## 1AC

### Plan

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase statutory restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by establishing a federal counterterrorism oversight court with jurisdiction over targeted killing orders for robotic aerial vehicles.

### Terror

#### Expansive use of targeted killing causes blowback, collateral damage, and operational errors— new guidelines key

Guiora, 2012

[Amos, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, Targeted killing: when proportionality gets all out of proportion, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. 45.1-2 (Fall 2012): p235., Academic onefile] /Wyo-MB

Morality in armed conflict is not a mere mantra: it imposes significant demands on the nation state that must adhere to limits and considerations beyond simply killing "the other side." For better or worse, drone warfare of today will become the norm of tomorrow. Multiply the number of attacks conducted regularly in the present and you have the operational reality of future warfare. It is important to recall that drone policy is effective on two distinct levels: it takes the fight to terrorists directly involved, either in past or future attacks, and serves as a powerful deterrent for those considering involvement in terrorist activity. (53) However, its importance and effectiveness must not hinder critical conversation, particularly with respect to defining imminence and legitimate target. The overly broad definition, "flexible" in the Obama Administration's words, (54) raises profound concerns regarding how imminence is applied. That concern is concrete for the practical import of Brennan's phrasing is a dramatic broadening of the definition of legitimate target. It is also important to recall that operators--military, CIA or private contractors--are responsible for implementing executive branch guidelines and directives. (55) For that very reason, the approach articulated by Brennan on behalf of the administration is troubling. This approach, while theoretically appealing, fails on a number of levels. First, it undermines and does a profound injustice to the military and security personnel tasked with operationalizing defense of the state, particularly commanders and officers. When senior leadership deliberately obfuscates policy to create wiggle room and plausible deniability, junior commanders (those at the tip of the spear, in essence) have no framework to guide their operational choices. (56) The results can be disastrous, as the example of Abu Ghraib shows all too well. (57) Second, it gravely endangers the civilian population. What is done in the collective American name poses danger both to our safety, because of the possibility of blow-back attacks in response to a drone attack that caused significant collateral damage, and to our values, because the policy is loosely articulated and problematically implemented.(58) Third, the approach completely undermines our commitment to law and morality that defines a nation predicated on the rule of law. If everyone who constitutes "them" is automatically a legitimate target, then careful analysis of threats, imminence, proportionality, credibility, reliability, and other factors become meaningless. Self-defense becomes a mantra that justifies all action, regardless of method or procedure.

#### Exclusive executive decision making in drone strikes makes groupthink and errors inevitable

Chebab, 2012

[Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review, 3-30-12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572] /Wyo-MB

The practical, pragmatic justification for the COAACC derives largely from considering¶ social psychological findings regarding the skewed potential associated with limiting unchecked decision-making in a group of individuals. As an initial point, psychologists have long pointed out how individuals frequently fall prey to cognitive illusions that produce systematic errors in judgment.137 People simply do not make decisions by choosing the optimal outcome from available alternatives, but instead employ shortcuts (i.e., heuristics) for convenience.138 Cognitive biases like groupthink can hamper effective policy deliberations and formulations.139 Groupthink largely arises when a group of decision-makers seek conformity and agreement, thereby avoiding alternative points of view that are critical of the consensus position.140 This theory suggests that some groups—particularly those characterized by a strong leader, considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfidence, and a shared world view or value system—suffer from a deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis.141 Many factors can affect such judgment, including a lack of crucial information, insufficient timing for decision-making, poor judgment, pure luck, and/or unexpected actions by adversaries.142 Moreover, decision-makers inevitably tend to become influenced by irrelevant information,143 seek out data and assessments that confirm their beliefs and personal hypotheses notwithstanding contradictory evidence,144 and “[i]rrationally avoid choices that represent extremes when a decision involves a trade-off between two incommensurable values.”145 Self-serving biases can also hamper judgment given as it has been shown to induce well-intentioned people to rationalize virtually any behavior, judgment or action after the fact.146 The confirmation and overconfidence bias, both conceptually related to groupthink, also result in large part from neglecting to consider contradictory evidence coupled with an irrational persistence in pursuing ideological positions divorced from concern of alternative viewpoints.147¶ Professor Cass Sunstein has described situations in which groupthink produced poor results precisely because consensus resulted from the failure to consider alternative sources of information.148 The failures of past presidents to consider alternative sources of information, critically question risk assessments, ensure neutral-free ideological sentiment among those deliberating,149 and/or generally ensure properly deliberated national security policy has produced prominent and devastating blunders,150 including the Iraq War of 2003,151 the Bay of Pigs debacle in the 1960’s,152 and the controversial decision to wage war against Vietnam.153¶ Professor Sunstein also has described the related phenomenon of “group polarization,” which includes the tendency to push group members toward a “more extreme position.”154 Given that both groupthink and group polarization can lead to erroneous and ideologically tainted policy positions, the notion of giving the President unchecked authority in determining who is eligible for assassination can only serve to increase the likelihood for committing significant errors.155 The reality is that psychological mistakes, organizational ineptitude, lack of structural coherence and other associated deficiencies are inevitable features in Executive Branch decision-making.

#### Impact is nuclear war

Wright, 2003

[Rusty, former associate speaker and writer with Probe Ministries, is an international lecturer, award-winning author, and journalist who has spoken on six continents. He holds Bachelor of Science (psychology) and Master of Theology degrees from Duke and Oxford universities, JFK and Groupthink: Lessons in Decision Making, http://www.probe.org/site/c.fdKEIMNsEoG/b.4221087/] /Wyo-MB

A fascinating facet of Kennedy's legacy involves the decision- making procedures he used among his closest advisors. Some brought great successes. Others were serious failures. This article looks at two specific examples: the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, an attempt to invade Cuba and overthrow Fidel Castro that became a fiasco, and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis that saw the world come perilously close to nuclear war.¶ Yale social psychologist Irving Janis studied these episodes carefully and concluded that too often decision makers are ~~blinded~~ by their own needs for self-esteem they get from being an accepted member of a socially important insiders group. Fears of shattering the warm feelings of perceived unanimity -- of rocking the boat -- kept some of Kennedy's advisors from objecting to the Bay of Pigs plan before it was too late. After that huge blunder, JFK revamped his decision-making process to encourage dissent and critical evaluation among his team. In the Cuban missile crisis, virtually the same policymakers produced superior results.{2}¶ "Groupthink" was the term Janis used for the phenomenon of flawed group dynamics that can let bad ideas go unchallenged and can sometimes yield disastrous outcomes. This article will consider how groupthink might have affected JFK and a major television enterprise, and how it can affect you.¶ The Bay of Pigs Invasion¶ "How could I have been so stupid?"{3} President John F. Kennedy asked that after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. He called it a "colossal mistake."{4} It left him feeling depressed, guilty, bitter, and in tears.{5} One historian later called the Bay of Pigs, "one of those rare events in history -- a perfect failure."{6}¶ What happened? In 1961, CIA and military leaders wanted to use Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro. After lengthy consideration among his top advisors, Kennedy approved a covert invasion. Advance press reports alerted Castro to the threat. Over 1,400 invaders at the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) were vastly outnumbered. Lacking air support, necessary ammunition and an escape route, nearly 1,200 surrendered. Others died.¶ Declassified CIA documents help illuminate the invasion's flaws. Top CIA leaders blamed Kennedy for not authorizing vital air strikes. Other CIA analysts fault the wishful thinking that the invasion would stimulate an uprising among Cuba's populace and military. Planners assumed the invaders could simply fade into the mountains for guerilla operations. Trouble was, eighty miles of swampland separated the bay from the mountains. The list goes on.{7}¶ Irving Janis felt that Kennedy's top advisors were unwilling to challenge bad ideas because it might disturb perceived or desired group concurrence. Presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger, for instance, presented serious objections to the invasion in a memorandum to the president, but suppressed his doubts at the team meetings. Attorney General Robert Kennedy privately admonished Schlesinger to support the president's decision to invade. At one crucial meeting, JFK called on each member for his vote for or against the invasion. Each member, that is, except Schlesinger -- whom he knew to have serious concerns. Many members assumed other members agreed with the invasion plan.{8}¶ Schlesinger later lamented, "In the months after the Bay of Pigs I bitterly reproached myself for having kept so silent during those crucial discussions in the cabinet room." He continued, "I can only explain my failure to do more than raise a few timid questions by reporting that one's impulse to blow the whistle on this nonsense was simply undone by the circumstances of the discussion."{9}¶ Have you ever kept silent when you felt you should speak up? President Kennedy later revised his group decision-making process to encourage dissent and debate. The change helped avert a nuclear catastrophe, as we will see.¶ The Cuban Missile Crisis¶ Ever face tough decisions? How would you feel if your wrong decision might mean nuclear war? Consider a time when the world teetered on the brink of disaster.{10}¶ Stung by the Bay of Pigs debacle, President Kennedy determined to ask hard questions during future crises.{11} A good opportunity came eighteen months later.¶ In October 1962, aerial photographs showed Soviet missile sites in Cuba.{12} The missile program, if allowed to continue, could reach most of the United States with nuclear warheads.{13} Kennedy's first inclination was an air strike to take out the missiles.{14} His top advisors debated alternatives from bombing and invasion to blockade and negotiation.{15}¶ On October 22, Kennedy set forth an ultimatum in a televised address: A U.S. naval "quarantine" would block further offensive weapons from reaching Cuba. Russia must promptly dismantle and withdraw all offensive weapons. Use of the missiles would bring attacks against the Soviet Union.{16}¶ The U.S. Navy blockaded Cuba. Soviets readied their forces. The Pentagon directed the Strategic Air Command to begin a nuclear alert. On October 24, the world held its breath as six Soviet ships approached the blockade. Then, all six ships either stopped or reversed course.{17} Secretary of State Dean Rusk told a colleague, "We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked."{18}¶ A maze of negotiations ensued. At the United Nations, U.S. ambassador Adlai Stevenson publicly pressed his Soviet counterpart to confirm or deny Soviet missiles' existence in Cuba. Saying he was prepared to wait for an answer "until hell freezes over," Stevenson then displayed reconnaissance photos to the Security Council.{19} Eventually, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev removed the missiles.{20}¶ Kennedy's decision-making process -- though imperfect -- had evolved significantly. He challenged military leaders who pressured him to bomb and invade. He heard the CIA's case for air strikes and Stevenson's counsel for negotiation. Advocates for different views developed their arguments in committees then met back together.{21} Robert Kennedy later wrote, "The fact that we were able to talk, debate, argue, disagree, and then debate some more was essential in choosing our ultimate course."{22} Many groupthink mistakes of the Bay of Pigs, in which bad ideas went unchallenged, had been avoided.{23}¶ Groupthink has serious ramifications for government, business, academia, neighborhood, family, and the ministry. One area it has affected is Christian television.

#### Judicial review solves groupthink

Chebab, 2012

[Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review, 3-30-12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572] /Wyo-MB

To check the vices of groupthink and shortcomings of human judgment, the psychology literature emphasizes a focus on accountability mechanisms in which a better reasoned decision- making process can flourish.156 By serving as a constraint on behavior, “accountability functions as a critical norm-enforcement mechanism—the social psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on the other.”157 Such institutional review can channel recognition for the need by government decision-makers to be more self-critical in policy targeted killing designations, more willing to consider alternative points of view, and more willing to anticipate possible objections.158 Findings have also shown that ex ante awareness can lead to more reasoned judgment while also preventing tendentious and ideological inclinations (and political motivations incentivized and exploited by popular hysteria and fear).159 Requiring accounting in a formalized way prior to engaging in a targeted killing—by providing, for example, in camera review, limited declassification of information, explaining threat assessments outside the immediate circle of policy advisors, and securing meaningful judicial review via a COAACC-like tribunal—can promote a more reliable and informed deliberation in the executive branch. With process-based judicial review, the COAACC could effectively reorient the decision to target individuals abroad by examining key procedural aspects—particularly assessing the reliability of the “terrorist” designation—and can further incentivize national security policy-makers to engage in more carefully reasoned choices and evaluate available alternatives than when subject to little to no review.

#### Plan is key to effective drone use—solves blowback

Masood 13

(Hassan, Monmouth College, “Death from the Heavens: The Politics of the United States’ Drone Campaign in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” 2013) /wyo-mm

Those who support the use of drones as an important counter-insurgency tactic nonetheless point out that the current campaign is not always conducted in the most effective manner. The authors of “Sudden Justice” for example, argue that the campaign should be focused on ‘high value targets’ and not be used frequently to take down the lower level operatives. The more you can destroy and disrupt the activities of personnel in the Taliban and al-Qaeda from the top-down instead of the bottom-up, the more of an impact it will have. The leadership qualities, organizational skills, and strategic awareness of various high-level commanders in both the Taliban and al-Qaeda cannot be easily replaced after their deaths at the hands of U.S. drones. Fricker and Plaw use the example of Baitullah Mehsud, a Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) leader who was killed by a drone strike on the roof of his uncle’s house on August 5, 2009. His death provoked an internal struggle in his organization that ultimately led to enough confusion and tension within the TTP that the Pakistan Army was able to launch the South Waziristan

ng said that whileOffensive, putting the TTP on the defensive. But the lower level Taliban and al-Qaeda members have skills and abilities that are more common and more easily replaced. The amount of time and energy, the article asserts, that the U.S. is spending killing lower-level members (and increasing civilian casualties in the process, as the majority of the time these strikes happen during funeral processions or wedding parties) could instead be used to seriously disrupt the activities of the entire organization by targeting its leaders, much like the death of Osama bin Laden did to al-Qaeda in South/Central Asia in 2011. David Rohde agrees that the drones should be used, as they are an effective and efficient way of disrupting and destroying the extremist power base there, but their usage should be both selective and surgical. There is no consensus among scholars when it comes to evaluating the effectiveness of the use of drones as a counter-insurgency tactic. As Hassan Abbas points out “the truth is we don’t know whether U.S. drone strikes have killed more terrorists or produced more terrorists.”

#### Global terror threat is high and attacks against the US are immanent

ETN, 9-26-13

[E Turbo News Global Travel News Industry Reporting on information from the State department, US State Department issues worldwide travel warning, http://www.eturbonews.com/38306/us-state-department-issues-worldwide-travel-warning] /Wyo-MB

The US State Department recently released a statement cautioning Americans traveling abroad of potential terror attacks in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East by al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups.¶ According to the report published on US State Government website, The Department of State has issued this Worldwide Caution to update information on the continuing threat of terrorist actions and violence against US citizens and interests throughout the world.¶ U.S. citizens are reminded to maintain a high level of vigilance and to take appropriate steps to increase their security awareness. This replaces the Worldwide Caution dated February 19, 2013, to provide updated information on security threats and terrorist activities worldwide.¶ The Department of State remains concerned about the continued threat of terrorist attacks, demonstrations, and other violent actions against U.S. citizens and interests overseas. Current information suggests that al-Qaeda, its affiliated organizations, and other terrorist groups continue to plan terrorist attacks against US interests in multiple regions, including Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. These attacks may employ a wide variety of tactics including suicide operations, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, and bombings.¶ Extremists may elect to use conventional or non-conventional weapons, and target both official and private interests. Examples of such targets include high-profile sporting events, residential areas, business offices, hotels, clubs, restaurants, places of worship, schools, public areas, shopping malls, and other tourist destinations both in the United States and abroad where US citizens gather in large numbers, including during holidays.¶ In early August 2013, the Department of State instructed certain US embassies and consulates to remain closed or to suspend operations August 4 through August 10 because of security information received. The US government took these precautionary steps out of an abundance of caution and care for our employees and others who may have planned to visit our installations.¶ US citizens are reminded of the potential for terrorists to attack public transportation systems and other tourist infrastructure.¶ Extremists have targeted and attempted attacks on subway and rail systems, aviation, and maritime services. In the past, these types of attacks have occurred in cities such as Moscow, London, Madrid, Glasgow, and New York City.¶ “Extremists may elect to use conventional or nonconventional weapons, and target both official and private interests,” the department said yesterday. Potential targets may include high-profile sports events, residences, businesses, hotels, clubs, restaurants, schools, places of worship, shopping malls and tourist destinations where Americans congregate.¶ Two US officials familiar with the warni it’s a routine renewal of the department’s worldwide caution, it also reflects mounting intelligence that suggests Islamic terrorist groups loosely affiliated with what remains of al-Qaeda’s core leadership in Pakistan may be planning a new series of attacks against Western targets.

#### And Nuclear terrorism is feasible---high risk of theft and attacks escalate

Vladimir Z. Dvorkin ‘12 Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html

Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

the entire counterterrorist effort, or become a national obsession that creates needless terror.

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction

**Morgan 9**Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus – South Korea (Dennis, Futures, November, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Science Direct), accessed 9-16-2011,WYO/JF

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” In Section , **Moore points out what most** **terrorists** obviously **already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries**. No doubt, **they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange**. As Moore points out, **all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel**. **Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,”** **it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States”**Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities**In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia.China would probably be involved as well,** **as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere**. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so.**The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons**. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors”  **In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons**, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, **leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.**

#### Current terror blowback results in bioterror

Nader 11

(Ralph, Stop the War Coaltion, “How Obama's drone warfare increases the likelihood of blowback,” November 13, 2011, <http://www.stopwar.org.uk/index.php/afghanistan-and-pakistan/933-how-drone-warfare-increases-the-likelihood-of-terrorist-blowback->) /wyo-mm

People who see invaders occupying their land with military domination that is beyond reach will resort to ever more desperate counterattacks, however primitive in nature. When the time comes that robotic weapons of physics cannot be counteracted at all with these simple handmade weapons because the occupier’s arsenals are remote, deadly and without the need for soldiers, what will be the blowback? Already, people like retired Admiral Dennis Blair, former director of National Intelligence under President Obama is saying, according to POLITICO, that the Administration should curtail US-led drone strikes on suspected terrorists in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia because the missiles fired from unmanned aircraft are fueling anti-American sentiment and undercutting reform efforts in those countries. While scores of physicists and engineers are working on refining further advances in UAVs, thousands of others are staying silent. In prior years, their counterparts spoke out against the nuclear arms race or exposed the unworkability of long-range missile defense. They need to re-engage. Because the next blowback may soon move into chemical and biological resistance against invaders. Suicide belts may contain pathogens—bacterial and viral—and chemical agents deposited in food and water supplies. Professions are supposed to operate within an ethical code and exercise independent judgment. Doctors have a duty to prevent harm. Biologists and chemists should urge their colleagues in physics to take a greater role as to where their knowhow is leading this tormented world of ours before the blowback spills over into even more lethally indefensible chemical and biological attacks.

#### Causes extinction

Ochs 2002

(Richard; Naturalist – Grand Teton National Park with a Masters in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers) “Biological Weapons must be abolished immediately” 6/9 www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html

**Of all** the **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction, **the** genetically engineered **biological weapons**, many without a known cure or vaccine, **are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth**. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. **While a** "**nuclear winter**," **resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control**. **Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily**, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. **The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause**. **Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less tha**n nuclear or **biological agents or more localized**. **Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment**. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. **With** nuclear and **biological weapons, the killing will probably never end**. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, **bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation**. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

#### Newest developments take out all impact defense

Jordans, 2011

[Frank, Associated Press, 12-7-11, Clinton warns of bioweapon threat from gene tech, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/45584359/ns/#.UkkMV2T72Ik] /Wyo-MB

GENEVA — New gene assembly technology that offers great benefits for scientific research could also be used by terrorists to create biological weapons, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton warned Wednesday.¶ The threat from bioweapons has drawn little attention in recent years, as governments focused more on the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation to countries such as Iran and North Korea.¶ But experts have warned that the increasing ease with which bioweapons can be created might be used by terror groups to develop and spread new diseases that could mimic the effects of the fictional global epidemic portrayed in the Hollywood thriller "Contagion."¶ Speaking at an international meeting in Geneva aimed at reviewing the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, Clinton told diplomats that the challenge was to maximize the benefits of scientific research and minimize the risks that it could be used for harm.¶ "The emerging gene synthesis industry is making genetic material more widely available," she said. "This has many benefits for research, but it could also potentially be used to assemble the components of a deadly organism."¶ Gene synthesis allows genetic material — the building blocks of all organisms — to be artificially assembled in the lab, greatly speeding up the creation of artificial viruses and bacteria.¶ The U.S. government has cited efforts by terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda to recruit scientists capable of making biological weapons as a national security concern.¶ Advertise¶ "A crude but effective terrorist weapon can be made using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology," Clinton told the meeting.¶ "Less than a year ago, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for, and I quote, 'brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry ... to develop a weapon of mass destruction,'" she said.¶ Clinton also mentioned the Aum Shinrikyo cult's attempts in Japan to obtain anthrax in the 1990s, and the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States that killed five people.¶ Washington has urged countries to be more transparent about their efforts to clamp down on the threat of bioweapons. But U.S. officials have also resisted calls for an international verification system — akin to that for nuclear weapons — saying it is too complicated to monitor every lab's activities.

### Drone Prolif

#### Drone Prolif Now

Zenko, 2013

[Micah, Council of Foreign Relations, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, January 2013, Council Special Report No. 65, Online] /Wyo-MB

It is estimated that the number of states that have acquired a com- plete drone system has grown from forty-one in 2005 to seventy-six in 2012.49 Over that same period of time, the number of total drone pro- grams within those states increased from one hundred ninety-five to nine hundred.50 Like the United States, the vast majority of all drones developed by other countries will be used exclusively for government or civilian intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Some advanced industrial economies—such as Russia, Taiwan, and South Korea—have developed increasingly sophisticated and largely indigenous drone capabilities, but they have also missed deadlines for when they would field armed drones, according to their own defense ministries. There is no international association for drone manufactur- ers and operators—similar to those that exist for civilian nuclear facili- ties or commercial space launches—that provides reliable information on drones or serves as a forum to exchange best practices to limit the associated risks and costs. Since most publicly available information is limited to air shows and the defense trade press, it is possible that there have been intentionally hidden advances toward states’ development of weaponized drones.

#### The US has a narrow window of opportunity to shape drone proliferation, only US reform based on transparency and restraint will solve

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In short, a world characterized by the proliferation of armed drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would under- mine core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer heeds the borders of sovereign states. Because of drones’ inherent advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors would be much more likely to use lethal force against the United States and its allies. Much like policies governing the use of nuclear weapons, offensive cyber capabilities, and space, developing rules and frameworks for innovative weapons systems, much less reaching a consensus within the U.S. government, is a long and arduous process. In its second term, the Obama administration has a narrow policy window of opportunity to pursue reforms of the targeted killings program. The Obama admin- istration can proactively shape U.S. and international use of armed drones in nonbattlefield settings through transparency, self-restraint, and engagement, or it can continue with its current policies and risk the consequences. To better secure the ability to conduct drone strikes, and potentially influence how others will use armed drones in the future, the United States should undertake the following specific policy recommendations.

#### Establishing a precedent of transparency and accountability spills over globally– a non-executive framework is key

Brooks 13 (Rosa, Professor of Law – Georgetown University Law Center, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow – New America Foundation, Former Counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy – Department of Defense, “The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing,” Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 4-23, <http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf>)

5. Setting Troubling International Precedents Here is an additional reason to worry about the U.S. overreliance on drone strikes: Other states will follow America's example, and the results are not likely to be pretty. Consider once again the Letelier murder, which was an international scandal in 1976: If the Letelier assassination took place today, the Chilean authorities would presumably insist on their national right to engage in “targeted killings” of individuals deemed to pose imminent threats to Chilean national security -- and they would justify such killings using precisely the same legal theories the US currently uses to justify targeted killings in Yemen or Somalia. We should assume that governments around the world—including those with less than stellar human rights records, such as Russia and China—are taking notice. Right now, the United States has a decided technological advantage when it comes to armed drones, but that will not last long. We should use this window to advance a robust legal and normative framework that will help protect against abuses by those states whose leaders can rarely be trusted. Unfortunately, we are doing the exact opposite: Instead of articulating norms about transparency and accountability, the United States is effectively handing China, Russia, and every other repressive state a playbook for how to foment instability and –literally -- get away with murder. Take the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been a core concept of the Westphalian international legal order.42 In the international arena, all sovereign states are formally considered equal and possessed of the right to control their own internal affairs free of interference from other states. That's what we call the principle of non-intervention -- and it means, among other things, that it is generally prohibited for one state to use force inside the borders of another sovereign state. There are some well-established exceptions, but they are few in number. A state can lawfully use force inside another sovereign state with that state's invitation or consent, or when force is authorized by the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to the U.N. Charter, 43 or in self-defense "in the event of an armed attack." The 2011 Justice Department White Paper asserts that targeted killings carried out by the United States don't violate another state's sovereignty as long as that state either consents or is "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by the individual being targeted." That sounds superficially plausible, but since the United States views itself as the sole arbiter of whether a state is "unwilling or unable" to suppress that threat, the logic is in fact circular. It goes like this: The United States -- using its own malleable definition of "imminent" -- decides that Person X, residing in sovereign State Y, poses a threat to the United States and requires killing. Once the United States decides that Person X can be targeted, the principle of sovereignty presents no barriers, because either 1) State Y will consent to the U.S. use of force inside its borders, in which case the use of force presents no sovereignty problems or 2) State Y will not consent to the U.S. use of force inside its borders, in which case, by definition, the United States will deem State Y to be "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat" posed by Person X and the use of force again presents no problem. This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty, and has the potential to significantly destabilize the already shaky collective security regime created by the U.N. Charter.44 If the US is the sole arbiter of whether and when it can use force inside the borders of another state, any other state strong enough to get away with it is likely to claim similar prerogatives. And, of course, if the US executive branch is the sole arbiter of what constitutes an imminent threat and who constitutes a targetable enemy combatant in an illdefined war, why shouldn’t other states make identical arguments—and use them to justify the killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities?

#### And, independent courts are key—only checks on unilateral executive power can provide legitimacy to the United States and credibility to our counterterror policies, finally, the selection process for drone courts solves all disads to judges

Chebab, 2012

[Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review, 3-30-12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572] /Wyo-MB

Rather, balancing the needs of security against the imperatives of liberty is a traditional¶ role for judges to play as recognized by the founders in the Fourth Amendment.110 Two scholars of national security law have highlighted the value of judicial inclusion in this process:¶ Judicial control of targeted killing could increase the accuracy of target selection, reducing the danger of mistaken or illegal destruction of lives, limbs, and property. Independent judges who double-check targeting decisions could catch errors and cause executive officials to avoid making them in the first place.”111¶ Judges are also both knowledgeable in the vagaries of the law and accustomed to dealing with sensitive security considerations.112 These qualifications make them ideal candidates to ensure that the executive exercises constitutional and international legal restraint when targeting individuals abroad. Reforming the decision-making process to allow for judicial oversight would accomplish numerous other important goals as well. Aside from providing a valuable check on executive power to take away the most fundamental of freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution—the right to life—judicial oversight would reinforce the separation of powers framework of American government and increase democratic legitimacy by placing these determinations on more predictable and accountable legal grounds. For those fearful of judicial encroachment on executive war-making powers, there is a strong argument that this will actually strengthen the President and empower him to take decisive action without worrying about the judicial consequences. As Justice Kennedy put it, “the exercise of [executive] powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the judicial branch.”113 Moreover, though it may be technically legal under international and domestic law, the targeted killing program has become a black spot on American credibility around the globe. The introduction of significant checks on unilateral executive power to target known terrorists can help reform that image and reinstate American moral legitimacy in its use of force against global terrorism.114

#### The plan solves international norms- US can shape and limit drone prolif and provide the ability to apply diplomatic pressure

Zenko, 2013

[Micah, Council of Foreign Relations, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, January 2013, Council Special Report No. 65, Online] /Wyo-MB

History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in the past. Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new technologies.72 Norms—sometimes but not always codified as legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported normative framework, bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone proliferation and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S. drones furthered U.S. objectives. And even if hostile states do not accept norms regulating drone use, the existence of an international normative framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would pre- serve Washington’s ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for developing such a framework would be based in existing international laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction—to which the United States claims to adhere for its drone strikes—and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of cyber and space.

#### Unfettered drone prolif causes deterrence crises that leads to nuclear conflict

Boyle, 13 [“The costs and consequences of drone warfare”, MICHAEL J. BOYLE, International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, assistant professor of political science at LaSalle University]

The emergence of this arms race for drones raises at least five long-term strategic consequences, not all of which are favourable to the United States over the long term. First, it is now obvious that other states will use drones in ways that are inconsistent with US interests. One reason why the US has been so keen to use drone technology in Pakistan and Yemen is that at present it retains a substantial advantage in high-quality attack drones. Many of the other states now capable of employing drones of near-equivalent technology—for example, the UK and Israel—are considered allies. But this situation is quickly changing as other leading geopolitical players, such as Russia and China, are beginning rapidly to developand deploy drones for their own purposes. While its own technology still lags behind that of the US, Russia has spent huge sums on purchasing drones and has recently sought to buy the Israeli-made Eitan drone capable of surveillance and firing air-to-surface missiles.132 China has begun to develop UAVs for reconnaissance and combat and has several new drones capable of long-range surveillance and attack under development.133 China is also planning to use unmanned surveillance drones to allow it to monitor the disputed East China Sea Islands, which are currently under dispute with Japan and Taiwan.134 Both Russia and China will pursue this technology and develop their own drone suppliers which will sell to the highest bidder, presumably with fewer export controls than those imposed by the US Congress. Once both governments have equivalent or near-equivalent levels of drone technology to the United States, they will be similarly tempted to use it for surveillance or attack in the way the US has done. Thus, through its own over-reliance on drones in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, the US may be hastening the arrival of a world where its qualitative advantages in drone technology are eclipsed and where this technology will be used and sold by rival Great Powers whose interests do not mirror its own. A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many of the traditional concepts which have underwritten stability in the international system will be radically reshaped by drone technology. For example, much of the stability among the Great Powers in the international system is driven by deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence.135 Deterrence operates with informal rules of the game and tacit bargains that govern what states, particularly those holding nuclear weapons, may and may not do to one another.136 While it is widely understood that nuclear-capable states will conduct aerial surveillance and spy on one another, overt military confrontations between nuclear powers are rare because they are assumed to be costly and prone to escalation. One open question is whether these states will exercise the same level of restraint with drone surveillance, which is unmanned, low cost, and possibly deniable. States may be more willing to engage in drone overflights which test the resolve of their rivals, or engage in ‘salami tactics’ to see what kind of drone-led incursion, if any, will motivate a response.137 This may have been Hezbollah’s logic in sending a drone into Israeli airspace in October 2012, possibly to relay information on Israel’s nuclear capabilities.138 After the incursion, both Hezbollah and Iran boasted that the drone incident demonstrated their military capabilities.139 One could imagine two rival states—for example, India and Pakistan—deploying drones to test each other’s capability and resolve, with untold consequences if such a probe were misinterpreted by the other as an attack. As drones get physically smaller and more precise, and as they develop a greater flying range, the temptation to use them to spy on a rival’s nuclear programme or military installations might prove too strong to resist. If this were to happen, drones might gradually erode the deterrent relationships that exist between nuclear powers, thus magnifying the risks of a spiral of conflict between them. Another dimension of this problem has to do with the risk of accident. Drones are prone to accidents and crashes. By July 2010, the US Air Force had identified approximately 79 drone accidents.140 Recently released documents have revealed that there have been a number of drone accidents and crashes in the Seychelles and Djibouti, some of which happened in close proximity to civilian airports.141 The rapid proliferation of drones worldwide will involve a risk of accident to civilian aircraft, possibly producing an international incident if such an accident were to involve an aircraft affiliated to a state hostile to the owner of the drone. Most of the drone accidents may be innocuous, but some will carry strategic risks. In December 2011, a CIA drone designed for nuclear surveillance crashed in Iran, revealing the existence of the spying programme and leaving sensitive technology in the hands of the Iranian government.142 The expansion of drone technology raises the possibility that some of these surveillance drones will be interpreted as attack drones, or that an accident or crash will spiral out of control and lead to an armed confrontation.143 An accident would be even more dangerous if the US were to pursue its plans for nuclear-powered drones, which can spread radioactive material like a dirty bomb if they crash.144 Third, lethal drones create the possibility that the norms on the use of force will erode, creating a much more dangerous world and pushing the international system back towards the rule of the jungle. To some extent, this world is already being ushered in by the United States, which has set a dangerous precedent that a state may simply kill foreign citizens considered a threat without a declaration of war. Even John Brennan has recognized that the US is ‘establishing a precedent that other nations may follow’.145 Given this precedent, there is nothing to stop other states from following the American lead and using drone strikes to eliminate potential threats. Those ‘threats’ need not be terrorists, but could be others— dissidents, spies, even journalists—whose behaviour threatens a government. One danger is that drone use might undermine the normative prohibition on the assassination of leaders and government officials that most (but not all) states currently respect. A greater danger, however, is that the US will have normalized murder as a tool of statecraft and created a world where states can increasingly take vengeance on individuals outside their borders without the niceties of extradition, due process or trial.146 As some of its critics have noted, the Obama administration may have created a world where states will find it easier to kill terrorists rather than capture them and deal with all of the legal and evidentiary difficulties associated with giving them a fair trial.147 Fourth, there is a distinct danger that the world will divide into two camps: developed states in possession of drone technology, and weak states and rebel movements that lack them. States with recurring separatist or insurgent problems may begin to police their restive territories through drone strikes, essentially containing the problem in a fixed geographical region and engaging in a largely punitive policy against them. One could easily imagine that China, for example, might resort to drone strikes in Uighur provinces in order to keep potential threats from emerging, or that Russia could use drones to strike at separatist movements in Chechnya or elsewhere. Such behaviour would not necessarily be confined to authoritarian governments; it is equally possible that Israel might use drones to police Gaza and the West Bank, thus reducing the vulnerability of Israeli soldiers to Palestinian attacks on the ground. The extent to which Israel might be willing to use drones in combat and surveillance was revealed in its November 2012 attack on Gaza. Israel allegedly used a drone to assassinate the Hamas leader Ahmed Jabari and employed a number of armed drones for strikes in a way that was described as ‘unprecedented’ by senior Israeli officials.148 It is not hard to imagine Israel concluding that drones over Gaza were the best way to deal with the problem of Hamas, even if their use left the Palestinian population subject to constant, unnerving surveillance. All of the consequences of such a sharp division between the haves and have-nots with drone technology is hard to assess, but one possibility is that governments with secessionist movements might be less willing to negotiate and grant concessions if drones allowed them to police their internal enemies with ruthless efficiency and ‘manage’ the problem at low cost. The result might be a situation where such conflicts are contained but not resolved, while citizens in developed states grow increasingly indifferent to the suffering of those making secessionist or even national liberation claims, including just ones, upon them. Finally, drones have the capacity to strengthen the surveillance capacity of both democracies and authoritarian regimes, with significant consequences for civil liberties. In the UK, BAE Systems is adapting military-designed drones for a range of civilian policing tasks including ‘monitoring antisocial motorists, protesters, agricultural thieves and fly-tippers’.149 Such drones are also envisioned as monitoring Britain’s shores for illegal immigration and drug smuggling. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued 61 permits for domestic drone use between November 2006 and June 2011, mainly to local and state police, but also to federal agencies and even universities.150 According to one FAA estimate, the US will have 30,000 drones patrolling the skies by 2022.151 Similarly, the European Commission will spend US$260 million on Eurosur, a new programme that will use drones to patrol the Mediterranean coast.152 The risk that drones will turn democracies into ‘surveillance states’ is well known, but the risks for authoritarian regimes may be even more severe. Authoritarian states, particularly those that face serious internal opposition, may tap into drone technology now available to monitor and ruthlessly punish their opponents. In semi-authoritarian Russia, for example, drones have already been employed to monitor pro-democracy protesters.153 One could only imagine what a truly murderous authoritarian regime—such as Bashar al-Assad’s Syria—would do with its own fleet of drones. The expansion of drone technology may make the strong even stronger, thus tilting the balance of power in authoritarian regimes even more decisively towards those who wield the coercive instruments of power and against those who dare to challenge them. Conclusion Even though it has now been confronted with blowback from drones in the failed Times Square bombing, the United States has yet to engage in a serious analysis of the strategic costs and consequences of its use of drones, both for its own security and for the rest of the world. Much of the debate over drones to date has focused on measuring body counts and carries the unspoken assumption that if drone strikes are efficient—that is, low cost and low risk for US personnel relative to the terrorists killed—then they must also be effective. This article has argued that such analyses are operating with an attenuated notion of effectiveness that discounts some of the other key dynamics—such as the corrosion of the perceived competence and legitimacy of governments where drone strikes take place, growing anti-Americanism and fresh recruitment to militant networks—that reveal the costs of drone warfare. In other words, the analysis of the effectiveness of drones takes into account only the ‘loss’ side of the ledger for the ‘bad guys’, without asking what America’s enemies gain by being subjected to a policy of constant surveillance and attack. In his second term, President Obama has an opportunity to reverse course and establish a new drones policy which mitigates these costs and avoids some of the long-term consequences that flow from them. A more sensible US approach would impose some limits on drone use in order to minimize the political costs and long-term strategic consequences. One step might be to limit the use of drones to HVTs, such as leading political and operational figures for terrorist networks, while reducing or eliminating the strikes against the ‘foot soldiers’ or other Islamist networks not related to Al-Qaeda. This approach would reduce the number of strikes and civilian deaths associated with drones while reserving their use for those targets that pose a direct or imminent threat to the security of the United States. Such a self-limiting approach to drones might also minimize the degree of political opposition that US drone strikes generate in states such as Pakistan and Yemen, as their leaders, and even the civilian population, often tolerate or even approve of strikes against HVTs. Another step might be to improve the levels of transparency of the drone programme. At present, there are no publicly articulated guidelines stipulating who can be killed by a drone and who cannot, and no data on drone strikes are released to the public.154 Even a Department of Justice memorandum which authorized the Obama administration to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, remains classified.155 Such non-transparency fuels suspicions that the US is indifferent to the civilian casualties caused by drone strikes, a perception which in turn magnifies the deleterious political consequences of the strikes. Letting some sunlight in on the drones programme would not eliminate all of the opposition to it, but it would go some way towards undercutting the worst conspiracy theories about drone use in these countries while also signalling that the US government holds itself legally and morally accountable for its behaviour.156 A final, and crucial, step towards mitigating the strategic consequences of drones would be to develop internationally recognized standards and norms for their use and sale. It is not realistic to suggest that the US stop using its drones altogether, or to assume that other countries will accept a moratorium on buying and using drones. The genie is out of the bottle: drones will be a fact of life for years to come. What remains to be done is to ensure that their use and sale are transparent, regulated and consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards. The Obama administration has already begun to show some awareness that drones are dangerous if placed in the wrong hands. A recent New York Times report revealed that the Obama administration began to develop a secret drones ‘rulebook’ to govern their use if Mitt Romney were to be elected president.157 The same logic operates on the international level. Lethal drones will eventually be in the hands of those who will use them with fewer scruples than President Obama has. Without a set of internationally recognized standards or norms governing their sale and use, drones will proliferate without control, be misused by governments and non-state actors, and become an instrument of repression for the strong. One remedy might be an international convention on the sale and use of drones which could establish guidelines and norms for their use, perhaps along the lines of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) treaty, which attempted to spell out rules on the use of incendiary devices and fragment-based weapons.158 While enforcement of these guidelines and adherence to rules on their use will be imperfect and marked by derogations, exceptions and violations, the presence of a convention may reinforce norms against the flagrant misuse of drones and induce more restraint in their use than might otherwise be seen. Similarly, a UN investigatory body on drones would help to hold states accountable for their use of drones and begin to build a gradual consensus on the types of activities for which drones can, and cannot, be used.159 As the progenitor and leading user of drone technology, the US now has an opportunity to show leadership in developing an international legal architecture which might avert some of the worst consequences of their use.

#### China’s drone prolif causes regional war—multiple flashpoints

Standaert, 2012

[Michael, Global Post, Stage set for drone chess match in Asia-Pacific, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/121102/china-drone-UAV-proliferation?page=0,1] /Wyo-MB

SHENZHEN, China — China’s plans to deploy surveillance drones in the East China and South China seas hint at the future of warfare in the region, but are also a reminder of how far ahead leading drone manufacturing nations like the United States and Israel remain on aviation technology.¶ Experts say interest in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is surging throughout the Asia-Pacific region without a framework of controls curtailing their proliferation and use.¶ Add the Obama administration’s policy refocusing American attention on the region — the so-called “Asia Pivot” — along with US announcements of further deployments of advanced UAVs to the area, and a massive game of drone chess looks increasingly likely.¶ In September, China commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and announced plans to use drones to monitor disputed territories including the Senkaku Islands that have caused recent friction with Japan. China detailed further plans to develop drone bases in 11 coastal provinces to be operational by 2015.¶ China has been playing catch-up with drone technology leaders, having purchased some technology from Israel already and showing strong interest in increasing its own share of the global UAV market, currently estimated at $6.6 billion per year and climbing.¶ Later this month the Zhuhai Air Show will be an important place to see what technology advancements Chinese companies have made as well as what countries might be interested in purchasing Chinese UAVs. Pakistan is known to have ordered drones from China, and countries such as Brunei and Malaysia in Southeast Asia have shown interest in China's drones.¶ Dennis Gormley, a senior research fellow at the Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, said that US defense and aviation industry logic is that if it doesn’t “satisfy the growing requirement for UAVs, other states will develop their own or turn to Israel or other developers.”¶ “Of greatest concern are the intentions of China,” said Gormley, author of the book “Missile Contagion,” published in 2010.¶ In the Asia-Pacific region, the list of countries who have developed or purchased drones already includes Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines, according to a report published by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) in July this year.¶ In June, a Chinese frigate was also photographed testing a helicopter UAV, said Wilson VornDick, a lieutenant commander in the US Navy Reserves and an analyst on China’s military for the Jamestown Foundation.¶ At the end of August, China’s State Oceanic Administration (SOA) announced plans to set up UAV patrols out of 11 airbases in coastal provinces for maritime surveillance. According to state media reports a pilot program last year ran UAVs out of Liaoning province to monitor an ocean area of around 380 square miles.¶ More recently, immediately following renewed conflict with Japan over the Senkakus, the SOA announced on Sep. 23 that it was deploying UAVs to monitor specifically monitor the disputed islands as well as territories in the South China Sea, which China claims almost in its entirety.¶ Reports also indicate that Japan is using drones to monitor the Senkakus, and the Philippines is reportedly looking to purchase more UAVs from the US for monitoring its own claims in the South China Sea.

#### SCS conflict causes nuke war

Glaser 12 Bonnie S., Senior Fellow – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” CFR, April, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883

The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being **shaped by—rising apprehensions about** the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China **has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities** to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from **escalating militarily**. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The **most likely** and **dangerous contingency** is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an **armed Chinese response**. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in **aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident** similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also **increased the danger of an incident**, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A **miscalculation** or misunderstanding could then result in a **deadly exchange of fire**, leading to further **military escalation** and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult.

#### Extinction

Lieven 12 Anatol, Professor in the War Studies Department – King’s College (London), Senior Fellow – New America Foundation (Washington), “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, 6-12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that **may one day lead to war**. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise **without severe damage** to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict **catastrophic damage** on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a **nuclear exchange**, **modern civilization would be wrecked**. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

#### Senkaku Conflict goes nuclear

John Blaxland 13, Senior Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University, and Rikki Kersten, Professor of modern Japanese political history in the School of International, Political and Strategic Studies at the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University, 2/13/13, “Escalating territorial tension in East Asia echoes Europe’s descent into world war,” http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/13/escalating-territorial-tension-in-east-asia-echoes-europes-descent-into-world-war/

The recent activation of Chinese weapons radars aimed at Japanese military platforms around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is the latest in a series of incidents in which China has asserted its power and authority at the expense of its neighbours.¶ The radars cue supersonic missile systems and give those on the receiving end only a split second to respond. With Japanese law empowering local military commanders with increased discretion to respond (thanks to North Korea’s earlier provocations), such incidents could easily escalate. In an era of well-established UN-related adjudication bodies like the International Court of Justice (ICJ), how has it come to this? These incidents disconcertingly echo past events. ¶ In the early years of the 20th century, most pundits considered a major war between the great powers a remote possibility. Several incidents prior to 1914 were handled locally or successfully defused by diplomats from countries with alliances that appeared to guarantee the peace. After all, never before had the world been so interconnected — thanks to advanced communications technology and burgeoning trade. But alliance ties and perceived national interests meant that once a major war was triggered there was little hope of avoiding the conflict. Germany’s dissatisfaction with the constraints under which it operated arguably was a principal cause of war in 1914. Similarly, Japan’s dissatisfaction helped trigger massive conflict a generation later. ¶ A century on, many of the same observations can be made in East Asia. China’s rise is coupled with a disturbing surge in jingoism across East and Southeast Asia. China resents the territorial resolution of World War II, in which the United States handed responsibility for the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to Japan while large chunks of the South China Sea were claimed and occupied by countries that emerged in Southeast Asia’s post-colonial order. Oil and gas reserves are attractive reasons for China to assert itself, but challenging the US place in East Asian waters is the main objective. China resents American ‘re-balancing ‘as an attempt at ‘containment’, even though US dependence on Chinese trade and finance makes that notion implausible. China is pushing the boundaries of the accepted post-Second World War order championed by the United States and embodied by the UN. ¶ China’s rapid rise and long-held grievances mean its powerbrokers are reluctant to use institutions like the ICJ. But China’s assertiveness is driving regional states closer into the arms of the United States. Intimidation and assertive maritime acts have been carried out, ostensibly by elements not linked to China’s armed forces. China’s white-painted Chinese Maritime Services and Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels operating in the South China Sea and around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have evoked strong reactions. ¶ But Japan’s recent allegation that China used active radars is a significant escalation. Assuming it happened, this latest move could trigger a stronger reaction from Japan. China looks increasingly as if it is not prepared to abide by UN-related conventions. International law has been established mostly by powers China sees as having exploited it during its ‘century of humiliation’. Yet arguably, it is in the defence of these international institutions that the peaceful rise of China is most likely to be assured. China’s refusal to submit to such mechanisms as the ICJ increases the prospect of conflict. ¶ For the moment, Japan’s conservative prime minister will need to exercise great skill and restraint in managing domestic fear and resentment over China’s assertiveness and the military’s hair-trigger defence powers. A near-term escalation cannot be ruled out. After all, Japan recognises that China is not yet ready to inflict a major military defeat on Japan without resorting to nuclear weapons and without triggering a damaging response from the United States. And Japan does not want to enter into such a conflict without strong US support, at least akin to the discreet support given to Britain in the Falklands War in 1982. Consequently, Japan may see an escalation sooner rather than later as being in its interests, particularly if China appears the aggressor. ¶ China’s domestic environment has nurtured jingoism. The Chinese state has built up the public’s appetite for vengeance against Japan by manipulating films and history textbooks. On the other hand, Chinese authorities recognise that the peaceful rise advocated by Deng Xiaoping is not yet complete (militarily at least). In the meantime it is prudent to exercise some restraint to avoid an overwhelming and catastrophic response. If the 1914–18 war taught us anything, it is that the outcome of wars is rarely as proponents conceived at the outset.

### Solvency

#### The creation of a federal counterterror oversight court solves all problems with the targeted killing program and all disads to judicial review

Plaw, 2007

[Avery, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth. He has taught at Concordia University and was also a Visiting Scholar at New York University. His primary research and teaching interests are in contemporary political theory and the history of moral and political thought, and he has published widely on these subjects. "Terminating terror: the legality, ethics and effectiveness of targeting terrorists." Theoria 114 (2007): Academic OneFile. Web. 3 Oct. 2013] /Wyo-MB

This final section offers a briefcase that there is room for a principled compromise between critics and advocates of targeting terrorists. The argument is by example--a short illustration of one promising possibility. It will not satisfy everyone, but I suggest that it has the potential to resolve the most compelling concerns on both sides.¶ The most telling issues raised by critics of targeting fall into three categories: (1) the imperative need to establish that targets are combatants; (2) the need in attacking combatants to respect the established laws of war; and (3) the overwhelming imperative to avoid civilian casualties. The first issue seems to demand an authoritative judicial determination that could only be answered by a competent court. The second issue requires the openly avowed and consistent implementation of targeting according to standards accepted in international law--a requirement whose fulfillment would best be assured through judicial oversight. The third issue calls for independent evaluation of operations to assure that standards of civilian protection are robustly upheld, a role that could be effectively performed by a court.¶ The first issue, then, must, and the second and third can, be resolved by the introduction of credible judicial oversight. But what kind of court could be expected to maintain secrecy around sensitive intelligence and yet render authoritative determinations as to, for example, individuals' combat status? An independent international court would doubtless be ideal, but even apart from all the technical and administrative difficulties such a solution would entail and the secrecy concerns it would evoke, it seems clear that the United States and Israel would refuse to have their national security subject to the authority of a foreign body, however judicious. They would argue, as indeed they have in regard to the ICC, that the final authority in this supremely important domain must derive ultimately from the will of their own people, whose lives and community are at stake. On the other hand, critics of targeting would certainly demand an independent, competent and internationally credible body. All the more so since the court's proceedings, for obvious reasons, could not be open to public scrutiny.¶ On this difficult question Michael Ignatieff offers a helpful idea. He suggests the possibility of setting up a national court to address counterterrorism issues loosely based on the model on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which considers surveillance and physical search requests from the Department of Justice and U.S. intelligence agencies related to foreign intelligence operations in the U.S. (Ignatieff 2004:134). Developing Ignatieff's suggestion, the new court could be called the Federal Counterterrorism Oversight Court (FCOC).¶ The institutional features of the FCOC could be designed to assure credibility and independence on one side, and secure and efficient contribution to national policy on the other. For example, like the FISC, the FCOC could be composed of seven federal court judges selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and serving staggered seven years terms. Like the FISC, the FCOC could hold its proceedings in camera, ensuring the secrecy of sensitive intelligence information. The FCOC could then consider requests from military and intelligence organizations to designate suspected terrorists as enemy combatants, assessing whether the intelligence presented warranted such a designation. It could also be assigned the responsibility to automatically review any actions that resulted in civilian casualties, and could be given the power to publicly censure operations that inadequately protected civilians, as well as to suspend, or even to terminate, targeting operations. Finally, it could also be authorized to review charges brought by other governments or private persons that targeting operations violated humanitarian law, in particular, by engaging in perfidy or employing disproportionate force.¶ In at least three key respects, however, the design of the FCOC should differ from the model of the FISC. As the FISC is charged with assessing surveillance requests from government agencies, its writs and rulings remain permanently sealed from civilian review. But in the interests of resolving the second issue of openness, the findings of the FCOC should be made public, including the names of those judged to be combatants, as well as any reprimand from the court regarding targeting operations.¶ In the second place, the FISC foregoes adversarial legal proceedings because potential subjects of surveillance can obviously not participate. It has been much criticized on this count. The FCOC should not follow this precedent which, in the views of many jurists and scholars, flies in the face of the core of the Western legal tradition. Evidently, the trials of terrorists who cannot otherwise be brought to justice will be conducted in absentia. This does not, however, necessitate the abandonment of adversarial procedure. In addition to the seven judges appointed to the court, an independent counsel should be appointed by the President of the National Bar Association to represent the interests of the accused before the court. Evidently, appropriate precautions will need to be taken to ensure the secrecy of court proceedings. But the independent counsel should also not be barred from offering general assessments of the performance of the court. Obviously this is an imperfect resolution to an intractable problem, but it should contribute significantly to ensuring the fairness of the FCOC.¶ Finally, the FCOC must be distinguished from the FISC in a third crucial sense. The recent 'domestic surveillance' scandal in the United States involving the Executive Branch's circumvention of the FISC approval process suggests safeguards would need to be built into the FCOC mandate. In the case of the FISC, President Bush issued an Executive Order which authorized the National Security Agency to carry out surveillance of any Americans suspected of links with al Qaeda without FISC approval (Risen and Lichtblau 2005). The scandal and legal consequences that ensued for the administration once this information became public in 2005 have significantly reduced the likelihood of a similar course being taken in the future. Nonetheless, the possibility should be explicitly precluded by specifying in the enabling legislation that no targeting action can be considered legally authorized without approval of the court. In response to the argument that immediate action may sometimes be required in emergency situations, the presiding justice could be permitted to issue a provisional approval based on prima facie evidence, but only subject to full subsequent review by the court.¶ Some critics and advocates of targeting will no doubt be dissatisfied with this resolution. Critics will worry that the FCOC would essentially be a rubber stamp (while robbing them of their best rhetorical point--that targetings are extra-judicial). But there is no compelling reason to believe that courts, especially high-level federal courts, must always approve government policies. After all, supreme courts in both Israel and the United States have both recently issued sharp rebukes of government counter-terrorist policies (e.g., 03-333/4 on the U.S. legal status of detainees, and 3799/02 on the IDF use of human shields).¶ On the other hand, some advocates will certainly worry that a requirement of FCOC approval will hinder the efficiency of targeting and that publishing lists of targets will render them more difficult to find. On the former point, however, there is little evidence that the incorporation of reasonable judicial procedures, such as those of the FISC, need render related policy ineffective. After all, as the 9/11 commission observed, the intelligence community succeeded in gathering the data necessary to anticipate the September 11 attack (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004: 254-77). The failure was in the domains of analysis and response. What is evident, however, is that carrying out extensive and dangerous counter-terrorist programs without judicial oversight generates widespread public skepticism and opposition (which tends to undermine the effectiveness of the programs) and leads to enormous legal difficulties in the long run--as exemplified by the American torture/rendition program.¶ On the second point, while it is true that targets may 'go to ground' if tipped off, the fact is that all or virtually all potential targets are already on most wanted lists (often with hefty price tags connected to information leading to them). In essence, they have already gone to ground--that is in part why targeting is required in the first place. Moreover, a retreat into even deeper obscurity is likely to further disrupt their ability to organize and carry out attacks. Finally, the Israeli experience suggests that targets will break cover eventually, and a little patience seems like a small price to pay for ensuring the justice of state-administered killing.¶ These answers will not fully satisfy either all critics or all advocates. But the burden of this section has been only to show that compromises are possible that address their most legitimate concerns. I think that the suggestion of an FCOC shows that a plausible and principled compromise is possible. In this light, the pertinent question becomes not whether terrorist targeting as currently practiced is uniformly legal, moral and practical or the reverse, but how institutions can best be designed to assure that terrorist targetings carried out in the future are uniformly legitimate and effective.

## 2AC

### 2AC – T – Restrictions = Prohibition/Oversight is not Restriction

#### 1. We meet—extend Jaffer from 1ac solvency—plan establishes a restriction on targeted killing that limits the presidents legal authority to use force

#### We meet – contextual ev

Guiora, 12 [Amos, Professor of Law, SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, author of numerous books dealing with military law and national security including Legitimate Target: A Criteria-Based Approach to Targeted Killing, “Drone Policy: A Proposal Moving Forward,” <http://jurist.org/forum/2013/03/amos-guiora-drone-policy.php>]

To re-phrase, this strict scrutiny test seeks to strike a balance by enabling the state to act sooner but subjecting that action to significant restrictions. This paradigm would be predicated on narrow definitions of imminence and legitimate targets. Rather than enabling the consequences of the DOJ memo, the strict scrutiny test would ensure implementation of person-specific operational counterterrorism. That is the essence of targeted killing conducted in accordance with the rule of law and morality in armed conflict.

#### 2. Counter interpretation:

#### “Statutory restrictions” can mandate judicial review, but are *enacted* by congress

Mortenson 11 (Julian Davis Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School, “Review: Executive Power and the Discipline of History Crisis and Command: The History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush John Yoo. Kaplan, 2009. Pp vii, 524,” Winter 2011, University of Chicago Law Review 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 377)

At least two of Yoo's main examples of presidential power are actually instances of presidential deference to statutory restrictions during times of great national peril. The earliest is Washington's military suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion (III, pp 66-72), a domestic disturbance that Americans viewed as implicating adventurism by European powers and threatening to dismember the new nation. n60 The Calling Forth Act of 1792 n61 allowed the President to mobilize state militias under federal control, but included a series of mandatory procedural checks--including judicial [\*399] approval--that restricted his ability to do so. n62 Far from defying these comprehensive restrictions at a moment of grave crisis, Washington satisfied their every requirement in scrupulous detail. He issued a proclamation ordering the Whiskey Rebels to disperse. n63 When they refused to do so, he submitted a statement to Justice James Wilson of the Supreme Court describing the situation in Pennsylvania and requesting statutory certification. n64 Only when Wilson issued a letter precisely reciting the requisite statutory language (after first requiring the President to come back with authentication of underlying reports and verification of their handwriting n65) did Washington muster the troops. n66 Washington's compliance with statutory restrictions on his use of force continued even after his forces were in the field. Because Congress was not in session when he issued the call-up order, Washington was authorized by statute to mobilize militias from other states besides Pennsylvania--but only "until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of the ensuing [congressional] session." n67 When it became clear that the Pennsylvania campaign would take longer than that, Washington went back to Congress to petition for extension of the statutory time limit that would otherwise have required him to [\*400] disband his troops. n68 Far from serving as an archetypal example of presidential defiance, the Whiskey Rebellion demonstrates exactly the opposite. FDR's efforts to supply the United Kingdom's war effort before Pearl Harbor teach a similar lesson. During the run-up to America's entry into the war, Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts that supplemented longstanding statutory restrictions on providing assistance to foreign belligerents. Despite these restrictions, FDR sent a range of military assistance to the future Allies. n69 Yoo makes two important claims about the administration's actions during this period. First, he claims the administration asserted that "[a]ny statutory effort by Congress to prevent the President from transferring military equipment to help American national security would be of 'questionable constitutionality'" (III, p 300). Second, he suggests that American military assistance in fact violated the neutrality statutes (III, pp 295-301, 310, 327-28).

#### A restriction on war powers authority limits Presidential discretion

Jules Lobel 8, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh  Law School, President of the Center for Constitutional Rights, represented members of Congress challenging assertions of Executive power to unilaterally initiate warfare, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power  over the Conduct of War,” Ohio State Law Journal, Vol 69, p 391, 2008, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel\_.pdf

So too, the congressional power to declare or authorize war has been long held to permit Congress to authorize and wage a limited war—“limited in place, in objects, and in time.” 63 When Congress places such restrictions on the President’s authority to wage war, it limits the President’s discretion to conduct battlefield operations. For example, Congress authorized President George H. W. Bush to attack Iraq in response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, but it confined the President’s authority to the use of U.S. armed forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions directed to force Iraqi troops to leave Kuwait. That restriction would not have permitted the President to march into Baghdad after the Iraqi army had been decisively ejected from Kuwait, a limitation recognized by President Bush himself.64

#### In the area of means a certain scope

Elizabeth Miura 12, China Presentation, prezi.com/tccgenlw25so/chin165a-final-presentation/

"in the area of" refers to a certain scope

#### 3. We meet our counter interpretation, drone courts are legal restrictions on the targeted killing activities of the president

#### 4. And, their interpretation is terrible and arbitrary Restrictions and regulations can both be prohibitions or limitations—no brightline to their interp

Supreme Court of Delaware 83 (THE MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF NEW CASTLE, a municipal corporation of the State of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. ROLLINS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., Defendant Below, Appellee, No. 155, 1983, 475 A.2d 355; 1984 Del. LEXIS 324, November 21, 1983, Submitted, April 2, 1984, Decided)

The term "restrict" is defined as: To restrain within bounds; to limit; [\*\*9] to confine. Id. at 1182. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that HN5the term "regulate" necessarily entails a possible prohibition of some kind. That Court has stated: "It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition." Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592, 8 L. Ed. 2d 130, 82 S. Ct. 987 (1962). The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in reviewing a statute containing language similar to that found in 22 Del.C. § 301 (which empowered municipalities to "regulate and restrict" outdoor advertising on public ways, in public places, and on private property within public view) held that the statute in question authorized a town to provide, through amortization, for the elimination of nonconforming off-site signs five years from the time the ordinance was enacted. The court held that the Massachusetts enabling act: Conferred on the Legislature plenary power to regulate and restrict outdoor advertising . . . . Although the word "prohibit" was omitted from [the enabling act], it was recognized that the unlimited and unqualified power to regulate and restrict can be, for practical purposes, the power to prohibit [\*\*10] "because under such power the thing may be so far restricted that there is nothing left of of it." (Citations omitted.) The court continued its discussions of the two terms by stating: The distinction between regulation and outright prohibition is often considered to be a narrow one: "that regulation may take the character of prohibition, in proper cases, is well established by the decisions of this court" . . . quoting from United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 425, 63 L. Ed. 337, 39 S. Ct. 143 (1919). John Donnelly and Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board, Mass. Supr., 369 Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975). We hold that, through Article II, Section 25 of the Delaware Constitution and 22 Del.C. § 301, the General Assembly has authorized New Castle to terminate nonconforming off-site signs upon reasonable notice, that is, by what has come to be known as amortization. We hold that the power to "regulate and restrict" as such term applies to zoning matters includes the power, upon reasonable notice, to prohibit some of those uses already in existence.

#### 5.Prefer our interpretation

#### Topic Education— drone courts are heart of topic in targeted killing, it is the largest policy proposal for resolving presidential authority

#### Predictable ground—best to include largest cases in the literature because they are a locus for negative and affirmative research and preparation

#### 6. Prefer reasonability over competing interpretations if the aff doesn’t make debate impossible than you can’t vote against us

### PTX

#### Support is snow balling for additional sanctions

Rubin 1-7

(Jennifer, Washington Post. “Iran sanctions opponents desperate” 1-7-14 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2014/01/07/iran-sanctions-opponents-desperate///wyoccd)

Forty-nine senators have signed on to the Iran sanctions bill, and more will. Traditionally pro-Israel Democrats Tim Kaine (Va.), Chris Murphy (Conn.), Debbie Stabenow (Mich.) and Bill Nelson (Fla.) have yet to sign on. Among Republicans, Sen. Rand Paul (Ky.), who once tried to ingratiate himself with pro-Israel Christian conservatives, has not signed on. (Continuing his pattern of separating himself from Paul’s reflexive isolationism, Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas has signed on.)¶ The bipartisan roster exerts pressure on Sen. Harry Reid (D-Nev.) to make good on his promise to bring the bill to the floor.¶ The anti-sanctions crowd remains a gaggle made up of far-left activists, State Department sycophants and reluctant Democratic chairmen dragooned into opposing the measure by the White House. As to the first group, you know when the hit squad and consistently anti-Israel gang at Think Progress starts sending out hysterical e-mails citing the far-left Ploughshares Fund and the Obama-dominated Center for American Progress that sanctions are going to start a war that the anti-sanctions effort is scraping the bottom of the barrel. It’s a scurrilous charge (identical to the one the mullahs are using) to make about senators — including Democrats Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), Kirsten Gillibrand (N.Y.), Ben Cardin (Md.) and Robert Menendez (N.J.) — who are actually sticking with the administration’s own words that sanctions are useful to pressure Iran to dismantle its illegal nuclear weapons program.¶ Just as before lopsided votes in favor of sanctions, a small cadre of ex-State Department and intelligence community hacks (including Thomas Pickering of the Benghazi review board) sent yet another letter urging the Democratic Senate Foreign Affairs chairman, Menendez, to back off. Former Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton dubbed this “the very essence of the State Department’s dominant culture on display.” (More colorfully, an ex-State Department official critical of Obama’s Iran policy wise-cracked, “If there is one thing they do not know how to do it’s negotiate. Listen, when the UAW goes in to wrestle concessions out of Ford, do you think they say, ‘I know, what we need is a retired ambassador to negotiate for us!’?) Menendez reminded viewers on MSNBC that this gang opposed sanctions consistently but it was Menendez and others’ fortitude on sanctions that brought the Iranians to the table.

#### 2nd, Link turn drone courts popular in congress—particularly with Feinstein and King

Hosenball, 2-8-2013

[Mark, Reuters news service, Support grows for U.S. "drone court" to review lethal strikes, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/09/us-usa-drones-idUSBRE91800B20130209] /Wyo-MB

During a fresh round of debate this week over President Barack Obama's claim that he can unilaterally order lethal strikes by unmanned aircraft against U.S. citizens, some lawmakers proposed a middle ground: a special federal "drone court" that would approve suspected militants for targeting.¶ While the idea of a judicial review of such operations may be gaining political currency, multiple U.S. officials said on Friday that imminent action by the U.S. Congress or the White House to create one is unlikely. The idea is being actively considered, however, according to a White House official.¶ At Thursday's confirmation hearing for CIA director nominee John Brennan, senators discussed establishing a secret court or tribunal to rule on the validity of cases that U.S. intelligence agencies draw up for killing suspected militants using drones.¶ The court could be modeled on an existing court which examines applications for electronic eavesdropping on suspected spies or terrorists.¶ Senator Dianne Feinstein, Democratic chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Thursday that she planned to "review proposals for ... legislation to ensure that drone strikes are carried out in a manner consistent with our values, and the proposal to create an analogue of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review the conduct of such strikes."¶ Senator Angus King, a Maine independent, said during the hearing that he envisioned a scenario in which executive branch officials would go before a drone court "in a confidential and top-secret way, make the case that this American citizen is an enemy combatant, and at least that would be ... some check on the activities of the executive."

#### Feinstein key to agenda- can wrangle in both parties

Tate 13

(Curits, Mcclatchy Newspapers, “Sen. Dianne Feinstein presses her decades-long crusade on guns,” March 10, 2013, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/10/185261/sen-dianne-feinstein-presses-her.html#.Uhp4YpKThSQ>) /wyo-mm

Feinstein is a veteran lawmaker who knows how to work behind the scenes and across the aisle, which is how much of the real business of Capitol Hill gets done. “She’s developed a chain of colleagues she can call on,” Kennedy said. “She knows very well how to use her position on other committees.” Feinstein is an influential member. She ranks 14th in Senate seniority. Besides her seat on the Judiciary Committee, she serves on the powerful Appropriations Committee and chairs the Intelligence Committee. Her political roots took hold at a time before bitter partisanship began to color every debate, and even relationships on Capitol Hill. One of her closest friends has been Kay Bailey Hutchison, a Texas Republican who left the Senate in January. And Feinstein has warm relations with many more lawmakers, in an era fraught with political polarization. Sen. Jeff Sessions, R-Ala., a staunch conservative who serves alongside the liberal-leaning Feinstein on the Judiciary Committee, said that while they disagreed on many issues, including the assault weapons ban, he admired her ability to forge compromise. “I’d say on the 16 years I’ve been on it, she’s been one of the more effective Democratic senators at reaching across the aisle on key issues,” he said. “She battles for what she believes in, but she’s also very able at finding common ground and solving problems.”

#### 3rd, Republicans will use Obamacare as a distraction to literally everything, clearly thumps the DA

Millbank 1-7

(Dana Milbank writes a regular column on politics. “It’s Obamacare all the time for Republicans” 1-7-14 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-its-obamacare-all-the-time-for-republicans/2014/01/07/60d72f26-77de-11e3-af7f-13bf0e9965f6\_story.html//wyoccd)

¶ Republican National Committee Chairman Reince Priebus on Tuesday outlined his party’s priorities for 2014. They are, in ascending order of importance:¶ ¶ ●Obamacare.¶ ●Obamacare! Obamacare!¶ ●OBAMACARE! OBAMACARE! OBAMACARE! OBAMACARE! OBAMACARE!!!¶ “We’ve promised that in 2014 we’d continue to pound away at Democrats and Obamacare and that’s how we’re starting the year,” the chairman told reporters on a conference call. “Democrats are eager to change the subject, but Republicans aren’t going to let that happen,” he added. “That’s why, I guess, we’re starting up the year in this fashion talking about Obamacare.”¶ A reporter from the Cedar Rapids (Iowa) Gazette asked Priebus if “Obamacare is going to be the Johnny-one-note campaign for Republicans” in which “every issue that comes up, you’re going to respond with Obamacare.” Or, he inquired, “is there more to what Republicans want in 2014?”¶ “The answer is Obamacare,” Priebus said, before adding a “just kidding.” But he wasn’t really kidding. He went on to say that “it’s not possible for this not to be the No. 1 issue going into the 2014 elections. It’s just not. . . . So the answer to your question is, it is going to be the No. 1 issue in 2014.”¶ The American public has a different view. A Gallup poll last month found that 47 percent cited economic issues as their top concern, including 31 percent who listed the overall economy and jobs. After that, 21 percent named dissatisfaction with government, followed by 17 percent who ranked health care. A CBS News poll a month earlier found much the same: Thirty-one percent cited the economy or jobs, compared to 15 percent listing health care.¶ But Priebus does seem to be in sync with Republicans in Congress. At the end of the House’s long holiday recess, Majority Leader Eric Cantor (Va.) wrote to Republicans on Thursday to once again take up — you guessed it — Obamacare in the new session of Congress. This time he’s seeking to raise doubts about the privacy protections on HealthCare.gov. “American families have enough to worry about as we enter the new year without having to wonder if they can trust the government to inform them when their personal information — entered into a government mandated website — has been compromised,” he wrote.¶ Indeed, Americans do have enough things to worry about, but now they have the additional worry that one of the two major political parties is collectively suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder. Immigration? Iraq? Unemployment benefits? The Republicans, following a year that included dozens of repeal attempts and a government shutdown over Obamacare, are prepared to respond to all with Obamacare, Obamacare and Obamacare.¶ On Tuesday morning, the Senate held a procedural vote on a topic that actually is related to Americans’ top priority: extending unemployment benefits for the long-term jobless. Such benefits, which have never been cut off before when long-term joblessness was this high, expired just after Christmas. Only six Senate Republicans voted to take up the legislation; 37 voted to block consideration.¶ Before the vote, the GOP leader, Mitch McConnell (Ky.), unsuccessfully tried to amend the legislation so that the unemployment benefits were funded by canceling part of Obamacare.¶ On his conference call, Priebus said the RNC was targeting a dozen Democrats in key races for repeating President Obama’s claim that if you like your health insurance you can keep it. “In this time of New Year’s resolutions, I guess we’re asking people to make it their resolution to hold these Democrats accountable for the lies they told the American people,” he said. Holding them accountable “is how we’re starting the year and it’s probably what you’re going to see more of in the months to come.”

#### 4th, Political capital theory not true—and if the plan causes a fight it means Obama will get to pass more legislation—winning wins

Hirsh, 2013

[Michael, national journal chief correspondent, There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital, 3-30-13, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207] /Wyo-MB

But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.¶ Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”

#### No impact – sanctions only apply if Iran cheats – and threats to walk out are a bluff

**Chicago Tribune, 12/28/13** – editorial board (“Send a message to the mullahs” <http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-12-28/opinion/ct-pass-iran-sanctions-edit-1228-jm-20131228_1_further-sanctions-blacklist-iran-new-sanctions>)

More than a month ago, Iran and the U.S. cut an interim deal on Iran's rogue nuclear program. Since then, Tehran and Washington look to have been engaged in the equivalent of arguing over whether the peace table should be round or square. They've met. They've talked. They've haggled over how to implement the agreement. Iran has allowed some preliminary nuclear inspections. But Tehran is still enriching uranium, still poised to bully its way into the nuclear club and menace the world. The six-month clock to start negotiating a final agreement hasn't even started yet. Recently a bipartisan group of U.S. senators, led by Illinois Republican Mark Kirk and New Jersey Democrat Robert Menendez, tried to inject some urgency into this diplomatic snoozefest. They introduced a bill that would trigger new sanctions on Tehran, but only if talks failed. This bill aims to concentrate the minds of Iranian leaders who may believe, after a decade of stalling while they developed their nuclear prowess, that they can continue to bamboozle the U.S. and its Western allies with ... more blather and feigned cooperation. The legislation would ratchet up the embargo on Iran's oil exports and blacklist Iran's mining, engineering and construction industries. It would cut Iran's access to billions of dollars in overseas bank funds and allow the U.S. to seize foreign-held assets of key regime officials. The key: Nothing — repeat, nothing — would happen unless Iran cheats on its commitments in the interim deal or drags its feet on negotiating a final deal. But President Barack Obama has threatened to veto the legislation. The administration warns that any move that even appears to impose new sanctions could upset the delicate sensibilities of the brutal mullahs who rule Iran. Tehran could interpret this legislation as a (gasp!) threat and scuttle the talks. Please. A couple of weeks ago, Iran stormed out of talks because its officials were incensed – incensed! – that the U.S. would enforce its own laws and blacklist a dozen Iranian companies and individuals for ... evading U.S. sanctions. The U.S. said the sanctions were imposed under existing laws and were not new measures. The Iranians soon returned to the bargaining table. Let's remember that there is only one reason the Iranians are negotiating: U.S. and European Union sanctions have strangled their economy. Unemployment and inflation are raging. Iran's currency is ideal for wallpapering the bathroom. The Senate bill would strengthen Obama's hand in current and future negotiations. He could shrug and play the good cop, warning the Iranians that he won't be able to hold back more sanctions for long if they don't get serious about cooperating, not just talking about cooperating. Obama has promised many times that he wouldn't let Iran build the bomb. But opposing this legislation is a signal to the Iranians that they need not worry much about further sanctions, that there's no hurry here, that there really aren't any imminent and painful consequences for stalling. That increases the risks to the world, and the risk that Israel may act in its self-defense. Every day that Iran stalls, every day that talk trumps action in this interim deal, is another signal that nothing has changed: Iran is still playing for time and winning.

### F/W

#### First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan.

#### Second, is reasons to prefer:

#### A. Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 9 minutes of the 1ac

#### B. It is predictable, the resolution demands USFG action

#### C. It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another

#### Engaging the state is critical to the ability of citizens to break into the project of solving global challenges: Engagement relies on an existing internationalist state and refocuses its energies through citizen participation in national institutions that solve for war as well as environmental and social challenges

Sassen 2009

[ColumbiaUniversity, istheauthorof TheGlobalCity (2ndedn, Princeton, 2001), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, 2008) and A Sociology of Globalisation (Norton,2007), among others, 2009, The Potential for a Progressive State?, uwyo//amp]

Using state power for a new global politics These post-1980s trends towards a greater interaction of national andglobal dynamics are not part of some unidirectional historical progres-sion. There have been times in the past when they may have been as strong in certain aspects as they are today (Sassen, 2008a: chapter 3). But the current positioning of national states is distinctive precisely because 270 Saskia Sassen the national state has become the most powerful complex organizational entity in the world, and because it is a resource that citizens, confined largely to the national, can aim at governing and using to develop novel political agendas. It is this mix of the national and the global that is so full of potential. The national state is one particular form of state: at the other end of this variable the state can be conceived of as a technical administrative capability that could escape the historic bounds of narrow nationalisms that have marked the state historically, or colonialism as the only form of internationalism that states have enacted. Stripping the state of the particularity of this historical legacy gives me more analytic freedom in conceptualising these processes and opens up the possibility of the denationalised state.As particular components of national states become the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central to glob-alisation they undergo change that is difficult to register or name. In my own work I have found useful the notion of an incipient denation-alising of specific components of national states, i.e. components that function as such institutional homes. The question for research then becomes what is actually ‘national’ in some of the institutional compo-nents of states linked to the implementation and regulation of economic globalisation. The hypothesis here would be that some components of national institutions, even though formally national, are not national in the sense in which we have constructed the meaning of that term overthe last hundred years.This partial, often highly specialised or at least particularised, dena-tionalisation can also take place in domains other than that of economic globalisation, notably the more recent developments in the humanrights regime which allow national courts to sue foreign firms and dictators, or which grant undocumented immigrants certain rights. Denationalisation is, thus, multivalent: it endogenises global agendas of many different types of actors, not only corporate firms and financial markets, but also human rights and environmental objectives. Those confined to the national can use national state institutions as a bridge into global politics. This is one kind of radical politics, and only one kind, that would use the capacities of hopefully increasingly denationalized states. The existence and the strengthening of global civil society organ-isations becomes strategic in this context. In all of this lie the possibilities of moving towards new types of joint global action by denationalized states–coalitions of the willing focused not on war but on environmental and social justice projects.

#### Finally, It is a voter for competitive equity—prefer our interpretation, it allows both teams to compete, other roles of the ballot are arbitrary and self serving

### Legalism

#### First, our Zenko 13 ev says drones inevitable—only a risk that aff solves state violence

#### And, Strict review of targeted killing operations is to maintain morality in war and undermine the video-game like effect of killing targets with drones

Guiora, 2012

[Amos, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, Targeted killing: when proportionality gets all out of proportion, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. 45.1-2 (Fall 2012): p235., Academic onefile] /Wyo-MB

One of the dominant, and admittedly controversial, arguments this essay advances is that states have an obligation to conduct themselves morally, including during armed conflict. Although some may find this notion inherently contradictory, "morality in armed conflict" is a term of art (and not an oxymoron) that lies at the core of the instant discussion. This concept imposes an absolute requirement that soldiers treat the civilian population of areas in which they are engaged in conflict with the utmost dignity and respect. This obligation holds true whether combat takes place "house-to-house" or using remotely piloted aircraft tens of thousands of feet up in the sky. This concept may be simple to articulate, yet it is difficult to implement; the operational reality of armed conflict short of war requires a soldier to make multiple decisions involving various factors, all of which have never-ending spin-off potential. After all, every decision is not only complicated in and of itself, but each operational situation has a number of "forks." The implication is that no decision is linear, and every decision leads to additional dilemmas and spurs further decision making.¶ Operational decision-making is thus predicated on a complicated triangle that must incorporate the rule of law, morality, and effectiveness. I have been asked repeatedly whether that triangle endangers soldiers while giving the "other side" an undue advantage. The concern is understandable; however, the essence of armed conflict is that innocent civilians are in the immediate vicinity of combatants, and there is a duty to protect them even at the risk of harm to soldiers. (12) The burden to distinguish between combatant and civilian is extraordinarily complicated and poses significant operational dilemmas for and burdens on soldiers.¶ For armed conflict conducted in accordance with the rule of law and morality, this burden of distinction can never be viewed as mere mantra. Distinction, (13) then, is integral to the discussion. It is as relevant and important to the soldier standing at a check-point, uncertain whether the person standing opposite him is a combatant or civilian, as it must be in any targeted killing dilemma. The decision whether to operationally engage must reflect a variety of criteria and guidelines. (14) Otherwise, the nation state conducts itself in the spirit of a video game where victims are not real and represent mere numbers, regardless of the degree of threat they pose.¶ At the most fundamental level, operational decision making in the context of counterterrorism involves the decision whether to kill an individual defined as a legitimate target. (15) Although some argue killing is inherently immoral, I argue that killing in the context of narrowly defined self-defense is both legal and moral provided that the decision to "pull the trigger" is made in the context of a highly circumscribed and criteria-based framework. If limits are not imposed in defining a legitimate target, then decisions take on the hue of both illegality and immorality.

#### Debating the law teaches us how to make it better – rejection is worse

Todd Hedrick, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University, Sept 2012, Democratic Constitutionalism as Mediation: The Decline and Recovery of an Idea in Critical Social Theory, Constellations Volume 19, Issue 3, pages 382–400

Habermas’ alleged abandonment of immanent critique, however, is belied by the role that the democratic legal system comes to play in his theory. While in some sense just one system among others, it has a special capacity to shape the environments of other systems by regulating their interaction. Of course, the legal system is not the only one capable of affecting the environments of other systems, but law is uniquely open to inputs from ordinary language and thus potentially more pliant and responsive to democratic will formation: “Normatively substantive messages can circulate throughout society only in the language of law … . Law thus functions as the ‘transformer’ that guarantees that the socially integrating network of communication stretched across society as a whole holds together.”55 This allows for the possibility of consensual social regulation of domains ranging from the economy to the family, where actors are presumed to be motivated by their private interests instead of respect for the law, while allowing persons directed toward such interests to be cognizant that their privately oriented behavior is compatible with respect for generally valid laws. While we should be cautious about automatically viewing the constitution as the fulcrum of the legal order, its status as basic law is significant in this respect. For, recalling Hegel's broader conception of constitutionalism, political constitutions not only define the structure of government and “the relationship between citizens and the state” (as in Hegel's narrower “political” constitution); they also “implicitly prefigure a comprehensive legal order,” that is, “the totality comprised of an administrative state, capitalist economy, and civil society.”56 So, while these social spheres can be conceived of as autonomous functional subsystems, their boundaries are legally defined in a way that affects the manner and degree of their interaction: “The political constitution is geared to shaping each of these systems by means of the medium of law and to harmonizing them so that they can fulfill their functions as measured by a presumed ‘common good’.”57 Thus, constitutional discourses should be seen less as interpretations of a positive legal text, and more as attempts to articulate legal norms that could shift the balance between these spheres in a manner more reflective of generalizable interests, occurring amidst class stratification and cultural pluralism.¶ A constitution's status as positive law is also of importance for fundamentally Hegelian reasons relating to his narrower sense of political constitutionalism: its norms must be public and concrete, such that differently positioned citizens have at least an initial sense of what the shared hermeneutic starting points for constitutional discourse might be. But these concrete formulations must also be understood to embody principles in the interest of all citizens, so that constitutional discourse can be the site of effective democratic will formation concerning the basic norms that mediate between particular individuals and the general interests of free and equal citizens. This recalls Hegel's point that constitutions fulfill their mediational function by being sufficiently positive so as to be publicly recognizable, yet are not exhausted by this positivity – the content of the constitution is instead filled in over time through ongoing legislation. In order to avoid Hegel's foreshortened conception of public participation in this process and his consequent authoritarian tendencies, Habermas and, later, Benhabib highlight the importance of being able to conceive of basic constitutional norms as themselves being the products of public contestation and discourse. In order to articulate this idea, they draw on legal theorists like Robert Cover and Frank Michelman who characterize this process of legal rearticulation as “jurisgenesis”58: a community's production of legal meaning by way of continuous rearticulation, through reflection and contestation, of its constitutional project.¶ Habermas explicitly conceives of the democratic legal order in this way when, in the context of considering the question of how a constitution that confers legitimacy on ordinary legislation could itself be thought to be democratically legitimate, he writes:¶ I propose that we understand the regress itself as the understandable expression of the future-oriented character, or openness, of the democratic constitution: in my view, a constitution that is democratic – not just in its content but also according to its source of legitimation – is a tradition-building project with a clearly marked beginning in time. All the later generations have the task of actualizing the still-untapped normative substance of the system of rights.59¶ A constitutional order and its interpretive history represent a community's attempt to render the terms under which they can give themselves the law that shapes their society's basic structure and secure the law's integrity through assigning basic liberties. Although philosophical reflection can give us some grasp of the presuppositions of a practice of legitimate lawmaking, this framework of presuppositions (“the system of rights”) is “unsaturated.”60 In Hegelian fashion, it must, to be meaningful, be concretized through discourse, and not in an one-off way during a founding moment that fixes the terms of political association once and for all, but continuously, as new persons enter the community and as new circumstances, problems, and perspectives emerge.¶ The stakes involved in sustaining a broad and inclusive constitutional discourse turn out to be significant. Habermas has recently invoked the concept of dignity in this regard, linking it to the process through which society politically constitutes itself as a reciprocal order of free and equal citizens. As a status rather than an inherent property, “dignity that accrues to all persons equally preserves the connotation of a self-respect that depends on social recognition.”61 Rather than being understood as a quality possessed by some persons by virtue of their proximity to something like the divine, the modern universalistic conception of dignity is a social status dependent upon ongoing practices of mutual recognition. Such practices, Habermas posits, are most fully instantiated in the role of citizens as legislators of the order to which they are subject.¶ [Dignity] can be established only within the framework of a constitutional state, something that never emerges of its own accord. Rather, this framework must be created by the citizens themselves using the means of positive law and must be protected and developed under historically changing conditions. As a modern legal concept, human dignity is associated with the status that citizens assume in the self-created political order.62¶ Although the implications of invoking dignity (as opposed to, say, autonomy) as the normative core of democratic constitutionalism are unclear,63 plainly Habermas remains committed to strongly intersubjective conceptions of democratic constitutionalism, to an intersubjectivity that continues to be legally and politically mediated (a dimension largely absent from Honneth's successor theory of intersubectivity).¶ What all of this suggests is a constitutional politics in which citizens are empowered to take part and meaningfully impact the terms of their cultural, economic, and political relations to each other. Such politics would need to be considerably less legalistic and precedent bound, less focused on the democracy-constraining aspects of constitutionalism emphasized in most liberal rule of law models. The sense of incompleteness and revisability that marks this critical theory approach to constitutionalism represents a point where critical theories of democracy may claim to be more radical and revisionary than most liberal and deliberative counterparts. It implies a sharp critique of more familiar models of bourgeois constitutionalism: whether they conceive of constitutional order as having a foundation in moral rights or natural law, or in an originary founding moment, such models a) tend to be backward-looking in their justifications, seeing the legal order as founded on some exogenously determined vision of moral order; b) tend to represent the law as an already-determined container within which legitimate ordinary politics takes place; and c) find the content of law to be ascertainable through the specialized reasoning of legal professionals. On the critical theory conception of constitutionalism, this presumption of completeness and technicity amounts to the reification of a constitutional project, where a dynamic social relation is misperceived as something fixed and objective.64 We can see why this would be immensely problematic for someone like Habermas, for whom constitutional norms are supposed to concern the generalizable interests of free and equal citizens. If it is overall the case for him that generalizable interests are at least partially constituted through discourse and are therefore not given in any pre-political, pre-discursive sense,65 this is especially so in a society like ours with an unreconciled class structure sustained by pseudo-compromises. Therefore, discursive rearticulation of basic norms is necessary for the very emergence of generalizable interests.¶ Despite offering an admirably systematic synthesis of radical democracy and the constitutional rule of law, Habermas’ theory is hobbled by the hesitant way he embraces these ideas. Given his strong commitment to proceduralism, the view that actual discourses among those affected must take place during the production of legitimate law if constitutionalism is to perform its mediational function, as well as his opposition to foundational or backward-looking models of political justification, we might expect Habermas to advocate the continuous circulation in civil society of constitutional discourses that consistently have appreciable impact on the way constitutional projects develop through ongoing legislation such that citizens can see the links between their political constitution (narrowly construed), the effects that democratic discourse has on the shape that it takes, and the role of the political constitution in regulating and transforming the broader institutional backbone of society in accordance with the common good. And indeed, at least in the abstract, this is what the “two track” conception of democracy in Between Facts and Norms, with its model of discourses circulating between the informal public sphere and more formal legislative institutions, seeks to capture.66 As such, Habermas’ version of constitutionalism seems a natural ally of theories of “popular constitutionalism”67 emerging from the American legal academy or of those who, like Jeremy Waldron,68 are skeptical of the merits of legalistic constitutionalism and press for democratic participation in the ongoing rearticulation of constitutional norms. Indeed, I would submit that the preceding pages demonstrate that the Left Hegelian social theoretic backdrop of Habermas’ theory supplies a deeper normative justification for more democratic conceptions of constitutionalism than have heretofore been supplied by their proponents (who are, to be fair, primarily legal theorists seeking to uncover the basic commitments of American constitutionalism, a project more interpretive than normative.69) Given that such theories have very revisionary views on the appropriate method and scope of judicial review and the role of the constitution in public life, it is surprising that Habermas evinces at most a mild critique of the constitutional practices and institutions of actually existing democracies, never really confronting the possibility that institutions of constitutional review administered by legal elites could be paternalistic or extinguish the public impetus for discourse he so prizes.70 In fact, institutional questions concerning where constitutional discourse ought to take place and how the power to make authoritative determinations of constitutional meaning should be shared among civil society, legislative, and judiciary are mostly abstracted away in Habermas’ post-Between Facts and Norms writings, while that work is mostly content with the professional of administration of constitutional issues as it exists in the United States and Germany.¶ This is evident in Habermas’ embrace of figures from liberal constitutional theory. He does not present an independent theory of judicial decision-making, but warmly receives Dworkin's well-known model of “law as integrity.” To a certain extent, this allegiance makes sense, given Dworkin's sensitivity to the hermeneutic dimension of interpretation and the fact that his concept of integrity mirrors discourse theory in holding that legal decisions must be justifiable to those affected in terms of publicly recognizable principles. Habermas does, however, follow Michelman in criticizing the “monological” form of reasoning that Dworkin's exemplary Judge Hercules employs,71 replacing it with the interpretive activities of a specialized legal public sphere, presumably more responsive to the public than Hercules. But this substitution does nothing to alleviate other aspects of Dworkin's theory that make a match between him and Habermas quite awkward: Dworkin's standard of integrity compels judges to regard the law as a complete, coherent whole that rests on a foundation of moral rights.72 Because Dworkin regards deontic rights in a strongly realistic manner and as an unwritten part of the law, there is a finished, retrospective, “already there” quality to his picture of it. Thinking of moral rights as existing independently of their social articulation is what moves Dworkin to conceive of them as, at least in principle, accessible to the right reason of individual moral subjects.73 Legal correctness can be achieved when lawyers and judges combine their specialized knowledge of precedent with their potentially objective insights into deontic rights. Fashioning the law in accordance with the demands of integrity thereby becomes the province of legal elites, rendering public discourse and the construction of generalizable interests in principle unnecessary. This helps explain Dworkin's highly un-participatory conception of democracy and his comfort with placing vast decision-making powers in the hands of the judiciary.7¶ There is more than a little here that should make Habermas uncomfortable. Firstly, on his account, legitimate law is the product of actual discourses, which include the full spate of discourse types (pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral). If the task of judicial decision-making is to reconstruct the types of discourse that went into the production of law, Dworkin's vision of filling in the gaps between legal rules exclusively with considerations of individual moral rights (other considerations are collected under the heading of “policy”75) makes little sense.76 While Habermas distances himself from Dworkin's moral realism, calling it “hard to defend,”77 he appears not to appreciate the extent to which Dworkin links his account of legal correctness to this very possibility of individual insight into the objective moral order. If Habermas wishes to maintain his long held position that constitutional projects involve the ongoing construction of generalizable interests through the democratic process – which in my view is really the heart of his program – he needs an account of legal correctness that puts some distance between this vision and Dworkin's picture of legal elites discovering the content of law through technical interpretation and rational intuition into a fixed moral order.¶ Also puzzling is the degree of influence exercised by civil society in the development of constitutional projects that Habermas appears willing to countenance. While we might expect professional adjudicative institutions to play a sort of yeoman's role vis-à-vis the public, Habermas actually puts forth something akin to Bruce Ackerman's picture of infrequent constitutional revolutions, where the basic meaning of a constitutional project is transformed during swelling periods of national ferment, only to resettle for decades at a time, during which it is administered by legal professionals.78 According to this position, American civil society has not generated new understandings of constitutional order that overcome group divisions since the New Deal, or possibly the Civil Rights era. Now, this may actually be the case, and perhaps Habermas’ apparent acquiescence to this view of once-every-few-generations national conversations is a nod to realism, i.e., a realistic conception of how much broad based, ongoing constitutional discourse it is reasonable to expect the public to conduct. But while a theory with a Left Hegelian pedigree should avoid “the impotence of the ought” and utopian speculation, and therefore ought not develop critical conceptions of legal practice utterly divorced from present ones, such concessions to realism are unnecessary. After all, critical theory conceptions of constitutionalism will aim to be appreciably different from the more authoritarian ones currently in circulation, which more often than not fail to stimulate and sustain public discourse on the basic constitution of society. Instead, their point would be to suggest how a more dynamic, expansive, and mediational conception of constitutionalism could unlock greater democratic freedom and rationally integrated social identities.¶ Given these problems in Habermas’ theory, the innovations that Benhabib makes to his conception of constitutionalism are most welcome. While operating within a discourse theoretic framework, her recent work more unabashedly recalls Hegel's broader conception of the constitution as the basic norms through which a community understands and relates to itself (of which a founding legal document is but a part): a constitution is a way of life through which individuals seek to connect themselves to each other, and in which the very identity and membership of a community is constantly at stake.79 Benhabib's concept of “democratic iterations,” which draws on meaning-as-use theories, emphasizes how meaning is inevitably transformed through repetition:¶ In the process of repeating a term or a concept, we never simply produce a replica of the original usage and its intended meaning: rather, very repetition is a form of variation. Every iteration transforms meaning, adds to it, enriches it in ever-so-subtle ways. In fact, there is really no ‘originary’ source of meaning, or an ‘original’ to which all subsequent forms must conform … . Every iteration involves making sense of an authoritative original in a new and different context … . Iteration is the reappropriation of the ‘origin’; it is at the same time its dissolution as the original and its preservation through its continuous deployment.80¶ Recalling the reciprocal relationship that Hegel hints at between the narrow “political” constitution and the broader constitution of society's backbone of interrelated institutions, Benhabib here seems to envision a circular process whereby groups take up the conceptions of social relations instantiated in the legal order and transform them in their more everyday attempts to live with others in accordance with these norms. Like Cover and Michelman, she stresses that the transformation of legal meaning takes place primarily in informal settings, where different groups try (and sometimes fail) to live together and to understand themselves in their relation to others according to the terms they inherit from the constitutional tradition they find themselves subject to.81 Her main example of such democratic iteration is the challenge Muslim girls in France raised against the head scarf prohibition in public schools (“L’Affaire du Foulard”), which, while undoubtedly antagonistic, she contends has the potential to felicitously transform the meaning of secularity and inclusion in the French state and to create new forms of togetherness and understanding. But although Benhabib illustrates the concept of democratic iterations through an exemplary episode, this iterative process is a constant and pervasive one, which is punctuated by events and has the tendency to have a destabilizing effect on authority.82¶ It is telling, however, that Benhabib's examples of democratic iterations are exclusively centered on what Habermas would call ethical-political discourses.83 While otherwise not guilty of the charge,84 Benhabib, in her constitutional theory, runs afoul of Nancy Fraser's critical diagnosis of the trend in current political philosophy to subordinate class and distributional conflicts to struggles for cultural inclusion and recognition.85 Perhaps this is due to the fact that “hot” constitutional issues are so often ones with cultural dimensions in the foreground, rarely touching visibly on distributional conflicts between groups. This nonetheless is problematic since much court business clearly affects – often subtly and invisibly – the outcomes of these conflicts, frequently with bad results.86 For another reason why centering constitutional discourse on inclusion and cultural issues is problematic, it is useful to remind ourselves of Habermas’ critique of civic republicanism, according to which the main deficit in republican models of democracy is its “ethical overburdening” of the political process.87 To some extent, republicanism's emphasis on ethical discourse is understandable: given the level of cooperativeness and public spirit that republicans view as the font of legitimate law, political discourses need to engage the motivations and identities of citizens. Arguably, issues of ethical self-understanding do this better than more abstract or arid forms of politics. But it is not clear that this is intrinsically so, and it can have distorting effects on politics. In the American media, for example, this amplification of the cultural facets of issues is very common; conflicts over everything from guns to taxes are often reduced to conflicts over who is a good, real American and who is not. It is hard to say that this proves edifying; substantive issues of rights and social justice are elided, politics becomes more fraudulent and conflictual. None of this is to deny a legitimate place for ethical-political discourse. However, we do see something of a two-steps-forward-one-step-back movement in Benhabib's advancement of Habermas’ discourse theory of law: although her concept of democratic iterations takes center stage, she develops the notion solely along an ethical-political track. Going forward, critical theorists developing conceptions of constitutional discourse should work to see it as a way of integrating questions of distributional justice with questions of moral rights and collective identities without subordinating or conflating them.¶ 4. Conclusion¶ Some readers may find the general notion of reinvigorating a politics of constitutionalism quixotic. Certainly, it has not been not my intention to overstate the importance or positive contributions of constitutions in actually existing democracies, where they can serve to entrench political systems experiencing paralysis in the face of long term fiscal and environmental problems, and where public appeals to them more often than not invoke visions of society that are more nostalgic, ethno-nationalistic, authoritarian, and reactionary than what Habermas and Benhabib presumably have in mind. Instead, I take the basic Hegelian point I started this paper with to be this: modern persons ought to be able to comprehend their social order as the work of reason; the spine of institutions through which their relations to differently abled and positioned others are mediated ought to be responsive to their interests as fully-rounded persons; and comprehending this system of mediation ought to be able to reconcile them to the partiality of their roles within the universal state. Though modern life is differentiated, it can be understood, when seen through the lens of the constitutional order, as a result of citizens’ jointly exercised rationality as long as certain conditions are met. These conditions are, however, more stringent than Hegel realized. In light of this point, that so many issues deeply impacting citizens’ social and economic relations to one another are rendered marginal – and even invisible – in terms of the airing they receive in the public sphere, that they are treated as mostly settled or non-questions in the legal system consitutues a strikingly deficient aspect of modern politics. Examples include the intrusion of market logic and technology into everyday life, the commodification of public goods, the legal standing of consumers and residents, the role of shareholders and public interests in corporate governance, and the status of collective bargaining arrangements. Surely a contributing factor here is the absence of a shared sense of possibility that the basic terms of our social union could be responsive to the force that discursive reason can exert. Such a sense is what I am contending jurisgenerative theories ought to aim at recapturing while critiquing more legalistic and authoritarian models of law.¶ This is not to deny the possibility that democratic iterations themselves may be regressive or authoritarian, populist in the pejorative sense. But the denial of their **legitimacy or** possibility moves us in the direction of authoritarian conceptions of law and political power and the isolation of individuals and social groups wrought by a political order of machine-like administration that Horkheimer and Adorno describe as a main feature of modern political domination. Recapturing some sense of how human activity makes reason actual in the ongoing organization of society need not amount to the claim that reason culminates in some centralized form, as in the Hegelian state, or in some end state, as in Marx. It can, however, move us to envision the possibility of an ongoing practice of communication, lawmaking, and revision that seeks to reconcile and overcome positivity and division, without the triumphalist pretension of ever being able to fully do so.

#### Perm do both

#### States will inevitably compete for relative status–only primacy can prevent conflict

**Wohlforth 9**,

Professor of government at Dartmouth, (William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War” World Politics, 61:1, January, Project Muse)

Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9 I begin by describing the puzzles facing predominant theories that status competition might solve. Building on recent research on social identity and status seeking, I then show that under certain conditions the ways decision makers identify with the states they represent may prompt them to frame issues as positional disputes over status in a social hierarchy. I develop hypotheses that tailor this scholarship to the domain of great power politics, showing how the probability of status competition is likely to be linked to polarity. The rest of the article investigates whether there is sufficient evidence for these hypotheses to warrant further refinement and testing. I pursue this in three ways: by showing that the theory advanced here is consistent with what we know about large-scale patterns of great power conflict through history; by [End Page 30] demonstrating that the causal mechanisms it identifies did drive relatively secure major powers to military conflict in the past (and therefore that they might do so again if the world were bipolar or multipolar); and by showing that observable evidence concerning the major powers’ identity politics and grand strategies under unipolarity are consistent with the theory’s expectations. Puzzles of Power and War Recent research on the connection between the distribution of capabilities and war has concentrated on a hypothesis long central to systemic theories of power transition or hegemonic stability: that major war arises out of a power shift in favor of a rising state dissatisfied with a status quo defended by a declining satisfied state.10 Though they have garnered substantial empirical support, these theories have yet to solve two intertwined empirical and theoretical puzzles—each of which might be explained by positional concerns for status. First, if the material costs and benefits of a given status quo are what matters, why would a state be dissatisfied with the very status quo that had abetted its rise? The rise of China today naturally prompts this question, but it is hardly a novel situation. Most of the best known and most consequential power transitions in history featured rising challengers that were prospering mightily under the status quo. In case after case, historians argue that these revisionist powers sought recognition and standing rather than specific alterations to the existing rules and practices that constituted the order of the day. In each paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the status quo. In R. Ned Lebow’s reading, for example, Thucydides’ account tells us that the rise of Athens posed unacceptable threats not to the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which was an important cause of the Spartan assembly’s vote for war.11 The issues that inspired Louis XIV’s and Napoleon’s dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and varied, but most accounts accord [End Page 31] independent importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled primacy. In these and other hegemonic struggles among leading states in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challenger’s dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material costs and benefits of the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status.12 Wilhemine Germany is a fateful case in point. As Paul Kennedy has argued, underlying material trends as of 1914 were set to propel Germany’s continued rise indefinitely, so long as Europe remained at peace.13 Yet Germany chafed under the very status quo that abetted this rise and its elite focused resentment on its chief trading partner—the great power that presented the least plausible threat to its security: Great Britain. At fantastic cost, it built a battleship fleet with no plausible strategic purpose other than to stake a claim on global power status.14 Recent historical studies present strong evidence that, far from fearing attacks from Russia and France, German leaders sought to provoke them, knowing that this would lead to a long, expensive, and sanguinary war that Britain was certain to join.15 And of all the motivations swirling round these momentous decisions, no serious historical account fails to register German leaders’ oft-expressed yearning for “a place in the sun.” The second puzzle is bargaining failure. Hegemonic theories tend to model war as a conflict over the status quo without specifying precisely what the status quo is and what flows of benefits it provides to states.16 Scholars generally follow Robert Gilpin in positing that the underlying issue concerns a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work,” “the nature and governance of the system,” and “the distribution of territory among the states in the system.”17 If these are the [End Page 32] issues at stake, then systemic theories of hegemonic war and power transition confront the puzzle brought to the fore in a seminal article by James Fearon: what prevents states from striking a bargain that avoids the costs of war? 18 Why can’t states renegotiate the international order as underlying capabilities distributions shift their relative bargaining power? Fearon proposed that one answer consistent with strict rational choice assumptions is that such bargains are infeasible when the issue at stake is indivisible and cannot readily be portioned out to each side. Most aspects of a given international order are readily divisible, however, and, as Fearon stressed, “both the intrinsic complexity and richness of most matters over which states negotiate and the availability of linkages and side-payments suggest that intermediate bargains typically will exist.”19 Thus, most scholars have assumed that the indivisibility problem is trivial, focusing on two other rational choice explanations for bargaining failure: uncertainty and the commitment problem.20 In the view of many scholars, it is these problems, rather than indivisibility, that likely explain leaders’ inability to avail themselves of such intermediate bargains. Yet recent research inspired by constructivism shows how issues that are physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate to the identities of decision makers.21 Once issues surrounding the status quo are framed in positional terms as bearing on the disputants’ relative standing, then, to the extent that they value their standing itself, they may be unwilling to pursue intermediate bargaining solutions. Once linked to status, easily divisible issues that theoretically provide opportunities for linkages and side payments of various sorts may themselves be seen as indivisible and thus unavailable as avenues for possible intermediate bargains. The historical record surrounding major wars is rich with evidence suggesting that positional concerns over status frustrate bargaining: expensive, protracted conflict over what appear to be minor issues; a propensity on the part of decision makers to frame issues in terms of relative rank even when doing so makes bargaining harder; decision-makers’ [End Page 33] inability to accept feasible divisions of the matter in dispute even when failing to do so imposes high costs; demands on the part of states for observable evidence to confirm their estimate of an improved position in the hierarchy; the inability of private bargains to resolve issues; a frequently observed compulsion for the public attainment of concessions from a higher ranked state; and stubborn resistance on the part of states to which such demands are addressed even when acquiescence entails limited material cost. The literature on bargaining failure in the context of power shifts remains inconclusive, and it is premature to take any empirical pattern as necessarily probative. Indeed, Robert Powell has recently proposed that indivisibility is not a rationalistic explanation for war after all: fully rational leaders with perfect information should prefer to settle a dispute over an indivisible issue by resorting to a lottery rather than a war certain to destroy some of the goods in dispute. What might prevent such bargaining solutions is not indivisibility itself, he argues, but rather the parties’ inability to commit to abide by any agreement in the future if they expect their relative capabilities to continue to shift.22 This is the credible commitment problem to which many theorists are now turning their attention. But how it relates to the information problem that until recently dominated the formal literature remains to be seen.23 The larger point is that positional concerns for status may help account for the puzzle of bargaining failure. In the rational choice bargaining literature, war is puzzling because it destroys some of the benefits or flows of benefits in dispute between the bargainers, who would be better off dividing the spoils without war. Yet what happens to these models if what matters for states is less the flows of material benefits themselves than their implications for relative status? The salience of this question depends on the relative importance of positional concern for status among states. Do Great Powers Care about Status? Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

#### Legal restraints work – the theory of the exception is self-serving and wrong

William E. **Scheuerman 6**, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, Constellations, Volume 13, Issue 1

Yet this argument relies on Schmitt’s controversial model of politics, as outlined eloquently but unconvincingly in his famous Concept of the Political. To be sure, there are intense conflicts in which it is naïve to expect an easy resolution by legal or juridical means. But the argument suffers from a troubling circularity: **Schmitt** occasionally **wants to define “political” conflicts as those irresolvable by legal** or juridical **devices in order** then **to argue against** **legal** or juridical **solutions** to them. **The claim** also **suffers from** a certain **vagueness** and lack of conceptual precision. At times, it seems to be directed against trying to resolve conflicts in the courts or juridical system narrowly understood; at other times it is directed against any legal regulation of intense conflict. The former argument is surely stronger than the latter. After all, **legal devices have undoubtedly played a positive role** **in taming** or at least minimizing the potential dangers of harsh **political antagonisms**. In the Cold War, for example, international law contributed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts which otherwise might have exploded into horrific violence, even if attempts to bring such conflicts before an international court or tribunal probably would have failed.22¶ Second, Schmitt dwells on the legal inconsistencies that result from modifying the traditional state-centered system of international law by expanding protections to non-state fighters. His view is that irregular combatants logically enjoyed no protections in the state-centered Westphalian model. By broadening protections to include them, international law helps undermine the traditional state system and its accompanying legal framework. Why is this troubling? The most obvious answer is that Schmitt believes that the traditional state system is normatively superior to recent attempts to modify it by, for example, extending international human rights protections to individuals against states. 23 But what if we refuse to endorse his nostalgic preference for the traditional state system? Then a sympathetic reading of the argument would take the form of suggesting that the project of regulating irregular combatants by ordinary law must fail for another reason: it rests on a misguided quest to integrate incongruent models of interstate relations and international law. We cannot, in short, maintain core features of the (state-centered) Westphalian system while extending ambitious new protections to non-state actors.¶ This is a powerful argument, but it remains flawed. Every modern legal order rests on diverse and even conflicting normative elements and ideals, in part because human existence itself is always “in transition.” When one examines the so-called classical liberal legal systems of nineteenth-century England or the United States, for example, one quickly identifies liberal elements coexisting uneasily alongside paternalistic and authoritarian (e.g., the law of slavery in the United States), monarchist, as well as republican and communitarian moments. The same may be said of the legal moorings of the modern welfare state, which arguably rest on a hodgepodge of socialist, liberal, and Christian and even Catholic (for example, in some European maternity policies) programmatic sources. In short, **it is by no means self-evident that trying to give coherent legal form to a transitional** political and social **moment is always doomed to fail**. Moreover, there may be sound reasons for claiming that the contemporary transitional juncture in the rules of war is by no means as incongruent as Schmitt asserts. In some recent accounts, **the general trend** towards extending basic protections to non-state actors **is** plausibly interpreted in a more **positive** – **and by no means incoherent** – light.24¶ Third, Schmitt identifies a deep tension between the classical quest for codified and stable law and the empirical reality of a social world subject to permanent change: “The tendency to modify or even dissolve classical [legal] concepts…is general, and in view of the rapid change of the world it is entirely understandable” (12). Schmitt’s postwar writings include many provocative comments about what contemporary legal scholars describe as the dilemma of legal obsolescence. 25 In The Partisan, he suggests that the “great transformations and modifications” in the technological apparatus of modern warfare place strains on the aspiration for cogent legal norms capable of regulating human affairs (17; see also 48–50). Given the ever-changing character of warfare and the fast pace of change in military technology, it inevitably proves difficult to codify a set of cogent and stable rules of war. The Geneva Convention proviso that legal combatants must bear their weapons openly, for example, seems poorly attuned to a world where military might ultimately depends on nuclear silos buried deep beneath the surface of the earth, and not the success of traditional standing armies massed in battle on the open field. “Or what does the requirement mean of an insignia visible from afar in night battle, or in battle with the long-range weapons of modern technology of war?” (17).¶ As I have tried to show elsewhere, these are powerful considerations deserving of close scrutiny; Schmitt is probably right to argue that the enigma of legal obsolescence takes on special significance in the context of rapid-fire social change.26 Unfortunately, he seems uninterested in the slightest possibility that we might successfully adapt the process of lawmaking to our dynamic social universe. To be sure, he discusses the “motorization of lawmaking” in a fascinating 1950 publication, but only in order to underscore its pathological core.27 Yet **one** possible **resolution** of the dilemma he describes **would be** to figure how **to reform the process** whereby rules of war are adapted to novel changes in military affairs in order **to minimize the danger of** anachronistic or **out-of-date law. Instead, Schmitt** simply **employs the dilemma of legal obsolescence as a battering ram** against the rule of law and the quest to develop a legal apparatus suited to the special problem of irregular combatants.

#### Legal norms don’t cause wars and the alt can’t effect liberalism

David **Luban 10**, law prof at Georgetown, Beyond Traditional Concepts of Lawfare: Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 457

Among these associations is the positive, constructive side of politics, the very foundation of Aristotle's conception of politics, which Schmitt completely ignores. Politics, we often say, is the art of the possible. It is the medium for organizing all human cooperation. Peaceable civilization, civil institutions, and elemental tasks such as collecting the garbage and delivering food to hungry mouths all depend on politics. Of course, peering into the sausage factory of even such mundane municipal institutions as the town mayor's office will reveal plenty of nasty politicking, jockeying for position and patronage, and downright corruption. Schmitt sneers at these as "banal forms of politics, . . . all sorts of tactics and practices, competitions and intrigues" and dismisses them contemptuously as "parasite- and caricature-like formations." n55 The fact is that **Schmitt has nothing** whatever **to say about the constructive side of politics**, and his entire theory focuses on enemies, not friends. In my small community, political meetings debate issues as trivial as whether to close a street and divert the traffic to another street. It is hard to see mortal combat as even a remote possibility in such disputes, and so, in Schmitt's view, they would not count as politics, but merely administration. Yet issues like these are the stuff of peaceable human politics.¶ Schmitt, I have said, uses the word "political" polemically--in his sense, politically. I have suggested that his very choice of the word "political" to describe mortal enmity is tendentious, attaching to mortal enmity Aristotelian and republican associations quite foreign to it. But the more basic point is that Schmitt's critique of humanitarianism as political and polemical is itself political and polemical. In a word, the critique of lawfare is itself lawfare. It is self-undermining because to the extent that it succeeds in showing that lawfare is illegitimate, it de-legitimizes itself.¶ What about the merits of Schmitt's critique of humanitarianism? His argument is straightforward: either humanitarianism is toothless and [\*471] apolitical, in which case ruthless political actors will destroy the humanitarians; or else humanitarianism is a fighting faith, in which case it has succumbed to the political but made matters worse, because wars on behalf of humanity are the most inhuman wars of all. Liberal humanitarianism is either too weak or too savage.¶ The argument has obvious merit. When Schmitt wrote in 1932 that wars against "outlaws of humanity" would be the most horrible of all, it is hard not to salute him as a prophet of Hiroshima. The same is true when Schmitt writes about the League of Nations' resolution to use "economic sanctions and severance of the food supply," n56 which he calls "imperialism based on pure economic power." n57 Schmitt is no warmonger--he calls the killing of human beings for any reason other than warding off an existential threat "sinister and crazy" n58 --nor is he indifferent to human suffering.¶ But **international** humanitarian law **and criminal law are not the same thing as wars to end all war or humanitarian military interventions, so Schmitt's** important moral **warning** against ultimate military self-righteousness **does not** really **apply**. n59 Nor does "bracketing" war by humanitarian constraints on war-fighting presuppose a vanished order of European public law. The fact is that in nine years of conventional war, the United States has significantly bracketed war-fighting, even against enemies who do not recognize duties of reciprocity. n60 This may frustrate current lawfare critics who complain that American soldiers in Afghanistan are being forced to put down their guns. Bracketing warfare is a decision--Schmitt might call it an existential decision--that rests in part on values that transcend the friend-enemy distinction. **Liberal values are not alien extrusions into politics** or evasions of politics; **they are part of politics, and**, as Stephen Holmes argued against Schmitt, **liberalism has proven remarkably strong, not weak**. n61 We could choose to abandon liberal humanitarianism, and that would be a political decision. It would simply be a bad one.

#### Perm do plan then the alt

#### The alternative fails – movements can’t coalesce, even if collapse is inevitable

Jamie Peck 10, geography prof at the University of British Columbia, Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents, Antipode, Volume 41, Issue Supplement s1, pages 94–116

While Latin American experiences can and should spur the postneoliberal imagination, the region's lessons are also sobering ones. Here, audacious forms of neoliberalized accumulation by dispossession inadvertently prepared the ground for widespread social mobilization and radical resistance politics. And in the decade or so that followed, electoral realignments in Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and elsewhere consolidated progressive gains, as a period of hegemonic dispute gave way to region-wide hegemonic instability (Sader 2009). **Moving purposefully in the direction of postneoliberal forms of governance has**, however, **been a challenge, even for the region's largest economies**. Global financial flows, trading regimes, and investment policies continue to be guided by logics of short-term, price competition—in the context of global overaccumulation—while progressive forms of multilateral coordination can only be negotiated in the long shadows of imperial and neoimperial power (Drake 2006). As Sader (2009:176) notes:¶ the deregulation fostered by neoliberal policies favoured the hegemony of financial capital in its speculative mode. In order to instate a different model, it would be necessary to introduce new forms of economic regulation, **which would be very difficult, even in the current crisis**, once deregulation has a foothold. **It could not come from a single country**, no matter what its importance, **because others would benefit from the flow of capital rejected in this country**. At the same time, **it would be hard to come to a large-scale international agreement, due to the different interests of the biggest powers and international corporations**.¶ **Whereas neoliberalism may have exposed the limits of financial capitalism, it has also undermined the strategic and organizational resources required for its transcendence**. In Sader's (2009) eyes, the root of the problem for progressive forces is what he characterizes as a “gulf” between the evident failures of neoliberalized capitalism and the potential of postneoliberal movements, forces, and interests. The short- and medium-term prospects for such forms of alternative politics will surely be structured (and to some extent constrained) by the neoliberalized terrains on which they must be prosecuted. **This is not simply a matter of contending with** (residual) **neoliberal power centers**, in economics ministries, in international financial institutions, in think tanks, in the media, and in much of the corporate sector. Perhaps more intractably, **it must also entail overcoming the profound reconstitution of** cross-national, interlocal, and cross-scalar **relations through** various forms of **market rule**, which facilitate the reproduction of neoliberalized logics of action, institutional routines, and political projects—both through the dull compulsion of competitive pressures and through the harsh imperatives of regulatory downloading.

#### The alt doesn’t influence legal decisionmaking and results in tyranny

Paul **Passavant**, Ph.D., Hobart and William Smith College Associate Professor of Political Science, December 20**10**, Yoo's Law, Sovereignty, and Whatever, Constellations Volume 17, Issue 4, pages 549–571

For some on the left, it has become conventional to celebrate, if not cultivate, pluralism, whether this means multiple forms of being or multiple interpretive possibilities with regard to texts. It has also become conventional to be critical of “sovereignty” and of “law.” Multiplicity is thought to be a threat to sovereignty, and this threat is thought to be democratizing or a force that resists oppression. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben exemplifies these tendencies within contemporary political and legal theory. In some of his earlier and less well-known work, he aspires toward a “coming community” that he calls “whatever being.” Whatever being embraces the infinite communicative possibilities of language as pure means beyond a preoccupation with true or false propositions.¶ In his best-known work, Agamben links sovereignty to the production of rightless subjects and the Nazi death camps. He urges us to rethink the very ontological basis of politics in the West, creating a human being beyond sovereignty or law, in order to avoid perilous outcomes. One key to surpassing the logic of sovereignty, according to Agamben, is whatever being's positive relation to the singularities of life and the multiplicities of communication.¶ Whatever being is also being outside of law. If “law” persists in this “coming community,” it would be a “law” that has become deactivated and deposed from its prior purposes. “Law” will have become an object for play – something to be toyed with the way that children might come upon a disused object and play with it by putting it to uses disconnected from whatever purpose this object might once have had.¶ Why does the fact of playful communicative possibilities lead to either more democracy or a less brutal world? The most conservative United States Supreme Court justices have recently embraced the fact that texts are open to multiple interpretations. For example, Samuel Alito has suggested that the meaning of public monuments is open to multiple interpretations that may shift over time to avoid a potential First Amendment establishment clause problem over a monument of the Ten Commandments in a public park.1 Yet, as the late Justice Blackmun has written regarding state endorsement of religion, “government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it asserts that God prefers some.”2 Recognizing the possibility of multiple interpretations, as this instance shows, does not lead necessarily to outcomes friendly to democracy.¶ In this essay, I investigate how playing with the multiplicity of communicative possibilities can, **contrary to Agamben's expectations**, actually **facilitate aspirations for unitary sovereign power**. My argument unfolds in the context of the legal arguments put forward by Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, particularly those enabling torturous interrogations.¶ Those, like Agamben, who favor interpretive pluralism in itself rarely, if ever, have right-wing supporters of unchecked presidentialism in mind. Reading the scholarship and legal memoranda of John Yoo, formerly in the Bush administration's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and presently a University of California, Berkeley law professor, however, approaches an experience of pure mediality or of law that has become deposed or disconnected from its purposes. Yoo is well known as the author of the key legal memoranda asserting the president's discretionary power to make war, to engage in warrantless surveillance, and, most infamously, justifying torturous methods of interrogation. Some scholars refer to Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland to describe the experience of reading Yoo's legal memos.3 Is **John Yoo an exemplar of the whatever being** and pure mediality that Agamben describes and to which he contends politics should aspire?¶ In this paper, I describe how Yoo gestures toward pure mediality, as he indicates the experience of language itself as pure communicability or as pure means in his legal work when he emphasizes the openness of law to being exposed to new, different, flexible, or plural interpretive possibilities. I argue, however, that Yoo is not well described as whatever being. His work repeats too consistently in the direction of absolute presidential decisionism to be open to whatever.¶ Instead, Yoo's work may capture a broader development within our society that Agamben describes as the emergence of whatever being. Without saying that there has been no resistance to the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping and policies of torturous interrogations, the contrast between the response to the Nixon administration and the Bush administration is striking. Richard Nixon resigned one step ahead of impeachment in the midst of mass protests against his presidency. The articles of impeachment, for instance, addressed how Nixon engaged in warrantless wiretapping, and refused to execute laws passed by Congress faithfully while repeatedly engaging in conduct that violated the constitutional rights of citizens. Congress also passed major acts of legislation to prevent a president such as Nixon from ever again abusing power the way he had. These laws include the War Powers Act of 1973, the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.¶ In contrast, almost no one seems to have noticed that the Bush administration claimed power to make war at the president's sole discretion. Additionally, upon learning that the Bush administration engaged in criminal acts of surveillance, Congress amended FISA in the summer of 2008 to expand the government's power to spy on Americans, while immunizing from legal accountability non-state actors who collaborated with the then-criminal acts of government officials who followed Bush's illegal orders. Congress tried to make it impossible for those detained to question, legally, their detention or to bring the torturous treatment they endured to a court's attention, while allowing the intelligence agencies to continue to engage in torturous acts by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). This complicity on the part of Congress cannot be explained on partisan grounds as many Democrats voted in favor of the MCA, and upon becoming the majority party in Congress, they have not rescinded it. Indeed, it was a Democratic-controlled Congress that brushed the Bush administration's illegal surveillance under the rug in 2008.4 Moreover, upon taking power in 2006, the Democratic leadership immediately stated that they would not pursue impeachment. Former Reagan administration Department of Justice lawyer Bruce Fein has decried the lack of outrage at the Bush administration's illegalities by suggesting that the nation has become a collection of constitutional “illiterates.”5 **Perhaps law is being deposed as Agamben suggests**.¶ Both Agamben's and Fein's observations may also indicate a failure of what Michel Foucault would call disciplinary power – the power to constitute subjects capable of exercising power, here the powers of liberal democracy – a failure that Gilles Deleuze has identified with the emergence of societies of control, and a subjective and ontological diversity that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call the “multitude.”6 They also indicate practices of textual “interpretation” where interpretative acts extricate legal texts from the narratives that once oriented their purposes and animated these texts for a republican and anti-monarchical polity. Robert Cover argues, however, that law is part of a narrative practice constitutive of subjects and a way of life.7 Insofar as interpretive practices become extricated from the possibility of narrative, then, we may indeed doubt the continuing existence of “law,” as Agamben posits. Psychoanalytic theory also identifies a loss of a structuring meaning in contemporary society and describes this as the decline of symbolic efficiency.8¶ In sum, there appears to be a phenomenon emerging in contemporary society that a variety of different theoretical and political perspectives are struggling to grasp and evaluate. While Agamben welcomes the failures of disciplinary powers as enabling the emergence of whatever being and the “coming community,” it is a cause for concern among those seeking to keep the faith with republicanism, with liberal democracy, or with a Constitution representing these aspirations. In this light, we can be more specific than Agamben about the kind of threat that whatever being poses to the state or to sovereignty.¶ Contrary to Agamben's contentions, I find that whatever being is no threat at all to the kind of unitary sovereignty that Agamben uses to theorize the state in his book Homo Sacer. Why would it be? Whatever being would be equally at ease with the legal justifications on behalf of a “unitary” sovereignty as it would anything else. If we, however, give the achievements of the people their due and consider the question of sovereignty from the perspective of popular sovereignty, of the assemblies and assemblages of power through which liberal democratic states seek to extend themselves and to govern at a distance, then whatever being is very much a danger to this type of power. Whatever being can be understood as facilitating a process of deposing this law and this state. A relation of whatever to the installation of a state of unchecked presidential powers and torture can be the **death knell of popular sovereignty** dedicated to the purpose of opposing tyranny. Whatever being is not the enemy of any state or form of “sovereignty.” It is the enemy of popular sovereignty. Whatever ruins democracy. **If we want more than unchecked presidential power and torture, then we will have to dedicate ourselves to certain purposes**, like resisting tyranny and recalling that this was the purpose of the U.S. Constitution.

#### The alt guarantees global violence through naïve rejection of necessary responses to specific threats

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Writing shortly after the world had only just passed through the horror that was World War II, Niebuhr chided those who had shrunk from doing what was necessary to combat Nazi tyranny, especially those who made the claim that in the process of fighting fascism, "we would all become fascists."17 This did not happen. Liberties were "fairly well preserved" even during a prolonged, total war (with some notable exceptions, like the internment of Japanese and Japanese Americans). We are always well advised to fly the flags of warning about descending into terror as we fight terror, or authoritarianism as we fight authoritarianism. But these perils do not negate the need to respond; rather, they make self-examination even more necessary.¶ The peace of God, writes Niebuhr, "cannot be equated with the peace of detachment." There is a role for forgiveness in human affairs, but forgiveness does not allow us to avoid facing the facts and confronting a disharmonious world. Forgiveness is possible "only to those who have some recognition of common guilt," for all have fallen short.18 Those struggling against brutality cannot forget their own sins as they engage in that struggle. The world of political action is one that may give rise to moral regret as we confront what political theorists call the problem of "dirty hands," for we cannot remain pure in a difficult and often dangerous world. Christian realists, as they are often called, appreciate that "political units—cities, provinces, and nations. . . gather up all people within a given geographical area, and so must create a workable community from those who have not come together sharing a set of beliefs or commitments."19 Politics is the way these plural, diverse groups of people order a life together.¶ The theologian Robin Lovin reminds us that the starting point for Christian realists (and for the just war tradition, as I construe it) is Augustinian and hence quite different from Aristotelianism, which held that politics somehow fulfills and completes our nature (or at least the nature of the more completely rational free male). The primary and most compelling reason Christians enter politics, by contrast, is to restrain evi1.20 If the restraint of evil remains their exclusive concern, however, they may become complacent toward systematic inequities, so long as violence is kept at a minimum. By the same token, a politics of the common good, which always sounds good, may prompt its adherents to evade doing what is necessary to curb violence, domestic and international; they may **indulge in naive advocacy** and refuse to engage with the least pleasant realities of a world in conflict. "Justice" and "nonviolence" too easily become mantras divorced from the realities of a world descending into a vortex of horrible threats and even more terrible realities.¶ By contrast, those who, like Niebuhr, link the restraint of evil to a politics of justice and the common good gain a rich and complex perspective. Above all, Niebuhr insists, Christians dare not lose the language of justice. No doubt he would have cautioned us against calling September 11 a tragedy: If it is a tragedy, we can simply succor the wounded and grief-stricken and avoid dealing with the knowledge that planned terror remains a clear and present danger. Usually when a true tragedy occurs—a flood roars through a canyon, for instance, and kills vacationers—there is no one to punish. When acts of terror destroy lives, however, there are specific persons we do, rightly, punish. It is this task of punishment, essential to any workable vision of political justice, that many contemporary Christians shun.21 Perhaps because our culture, steeped in a therapeutic ethos, is tuned in to syndromes but resistant to sin, we prefer not to conjure with humanly willed horror.¶ Tied to this recognition is another: We have particular moral responsibilities to those nearest and dearest to us—parents to children, friends to other friends, but also citizens to fellow citizens. Vague talk about our responsibility for the entire human race is meaningless.22 Unless we tie our responsibility to concrete tasks, we are simply issuing greeting card nostrums. To call myself a "citizen of the world," as Hannah Arendt rightly insisted, is to strip citizenship of concrete meaning and to flee the world of political actuality for a world of vague goodwill. Those who take on the vocation of concrete political responsibility have a special obligation to their fellow citizens. Their obligations are not exclusive to their own citizenry, but they are far more meaningful and demanding than any thinned-out obligations to those who are not citizens. One dimension of a Niebuhrian ethic is to insist that, when Christianity is interpreted as an ethos of universal benevolence, it loses the concrete neighbor love we should always connect with it.¶ Niebuhr's larger contribution to the ongoing debate about Christ and culture and what is demanded from believers lies in his hardheaded insistence that Christianity is not solely a religion of love. Because the God of mercy is also a God of judgment, justice and love go together. Chiding what he calls "Christian moralism," Niebuhr reminds us that justice "requires discriminate judgments between conflicting claims." By contrast to simplistic moralism, a "profounder Christian faith must encourage men to create systems of justice" in a realm that presents "tragic choices, which are seldom envisaged in a type of idealism in which all choices are regarded as simple."23¶ Unfortunately, what presents itself as true Christian idealism, the idea that "pure moral suasion could solve every social problem," may be a form of self-delusion. This kind of idealism ignores the fall and the inheritance of sin and embraces an overly optimistic view of human nature and possibility. Niebuhr continues: "Whether the task of reconciliation is conceived in terms of pure moral suasion or whether it recognizes the inevitabilities of conflict in society and only seeks to avoid violence in such conflicts, it is interesting that the consequence of such conceptions is to create moral idealists who imagine that they are changing the world by their moral ideals." Or, one might add, by their condemnations. But either stance evades "responsibility for maintaining a relative justice in an evil world," a stance that Niebuhr insists is central to biblical understanding.24¶ Whether Niebuhr was calling for repeal of the Neutrality Act of 1939 as an immoral law promoting isolationism, urging Christians into the fight against Nazism, or opposing the war in Vietnam, he held that the world must be engaged. Sentimentality in the name of Christianity must be avoided and idolatry of the state—any state—eschewed. Christians must understand that their own freedom is entangled with political realities and possibilities. It follows that Christians as citizens have "an important stake in politics" and in all the institutions that are the warp and woof of a democratic society.25 Niebuhr was especially scathing in his criticism of those who advocate a withdrawal from what he called "world responsibility"—people who keep their own hands clean by refusing to confront the inevitable moral ambiguities of politics.¶ Most pertinent to the contemporary war against terrorism are Niebuhr's World War II–era writings. In a potent essay, "Love Your Enemies," Niebuhr argued with a "certain rather hysterical" strain of Christian idealism that believed that, since Christians are enjoined to love all men, and "it is impossible to love an enemy, you must have no enemy." Is this really so? he queried. He challenged those who were then "touring the country with the message that all people who are participating in the war will become so corrupted by hatred that they will be incapable of contributing to a decent peace." Niebuhr called, in cutting tones, on "the handful of nonparticipants to hold themselves in readiness to build a new world after the rest of us have ruined it."26¶ A summary of Niebuhr's response to this idealistic message—here one is reminded of Camus's see-no-evil "humanists"—is reducible to one word: balderdash. Of course, war and conflict tempt some to hatred, but "this hatred is not nearly as universal as our idealists assume. And it is least general among those who are engaged in the actual horrors of belligerency." Niebuhr points to a commonly accepted fact of war-fighting: combatants themselves usually do not hate. Bloodthirstiness is more often found on the sidelines. Niebuhr also mulls over the poverty of the idealists' deployment of terms like "love." Christian agape, the love of the Kingdom of God, is more than a "refined form of sympathy, for it does not depend upon the likes and dislikes that men may have for each other."27 We may struggle against a determined foe intent on our harm and destruction without hating that foe.¶ Yet criticism of and contempt for, the military comes readily to the lips of many religious people, perhaps because they put the worst possible interpretation on those who have determined that a resort to force is justified. Niebuhr insists, however, that such contempt flows from a sentimentalized Christianity whose adherents have reduced the complexities of the Christian message to slogans that exalt alleged victims, encourage condemnation of responsible authorities, and traffic in attention-getting breast-beating. Sometimes what looks like self-effacement is really a form of self-promotion.¶ On December 18, 1940, pondering America's entry into World War II, Niebuhr published an essay, "To Prevent the Triumph of an Intolerable¶ Tyranny," in the journal Christian Century.28 America was not, as some alleged, plunging recklessly into conflict, Niebuhr argues. To the contrary, "contemporary history refutes the idea that nations are drawn into war too precipitately. It proves, on the contrary, that it is the general inclination, of democratic nations at least, to hesitate so long before taking this fateful plunge that the dictator nations gain a fateful advantage over them by having the opportunity of overwhelming them singly, instead of being forced to meet their common resistance." (Niebuhr was referring to appeasement of the German National Socialists, who, by the time the essay was written, had already overrun Poland and Czechoslovakia.) It is naive to assume that "all war could be avoided if only you could persuade nations not to cross each other's borders." Those who counseled neutrality for America in 1940 so as to avoid entering the conflict, Niebuhr claims, exhibited the fruit of a "moral confusion that issues from moral perfectionism, whenever moral perfectionism seeks to construct political systems." The result is that evil flourishes, as in Germany, "its fury . . fed by a pagan religion of tribal self-glorification; . . . it intends to root out the Christian religion; . . . it defies all the universal standards of justice," and it threatens the Jewish people "with annihilation."¶ How can one not respond to such attacks? To condemn America's alleged rush to war, to make that the focus of critique rather than the statements and aims of those on the attack, is a rhetoric of perfectionism of the sort that informs much of liberal Protestantism in America. This brand of Protestantism, Niebuhr stated rather bitingly during World War II, is "wrong not only about this war and the contemporary international situation. It is wrong about the whole nature of historical reality." Sadly, he concludes, much pacifism in America (he calls it "perfectionist pacifism") springs from this same well of historic utopianism rather than from solid scriptural resources. Liberal pacifism, for Niebuhr, is a position that relies far more on a general faith in human perfectibility and a teleology of historic progress than it does on the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. It is, in other words, an ideological, not a gospel, stance.29 Are Christians not obliged to respond, even at the risk of dirtying their hands?

#### Judicial action is a meaningful restraint, and debating judicial prez powers restraints is good

Serrano and Minami, ‘03 (Susan, Project Director, Equal Justice Society; J.D. 1998, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai', partner, Minami, Lew & Timaki, Asian Law Journal, Korematsu v. United States: A "Constant Caution" in a Time of Crisis, p. Lexis)

Today, a broadly conceived political identity is critical to the defense of civil liberties. In 1942, Japanese Americans stood virtually alone, without allies, and suffered the banishment of their entire race. Forty years later, Japanese Americans, supported by Americans of all colors, were able to extract an apology and redress from a powerful nation. That lesson of the need for political empowerment was made even more obvious after September 11, 2001, when Arab and Muslim American communities, politically isolated and besieged by hostility fueled by ignorance, became targets of violence and discrimination. In the aftermath of September 11, Japanese Americans knew from history that the United States, which turned on them in 1942, could repeat itself in 2001. Therefore, on September 12, 2001, the Japanese American Citizens' League, the oldest Asian American civil rights organization in the country, immediately issued a press release warning against racial discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans and supporting their  [**[\*49]**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=bee887063044547ab12532f483726d11&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAk&_md5=f0e31afba24c7755402ea0ead0b3cfb6&focBudTerms=%2522serrano%2522%20and%20%2522minami%2522%20and%20%2522korematsu%2522&focBudSel=all)  civil rights.n60 Other Japanese American individuals and groups have offered their friendship, political support, and solidarity with Arab and Muslim Americans. Japanese Americans also knew from their Redress experience that political power was the strongest antidote. The coram nobis legal teams understood the political dimensions of their cases and adopted a course of litigation that would discredit the Wartime Cases by undermining the legal argument that the Supreme Court had legitimized the World War II exclusion and detention. This impaired (though did not overturn) the value of Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui as legal precedents for mass imprisonments of any definable racial group without due process. The even larger vision of these cases, however, was the long-term education of the American public. Many still believed (and continue to believe) that there were valid reasons for incarcerating Japanese Americans en masse: the coram nobis cases strongly refuted that notion and boldly illuminated the essentially political nature of the judicial system. In doing so, the coram nobis cases have contributed to the public's education about the frailty of civil rights and the evanescence of justice in our courts. As such, these cases highlight the need for continuing political activism and constant vigilance to protect our civil rights. In today's climate of fear and uncertainty, we must engage ourselves to assure that the vast national security regime does not overwhelm the civil liberties of vulnerable groups. This means exercising our political power, making our dissents heard, publicizing injustices done to our communities as well as to others, and enlisting allies from diverse communities. Concretely, this may mean joining others' struggles in the courts, Congress, schools and union halls; organizing protests against secret arrests, incarcerations, and deportations; building coalitions with other racial communities; writing op-ed essays or letters to politicians; launching media campaigns; donating money; and writing essays and articles.n61 Through these various ways, "our task is to compel our institutions, particularly the courts, to be vigilant, to "protect all.'" n62 The lesson of the Wartime Cases and coram nobis cases taken together is not that the government may target an entire ethnic group in the name of national security; the cases teach us instead that civil rights and liberties are best protected by strongly affirming their place in our national character, especially in times of national crisis. As Fred Korematsu avowed nearly twenty years ago, we must not let our governmental  **[[\*50]](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=bee887063044547ab12532f483726d11&docnum=3&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAk&_md5=f0e31afba24c7755402ea0ead0b3cfb6&focBudTerms=%2522serrano%2522%20and%20%2522minami%2522%20and%20%2522korematsu%2522&focBudSel=all)**  institutions mistreat another racial group in such a manner again. To do this, we must "collectively [turn] the lessons learned, the political and economic capital gained, the alliances forged and the spirit renewed, into many small and some grand advances against continuing harmful discrimination across America."n63 We must become, as Professor Yamamoto has argued, "present-day social actors, agents of justice, because real, hard injustices are occurring all around us every day to Asian Americans and other racial communities and beyond." n64

### 2AC – AT: Damage Suits CP

#### Perm do the counterplan—extend Chebab could incorporate damage suits

#### Perm do both—have the drone court also hear damage suits

#### No Solvency—

#### Can’t solve terror—there is no limit on strikes, just reparations afterward—means casualties still happen that cause blowback—impact is terrorism

#### Can’t solve groupthink—court’s don’t check targeting decisions—impact is nuke war

#### Ex ante review is key—only way to signal meaningful judicial oversight, that’s key to solve drone prolif because it demonstrates accountability

#### Ex post review fails to solve legitimacy or set up a legal framework

Crandall 12 (Carla, Law Clerk – Supreme Court of Missouri, “Ready…Fire…Aim! A Case for Applying American Due Process Principles Before Engaging in Drone Strikes,” Florida Journal of International Law, April, 24 Fla. J. Int'l L. 55, Lexis)

Despite the expanded use of drones, however, the legitimacy of these attacks remains unclear. Most commentators who have addressed the legitimacy of more general targeted killings have examined the issue within the framework of either international humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law (IHRL). n6 Those limited few who have [\*57] analyzed the subject through the lens of American due process have limited their scrutiny to the absence of post-deprivation rights. n7 They suggest, for instance, that the United States should implement some sort of Bivens-type action as a remedy for the survivors of erroneous drone strikes. n8

As this Article explains, however, none of these approaches yield wholly satisfactory answers as to which framework should govern the use of drones within the context of the war on terror. And though the idea that American due process principles ought to be applied ex post represents a significant contribution to the debate, it too ultimately falls flat. Indeed, such an approach unduly narrows the obligation of U.S. officials to the standard of readying, firing, and then aiming- requiring them to perform a detailed review of the strikes only after the fact. Instead, this Article argues that the United States ought to be held to a higher, ex ante standard-that of "aiming" before firing-and posits that such a standard is practically attainable.

In doing so, the Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the capabilities and current employment of drones and explains why resolving the legitimacy of their use is so critical. Specifically, it highlights that, despite the unsettled nature of the law in this area, targeted killings by drone strikes have increased exponentially in recent years-in some instances against arguably questionable targets. Part III examines current attempts to address the legitimacy of drone assaults and explains why they fail to adequately govern the use of these weapons. While this Part explores the applicability of IHRL and IHL, it does not undertake to resolve the debate as to which regime does or ought to apply to these operations. To the contrary, it argues that limitations within each framework have prevented consensus from forming around the applicability of either. Accordingly, U.S. officials [\*58] must arguably look to other sources to find guiding principles to legitimize targeted killings via drones. Though it is admittedly not entirely clear whether constitutional guarantees apply in the foreign locales where these strikes occur-or to the foreign nationals who are often their target-this Part proposes that American due process principles nevertheless ought to be invoked before such strikes occur, because failing to do so allows the executive to act with impunity in a legal void. Part IV argues that, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld n9 and Boumediene v. Bush, n10 the Supreme Court signaled the process that may be due before drones are used to eliminate known terrorist targets. In extending the Hamdi and Boumediene analysis to targeted killings by drones, this Part also begins the inquiry into the procedural protections that due process may demand before U.S. officials engage in such actions. Part V concludes.

## 1AR

### PTX

#### Support is there for additional sanctions- will be veto proof

Johnson 1-8

(Bridget Johnson is a career journalist whose news articles and opinion columns have run in dozens of news outlets across the globe. “Veto-Proof Majority on Iran Sanctions Bill Looking More Likely” 1-8-14 http://pjmedia.com/tatler/2014/01/08/veto-proof-majority-on-iran-sanctions-bill-looking-more-likely//wyoccd)

The number of co-sponsors backing the Iran sanctions bill introduced before the holiday by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) has now reached 50, according to the Jerusalem Post.¶ The last recorded number in the Library of Congress database is 47 co-sponsors. The most recent bump shows that not only would the bill that angers the White House pass on a bipartisan basis, but would likely hit a veto-proof majority on a bipartisan basis.¶ At least 14 Democrats have signed on board the bill, including Sens. Mark Begich (D-Alaska), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Ben Cardin (D-Md.), Bob Casey (D-Pa.), Chris Coons (D-Del.), Joe Donnelly (D-Ind.), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Kay Hagan (D-N.C.), Mary Landrieu (D-La.), Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.), Mark Pryor (D-Ark.), Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Mark Warner (D-Va.).¶ Supporters need 67 votes for a veto-proof majority. Assuming all Republicans vote for the bill, that leaves 22 Democrats needed come voting time.¶ Both Colorado senators –Mark Udall (D) and Michael Bennet — have previously supported sanctions legislation. Other potential votes could include Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Heidi Heitkamp (D-N.D.), Jon Tester (D-Mont.), Tom Udall (D-N.M.), Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.), Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii), Clarie McCaskill (D-Mo.), Max Baucus (D-Mont.), Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) and Bill Nelson (D-Fla.).¶ The Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act was introduced Dec. 19 by more than a quarter of the Senate. The bipartisan legislation proposes prospective sanctions against Iran’s petroleum, engineering, mining and construction sectors should the regime violate the interim Joint Plan of Action agreed to in Geneva or should Iran fail to reach a final agreement with the P5+1.¶ “With regards to this particular measure, we don’t think it will be enacted. We certainly don’t think it should be enacted,” White House press secretary Jay Carney said at the time, promising a presidential veto. “And the reason why it should not and does not need to be enacted is because if Iran does not comply with its obligations under the Joint Plan of Action, the preliminary agreement, or if Iran fails to reach agreement with the P5-plus-1 on the more comprehensive agreement over the course of six months, we are very confident that we can work with Congress to very quickly pass new, effective sanctions against Iran. And it is our view that it is very important to refrain from taking an action that would potentially disrupt the opportunity here for a diplomatic resolution of this challenge.”¶ The Menendez-Kirk effort already has high-ranking support from House leadership, with a similar resolution offered by Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer (D-Md.).¶ Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has warned that “the entire deal is dead” if new sanctions are enacted.¶ “We do not like to negotiate under duress. And if Congress adopts sanctions, it shows lack of seriousness and lack of a desire to achieve a resolution on the part of the United States,” Zarif said.¶ However, the deal forged by the Obama administration and the European Union hasn’t even been implemented yet.