proposition, ranging from Castell’s “space of flows” replacing the “space of place.” 23 and Giddens “time-space distanciation” as the “lifting” of social relations from territorial place and their stretching around the globe in ways that may eliminate territorial friction. 24 This notion of ongoing and novel reconfigurations of time and social space is central to a number of globalization theories. It in turn points to the larger theoretical issue of the relationship of social structure to space, the notion of space as the material basis for social practices, and the changing relationship under globalization between territoriality/geography, institutions, and social structures. The crucial question here is the ways in which globalization may be transforming the spatial dynamics of accumulation and the institutional arrangements through which it takes place. The subject – literally, that is, the agents/makers of the social world – is not global space but people in those spaces. What is central, therefore, is a spatial reconfiguration of social relations beyond a nation-state/inter-state framework, if not indeed even beyond territory. States are institutionalized social relations and territorial actors to the extent that those social relations are territorialized. Nation-states are social relations that have historically been territorialized but those relations are not by definition territorial. To the extent that the US and other national states promote deterritorializing social and economic processes they are not territorial actors. The US state can hardly be considered as acting territorially when it promotes the global relocation of accumulation processes that were previously concentrated in US territory. Harvey’s approach is at odds to explain such behavior since by his definition the US state must promote its own territorial aggrandizement. Harvey observes that as local banking was supplanted by national banking in the development of capitalism “the free flow of money capital across the national space altered regional dynamics.” 25 In the same vein we can argue that the free flow of capital across global space alters these dynamics on a worldwide scale. Let us return to the question: why would Harvey propose separate logics for the economic and the political – for capital and the state? By separating the political and the economic he is able to claim that indeed globalization has transformed the spatial dynamics of accumulation – hence capital globalizes – but that the institutional arrangements of such global accumulation remain territorial as nation-states. The state has its own independent logic that brings it into an external relation to globalizing capital. Here we arrive at the pitfall of theoreticism. If one starts with the theoretical assumption that the world is made up of independent, territorial-based nation states and that this particular institutional-political form is something immanent to the modern world – Wood makes the assumption explicit, a law of capitalism; for Harvey it seems implicit – then the changing world of the 21st century must be explained by theoretical i at in these terms. Reality must be made to conform to the theoretical conception of an immutable nation-state based, inter-state political and institutional order. But since Harvey acknowledges the reality of globalizing capital he is therefore forced to separate the logic of that globalizing capital from that of territorially-based states; he is forced either to abandon the theoretical construct altogether or to build it upon a dualism of the economic and the political, of capital and the state. Theory needs to illuminate reality, not make reality conform to it. The pitfall of this theoreticism is to develop analyses and propositions to fit theoretical assumptions. Since received theories establish a frame of an inter-state system made up of competing national states, economies and capitals then 21st century reality must be interpreted so that it fits this frame one way or another. Such theoreticism forces theorists of the “new imperialism” into a schizophrenic dualism of economic and political logics. In any event Harvey has trapped himself in a blind alley that underscores the pitfall. Despite his acknowledgement of capital’s transnationalization he concludes that the US state’s political/territorial logic is driven now by an effort to open up space vis-à-vis competitor nation-states for unloading national capital surplus, hence the new US imperialism. This inconsistency in Harvey’s argumentation reflects a general contradiction in the “new imperialism” literature: the dualism of the economic and political, of capital and the state, is negated by the claim that the US state functions to serve (US national) capital.

#### They undermine the notion of truth—protects the ruling class and destroys class struggle

Mas'ud Zavarzadeh, Department of English, Syracuse University, "The stupidity that consumption is just as productive as production": in the shopping mall of the post-al left.” *College Literature,* October 01, 1994

This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy in these texts therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to "politicizing the classroom" in OR-1 [Hogan]) and in which knowledge (concept) is turned--through the process that OR-3 [McCormick] calls "translation"--into "consumable" EXPERIENCES. The more "intense" the experience, as the anecdotes of [McCormick] show, the more successful the pedagogy. In short, it is a pedagogy that removes the student from his/her position in the social relations of production and places her/him in the personal relation of consumption: specifically, EXPERIENCE of/as the consumption of pleasure. The post-al logic obscures the laws of motion of capital by very specific assumptions and moves--many of which are rehearsed in the texts here. I will discuss some of these, mention others in passing, and hint at several more. (I have provided a full account of all these moves in my "Post-ality" in Transformation 1.) I begin by outlining the post-al assumptions that "democracy" is a never-ending, open "dialogue" and "conversation" among multicultural citizens; that the source of social inequities is "power"; that a post-class hegemonic "coalition," as OR-5 [Williams] calls it--and not class struggle--is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-1 [Hill] writes) is an "epistemological gulag"-- a construct of power--and thus any form of "ideology critique" that raises questions of "falsehood" and "truth" ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the "other" truths by, in [Williams'] words, "staking sole legitimate claim" to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of "epistemology" is displaced in the ludic academy by "rhetoric." The question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the "truth" of a practice but whether it "works." (Rhetoric has always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, [France] is not interested in whether my practices are truthful but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the "truth" of my texts) end up "cutting our funding?" [he] asks. A post-al leftist like [France], in short, "resists" the state only in so far as the state does not cut [his] "funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like [Williams] to conclude that my argument "has little prospect of effectual force" in order to disregard its truthfulness. The post-al dismantling of "epistemology" and the erasure of the question of "truth," it must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If the "truth question" is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox binarism ([Hill]), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization that disregards the "difference" of the ruling class. This is why a defender of the ruling class such as [Hill] sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness as a form of "epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables [France] to answer my question, "What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics (rhetoric): what is "wrong" with dogmatism, [he] says, is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of [his] text) I will not get a political or philosophical argument but a tropological description.[6] The post-al left is a New Age Left: the "new new left" privileged by [Hill] and [Williams]--the laid-back, "sensitive," listening, and dialogic left of coalitions, voluntary work, and neighborhood activism (more on these later). It is, as I will show, anti-intellectual and populist; its theory is "bite size" (mystifying, of course, who determines the "size" of the "bite"), and its model of social change is anti-conceptual "spontaneity": May 68, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and, in [Hill's] text, Chiapas. In the classroom, the New Age post-al pedagogy inhibits any critique of the truth of students' statements and instead offers, as [McCormick] makes clear, a "counseling," through anecdotes, concerning feelings. The rejection of "truth" (as "epistemological gulag"--[Hill]), is accompanied by the rejection of what the post-al left calls "economism." Furthermore, the post-al logic relativizes subjectivities, critiques functionalist explanation, opposes "determinism," and instead of closural readings, offers supplementary ones. It also celebrates eclecticism; puts great emphasis on the social as discourse and on discourse as always inexhaustible by any single interpretation--discourse (the social) always "outruns" and "exceeds" its explanation. Post-al logic is, in fact, opposed to any form of "explanation" and in favor of mimetic description: it regards "explanation" to be the intrusion of a violent outside and "description" to be a respectful, caring attention to the immanent laws of signification (inside). This notion of description--which has by now become a new dogma in ludic feminist theory under the concept of "mimesis" (D. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation)--regards politics to be always immanent to practices: thus the banalities about not politicizing the classroom in [Hogan's] "anarchist" response to my text[7] and the repeated opposition to binaries in all nine texts. The opposition to binaries is, in fact, an ideological alibi for erasing class struggle, as is quite clear in [France's] rejection of the model of a society "divided by two antagonistic classes" (see my Theory and its Other).

**THE DETERMINISM OF CAPITAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF ALL LIFE—THIS LOGIC MOBILIZES AND ALLOWS FOR THE 1AC’S SCENARIOS IN THE FIRST PLACE**

**DYER-WITHERFORD** (professor of Library and Info. Sciences at the U of Western Ontario) **1999**   
[Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

**For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative.** The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that **capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control.** Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. **This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet.** The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

**The alternative is to Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.**

**METHOD IS THE FOREMOST POLITICAL QUESTION BECAUSE ONE MUST UNDERSTAND EXISTING SOCIAL TOTALITY BEFORE ONE CAN HOW TO ACT—GROUNDING THE SITES OF POLITICAL CONTESTATION OUTSIDE OF LABOR MERELY SERVE TO HUMANIZE CAPITAL AND PREVENT A TRANSITION BEYOND OPPRESSION**

**TUMINO** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **2001**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, **Red Critique**, p. online //wyo-tjc]

**Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis**. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, **only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity**. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that **to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality**. I will argue that **the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access** (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). **This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism** which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All **modes** of Marxism **now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so**—and this is my main argument—**legitimate capitalism**. Why? **Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy**." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . **For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane**. **This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts** (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). **Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is** produced by the human mind and is thus **free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth**. In this paper I argue that **any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of** corporate theory ("**knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory**.

### 4th Off

#### The celebration of border thinking and knowing as their advocacy places disability as the underside and opposition to knowing—resulting in ableism

Ferri and May, 2005

[Vivian and Beth, FIXATED ON ABILITY Questioning Ableist Metaphors in FeministTheories of Resistance, rose Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1&2 April-August 2005, pp. 120-140, http://www.academia.edu/227091/Fixated\_on\_Ability\_Questioning\_Ableist\_Metaphors\_in\_Feminist\_Theories\_of\_Resistance] /Wyo-MB

This lack of understanding of disability,or a presumed understanding of disability that ﬁxes its meaning in stereotypical ways, is all too common, but we have noticed two predominant trends in feminist and critical race theorizing: the tendency to characterize disability in opposition to knowledge or insight (this characterization can be both negative/stigmatized or positive/romanticized); and the use of disability to identify and describe objects of remediation (to critique dominant ideologies which are imbued with unacknowledged power and privilege or to name and reject the effects of oppression).¶ Constructing Disability in Opposition to Knowledge¶ Surprisingly, many theorists continue to rely on disability as a metaphor for ignorance, stupidity, oversight, or general incompetence as a knower. For example, mixing metaphors of muteness and blindness to underscore exclusions in feminist thinking, Ann DuCille critiques “the silence (and theblindness) of feminism”(247). Bell hooks uses ableist metaphors to highlight sexist thinking on the part of Paulo Freire. She writes: “For me this[patriarchal paradigm of liberation] is always a source of great anguish for it represents a blind spot in the vision of men [like Freire] who have profound insight”(49).Here, Freire’s¶ blind spot¶ is his lack of awareness of sexism, which hooks places in opposition to his great¶ insight¶ and otherwise redeemable¶ vision¶ abou the politics of race, ethnicity, and social class resistance. Of course, hooks is not alone in her use of visual metaphors for knowing or¶ insight. For example, we found that we, too, relied on the notion of sight to signify understanding in an earlier co-authored article on disability and ﬁlm (May and Ferri 135).Yet equating visuality and knowing is not innocent—it has, of course, a history. For instance, many have argued that it is an episteme foundational to practices empire building and colonial cartography, of “looking out” over or surveying lands and their inhabitants as property to be conquered or developed (e.g., Duncan). Moreover, by reinscribing vision as knowledge (and, directly or indirectly, blindness as ignorance), visual metaphors for knowing or insight can reinforce Manichean dualisms of mind/body,I/ not-I in the name of liberation politics. Equating visual acuity with knowing is one common way to place disability in opposition to knowledge. But many others are equally as frequent, including dualisms between mental illness and rationality and/or characterizations of faulty knowledge models as “pathologies” or “illnesses.” For example, because Frederic Jameson relies heavily on ableist notions of schizophrenia and pathological illness in his critique of the postmodern subject, these ideas inﬁltrate Chela Sandoval’s reading and critique of Jameson. Sandoval writes that for Jameson, the “euphoria” of the postmodern subject“markstheonsetofanewformofmassculturalpathology.Itis‘schizophrenic’innature— charged with hallucinogenic intensity” (21). Similarly, June Jordan (in Collins,¶ Fighting¶ 150) describes constructivist approaches to identity as a “delusional disease.” In assertingher own social theory, Patricia Hill Collins writes that deconstructivist theory can be“crippling” because it “runs in circles” and fosters nihilism (¶ Fighting¶ 189). Once again,disability is enlisted to represent foolishness and despair.Similarily, Susan Stanford Friedman, in querying whether a doctoral education inan interdisciplinary ﬁeld such as Women’s Studies is even viable, asserts “that way,madness lies” (318). Other scholars refer to those occupying opposing sides of theoretical or political debates as “madheads” (Jamila 390), as “crazy,” or as “wingnuts”(Be´rube´). As these examples illustrate, schizophrenia and madness more generally areoften placed in opposition to more reasoned approaches, arguments, or positions.Disability as a state of unknowing, or irrationality, is invoked in order to be deplored.Reading our own works, we found that Vivian discusses the “crazed” and troubled stateambiguity can elicit (May 366) and Beth discusses the “paranoia” about differentialbirthrates that Eugenicists tried to evoke (Ferri and Connor).Schizophrenia can also be used rather romantically, as a potentiallyliberating state of mind that allows us to think beyond given categories and binaries,to free ourselves from modernist impulses of mind or from “autistic” egocentrism!As Fe´lix Guattari writes,“in a certain sense people who are operating on the level of social sciences or on thelevel of politics ought to ‘make themselves schizophrenic.’ And I’m not speaking of that illusory image of schizophrenics, caught in the grip of a repression, whichwould have us believe that they are ‘autistic,’ turned inward on themselves, and soforth. I mean that we should have the schizophrenic’s capacity to range acrossﬁelds¶ . . .¶ of study” (Guattari, 83).Obviously, Guattari is not alone in this rhetorical strategy. If we were to tell the “originstory” for wanting to write this paper, it would begin with a talk given by Judith Butlerin New York City reﬂecting on the events of September 11th in which she made an¶ analogy between post-9/11 experiences and schizophrenia. Because she was usingschizophrenia to highlight the beneﬁts of destabilization, Butler could not fully graspwhy her use of schizophrenia could be problematic. Yet the trouble with this kind of “borrowing” of disability, whether it is seemingly positive or negative, is that in theseinstances schizophrenia becomes, primarily, a rhetorical device. Schizophrenia as anembodied lived experience, a social and political history, an ontology withmeaning in its own right, disappears. Instead, it is transformed into an imagined state of dis/order available for using, for deepening the audience’s understandings of their own (able-bodied) lives and their own modes of rationality.

#### Alt is to vote negative for our internal critique of disability—solves all the aff and avoids the impact of marginalization that turns the case

Ferri and May, 2005

[Vivian and Beth, FIXATED ON ABILITY Questioning Ableist Metaphors in FeministTheories of Resistance, rose Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1&2 April-August 2005, pp. 120-140, http://www.academia.edu/227091/Fixated\_on\_Ability\_Questioning\_Ableist\_Metaphors\_in\_Feminist\_Theories\_of\_Resistance] /Wyo-MB

The bulk of our analysis illustrates Lorraine Code’s warning about “hegemonic imaginaries”—that they tend to hinder or block what she describes as “ responsible”knowing, or knowing other people in ways that go beyond the parameters of the “readilythinkable,”aformofknowingthatis“¶ more than other than a mere stretching¶ ”ofgivenmodesof perception (¶ Rational ¶ 262, 272, 265 emphasis added). We have sought to underscore someofthewaysinwhich analogies and metaphors can reinforce exclusionary and binary ways of thinking and hinder knowing others “responsibly.” As Miranda Joseph reminds us,“Although the comparison implicit in¶ . . .¶ analogy¶ . . .¶ presumes equivalence, it actuallyinvolvesthehierarchicalinscriptionofdifferentiatedidentities.Inevitably,theuseofanalogyelides both internal discontinuities¶ . . .¶ and external connections” (273).However, as Joseph argues, what is needed when “building political movements¶ . . .¶ [is] the recognition of external connections and internal incoherencies¶ . . .¶ not only forrevealing complicity, but also for revealing opportunities” (271). This is the kind of nuance that we would like to ﬁnd emphasized more often in rhetorical uses of disability—the both/and simultaneity, the ironic redeployment, and the playfulpositioning via language that not only allow us to come to terms with ambiguities, but toﬂourish by engaging with multiple structures of difference and identity simultaneously.Building coalitions and thinking intersectionally is not impossible and, in fact, is excitingand fruitful—it allows us to rethink everyday assumptions and attitudes about bodilydifference in ways that do not require disability to function solely as a pedagogical toolfor highlighting social problems in need of remediation and it asks us not merely to invert the negative and resort to romanticizing the difference of disability.Thus with the goal of highlighting “external connections and internal incoherencies,” we have underscored the need to account for disability in ways that do not reinforce hegemony but, rather, help to transform it. Intersectionality demands¶ that we do more than merely modify our analytic or metaphoric content within setframes of analysis that contain and control complexity and ambiguity. We havetherefore aimed to emphasize the urgent need for new metaphors and frames of reference to adequately theorize and realize multiplicity, to account for rather thansuppress the intersection of ableism with racism and sexism, such that we shiftconceptions of liberation, not merely in descriptive or additive ways, but at the levelsof analysis, meaning, and subjectivity.We have raised these critiques of ableist analogical thinking in feminist discoursebecause they are merited and serious. Yet, we conclude by acknowledging that analogicalthought has, in the end, helped us construct our own argument about analogy andmetaphor.GeraldinePrattargues thatthe “utility of metaphor tosome extentdependsonthe speciﬁc circumstances in which it is used, and there are no doubt times when a static,simplifying metaphor may be useful precisely because it obscures detail and otherviewpoints for the sake of a speciﬁc political (and polemical) aim. Nevertheless, we mustcontinually remind ourselves of what we are closing off through these strategic closures;¶ . . .¶ [we must] encourage this process of remembering” (26). It is important for us torecognize/remember, for example, that, in order to illustrate the dangers of ﬁgure/ground thinking, we drew connections to Biddy Martin’s work in queer theory.Or, as a means of emphasizing how analogy relies on binary oppositions to work, therebyerasing whole groups of people who straddle both ‘sides’ of the analogy, we connected toresearch about the exclusions of race-sex analogies. In other words, we have basicallyargued, “like race-sex analogies, sex-disability analogies are problematic.”Ironically, without analogy or comparative metaphorics, our own analysis would notexist, at least in its present form. So, despite its potential pitfalls, it is important toemphasize how “analogy has and can function as a powerful tool in the articulation of progressive social movements” (Joseph 273). Analogy and metaphor are necessary tools,but they are not innocent ones: they need to be used with care, “deployed strategically todirect attention to the social construction of subjectivity” (Mascia-Lees and Sharpe 234),“employed [only when]¶ explicitly ¶ grappling with¶ . . .¶ intersectional reality” (Carbado 296).By critiquing exclusionary practices within libratory theoretical, pedagogical, or historical frames of reference, we hope to have illustrated the radical possibilities of a transformative, rather than tokenizing, methodological and rhetorical inclusion. Weremain hopeful that Lorraine Code’s “empathy at its best” and Megan Boler’s“testimonial” relations are possible. We have come across a few examples in ourreading. For example, Anzaldu´a describes “blank spots” to describe gaps in knowledgeas well as the selective reality induced by privilege (¶ Haciendo¶ xxi). Margrit Shildrickuses the term “disenabled” to discuss how systems of domination simultaneously enablesome at the expense of others (116). And Nancy Mairs quips, with humorousredeployment, “as a cripple, I swagger” (¶ Plaintext¶ 9).Rather than advocating a “cure” for wayward language use, we are suggesting the need for more nuanced uses of language and metaphor that do not characterize people with disabilities in stereotypical, one-dimensional ways. Because language does not merely reﬂect reality but constructs it, we must be thoughtful about the politics of our words if we want to enact the kinds of social transformation we say we do. In order to promote changed social relations, we must continue to create new ways of linking our experiences and recognizing and accepting our differences in ways that retain and encourage an ambiguous, intersubjective ethic between self and other.

### Case

#### The border as a focus on Chicano nationalism has created dystopia and perverse relationships to capital-ultimately creates more oppression

Spires 08

(Dr. Adam Spires¶ Associate Professor¶ Spanish and Latin American Studies at St. Marys University. “The utopia/dystopia of Latin America's margins: writing identity in Acadia and Aztlan” January 2008 Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Academic OneFile//wyoccd)

Though celebrations of identity and assertions of political persistence have followed Acadian and Chicano cultural practices into the 21st century, visions of an ill-fated future have also begun to materialize, pointing instead to the unlikelihood of independence and to the eventual erasure of identity. Arguably this dystopian impulse grows in direct proportion to the erosion of the eutopian foundations that underlie their respective interpretations of history. As illustrated in the foregoing example, the erosion derives in part from a shift in perspective whereby the marginalized fail to reconcile their eutopian past with the incongruity of an Anglo-dominated reality.¶ In Acadia, this shift began with the 1970s neo-nationalist movement, which consisted of a counter-current to the conservative and bourgeois discourse that perpetuates the myth of Acadia's grandeur. In lieu of glorifying l'empremier and the heroic return from the deportation, a new generation of dissident voices would view their state of affairs as stagnant in a utopia that does nothing to improve their lives. Thus the self-deprecation with which writers would represent Acadian identity thereinafter is strategic, aimed at provoking fellow Acadians into political action or, at least, awakening them to the reality of their continued marginalized status. But this more hard-line approach to reinvigorating Acadia was short-lived, as it made no significant impact where questions of independence or social change are concerned. In consequence, the writing that succeeds the neo-nationalist movement is characterized by disillusionment and the futility of advocating an Acadia that is too divided and scattered to become the focus of cultural nationhood (Runte 1997, 110). Assimilation continues unabated, and trends in urbanization that draw successive generations out of French-speaking communities into an Anglo work environment are on the rise. As always, dependence on the Anglo economy continues to compromise the integrity of a purely Acadian identity. In this respect, Andre Magord explains that the idea of asserting Acadian difference in the presence of more powerful economic forces conjures up age-old fears: "the fear of asserting one's difference. The fear of the Other's reaction. A fear anchored in the often antagonistic attitude of the Anglophone majority. A fear transformed into the uncomfortable feeling that said majority is always viewing us as inferior" (2003, 15 [trans.]). As explored further on, when the hopes and dreams of eutopia are overshadowed by external forces that prove too daunting, said fears intensify, steering the critical response in cultural practices toward premonitions of dystopia.¶ In like manner, with the fervor of the 1960s diminished, the Chicano Movement has also shown signs of ambiguity, obliging today's Chicanos to rethink the significance of Aztlan. Moreover, the influx of Latino immigrants from other countries dilutes the emphasis on Mexican origins. Today's Chicanos are just as apt to espouse celebrations of la raza (race) and "the birth of a New World mestizaje within minority cultures" (Rosales 2001, 142), suggesting that the relevance of Aztlan lies now in its affiliation with a greater Latin American cause. Just as Vasconcelos (in the tradition of Rodo and Marti, later followed by Fernandez Retamar) defined Latin identity in terms of race and resistance to Yankee imperialism, venerating Latin America's mestizaje to the detriment of the colossal WASP of the North, so too is the Chicano metaphor of Aztlan best suited for articulating a sense of racial pride in response to the detrimental effects of marginalization. Nevertheless, reminiscent of the demise of "Universopolis" (Vasconcelos 1948 [1925], 35), the view of Aztlan as a spiritual homeland for Latinos has also been eclipsed by the economic giant of "Anglotown" (Vasconcelos 1948 [1925], 35). In effect, the corrosion of Latin culture by American imperialism that Vasconcelos condemns in La raza cosmica ("The cosmic race") has since only intensified. Case in point: the perverse relationship between Aztlan and the American economy can be quantified by the length and density of the maquiladora (assembly plant) belt, where Mexican labourers are tethered to the Machine. Today's reality along the Mexico-U.S. border is not a celebration of la raza, but rather, their continued oppression in an industrialized dystopia.

#### Prioritizing epistemology reifies, rewards extremism and causes self-serving scholarship.

Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California – San Diego, ‘11

[David, “Why ‘‘isms’’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress”, International Studies Quarterly, 2011, 55, 465-480, RSR]

The question of epistemology in international studies suffers from the same pathologies for theories outlined earlier, and which I need not repeat here. We reify each approach, reward extremism, fail to specify research designs completely, apply epistemologies selectively where they are most likely to work, and then claim universality. Through these pathologies, we not only create academic religions of different theories but also become committed to academic sects with different epistemologies. Like our theories, these epistemologies have become increasingly politicized and used as criteria and even weapons in power struggles within the discipline. Gatekeepers increasingly use one’s adherence to this or that epistemological religion to determine who gets hired where, who gets access to resources, and who is accepted in various professional networks. We increasingly talk and interact only with others of our same epistemological persuasion. Yet, although it may disappoint partisans, I can think of no objective reason to prefer one epistemology over another. Rather, the choice of epistemology by scholars appears to be largely subjective. We appear to be drawn to one or the other approach by intuition: one form of explanation simply feels right. Some are satisfied only when an event is placed in its full historical perspective with all the conjunctures and counterfactuals accounted for. Others are satisfied only when events accord with an appropriately derived hypothesis that has passed many demanding experimental tests. For myself, I read a lot in history—far more than I read in political science—and benefit from and enjoy these mostly narrative accounts immensely. But at the same time, I am usually not persuaded by causal claims that lack well-specified theories and experimental tests. In turn, while most of my own research has focused on the history of US foreign policy, the cases are treated within a nomological approach (see Lake 1988, 1999). One can move across the divide without finding the causal claims on the other side especially satisfying.

#### Images of suffering only create pity – which foregoes all opportunities to have any true relationship with the victims outline in 1ac

Bruckner 1986 [Pascal, Tears of the White Man, p. 77-79]

We all know that newsmaking follows the lure of trouble, and broadcasting means telling about what has gone wrong. The only thing that catches people's attention is dramatic and shocking news, in the form of mass murders or catastrophes. The trouble is that the media also pretend they are presenting what is really going on. They pretend they are showing the real world. This leads to distortion, because people see foreign lands always as if they were full of dissidents fleeing dictators, pariahs, and the sickly. In the public mind forms an image of a world in disintegration, where life can subsist only by some miracle. This deformation of reality is not a momentary lapse or an ideological perversion; it seems to be a precondition for reporting the news. In the apparent truthfulness of journalism, where there seems to be no trickery or falsification, a subtle process is at work. Cruel and violent scenes shown almost nightly do not simply transmit real famines and obvious suffering. In the guise of facts, they objectify these things, and so a single moment in the life of a people is thought to be the sum of their life. The periodic sufferings of some tropical republic or the seasonal malnutrition of some region in Africa symbolize the constant and timeless anguish of continents beyond Europe. What can be concluded from these images? They are honest and guileless, but above all they are stereotypes. In their desire to move us emotionally, the newsmakers produce poverty as the single truth of underdeveloped countries, and newscasting assumes the character of testimony. The image we see, therefore, is both a copy and a model of reality. It reflects real events that are presented as the prototypes of all events. This is a double deception, because the camera denies that life "over there" is anything but a long cry of the oppressed. With regard to our far-off brothers, it means that happiness is a pathological symptom. Compassion is no longer one of the arms of charity, it has become a tool of geography. If, in spite of terrible difficulties, Indians, Thais, Koreans, Angolans, and West Africans feel joy, if those men and women are brought together by laughter and love exactly the way we are, if these people refuse to be defined by our compassionate view of them, it can only be a sign of corruption or of subversion by imperialist propaganda.83 Man in the Third World is either a victim or a warrior, [he] is caught in a logic of martyrdom or warfare, and has no right to exist except as a rebel or as one repressed. His reaction can only be one of depression or of outrage; there is no middle ground. A happy native is a contradiction in terms, a squared circle. It is much better to depict him as bent down in a valley of tears, and to mourn his loss of liberty by weeping over him. This law of compassion precludes any real relationship with him, and forbids free rein to feelings such as anger, admiration, mistrust, and fascination. It is so much easier to sympathize abstractly with unhappy people, because sympathy with happy people requires more nobility of the soul, because it makes us fight against the obstacle of jealousy within us: “If man is capable of having compassion for the sufferings of others, only Angels share in others' joys. . . . " The Southern hemisphere is presented in a true, but one-sided way; at the same time, it is raised to the level of a symbol, and this false projection is hailed as a "new" and "revolutionary" perspective. This is defining what the Third World should be, and the act of definition gives it the power of a moral principle, the quality of liberation. So the new crusaders, under the pretext of mobilizing the conscience of the Western World and showing the misdeeds we are guilty of, are pouring out stereotypes that are just as naive as the reports of Loti, Colette, and Paul Morand were in their day. The leftists portray the poor countries in shades just as stereotypically dark as the pamphlets of the colonial era were stereotypically rosy. Whom are we supposed to believe? The spokesmen of multinational corporations that are quietly pillaging the Southern hemisphere? Or the querulous leftists who value man in the Third World only as poor, crushed, and wretched? Where is the prejudice greater? Is it in the curses heaped on the Southern hemisphere by the adherents of Raymond Cartier, or in the tearful image the so-called sympathizers present? It comes down to asking the far-off "other" what kind of subjugation he prefers—strangulation by neocolonialism or routinization through pity. This is a hopeless choice, and represents nothing but two aspects of the Western imagination.

#### The act of pity takes out solvency

Bruckner 1986 [Pascal, Tears of the White Man, p. 49-50]

The result is a terrible paradox. The more widespread hunger is, the greater is our indifference to its ravages. Pathetic appeals to our conscience and manipulation by shock are reiterated by the tireless television. The phrase "You are all murderers" does not mobilize people, it makes them yawn. What remains is a guilty conscience that has no strength and no will. We have passed from being tragically ignorant of the Third World to being tragically inured to it. When it was not normally mentioned, famine was deeply touching whenever it was. What is remarkable today is that it is too well known, too much a part of the norm. Rather than a blackout there is a welter of studies, statistics, and calls to alarm on these burning topics. Our emotional appetites are beset from all sides, and rather than being misled by propaganda, we are being told far too much. When catastrophe becomes an everyday thing, it ceases to be catastrophe.

#### Their obsession with the Guilt of the West eliminates all value to life; culminates in self-destruction

Bruckner 1986 [Pascal, Tears of the White Man, p. 63-66]

For the prophets of guilty conscience, the tireless sowers of discontent, this disquiet is not enough. They need to make us responsible for everything that goes wrong. Their trick is to confront us via the media with all the suffering of the human race, in the face of which the slightest gesture of generosity is an inadequate act of charity. This accounts for their ceaseless and frantic recourse to their favorite weapon, statistics—a veritable secular weapon of sin, a perfect arithmetic club. We are beaten with figures so monstrous, quantities of suffering so enormous, that we hardly dare breathe. The panoramic road show of worldwide suffering has come knocking on our door. Everything is reduced to a sum of afflictions, in the face of which our existence seems obscene. Here are some examples: “In India, somebody dies of tuberculosis every minute.30 One Frenchman consumes as much energy as 46 Nigerians, 20 Indonesians, 10 Ecuadoreans, six Algerians and three Iranians.31 The inhabitants of the wealthy countries, thanks to their buying power, give almost as much grain to their animals as the amount eaten by all the inhabitants of the Third World put together (not including China).32 The landless peasants of the Third World have less disposable income than a cow in Normandy, a pig in Brittany, and a house cat in Paris, and, therefore, are less well-fed.33 Throughout the world, reason is stultified along with brotherhood and dignity. Narrowly perceived group interests are more important than the general interest, and thus sow the seeds of bloody confrontations and condemn a billion human beings to living on a yearly wage that is lower than what some spoiled brats in our country spend in a single weekend.34 The price of a night in a hotel room for American tourists in Cancun is equivalent to twice the annual wage of the average citizen of Bangladesh.35 In California feed lots, 100,000 steers being fattened eat 11/2 million pounds of corn every day, which would be enough to feed 1.7 million East Africans, or almost the entire population of Zambia.36 When I eat a half-pound steak, I could feed 30 people with the protein that was used to feed the animal.37 If you take six hours to read this book, by the time you have turned the last page, 2,500 people will have died of hunger or of hunger-related disease somewhere in the world.38” What is our wealth, in short? "A sort of economic Nazism created by a master race of the wealthy, who reign over a mass of undernourished people."39 After this, how can we fail to see ourselves as monsters devastated by shame?40 These are fallacious comparisons, of course, because they always fail to mention the different levels of industrialization that by themselves explain the huge differences in consumption between countries. When socioeconomic conditions are radically different, precise figures lose all validity and serve no purpose other than for slogans and reproaches. But there is no value in pointing out the uselessness of this quantitative overkill. Excess is the enemy of precision, and overstatement is deceptive. Overabundance of numbers becomes the rule, and indignant speeches answer with millions of starving people and contemptuous citations of the record books, where the number of hungry people is listed alongside the largest number of sausages, the longest kiss, the highest hairdo, and so on. These statistics pretend to be encyclopedias of suffering, packages of agony,'" and the officious indicators of one sole message: We are all parasites and cannibals.42 Suffering humanity is placed on a scale and, on balance, the West is portrayed as worthless. Our way of life is put in numerical terms in order to ridicule it. § Marked 10:58 § The reasoning behind our scolding Third World-lovers is that, the less we suffer, the more we must feel responsible. An elaborate, ramshackle, logical system that tries to establish a causal link, no matter how far-fetched, is set up between myself and this suffering. Highly technical explanations are worked out to demonstrate that, in the final analysis, it is still Europe that pulls the strings.43 It is like the world of a detective story, the infallible deduction that unravels the problems f hunger like Sherlock Holmes: “Who is guilty of these massacres that fill the morgues of the Third World every day? Is it mere fate? Are these men, women, and children the victims of uncontrollable and recurring natural disasters? No. For every victim, there is a murderer.” Thenceforth, all of us, young and old, are at fault for what goes wrong on our unhappy planet.45 We are participating in the destruction of the world46—from agricultural breakthroughs to woodcutting technology47 to female circumcision.48 The West is the great and only guilty party to all the evils of the world. In sum, we are inhuman and criminal because we do not want others to exist, and the causes of famine lie before us on the dinner table. It makes no difference that this accusation cannot be proven. Guilt is an easy way of bridging distinctions and doing away with intermediaries, because it draws a pitiless red line between their poverty and our sated appetites. Remorse comes before wrongdoing, because our error is not in sinning but in existing. The mania of suspicion makes us guilty before the fact for the disintegration of Ghanaian society, for empty stores in Angola, for the rising prices in Central America, for clouds of locusts in black Africa, for hurricanes in the Caribbean, tribal warfare in New Guinea, and so on. Every study, every book on the Third World, whatever its subject, says the same thing. The guilt of the accused is confirmed, and more evidence is accumulated against him. They are like a storekeeper's books, where the long list of the evils of the Old World is neatly spelled out, while the merits of the Southern hemisphere stand out from the details of an implicit frame of reference that is never questioned. They are an exercise in malediction, which is supposed to make our horror grow as it convinces us all—salaried workers, professors, lawyers, laborers, truckdrivers—of our fundamental thievery. The reader himself is a convenient scoundrel. . . . Obsessive repetition takes the place of a concern for precision, because we have to make our own breast-beating offering for the suffering of the world. Duty, that nameless and insatiable goddess, conducts a Kafkaesque trial against Europeans. This is the bad faith of bad consciences—unable to give solace for one scourge or another in any real way, we accuse ourselves of being the cause. The old relationship between colonizer and colonized is endlessly atoned for, and we search for aftereffects of imperialism everywhere. We can thus mortify our flesh with delight because we know how rotten we are. The conclusion is that our very existence is an insult to the human race. We have only one duty—to wipe ourselves off the face of the earth. The future of the West is self-destruction.

### 2NC – Overview – K COMES FIRST

#### This must be a voting issue – Ableist Speech strengthens oppression and destroys the purposes of public debate – the impacts trump the other warrants in their arguments

Wheelchair Dancer, 4/28/8

(“On Making Argument: Disability and Language”, <http://cripwheels.blogspot.com/2008/04/on-making-argument-disability-and.html> Accessed: 2/10/11 GAL)  
If you are feeling a little bit of resistance, here, I'd ask you to think about it. If perhaps what I am saying feels like a burden -- too much to take on? a restriction on your carefree speech? -- perhaps that feeling can also serve as an indicator of how pervasive and thus important the issue is. As a community, we've accepted that commonly used words can be slurs, and as a rule, we avoid them, hopefully in the name of principle, but sometimes only in the name of civility. Do you go around using derivatives of the b**\*ch** word?If you do, I bet you check which community you are in**....** Same thing for the N word**.** These days, **depending on your age,** you might say something is retarded **or spastic,** but you probably never say that it's gay. I'd like to suggest that society as a whole has not paid the same kind of attention to disabled people's concerns about language. By not paying attention to the literal value, the very real substantive, physical, psychological, sensory, and emotional experiences that come with these linguistic moves, we have created a negative rhetorical climate. In this world, it is too easy for feminists and people of colour to base their claims on argumentative strategies that depend, as their signature moves, on marginalizing the experience of disabled people and on disparaging their appearance and bodies. Much of the blogosphere discourse of the previous weeks has studied the relationships between race, (white) feminism and feminists, and WOC bloggers. To me, the intellectual takeaway has been an emerging understanding of how, in conversation, notions of appropriation, citation, ironization, and metaphorization can be deployed as strategies of legitimation and exclusion. And, as a result, I question how "oppressed, minoritized" groups differentiate themselves from other groups in order to seek justice and claim authority. Must we always define ourselves in opposition and distance to a minoritized and oppressed group that can be perceived as even more unsavory than the one from which one currently speaks?  
As I watched the discussion about who among the feminist and WOC bloggers has power and authority and how that is achieved, I began to recognise a new power dynamic both on the internet and in the world at large. Feminism takes on misogyny. The WOC have been engaging feminism. But from my point of view, a wide variety of powerful feminist and anti-racist discourse is predicated on negative disability stereotyping. There's a kind of hierarchy here: the lack of awareness about disability, disability culture and identity, and our civil rights movement has resulted in a kind of domino effect where disability images are the metaphor of last resort: the bottom, the worst. Disability language has about it a kind of untouchable quality -- as if the horror and weakness of a disabled body were the one true, reliable thing, a touchstone to which we can turn when we know we can't use misogynistic or racist language. When we engage in these kinds of argumentative strategies, we exclude a whole population of people whose histories are intricately bound up with ours. When we deploy these kinds of strategies to underscore the value of our own existence in the world, we reaffirm and strengthen the systems of oppression that motivated us to speak out in the first place.

### 2NC – Link Wall

#### Extend Ferri and May—constructing thinking, rationality and knowledge as a desirable outcome of politics places disability as the underside of their politics that should be excluded—it is equated with a lack of knowledge and ignorance allowing demonization of the disabled

#### Their metaphors of bordercrossing they draw from Anzaldua in their Mignolo evidence as a form of resistance reinstate ambulist norms of able-bodiedness as connoting freedom and the ability to engage in resistance.

Ferri and May 5 (Beth and Vivian, “Fixated on Ability: Questioning Ableist Metaphors in Feminist Theories of Resistance”, Prose Studies, 27 (1&2), GAL)

In addition to the use of explicitly ableist metaphors, it is equally important to think about how ableism plays out in more implicit ways. In this vein, we wonder about many of the metaphors of movement being used in contemporary discourse. Consider this query posed to incite innovative action toward a more positive future: "What... if we were to tap into the lifeforce that confers upon us the right to live and work toward possibility as opposed to remaining paralyzed and dissatisfied.. *.V* (Cervenak et al. 354). A life of possibility, and even the lifeforce itself, is constructed here in opposition to "paralysis" and dissatisfaction: in other words, being moved to act and live in fulfilling ways requires a form of *movement* that is understood in ableist terms. Iliis example is not unique, however. References to roving subjects, boundary crossers, and migrating subjects abound: is the movement invoked to signal freedom conceptualized in ways that account for or include disability? Our suspicion is that it is not. Are contemporary theorists imagining rolling down the road to freedom or is there an assumption of marching as the authoritative sign of collective group action? What notions of motility are at use in the idea of crossing borders, leaving home, or exile? What of the ideas of unrestrained movement at work in the many references to untethered subjectivities or "figures of hybridity and excess jsuch as the cvborgj" (Thomson, *Inicfitaiinn* 9)? Just as whiteness frequently operates as an unstated/unmarked racial norm (in, for example, analogies between homophobia and racism (Carbado 291)), able-bodiedness continues to operate as the unstated/unnoticed bodily norm both in analogies to disability and in metaphors for freedom and agency. This dynamic obscures the fact that able-bodied people are, in fact, embodied and that disabled persons are disenabled by systems of power. Additionally, it denies the myriad forms of unearned able-bodied privilege accorded to non-disabled persons. \*l\*he able-bodied or "ambulist" (Keith) notions of mobility and movement used to define and imagine liberation, resistance, and transformation require an unstated, but understood, notion of stasis as their figurative, disabled doppelganger. Here, we turn again to our own writing to further illustrate our point. In our discussion of the character Nichole in Atom Kgoyan's film adaption of the novel, *The Sweet Hereafter,* we analyze Nichole's newfound agency, which rests on her astute uses of ableism to refuse sexual exploitation by her father. Yet in our article, we problematically celebrate the scene at the close of the film when she wheels herself away from the deposition table. Ironically, in analyzing the interdependent nature of ableism and sexism, we privileged autonomy and a narrow notion of motility as signifiers of freedom and agency (May and rerri, 145). The *motility* that is imagined, in our example and in many others, as signaling freedom, political action or movement, or agency often (directly or indirectly) constructs disability as a state of being that is dependent, relational, "stuck," broken, and/or in need of a cure in contrast, of course, to the critical or postmodern subject who seems unfettered, on the move, independent, and whole. Such a framework replicates a troubling figure/ground dichotomy and stymies our ability to rethink diverse modes of motility, movement, agency, freedom, and subjectivity.

#### Link focus on slavery at the start of the 1ac—masks disability—makes those bodies appear useless

Ferri and May, 2005

[Vivian and Beth, FIXATED ON ABILITY Questioning Ableist Metaphors in FeministTheories of Resistance, rose Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1&2 April-August 2005, pp. 120-140, http://www.academia.edu/227091/Fixated\_on\_Ability\_Questioning\_Ableist\_Metaphors\_in\_Feminist\_Theories\_of\_Resistance] /Wyo-MB

In contrast to the political strategy of asserting collective rights by differentiating from/refusing analogies to other “others,” many political activists and theorists have purposefully created metaphoric links between themselves and other marginalized groups in order to illustrate shared experiences of oppression. In other words, feminists have also embraced analogies as rhetorically effective for revealing as relevant and as readable/understandable heretofore unacknowledged forms of oppression or aspects of lived experience. For example, both feminists and Marxists have borrowed from the experiences of slavery and from deﬁcit models of disability to illustrate other forms of oppression. Connecting these different experiences of social stratiﬁcation seems politically practical and also a form of alliance-building. However, such strategic borrowing erases the existence of slaves who are women, obliterates slavery as a key mode of production within capitalism, and erases people with disabilities as anything other than impaired/lacking. In these instances, the potential pitfalls or closures created by analogic bridging have been ignored or brushed aside in the name of utility.

#### Even if you don’t believe that we have a link to the “topic” or “plan” – we definitely have a link to what is happening in this room right now

Berube 2003 (Michael, “Citizenship and Disability: Disability is a matter of civil rights, even if the Supreme Court doesn't seem to agree.”, http://www.alternet.org/story/15809/citizenship\_and\_disability)

Imagine a building in which political philosophers are debating, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the value and the purpose of participatory parity over against forms of authoritarianism or theocracy. Now imagine that this building has no access ramps, no Braille or large-print publications, no American Sign Language interpreters, no elevators, no special-needs paraprofessionals, no in-class aides. Contradictory as such a state of affairs may sound, it's a reasonably accurate picture of what contemporary debate over the meaning of democracy actually looks like. How can we remedy this? Only when we have fostered equal participation in debates over the ends and means of democracy can we have a truly participatory debate over what "participatory parity" itself means. That debate will be interminable in principle, since our understandings of democracy and parity are infinitely revisable, but lest we think of deliberative democracy as a forensic society dedicated to empyreal reaches of abstraction, we should remember that debates over the meaning of participatory parity set the terms for more specific debates about the varieties of human embodiment. These include debates about prenatal screening, genetic discrimination, stem-cell research, euthanasia, and, with regard to physical access, ramps, curb cuts, kneeling buses, and buildings employing what is now known as universal design. Leftists and liberals, particularly those associated with university humanities departments, are commonly charged with being moral relativists, unable or unwilling to say (even after September 11) why one society might be "better" than another. So let me be especially clear on this final point. I think there's a very good reason to extend the franchise, to widen the conversation, to democratize our debates, and to make disability central to our theories of egalitarian social justice. The reason is this: a capacious and supple sense of what it is to be human is better than a narrow and partial sense of what it is to be human, and the more participants we as a society can incorporate into the deliberation of what it means to be human, the greater the chances that that deliberation will in fact be transformative in such a way as to enhance our collective capacities to recognize each other as humans entitled to human dignity. As Jamie reminds me daily, both deliberately and unwittingly, most Americans had no idea what people with Down syndrome could achieve until we'd passed and implemented and interpreted and reinterpreted a law entitling them all to a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. I can say all this without appealing to any innate justification for human dignity and human rights, and I can also say this: Without a sufficient theoretical and practical account of disability, we can have no account of democracy worthy of the name. Perhaps some of our fellow citizens with developmental disabilities would not put the argument quite this way; even though Jamie has led me to think this way, he doesn't talk the way I do. But those of us who do participate in political debates, whether about school funding in a specific district or about the theory and practice of democracy at its most abstract, have the obligation to enhance the abilities of our children and our fellow citizens with disabilities to participate in the life of the United States as political and moral equals with their nondisabled peers-both for their own good, and for the good of democracy, which is to say, for the good of all of us.

### 2NC – Impact Wall

#### Ableism causes exclusion, oppression, and crushes possibilities for debate. Extend Wheelchair Dancer, 8.

#### Risk of link turns the case—ignore how disability is also socially produced like racism and sexism

Ferri and May 5 (Beth and Vivian, “Fixated on Ability: Questioning Ableist Metaphors in Feminist Theories of Resistance”, Prose Studies, 27 (1&2), GAL)

However, feminist theorists do not only use analogies to disability to identify various unacknowledged forms of privilege and power. Many critical race-gender theorists also invoke disability to highlight the negative and destructive effects of oppression, to characterize how oppression can be internalized, and to urge others to reject given social hierarchies. For example, emphasizing the costs of a colonized imagination, Nada Hlia explains, "Living at one remove from oneself is indeed a handicap" (230). Others link the destructive results of internalized racism to a "stumbling mind" (Cervantes 5) or to being "muted" and "paralyzed" (Lugones 49, 53). Gloria Anzaldua asserts that internalized racism "mutilates and stunts vour life" because your personhood is "chopped off at the knees" *(Haciendo euros* xix; *En rapport* 207). In her later work, Anzaldua continues to use ableist notions of paralysis to characterize a "stuck" consciousness. She writes, "Coyolxauhqui's luz pulls you from the pit of your grief. Realizing that you always use the same tactics, repeat the same behaviors in each stage, breaks your paralysis" *(Now* 253 54). The thread of connection across these examples is of course the slippage between disability and ignorance or the assumption that to be crippled is to be unable to move or act. In all of these examples in which oppression is linked to illness and dis/ease, *the analogies position the source of disability oppression as impairment itself*.Once again, there is little to no understanding of disability as resulting from social structures and objectifying knowledge practices that create disabilities out of corporeal differences. In other words, although racism and sexism are seen as socially produced, disability remains as an absolute state, both apolitical and asocial it is the source of its own oppression.

#### And, the kritik turns the case. Ableism is at the root of all violence. Its oppressive structures results in mass extermination of anything deemed inferior.

Roberts 2007 (Jeff, M.A., The Rhetorical Structure of Disability: Bridging the Gap Between What is ‘Spoken’ and What is ‘Said’ with Song - Over-Signifying with Personhood Against the Backdrop of Disease-Centric Discourse - Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Baylor University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts. <https://beardocs.baylor.edu/bitstream/2104/5086/.../Jeff_Roberts_Masters.pdf>)

Until recently, human “disability” has been conceptually understood as an abnormal, unnatural, and problematic condition of either the mental or physical self. Located within the individual, disability detracts, disadvantages, incapacitates and prevents one from living a full, normal life. Being that disability has been understood as a diseased condition of the individual, it has often been rendered something to be regulated, and potentially “fixed” or “cured” by the higher knowledge and reason of modern medicine. With the emergence of “anti-psychiatry” and critical disability studies many of the fundamental assumptions of the historical development of “disability” came into question. Notions of “normalcy,” the location of disability within the individual, the priestly status of modern medicine as unquestionable, along with the claims of scientific rationality, objectivity and expert knowledge in which the medical model founds its regulatory jurisdiction, became the target of deconstruction. The goal of such inquiries was to improve the lives and status of people with disabilities by renouncing the social construction of disability as inherent within the “inferior” or “flawed” individual. These criticisms are also aimed at shielding individuals with disabilities from oppression and bio-political control by advancing alternative forms of knowledge and sets of understandings distinct and apart from the hegemonic medical model. Advocates and critical scholars advancing these perspectives help to create a better world for people with 2 disabilities by promoting equality, justice and individual autonomy, while also working to eliminate social stigmatization. Recently, many state actors have also embraced this spirit of justice; responding to the demands of people with disabilities by creating legislation mandating equal treatment of individuals throughout society, regardless of individual disability. These state actions represent a concrete and pragmatic attempt to better the lives of people with disabilities by removing the barriers that prevent equal access to the American dream. Unfortunately, while these actions may intend to secure a social world free of discrimination, often times they serve to perpetuate the same notions of injustice the policy was intended to combat. Recent history provides numerous examples of legislation intending to affirm the communal demands of people with disabilities, while discursively constructing these individuals according to a rhetorical structure of terminology which denies equality, reifies stigma, and mandates dehumanization. The rhetorical structure of disease-centric terminology deployed in these legislative texts places a primacy on the individuals’ disability, while rendering all other claims of identity and personhood a mere afterthought. Historically, examples of disease-centric rhetoric in legislation include the singular terms of “mongoloid,” “lunatic,” “retard,” “imbecile,” and “cripple.” More recently, legislative examples include the terms “disabled child,” “schizophrenic patient,” and the generic all inclusive “disabled people.” While modern examples of legislation avoiding disease-centric rhetoric in favor of the more empowering rhetorical structure “people-first language” can be found, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, yet these examples are far from the textual norm in modern legislation.

The rhetoric surrounding disability, particularly as it is embodied in recent Congressional legislation, is an area ripe for criticism and study. The inherent social negativity and connotation of difference associated with the term “disability” itself, along with the ways in which that term is deployed to categorize individuals for no other reason than falling outside the social norms of a given time, circumscribes the rhetoric of disability within a unique sphere of power. Historically, the rhetoric of disability has exerted its power overtly as a justification for mass extermination of entire sections of a populationi; allowed for state sponsored forced sterilization in the name of social progressii; and has been actively deployed in an effort to link nearly all social minorities with defect and inferiority so to bolster legitimacy for their oppression. Given the propensity for the rhetoric of disability to play an integral role in violence and atrocity, how then is it possible to maintain an infinite commitment to creating a better world for people with disabilities while simultaneously viewing the legislation aimed at pragmatically achieving such a goal under a lens of strict scrutiny for rejecting dangerous rhetoric? How then would it be possible to overcome the gap between the dangers presented by disease-centric rhetoric in what is “spoken” in legislative texts, and still affirm what is “said” by those same texts attempting to make pragmatic gains for people with disabilities in the spirit of equality? This paper attempts to answer these questions through an examination of the rhetoric surrounding disability in its structure, deployment, and intent. Starting from social constructionist position embraced by many “anti-psychiatrists,” critical disability theorists and disability rights advocates, this paper investigates the texts of modern and historical legislation attempting to discover a method of advancing positive pragmatic actions while simultaneously removing the location of disability from the individual in which it rhetorically subsumes in terminology. This position concedes that the use of disease-centric rhetoric can be unconscious; or rather the deployment of such rhetoric generally is not intended to demean or dehumanize people with disabilities. In many instances, the “intent” is quite the opposite; individuals often deploy such rhetorical labels in an effort to affirm equality, without the knowledge that such rhetoric constructs the greatest blockade in achieving such a goal. This “blockade” is not a physical limitation upon pragmatic action, but rather an attitudinal barrier which eliminates the potential for full and equal participation in society. The National Collaborative on Workforce and Disability for Youth (2006) explains.

People with disabilities face many barriers and, like many minority groups, have fought for equal access “to education, to employment, to public facilities and services, to transportation, to housing, and to other resources needed to more fully realize their rights as citizens” (Tan, 1995, n.p.). The major barriers to achievement by people with disabilities in our society, however, continue to be attitudinal barriers, stereotypical thinking, and assumptions about what people can and cannot do. Stereotypes flagrantly and incorrectly limit the range of an individual’s ability. The truth is that the range of abilities of persons within any disability group is enormous. Attitudinal barriers are ideas, fears, and assumptions that impede meaningful communication between people with and without disabilities and prevent people with disabilities from participating fully in society. Most attitudinal barriers are passively learned; unlearning them takes effort and interaction (Miller, n.d., ch. 3). Labels and language have long reflected society’s views of disabilities as abnormal. Although this is changing, some people and institutions continue to focus on individuals’ disabilities rather than their abilities and by doing so foster segregation. In the media, people with disabilities have been portrayed as “broken” and treated with pity, scorn, sorrow, or anger. Or, on the other hand, they have been treated as though they had superpowers. Labels have often been used to define a person’s potential and value …

When we hear a person’s label, we (mistakenly) think we know something important about him, and we give great weight to the label, using it to determine how/where a person will be educated, what type of job he will/won’t have, where/how he’ll live, and more. In effect, a person’s future is often cast by others, based on the label. (n.p.)

Fueled by disease-centric rhetoric, the societal image of people with disabilities as “inferior” and “broken” fosters cultural attitudes of pity, anger, and ablest supremacy over people with disabilities. These attitudes create a world of inter-relationships predicated on viral difference and hatred. Within this matrix of interaction the other can never be authentically embraced in its infinity or manifest oneself in accordance to anything but its difference. The individual with a disability is not “monstrous” or “savage” within this world, for radical exoticism is overcome through the domestication of the other. “Difference is what destroys otherness (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 127);” all societal interactions involving people with disabilities become premised on “difference,” and the societal incorporation of such difference accepted out of pity and compassion. The rules governing this symbolic exchange of “structural interaction of difference” assume that there is a proper use of difference, and that otherness can be negotiated (Baudrillard, 1993). This type of acceptance never facilitates an ethical confrontation with the other, nor can it advance full and equal participation in society, for its viral nature only cause’s society itself to draw new lines of demarcation, erect new barriers to equality and find new claims to difference which justifies further segregation. Jean Baudrillard argues “there is no such thing as the proper use of difference (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 130),” and that efforts which attempt to “protect difference” offer no solutions, only serving to threaten communities which society labels as different with annihilation. Baudrillard (1993) further explains: 6 There is no such thing as the proper use of difference – a fact revealed not only by racism itself but also by all anti-racist and humanitarian efforts to promote and protect differences. Humanitarian ecumenism, the ecumenism of differences, is in a cul-de-sac: the cul-de-sac of the concept of the universal itself. The most recent illustration of this, in France, was the brouhaha over the wearing of headscarves for religious reasons by North African schoolgirls. All the rational arguments mustered in this connection turned out to be nothing but hypocritical attempts to get rid of the simple fact that no solution is to be found in any moral or political theory of difference. It is difference itself that is a reversible illusion… The risibility of our altruistic ‘understanding’ is rivaled only by the profound contempt it is designed to conceal. For ‘We respect the fact that you are different’ read: You people who are underdeveloped would do well to hang on to this distinction because it is all you have left’. (The signs of folklore and poverty are excellent markers of difference.) Nothing could be more contemptuous – or more contemptible – than this attitude, which exemplifies the most radical form of incomprehension that exists. It has nothing to do, however, with what Segalen calls ‘eternal incomprehensibility’. Rather, it is a product of eternal stupidity – of that stupidity which endures forever in its essential arrogance, feeding on the differentness of other people. Other cultures, meanwhile, have never laid claim to universality. Nor did they ever claim to be different – until difference was forcibly injected into them as part of a sort of cultural opium war. They live on the basis of their own singularity, their own exceptionality, on the irreducibility of their own rights and values. They find no comfort in the lethal illusion that all differences can be reconciled – an illusion that for them spells only annihilation. (pp. 131-132) Just as disease-centric discourse creates these attitudes, imageries and actions rooted in notions of viral difference and hatred, it seems that any action towards people with disabilities conveyed in disease-centric discourse is premised on a notion of viral difference. Viral difference manifests itself not only in the actions and attitudes stemming from disease-centric discourse, but also in the rhetorical structure of disease-centric discourse itself and its general deployment. Actions which place a primacy on difference and its domestication in the acts of “acceptance of difference” are often justified as acts of “compassion,” yet acts premised on such notions can never truly overcome difference, nor can they recognize and appreciate the alterity of the other necessary for ethical encounters. Deployment of disease-centric discourse represents and independent rhetorical act which, in the words of Emmanuel Levinas, “thematizes” disability as difference allowing difference to obscure alterity and unique otherness by “standing in” for the individual subject in all encounters. In other words, difference in terms of disability subsumes the entirety of the person by reducing the individual to a mere condition of difference, as Lois Shepherd (2006) explains: On the other hand, however, focusing on the condition carries the risk of what Levinas calls "thematization." If the condition stands in for the person in evoking the right ethical response, i.e., compassion, then the condition may stand in for the person in other respects as well. In other words, the condition is the person, and thus we need to know nothing more about the person than the existence of the condition . . . A compassionate response that focuses on the condition of a person in a way that permits us to see her in terms of a theme can result in unfair prejudice and discrimination. Even when less noxious results follow, such a response inappropriately shortcuts the more intense inquiry that is required to determine the needs and desires of that individual and can prevent the ethical response that is due . . . . . . A compassionate response that thematizes a person as disabled can cause an underestimation of what that person can achieve and can thereby cut off opportunities for success, expression, respect, and self-worth. It can also result in alienation of people with disabilities as others cannot see beyond the apparent physical condition. The emphasis that advocates for people with disabilities place on language captures this concern that the focus of attention is properly placed on the person rather than the condition; advocates encourage the use of terms such as "person with a disability" rather than "the disabled person" so that the person comes first. (para.8.) Founding action towards people with disabilities upon notions of difference, placing a primacy on difference particularly in the context of incorporation, domestication, and acceptance of such difference, dooms the struggle for equality to failure. “Over recent centuries all forms of violent otherness have been incorporated, willingly or under threat of force, into a discourse of difference which simultaneously implies inclusion and exclusion, recognition and discrimination (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 8 129).” Once the Native American “savage” became “accepted” under U.S. law as “human,” or rather a different type of human, it was not long until viral hatred forced new boundaries of difference to be erected, and segregation of such difference to be enacted in the form of the reservation. Where the “savage” or “monster” is never understood, or assimilated, remaining radically exotic to the oppressive guise of society, when “accepted” by society on the basis of “difference” viral racism allows only two options for the future: assimilation or extermination (Baudrillard, 1993). Similarly, modern medicine has facilitated society with an understanding of disability, allowing it to accept the “different” or “disabled” person under law as “human,” more specifically a “disabled human” in which is different from “normal” individuals, but none the less similar. “Madness, once its exclusionary status had been revoked, was caught up in the far subtler toils of psychology (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 129).” As soon as society began to understand and consequently attempt to “accept” the “monster” other, the other traded its quality of foreign “monsterness” for qualities of “feebleness,” with the social acceptance of the others difference, the “monster” soon became the “mongoloid.” “Difference” annihilated the subaltern subject by making all that was foreign and radically exotic within easy reach of societal understanding. With a compassion rooted in pity, and fear founded upon difference, society became locked into a mode of interaction with disability, and the individuals’ disability located itself within, which mandated oppression in the spirit of viral hatred. Just as the Native was forced out of “normal” society into the state of exception of the reservation, the “mongoloid” (“lunatic” or “imbecile”) was stripped of all possessions and forced into the state of exception of the asylum. The “feeble” were forcefully 9 sterilized by the state “for their own good,” and for the benefit of society as a whole, while even today pregnant women labeled “mentally ill” are subject to being chained to hospital beds while physicians perform court-ordered cesarean sections against their will, under Supreme Court precedent pertaining to the compelling states interest in the life of the fetus and the health of the mother (Ehrenreich, 1993). The “discourse of difference” found within the rhetoric of disability continually multiplies the signs of difference with each medical advancement. Likewise, these “advancements” increase claims of knowledge and understanding over “disability,” encouraging the incorporation of these differences into the system of regulated exchange of homogenized difference through acts of compassion and acceptance. The viral nature of difference guarantees increased efforts of segregation, assimilation, and extermination with each glimmer of similarity recognized. Viral difference, similar to most viruses, operates as “a self-replicating code” which for survival feeds off the living host in which it attempts to destroy. When difference becomes the motivating factor in actions of acceptance and compassion, viral difference must replicate itself, often mutating forms, in the production of more difference which seeks to destroy any similarity created between the self and other (Baudrillard, 1993). Just as health provides energy for viral sickness, similarity provides impetus for viral difference, often when the different other becomes too similar to one’s self the individual self must create new forms of difference in order to maintain the identity of the self (Baudrillard, 1993). Congressional legislation aimed at achieving equality for people with disabilities represents a fatal strategy when deploying the disease-centric rhetoric of viral difference. This rhetorical “strategy” of the congressional act is generally unconscious and unintended, while it is “fatal” in respect to its ironic and self defeating potential; the language used to compel action towards equality is simultaneously the same language which creates attitudinal barriers blocking social equality for the group the act intends to help, people with disabilities.

#### Ablist Language is an act of dehumanization

Anna ‘9 http://www.amptoons.com/blog/archives/2009/06/16/why-not-to-use-the-word-lame-i-think-im-starting-to-get-it/

Doug S, **it’s almost like people treat having a disability like it’s this horrible thing, and that people with disabilities aren’t human**. That’s the subtext I see in comments about how all words that describe intellectual disabilities are going to turn into insults. Of course they are – **people treat people with disabilities, mental or physical, like they’re subhuman.** Part of **asking people to consider their language** (and really – it’s a request. No one can make you not use these words) **is asking them to consider that people with disabilities exist.** When I see comment after comment elsewhere saying “I hadn’t even HEARD of Ablism!”, I wonder where the heck they’ve been hanging out that there are NO progressive people in their circles talking about people with disabilities. (Then I remember the confusion people look at me at when I go to progressive-focused meetings and ask for things like “wheelchair accessible” locations, and transcripts of videos for the Deaf. \*sigh\*) Part of **bringing up the ablist nature of language is reminding people I would expect to be our natural allies that we exist, we’re not your pity cases,** we’re not here to make you feel better or support whatever notion of “Good Charity” you want. **Most of us our living our lives**. **All we want is some respect for those lives.** Maybe we don’t want to be turned away from voting. Maybe we don’t want to be told that our doctor-prescribed medication is banned from our graduation. Maybe we don’t want to be told that if we get a job, we’ll lose all of our benefits that pay for the care we need to live. Maybe we don’t want to be unable to leave our home because the elevator has been shut down for the next three hours, and no one thought to warn us. Maybe we want some bloody curb cuts. **Maybe we don’t want to be your go-to insult. Pointing out ablist language is part of the advocacy of pointing out we exist.**

### Alt- rejection key

#### Alt is a prerequisite to social transformation

Ferri and May, 2005

[Vivian and Beth, FIXATED ON ABILITY Questioning Ableist Metaphors in FeministTheories of Resistance, rose Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1&2 April-August 2005, pp. 120-140, http://www.academia.edu/227091/Fixated\_on\_Ability\_Questioning\_Ableist\_Metaphors\_in\_Feminist\_Theories\_of\_Resistance] /Wyo-MB

In questioning ableist analogies, our goal is not to ﬁnd the most “correct” languageuse, ultimate analogy, or perfect metaphor: we are Not advocating the policing of language’s boundaries or the creation of a morally superior linguistic orthodoxy. Werecognize language’s ﬂuidity and playful potential and like Simone de Beauvoir (129),we ﬁnd possibility in ambiguity—a call to continuously take up the world’s possibilitiesrather than a nihilism or fatalism about lived complexities. The core problem,whether we are talking about refusing comparisons to disability or embracing them fortheir utility, is that most analogies to disability are often limited, careless, and overlyﬁxed. Disability is rarely conceptualized as a constructed outcome of power, nor is itregarded as a political identity forged in and through systems of domination. In otherwords, the intersectionality of identities (Crenshaw) and the necessarily coalitionalfocus of instigating social change disappears: the presumed stasis of disability remainsunchallenged in efforts to examine “women’s” social construction and socialconstraints. Moreover, because it only enters the discourse in its metaphoric sense or asa medical or bodily “fact,” disability is not comprehended as a lived reality or point of view, nor is it seen as an analytic category. The fact that power is itself a “humanaccomplishment, situated in everyday interaction” (Ng 132) gets elided as well. Thus disability has been, implicitly and explicitly, interpreted as an entirely bodilyand/or medical state of deﬁciency. Facile dismissals of disability as merely “bodily” orsimply “medical” obscure how bodies are inculturated, phenomenological, and located.Medical-model understandings of disability also deny the myriad ways that science andmedicine are “inside” culture, not pure, objective sets of practices immune from any imprint of power, culture, identity, or time/place. Ironically, by conﬂating disabilitywith stigma or stuckness many feminists also construe disability in opposition to thefeminist subject. In other words, disability’s facticity is presumed, its concretenessassumed: it has no meaning except as illustrative to and for others. Given these dynamics, we ﬁnd ourselves compelled to examine the ubiquitous useof ableist metaphors in contemporary feminist discourses aimed at critiquing and transforming the status quo. We have identiﬁed several interrelated rhetoricalstrategies common in feminist and other liberatory theories. Perhaps the most evidentuse of disability can be found in the over reliance upon metaphors of madness,crippling, and more to characterize and locate objects of remediation, in this casedominant ideologies, practices, and politics. In this paper, we outline two particularways in which feminist theorists use disability to locate objects of remediation: ﬁrst, theconstruction of disability in opposition to knowledge and second, the use of disabilityto highlight the subtle workings of power and privilege. In addition, we question theuse of ableist notions of mobility and movement to deﬁne and imagine liberation,resistance, and transformation.

#### The critique solves by confronting ableism at the level of rhetoric- it exposes the attitudes that keep ableism alive, leads to productive corrective practices, and failure to confront it means that ALL efforts to challenge oppression will operate within the context of ableism. Perm fails.

Cherney 11 (James L., Wayne State University, “The Rhetoric of Ableism”, Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606> Accessed 1/27/12 GAL)

In this essay I analyze ableism as a rhetorical problem for three reasons. First, ableist culture sustains and perpetuates itself via rhetoric; the ways of interpreting disability and assumptions about bodies that produce ableism are learned. The previous generation teaches it to the next and cultures spread it to each other through modes of intercultural exchange. Adopting a rhetorical perspective to the problem of ableism thus exposes the social systems that keep it alive. This informs my second reason for viewing ableism as rhetoric, as revealing how it thrives suggests ways of curtailing its growth and promoting its demise. Many of the strategies already adopted by disability rights activists to confront ableism explicitly or implicitly address it as rhetoric. Public demonstrations, countercultural performances, autobiography, transformative histories of disability and disabling practices, and critiques of ableist films and novels all apply rhetorical solutions to the problem. Identifying ableism as rhetoric and exploring its systems dynamic reveals how these corrective practices work. We can use such information to refine the successful techniques, reinvent those that fail, and realize new tactics. Third, I contend that any means of challenging ableism must eventually encounter its rhetorical power. As I explain below, ableism is that most insidious form of rhetoric that has become reified and so widely accepted as common sense that it denies its own rhetoricity—it "goes without saying." To fully address it we must name its presence, for cultural assumptions accepted uncritically adopt the mantle of "simple truth" and become extremely difficult to rebut. As the neologism "ableism" itself testifies, we need new words to reveal the places it resides and new language to describe how it feels. Without doing so, ableist ways of thinking and interpreting will operate as the context for making sense of any acts challenging discrimination, which undermines their impact, reduces their symbolic potential, and can even transform them into superficial measures that give the appearance of change yet elide a recalcitrant ableist system.

#### Ableism is so pervasive that it must be vigilantly challenged and made into an irredeemable practice via social castigation. Empirically, confronting hierarchical attitudes at the level of rhetoric solves.

Cherney 11 (James L., Wayne State University, “The Rhetoric of Ableism”, Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606> Accessed 1/27/12 GAL)

If we locate the problem in disability, then the ableist absolves his or her responsibility for discrimination and may not even recognize its presence. If we locate the problem in ableism, then the ableist must question her or his orientation. The critic's task is to make ableism so apparent and irredeemable that one cannot practice it without incurring social castigation. This requires substantial vigilance, for ableist thinking pervades the culture. For example, as I write this, I am tempted to use medical metaphors to explain the task and script something like "we cannot simply excise the tumor of ableism and heal the culture, for it has metastasized and infiltrated every organ of society." Yet this metaphor relies on an ableist perspective that motivates with the fear of death and turns to medical solutions to repair a body in decay. Using it, I would endorse and perpetuate ableist rhetoric, just as I would by using deafness as a metaphor for obstinacy ("Marie was deaf to their pleas for bread") or blindness to convey ignorance ("George turned a blind eye to global warming"). The pervasiveness of these and similar metaphors, like the cultural ubiquity of using images of disabled bodies to inspire pity, suggest the scale of the work ahead, and the ease with which one can resort to using them warns of the need for critical evaluation of one's own rhetoric. Yet the task can be accomplished. Just as feminists have changed Western culture by naming and promoting recognition of sexism, the glass ceiling, and patriarchy—admittedly a work in progress, yet also one that can celebrate remarkable achievements—we can reform ableist culture by using rhetoric to craft awareness and political action.

#### Preemptively, their censorship arguments and claims that language is a trivial concern are wrong- rejecting ableist speech has tremendous emancipatory potential- in particular, the rejection of these discursive practices is conceptually and concretely continuous with the political movement to resist and challenge oppression.

Tremain 97 (Shelley, Book Review: The Rejected Body by Susan Wendell, Hypatia, Vol 12, No 2, Spring, p. 222-3 GAL)

I take exception, nonetheless, with the brief remarks Wendell makes with respect to disablement and language (1996, 77-81). Wendell worries that "acrimonious divisions" among disability activists and theorists with respect to so-called "politically correct" language (for example, disagreements over the metaphorical use of abilities and disabilities) might "weaken" the disability rights movement and might "distract" us from what should be our central concerns (for instance, widespread discrimination and prejudice against us) (1996, 78). I believe, however, that these debates comprise aspects of both the disability rights political agenda and the field of disability studies that have tremendous emancipatory potential. Wendell also worries that certain anti-ableist critiques of language that many of us produce (specifically our critiques of ableist and disableist meta­phors) threaten to "impoverish language" (1996, 80).' But this worry seems philosophically misguided, for it assumes that there is a static, predetermined, and finite set of linguistic practices that we would deplete if we were to render unacceptable the production of those linguistic practices. This cannot be true, for if there is one human invention whose obsolescence is almost guaranteed, it is a linguistic practice; and moreover, we do not seem to be any worse for it. Indeed, I would argue that when (and if) politically responsible, privileged people refuse to endorse discursive practices that disparage members of disempowered constituencies (people with disabilities, to name but one), they effectively open symbolic-discursive spaces in which those constituents may produce a proliferation of meanings with which to redeem themselves, mean­ings that ultimately will enrich the set of linguistic practices available in a given historical moment. Thus, I would suggest that Wendell's worry seems idealistic, for it implies that each and every one of us is equally represented by, and invested in, current discursive practices. 1 think that this is not at all the case; and therefore I would recommend that we conceive the anti-ableist critique of disabling language as conceptually, practically, and concretely continuous with the cultural and political movement that people of the First Nations, people of color, lesbians and gay men, women, and other socially subordinated groups have already initiated to challenge and transform oppressive discursive practices.

### A2 Perm

#### This is a question of competing methodologies. There is no perm for the affirmative because they have already used the ableist language which links back to the entirety of the kritik.

#### It’s either/or – they have no defense for their language choices and we have evidence verifying the educational importance of our argument

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and Women Studies at Syracuse University. ““Lame Idea”: Disabling Language in the Classroom,” in Building Pedagogical Curb Cuts: Incorporating Disability into the University Classroom and Curriculum, found at http://www.syr.edu/gradschool/pdf/resourcebooksvideos/Pedagogical%20Curb%20Cuts.pdf]

The language that we use in our classrooms has far reaching implications on the education of students. Just as we would not tolerate sexist, misogynist or racist language, we must not tolerate disabling imagery and phrases. In particular, we should not contribute to reproducing it. Disability is not merely a metaphor or an analogy, but it is an identity for some of us as well as for some of our students. Disability is defined almost arbitrarily and the line between the disabled and the nondisabled is not aclear one. We must not assume disability, or the lack of it, by mere observation. Abelist language can be offensive and hurt some of our students while interfering with our original messages. We can either create barriers to communication or we can create classrooms in which we all feel equally challenged.

### 1NR

#### Border thinking focuses too much on the individual-trades off with a more macro approach

Mendoza 08

(Elva Fabiola Orozco; Virginia Polytechnicvpg. 67-68 http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-05062008-175949/unrestricted/Final\_thesis\_corrected.pdf//wyoccd)

The development of Borderlands theory, no doubt, has been one of the most provocative projects ¶ of resistance and political initiatives that are based in the border. Anzald˙a influenced ¶ enormously many people from many different disciplines who decided to take her ideas in all ¶ kinds of directions to defend a common project; namely, achieve social, cultural economical and ¶ political recognition. This vast production of knowledge, to a great extent, was made possible in ¶ response to Anzald˙aís call to recuperate and express oneís autohistorias. In the Chicano context ¶ that demanded recognition of the Chicanos as a distinctive group Anzald˙a allows herself to ¶ theorize about the possibilities of the Borderlands for minority groups influencing, in so doing, ¶ the American academy. Anzald˙aís work remains one of the most influential and persuasive ¶ until these days, yet it is important to know in what direction the theory is taking us, outside the ¶ idealism that Borderlands theory certainly has. In what follows, I am interested in establishing ¶ the limitations of the Borderlands theory as part of a broader political context that resists change. ¶ Because power is not easily, and perhaps willingly, ceded, I remaiain cautious about the ¶ emancipatory character of the Borderlands. ¶ Anzald˙a theorized self-liberation by developing a set of cognitive processes oriented to ¶ produce a resisting identity in the oppressed. With this process, Anzalda appealed to the re-˙¶ cognition, transformation, exposition, and exchange of self-epistemologies that work towards a ¶ self-metamorphosis that allows the self to resist domination and eventually to bear liberation. ¶ Although as a resistance project, the Borderlands theory is not only healing but also empowering, ¶ Anzald˙aís formulation is restricted by the subject it speaks. Anzald˙a is addressing the ¶ colonized and the people whose identity has been bordered by the dominant power. In Borderlands, she is trying to tear those borders down in order to join the loose ends in one ís identity to be able to function as a whole being again. However, Anzald˙a is addressing the self as an individual, as a single being that needs to cure him/herself before becoming political. This is precisely the message she gives us when she states: The struggle is innerÖ The struggle has always been inner, and is played out in the outer terrains. Awareness of our situation must come ¶ before inner changes, which in turn comes before changes in societyî (Anzald˙a, 1987: 87). ¶ From this explanation, we learn that Anzald˙a does not conceive social change unless the ¶ essence of a person changes, unless one has been exposed to the fears of the soul and has learned ¶ how to block them.

#### The marginalization the affirmative identifies is based off of economic inequalities and separation from the means of production-their movement fractures a class based approach

Spires 08

(Dr. Adam Spires¶ Associate Professor¶ Spanish and Latin American Studies at St. Marys University. “The utopia/dystopia of Latin America's margins: writing identity in Acadia and Aztlan” January 2008 Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Academic OneFile//wyoccd)

It stands to reason that the homogenizing forces of globalization present an immediate concern for any marginalized community. Marginalization entails a priori an absence from economic power, and a lack of control over technology (the means of production) through which this power is wielded. In this respect, the disadvantages that global neoliberalism occasions throughout Latin America has many precedents, (13) but these are not in contention here. The point that we make is that said disadvantages dramatically influence the perception of identity in Acadia and Aztlan with similar outcomes, manifested in the prevalence of utopian/dystopian writing. Presently, the supremacy of global economics operating within North America accentuates the impossibility of Latin independence, both political and cultural, for Acadia and Aztlan, and thus collapses the eutopian dreams of old. Views of the future now take on a dystopian quality, owing to this collapse, and to the growing eclipse of their respective traditions by global trends.¶ Though basic, the primary assumption that Acadian and Chicano identities are based on traditional values, and thus that they are eroded by the more modern Anglo world, is a position supported by the writing samples surveyed in this paper, and by some of Acadia's and Aztlan's most respected thinkers. Hermenegilde Chiasson, for one, bemoans the conundrum of how to be Acadian and modern simultaneously, concluding that the new generation has already begun sacrificing the former for the latter. It is his observation "that today's youth doesn't feel as much need to appropriate the past, to occupy the public arena, or maybe it's that such displays, the flags and the popular songs, belong to a tradition that's too overwhelming, and that we now live in an era when the Internet brings us closer to the rest of the planet than to our immediate community" (2007, 20 [trans.]). It is worth noting that the above quotation is an echo of the anxiety he voiced 30 years earlier regarding technology's role in assimilation: "I am close to the radio, soon I will be in it and then finally I will be like it" (Chiasson 1974, 61).14 For his part, Andre Magord contends that the idea of Acadians distinguishing themselves from the global mainstream is no longer viable, given that "today's techno-media world catches up with you wherever you may be, even in your own home, the last line of defence for preserving the specificity of your identity. Moreover, young people and the majority of the population in question could not identify with a cause aimed at cutting them off from this global evolution" (2003, 16 [trans.]). Given Acadia's continued integration into a global village that is dominated by American culture (and thus, the English language), it only seems fitting to conclude that the shift to a dystopian outlook has emerged as an accurate measure of an ominous future.¶ With the sustained growth of the Latino population in the American Southwest, it follows that the marginalized will one day form the majority. Though current trends in immigration suggest a future homeland for Latinos north of the border, it remains clear that presently this homeland bears no relation to Aztlan's promise of cultural restoration. First popularized by Alurista (Aztlan's poet laureate) in the "Plan espiritual [...]," the resurrection of the term "Aztlan" was meant to unite Chicanos spiritually and politically in an effort to reclaim their land. However, only 20 years into the revolution even Alurista must concede that "Aztlan is the territory occupied by the norteamericanos and the capitalist Mexicanos on the borderland between the U.S. and Mexico. [...] at worst, Aztlan is a long lost legend that has become a nightmare embodied and disguised in the so-called 'American Dream'" (1988, 87, his emphasis). From eutopian dream to dystopian reality, arguably a future Latino majority would merely entail an even larger workforce for the capitalist Machine.

#### The marginalization the affirmative identifies is based off of economic inequalities and separation from the means of production-their movement fractures a class based approach

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#### Capitalism provides the better analysis of the creation of the border. Ever since the border was created Mexican immigrants have been allowed into the State for the purpose of providing cheap and expendable labor

Bach 78

(Robert L, former director of the Global Inclusion Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, *“Mexican Immigration and the American State,”* International Migration Review, Winter 1978, JSTOR)

The rise of the liberal state at the national level corresponds to the rapid incorporation of regions of Mexico and the U.S. into a single structure of accumulation. The commodity chains established earlier continued to expand both in number and volume as U.S. railroads extended into Mexico and Western commercial agriculture boomed (McWilliams, 1942). The flow of landless workers from Mexico also increased along the expanded commercial routes. Earlier migrations of Mexicans to Texas to work in the cotton fields and in basic processing plants were complemented by a larger volume of Mexican laborers moving to help construct and maintain the railroads (Dillingham Commission, 1911; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1939). Simultaneously, the development of refrigerated railroad cars and improved methods of food preservation fueled the expansion of Western agriculture. The demand for manual labor increased as irrigation expanded the amount of land available for cultivation (Reisler, 1976). This increased demand came mainly from that sector of capital which was tied closely to the market or had need of large amounts of manual labor. That is, from the earliest periods Mexican labor was involved in only a fragmented part of the total accumulation process. The demand for Mexican labor developed out of an expressed need for a particular type of worker; one that would work for low wages and did not make competitive demands on precious agricultural land (Clark, 1908). Japanese laborers were employed extensively throughout this period but their attempted organization and land settlement challenged the monopoly of the growers. Consequently, the growers' associations turned to the available Mexican Labor. It did not take long for the employers to recognize the importance of the ease at which Mexican labor could be deported or made to 'voluntarily' leave the area of employment (Department of Commerce and Labor, 1909). That is, the structural nature of the powerlessness of the Mexican laborer, based on the original exclusion at the border, was quickly realized. The growing demand for Mexican labor by commercial agriculture and competitive manufacturers first encountered problems with national reforms when the 1917 Immigration Act placed restrictions on the character of legal entries. The growers, of course, responded with outcries about the danger to continued agricultural production if the Mexican labor was not made available. The state intervened to facilitate accumulation as the Secretary of Labor issued a departmental order waiving the literacy test, head tax and contract labor clause. However, even though this state action served the direct interests of a particular sector of capital, the state was acting well within the framework of its liberal tendencies. The departmental order from the Labor Secretary invoked a clause of the national act that gave him the power to "issue rules and prescribe conditions ... to control and regulate the admission and return of otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission". The emerging liberal state continued to promote accumulation through greater regulation during World War I. The War gave the progressives an opportunity to intervene and regulate markets, including the labor market, within a framework of relative acquiescence from trade unions. In the Southwest, President Wilson authorized the Food Administration and the U.S. Employment Service to act as employers and contractors with Mexican workers as they crossed the border (Reisler, 1976). However, direct attempts by Southwest growers to have the immigration restrictions repealed were defeated. While the trade unions had accepted the temporary admissions during the war, they clearly opposed extensions after the War (American Federation of Labor, 1920)

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#### THE AFFIRMATIVES FOCUS ON THE DISCURSIVE/SYMBOLIC REVEALS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY HAVE GIVEN UP ON ACTUALLY CHALLENGING THE STRUCTURES OF OPPRESSION. BUT FAR FROM BEING A POST-CAPITALIST AGE IN WHICH ALL SOCIAL EXPERIENCE IS TEXTUALLY OR DISCURSIVELY PRODUCED, IT IS A MATERIAL WORLD. ONLY A MATERIALIST METHOD CAN ACCOUNT FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH CERTAIN CLASSES CREATE AND DEPLOY RHETORIC TO LEGITIMIZE A CAPITALIST MODE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

CLOUD (Prof of Comm at Texas) 2001

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm //wyo-tjc]

At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomena. Most importantly, critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them. In poststructuralist discourse theory, the "retreat from class" (Wood, 1999) expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure at the level of the economy and the state. It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformation even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. At the core of the issue is a debate across the humanities and social sciences with regard to whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a great deal of evidence against claims that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, both class polarization (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor in the U.S. (as well as around the world) continued to grow, in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation and progressive critical practice in fact encourage scholars and/as activists to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and perhaps revolutionary potential. Instead, on their arguments, we must recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism. Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. The point, though, is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other. Marxist ideology critique, understands that classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience.

Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144).

Within this understanding, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details and representations of our lives. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges. (p. 7)