### 1AC

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase statutory restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by establishing a federal counterterrorism oversight court with jurisdiction over targeted murder orders.

### 2AC

#### [\_\_] WM – plan restricts targeted murders - murder means killing

Bing Dictionary

Definition of murder (n)

mur·der

[ múrdər ]

1.crime of killing somebody: the crime of killing another person deliberately and not in self-defense or with any other extenuating circumstance recognized by law

#### rendering visible the impacts policymaking has on non-western bodies allows an inclusion of their voices into policy praxis that solves a risk of a link

Turner et al 08

(Nancy J., Robin Gregory, Cheryl Brooks, Lee Failing and Terre Satterfield, Ecology and Society, “From Invisibility to Transparency: Identifying the Implications,” 2008, Jstor//wyo-mm)

This paper has explored a range of issues related to¶ the need for a broader and more inclusive approach¶ that recognizes the legitimacy of cultural values and¶ traditional knowledge in environmental decision¶ making. We have used the term “invisible losses”¶ to describe indirect and cumulative losses that have¶ not been adequately acknowledged, recognized, or¶ addressed in the past. We stressed the need to¶ recognize and accommodate invisible losses, past¶ and present, alongside the more easily measured,¶ observed, and understood impacts of development¶ and discussed some aspects of recognizing and¶ characterizing invisible losses.¶ We hope that these ideas will help to alert planners,¶ policy makers, and negotiators to the critical importance of recognizing and incorporating the full¶ spectrum of impacts incurred by local communities¶ from resource development and to the fact that there¶ are practical methods for making these impacts¶ more visible and relevant in decision making and¶ policy. This is only possible through an inclusive¶ consultation process that allows individuals to¶ express themselves fully in their own words,¶ facilitates the comprehension of decision makers¶ through culturally appropriate and mutually¶ understandable means, and creates a place for the¶ consideration of cultural perspectives and values in¶ ways that are decision relevant, using measures that¶ successfully bring into the equation attributes that¶ were previously felt to be “intangible” or¶ “invisible.”

#### fourth, the squo is worse- not locating the enemy allows uses signature strikes that decimate mass amounts of civilians- drones most moral technology

Brooks 13

(Rosa, law professor at Georgetown University, fellow at the New America Foundation and former Counselor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Georgetown University Law Center, “Drones and Cognitive Dissonance,” 2013, <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2266&context=facpub>) /wyo-mm

For many on the political left (and more than a few in the middle), drone strikes are the paradigmatic example of US militarism run amok. But many of the most common objections to drones don’t hold up well under serious scrutiny – or, at any rate, there’s nothing uniquely different or worse about drones, compared to other military technologies. Consider the most common anti-drone arguments: Drone strikes kill innocent civilians – This is undoubtedly true, but it is not an argument against drone strikes as such. After all, war kills innocent civilians. And there are some means and methods of warfare that tend to cause more unintended civilian deaths than others. The website for Code Pink, a women’s peace group,states: Drones scout over [Afghanistan and Pakistan] launching Hellfire missiles into the region missing their intended targets, resulting in the deaths of many innocent people.1 Similarly, the Anti-War Committee asserts “the physical distance between the drone and its shooter makes lack of precision unavoidable.”2 But to paraphrase the NRA, “Drones don’t kill people, people kill people.” At any rate, drone strikes kill civilians at no higher a rate, and almost certainly at a lower rate, than most other common means of warfare. Drones actually permit far greater precision in targeting. Today’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) carry highly accurate ordinance that generally produces far less widespread damage that other munitions. Their low profile and relative fuel efficiency permit them to spend more “time on target” than any manned aircraft. And unlike pilots of manned aircraft, pilots of unmanned vehicles can regularly be replaced while on a mission to avoid fatigue and ensure greater accuracy. Drones can engage in “persistent surveillance.” That means they do not just swoop in, fire missiles and fly off. Instead, they can spend hours, days, weeks or even months monitoring a potential target. Equipped with imaging technologies that enable operators who may be thousands of miles away to see details as fine as individual faces, modern drone technologies allow their operators to distinguish between civilians and combatants far more effectively than most other weapons systems. That does not mean that civilians are not killed in drone strikes. They are. But how many civilians are killed in these actions, and are these casualties greater than if other weapons systems had been used? The numbers are not completely clear. The British Bureau of Investigative Journalism analyzed reports by “government, military and intelligence officials, and by credible media, academic and other sources.” 3 They determined that of the 344 known drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2012, between 2,562 and 3,325 people were killed of whom they estimated that between 474 and 881 were civilians (the numbers for Yemen and Somalia are less accurate.)4 The New America Foundation came up with slightly lower numbers, estimating that in roughly the same time period, 1,948 to 3,263 people were killed in Pakistan, of whom between 258 and 307 were reported to be civilians (and a further 196 to 330 were difficult to categorize as either civilians or militants.) 5 Behind the numbers, regardless of which data set is right, lie the mangled bodies of human beings. And whether drones strikes cause “a lot” or “only a few” civilian casualties depends on what we regard as the right point of comparison. Compared to the mass bombing campaigns of the Vietnam era or the Second World War (to say nothing of the use of atomic weapons) drone strikes involve relatively few civilian casualties. Yet these comparisons may not tell us anything useful. Should we compare the civilian deaths caused by drone strikes to the civilian deaths caused by large-scale armed conflicts? One study by the International Committee for the Red Cross found that on average, 10 civilians died for every combatant killed during the armed conflicts of the 20th century. 6 For the Iraq War, estimates vary widely; different studies place the ratio of civilian deaths to combatant deaths anywhere between 10 to 1 and 2 to 1.7 The most meaningful point of comparison for drones is probably manned aircraft. It’s difficult to get solid numbers here, but one analysis published in the Small Wars Journal suggested that in 2007 the ratio of civilian deaths due to coalition air attacks in Afghanistan may have been as high as 15 to 1.8 More recent UN figures suggest a far lower rate, with as few as one civilian killed for every ten airstrikes in Afghanistan. 9 It is also important to note that drone strikes have become far less lethal for civilians in the last few years. The New America Foundation concludes that between 89 to 102 five civilians or “unknowns” were killed by 48 US drone strikes in 2011, for instance. 10 Reductions in civilian casualties are due to technological advances in drones, surveillance and targeting systems as well as far more stringent rules for when drones can release weapons. Pacifists willing to condemn all forms of violence can condemn drone strikes without a trace of cognitive dissonance. However, for nonpacifists, a per se condemnation of drone strikes makes less sense. While it is reasonable to condemn a particular war or particular policy, why fixate on a specific method of ordinance delivery? Why focus special attention on drone strikes, which cause relatively low numbers of civilian deaths and largely ignore the many civilian deaths that occur during raids by ground troops, at vehicle checkpoints, or as a result of close air support?

#### Preventing extinction needs to come first

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

#### Second, perm do both- Spanos’ demand for purity ensures his marginalization and forecloses on coalition building – only the perm offers a way out

Perkin ‘93

[J. Russell, Prof. English @ St. Mary’s, “Theorizing the Culture Wars,” *Postmodern Culture* 3: 3, 1993, Muse//uwyo]

My final criticism is that Spanos, by his attempt to put all humanists into the same category and to break totally with the tradition of humanism, isolates himself in a posture of ultraleftist purity that cuts him off from many potential political allies, especially when, as I will note in conclusion, his practical recommendations for the practical role of an adversarial intellectual seem similar to those of the liberal pluralists he attacks. He seems ill-informed about what goes on in the everyday work of the academy, for instance, in the field of composition studies. Spanos laments the "unwarranted neglect" (202) of the work of Paulo Freire, yet in reading composition and pedagogy journals over the last few years, I have noticed few thinkers who have been so consistently cited. Spanos refers several times to the fact that the discourse of the documents comprising The Pentagon Papers was linked to the kind of discourse that first-year composition courses produce (this was Richard Ohmann's argument); here again, however, Spanos is not up to date. For the last decade the field of composition studies has been the most vigorous site of the kind of oppositional practices The End of Education recommends. The academy, in short, is more diverse, more complex, more genuinely full of difference than Spanos allows, and it is precisely that difference that neoconservatives want to erase.¶ By seeking to separate out only the pure (posthumanist) believers, Spanos seems to me to ensure his self-marginalization. For example, several times he includes pluralists like Wayne Booth and even Gerald Graff in lists of "humanists" that include William Bennett, Roger Kimball and Dinesh D'Souza. Of course, there is a polemical purpose to this, but it is one that is counterproductive. In fact, I would even question the validity of calling shoddy and often inaccurate journalists like Kimball and D'Souza with the title "humanist intellectuals." Henry Louis Gates's final chapter contains some cogent criticism of the kind of position which Spanos has taken. Gates argues that the "hard" left's opposition to liberalism is as mistaken as its opposition to conservatism, and refers to Cornel West's remarks about the field of critical legal studies, ¶ "If you don't build on liberalism, you build on air" (187). Building on air seems to me precisely what Spanos is recommending. Gates, on the other hand, criticizes "those massively totalizing theories that marginalize practical political action as a jejune indulgence" (192), and endorses a coalition of liberalism and the left.

#### Fourth, no risk of endless warfare from American exceptionalism-

Gray 7

Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

#### 1. Perm do both

Richard Rorty, Professor of Humanities, University of Virginia, Truth, Politics, and Postmodernism, Spinoza Lectures, **19**97, p. 51-2

This distinction between the theoretical and the practical point of view is often drawn by Derrida, another writer who enjoys demonstrating that something very important – meaning, for example, or justice, or friendship – is both necessary and impossible. When asked about the implications of these paradoxical fact, Derrida usually replies that the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are labeled `post‑modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray, Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post‑modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox‑mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self‑contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency ‑ and more generally, to the `metaphysics of presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible. I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the metaphor of things being accurately represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way to describe intellectual progress. Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls "a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from psychoanalysis. All that we have learned from `post‑modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment offered. We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.

#### Replacing words with other words does nothing and leaves aggressive attitudes intact

Zizek ‘97

[Slavoj, Moving away from the darkness, The Plague of Fantasies, New York: Verso, 1997, 111-2//uwyo-ajl]

In his formidable Fear in the Occident,7 Jean Delumeau draws attention to the unerring succession of atutudes in a medieval city infested by plague: first, people ignore it and behave as if nothing terrible is really going on; then they withdraw into privacy, avoiding contact with each other; then they start to resort to religious fervour, staging processions, confessing their sins, and so on; then they say to themselves 'What the hell, let's enjoy it while it lasts!', and indulge passionately in orgies of sex, eating, drinking and dancing; finally, they return to life as usual, and again behave as if nothing terrible is going on. However, this second 'life as usual' does not occupy the same structural role as the first: it is, as it were, located on the other side of the Moebius band, since it no longtt signals the desperate attempt to ignore the reality of plague, but, rather its exact opposite: resigned acceptance of it . . . . Does not the same go for the gradual replacement of (sexually, racially...) aggressive with more 'correct' expressions, like the chain nigger - Negro - black - African American or crippled - disabled - bodily challenged? This replacement functions as a metaphorical substitution which potentially proliferate and enhances the very (racist, etc.) effect it tries to banish, adding insult to injury. In analogy to Delumeau, one should therefore claim that the only way actually to abolish the hatred-effect is, paradoxically, to create the circumstances in which one can return to the first link in the chain and use it in a non-aggressive way -like following the patterns of 'life as usual' the second time in the case of plague. That is to say: as long as the expression 'crippled' contains a surplus, an indelible mark, of aggressivity this surplus will not only be more or less automatically transferred on to any of its 'correct' metaphorical substitutes, it will even be enhanced by dint of this substitution. The strategy of returning to the first link, of course, is risky; however, the moment it is fully accepted by the group targeted by it, it definitely can work. When radical African-Americans call each other 'niggers', it is wrong to dismiss this strategy as a mere ironic identification with the aggressor; rather, the point is that it functions as an autonomous act of dismissing the aggressive sting.

#### They create hierarchies in language that makes their impact inevitable

Bleiker 2003 (Roland, Professor of International Relations Harvard and Cambridge, Discourse

and Human Agency, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. p. 27-28 UWYO KB)

‘It is within discourse,’ one of Foucault’s much rehearsed passages (1976, 133) notes, ‘that power and knowledge articulate each other.’ The work of the French historian and philosopher epitomizes what is at stake in questions of discourse and agency. For Foucault, discourses are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked and written in a normal and rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized and diffused by certain procedures. This process creates systems of exclusion in which one group of discourses is elevated to a hegemonic status, while others are condemned to exile. Discourses give rise to social rules that decide which statements most people recognize as valid, as debatable or as undoubtedly false. They guide the selection process that ascertains which propositions from previous periods or foreign cultures are retained, imported, valued, and which are forgotten or neglected (see Foucault, 1969, 1971, 1991, 59–60). Not everything is discourse, but everything is in discourse. Things exist independently of discourses, but we can only assess them through the lenses of discourse, through the practices of knowing, perceiving and sensing, which we have acquired over time. Discourses render social practices intelligible and rational and by doing so mask the ways in which they have been constituted and framed. Systems of domination gradually become accepted as normal and silently penetrate every aspect of society. They cling to the most remote corners of our mind, for, as Nietzsche (1983, 17) once expressed it, ‘all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their emergence out of unreason thereby becomes improbable.’

#### Simulated national security law debates preserve agency and enhance decision-making---avoids cooption

Laura K. Donohue 13, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, 4/11, “National Security Law Pedagogy and the Role of Simulations”, http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/National-Security-Law-Pedagogy-and-the-Role-of-Simulations.pdf

The concept of simulations as an aspect of higher education, or in the law school environment, is not new.164 Moot court, after all, is a form of simulation and one of the oldest teaching devices in the law. What is new, however, is the idea of designing a civilian national security course that takes advantage of the doctrinal and experiential components of law school education and integrates the experience through a multi-day simulation. In 2009, I taught the first module based on this design at Stanford Law, which I developed the following year into a full course at Georgetown Law. It has since gone through multiple iterations. The initial concept followed on the federal full-scale Top Official (“TopOff”) exercises, used to train government officials to respond to domestic crises.165 It adapted a Tabletop Exercise, designed with the help of exercise officials at DHS and FEMA, to the law school environment. The Tabletop used one storyline to push on specific legal questions, as students, assigned roles in the discussion, sat around a table and for six hours engaged with the material. The problem with the Tabletop Exercise was that it was too static, and the rigidity of the format left little room, or time, for student agency. Unlike the government’s TopOff exercises, which gave officials the opportunity to fully engage with the many different concerns that arise in the course of a national security crisis as well as the chance to deal with externalities, the Tabletop focused on specific legal issues, even as it controlled for external chaos. The opportunity to provide a more full experience for the students came with the creation of first a one-day, and then a multi-day simulation. The course design and simulation continues to evolve. It offers a model for achieving the pedagogical goals outlined above, in the process developing a rigorous training ground for the next generation of national security lawyers.166 A. Course Design The central idea in structuring the NSL Sim 2.0 course was to bridge the gap between theory and practice by conveying doctrinal material and creating an alternative reality in which students would be forced to act upon legal concerns.167 The exercise itself is a form of problem-based learning, wherein students are given both agency and responsibility for the results. Towards this end, the structure must be at once bounded (directed and focused on certain areas of the law and legal education) and flexible (responsive to student input and decisionmaking). Perhaps the most significant weakness in the use of any constructed universe is the problem of authenticity. Efforts to replicate reality will inevitably fall short. There is simply too much uncertainty, randomness, and complexity in the real world. One way to address this shortcoming, however, is through design and agency. The scenarios with which students grapple and the structural design of the simulation must reflect the national security realm, even as students themselves must make choices that carry consequences. Indeed, to some extent, student decisions themselves must drive the evolution of events within the simulation.168 Additionally, while authenticity matters, it is worth noting that at some level the fact that the incident does not take place in a real-world setting can be a great advantage. That is, the simulation creates an environment where students can make mistakes and learn from these mistakes – without what might otherwise be devastating consequences. It also allows instructors to develop multiple points of feedback to enrich student learning in a way that would be much more difficult to do in a regular practice setting. NSL Sim 2.0 takes as its starting point the national security pedagogical goals discussed above. It works backwards to then engineer a classroom, cyber, and physical/simulation experience to delve into each of these areas. As a substantive matter, the course focuses on the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory authorities in national security law, placing particular focus on the interstices between black letter law and areas where the field is either unsettled or in flux. A key aspect of the course design is that it retains both the doctrinal and experiential components of legal education. Divorcing simulations from the doctrinal environment risks falling short on the first and third national security pedagogical goals: (1) analytical skills and substantive knowledge, and (3) critical thought. A certain amount of both can be learned in the course of a simulation; however, the national security crisis environment is not well-suited to the more thoughtful and careful analytical discussion. What I am thus proposing is a course design in which doctrine is paired with the type of experiential learning more common in a clinical realm. The former precedes the latter, giving students the opportunity to develop depth and breadth prior to the exercise. In order to capture problems related to adaptation and evolution, addressing goal [1(d)], the simulation itself takes place over a multi-day period. Because of the intensity involved in national security matters (and conflicting demands on student time), the model makes use of a multi-user virtual environment. The use of such technology is critical to creating more powerful, immersive simulations.169 It also allows for continual interaction between the players. Multi-user virtual environments have the further advantage of helping to transform the traditional teaching culture, predominantly concerned with manipulating textual and symbolic knowledge, into a culture where students learn and can then be assessed on the basis of their participation in changing practices.170 I thus worked with the Information Technology group at Georgetown Law to build the cyber portal used for NSL Sim 2.0. The twin goals of adaptation and evolution require that students be given a significant amount of agency and responsibility for decisions taken in the course of the simulation. To further this aim, I constituted a Control Team, with six professors, four attorneys from practice, a media expert, six to eight former simulation students, and a number of technology experts. Four of the professors specialize in different areas of national security law and assume roles in the course of the exercise, with the aim of pushing students towards a deeper doctrinal understanding of shifting national security law authorities. One professor plays the role of President of the United States. The sixth professor focuses on questions of professional responsibility. The attorneys from practice help to build the simulation and then, along with all the professors, assume active roles during the simulation itself. Returning students assist in the execution of the play, further developing their understanding of national security law. Throughout the simulation, the Control Team is constantly reacting to student choices. When unexpected decisions are made, professors may choose to pursue the evolution of the story to accomplish the pedagogical aims, or they may choose to cut off play in that area (there are various devices for doing so, such as denying requests, sending materials to labs to be analyzed, drawing the players back into the main storylines, and leaking information to the media). A total immersion simulation involves a number of scenarios, as well as systemic noise, to give students experience in dealing with the second pedagogical goal: factual chaos and information overload. The driving aim here is to teach students how to manage information more effectively. Five to six storylines are thus developed, each with its own arc and evolution. To this are added multiple alterations of the situation, relating to background noise. Thus, unlike hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single-experience exercises, or even Tabletop exercises, the goal is not to eliminate external conditions, but to embrace them as part of the challenge facing national security lawyers. The simulation itself is problem-based, giving players agency in driving the evolution of the experience – thus addressing goal [2(c)]. This requires a realtime response from the professor(s) overseeing the simulation, pairing bounded storylines with flexibility to emphasize different areas of the law and the students’ practical skills. Indeed, each storyline is based on a problem facing the government, to which players must then respond, generating in turn a set of new issues that must be addressed. The written and oral components of the simulation conform to the fourth pedagogical goal – the types of situations in which national security lawyers will find themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on nontraditional modes of communication, such as legal documents in advance of the crisis itself, meetings in the midst of breaking national security concerns, multiple informal interactions, media exchanges, telephone calls, Congressional testimony, and formal briefings to senior level officials in the course of the simulation as well as during the last class session. These oral components are paired with the preparation of formal legal instruments, such as applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, legal memos, applications for search warrants under Title III, and administrative subpoenas for NSLs. In addition, students are required to prepare a paper outlining their legal authorities prior to the simulation – and to deliver a 90 second oral briefing after the session. To replicate the high-stakes political environment at issue in goals (1) and (5), students are divided into political and legal roles and assigned to different (and competing) institutions: the White House, DoD, DHS, HHS, DOJ, DOS, Congress, state offices, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. This requires students to acknowledge and work within the broader Washington context, even as they are cognizant of the policy implications of their decisions. They must get used to working with policymakers and to representing one of many different considerations that decisionmakers take into account in the national security domain. Scenarios are selected with high consequence events in mind, to ensure that students recognize both the domestic and international dimensions of national security law. Further alterations to the simulation provide for the broader political context – for instance, whether it is an election year, which parties control different branches, and state and local issues in related but distinct areas. The media is given a particularly prominent role. One member of the Control Team runs an AP wire service, while two student players represent print and broadcast media, respectively. The Virtual News Network (“VNN”), which performs in the second capacity, runs continuously during the exercise, in the course of which players may at times be required to appear before the camera. This media component helps to emphasize the broader political context within which national security law is practiced. Both anticipated and unanticipated decisions give rise to ethical questions and matters related to the fifth goal: professional responsibility. The way in which such issues arise stems from simulation design as well as spontaneous interjections from both the Control Team and the participants in the simulation itself. As aforementioned, professors on the Control Team, and practicing attorneys who have previously gone through a simulation, focus on raising decision points that encourage students to consider ethical and professional considerations. Throughout the simulation good judgment and leadership play a key role, determining the players’ effectiveness, with the exercise itself hitting the aim of the integration of the various pedagogical goals. Finally, there are multiple layers of feedback that players receive prior to, during, and following the simulation to help them to gauge their effectiveness. The Socratic method in the course of doctrinal studies provides immediate assessment of the students’ grasp of the law. Written assignments focused on the contours of individual players’ authorities give professors an opportunity to assess students’ level of understanding prior to the simulation. And the simulation itself provides real-time feedback from both peers and professors. The Control Team provides data points for player reflection – for instance, the Control Team member playing President may make decisions based on player input, giving students an immediate impression of their level of persuasiveness, while another Control Team member may reject a FISC application as insufficient. The simulation goes beyond this, however, focusing on teaching students how to develop (6) opportunities for learning in the future. Student meetings with mentors in the field, which take place before the simulation, allow students to work out the institutional and political relationships and the manner in which law operates in practice, even as they learn how to develop mentoring relationships. (Prior to these meetings we have a class discussion about mentoring, professionalism, and feedback). Students, assigned to simulation teams about one quarter of the way through the course, receive peer feedback in the lead-up to the simulation and during the exercise itself. Following the simulation the Control Team and observers provide comments. Judges, who are senior members of the bar in the field of national security law, observe player interactions and provide additional debriefing. The simulation, moreover, is recorded through both the cyber portal and through VNN, allowing students to go back to assess their performance. Individual meetings with the professors teaching the course similarly follow the event. Finally, students end the course with a paper reflecting on their performance and the issues that arose in the course of the simulation, develop frameworks for analyzing uncertainty, tension with colleagues, mistakes, and successes in the future. B. Substantive Areas: Interstices and Threats As a substantive matter, NSL Sim 2.0 is designed to take account of areas of the law central to national security. It focuses on specific authorities that may be brought to bear in the course of a crisis. The decision of which areas to explore is made well in advance of the course. It is particularly helpful here to think about national security authorities on a continuum, as a way to impress upon students that there are shifting standards depending upon the type of threat faced. One course, for instance, might center on the interstices between crime, drugs, terrorism and war. Another might address the intersection of pandemic disease and biological weapons. A third could examine cybercrime and cyberterrorism. This is the most important determination, because the substance of the doctrinal portion of the course and the simulation follows from this decision. For a course focused on the interstices between pandemic disease and biological weapons, for instance, preliminary inquiry would lay out which authorities apply, where the courts have weighed in on the question, and what matters are unsettled. Relevant areas might include public health law, biological weapons provisions, federal quarantine and isolation authorities, habeas corpus and due process, military enforcement and posse comitatus, eminent domain and appropriation of land/property, takings, contact tracing, thermal imaging and surveillance, electronic tagging, vaccination, and intelligence-gathering. The critical areas can then be divided according to the dominant constitutional authority, statutory authorities, regulations, key cases, general rules, and constitutional questions. This, then, becomes a guide for the doctrinal part of the course, as well as the grounds on which the specific scenarios developed for the simulation are based. The authorities, simultaneously, are included in an electronic resource library and embedded in the cyber portal (the Digital Archives) to act as a closed universe of the legal authorities needed by the students in the course of the simulation. Professional responsibility in the national security realm and the institutional relationships of those tasked with responding to biological weapons and pandemic disease also come within the doctrinal part of the course. The simulation itself is based on five to six storylines reflecting the interstices between different areas of the law. The storylines are used to present a coherent, non-linear scenario that can adapt to student responses. Each scenario is mapped out in a three to seven page document, which is then checked with scientists, government officials, and area experts for consistency with how the scenario would likely unfold in real life. For the biological weapons and pandemic disease emphasis, for example, one narrative might relate to the presentation of a patient suspected of carrying yersinia pestis at a hospital in the United States. The document would map out a daily progression of the disease consistent with epidemiological patterns and the central actors in the story: perhaps a U.S. citizen, potential connections to an international terrorist organization, intelligence on the individual’s actions overseas, etc. The scenario would be designed specifically to stress the intersection of public health and counterterrorism/biological weapons threats, and the associated (shifting) authorities, thus requiring the disease initially to look like an innocent presentation (for example, by someone who has traveled from overseas), but then for the storyline to move into the second realm (awareness that this was in fact a concerted attack). A second storyline might relate to a different disease outbreak in another part of the country, with the aim of introducing the Stafford Act/Insurrection Act line and raising federalism concerns. The role of the military here and Title 10/Title 32 questions would similarly arise – with the storyline designed to raise these questions. A third storyline might simply be well developed noise in the system: reports of suspicious activity potentially linked to radioactive material, with the actors linked to nuclear material. A fourth storyline would focus perhaps on container security concerns overseas, progressing through newspaper reports, about containers showing up in local police precincts. State politics would constitute the fifth storyline, raising question of the political pressures on the state officials in the exercise. Here, ethnic concerns, student issues, economic conditions, and community policing concerns might become the focus. The sixth storyline could be further noise in the system – loosely based on current events at the time. In addition to the storylines, a certain amount of noise is injected into the system through press releases, weather updates, private communications, and the like. The five to six storylines, prepared by the Control Team in consultation with experts, become the basis for the preparation of scenario “injects:” i.e., newspaper articles, VNN broadcasts, reports from NGOs, private communications between officials, classified information, government leaks, etc., which, when put together, constitute a linear progression. These are all written and/or filmed prior to the exercise. The progression is then mapped in an hourly chart for the unfolding events over a multi-day period. All six scenarios are placed on the same chart, in six columns, giving the Control Team a birds-eye view of the progression. C. How It Works As for the nuts and bolts of the simulation itself, it traditionally begins outside of class, in the evening, on the grounds that national security crises often occur at inconvenient times and may well involve limited sleep and competing demands.171 Typically, a phone call from a Control Team member posing in a role integral to one of the main storylines, initiates play. Students at this point have been assigned dedicated simulation email addresses and provided access to the cyber portal. The portal itself gives each team the opportunity to converse in a “classified” domain with other team members, as well as access to a public AP wire and broadcast channel, carrying the latest news and on which press releases or (for the media roles) news stories can be posted. The complete universe of legal authorities required for the simulation is located on the cyber portal in the Digital Archives, as are forms required for some of the legal instruments (saving students the time of developing these from scratch in the course of play). Additional “classified” material – both general and SCI – has been provided to the relevant student teams. The Control Team has access to the complete site. For the next two (or three) days, outside of student initiatives (which, at their prompting, may include face-to-face meetings between the players), the entire simulation takes place through the cyber portal. The Control Team, immediately active, begins responding to player decisions as they become public (and occasionally, through monitoring the “classified” communications, before they are released). This time period provides a ramp-up to the third (or fourth) day of play, allowing for the adjustment of any substantive, student, or technology concerns, while setting the stage for the breaking crisis. The third (or fourth) day of play takes place entirely at Georgetown Law. A special room is constructed for meetings between the President and principals, in the form of either the National Security Council or the Homeland Security Council, with breakout rooms assigned to each of the agencies involved in the NSC process. Congress is provided with its own physical space, in which meetings, committee hearings and legislative drafting can take place. State government officials are allotted their own area, separate from the federal domain, with the Media placed between the three major interests. The Control Team is sequestered in a different area, to which students are not admitted. At each of the major areas, the cyber portal is publicly displayed on large flat panel screens, allowing for the streaming of video updates from the media, AP wire injects, articles from the students assigned to represent leading newspapers, and press releases. Students use their own laptop computers for team decisions and communication. As the storylines unfold, the Control Team takes on a variety of roles, such as that of the President, Vice President, President’s chief of staff, governor of a state, public health officials, and foreign dignitaries. Some of the roles are adopted on the fly, depending upon player responses and queries as the storylines progress. Judges, given full access to each player domain, determine how effectively the students accomplish the national security goals. The judges are themselves well-experienced in the practice of national security law, as well as in legal education. They thus can offer a unique perspective on the scenarios confronted by the students, the manner in which the simulation unfolded, and how the students performed in their various capacities. At the end of the day, the exercise terminates and an immediate hotwash is held, in which players are first debriefed on what occurred during the simulation. Because of the players’ divergent experiences and the different roles assigned to them, the students at this point are often unaware of the complete picture. The judges and formal observers then offer reflections on the simulation and determine which teams performed most effectively. Over the next few classes, more details about the simulation emerge, as students discuss it in more depth and consider limitations created by their knowledge or institutional position, questions that arose in regard to their grasp of the law, the types of decision-making processes that occurred, and the effectiveness of their – and other students’ – performances. Reflection papers, paired with oral briefings, focus on the substantive issues raised by the simulation and introduce the opportunity for students to reflect on how to create opportunities for learning in the future. The course then formally ends.172 Learning, however, continues beyond the temporal confines of the semester. Students who perform well and who would like to continue to participate in the simulations are invited back as members of the control team, giving them a chance to deepen their understanding of national security law. Following graduation, a few students who go in to the field are then invited to continue their affiliation as National Security Law fellows, becoming increasingly involved in the evolution of the exercise itself. This system of vertical integration helps to build a mentoring environment for the students while they are enrolled in law school and to create opportunities for learning and mentorship post-graduation. It helps to keep the exercise current and reflective of emerging national security concerns. And it builds a strong community of individuals with common interests. CONCLUSION The legal academy has, of late, been swept up in concern about the economic conditions that affect the placement of law school graduates. The image being conveyed, however, does not resonate in every legal field. It is particularly inapposite to the burgeoning opportunities presented to students in national security. That the conversation about legal education is taking place now should come as little surprise. Quite apart from economic concern is the traditional introspection that follows American military engagement. It makes sense: law overlaps substantially with political power, being at once both the expression of government authority and the effort to limit the same. The one-size fits all approach currently dominating the conversation in legal education, however, appears ill-suited to address the concerns raised in the current conversation. Instead of looking at law across the board, greater insight can be gleaned by looking at the specific demands of the different fields themselves. This does not mean that the goals identified will be exclusive to, for instance, national security law, but it does suggest there will be greater nuance in the discussion of the adequacy of the current pedagogical approach. With this approach in mind, I have here suggested six pedagogical goals for national security. For following graduation, students must be able to perform in each of the areas identified – (1) understanding the law as applied, (2) dealing with factual chaos and uncertainty, (3) obtaining critical distance, (4) developing nontraditional written and oral communication skills, (5) exhibiting leadership, integrity, and good judgment in a high-stakes, highly-charged environment, and (6) creating continued opportunities for self-learning. They also must learn how to integrate these different skills into one experience, to ensure that they will be most effective when they enter the field. The problem with the current structures in legal education is that they fall short, in important ways, from helping students to meet these goals. Doctrinal courses may incorporate a range of experiential learning components, such as hypotheticals, doctrinal problems, single exercises, extended or continuing exercises, and tabletop exercises. These are important classroom devices. The amount of time required for each varies, as does the object of the exercise itself. But where they fall short is in providing a more holistic approach to national security law which will allow for the maximum conveyance of required skills. Total immersion simulations, which have not yet been addressed in the secondary literature for civilian education in national security law, may provide an important way forward. Such simulations also cure shortcomings in other areas of experiential education, such as clinics and moot court. It is in an effort to address these concerns that I developed the simulation model above. NSL Sim 2.0 certainly is not the only solution, but it does provide a starting point for moving forward. The approach draws on the strengths of doctrinal courses and embeds a total immersion simulation within a course. It makes use of technology and physical space to engage students in a multi-day exercise, in which they are given agency and responsibility for their decision making, resulting in a steep learning curve. While further adaptation of this model is undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.

#### Our interpretation makes participation in policy decisions by those without their hands on the levers of power possible

Hickman, 12

[Larry, director of the Center for Dewey Studies and professor of philosophy at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, “Citizen Participation: more or less?” Online, http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=fi&page=hickman\_28\_6] /Wyo-MB

Lippmann, and the Roberts Court. In his 1927 book The Public and Its Problems, Dewey mounted an energetic response to Lippmann. He encouraged support for a free and vigorous press whose task would be to make the results of research in the social sciences available to every citizen. He denied that the “ordinary citizen” lacked sufficient intelligence or interest to participate in public affairs. And he called for greater support for a type of public education that would increase the critical skills that every citizen requires to cut through the web of disinformation that tends to be disseminated by governments, corporations, and other forces seeking to impede full discussion of matters affecting the public good. If ordinary citizens were as distracted as Lippmann claimed, Dewey suggested, they would hardly be amenable to control by the educated elites in any event. And if experts were cut off from the needs and concerns of the general population, then their databases would dry up. They and their reports would become increasingly irrelevant. Of course, Dewey was not advocating a pure form of participatory democracy. He recognized that men and women have different talents, needs, and interests and that when they associate themselves in groups larger than a mere handful, there is a tendency toward specialization in the various tasks required to support the continued existence of the group. One of those areas of specialization is the ability to act on behalf of other members of a group—or what Dewey termed a public—in ways that its members find acceptable. In sum, in order for a public to exist, it must have members who are able to take the lead in articulating its goals and interests and in representing those goals and interests to other publics. Dewey was in fact calling for a form of deliberative democracy that would achieve a creative balance between participation and representation. He realized that deliberative democracies cannot function in the absence of experts in various fields and representatives who take decisions on behalf of a voting public. On one side, while participation within civic affairs could hardly be required, it should nevertheless be open to anyone willing to develop the skills necessary for involvement in the processes of public debate and decision making. On the other side, efficient government requires both representatives who are sensitive to public problems and experts who can advise those representatives on technical matters.

#### We can challenge those with their hands on the levers of power—the Aff’s education is key to deliberative democracy and developing informed citizenry

Hickman, 12

[Larry, director of the Center for Dewey Studies and professor of philosophy at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, “Citizen Participation: more or less?” Online, http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=fi&page=hickman\_28\_6] /Wyo-MB

How can preclusionary decisions be justified? In their 2004 book Why Deliberative Democracy?, Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson provided a baseline for citizen participation. Deliberative democracies involve a give-and-take in which citizens are free and equal and in which they and their representatives “justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future.” The second prong of Dewey’s answer to a Caplanesque argument is inclusionary. He called for an expanded and invigorated system of public education, including lifelong learning, in which every learner—including every current and future voter—would master the critical tools necessary to take his or her place as a full participant in the democratic process. For example, Dewey championed an educational process that emphasizes learning to learn rather than simply learning to take standardized tests. His prescription would effectively reverse the process that currently exists in many educational settings. Pedagogies of memorization and recitation of factual information as a means to understanding larger patterns would be limited. Instead, knowledge of factual information would be the fruit of educational practices that engage the talents, interests, and abilities of learners. Learning to learn would trump memorization of facts. This second prong of Dewey’s response reveals the poverty of Caplan’s argument. It is unfortunate but undeniable that there are times when some of our fellow citizens exhibit traits that are best described as ignorant or irrational. But rather than simply accepting this fact, instead of offering a cosmetic solution by dividing citizens into an elite participant class and a nonparticipant underclass, Dewey wanted to attack the root causes of the problem. His proposal was to decrease the incidence of ignorant and irrational acts by enlarging the sphere of public education, including lifelong learning. He argued that educators should start with the premise that everyone is capable of knowledgeable and intelligent participation in democratic processes. Instead of dividing the educated from the uneducated, then, Dewey and other Progressives aimed to enlarge the pool of educated and informed citizens as far as possible. Dewey and the other Progressives thought that the processes of deliberative democracy are themselves educative. Citizen participation should not be restricted, but expanded. In their view, when deliberative democracy does not work, the answer is not disenfranchisement. The answer is more education and thus an enlarged deliberative democracy.

#### Perm solves—should look at state and individual experience they are entangled together

Little 2002 (Adrian, Ph.D from Queen's University Belfast, “The politics of community: theory and practice”, Google Book, UWYO KB)

The implications of the variations mentioned above are manifold in theoretical terms but it is also vital to examine the ways in which they inform practical politics in the contemporary world. As the pre-eminent guru of political communitarianism Amitai Etzioni has suggested, it is more than a political philosophy but rather communitarianism is most commonly regarded as a global political movement with supporters of all political hues across the world. The analysis will develop from here as we investigate Enioni's 'political' or 'orthodox' communitarianism1 and the specific notion of community which it employs. The emphasis will be twofold. First, it will focus on the sometimes distant relations between the sophisticated arguments put forward in the philosophical debate and the approach adopted by Etzioni. Most of the arguments put forward by the latter are couched in somewhat conservative terms which actually counter the liberal ideas held by communitarians such as Walzer. The second point of emphasis will be the populist and potentially authoritarian implications of Etzioni's work which, although he is at pains to suggest the opposite, pander to conservative and sometimes reactionary readings of the organisation of society. This analysis is particularly timely due to the popularity of the communitarianism movement. In the United Kingdom the argument has been taken up by a range of individuals from politicians in the major political parties to campaigning journalists such as Melanie Phillips. Community has also been promoted by members of think-tanks like Demos (see Atkinson 1994) and the Institute of Economic Affairs such as Norman Dennis and David Green. Despite the different standpoints presented by these individuals, they all develop a moral ism that ultimately counteracts progressive and liberal ideas. Moreover, in general, the community that they seek to reinvigorate or protect is essentially backward looking and regressive. Rather than attempting to develop a theory of community that fits with the exigencies of the contemporary world, they prefer to don rose-tinted spectacles and eulogise previous ways of life that look increasingly anachronistic in the context of current conditions. Indeed it is just these conditions which necessitate fresh, radical thought on the concept of community. Whilst the 'moral authoritarian communitarianism' (Hughes 1996) outlined above is clearly the dominant strand of communitarian politics in terms of influence and popularity, there are also radical approaches that offer more sophisticated variations on the meaning of community. Among the most important commentators in this school of thought are egalitarians such as Bill Jordan and Andre Gon: and radical pluralists such as Chantal Mouffe. The radical approach to community examines not only the relationship between the individual and the state, but also the social and the economic implications of rethinking community. Ultimately it recognises that these issues cannot be easily disentangled from one another. From this perspective the promotion of community is not presented as the panacea for a range of social ills that may be identified in modern societies. The reason for this is that the radical standpoint does not promote one unitary community but argues instead that individuals need to be members of a range of different associational groups and communities. This goes beyond the search for the subject of the political community that is manifest in the communitarianism/liberalism debate. Certainly the wider political community is a feature of the approach of radical communitarians, but they also stress the importance of other types of community - smaller associational groups, the membership of which provides self-identity and allows individuals to express particularistic differences. Advocates of this perspective often look to the sphere of civil society as an arena that holds considerable potential for individual expression as it may not be guided by the principles which organise market mechanisms or the universal values that underpin the broader political community (Barber 1996). Moreover the radical approach to community recognises that individual self-identity cannot be wholly detached from communities one is bom into as in atomistic or asocial individualism, whilst simultaneously understanding that identity can also be constituted by communities that individuals choose to belong to (Kukathas 1996).

#### And, the aff is a gift of justice that enables community building

Vaughan 1999 (Genevieve went to Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania and later attended graduate school at the University of Texas, “Gift giving and the goddess A philosophy for social change” Avalon Magazine http://www.gift-economy.com/articlesAndEssays/giftAndGoddess.html UWYO KB)

Over the years I developed a theory of language as gift giving in contrast to my ex husband's theory of language as exchange. While we give to one another and create community, there are many material things we cannot give, like mountains or the sun, and many immaterial things, like justice or partnership that cannot be transferred, or just handed over to another. Words are the socially invented commonly-held sound-gifts we can give to each other in the place of other material and immaterial gifts, creating our bonds as part of the group verbally when we cannot do so materially. We satisfy each other's communicative needs to be put into a common relation to the world. The specification of this relation at any moment constitutes the transmission (giving and receiving) of information. We are related to each other in community as verbal givers and receivers regarding specific parts and aspects of the world (even in cases when, as happens in capitalist exchange, we are no longer giving to each other on a material basis). Syntax itself can be seen as a transposition of giving from the plane of interpersonal behavior to the plane of the relation among words. Subject, predicate and object can be seen as giver, gift or service, and receiver. A theory of language of this sort restores mothering or nurturing to its place as the main factor in our becoming human not only as a species but individually, life by life. Abstract reasoning has been influenced by exchange. It is not a sui generis activity but only a complication of giftgiving and language, which has left aside or cancelled the other oriented content in order to contend with cause and effect, quantification, self reflecting consciousness and supposedly value-free (not value- giving) 'activity'. By abstracting from giftgiving we prepare ourselves for exchange. We eliminate meaningful human relations and bonding based on giving, and separate reason from the emotions which respond to needs. Our emotional responses create the map that tells us where and what gifts to give. Basing reason as we do on the equations and categories of exchange while discrediting emotions, we find our lives are no longer 'meaningful'. That is because meaning - in life as in language - is formed by gift giving communication. We also forget that the truth is other oriented, that it satisfies the other's need to know, while lying is constructed according to the model of exchange, satisfying only the speakers' own need. Our lack of honesty is also a lack of altruism and gift giving is defeated once more.

#### Perm solves

Little 2002 (Adrian, Ph.D from Queen's University Belfast, “The politics of community: theory and practice”, Google Book, UWYO KB)

Community is a key ingredient in the complex matrix of social organisation and individual self-identity that characterises modern life. The exposition of the theory of community must grapple with the role it should play in social organisation in the context of diversity and value pluralism. In practical terms the book will attempt to transcend arguments over 4the state or the market' by showing that both have a role to play in social organisation if they are supported by solid community institutions. The key to the argument presented here is that the politics of community requires foundations in clear philosophical values and principles. We cannot just assume that communities exist in the requisite fonn (even though they may do to some extent) or that communities only need to be reactivated to perform some kind of romanticised vision of their rote in previous times. Rather communities may sometimes need to be manufactured and policies may have to be directed towards the creation of spaces for them to develop and flourish. In this vein the theoretical exposition of community should be coupled with strategies for their practical enactment. In short, it is vital to establish the appropriate links between the theory of community and practical initiatives for redeveloping social and economic policies on one hand and its implications for political renewal on the other. Initially it is important to analyse the explicit and implicit appeals to community in political and sociological thought. This approach will demonstrate how the values of community have been employed from Ancient Greek philosophy to contemporary supporters of radical pluralism and civil society in order to propagate visions of cohesive societies. From the beginnings in classical thought much of this theorising has taken the form of discussion about the constitution of the public sphere and the nature of relations therein. This has been evident since the rise of liberalism insofar as debates about individual freedoms and rights have been discussed in relation to the social context in which they are experienced. Moreover, especially in the work of Enlightenment philosophers such as Paine and Rousseau, the theorisation of freedom and rights have been bound up with conceptual arguments about the meaning of the public sphere and the constitution of the good society. The explicit theorisation of community expanded significantly with industrialisation (Reeve 1997) and this was the origin of the link between the concept and 'conservative' sociology. This association is most frequently associated with the work of Tonnies and Durkheim, who studied the effects of industrial societies on traditional associational relationships. Their theories remain influential on thinking about community today, although this is not to say that either the concept of community or the sociological theorisations of it should be endowed with conservative connotations by definition. From these historical foundations we can identify why community remains a central concept in political philosophy and sound reasons to resist prematurely or simplistically pigeon-holing it. By analysing these differing traditions this chapter will establish the complex nature of community and the problems that emerge in practically applying it in contemporary politics.

#### Focusing on epistemology or ontology selfishly ignores real world problems

Jarvis, 2K – Prof Philosophy @ U South Carolina (Darryl, Studies in International Relations, “International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism”, pg. 2)

While Hoffmann might well be correct, these days one can neither begin nor conclude empirical research without first discussing epistemological orientations and ontological assumptions. Like a vortex, metatheory has engulfed us all and the question of "theory" which was once used as a guide to research is now the object of research. Indeed, for a discipline whose purview is ostensibly outward looldng and international in scope, and at a time of ever encroaching globalization and transnationalism, International Relations has become increasingly provincial and inward looking. Rather than grapple with the numerous issues that confront peoples around the world, since the early 1980s the discipline has tended more and more toward obsessive self-examination.3 These days the politics of famine, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, or ethnic cleansing, let alone the cartographic machinations in Eastern Europe and the reconfiguration of the geo-global political-economy, seem scarcely to concern theorists of international politics who define the urgent task of our time to be one of metaphysical reflection and epistemological investigation. Arguably, theory is no longer concerned with the study of international relations so much as the "manner in which international relations as a discipline, and international relations as a subject matter, have been constructed."4 To be concerned with the latter is to be "on the cutting edge," where novelty has itself become "an appropriate form of scholarship."5