## 1AC

### Plan

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase statutory restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States by establishing a federal counterterrorism oversight court with jurisdiction over targeted killing orders for robotic aerial vehicles.

### Terror

#### Expansive use of targeted killing causes blowback, collateral damage, and operational errors— new guidelines key

Guiora, 2012

[Amos, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, Targeted killing: when proportionality gets all out of proportion, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. 45.1-2 (Fall 2012): p235., Academic onefile] /Wyo-MB

Morality in armed conflict is not a mere mantra: it imposes significant demands on the nation state that must adhere to limits and considerations beyond simply killing "the other side." For better or worse, drone warfare of today will become the norm of tomorrow. Multiply the number of attacks conducted regularly in the present and you have the operational reality of future warfare. It is important to recall that drone policy is effective on two distinct levels: it takes the fight to terrorists directly involved, either in past or future attacks, and serves as a powerful deterrent for those considering involvement in terrorist activity. (53) However, its importance and effectiveness must not hinder critical conversation, particularly with respect to defining imminence and legitimate target. The overly broad definition, "flexible" in the Obama Administration's words, (54) raises profound concerns regarding how imminence is applied. That concern is concrete for the practical import of Brennan's phrasing is a dramatic broadening of the definition of legitimate target. It is also important to recall that operators--military, CIA or private contractors--are responsible for implementing executive branch guidelines and directives. (55) For that very reason, the approach articulated by Brennan on behalf of the administration is troubling. This approach, while theoretically appealing, fails on a number of levels. First, it undermines and does a profound injustice to the military and security personnel tasked with operationalizing defense of the state, particularly commanders and officers. When senior leadership deliberately obfuscates policy to create wiggle room and plausible deniability, junior commanders (those at the tip of the spear, in essence) have no framework to guide their operational choices. (56) The results can be disastrous, as the example of Abu Ghraib shows all too well. (57) Second, it gravely endangers the civilian population. What is done in the collective American name poses danger both to our safety, because of the possibility of blow-back attacks in response to a drone attack that caused significant collateral damage, and to our values, because the policy is loosely articulated and problematically implemented.(58) Third, the approach completely undermines our commitment to law and morality that defines a nation predicated on the rule of law. If everyone who constitutes "them" is automatically a legitimate target, then careful analysis of threats, imminence, proportionality, credibility, reliability, and other factors become meaningless. Self-defense becomes a mantra that justifies all action, regardless of method or procedure.

#### Exclusive executive decision making in drone strikes makes groupthink and errors inevitable

Chebab, 2012

[Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review, 3-30-12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572] /Wyo-MB

The practical, pragmatic justification for the COAACC derives largely from considering¶ social psychological findings regarding the skewed potential associated with limiting unchecked decision-making in a group of individuals. As an initial point, psychologists have long pointed out how individuals frequently fall prey to cognitive illusions that produce systematic errors in judgment.137 People simply do not make decisions by choosing the optimal outcome from available alternatives, but instead employ shortcuts (i.e., heuristics) for convenience.138 Cognitive biases like groupthink can hamper effective policy deliberations and formulations.139 Groupthink largely arises when a group of decision-makers seek conformity and agreement, thereby avoiding alternative points of view that are critical of the consensus position.140 This theory suggests that some groups—particularly those characterized by a strong leader, considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfidence, and a shared world view or value system—suffer from a deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis.141 Many factors can affect such judgment, including a lack of crucial information, insufficient timing for decision-making, poor judgment, pure luck, and/or unexpected actions by adversaries.142 Moreover, decision-makers inevitably tend to become influenced by irrelevant information,143 seek out data and assessments that confirm their beliefs and personal hypotheses notwithstanding contradictory evidence,144 and “[i]rrationally avoid choices that represent extremes when a decision involves a trade-off between two incommensurable values.”145 Self-serving biases can also hamper judgment given as it has been shown to induce well-intentioned people to rationalize virtually any behavior, judgment or action after the fact.146 The confirmation and overconfidence bias, both conceptually related to groupthink, also result in large part from neglecting to consider contradictory evidence coupled with an irrational persistence in pursuing ideological positions divorced from concern of alternative viewpoints.147¶ Professor Cass Sunstein has described situations in which groupthink produced poor results precisely because consensus resulted from the failure to consider alternative sources of information.148 The failures of past presidents to consider alternative sources of information, critically question risk assessments, ensure neutral-free ideological sentiment among those deliberating,149 and/or generally ensure properly deliberated national security policy has produced prominent and devastating blunders,150 including the Iraq War of 2003,151 the Bay of Pigs debacle in the 1960’s,152 and the controversial decision to wage war against Vietnam.153¶ Professor Sunstein also has described the related phenomenon of “group polarization,” which includes the tendency to push group members toward a “more extreme position.”154 Given that both groupthink and group polarization can lead to erroneous and ideologically tainted policy positions, the notion of giving the President unchecked authority in determining who is eligible for assassination can only serve to increase the likelihood for committing significant errors.155 The reality is that psychological mistakes, organizational ineptitude, lack of structural coherence and other associated deficiencies are inevitable features in Executive Branch decision-making.

Branch decision-making.

#### Impact is nuclear war

Wright, 2003

[Rusty, former associate speaker and writer with Probe Ministries, is an international lecturer, award-winning author, and journalist who has spoken on six continents. He holds Bachelor of Science (psychology) and Master of Theology degrees from Duke and Oxford universities, JFK and Groupthink: Lessons in Decision Making, http://www.probe.org/site/c.fdKEIMNsEoG/b.4221087/] /Wyo-MB

A fascinating facet of Kennedy's legacy involves the decision- making procedures he used among his closest advisors. Some brought great successes. Others were serious failures. This article looks at two specific examples: the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, an attempt to invade Cuba and overthrow Fidel Castro that became a fiasco, and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis that saw the world come perilously close to nuclear war.¶ Yale social psychologist Irving Janis studied these episodes carefully and concluded that too often decision makers are ~~blinded~~ by their own needs for self-esteem they get from being an accepted member of a socially important insiders group. Fears of shattering the warm feelings of perceived unanimity -- of rocking the boat -- kept some of Kennedy's advisors from objecting to the Bay of Pigs plan before it was too late. After that huge blunder, JFK revamped his decision-making process to encourage dissent and critical evaluation among his team. In the Cuban missile crisis, virtually the same policymakers produced superior results.{2}¶ "Groupthink" was the term Janis used for the phenomenon of flawed group dynamics that can let bad ideas go unchallenged and can sometimes yield disastrous outcomes. This article will consider how groupthink might have affected JFK and a major television enterprise, and how it can affect you.¶ The Bay of Pigs Invasion¶ "How could I have been so stupid?"{3} President John F. Kennedy asked that after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. He called it a "colossal mistake."{4} It left him feeling depressed, guilty, bitter, and in tears.{5} One historian later called the Bay of Pigs, "one of those rare events in history -- a perfect failure."{6}¶ What happened? In 1961, CIA and military leaders wanted to use Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro. After lengthy consideration among his top advisors, Kennedy approved a covert invasion. Advance press reports alerted Castro to the threat. Over 1,400 invaders at the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) were vastly outnumbered. Lacking air support, necessary ammunition and an escape route, nearly 1,200 surrendered. Others died.¶ Declassified CIA documents help illuminate the invasion's flaws. Top CIA leaders blamed Kennedy for not authorizing vital air strikes. Other CIA analysts fault the wishful thinking that the invasion would stimulate an uprising among Cuba's populace and military. Planners assumed the invaders could simply fade into the mountains for guerilla operations. Trouble was, eighty miles of swampland separated the bay from the mountains. The list goes on.{7}¶ Irving Janis felt that Kennedy's top advisors were unwilling to challenge bad ideas because it might disturb perceived or desired group concurrence. Presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger, for instance, presented serious objections to the invasion in a memorandum to the president, but suppressed his doubts at the team meetings. Attorney General Robert Kennedy privately admonished Schlesinger to support the president's decision to invade. At one crucial meeting, JFK called on each member for his vote for or against the invasion. Each member, that is, except Schlesinger -- whom he knew to have serious concerns. Many members assumed other members agreed with the invasion plan.{8}¶ Schlesinger later lamented, "In the months after the Bay of Pigs I bitterly reproached myself for having kept so silent during those crucial discussions in the cabinet room." He continued, "I can only explain my failure to do more than raise a few timid questions by reporting that one's impulse to blow the whistle on this nonsense was simply undone by the circumstances of the discussion."{9}¶ Have you ever kept silent when you felt you should speak up? President Kennedy later revised his group decision-making process to encourage dissent and debate. The change helped avert a nuclear catastrophe, as we will see.¶ The Cuban Missile Crisis¶ Ever face tough decisions? How would you feel if your wrong decision might mean nuclear war? Consider a time when the world teetered on the brink of disaster.{10}¶ Stung by the Bay of Pigs debacle, President Kennedy determined to ask hard questions during future crises.{11} A good opportunity came eighteen months later.¶ In October 1962, aerial photographs showed Soviet missile sites in Cuba.{12} The missile program, if allowed to continue, could reach most of the United States with nuclear warheads.{13} Kennedy's first inclination was an air strike to take out the missiles.{14} His top advisors debated alternatives from bombing and invasion to blockade and negotiation.{15}¶ On October 22, Kennedy set forth an ultimatum in a televised address: A U.S. naval "quarantine" would block further offensive weapons from reaching Cuba. Russia must promptly dismantle and withdraw all offensive weapons. Use of the missiles would bring attacks against the Soviet Union.{16}¶ The U.S. Navy blockaded Cuba. Soviets readied their forces. The Pentagon directed the Strategic Air Command to begin a nuclear alert. On October 24, the world held its breath as six Soviet ships approached the blockade. Then, all six ships either stopped or reversed course.{17} Secretary of State Dean Rusk told a colleague, "We're eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked."{18}¶ A maze of negotiations ensued. At the United Nations, U.S. ambassador Adlai Stevenson publicly pressed his Soviet counterpart to confirm or deny Soviet missiles' existence in Cuba. Saying he was prepared to wait for an answer "until hell freezes over," Stevenson then displayed reconnaissance photos to the Security Council.{19} Eventually, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev removed the missiles.{20}¶ Kennedy's decision-making process -- though imperfect -- had evolved significantly. He challenged military leaders who pressured him to bomb and invade. He heard the CIA's case for air strikes and Stevenson's counsel for negotiation. Advocates for different views developed their arguments in committees then met back together.{21} Robert Kennedy later wrote, "The fact that we were able to talk, debate, argue, disagree, and then debate some more was essential in choosing our ultimate course."{22} Many groupthink mistakes of the Bay of Pigs, in which bad ideas went unchallenged, had been avoided.{23}¶ Groupthink has serious ramifications for government, business, academia, neighborhood, family, and the ministry. One area it has affected is Christian television.

#### Judicial review solves groupthink

Chebab, 2012

[Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review, 3-30-12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572] /Wyo-MB

To check the vices of groupthink and shortcomings of human judgment, the psychology literature emphasizes a focus on accountability mechanisms in which a better reasoned decision- making process can flourish.156 By serving as a constraint on behavior, “accountability functions as a critical norm-enforcement mechanism—the social psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on the other.”157 Such institutional review can channel recognition for the need by government decision-makers to be more self-critical in policy targeted killing designations, more willing to consider alternative points of view, and more willing to anticipate possible objections.158 Findings have also shown that ex ante awareness can lead to more reasoned judgment while also preventing tendentious and ideological inclinations (and political motivations incentivized and exploited by popular hysteria and fear).159 Requiring accounting in a formalized way prior to engaging in a targeted killing—by providing, for example, in camera review, limited declassification of information, explaining threat assessments outside the immediate circle of policy advisors, and securing meaningful judicial review via a COAACC-like tribunal—can promote a more reliable and informed deliberation in the executive branch. With process-based judicial review, the COAACC could effectively reorient the decision to target individuals abroad by examining key procedural aspects—particularly assessing the reliability of the “terrorist” designation—and can further incentivize national security policy-makers to engage in more carefully reasoned choices and evaluate available alternatives than when subject to little to no review.

#### Plan is key to effective drone use—solves blowback

Masood 13

(Hassan, Monmouth College, “Death from the Heavens: The Politics of the United States’ Drone Campaign in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” 2013) /wyo-mm

Those who support the use of drones as an important counter-insurgency tactic nonetheless point out that the current campaign is not always conducted in the most effective manner. The authors of “Sudden Justice” for example, argue that the campaign should be focused on ‘high value targets’ and not be used frequently to take down the lower level operatives. The more you can destroy and disrupt the activities of personnel in the Taliban and al-Qaeda from the top-down instead of the bottom-up, the more of an impact it will have. The leadership qualities, organizational skills, and strategic awareness of various high-level commanders in both the Taliban and al-Qaeda cannot be easily replaced after their deaths at the hands of U.S. drones. Fricker and Plaw use the example of Baitullah Mehsud, a Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) leader who was killed by a drone strike on the roof of his uncle’s house on August 5, 2009. His death provoked an internal struggle in his organization that ultimately led to enough confusion and tension within the TTP that the Pakistan Army was able to launch the South Waziristan

ng said that whileOffensive, putting the TTP on the defensive. But the lower level Taliban and al-Qaeda members have skills and abilities that are more common and more easily replaced. The amount of time and energy, the article asserts, that the U.S. is spending killing lower-level members (and increasing civilian casualties in the process, as the majority of the time these strikes happen during funeral processions or wedding parties) could instead be used to seriously disrupt the activities of the entire organization by targeting its leaders, much like the death of Osama bin Laden did to al-Qaeda in South/Central Asia in 2011. David Rohde agrees that the drones should be used, as they are an effective and efficient way of disrupting and destroying the extremist power base there, but their usage should be both selective and surgical. There is no consensus among scholars when it comes to evaluating the effectiveness of the use of drones as a counter-insurgency tactic. As Hassan Abbas points out “the truth is we don’t know whether U.S. drone strikes have killed more terrorists or produced more terrorists.”

#### Global terror threat is high and attacks against the US are immanent

ETN, 9-26-13

[E Turbo News Global Travel News Industry Reporting on information from the State department, US State Department issues worldwide travel warning, http://www.eturbonews.com/38306/us-state-department-issues-worldwide-travel-warning] /Wyo-MB

The US State Department recently released a statement cautioning Americans traveling abroad of potential terror attacks in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East by al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups.¶ According to the report published on US State Government website, The Department of State has issued this Worldwide Caution to update information on the continuing threat of terrorist actions and violence against US citizens and interests throughout the world.¶ U.S. citizens are reminded to maintain a high level of vigilance and to take appropriate steps to increase their security awareness. This replaces the Worldwide Caution dated February 19, 2013, to provide updated information on security threats and terrorist activities worldwide.¶ The Department of State remains concerned about the continued threat of terrorist attacks, demonstrations, and other violent actions against U.S. citizens and interests overseas. Current information suggests that al-Qaeda, its affiliated organizations, and other terrorist groups continue to plan terrorist attacks against US interests in multiple regions, including Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. These attacks may employ a wide variety of tactics including suicide operations, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, and bombings.¶ Extremists may elect to use conventional or non-conventional weapons, and target both official and private interests. Examples of such targets include high-profile sporting events, residential areas, business offices, hotels, clubs, restaurants, places of worship, schools, public areas, shopping malls, and other tourist destinations both in the United States and abroad where US citizens gather in large numbers, including during holidays.¶ In early August 2013, the Department of State instructed certain US embassies and consulates to remain closed or to suspend operations August 4 through August 10 because of security information received. The US government took these precautionary steps out of an abundance of caution and care for our employees and others who may have planned to visit our installations.¶ US citizens are reminded of the potential for terrorists to attack public transportation systems and other tourist infrastructure.¶ Extremists have targeted and attempted attacks on subway and rail systems, aviation, and maritime services. In the past, these types of attacks have occurred in cities such as Moscow, London, Madrid, Glasgow, and New York City.¶ “Extremists may elect to use conventional or nonconventional weapons, and target both official and private interests,” the department said yesterday. Potential targets may include high-profile sports events, residences, businesses, hotels, clubs, restaurants, schools, places of worship, shopping malls and tourist destinations where Americans congregate.¶ Two US officials familiar with the warni it’s a routine renewal of the department’s worldwide caution, it also reflects mounting intelligence that suggests Islamic terrorist groups loosely affiliated with what remains of al-Qaeda’s core leadership in Pakistan may be planning a new series of attacks against Western targets.

#### And Nuclear terrorism is feasible---high risk of theft and attacks escalate

Vladimir Z. Dvorkin ‘12 Major General (retired), doctor of technical sciences, professor, and senior fellow at the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Center participates in the working group of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, 9/21/12, "What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what\_can\_destroy\_strategic\_stability.html

Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

the entire counterterrorist effort, or become a national obsession that creates needless terror.

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction

**Morgan 9**Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus – South Korea (Dennis, Futures, November, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Science Direct), accessed 9-16-2011,WYO/JF

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” In Section , **Moore points out what most** **terrorists** obviously **already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries**. No doubt, **they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange**. As Moore points out, **all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel**. **Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,”** **it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States”**Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities**In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia.China would probably be involved as well,** **as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere**. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so.**The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons**. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors”  **In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons**, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, **leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.**

### Drone Prolif

#### Drone Prolif Now

Zenko, 2013

[Micah, Council of Foreign Relations, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, January 2013, Council Special Report No. 65, Online] /Wyo-MB

It is estimated that the number of states that have acquired a com- plete drone system has grown from forty-one in 2005 to seventy-six in 2012.49 Over that same period of time, the number of total drone pro- grams within those states increased from one hundred ninety-five to nine hundred.50 Like the United States, the vast majority of all drones developed by other countries will be used exclusively for government or civilian intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Some advanced industrial economies—such as Russia, Taiwan, and South Korea—have developed increasingly sophisticated and largely indigenous drone capabilities, but they have also missed deadlines for when they would field armed drones, according to their own defense ministries. There is no international association for drone manufactur- ers and operators—similar to those that exist for civilian nuclear facili- ties or commercial space launches—that provides reliable information on drones or serves as a forum to exchange best practices to limit the associated risks and costs. Since most publicly available information is limited to air shows and the defense trade press, it is possible that there have been intentionally hidden advances toward states’ development of weaponized drones.

#### The US has a narrow window of opportunity to shape drone proliferation, only US reform based on transparency and restraint will solve

Zenko, 2013

[Micah, Council of Foreign Relations, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, January 2013, Council Special Report No. 65, Online] /Wyo-MB

In short, a world characterized by the proliferation of armed drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would under- mine core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer heeds the borders of sovereign states. Because of drones’ inherent advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors would be much more likely to use lethal force against the United States and its allies. Much like policies governing the use of nuclear weapons, offensive cyber capabilities, and space, developing rules and frameworks for innovative weapons systems, much less reaching a consensus within the U.S. government, is a long and arduous process. In its second term, the Obama administration has a narrow policy window of opportunity to pursue reforms of the targeted killings program. The Obama admin- istration can proactively shape U.S. and international use of armed drones in nonbattlefield settings through transparency, self-restraint, and engagement, or it can continue with its current policies and risk the consequences. To better secure the ability to conduct drone strikes, and potentially influence how others will use armed drones in the future, the United States should undertake the following specific policy recommendations.

#### Establishing a precedent of transparency and accountability spills over globally– a non-executive framework is key

Brooks 13 (Rosa, Professor of Law – Georgetown University Law Center, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow – New America Foundation, Former Counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy – Department of Defense, “The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing,” Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 4-23, <http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf>)

5. Setting Troubling International Precedents Here is an additional reason to worry about the U.S. overreliance on drone strikes: Other states will follow America's example, and the results are not likely to be pretty. Consider once again the Letelier murder, which was an international scandal in 1976: If the Letelier assassination took place today, the Chilean authorities would presumably insist on their national right to engage in “targeted killings” of individuals deemed to pose imminent threats to Chilean national security -- and they would justify such killings using precisely the same legal theories the US currently uses to justify targeted killings in Yemen or Somalia. We should assume that governments around the world—including those with less than stellar human rights records, such as Russia and China—are taking notice. Right now, the United States has a decided technological advantage when it comes to armed drones, but that will not last long. We should use this window to advance a robust legal and normative framework that will help protect against abuses by those states whose leaders can rarely be trusted. Unfortunately, we are doing the exact opposite: Instead of articulating norms about transparency and accountability, the United States is effectively handing China, Russia, and every other repressive state a playbook for how to foment instability and –literally -- get away with murder. Take the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty has long been a core concept of the Westphalian international legal order.42 In the international arena, all sovereign states are formally considered equal and possessed of the right to control their own internal affairs free of interference from other states. That's what we call the principle of non-intervention -- and it means, among other things, that it is generally prohibited for one state to use force inside the borders of another sovereign state. There are some well-established exceptions, but they are few in number. A state can lawfully use force inside another sovereign state with that state's invitation or consent, or when force is authorized by the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to the U.N. Charter, 43 or in self-defense "in the event of an armed attack." The 2011 Justice Department White Paper asserts that targeted killings carried out by the United States don't violate another state's sovereignty as long as that state either consents or is "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by the individual being targeted." That sounds superficially plausible, but since the United States views itself as the sole arbiter of whether a state is "unwilling or unable" to suppress that threat, the logic is in fact circular. It goes like this: The United States -- using its own malleable definition of "imminent" -- decides that Person X, residing in sovereign State Y, poses a threat to the United States and requires killing. Once the United States decides that Person X can be targeted, the principle of sovereignty presents no barriers, because either 1) State Y will consent to the U.S. use of force inside its borders, in which case the use of force presents no sovereignty problems or 2) State Y will not consent to the U.S. use of force inside its borders, in which case, by definition, the United States will deem State Y to be "unwilling or unable to suppress the threat" posed by Person X and the use of force again presents no problem. This is a legal theory that more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty, and has the potential to significantly destabilize the already shaky collective security regime created by the U.N. Charter.44 If the US is the sole arbiter of whether and when it can use force inside the borders of another state, any other state strong enough to get away with it is likely to claim similar prerogatives. And, of course, if the US executive branch is the sole arbiter of what constitutes an imminent threat and who constitutes a targetable enemy combatant in an illdefined war, why shouldn’t other states make identical arguments—and use them to justify the killing of dissidents, rivals, or unwanted minorities?

#### And, independent courts are key—only checks on unilateral executive power can provide legitimacy to the United States and credibility to our counterterror policies, finally, the selection process for drone courts solves all disads to judges

Chebab, 2012

[Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review, 3-30-12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572] /Wyo-MB

Rather, balancing the needs of security against the imperatives of liberty is a traditional¶ role for judges to play as recognized by the founders in the Fourth Amendment.110 Two scholars of national security law have highlighted the value of judicial inclusion in this process:¶ Judicial control of targeted killing could increase the accuracy of target selection, reducing the danger of mistaken or illegal destruction of lives, limbs, and property. Independent judges who double-check targeting decisions could catch errors and cause executive officials to avoid making them in the first place.”111¶ Judges are also both knowledgeable in the vagaries of the law and accustomed to dealing with sensitive security considerations.112 These qualifications make them ideal candidates to ensure that the executive exercises constitutional and international legal restraint when targeting individuals abroad. Reforming the decision-making process to allow for judicial oversight would accomplish numerous other important goals as well. Aside from providing a valuable check on executive power to take away the most fundamental of freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution—the right to life—judicial oversight would reinforce the separation of powers framework of American government and increase democratic legitimacy by placing these determinations on more predictable and accountable legal grounds. For those fearful of judicial encroachment on executive war-making powers, there is a strong argument that this will actually strengthen the President and empower him to take decisive action without worrying about the judicial consequences. As Justice Kennedy put it, “the exercise of [executive] powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the judicial branch.”113 Moreover, though it may be technically legal under international and domestic law, the targeted killing program has become a black spot on American credibility around the globe. The introduction of significant checks on unilateral executive power to target known terrorists can help reform that image and reinstate American moral legitimacy in its use of force against global terrorism.114

#### The plan solves international norms- US can shape and limit drone prolif and provide the ability to apply diplomatic pressure

Zenko, 2013

[Micah, Council of Foreign Relations, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, January 2013, Council Special Report No. 65, Online] /Wyo-MB

History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used them in the past. Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new technologies.72 Norms—sometimes but not always codified as legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported normative framework, bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone proliferation and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S. drones furthered U.S. objectives. And even if hostile states do not accept norms regulating drone use, the existence of an international normative framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would pre- serve Washington’s ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for developing such a framework would be based in existing international laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction—to which the United States claims to adhere for its drone strikes—and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of cyber and space.

#### Unfettered drone prolif causes deterrence crises that leads to nuclear conflict

Boyle, 13 [“The costs and consequences of drone warfare”, MICHAEL J. BOYLE, International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, assistant professor of political science at LaSalle University]

The emergence of this arms race for drones raises at least five long-term strategic consequences, not all of which are favourable to the United States over the long term. First, it is now obvious that other states will use drones in ways that are inconsistent with US interests. One reason why the US has been so keen to use drone technology in Pakistan and Yemen is that at present it retains a substantial advantage in high-quality attack drones. Many of the other states now capable of employing drones of near-equivalent technology—for example, the UK and Israel—are considered allies. But this situation is quickly changing as other leading geopolitical players, such as Russia and China, are beginning rapidly to developand deploy drones for their own purposes. While its own technology still lags behind that of the US, Russia has spent huge sums on purchasing drones and has recently sought to buy the Israeli-made Eitan drone capable of surveillance and firing air-to-surface missiles.132 China has begun to develop UAVs for reconnaissance and combat and has several new drones capable of long-range surveillance and attack under development.133 China is also planning to use unmanned surveillance drones to allow it to monitor the disputed East China Sea Islands, which are currently under dispute with Japan and Taiwan.134 Both Russia and China will pursue this technology and develop their own drone suppliers which will sell to the highest bidder, presumably with fewer export controls than those imposed by the US Congress. Once both governments have equivalent or near-equivalent levels of drone technology to the United States, they will be similarly tempted to use it for surveillance or attack in the way the US has done. Thus, through its own over-reliance on drones in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, the US may be hastening the arrival of a world where its qualitative advantages in drone technology are eclipsed and where this technology will be used and sold by rival Great Powers whose interests do not mirror its own. A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many of the traditional concepts which have underwritten stability in the international system will be radically reshaped by drone technology. For example, much of the stability among the Great Powers in the international system is driven by deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence.135 Deterrence operates with informal rules of the game and tacit bargains that govern what states, particularly those holding nuclear weapons, may and may not do to one another.136 While it is widely understood that nuclear-capable states will conduct aerial surveillance and spy on one another, overt military confrontations between nuclear powers are rare because they are assumed to be costly and prone to escalation. One open question is whether these states will exercise the same level of restraint with drone surveillance, which is unmanned, low cost, and possibly deniable. States may be more willing to engage in drone overflights which test the resolve of their rivals, or engage in ‘salami tactics’ to see what kind of drone-led incursion, if any, will motivate a response.137 This may have been Hezbollah’s logic in sending a drone into Israeli airspace in October 2012, possibly to relay information on Israel’s nuclear capabilities.138 After the incursion, both Hezbollah and Iran boasted that the drone incident demonstrated their military capabilities.139 One could imagine two rival states—for example, India and Pakistan—deploying drones to test each other’s capability and resolve, with untold consequences if such a probe were misinterpreted by the other as an attack. As drones get physically smaller and more precise, and as they develop a greater flying range, the temptation to use them to spy on a rival’s nuclear programme or military installations might prove too strong to resist. If this were to happen, drones might gradually erode the deterrent relationships that exist between nuclear powers, thus magnifying the risks of a spiral of conflict between them. Another dimension of this problem has to do with the risk of accident. Drones are prone to accidents and crashes. By July 2010, the US Air Force had identified approximately 79 drone accidents.140 Recently released documents have revealed that there have been a number of drone accidents and crashes in the Seychelles and Djibouti, some of which happened in close proximity to civilian airports.141 The rapid proliferation of drones worldwide will involve a risk of accident to civilian aircraft, possibly producing an international incident if such an accident were to involve an aircraft affiliated to a state hostile to the owner of the drone. Most of the drone accidents may be innocuous, but some will carry strategic risks. In December 2011, a CIA drone designed for nuclear surveillance crashed in Iran, revealing the existence of the spying programme and leaving sensitive technology in the hands of the Iranian government.142 The expansion of drone technology raises the possibility that some of these surveillance drones will be interpreted as attack drones, or that an accident or crash will spiral out of control and lead to an armed confrontation.143 An accident would be even more dangerous if the US were to pursue its plans for nuclear-powered drones, which can spread radioactive material like a dirty bomb if they crash.144 Third, lethal drones create the possibility that the norms on the use of force will erode, creating a much more dangerous world and pushing the international system back towards the rule of the jungle. To some extent, this world is already being ushered in by the United States, which has set a dangerous precedent that a state may simply kill foreign citizens considered a threat without a declaration of war. Even John Brennan has recognized that the US is ‘establishing a precedent that other nations may follow’.145 Given this precedent, there is nothing to stop other states from following the American lead and using drone strikes to eliminate potential threats. Those ‘threats’ need not be terrorists, but could be others— dissidents, spies, even journalists—whose behaviour threatens a government. One danger is that drone use might undermine the normative prohibition on the assassination of leaders and government officials that most (but not all) states currently respect. A greater danger, however, is that the US will have normalized murder as a tool of statecraft and created a world where states can increasingly take vengeance on individuals outside their borders without the niceties of extradition, due process or trial.146 As some of its critics have noted, the Obama administration may have created a world where states will find it easier to kill terrorists rather than capture them and deal with all of the legal and evidentiary difficulties associated with giving them a fair trial.147 Fourth, there is a distinct danger that the world will divide into two camps: developed states in possession of drone technology, and weak states and rebel movements that lack them. States with recurring separatist or insurgent problems may begin to police their restive territories through drone strikes, essentially containing the problem in a fixed geographical region and engaging in a largely punitive policy against them. One could easily imagine that China, for example, might resort to drone strikes in Uighur provinces in order to keep potential threats from emerging, or that Russia could use drones to strike at separatist movements in Chechnya or elsewhere. Such behaviour would not necessarily be confined to authoritarian governments; it is equally possible that Israel might use drones to police Gaza and the West Bank, thus reducing the vulnerability of Israeli soldiers to Palestinian attacks on the ground. The extent to which Israel might be willing to use drones in combat and surveillance was revealed in its November 2012 attack on Gaza. Israel allegedly used a drone to assassinate the Hamas leader Ahmed Jabari and employed a number of armed drones for strikes in a way that was described as ‘unprecedented’ by senior Israeli officials.148 It is not hard to imagine Israel concluding that drones over Gaza were the best way to deal with the problem of Hamas, even if their use left the Palestinian population subject to constant, unnerving surveillance. All of the consequences of such a sharp division between the haves and have-nots with drone technology is hard to assess, but one possibility is that governments with secessionist movements might be less willing to negotiate and grant concessions if drones allowed them to police their internal enemies with ruthless efficiency and ‘manage’ the problem at low cost. The result might be a situation where such conflicts are contained but not resolved, while citizens in developed states grow increasingly indifferent to the suffering of those making secessionist or even national liberation claims, including just ones, upon them. Finally, drones have the capacity to strengthen the surveillance capacity of both democracies and authoritarian regimes, with significant consequences for civil liberties. In the UK, BAE Systems is adapting military-designed drones for a range of civilian policing tasks including ‘monitoring antisocial motorists, protesters, agricultural thieves and fly-tippers’.149 Such drones are also envisioned as monitoring Britain’s shores for illegal immigration and drug smuggling. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued 61 permits for domestic drone use between November 2006 and June 2011, mainly to local and state police, but also to federal agencies and even universities.150 According to one FAA estimate, the US will have 30,000 drones patrolling the skies by 2022.151 Similarly, the European Commission will spend US$260 million on Eurosur, a new programme that will use drones to patrol the Mediterranean coast.152 The risk that drones will turn democracies into ‘surveillance states’ is well known, but the risks for authoritarian regimes may be even more severe. Authoritarian states, particularly those that face serious internal opposition, may tap into drone technology now available to monitor and ruthlessly punish their opponents. In semi-authoritarian Russia, for example, drones have already been employed to monitor pro-democracy protesters.153 One could only imagine what a truly murderous authoritarian regime—such as Bashar al-Assad’s Syria—would do with its own fleet of drones. The expansion of drone technology may make the strong even stronger, thus tilting the balance of power in authoritarian regimes even more decisively towards those who wield the coercive instruments of power and against those who dare to challenge them. Conclusion Even though it has now been confronted with blowback from drones in the failed Times Square bombing, the United States has yet to engage in a serious analysis of the strategic costs and consequences of its use of drones, both for its own security and for the rest of the world. Much of the debate over drones to date has focused on measuring body counts and carries the unspoken assumption that if drone strikes are efficient—that is, low cost and low risk for US personnel relative to the terrorists killed—then they must also be effective. This article has argued that such analyses are operating with an attenuated notion of effectiveness that discounts some of the other key dynamics—such as the corrosion of the perceived competence and legitimacy of governments where drone strikes take place, growing anti-Americanism and fresh recruitment to militant networks—that reveal the costs of drone warfare. In other words, the analysis of the effectiveness of drones takes into account only the ‘loss’ side of the ledger for the ‘bad guys’, without asking what America’s enemies gain by being subjected to a policy of constant surveillance and attack. In his second term, President Obama has an opportunity to reverse course and establish a new drones policy which mitigates these costs and avoids some of the long-term consequences that flow from them. A more sensible US approach would impose some limits on drone use in order to minimize the political costs and long-term strategic consequences. One step might be to limit the use of drones to HVTs, such as leading political and operational figures for terrorist networks, while reducing or eliminating the strikes against the ‘foot soldiers’ or other Islamist networks not related to Al-Qaeda. This approach would reduce the number of strikes and civilian deaths associated with drones while reserving their use for those targets that pose a direct or imminent threat to the security of the United States. Such a self-limiting approach to drones might also minimize the degree of political opposition that US drone strikes generate in states such as Pakistan and Yemen, as their leaders, and even the civilian population, often tolerate or even approve of strikes against HVTs. Another step might be to improve the levels of transparency of the drone programme. At present, there are no publicly articulated guidelines stipulating who can be killed by a drone and who cannot, and no data on drone strikes are released to the public.154 Even a Department of Justice memorandum which authorized the Obama administration to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, remains classified.155 Such non-transparency fuels suspicions that the US is indifferent to the civilian casualties caused by drone strikes, a perception which in turn magnifies the deleterious political consequences of the strikes. Letting some sunlight in on the drones programme would not eliminate all of the opposition to it, but it would go some way towards undercutting the worst conspiracy theories about drone use in these countries while also signalling that the US government holds itself legally and morally accountable for its behaviour.156 A final, and crucial, step towards mitigating the strategic consequences of drones would be to develop internationally recognized standards and norms for their use and sale. It is not realistic to suggest that the US stop using its drones altogether, or to assume that other countries will accept a moratorium on buying and using drones. The genie is out of the bottle: drones will be a fact of life for years to come. What remains to be done is to ensure that their use and sale are transparent, regulated and consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards. The Obama administration has already begun to show some awareness that drones are dangerous if placed in the wrong hands. A recent New York Times report revealed that the Obama administration began to develop a secret drones ‘rulebook’ to govern their use if Mitt Romney were to be elected president.157 The same logic operates on the international level. Lethal drones will eventually be in the hands of those who will use them with fewer scruples than President Obama has. Without a set of internationally recognized standards or norms governing their sale and use, drones will proliferate without control, be misused by governments and non-state actors, and become an instrument of repression for the strong. One remedy might be an international convention on the sale and use of drones which could establish guidelines and norms for their use, perhaps along the lines of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) treaty, which attempted to spell out rules on the use of incendiary devices and fragment-based weapons.158 While enforcement of these guidelines and adherence to rules on their use will be imperfect and marked by derogations, exceptions and violations, the presence of a convention may reinforce norms against the flagrant misuse of drones and induce more restraint in their use than might otherwise be seen. Similarly, a UN investigatory body on drones would help to hold states accountable for their use of drones and begin to build a gradual consensus on the types of activities for which drones can, and cannot, be used.159 As the progenitor and leading user of drone technology, the US now has an opportunity to show leadership in developing an international legal architecture which might avert some of the worst consequences of their use.

#### China’s drone prolif causes regional war—multiple flashpoints

Standaert, 2012

[Michael, Global Post, Stage set for drone chess match in Asia-Pacific, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/121102/china-drone-UAV-proliferation?page=0,1] /Wyo-MB

SHENZHEN, China — China’s plans to deploy surveillance drones in the East China and South China seas hint at the future of warfare in the region, but are also a reminder of how far ahead leading drone manufacturing nations like the United States and Israel remain on aviation technology.¶ Experts say interest in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is surging throughout the Asia-Pacific region without a framework of controls curtailing their proliferation and use.¶ Add the Obama administration’s policy refocusing American attention on the region — the so-called “Asia Pivot” — along with US announcements of further deployments of advanced UAVs to the area, and a massive game of drone chess looks increasingly likely.¶ In September, China commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and announced plans to use drones to monitor disputed territories including the Senkaku Islands that have caused recent friction with Japan. China detailed further plans to develop drone bases in 11 coastal provinces to be operational by 2015.¶ China has been playing catch-up with drone technology leaders, having purchased some technology from Israel already and showing strong interest in increasing its own share of the global UAV market, currently estimated at $6.6 billion per year and climbing.¶ Later this month the Zhuhai Air Show will be an important place to see what technology advancements Chinese companies have made as well as what countries might be interested in purchasing Chinese UAVs. Pakistan is known to have ordered drones from China, and countries such as Brunei and Malaysia in Southeast Asia have shown interest in China's drones.¶ Dennis Gormley, a senior research fellow at the Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, said that US defense and aviation industry logic is that if it doesn’t “satisfy the growing requirement for UAVs, other states will develop their own or turn to Israel or other developers.”¶ “Of greatest concern are the intentions of China,” said Gormley, author of the book “Missile Contagion,” published in 2010.¶ In the Asia-Pacific region, the list of countries who have developed or purchased drones already includes Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines, according to a report published by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) in July this year.¶ In June, a Chinese frigate was also photographed testing a helicopter UAV, said Wilson VornDick, a lieutenant commander in the US Navy Reserves and an analyst on China’s military for the Jamestown Foundation.¶ At the end of August, China’s State Oceanic Administration (SOA) announced plans to set up UAV patrols out of 11 airbases in coastal provinces for maritime surveillance. According to state media reports a pilot program last year ran UAVs out of Liaoning province to monitor an ocean area of around 380 square miles.¶ More recently, immediately following renewed conflict with Japan over the Senkakus, the SOA announced on Sep. 23 that it was deploying UAVs to monitor specifically monitor the disputed islands as well as territories in the South China Sea, which China claims almost in its entirety.¶ Reports also indicate that Japan is using drones to monitor the Senkakus, and the Philippines is reportedly looking to purchase more UAVs from the US for monitoring its own claims in the South China Sea.

#### SCS conflict causes nuke war

Glaser 12 Bonnie S., Senior Fellow – Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” CFR, April, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883

The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being **shaped by—rising apprehensions about** the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China **has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities** to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from **escalating militarily**. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The **most likely** and **dangerous contingency** is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an **armed Chinese response**. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in **aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident** similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also **increased the danger of an incident**, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A **miscalculation** or misunderstanding could then result in a **deadly exchange of fire**, leading to further **military escalation** and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult.

### Solvency

#### The creation of a federal counterterror oversight court solves all problems with the targeted killing program and all disads to judicial review

Plaw, 2007

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This final section offers a briefcase that there is room for a principled compromise between critics and advocates of targeting terrorists. The argument is by example--a short illustration of one promising possibility. It will not satisfy everyone, but I suggest that it has the potential to resolve the most compelling concerns on both sides.¶ The most telling issues raised by critics of targeting fall into three categories: (1) the imperative need to establish that targets are combatants; (2) the need in attacking combatants to respect the established laws of war; and (3) the overwhelming imperative to avoid civilian casualties. The first issue seems to demand an authoritative judicial determination that could only be answered by a competent court. The second issue requires the openly avowed and consistent implementation of targeting according to standards accepted in international law--a requirement whose fulfillment would best be assured through judicial oversight. The third issue calls for independent evaluation of operations to assure that standards of civilian protection are robustly upheld, a role that could be effectively performed by a court.¶ The first issue, then, must, and the second and third can, be resolved by the introduction of credible judicial oversight. But what kind of court could be expected to maintain secrecy around sensitive intelligence and yet render authoritative determinations as to, for example, individuals' combat status? An independent international court would doubtless be ideal, but even apart from all the technical and administrative difficulties such a solution would entail and the secrecy concerns it would evoke, it seems clear that the United States and Israel would refuse to have their national security subject to the authority of a foreign body, however judicious. They would argue, as indeed they have in regard to the ICC, that the final authority in this supremely important domain must derive ultimately from the will of their own people, whose lives and community are at stake. On the other hand, critics of targeting would certainly demand an independent, competent and internationally credible body. All the more so since the court's proceedings, for obvious reasons, could not be open to public scrutiny.¶ On this difficult question Michael Ignatieff offers a helpful idea. He suggests the possibility of setting up a national court to address counterterrorism issues loosely based on the model on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which considers surveillance and physical search requests from the Department of Justice and U.S. intelligence agencies related to foreign intelligence operations in the U.S. (Ignatieff 2004:134). Developing Ignatieff's suggestion, the new court could be called the Federal Counterterrorism Oversight Court (FCOC).¶ The institutional features of the FCOC could be designed to assure credibility and independence on one side, and secure and efficient contribution to national policy on the other. For example, like the FISC, the FCOC could be composed of seven federal court judges selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and serving staggered seven years terms. Like the FISC, the FCOC could hold its proceedings in camera, ensuring the secrecy of sensitive intelligence information. The FCOC could then consider requests from military and intelligence organizations to designate suspected terrorists as enemy combatants, assessing whether the intelligence presented warranted such a designation. It could also be assigned the responsibility to automatically review any actions that resulted in civilian casualties, and could be given the power to publicly censure operations that inadequately protected civilians, as well as to suspend, or even to terminate, targeting operations. Finally, it could also be authorized to review charges brought by other governments or private persons that targeting operations violated humanitarian law, in particular, by engaging in perfidy or employing disproportionate force.¶ In at least three key respects, however, the design of the FCOC should differ from the model of the FISC. As the FISC is charged with assessing surveillance requests from government agencies, its writs and rulings remain permanently sealed from civilian review. But in the interests of resolving the second issue of openness, the findings of the FCOC should be made public, including the names of those judged to be combatants, as well as any reprimand from the court regarding targeting operations.¶ In the second place, the FISC foregoes adversarial legal proceedings because potential subjects of surveillance can obviously not participate. It has been much criticized on this count. The FCOC should not follow this precedent which, in the views of many jurists and scholars, flies in the face of the core of the Western legal tradition. Evidently, the trials of terrorists who cannot otherwise be brought to justice will be conducted in absentia. This does not, however, necessitate the abandonment of adversarial procedure. In addition to the seven judges appointed to the court, an independent counsel should be appointed by the President of the National Bar Association to represent the interests of the accused before the court. Evidently, appropriate precautions will need to be taken to ensure the secrecy of court proceedings. But the independent counsel should also not be barred from offering general assessments of the performance of the court. Obviously this is an imperfect resolution to an intractable problem, but it should contribute significantly to ensuring the fairness of the FCOC.¶ Finally, the FCOC must be distinguished from the FISC in a third crucial sense. The recent 'domestic surveillance' scandal in the United States involving the Executive Branch's circumvention of the FISC approval process suggests safeguards would need to be built into the FCOC mandate. In the case of the FISC, President Bush issued an Executive Order which authorized the National Security Agency to carry out surveillance of any Americans suspected of links with al Qaeda without FISC approval (Risen and Lichtblau 2005). The scandal and legal consequences that ensued for the administration once this information became public in 2005 have significantly reduced the likelihood of a similar course being taken in the future. Nonetheless, the possibility should be explicitly precluded by specifying in the enabling legislation that no targeting action can be considered legally authorized without approval of the court. In response to the argument that immediate action may sometimes be required in emergency situations, the presiding justice could be permitted to issue a provisional approval based on prima facie evidence, but only subject to full subsequent review by the court.¶ Some critics and advocates of targeting will no doubt be dissatisfied with this resolution. Critics will worry that the FCOC would essentially be a rubber stamp (while robbing them of their best rhetorical point--that targetings are extra-judicial). But there is no compelling reason to believe that courts, especially high-level federal courts, must always approve government policies. After all, supreme courts in both Israel and the United States have both recently issued sharp rebukes of government counter-terrorist policies (e.g., 03-333/4 on the U.S. legal status of detainees, and 3799/02 on the IDF use of human shields).¶ On the other hand, some advocates will certainly worry that a requirement of FCOC approval will hinder the efficiency of targeting and that publishing lists of targets will render them more difficult to find. On the former point, however, there is little evidence that the incorporation of reasonable judicial procedures, such as those of the FISC, need render related policy ineffective. After all, as the 9/11 commission observed, the intelligence community succeeded in gathering the data necessary to anticipate the September 11 attack (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004: 254-77). The failure was in the domains of analysis and response. What is evident, however, is that carrying out extensive and dangerous counter-terrorist programs without judicial oversight generates widespread public skepticism and opposition (which tends to undermine the effectiveness of the programs) and leads to enormous legal difficulties in the long run--as exemplified by the American torture/rendition program.¶ On the second point, while it is true that targets may 'go to ground' if tipped off, the fact is that all or virtually all potential targets are already on most wanted lists (often with hefty price tags connected to information leading to them). In essence, they have already gone to ground--that is in part why targeting is required in the first place. Moreover, a retreat into even deeper obscurity is likely to further disrupt their ability to organize and carry out attacks. Finally, the Israeli experience suggests that targets will break cover eventually, and a little patience seems like a small price to pay for ensuring the justice of state-administered killing.¶ These answers will not fully satisfy either all critics or all advocates. But the burden of this section has been only to show that compromises are possible that address their most legitimate concerns. I think that the suggestion of an FCOC shows that a plausible and principled compromise is possible. In this light, the pertinent question becomes not whether terrorist targeting as currently practiced is uniformly legal, moral and practical or the reverse, but how institutions can best be designed to assure that terrorist targetings carried out in the future are uniformly legitimate and effective.

#### As academics we are directly responsible for what we do or don’t say about drone violence—this space is not neutral since we chose to debate the war powers topic—we have a responsibility to make the choice to say no to unrestrained use of drones

Sparrow, 2012

[Robert, School of Philosophical, Historical and Inter- national Studies, “Just say no” to drones, IEEE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY MAGAZINE | SPRING 2012] /Wyo-MB

“A Searching and Fearless Moral Inventory”¶ Nothing I have said here is intended to deny that there are many decent, well-intentioned, and conscientious people working on military robots – some of whom I would like to count as friends.5 As I said at the outset, my goal here is to provoke discus- sion and to emphasize the need for such discussion to include moral and political questions about the justification of military spending in current circumstances and also of particular conflicts. Yet it must also be acknowledged that those who are addicted to military funding are unlikely to admit that they have a problem. At least briefly, then, I want to respond to several uncon- vincing arguments that defend the ethics of military research and also acknowledge the pressures that lead many engineers to accept military funding despite their own reserva- tions about doing so.¶ I suspect that working on projects funded by the military is only possible for many engi- neers because of the psychologi- cal distance between their own activities and the consequences of war. Computer scientists work- ing on an algorithm for machine vision for the military may not see the connection between what they do and the mangled corpses that result from the operations of military robots. Moreover, engi- neers can quite properly point to the intervening responsibility of others for the uses to which their research is put.¶ It would be implausible to insist that the responsibility of engineers who design military robots was no different to that of the warfighters who operate or command them. Equally well, however, it is too swift to conclude that engineers have no responsibility for the ulti- mate uses to which their research is put. Most human projects involve a number of people who must share responsibility for the outcomes of their actions and there is a large literature on responsibility for joint and collective projects – much larger than I could plausibly survey here [28].¶ However, there are two consider- ations that are crucial to determin- ing when – and how much – people should be held responsible for con- sequences brought about by the actions of others. The first is the extent to which it is foreseeable that our actions will contribute to or facilitate the immoral acts of others. The second is the extent to which our actions and the actions of oth- ers constitute joint action – action to a common purpose – or collective action – as part of the activities of a collective agent such as a corpora- tion or nation.¶ Both of these considerations suggest that engineers working on projects funded by the military do have significant responsibility for the uses to which their research is put. If one is being funded by the military, it can hardly be a surprise when one’s research is put to use killing people. Fund- ing from the military will usually involve a group of people work- ing to a common purpose that will largely be defined by the reasons why the military provided the funding. All these individuals will then have some responsibility for the outcomes of the joint project as well as for their particular contribu- tion to it. Whether or not engineers funded by the military contribute to the actions of a collective agent is more controversial. However, military organizations are them- selves paradigmatic examples of collective agents, being so tightly structured and organized as to be capable of acting in ways (for instance, invading A fghanistan) that individuals are not. In cases where the links between research- ers and military organizations are particularly strong, as, for instance, when they are extensive and/or long-standing, when the military is the primary source of funding for a research group, or when engineers are directly employed by the mili- tary, engineers may well come to be part of a collective agent dedicated to military goals and to inherit some responsibility for the actions of this agent.¶ Another thought that allows people to rationalize working on projects that they themselves feel uneasy about is “If I don’t do it, someone else will”. This is often true – although equally well it sits uneasily alongside the belief that one is uniquely talented, which itself is often necessary to achieve success in highly competitive fields such as engineering. However, this argument neglects that we are responsible for what we do and not just for what happens as a result of our choices. That others might do what we choose not to does not absolve us of responsibility for our actions. There are always people willing to deal drugs, after all, but most of us do not conclude that it might as well be us.¶ A related argument emphasizes how much robotics research is “dual use” and then suggests that, as there is no way to prevent the results of civilian research being adopted by the military, there is little point in refusing military funding [5], [24]. Again, this elides the distinction between our own actions and the actions of unrelated parties. Other people will try to draw the line at working on offensive weaponry, while being happy to work on defen- sive systems. This distinction can sustain less moral weight than first appears because defensive systems make offensive operations possi- ble: one contributes to the military achieving its ends either way.¶ A particularly unconvinc- ing argument for participating in research on military projects is that it is justified by the civilian spin- offs it generates. This argument is too quick to concede that if research isn’t funded by the military then it will not be funded at all. Spending money on any project will gener- ate unanticipated benefits. Indeed, even “pure” research typically leads to spin-offs. If we are look- ing for technologies for civilian purposes, we would do much better to research them directly.¶ I do want to acknowledge, how- ever, that individuals, particularly aspiring engineers, may pay a high personal price for refusing to work on projects that receive mili- tary funding. Given just how much robotics research is funded by the military, engineering students look- ing for a job or a place to undertake their doctorates may face a choice between working on a military project or not gaining entry into their desired profession at all. This is a dilemma that is unlikely to be faced by philosophers! Even if one is a more senior researcher, if one refuses military funding, one’s research may not be funded, and one’s career may be seriously affected.

#### A risk of nuclear war precludes any deontological framework – uncertainty mandates that every policy decision must be able to guarantee the continued existence of the human race, and to ignore this possibility is in itself immoral and unjustified.

Schell, 2000

Schell, policy analyst and proliferation expert, 2000 (Jonathan, “The Fate of the Earth”, p. 94-5) \*This card has been gender-modified.

To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation—just as it would be a misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects, in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we are as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that our species may be extinguished. We are left with uncertainty, and are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty. If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass—of “the basic power of the universe”—and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between [humans] and the source of [their] life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than, that of any other risk, and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the frame of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purposes would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risks that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematical analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now pose to the earth and to ourselves.

## 2AC

### Solvency

**Even if predictions are not perfect we should use foresight to take action to prevent crisis precisely because the future is uncertain. Prefer this evidence – it assumes their critique of prediction and is conclusive on what to do about it.**

**Kurasawa, 2004**

[Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology at York University, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention

and the Work of Foresight.” 2004, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4]

**When engaging in** the labor of **preventive foresight, the first obstacle** that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles **is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking**, for instance, **would lead us to believe that** it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, **history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if**, contra scientistic futurism, **prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation** about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; **let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises** already coming into their own. In fact, **the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences** (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, **the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including**, of course, **trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.**

### Nietzsche

#### And, Attempting to change the world is crucial to celebrating life. Refusing to try denies our own lives while condemning others to unnecessary suffering\*

Todd May, prof @ Clemson. “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 2005 Vol 31 nos 5–6 pp. 517–531

To change the world and to celebrate life. This, as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, is the struggle within us. It is a struggle in which one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the sake of the other can lead only to disaster or callousness. Forsaking the celebration of life for the sake of changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary. In his preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to he revolutionarv. The matter is more urgent than that, however. One cannot be both sad and revolutionary lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is focused only on the future; the present is what is to be overcome. The vision of what is not but must come to be overwhelms all else, and the point of change itself becomes lost. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now. The alternative is surely not to shift one’s allegiance to the pure celebration of life, although there are many who have chosen this path. It is at best blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many of our fellow humans, to say nothing of what happens to sentient nonhuman creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an uncritical assent to the world as it is requires a self-deception that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, it is anathema for all of us who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is matched only by an equally expansive disregard for those we place in harm’s way. This is the struggle, then. The one between the desire for life celebration and the desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. The question then becomes one of how to choose both sides at once. III Maybe it happens this way. You walk into a small meeting room at the back of a local bookstore. There are eight or ten people milling about. They’re dressed in dark clothes, nothing fancy, and one or two of them have earrings or dreadlocks. They vary in age. You don’t know any of them. You’ve never seen them before. Several of them seem to know one another. They are affectionate, hugging, letting a hand linger on a shoulder or an elbow. A younger man, tall and thin, with an open face and a blue baseball cap bearing no logo, glides into the room. Two others, a man and a woman, shout, ‘Tim!’ and he glides over to them and hugs them, one at a time. They tell him how glad they are that he could make it, and he says that he just got back into town and heard about the meeting. You stand a little off to the side. Nobody has taken a seat at the rectangle of folding tables yet. You don’t want to be the first to sit down. Tim looks around the room and smiles. Several other people filter in. You’re not quite sure where to put your hands so you slide them into your jean pockets. You hunch your shoulders. Tim’s arrival has made you feel more of an outsider. But then he sees you. He edges his way around several others and walks up to you and introduces himself. You respond. Tim asks and you tell him that this is your first time at a meeting like this. He doesn’t ask about politics but about where you’re from. He tells you he has a friend in that neighborhood and do you know . . . ? Then several things happen that you only vaguely notice because you’re talking with Tim. People start to sit down at the rectangle of tables. One of them pulls out a legal pad with notes on it. She sits at the head of the rectangle; or rather, when she sits down there, it becomes the head. And there’s something you don’t notice at all. You are more relaxed, your shoulders have stopped hunching, and when you sit down the seat feels familiar. The woman at the head of the table looks around. She smiles; her eyes linger over you and a couple of others that you take to be new faces, like yours. She says, ‘Maybe we should begin.’ IV I can offer only a suggestion of an answer here today. It is a suggestion that brings together some thoughts from the late writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with those of Foucault, in order to sketch not even a framework for thought, but the mere outlines of a framework. It is not a framework that would seek to find the unconscious of each in the writings of the other. Neither thinker finishes or accomplishes the other. (Often, for example regarding methodology, they do not even agree.) Rather, it is a framework that requires both of them, from their very different angles, in order to be able to think it. My goal in constructing the outlines of this framework is largely philosophical. That is to say, the suggestion I would like to make here is not one for resolving for each of us the struggle of life-celebration and world-changing, but of offering a way to conceive ourselves that allows us to embrace both sides of this battle at the same time. Given the thinkers I have chosen as reference points, it will be no surprise when I say that that conception runs through the body. Let me start with Merleau-Ponty. In his last writings, particularly in The Visible and the Invisible, he offers a conception of the body that is neither at odds nor even entangled with the world, but is of the very world itself. His concept of the flesh introduces a point of contact that is also a point of undifferentiation. The flesh, Merleau-Ponty writes, ‘is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things, such that, as tangible it descends among them’.2 We must recall this economy of the flesh before we turn to Foucault. There is, for Merleau-Ponty, a single Being. Our world is of that Being, and we are of our world. We are not something that confronts the world from outside, but are born into it and do not leave it. This does not mean that we cannot remove ourselves from the immediacy of its grasp. What it means is that to remove ourselves from that immediacy is neither the breaking of a bond nor the discovery of an original dichotomy or dualism. What is remarkable about human beings is precisely our capacity to confront the world, to reflect upon it, understand it, and change it, while still being of a piece with it. To grasp this remarkable character, it is perhaps worth recalling Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the fold. The world is not composed of different parts; there is no transcendent, whether of God or of subjectivity. The world is one. As Deleuze sometimes says, being is univocal. This oneness is not, however, inert or inanimate. Among other things, it can fold over on itself, creating spaces that are at once insides and outsides, at once different from and continuous with one another. The flesh is a fold of Being in this sense. It is of the world, and yet encounters it as if from a perceptual or cognitive distance. It is a visibility that sees, a tangible that touches, an audible that hears. Merleau- Ponty writes: There is vision, touch when a certain visible, a certain tangible, turns back upon the whole of the visible, the whole of the tangible, of which it is a part, or when suddenly it finds itself surrounded by them, or when between it and them, and through their commerce, is formed a Visibility, a Tangible in itself, which belong properly neither to the body qua fact nor to the world qua fact . . . and which therefore form a couple, a couple more real than either of them.3 For Merleau-Ponty, thought and reflection do not attach themselves to this flesh from beyond it, but arise through it. As our body is of this world, our thought is of our bodies, its language of a piece with the world it addresses. ‘[I]f we were to make completely explicit the architectonics of the human body, its ontological framework, and how it sees itself and hears itself, we would see the possibilities of language already given in it.’4 This conception of the body as flesh of the world is not foreign to Foucault, although of course the terms Merleau-Ponty uses are not his. We might read Foucault’s politics as starting from here, inaugurated at the point of undifferentiation between body and world. The crucial addition he would make is that that point of undifferentiation is not historically inert. The body/world nexus is inscribed in a history that leaves its traces on both at the same time, and that crosses the border of the flesh and reaches the language that arises from it, and the thought that language expresses. How does this work?V Maybe it doesn’t happen that way. Maybe it happens another way. Maybe you walk into a room at a local community center. The room is large, but there aren’t many people, at least yet. There’s a rectangular table in the center, and everyone is sitting around it. A couple of people look up as you walk in. They nod slightly. You nod back, even more slightly. At the head of the table is someone with a legal pad. She does not look up. She is reading the notes on the pad, making occasional marks with the pen in her right hand. Other people come in and take places at the table. One or two of them open laptop computers and look for an outlet. Eventually, the table fills up and people start sitting in chairs behind the table. Your feel as though you’re in an inner circle where you don’t belong. You wonder whether you should give up your chair and go sit on the outside with the others who are just coming in now. Maybe people notice you, think you don’t belong there. At this moment you’d like to leave. You begin to feel at once large and small, visually intrusive and an object of scrutiny. You don’t move because maybe this is OK after all. You just don’t know. The room is quiet. A couple of people cough. Then the woman seated at the head of the table looks up. She scans the room as if taking attendance. She says, ‘Maybe we should begin.’ VI Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the body as flesh is an ontological one. Although he does not see the body as remote from its historical inscription, his discussion does not incorporate the role such inscription plays. For a body to be of the world is also for it to be temporal, to be encrusted in the continuous emerging of the world over time. And this emerging is not abstract; rather, it is concrete. The body/world nexus evolves during particular historical periods. This fold of the flesh, this body, is not nowhere and at any time. It is there, then; or it is here, now. A body is entangled within a web of specific events and relations that, precisely because it is of this world, are inescapably a part of that body’s destiny. As Merleau-Ponty tells us in Phenomenology of Perception, ‘our open and personal existence rests on an initial foundation of acquired and stabilized existence. But it could not be otherwise, if we are temporality, since the dialectic of acquisition and future is what constitutes time.’5 The medium for the body’s insertion into a particular net of eventsand relations is that of social practices. Our bodies are not first and foremost creatures of the state or the economy, no more than they are atomized wholes distinct from the world they inhabit. Or better, they are creatures of the state and the economy inasmuch as those appear through social practices, through the everyday practices that are the ether of our lives. Social practices are the sedimentation of history at the level of the body. When I teach, when I write this article, when I run a race or teach one of my children how to ride a bicycle, my body is oriented in particular ways, conforming to or rejecting particular norms, responding to the constraints and restraints of those practices as they have evolved in interaction with other practices over time. Through its engagement in these practices, my body has taken on a history that is not of my making but is nevertheless part of my inheritance. It is precisely because, as Merleau-Ponty has written, the body and the world are not separate things but rather in a chiasmic relation that we can think this inheritance. And it is because of Foucault’s histories that we can recognize that this inheritance is granted through specific social practices. And of course, as Foucault has taught us, social practices are where the power is. It is not, or not simply, at the level of the state or the modes of production where power arises. It is, as he sometimes puts it, at the capillaries. One of the lessons of Discipline and Punish is that, if the soul is the prison of the body, this is because the body is inserted into a set of practices that create for it a soul. These practices are not merely the choices of an individual whose thought surveys the world from above, but instead the fate of a body that is of a particular world at a particular time and place. Moreover, these practices are not merely in service to a power that exists outside of them; they are mechanisms of power in their own right. It is not because Jeremy Bentham disliked the prison population that the Panopticon became a grid for thinking about penal institutions. It is instead because the evolution of penal practices at that time created an opening for the economy of visibility that the Panopticon represented. When Foucault writes that . . . the soul has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished – and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives6 his claim is informed by four other ones that lie behind it: that bodies are of a piece with the world, that the body/world nexus is a temporal one, that the medium of that corporeal temporality is the practices a body is engaged in, and that that medium is political as well as social. The last three claims are, of course, of the framework of Foucault’s thought. The first one is the ontological scaffolding provided by Merleau-Ponty. And it is by means of all four that we can begin to conceive things so as to be able to choose both world-changing and lifecelebrating at the same time. VII It could happen yet another way. Increasingly, it does. There is no meeting. There are no tables and no legal pads. Nobody sits down in a room together, at least nobody sits down at a place you know about. There may not even be a leaflet. Maybe you just got an email that was forwarded by someone you know slightly and who thought you might be interested. At the bottom there’s a link, in case you want to unsubscribe. If you don’t unsubscribe you get more notices, with petitions to sign or times and places for rallies or teach-ins or marches. Maybe there’s also a link for feedback or a list for virtual conversations or suggestions. If you show up, it’s not to something you put together but to something that was already in place before you arrived. How did you decide on this rally or teach-in? You sat in front of your computer screen, stared at it, pondering. Maybe you emailed somebody you know, asking for their advice. Is it worth going? If it’s on campus you probably did. It matters who will see you, whether you have tenure, how much you’ve published. There are no Tims here. You’ve decided to go. If it’s a teach-in, you’ve got plausible deniability; you’re just there as an observer. If it’s a rally, you can stand to the side. But maybe you won’t do that. The issue is too important. You don’t know the people who will be there, but you will stand among them, walk among them. You will be with them, in some way. Bodies at the same time and place. You agree on the issue, but it’s a virtual agreement, one that does not come through gestures or words but through sharing the same values and the same internet connections. As you march, as you stand there, nearly shoulder to shoulder with others of like mind, you’re already somewhere else, telling this story to someone you know, trying to get them to understand the feeling of solidarity that you are projecting back into this moment. You say to yourself that maybe you should have brought a friend along.There are many ways to conceive the bond between world-changing and life-celebrating. Let me isolate two: one that runs from Merleau-Ponty to Foucault, from the body’s chiasmic relation with the world to the politics of its practices; and the other one running back in the opposite direction. The ontology Merleau-Ponty offers in his late work is one of wonder. Abandoning the sterile philosophical debates about the relation of mind and body, subject and object, about the relation of reason to that which is not reason, or the problem of other minds, his ontology forges a unity of body and world that puts us in immediate contact withall of its aspects. No longer are we to be thought the self-enclosed creatures of the philosophical tradition. We are now in touch with the world, because we are of it.Art, for example, does not appeal solely to our minds; its beauty is not merely a matter of the convergence of our faculties. We are moved by art, often literally moved, because our bodies and the work of art share the same world. As Merleau-Ponty says, ‘I would be at great pains to say where is the painting I am looking at. For I do not look at it as I do a thing; I do not fix it in its place. My gaze wanders in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or with it, than that I see it.’7 It is only because my body is a fold of this world that art can affect me so. But this affection is also a vulnerability. As my look can happen according to a work of art, so it can happen according to a social practice. And even more so in proportion as that social practice and its effects are suffused through the world in which I carry on my life, the world my body navigates throughout the day, every day. I do not have a chance to look according to a painting by Cezanne very often; but I do encounter the effects of normalization as it has filtered through the practices of my employment, of my students’ upbringing, and of my family’s expectations of themselves and one another. The vulnerability of the body, then, is at once its exposure to beauty and its opening to what is intolerable.We might also see things from the other end, starting from politics and ending at the body. I take it that this is what Foucault suggests when he talks about bodies and pleasures at the end of the first volume of the History of Sexuality. If we are a product of our practices and the conception of ourselves and the world that those practices have fostered, so to change our practices is to experiment in new possibilities both for living and, inseparably, for conceiving the world. To experiment in sexuality is not to see where the desire that lies at the core of our being may lead us; that is simply the continuation of our oppression by other means. Rather, it is to construct practices where what is at issue is no longer desire but something else, something that might go by the name of bodies and pleasures. In doing so, we not only act differently, we think differently, both about ourselves and about the world those selves are inseparable from. And because these experiments are practices of our bodies, and because our bodies are encrusted in the world, these experiments become not merely acts of political resistance but new folds in the body/ world nexus. To construct new practices is to appeal to aspects or possibilities of the world that have been previously closed to us. It is to offer novel, and perhaps more tolerable, engagements in the chiasm of body and world. Thus we might say of politics what Merleau-Ponty has said of painting, that we see according to it. Here, I take it, is where the idea of freedom in Foucault lies. For Foucault, freedom is not a metaphysical condition. It does not lie in the nature of being human, nor is it a warping, an atomic swerve, in the web of causal relations in which we find ourselves. To seek our freedom in a space apart from our encrustation in the world is notso much to liberate ourselves from its influence as to build our own private prison. Foucault once said: There’s an optimism that consists in saying that things couldn’t be better. My optimism would consist rather in saying that so many things can be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than with necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constraints . . .8 That is where to discover our freedom. And what happens from there? From the meetings, from the rallies, from the petitions and the teach-ins? What happens next? There is, after all, always a next. If you win this time – end aid to the contras, divest from apartheid South Africa, force debt-forgiveness by technologically advanced countries – there is always more to do. There is the de-unionization of workers, there are gay rights, there is Burma, there are the Palestinians, the Tibetans. There will always be Tibetans, even if they aren’t in Tibet, even if they aren’t Asian. But is that the only question: Next? Or is that just the question we focus on? What’s the next move in this campaign, what’s the next campaign? Isn’t there more going on than that? After all, engaging in political organizing is a practice, or a group of practices. It contributes to making you who you are. It’s where the power is, and where your life is, and where the intersection of your life and those of others (many of whom you will never meet, even if it’s for their sake that you’re involved) and the buildings and streets of your town is. This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don’t exist. It’s not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. You’ve made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take Merleau-Ponty’s Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings.Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . .10 What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault’s work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate livingwithin it. And to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both. If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau- Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it. So how might you be a political body, woven into the fabric of the world as a celebrator and as a changer?You went to the meeting, and then to the demonstration. How was it there?Were the bodies in harmony or in counterpoint? Did you sing with your feet, did your voice soar? Did your mind come alive? Did you see possibilities you had not seen before? Were there people whose words or clothes, or even the way they walked hand in hand (how long has it been since you’ve walked hand in hand with someone out in public?) offer you a possibility, or make you feel alive as well as righteous? And how about those people off to the side, the ones on the sidewalk watching? Maybe they just stared, or maybe nodded as you went past. Or maybe some of them shouted at you to stop blocking the streets with your nonsense. Did you recoil within yourself, see yourself as in a mirror, or as the person at Sartre’s keyhole who’s just been caught? Did you feel superior to them, smug in your knowledge? Or did they, too, show you something you might learn from? Are they you at another moment, a moment in the past or in the future? Are they your parents that you have not explained to, sat down beside, or just shared a meal with? That one over there, the old man slightly stooped in the long overcoat: whom does he remind you of? What message might he have unwittingly brought for you? And why does it have to be a demonstration?You go to a few meetings, a few more demonstrations. You write some letters to legislators. You send an email to the President. And then more meetings. The next thing you know, you’re involved in a political campaign. By then you may have stopped asking why. This is how it goes: demonstrations, meetings with legislators, internet contacts. Does it have to be like this? Are demonstrations and meetings your only means? Do they become, sooner or later, not only means but ends? And what kinds of ends? In some sense they should always be ends: a meeting is a celebration, after all. But there are other ends as well. You go to the meeting because that fulfills your obligation to your political conscience. Does it come to that? There are other means, other ends. Other means/ends. Some people ride bicycles, en masse, slowly through crowded urban streets. You want environmentalism? Then have it. The streets are beautiful with their tall corniced buildings and wide avenues. To ride a bike through these streets instead of hiding in the armor of a car would be exhilarating. If enough of you do it together it would make for a pleasant ride, as well as a little lived environmentalism. Would you want to call it a demonstration? Would it matter? There are others as well who do other things with their bodies, more dangerous things. Some people have gone to Palestine in order to put their bodies between the Palestinians and the Israeli soldiers and settlers who attack them. They lie down next to Palestinians in front of the bulldozers that would destroy homes or build a wall through a family’s olive orchard. They feel the bodies of those they are in solidarity with. They smell the soil of Palestine as they lay there. Sometimes, they are harmed by it. A young woman, Rachel Corrie, was deliberately crushed by a US bulldozer operated by an Israeli soldier as she kneeled in front of a Palestinian home, hoping to stop its demolition. To do politics with one’s body can be like this. To resist, to celebrate, is also to be vulnerable. The world that you embrace, the world of which you are a part, can kill you too. And so you experiment. You try this and you try that. You are a phenomenologist and a genealogist. You sense what is around you, attend to the way your body is encrusted in your political involvements. And you know that that sensing has its own history, a history that often escapes you even as it envelops you. There is always more to what you are, and to what you are involved in, than you can know. So you try to keep vigilant, seeking the possibilities without scorning the realities.It’s a difficult balance. You can neglect it if you like. Many do. But your body is there, woven into the fabric of all the other bodies, animate and inanimate. Whether you like it or not, whether you recognize it or not. The only question is whether you will take up the world that you are of, or leave it to others, to those others who would be more than willing to take your world up for you.

And it’s morally reprehensible for two US college students to argue about embracing suffering when their lives aren’t being destroyed by drone strikes- prioritizing your lives over others is the worst-

Lillehammer, 2011

[Hallvard, Faculty of Philosophy Cambridge University, “Consequentialism and global ethics.” Forthcoming in M. Boylan, Ed., Global Morality and Justice: A Reader, Westview Press, Online, <http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/teaching_staff/lillehammer/Consequentialism_and_Global_Ethics-1-2.pdf>] /Wyo-MB

Contemporary discussions of consequentialism and global ethics have been marked by a focus on examples such as that of the shallow pond. In this literature, distinctions are drawn and analogies made between different cases about which both the consequentialist and his or her interlocutor are assumed to have a more or less firm view. One assumption in this literature is that progress can be made by making judgements about simple actual or counterfactual examples, and then employing a principle of equity to the effect that like cases be treated alike, in order to work out what to think about more complex actual cases. It is only fair to say that in practice such attempts to rely only on judgements about simple cases have a tendency to produce trenchant stand-offs. It is important to remember, therefore, that for some consequentialists the appeal to simple cases is neither the only, nor the most basic, ground for their criticism of the ethical status quo. For some of the historically most prominent consequentialists the evidential status of judgements about simple cases depends on their derivability from basic ethical principles (plus knowledge of the relevant facts). Thus, in The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick argues that ethical thought is grounded in a small number of self-evident axioms of practical reason. The first of these is that we ought to promote our own good. The second is that the good of any one individual is objectively of no more importance than the good of any other (or, in Sidgwick’s notorious metaphor, no individual’s good is more important ‘from the point of view of the Universe’ than that of any other). The third is that we ought to treat like cases alike. Taken together, Sidgwick takes these axioms to imply a form of consequentialism. We ought to promote our own good. Yet since our own good is objectively no more important than the good of anyone else, we ought to promote the good of others as well. And in order to treat like cases alike, we have to weigh our own good against the good of others impartially, all other things being equal. iv It follows that the rightness of our actions is fixed by what is best for the entire universe of ethically relevant beings. To claim otherwise is to claim for oneself and one’s preferences a special status they do not possess. When understood along these lines, consequentialism is by definition a global ethics: the good of everyone should count for everyone, no matter their identity, location, or personal and social attachments, now or hereafter. v Some version of this view is also accepted by a number of contemporary consequentialists, including Peter Singer, who writes that it is ‘preferable to proceed as Sidgwick did: search for undeniable fundamental axioms, [and] build up a moral theory from them’ (Singer 1974, 517; Singer 1981). For these philosophers the question of our ethical duties to others is not only a matter of our responses to cases like the shallow pond. It is also a matter of whether these responses cohere with an ethics based on first principles. If you are to reject the consequentialist challenge, therefore, you will have to show what is wrong with those principles

Trying to stop suffering is good – it affirms life and allows people the choice of how they want to find meaning in life

Smolkin 89

(Mitchell Smolkin. Understanding Pain, 1989 p75-79)

For Camus, the absurdity of the human condition consists in the incongruity between what humans naturally desire, and the reality of the world. Humans naturally desire not to be injured and killed. They desire to understand life and to find meaning in living. They desire to feel at home in the universe. Despite these natural needs, [humanity] man is confronted with a silent universe that does not answer human questions about meaning. He is surrounded by irrational destructiveness, and by the spectre of suffering and pain hurtling out of the void capriciously at human recipients with no regard for their relative merits. Man is estranged from a universe which seems so antagonistic to his natural needs. He feels homeless, in exile, a stranger in his own land. He [Humanity] hears his “nights and days filled always, everywhere with the eternal cry of human pain.”56 Man has been “sentenced, for an unknown crime to an indeterminate period of punishment. And while a good many people adapted themselves to confinement and carried out their humdrum lives as before, there were others who rebelled, and whose one idea was to break loose from the prison house.” Like Ivan Karamozov (Bk V, Chap 4), Camus refuses to accept the idea that future goods such as Divine salvation or eternal happiness “can compensate for a single moment of human suffering,”57 or a child’s tears. Both Ivan Karamozov and Camus believe that “if evil is essential to Divine creation, then creation is unacceptable.” They wish to replace “the reign of grace by the reign of justice.”58 They both assert that no good man would accept salvation on these terms. “There is no possible salvation for the man who feels real compassion,” because he would side with the damned and for their sake reject eternity.59 What is to be gained by rebellion, what are its dangers, and how does one avoid merely “beating the sea with rods” in a nihilistic orgy?With great perceptiveness, Camus discusses these issues in The Rebel. He begins by outlining the entire history of nihilistic rebellion. He admits that once God is declared dead and life meaningless, there is the tendency to rebel in anger by engaging in irrational acts of violence and destruction. Andre Breton has written that the simplest surrealistic act consists “in going out in the Street, revolver in hand, and shooting at random into the crowd.”6° Camus cites “the struggle between the will to be and the desire for annihilation, between the yes and the no, which we have discovered again and again at every stage of rebellion.”61 Citing numerous historical examples, he continually warns against this degeneration of rebellion into crime and murder. Another danger of rebellion which Camus discusses is the sub- stitution of human gods and concepts of salvation for the dead God. This error is more subtle than shooting at random into the crowd, but leads to much more killing and human suffering than the nihilist sniper. Camus criticizes “Nietzsche, at least in his theory of super-humanity, and Marx before him, with his classless society, [who] both replace The Beyond by the Later On.”62 In this respect, these thinkers have not abandoned the notion that history marches toward redemption in which some messianic goal will be realized. Camus urges moderation in the quest for distant goals. He writes, “the absolute is not attained nor, above all, created through history. Politics is not religion, or if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition.”63 He contrasts rebellion, which he applauds with revolution which leads to murder in the name of vague future goals. “Revolution consists in loving[those] a man who does not yet exist,” and in murdering [those] men who doexist.64 “He who dedicates himself to this history, dedicates himself to nothing, and in his turn is nothing.”65 In The Plague, the character Tarrou renounces his revolutionary past. He states, For many years I’ve been ashamed, mortally ashamed of having been, even with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. . . All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and its up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestil- ences.66 Though obviously attuned to the dangers of rebellion, he insists that “these consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself, or at least they occur to the extent that the rebel forgets his original purpose.”67 What is the original purpose that has been forgotten? Rebellion begins because the rebel denounces the lack of justice in the world. He denounces the idea that the end, whether it be the coming of the messianic age, or the revo- lution, or eternal bliss, justifies means which involve so much suffering.Once injustice and suffering are denounced, [people] man needs to exert all his effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers in the world. Killing existing men for a ques- tionable future good, would not be a rational method of exhibi ting solidarity with the sufferers. Nor would solidarity be shown by stoical acceptance of the status quo. Camus urges his rebels to renounce murder completely and work for justice and for a decrease in suffering. Like Dr. Rieux in The Plague, one should take the victim’s side and “share with his fellow citizens the onlycertitude they have in common—love, exile, suffering.”68 What can be accomplished through rebellion? Camus’ goals are modest. He realizes that the rebel is doomed to “a never ending defeat,”69 in that death, finitude and suffering will always conquer him. He realizes that after [humanity] man has mastered everything in creation that can be mastered and rectified everything that can be rectified, children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society.Even by his greatest effort man can only purpose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage.7° However, there are ephemeral victories and rewards for the rebel. He [One] who dedicates [oneself] himself for the duration of his life to the house he builds, to the dignity of [hu]mankind, dedicates himself the earth and reaps from it the harvest that sows its seedand sustains the world again and again. Those whosedesires are limited to man and his humble yet formidable love, should enter, if only now and then, into their reward. They know that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love. Society must be arranged to limit injustice and suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the leisure and freedom to pursue his own search for meaning. Future utopias must be renounced, and “history can no longer be presented as an object of worship.”74 “It is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies,” and to aim for what is possible—more justice, solidarity, and love among [people] men. The rebel must “reject divinity in order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men.”75 Redemption is impossible. Human dignity and love can inter mittently be achieved with struggle and constant vigilance against the plague bacillus that “never dies or disappears for good. .. [but can] rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”76

#### The possibility of extinction means we can no longer afford to be complicit with inevitable suffering – an affirmation of life must affirm existence first

Connolly 02

(William, Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University, “Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox” p 186-187)

Zarathustra says: "The most concerned ask today, 'How is man to be preserved?\* But Zarathustra is the first and only one to ask: 'How is man to be overcome?\*"16 The idea is to stop worrying about the preservation of man, to strive to create a few overmen. Leave to their own devices those who insist upon being consumed by resentment, so that a few can cultivate another type of human­ity. The new type to be cultivated consists of a few free spirits who fend off the resentment against the human condition that wells up in everyone, a few who rise above the insistence that there be symmetry between evil and responsibility, who live above the demand that some guilty agent worthy of punishment be located every time they themselves suffer, who recognize that existential suffering is a precondition of wisdom. But this typological differentiation between man and overman no longer makes much sense, if it ever did. For the overman— constituted as an independent, detached type—refers simultane­ously to a spiritual disposition and to the residence of free spirits in a social space relatively insulated from reactive politics. The prob­lem is that the disappearance of the relevant social preconditions confounds any division of humanity into two spiritual types. If there is anything in the type to be admired, the ideal must be dismantled as a distinct caste of solitary individuals and folded into the political fabric of late-modern society. The "overman" now falls apart as a set of distinctive dispositions concentrated in a particular caste or type, and its spiritual qualities migrate to a set of disposi­tions that may compete for presence in any self. The type now becomes (as it already was to a significant degree) a voice in the self contending with other voices, including those of ressentiment. This model is implicitly suggested by Foucault when he eschews the term "overman" (as well as "will to power") and shifts the center of gravity of Nietzschean discourse from heroes and classical tragic figures to everyday misfits such as Alex/ Alexina and Pierre Riviere. These textual moves are, I think, part of a strategy to fold Nietz­schean agonism into the fabric of ordinary life by attending to the extraordinary character of the latter. I seek to pursue this same trail. The Nietzschean conception of a few who overcome resentment above politics while the rest remain stuck in the muck of resentment in politics is not today viable on its own terms. Today circum­stances require that many give the sign of the overman a presence in themselves and in the ethicopolitical orientations they project onto the life of the whole. But this break with the spirit of Nietzsche requires further elucidation. The shift results partly from the late-modern possibility of human self-extinction. In this new world the failure to "preserve man" could also extinguish the human basis for the struggle Nietzsche named "overman." Preservation and overcoming are now drawn closer together, so that each becomes a term in the other: the latter cannot succeed unless it touches the former. But the entanglement of each with the other in sociopolitical relations means, when the logic of this entanglement is worked out, that the "overman" as a type cannot eliminate from its life some of the modalities definitive; of the "human.” If the overman was ever projected as a distinct type—and this is not certain—it now becomes refigured into a struggle within the self between the inclination to existential resent-ment and an affirmation of life that rises above this tendency.

#### Nietzsche is wrong, suffering isn’t an inevitable part of life. We should embrace compassion- best way to find value to life.

Van Hooft 98

(Stan Van Hooft, Associate Professor of International and Political Studies Deakin University, "The Meanings of Suffering,", The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 28, No.5, Sep/Oct., 1998 UWYO KB)

#### The reason that Nietzsche's view and its self-deprecating irony finds a ready response in contemporary postmodern thinking is that it rejects overarching theories of providence or human progress. In postmodern thinking there is little scope for contemplative reason. The existential quest for meaning that used to be expressed in the theoretical aspect of our being is still in us, however. In a postmodern culture it is exercised in the "integrative" aspect of our being,[ 14] the aspect in which we engage in the preconscious task of combining the various dimensions of our lives together so as to constitute our wholeness and identity. This can be achieved by faith or commitment. And above all else, Nietzsche might be seen as urging us to live in a committed way. Which ideals and hopes we commit ourselves to does not much matter; they would all be meaning-giving stories anyway. But the key point is that we achieve the integration of our being by infusing every aspect of our existence, including the bodily, with the enthusiasm for, and commitment to, those of our goals that define our identity. Both our zest for living and our practical tasks would in this way become, along with our very biological being, an expression of our commitment. Our highest ideals would shape the way we live. Our bodies would be infused and enlivened by our commitments, not just as their vehicle, but as their very expression, for we feel more alive when we are engaged upon an absorbing task. In this way we would overcome the all-too-human desire for comfort and security and extend ourselves both physically and spiritually toward the goal of self-overcoming. Our pain, effort, and struggle would then not be meaningless suffering since they would not frustrate our whole being. While there might be pain and hardship, our commitment and drive for becoming would shape all of them into a single life project. Our pain and hardship would validate our identity. Whether this way of thinking would allow us to embrace the suffering that is inflicted by disease or accident, the suffering that is not part of our life's plan, is perhaps still doubtful. Useless suffering in the face of which we are passive might continue to be meaningless in terms of our life's goals. Or it might be embraced as the test of our mettle, the ultimate ordeal through which our existential faith and commitment might be tested. Whether one is a Christian who sees suffering as part of God's salvific plan for humanity,[ 3] or a humanist who thinks that suffering grounds the possibility of ethics through compassion, or a Stoic who maintains an indifference to suffering as something morally irrelevant, or a Nietzschean who holds that suffering ennobles the human spirit and makes possible human advancement and personal self-validation, the perennial and inescapable question of the one who suffers is, Why me? But rather than seek an answer to that question, we should ask, in the spirit of Nietzsche, why we want an answer to it. The challenge of postmodern authenticity is to sever the link between suffering and justice. It is to accept the blindness of fate and the inevitability of bad luck. It is to refuse the false consolations of theodicies or metaphysical theories that make suffering positive. Suffering is to be borne. There is nothing more to it. The only question remaining about this way of thinking would be whether it could give rise to compassion for the suffering of others. That is, even if we reject the ancient and Christian attempts to accept suffering, we should try to incorporate some part of Levinas's humanistic insight. And this seems possible. Insofar as suffering is borne, it opens us to the suffering of others. Indeed, attempts to make suffering good blind us to the reality of our and of others' suffering by allowing us to view it as something that ought to happen or that ought to be accepted. Cruelty and insensitivity lie down this path. The tragic bearing of suffering, on the other hand, awakens us to its reality. If neither the gods, the cosmos, providence, nor a faith in human progress rob suffering of its tragedy, then we are left just with the brute fact that we and others suffer. And in this there is community. Our own suffering awakens us to what the other is going through and thus creates in us the compassion through which relieving actions can be motivated. In this community of suffering, a meaning might yet be found for our own suffering. Perhaps all the meaning that suffering can have is that it teaches us to care for others.

#### “No value to life” doesn’t outweigh---prioritize existence because value is subjective

Torbjörn Tännsjö 11, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, 2011, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” online: http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

#### You should evaluate ALL epistemology claims through the lens of specificity—Drawing inferences from empirical reality is possible EVEN IF there is no possibility for pure certainty.

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[Colin, Department of Politics, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Exeter, Journal of International Relations and Development, “Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Kratochwil’s attempt to push beyond the epistemological wars by remaining inside the epistemological cave is not as puzzling as it might seem given that **he assumes all meta-theoretical debate to be epistemological.** Thus, for example, he argues that he aims to ‘review some of the issues that meta-theorizing was supposed to address and show how this project of securing knowledge through hierarchization and finding absolute foundations failed’(Kr atochwil 2007: 2). Likewise, he suggests that issues such as incommensurability, reductionism and materialism vs idealism are arcane epistemological concerns (Kratochwil 2007: 2). **But in what sense, for example, is the materialism vs idealism question epistemological**? **As it has developed in IR, this is a debate about whether social outcomes are best explained in terms of material factors or ideational ones**.8 A related debate within philosophy attempts to grasp whether being or ideas ultimately matter. **In either debate, no epistemological issues are involved until a specific claim is made.**9 **We can certainly ask any theorist** who takes a position of either side of this debate **how they know (the epistemological question) their chosen factor is determinate in the last instance**. **But their epistemological response** to this question **is not the same as the claim itself, but rather defends the claim on one or other basis**. And we assess these claims on a number of grounds. **Given that we do not know in advance what the epistemological support for any given claim may be**, then it also follows that **scientists cannot afford to be epistemological dogmatists, pinning their colours to only one epistemological mast.** **Philosophers can trouble themselves with convoluted debates about the relative merits of one particular epistemological stance** over another— empiricism vs rationalism, for example—after all it is their job, **but scientists need to be epistemological opportunists** (Einstein 1949) **using a wide range of** epistemological **supports** **and never knowing in advance which one, or which mix of them, is relevant until a specific claim is made**. In some respects, this might seem to place me close to the position that Kratochwil suggests is absurd. For **is not my position a form of ‘anything goes’?** Well, again agreeing with Kratochwil that we should reject traditional logic and its associated yes or no answers, I will reply both yes and no.10 **Yes, it is an ‘anything goes’ position insofar as I reject outright that we need to commit ourselves to any particular epistemological position in advance of making or judging** particular **knowledge claims**. **I can see no good reason for giving any specific epistemological standpoint a position of a priori privilege**. **But I can also answer no because this position does not mean that we are unable to make informed judgements on the basis of the evidence for the claim**. **The fact that philosophers have been unable to provide secure foundations** for one or other epistemological stance **does not alter the fact that we continue to use these positions to get along in the world**. In this respect, I agree completely with Kratochwil’s claim (2007: 11) that b**oth absolute certainty and absolute doubt are impossible positions to hold, and that we ‘go on’in a situation located somewhere in between**. **It may be philosophically naıve of me to claim that if I wish to know how many cars are parked in my drive, then the easiest way is to probably go and look. But I can do this without needing philosophy to prove empiricism infallible.** Equally, in certain circumstances I might be able to ascertain how many cars are in my drive without looking; if, for example, I know that at time T1 that there were three cars and that one went away at time T2, then, if asked at time T3 (assuming these events are sequential), I have a legitimate case to say ‘two’. Of course, in either case, **I could still be wrong but the point is that the claim** about the existence of a certain number of cars **can justifiably be supported on various epistemological grounds and we do not know in advance which will be the most appropriate**. **Hence the context in which the claim emerges is also an important aspect of its validity**. In both cases, there is no doubt that observation or the process of rational deduction is theoretically laden, but **to say that our concepts help carve up the world in certain ways is not to accept that they either determine the physicality of what exists or can,** in all cases, **stop an object from existing**.

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#### Fifth, scenario creation isn't the same as threat construction, it’s crucial to see if policies are a good idea and reduce the risk of nuclear war.

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Scenario generation has its origins in the Cold War when strategic analysts developed the method for helping to think futuristically about driving forces, chains of events, or possible trigger points that might lead to conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and how, if this occurred, the conflict might proceed. In essence, scenario generation was used to plot logically plausible possibilities and then to model responses, strategic positioning strategies, and to formulate war-fighting and contingency plans. Cold War scenario generation was said to be so successful in modeling circumstances of possible nuclear confrontation with devastating and mass annihilation outcomes, that policy makers were moved to develop the doctrine of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) and various avoidance strategies to avert the possibility of nuclear confrontation.64 The essence of scenario generation is defined by Geoff Coyle as “a justified and traceable sequence of events which might plausibly be imagined to occur in the future.”65 Importantly, scenarios are not “forecasts, preferences or predictions, but plausible, challenging descriptions of what might happen—in the form of a set of stories about alternative futures.”66 To this end, scenario analysis builds on many of the techniques of the Delphi method. But rather than use intermediaries to design survey questionnaires, identify experts and synthesize and interpret responses, scenario generation allows experts to develop scenarios that lay bare assumptions and the rationale on which interpretations are made, and to develop possible sketches of anticipated events and their probable time lines. The thinking behind this is to allow those who utilize scenarios to make informed decisions and to evaluate the scenarios generated relative to the assumptions on which they have been based. Apart from the military, some of the first institutions to employ scenario generation were commercial organizations. The Royal Dutch Shell Company, for example, pioneered scenario analysis under the auspices of three prominent individuals, Peter Schwartz, Kees van der Heijden and Peter Checkland.67 However, despite some 30 years of scenario generation no formal models exist; indeed the notion of formal techniques is actively resisted. Rather, scenario generation stresses creative, imaginary, challenging discourses about possible futures by looking at the dominant drivers of societal change and risk. These are normally categorized under the well known PEST acronym (political, economic, social and technological factors) as the primary drivers of change and risk, and primary determinations of future worlds, processes and events. Scenarios, however, are not used to write the future but to outline possibilities in relation to key decisions that need to be taken today and of the possible future implications of these decisions given a constantly changing environment. It is, in this sense, an attempt to map possible trajectories and outcomes and logically construct images of cause and effect so that the ramifications of decision making can be understood in terms of its collateral implications and consequences. Peter Schwartz encapsulated the process with the provocative title of his book: The art of the Long View.68 The precise methods associated with scenario generation are numerous and the method employed normally contingent on the intended purpose. Angela Wilkinson and Esther Eidinow, for example, suggest that scenario generation falls into four discrete categories: identified objectives, known constitutive / environmental elements; formally mapped trajectories; scenarios generated. 2. Inductive Method: Development of a series of scenarios from an assemblage of a series of possible events. 3. Incremental Approach: Develops images and maps and describes an “official future”—or the one the organization thinks most likely to emerge, and then develops scenarios on the basis of decisions and how they will interact with the “official future” and their possible consequences and effects. 4. Normative Approach: Starts with a set of characteristics of assumed conditions, or a scenario framed in a forward time horizon, and works backwards to see what it requires (decisions, events, processes, attributes) to get there and if this is feasible.69 Peter Schwartz suggested that just as novels have themes which provide continuity, logical connections, and thus a central narrative enabling interpretation and assessment, scenarios too need a theme. But what? Schwartz suggested several themes; challenge and response, for example: “Perhaps London’s position as a centre for financial services is challenged by Frankfurt or Tokyo; what are the drivers and uncertainties which will affect the viability of a strategic response?” Other themes suggested included winners and losers or infinite possibility. The theme is not important per se, but a tool providing a catalyst or fulcrum via which to stress test the assumptions, the logicality of outcomes, the implications of strategic decisions and the risks and opportunities that might present. As with other third generation approaches, scenario analysis is not a panacea, offering both insights but also displaying limitations. It embraces lateral creative thinking and challenges organizations (commercial, non-commercial and state based) to think about alternative futures or events otherwise not anticipated. To the extent that it is able to do this successfully, it has obvious advantages for contingency planning, risk identification, mitigation planning and risk avoidance. It thus helps various commercial, state and non-commercial actors to navigate uncertainty and risk environments rather than stumble upon them without due thought to management and response. The normal caveats about such approaches apply, however: the quality of the analysis is directly proportionate to the quality of the analysts; interpretative discretion if not managed and appropriately tested and checked, can derail the construction of quality scenarios and their utility.