# 1NC

## framework

### Observation One: The Role of DEBATE

#### First, our interpretation: debate is an agonistic field of play where participants must accept the constraints of agreeing to switch-sides on the topic by reading a topical affirmative when they are aff and negating the topic when they are negative.

#### Second, are our link arguments. The aff team fails to engage in this process in three ways:

#### Advocating a definitive course of action as indicated by the words ‘resolved’ and ‘should’[[1]](#footnote-1), rather they have you endorse a fluid system of constant criticism.

#### Not defending the agent of the resolution, which is the government of the United States based in D.C.[[2]](#footnote-2)

#### Not defending the direction of the resolution, which requires that American Democracy assistance be INCREASED, or made greater.[[3]](#footnote-3)

### Observation Two: The impacts

#### There are three net benefits to this interpretation of debate:

#### First, MORAL disagreement: Effective moral deliberation requires that all parties be willing to submit to a RECIPROCAL process of agonistic disagreement. Without an effective PROCESS of switch-side debate, there can be no method of dealing with the practical constraints that surround any persuasive context. EVEN IF the affirmative wins there is merit to considering their case, their abandonment of the forum of switch-side debate leaves us less able to speak to problems of power, violence and inequality because they give up on a process that is inherently valuable.

Gutmann & Thompson 96

[Amy & Dennis, President of Penn State and Professor of Political Philosophy at Harvard, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 1//wyo-tjc]

OF THE CHALLENGES that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values. We address the challenge of moral disagreement here by developing a conception of democracy that secures a central place for moral discussion in political life. Along with a growing number of other political theorists, we call this conception deliberative democracy. The core idea is simple: when citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions. But the meaning and implications of the idea are complex. Although the idea has a long history, it is still in search of a theory. We do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of delib-eration that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies. Some scholars have criticized liberal political theory for neglecting moral deliberation. Others have analyzed the philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy, and still others have begun to explore institutional reforms that would promote deliberation. Yet nearly all of them stop at the point where deliberation itself begins. None has systematically examined the substance of deliberation—the theoretical principles that should guide moral argument and their implications for actual moral disagreements about public policy. That is our subject, and it takes us into the everyday forums of democratic politics, where moral argument regularly appears but where theoretical analysis too rarely goes. Deliberative democracy involves reasoning about politics, and nothing has been more controversial in political philosophy than the nature of reason in politics. We do not believe that these controversies have to be settled before deliberative principles can guide the practice of democracy. Since on occasion citizens and their representatives already engage in the kind of reasoning that those principles recommend, deliberative democracy simply asks that they do so more consistently and comprehensively. The best way to prove the value of this kind of reasoning is to show its role in arguments about specific principles and policies, and its contribu¬tion to actual political debates. That is also ultimately the best justification for our conception of deliberative democracy itself. But to forestall pos¬sible misunderstandings of our conception of deliberative democracy, we offer some preliminary remarks about the scope and method of this book. The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy pre-scribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity, the subject of Chapter 2, but no less essential are the other principles developed in later chapters. When citizens reason reciprocally, they seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake; they try to find mutually acceptable ways of resolving moral disagreements. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest (say, taking advantage of a legal loophole or a lucky break) and acting fairly (following rules in the spirit that one expects others to adopt). In many of the controversies dis-cussed later in the book, the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them. Even though the quality of deliberation and the conditions under which it is conducted are far from ideal in the controversies we consider, the fact that in each case some citizens and some officials make arguments consistent with reciprocity suggests that a deliberative perspective is not Utopian. To clarify what reciprocity might demand under non-ideal conditions, we develop a distinction between deliberative and nondeliberative disa-greement. Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong. They can believe that a moderate pro-life position on abortion, for example, is morally respectable even though they think it morally mistaken. (The abortion example—to which we often return in the book—is meant to be illustrative. For readers who deny that there is any room for deliberative disagreement on abortion, other political controversies can make the same point.) The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative (for example, about a policy to legalize discrimination against blacks and women), citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect toward their opponents. In deliberative disagreement (for example, about legalizing abortion), citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and believe that, though neglected in theory and practice, it is essential to a morally robust democratic life. Although both of us have devoted some of our professional life to urging these ideas on public officials and our fellow citizens in forums of practical politics, this book is primarily the product of scholarly rather than political deliberation. Insofar as it reaches beyond the academic community, it is addressed to citizens and officials in their more reflective frame of mind. Given its academic origins, some readers may be inclined to complain that only professors could be so unrealistic as to believe that moral reasoning can help solve political problems. But such a complaint would misrepresent our aims. To begin with, we do not think that academic discussion (whether in scholarly journals or college classrooms) is a model for moral deliberation in politics. Academic discussion need not aim at justifying a practical decision, as deliberation must. Partly for this reason, academic discussion is likely to be insensitive to the contexts of ordinary politics: the pressures of power, the problems of inequality, the demands of diversity, the exigencies of persuasion. Some critics of deliberative democracy show a similar insensitivity when they judge actual political deliberations by the standards of ideal philosophical reflection. Actual deliberation is inevitably defective, but so is philosophical reflection practiced in politics. The appropriate comparison is between the ideals of democratic deliberation and philosophical reflection, or between the application of each in the non-ideal circumstances of politics. We do not assume that politics should be a realm where the logical syllogism rules. Nor do we expect even the more appropriate standard of mutual respect always to prevail in politics. A deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation, force, and even violence. It is partly because moral argument has so much unrealized potential in dem-ocratic politics that we believe it deserves more attention. Because its place in politics is so precarious, the need to find it a more secure home and to nourish its development is all the more pressing. Yet because it is also already part of our common experience, we have reason to hope that it can survive and even prosper if philosophers along with citizens and public officials better appreciate its value in politics. Some readers may still wonder why deliberation should have such a prominent place in democracy. Surely, they may say, citizens should care more about the justice of public policies than the process by which they are adopted, at least so long as the process is basically fair and at least minimally democratic. One of our main aims in this book is to cast doubt on the dichotomy between policies and process that this concern assumes. Having good reason as individuals to believe that a policy is just does not mean that collectively as citizens we have sufficient justification to legislate on the basis of those reasons. The moral authority of collective judgments about policy depends in part on the moral quality of the process by which citizens collectively reach those judgments. Deliberation is the most appropriate way for citizens collectively to resolve their moral disagreements not only about policies but also about the process by which policies should be adopted. Deliberation is not only a means to an end, but also a means for deciding what means are morally required to pursue our common ends.

#### Second, Presidential Powers Policy:

#### Third, SWITCH-SIDE DEBATE: The net-benefits are both epistemic and ontological: epistemic because prepared, competitive discourse and required listening to both sides of an argument is a prerequisite for critical reasoning and interested inquiry, and ontological because it affirms a method of living that is the only antidote to the violence of the affirmative’s universalist dogma, which is root of violence and genocide

Roberts-Miller 3

[Patricia, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at UT Austin, “Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, but not act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibility for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banality of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place,

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the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in both rhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking.

### Observation Three: Voting Issue

#### Vote negative to reject the affirmative’s dogmatic refusal to subject themselves to the constraints of switch-side debate.

#### First, BOUNDED CREATIVITY outweighs: You should embrace a model of debate that strikes a balance between predictability and creativity—it is a PRACTICAL REALITY that preparing to debate within a common framework enhances education because it maximizes elaboration and testing of ideas. That’s also a reason to SEVERLY DISCOUNT their impact claims because those claims have not been submitted to rigorous testing but are only shallow gut-shot reactions.

Goodin 03

[Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, uwyo//amp]

Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and procedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue.

## hope

**First, Their performance doesn’t happen in a vacuum – the decision to ignore the workings of state power is the fundamental cause of capricious abuse of power by elites – their model of politics gives carte blanche to the powerful, leading to a shrunken public sphere and killing citizen engagement**

Carl **Boggs**, Professor of Social Sciences and Film Studies at National University, Los Angeles, **2000**, The End of Politics, p. 250-251

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning as either useless or dangerous, **the actually existing power structure**—replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious de­signs, and, indeed, rational plans—**remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique**. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly ac­ceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. **Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally de­sire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the sta­tus quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injus­tices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If poli­tics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling­-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom**.” Systematic attempts to ameliorate op­pressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political night­mare. A belief that totalitarianism might result from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; **to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessarily doomed either to impotence or totalitari­anism requires a completely** different (and **indefensible) set of premises.** Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: **the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate coloni­zation, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear** from people’s lives. **Far from it: the public space va­cated by ordinary citizens,** well informed and ready to fight for their inter­ests, simply **gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege**. Beyond that, the **fragmentation** and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Dar­winism, and urban violence of the American landscape, **could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration.** Viewed in this light, **the contemporary drift toward antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise—**or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would prob­ably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those univer­sal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.’6 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’s Burkean muddling-though theories.

**Second, engaging the state is critical to the ability of citizens to break into the project of solving global challenges: Engagement relies on an existing internationalist state and refocuses its energies through citizen participation in national institutions that solve for war as well as environmental and social challenges**

**Sassen 2009**

[Columbia University, istheauthorof TheGlobalCity (2ndedn, Princeton, 2001), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, 2008) and A Sociology of Globalisation (Norton,2007), among others, 2009, The Potential for a Progressive State?, uwyo//amp]

Using state power for a new global politics These post-1980s trends towards **a greater interaction of national and global dynamics are not part of some unidirectional historical progres-sion**. There have been times in the past when they may have been as strong in certain aspects as they are today (Sassen, 2008a: chapter 3). But **the current positioning of national states is distinctive precisely because** 270 Saskia Sassen the national state has become the most powerful complex organizational entity in the world, and because it is a resource that citizens, confined largely to the national, can aim at governing and using to develop novelpolitical agendas**. It is this mix of the national and the global that is so full of potential. The national state is one particular form of state: at the other end of this variable the state can be conceived of as a technical administrative capability that could escape the historic bounds of narrow nationalisms that have marked the state historically**, or colonialism as the only form of internationalism that states have enacted**. Stripping the state of the particularity of this historical legacy gives me more analytic freedom in conceptualising these processes and opens up the possibility of the denationalised state**.As particular components of national states become the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central to glob-alisation they undergo change that is difficult to register or name. In my own work I have found useful the notion of an incipient denation-alising of specific components of national states, i.e. components that function as such institutional homes. **The question for research then becomes what is actually ‘national’ in some of the institutional compo-nents of states linked to the implementation and regulation of economic globalisation. The hypothesis here would be that some components of national institutions, even though formally national, are not national in the sense in which we have constructed the meaning of that term overthe last hundred years.This partial**, often highly specialised or at least particularised**, dena-tionalisation can also take place in domains other than that of economic globalisation, notably the more recent developments in the humanrights regime which allow national courts to sue foreign firms and dictators, or which grant undocumented immigrants certain rights. Denationalisation is, thus, multivalent: it endogenises global agendas of many different types of actors, not only corporate firms and financial markets, but also human rights and environmental objectives. Those confined to the national can use national state institutions as a bridge into global politics. This is one kind of radical politics**, and only one kind, **that would use the capacities of hopefully increasingly denationalized states. The existence and the strengthening of global civil society organ-isations becomes strategic in this context. In all of this lie the possibilities of moving towards new types of joint global action by denationalized states–coalitions of the willing focused not on war but on environmental and social justice projects.**

**Third, the alternative is to reject their localist approach to politics in favor of a state based global approach**

**Their method is doomed in the face of the global politics of violence – global governance is inevitable, and surrendering the global to the purely local makes it impossible to influence the outcome of global politics. Reclaiming the global is the only way to make effective local politics possible – it can’t go the other way around.**

George **Monbiot**, journalist, academic, and political and environmental activist, **2004**, Manifesto for a New World Order, p. 11-13

The quest for global solutions is difficult and divisive. **Some members of this movement are deeply suspicious of all institutional power** at the global level, fearing that it could never be held to account by the world’s people. Others are concerned that a single set of universal prescriptions would threaten the diversity of dissent. **A smaller faction has argued that all political programmes are oppressive**: our task should not be to replace one form of power with another, but to replace all power with a magical essence called ‘anti-power’. **But** most of the members of this movement are coming to recognize that **if we propose solutions which can be effected only at the local or the national level, we remove ourselves from any meaningful role in solving precisely those problems which most concern us. Issues such as cli­mate change, international debt, nuclear proliferation, war, peace and the balance of trade between nations can be addressed only globally or internationally. Without global measures and global institutions, it is impossible to** see how we might distribute wealth from rich nations to poor ones, tax the mobile rich and their even more mobile money, control the shipment of toxic waste, sustain the ban on landmines, prevent the use of nuclear weapons, **broker peace between nations or prevent powerful states from forc­ing weaker ones to trade on their terms. If we were to work only at the local level, we would leave these, the most critical of issues, for other people to tackle. Global governance will take place whether we participate in it or not.** Indeed, **it must take place if the issues which concern us are not to be resolved by the brute force of the powerfu**l. That the international institutions have been designed or captured by the dictatorship of vested interests is not an argument against the existence of international institutions, but a reason for overthrowing them and re­placing them with our own. It is an argument for a global political system which holds power to account. **In the absence of an effective global politics, moreover, local solutions will always be undermined by communities of interest which do not share our vision. We might, for example, manage to persuade the people of the street in which we live to give up their cars in the hope of preventing climate change, but unless everyone, in all communities, either shares our politics or is bound by the same rules, we simply open new road space into which the neighbouring communities can expand**. We might declare our neighbour­hood nuclear-free, but unless we are simultaneously work­ing, at the international level, for the abandonment of nuclear weapons, we can do nothing to prevent ourselves and everyone else from being threatened by people who are not as nice as we are. We would deprive ourselves, in other words, of the power of restraint. **By first rebuilding the global politics, we establish the political space in which our local alternatives can flourish. If, by contrast, we were to leave the governance of the neces­sary global institutions to others, then those institutions will pick off our local, even our national, solutions one by one**. There is little point in devising an alternative economic policy for your nation, as Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva, now president of Brazil, once advocated, if the International Monetary Fund and the financial speculators have not first been overthrown. There is little point in fighting to protect a coral reef from local pollution, if nothing has been done to prevent climate change from destroying the conditions it requires for its survival.

## Case

#### YOUR DEMAND FOR ACTION NOW AND FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL SACRIFICE TRADES OFF WITH AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND LEADS TO PRESCRIPTIONS CAN LEAVE THE OPPRESSED WORSE OFF

KUPER 02

[Andrew Kuper, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, "More than charity: cosmopolitan alternatives to the "Singer Solution".”, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 16, Issue 1, pages 107–128, March 2002, Accessed via Wiley Library 5/28/13, \\wyo-bb]

Here's the rub: It is not enough to say that all persons have equal moral claims on us; we need to ask how best to organize ourselves politically and economically to meet those claims. Which combinations of rules and institutions of governance are most effective? What roles ought we to play as individuals in respect of the primary agents of aid and justice? Analogies to ethical decisions by an individual in a hermetically sealed case actually obscure all these problems and questions. For while it is true that we often act as individuals, the causal relevance or impact of our actions depends on the positions we occupy within complex social systems. Philosophers may want me to put the point a little more technically: Singer conflates issues of practical reason--our obligations to the vulnerable--with issues of judgment--the obligations of the relatively rich to the poor in the particular case of the world in which we live. If we are to make judgments of how to act in this world, we should not confuse abstract with practical requirements. From the fact that we have an abstract obligation of aid or charity, it does not follow that we are practically obliged to donate to the poor. How we address poverty is a matter of judgment: understanding the relevant features of a social system or situation; considering which principles are relevant, whether they present competing demands in practice, and how other agents are likely to act; and finally, adjudicating on a contextual course of action. Nothing in the principle of aid or charity determines that the right action in any or all contexts is donation. All-too-quick recommendations are not just a leap from principle to action, they are symptomatic of an implicitly apolitical outlook that does not take the real demands of contextual judgment seriously. Singer might say that analogies are merely designed to show that we do have an extensive obligation of charity. But this is no answer. His analogies and other arguments abstract from the causal dynamics of poverty and opportunity, and from the mediated and indirect nature of social relations at a global scale. This leads to a serious underestimation of the complexities of the remedies and the diversity of roles available to us. Indeed, it leads to a failure to see that, in making judgments about poverty relief, knowledge of institutions and awareness of roles must frame thinking about individuals. Even aggressively laissez-faire capitalists maintain that their actions are best for the poor. That is, what is at stake most of the time is not how much we should sacrifice, but whether and which uses of resources and what kinds of agencies make a positive difference, and how. POLITICAL JUDGMENT IN CONTEXT Lest I seem to sound like a neoliberal apologist, or a defeatist, it is helpful to see how much more informative is the theoretical orientation of Karl Marx. Marx understood that the first step in approaching political struggle and producing change is a structural analysis of the dynamic causes of impoverishment and immiseration. A theory that does not include a contextual and institutional analysis (in the broadest sense) is condemned to recommending brief symptomatic relief, or even damaging and counterproductive action. This is not a peculiarly Marxist point, and one does not have to sympathize with Marxists to think that telling the bourgeoisie to be more charitable as individual actors is unlikely to produce deep changes. There is, ironically, a quasi-Calvinist strand to the individualist approach to development: an insistence that one can never do enough, never be as moral as one ought to be; and an emphasis on individual conscience rather than effective collective moral norms and political institutions. Yet the well-documented failure of relief efforts in recent decades is a powerful indicator that a structure-sensitive approach to development is indispensable to any wise, humane program or philosophy of right action. Consider, most starkly, the perpetuation and intensification of the Rwandan conflict and the human misery aggravated by aid agencies that sustained refugee camps. In spite of the camps becoming bases for militiamen and incubators for cholera, the prospect of international NGO aid encouraged people not to return to their homes even when it was safer to do so, thus intensifying and prolonging the conflict. Consider also the "food relief" of the 1970s that so damaged the situation of developing world farmers and their dependents. It is hardly an unfamiliar thought that things can always get worse: consider Shakespeare's King Lear on the Heath, or Titus Andronicus. Development experts will be highly aware of countless recent examples that we can only wish were fictional.

# 2NC

# K

## hope

#### Magnitude: Engaging the state solves every impact: Climate change, economic violence/injustice, war, other environmental catastrophes, racism, etc

**Sassen 2009**

[ColumbiaUniversity, istheauthorof TheGlobalCity (2ndedn, Princeton, 2001), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, 2008) and A Sociology of Globalisation (Norton,2007), among others, 2009, The Potential for a Progressive State?, uwyo//amp]

Power is made, and hence can be unmade. **The work of making power varies across time and space. And so does the success, effectiveness and durability of this work of making. This means also that powerlessness is constructed.** Powerlessness is not simply the absence of power or mere victimhood, as is so often believed. Hence **it is variable rather than fixed**. From there, then, comes the possibility that powerlessness can range from **elementary to complex.** This variability does not sim-ply depend on the characteristics of individuals: the settings also matter.For instance, the powerlessness of a specific undocumented immigrantwill be quite elementary in the context of a California commercial farmbut can become complex in a city like New York or Los Angeles. In thatcomplexity of powerlessness lies the possibility of a politics.Here I examine one particular aspect of a larger project that seeks to recode power and powerlessness (Sassen, 2008a, 2008b). It is the fact that **corporate economic globalization is far more dependent on national states and national spaces than the typical arguments in the globali-sation scholarship allow for. This is one way of researching the limits of power,** in this case, **corporate global power**. The work of national states has been far more important than is usually recognised. **Much has been said about the USA and the UK as the key states producing the design for the new standards and legalities needed to ensure pro-tections and guarantees for global firms and markets**. 2 But here it is 263 264 Saskia Sassen important to emphasise **that the imposed ‘consensus’ in the commu-nity of states to further globalisation is not merely a political decision: ite ntails specific types of work by a large number of distinct state insti-tutions in each of the 150 plus countries that have joined (willinglyor not) the global economy.** Legislative items, executive orders, adher-ence to new technical standards, and so on, will have to be producedthrough the particular institutional and political structures of each state**.**All these states worked at it, and in that process installed global logicsdeep inside their national institution. Precisely because of this**, I see a possible radical politics in using state capacities for a politics not only of resistance, but of remaking without the violence of armed conflict, without war**.I argue that **neo-liberal globalisation has**, ironically, **forced specific state institutions to learn how to do global work and has produced a par-ticular type of state authority and power, one geared to global projects.States have historically been nationalist.** One challenge for a radical pol-itics today is to **get states to redeploy that learning and that particular type of power towards the pursuit of alternative global projects–towardsan alternative globalisation. We need to push states to use that learn-ing and emergent global power for projects aiming at social justice andhuman security** in its many different settings. **It will take political action to get states to reorient their international work away from the corporate global economy and from war**. These global agendas include e**liminating economic violence, strengthening human rights, protecting the envi-ronment, fighting racisms and intolerance. None of these is likely tobe achieved fully. But we can do better with our massive resources.** Theworld need not be this grim.**Any working state is a complex organisation with major capacities to handle an enormous variety of challenges and disparate political alignments**. **Not even the richest corporation is as complex a capabil-ity as a working state**. Pity that just about most states are in the handof regressive forces when it comes to the larger agendas that wouldhumanise the world. If we add to this organisational complexity thefact that **states have shown a willingness to be more internationalist**,albeit on the wrong terrain, **it becomes clear that states are key actorsto address our global challenges, from the environment to socially justeconomic development. We cannot give up on this type of capabil-ity. We need to reorient these vast organisations within each country towards addressing these urgent challenges, some of which can onlyb e addressed through collaborations and concerted action among a majority of states**.

### 2NC – ROB

**Linking the ballot to a should question in combination with USFG simulation teaches the skills to organize pragmatic consequences and philosophical values into a course of action**

**Hanghoj 08**

(Thorkild Hanghøj, Phd, DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. 2008 http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf//wyoccd)

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, **the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view,** which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: **Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal** (in imagination) **of various competing possible lines of action**… [It] **is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like** (...) **Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable** (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. **Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment**. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70**). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error** (Biesta, 2006: 8**). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios.**

**MARKED**

Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. **Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation,** i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. **In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes** (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) **and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action”** that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective**, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.**

### 2NC – Impact Debate

**We must use the institutions that exercise power to change them**

Lawrence **Grossburg**, University of Illinois, We Gotta Get Outta This Place, **1992**, p. 391-393

**The Left needs institutions which can operate within the systems of governance, understanding that such institutions are the mediating structures by which power is actively realized. It is often by directing opposition against specific institutions that power can be challenged**. The Left has assumed from some time now that, since it has so little access to the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. **The Left** does in fact need more visibility, but it also **needs greater access to the entire range of apparatuses of decision making and power**. Otherwise, the Left has nothing but its own self-righteousness. **It is not individuals who have produced** starvation and the other **social disgraces of our world, although it is individuals who must take responsibility for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act within organizations, and within the system of organizations which in fact have the capacity (**as well as the moral responsibility) **to fight them**. Without such organizations, the only models of political commit­ment are self-interest and charity. Charity suggests that we act on behalf of others who cannot act on their own behalf. But we are all precariously caught in the circuits of global capitalism, and every­one’s position is increasingly precarious and uncertain. It will not take much to change the position of any individual in the United States, as the experience of many of the homeless, the elderly and the “fallen” middle class demonstrates. Nor are there any guarantees about the future of any single nation. We can imagine ourselves involved in a politics where acting for another is always acting for oneself as well, a politics in which everyone struggles with the resources they have to make their lives (and the world) better, since the two are so intimately tied together! For example, we need to think of affirmation action as in everyone’s best interests, because of the possibilities it opens. We need to think with what Axelos has described as a “planetary thought” which “would be a coherent thought—but not a rationalizing and ‘rationalist’ inflection; it would be a fragmentary thought of the open totality—for what we can grasp are fragments unveiled on the horizon of the totality. **Such a politics will not begin by distinguishing between the local and the global** (and certainly not by valorizing one over the other) **for the ways in which the former are incorporated into the latter preclude the luxury of such choices. Resistance is always a local struggle, even when** (as in parts of the ecology movement) **it is imagined to connect into its global structures of articulation:** Think globally, act locally. Opposition is predicated precisely on locating the points of articulation between them, the points at which the global becomes local, and the local opens up onto the global. Since the meaning of these terms has to be understood in the context of any particular struggle, one is always acting both globally and locally: Think globally, act appropriately! **Fight locally because that is the scene of action, but aim for the global because that is the scene of agency**. “Local struggles directly target national and international axioms, at the precise point of their insertion into the field of imma­nence. This requires the imagination and construction of forms of unity, commonality and social agency which do not deny differences. Without such commonality, politics is too easily reduced to a ques­tion of individual rights (i.e., in the terms of classical utility theory); difference ends up “trumping” politics, bringing it to an end. The struggle against the disciplined mobilization of everyday life can only be built on affective commonalities, a shared “responsible yearning: a yearning out towards something more and something better than this and this place now.” The Left, after all, is defined by its common commitment to principles of justice, equality and democ­racy (although these might conflict) in economic, political and cultural life. It is based on the hope, perhaps even the illusion, that such things are possible. **The construction of an affective commonal­ity attempts to mobilize people in a common struggle, despite the fact that they have no common identity or character, recognizing that they are the only force capable of providing a new historical and oppositional agency. It strives to organize minorities into a new majority.**

### 2NC - Policy Simulation Good

**Simulation of policy making is crucial for skills development even if the state isn’t reformable-we control uniqueness:**

**Esberg and Sagan 12**

(Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2-17-12 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108 Taylor and Francis Online DA: 5-23-13//wyoccd)

**These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very**¶ **similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulation**s.¶ **Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and**¶ **coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises.** During the Cold War,¶ political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced¶ government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal¶ organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis¶ or conflict.6¶ The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests¶ and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations¶ of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban¶ Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials¶ and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’¶ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the¶ primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other¶ states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7¶ By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs,¶ and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave¶ and how their own government works.8¶ **Since simulations became more common as a**¶ **teaching tool** in the late 1950s, **educational literature has expounded on their benefits**,¶ **from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving**¶ **communication skills, to promoting teamwork**.9¶ **More broadly, simulations can deepen**¶ **understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts¶ while bringing theory into the realm of practice**.10 These exercises are particularly valuable¶ in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy¶ makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’¶ 11¶ **Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics**¶ **as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.**12¶ **Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts**\*¶ but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and¶ merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions¶ and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 **Facts can change quickly**;¶ **simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.**14¶

### 2NC – Rebellion Politics Worse

**Reforming authority is a comparatively better approach than rebellion politics that reinscribe oppression**

**Morson 04**

(Northwestern Professor, work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres incuding relation of literature to philosophy. 2004)

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) Development as an endless dialogue. **As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.** **We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful**. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. **There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue**. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. **Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority**. **If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.**

## Case

#### YOUR FOCUS ON SACRIFICE AND INDIVIDUAL PRACTICAL ETHICS TRADES OFF WITH A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY THAT FOCUSES ON GLOBAL ECONOMICS WHICH IS KEY TO IMPROVE THE CONDITIONS OF THE OPPRESSED.

Kuper 02

[Andrew Kuper, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, "More than charity: cosmopolitan alternatives to the "Singer Solution".”, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 16, Issue 1, pages 107–128, March 2002, Accessed via Wiley Library 5/28/13, \\wyo-bb]

I have repeatedly asked what difference philosophical theories make to the project of global poverty relief. It should by now be clear that an analysis from the broader perspective of political philosophy--as opposed to the simple individualist lens of a purportedly "practical ethics"--enables us to begin to distinguish peremptory directives from considered, politically aware, and sustainable strategies. But there remains the deep disjunct between the perspective of a system of global justice and the sedimented power structures of the current global order. Part of what a clearly articulated theory reveals is that some individuals' giving away income may do little to remedy this schism. While charity may produce improvements, it may at worst cause harm, or at least the relevant resources might be better used in another way. No doubt there are good reasons to support organizations that produce sustainable changes in the background framework of social institutions. But a systemic and long-term approach involves far more than targeting donations better. It requires a nuanced awareness that politics is ineradicably about scale and connectedness, and thus the coordinated action of multiple interdependent roles. We must play those roles not with an eye to making us, the relatively wealthy or developed country citizens, feel better, but with a view to which complexes of agencies and actions will generate the most sustainable positive momentum. This means that the language of sacrifice must generally give way to a deeper and better language: the language of social and economic cooperation conditioned by the interests of the globally disadvantaged. For all their deficiencies, both Rawls and Marx have in place large parts of a political philosophy. Singer does not. It is badly needed if he wishes to provide guidance for engendering lasting improvements to the lives of the needy. Singer and political philosophy might benefit significantly from his turning his mind and formidable pen to this range of difficult questions. As Wittgenstein put it, with characteristically wry acuity: "If someone tells me he has bought the outfit of a tightrope walker I am not impressed until I see what he has done with it." (41)

#### And, Their totalizing criticism of power prevents reform—we must use the state for incremental ends.

Faubian ‘94

[James D., professor of anthro @ Rice University, Michel Foucault: Power, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 3, 1994, p. xxxi-xxxii]

Foucault wanted, then, to move both the descriptive and prescriptive functions of political analysis away from the “juridico-discursive” language of legitimation. To try to put the matter as simply as possible: he **does not think that all** power is evil or all government **unacceptable**, but does think that theorems claiming to confer legitimacy on power or government are fictions; in a lecture of 1979, he expresses sympathy with the view of earlier political skeptics that “civil society is a bluff and the social contract a fairy tale.” This does not mean that the subject matter of political philosophy is evacuated, for doctrines of legitimation have been and may still act as political forces in history. But his analytic quarrel with legitimation theory is that it can divert us from considering the terms in which modern government confers rationality, and thus possible acceptability, on its activity and practice. This is the main reason why he argues political analysis is still immature, having still not cut off the king’s head.1o **The deployment and application of law is**, for Foucault, like everything else, not good or evil in itself**, capable of acting in the framework of liberalism as an instrument for** economizing and **moderating the interventions of governmental power, necessary as an indispensable restraint on power** in some contexts, uses, and guises; **it is to be** **resisted as an encroaching menace in oth**ers. In his governmentality lectures, Foucault investigates the evolution, from the era of the police states through the development of parliamentary liberal government, of the ambiguous and dangerous hybridization of law with a rationality of security and with new theories of social solidarity and social defense. This historical analysis and diagnosis informs Foucault’s commentary on the civil liberties politics of seventies France, with its distinctive contemporary recrudescence of raison d’etat and the police state. But at the same time, in a way we tend not to think of as typically French, he dryly mocked and debunked the excesses of what he called “state phobia”—the image of the contemporary state as an agency of essential evil and limitless despotism. **The state**, he said, **does not have a unitary essence** or indeed the importance commonly ascribed to it: what are important to study are the multiple governmental practices that are exercised through its institutions and elsewhere. (In a lecture describing the seventeenth-century theory of raison d’etat, Foucault characterized it as a doctrine of the “permanent coup d’etat”—a piquant choice of phrase, because it had been the title of a polemical book written against de Gaulle by Francois Mitterrand. We know that Foucault did not share the view, common in the French Left, of de Gaulle’s government as an antidemocratic putsch with crypto-fascistic tendencies**.” The Left**, he also suggested, **should expect to win elected power not by demonizing the state** (never a very convincing platform for a socialist party) **but by showing it possessed its own conception of how to govern**.

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#### Third, confirmation biases take-out their impacts: refusing to switch-sides both makes their claims more polarized and radical than the truth and makes them overconfident that they are right—switching sides is the only way to have an epistemic foundation to our arguments

Mercier 11

[Hugo & Hélène Landemore, Professors of Philosophy & Political Science at UPenn and Yale, “Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation”, Political Psychology, in press, p. http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications]

Reasoning can function outside of its normal conditions when it is used purely internally. But it is not enough for reasoning to be done in public to achieve good results. And indeed the problems of individual reasoning highlighted above, such as polarization and overconfidence, can also be found in group reasoning (Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Sunstein, 2002). Polarization and overconfidence happen because not all group discussion is deliberative. According to some definitions of deliberation, including the one used in this paper, reasoning has to be applied to the same thread of argument from different opinions for deliberation to occur. As a consequence, “If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views 20 before they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation.” (Thompson, 2008: 502). We will presently review evidence showing that the absence or the silencing of dissent is a quasi-necessary condition for polarization or overconfidence to occur in groups. Group polarization has received substantial empirical support. 11 So much support in fact that Sunstein has granted group polarization the status of law (Sunstein, 2002). There is however an important caveat: group polarization will mostly happen when people share an opinion to begin with. In defense of his claim, Sunstein reviews an impressive number of empirical studies showing that many groups tend to form more extreme opinions following discussion. The examples he uses, however, offer as convincing an illustration of group polarization than of the necessity of having group members that share similar beliefs at the outset for polarization to happen (e.g. Sunstein, 2002: 178). Likewise, in his review of the group polarization literature, Baron notes that “The crucial antecedent condition for group polarization to occur is the presence of a likeminded group; i.e. individuals who share a preference for one side of the issue.” (Baron, 2005). Accordingly, when groups do not share an opinion, they tend to depolarize. This has been shown in several experiments in the laboratory (e.g. Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Likewise, studies of deliberation about political or legal issues report that many groups do not polarize (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Luskin, Fishkin, & Hahn, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin, Iyengar, & Fishkin, 2004; Mendelberg & Karpowitz, 2000). On the contrary, some groups show a homogenization of their attitude (they depolarize) (Luskin et al., 2007; Luskin et al., 2002). The contrasting effect of discussions with a supportive versus dissenting audience is transparent in the results reported by Hansen ( 2003 reported by Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Participants had been exposed to new information about a political 11 Evidence for the related concept of groupthink is more mixed (Baron, 2005). ￼21 issue. When they discussed it with their family and friends, they learned more facts supporting their initial position. On the other hand, during the deliberative weekend—and the exposition to other opinions that took place—they learned more of the facts supporting the view they disagreed with. The present theory, far from being contradicted by the observation that groups of like- minded people reasoning together tend to polarize, can in fact account straightforwardly for this observation. When people are engaged in a genuine deliberation, the confirmation bias present in each individual’s reasoning is checked,

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compensated by the confirmation bias of individuals who defend another opinion. When no other opinion is present (or expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to critically examine the arguments put forward by other discussants, since they share their opinion. Instead, they will use reasoning to strengthen these arguments or find other arguments supporting the same opinion. In most cases the reasons each individual has for holding the same opinion will be partially non-overlapping. Each participant will then be exposed to new reasons supporting the common opinion, reasons that she is unlikely to criticize. It is then only to be expected that group members should strengthen their support for the common opinion in light of these new arguments. In fact, groups of like-minded people should have little endogenous motivation to start reasoning together: what is the point of arguing with people we agree with? In most cases, such groups are lead to argue because of some external constraint. These constraints can be more or less artificial—a psychologist telling participants to deliberate or a judge asking a jury for a well supported verdict—but they have to be factored in the explanation of the phenomenon. 22 4. Conclusion: a situational approach to improving reasoning We have argued that reasoning should not be evaluated primarily, if at all, as a device that helps us generate knowledge and make better decisions through private reflection. Reasoning, in fact, does not do those things very well. Instead, we rely on the hypothesis that the function of reasoning is to find and evaluate arguments in deliberative contexts. This evolutionary hypothesis explains why, when reasoning is used in its normal conditions—in a deliberation—it can be expected to lead to better outcomes, consistently allowing deliberating groups to reach epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic status. Moreover, seeing reasoning as an argumentative device also provides a straightforward account of the otherwise puzzling confirmation bias—the tendency to search for arguments that favor our opinion. The confirmation bias, in turn, generates most of the problems people face when they reason in abnormal conditions— when they are not deliberating. This will happen to people who reason alone while failing to entertain other opinions in a private deliberation and to groups in which one opinion is so dominant as to make all others opinions—if they are even present—unable to voice arguments. In both cases, the confirmation bias will go unchecked and create polarization and overconfidence. We believe that the argumentative theory offers a good explanation of the most salient facts about private and public reasoning. This explanation is meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing psychological theories by providing both an answer to the why-questions and a coherent integrative framework for many previously disparate findings. The present article was mostly aimed at comparing deliberative vs. non-deliberative situations, but the theory could also be used to make finer grained predictions within deliberative situations. It is important to stress that the theory used as the backbone for the article is a theory of reasoning. The theory can only make predictions about reasoning, and not about the various other psychological mechanisms that impact the outcome of group discussion. We did not aim at 23 providing a general theory of group processes that could account for all the results in this domain. But it is our contention that the best way to reach this end is by investigating the relevant psychological mechanisms and their interaction. For these reasons, the present article should only be considered a first step towards more fined grained predictions of when and why deliberation is efficient.

1. ###  “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

 And Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan
American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)
should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Federal government is the central government in Washington DC
Encarta Online 2005,

United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United

States is centered in Washington, D.C. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Merriam Webster, no date [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase

intransitive verb

1: to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)

2 : to multiply by the production of young

transitive verb

1 : to make greater : augment [↑](#footnote-ref-3)