#### Engaging the state is critical to the ability of citizens to break into the project of solving global challenges: Engagement relies on an existing internationalist state and refocuses its energies through citizen participation in national institutions that solve for war as well as environmental and social challenges

Sassen 2009

[ColumbiaUniversity, istheauthorof TheGlobalCity (2ndedn, Princeton, 2001), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, 2008) and A Sociology of Globalisation (Norton,2007), among others, 2009, The Potential for a Progressive State?, uwyo//amp]

Using state power for a new global politics These post-1980s trends towards a greater interaction of national andglobal dynamics are not part of some unidirectional historical progres-sion. There have been times in the past when they may have been as strong in certain aspects as they are today (Sassen, 2008a: chapter 3). But the current positioning of national states is distinctive precisely because 270 Saskia Sassen the national state has become the most powerful complex organizational entity in the world, and because it is a resource that citizens, confined largely to the national, can aim at governing and using to develop novel political agendas. It is this mix of the national and the global that is so full of potential. The national state is one particular form of state: at the other end of this variable the state can be conceived of as a technical administrative capability that could escape the historic bounds of narrow nationalisms that have marked the state historically, or colonialism as the only form of internationalism that states have enacted. Stripping the state of the particularity of this historical legacy gives me more analytic freedom in conceptualising these processes and opens up the possibility of the denationalised state.As particular components of national states become the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central to glob-alisation they undergo change that is difficult to register or name. In my own work I have found useful the notion of an incipient denation-alising of specific components of national states, i.e. components that function as such institutional homes. The question for research then becomes what is actually ‘national’ in some of the institutional compo-nents of states linked to the implementation and regulation of economic globalisation. The hypothesis here would be that some components of national institutions, even though formally national, are not national in the sense in which we have constructed the meaning of that term overthe last hundred years.This partial, often highly specialised or at least particularised, dena-tionalisation can also take place in domains other than that of economic globalisation, notably the more recent developments in the humanrights regime which allow national courts to sue foreign firms and dictators, or which grant undocumented immigrants certain rights. Denationalisation is, thus, multivalent: it endogenises global agendas of many different types of actors, not only corporate firms and financial markets, but also human rights and environmental objectives. Those confined to the national can use national state institutions as a bridge into global politics. This is one kind of radical politics, and only one kind, that would use the capacities of hopefully increasingly denationalized states. The existence and the strengthening of global civil society organ-isations becomes strategic in this context. In all of this lie the possibilities of moving towards new types of joint global action by denationalized states–coalitions of the willing focused not on war but on environmental and social justice projects.

#### Only an understanding of the consequences of our advocacies can make us ethically responsible.

David Kennedy, Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, 2004, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism, p. xvii-xviii

Of course, activism and policy making are not always so distinct. The activist aspires not only to articulate what the universal requires, but also to make that articulation effective. The humanitarian policy maker is not simply governing to solve problems or please constitu­encies, but to foster outcomes which vindicate humanitarian values and objectives. We might see activists and policy makers as partners in governance. Increasingly, they share a common vocabulary. Per­haps the most familiar is the international law of force, whose terms — proportionality, self-defense, military necessity — have be­come common to military strategists, statesmen, and humanitarians alike. It can be unsettling to think of humanitarians, whether activists or policy makers, as participants in the world of power and influence. It is difficult to think of humanitarian vocabularies — human rights, hu­manitarian law — as idioms of statecraft. Humanitarians are used to thinking of their efforts as marginal, weak, barely able to be heard. Those who develop humanitarian policies often see themselves giv­ing advice rather than making policy, formulating proposals which others — the real rulers — will need to implement. But our work, our ideas, our institutions, our professional prac­tices of advocacy and policy making do have consequences. State power is now routinely exercised in the vocabularies of these helping professions. As is economic power. We should own the uses made of the institutions and professional practices we have set loose in the world. We should come to see humanitarians less as people outside looking in than as participants in governance. Their truth is also power. DARK SIDES Once we see international humanitarians as participants in global governance — as rulers — it seems irresponsible not to be as attentive as possible to the costs, as well as the benefits, of our work. Inter­national humanitarian efforts to rebuild societies, to reproach and shame the unjust, or to protect the vulnerable can all be swamped by the opposition and inattention of others, or undone by lack of re­sources and commitment among humanitarians themselves. Making humanitarian headway is almost always harder, more expensive, and more time-consuming than we expect. These quite formidable problems of implementation are not my focus. I am concerned about the difficulties which our best efforts themselves may bring, and with the unacknowledged costs of routine humanitarian endeavors on the international stage. I do not propose a unified theory for the dark sides of international humanitarianism. My sense, rather, is that things can go wrong in all sorts of different ways. We promise more than can be delivered — and come to believe our own promises. We enchant our tools, substitute work on our own institutions and promotion of our own professional expertise for work on the problems which gave rise to our humanitarian hopes. At worst, we can find our own work contributing to the very prob­lems we hoped to solve. Humanitarianism tempts us to hubris, to an idolatry about our intentions and routines, to the conviction that we know more than we do about what justice can be.

#### Turn—without evaluating a person in the context of terrorism will result in political paralysis and greater casualties---their K turns a blind eye to the horrific acts of terrorists and their unwavering vigilance to taking innocent lives

Peters 4 (Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel, 4 http://www.freeman.org/m\_online/apr04/peters.htm)

Have we lost the will to win wars? Not just in Iraq, but anywhere? Do we really believe that being nice is more important than victory? It's hard enough to bear the timidity of our civilian leaders—anxious to start wars but without the guts to finish them—but now **military leaders have fallen prey to political correctness**. Unwilling to accept that war is, by its nature, a savage act and that defeat is immoral, influential officers are arguing for a kinder, gentler approach to our enemies. **They're going to lead us into failure, sacrificing our soldiers and Marines for nothing: Political correctness kills.** Obsessed with low-level "tactical" morality—war's inevitable mistakes—the officers in question have lost sight of the strategic morality of winning. Our Army and Marine Corps are about to suffer the imposition of a new counterinsurgency doctrine designed for fairy-tale conflicts and utterly inappropriate for the religion-fueled, ethnicity-driven hyper-violence of our time. We're back to struggling to win hearts and minds that can't be won. The good news is that the Army and Marine Corps worked together on the new counterinsurgency doctrine laid out in Field Manual 3-24 (the Army version). The bad news is that the doctrine writers and their superiors came up with fatally wrong prescriptions for combating today's insurgencies. Astonishingly, the doctrine ignores faith-inspired terrorism and skirts ethnic issues in favor of analyzing yesteryear's political insurgencies. It would be a terrific manual if we returned to Vietnam circa 1963, but its recommendations are profoundly misguided when it comes to fighting terrorists intoxicated with religious visions and the smell of blood. Why did the officers in question avoid the decisive question of religion? Because the answers would have been ugly. Wars of faith and tribe are immeasurably crueler and tougher to resolve than ideological revolts. A Maoist in Malaya could be converted. But Islamist terrorists who regard death as a promotion are not going to reject their faith any more than an ethnic warrior can—or would wish to—change his blood identity. So the doctrine writers ignored today's reality. Al Qaeda and other terror organizations have stated explicitly and repeatedly that they're waging a global jihad to re-establish the caliphate. Yet the new manual ignores religious belief as a motivation. **The politically correct atmosphere in Washington deems any discussion** of religion as a strategic factor **indelicate: Let our troops die, just don't hurt anyone's feelings**. So the doctrine writers faked it, treating all insurgencies as political. As a result, they prescribed an excellent head-cold treatment—for a cancer patient. The text is a mush of pop-zen mantras such as "Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction," "The best weapons do not shoot," or "The more force used, the less effective it is." That's just nutty. **Should we have done nothing in the wake of 9/11? Would everything have been OK if we'd just been nicer? What non-lethal "best weapons" might have snagged Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora, where the problem was too little military force, not too much violence?** Should we have sent fewer troops to Iraq, where inadequate numbers crippled everything we attempted? Will polite chats with tribal chiefs stop the sectarian violence drenching Iraq in blood? On the surface, the doctrine appears sober and serious. But it's morally frivolous and intellectually inert, a pathetic rehashing of yesteryear's discredited "wisdom" on counterinsurgencies and, worst of all, driven by a stalker-quality infatuation with T.E. Lawrence, "Lawrence of Arabia," who not only was a huckster of the first order, but whose "revolt in the desert" was a near-meaningless sideshow of a sideshow. Lawrence is quoted repeatedly, with reverence. We might as well cite the British generals of the Great War who sent men over the top in waves to face German machine guns. You can trust two kinds of officers: Those who read a great deal and those who don't read at all. But beware the officer who reads just a little and falls in love with one book. A little education really is a dangerous thing. The new manual is thick - length is supposed to substitute for insight. It should be 75 percent shorter and 100 percent more honest. If issued to our troops in its present form, it will lead to expensive failures. Various generals have already tried its prescriptions in Iraq—with discouraging results, to put it mildly. We've reached a fateful point when senior officers seek to evade war's brute reality. Our leaders, in and out of uniform, must regain their moral courage. We can't fight wars of any kind if the entire chain of command runs for cover every time an ambitious journalist cries, "War crime!" And sorry: **Soccer balls are no substitute for bullets when you face fanatics willing to kill every child on the playing** field. In war, you don't get points for good manners. It's about winning. Victory forgives. The new counterinsurgency doctrine recommends forbearance, patience, understanding, non-violent solutions and even outright passivity. Unfortunately, **our enemies won't sign up for a replay of the Summer of Love in San Francisco. We can't treat hardcore terrorists like Halloween pranksters on mid-term break from prep school** Where is the spirit of FDR and George C. Marshall, who recognized that the one unbearable possibility was for the free world to lose? We discount the value of ferocity —as a practical tool and as a deterrent. But war's immutable law —proven yet again in Iraq—is that those unwilling to pay the butcher's bill up front will pay it with compound interest in the end. The new counterinsurgency doctrine is dishonest and cowardly. We don't face half-hearted Marxists tired of living in the jungle, but religious zealots who behead prisoners to please their god and who torture captives by probing their skulls with electric drills. We're confronted by hatreds born of blood and belief and madmen whose appetite for blood is insatiable. And we're afraid to fight.

#### Terror rhetoric necessary- term key to create new forms of knowledge

Gunning 07

(Jeroen, Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence Department of International Politics, “Babies and Bathwaters: Reflecting on the Pitfalls of Critical Studies on Terrorism,” 2007, <http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/8/9/6/pages178966/p178966-1.php>) /wyo-mm

Usage of the term ‘terrorism’ also poses serious security problems for those conducting fieldwork among ‘terrorists’ and the communities they belong to. 16 A colleague whose publisher insisted on including ‘terrorism’ in her book title found that her relationship with her research subjects had come under serious strain as a result. If one of the aims of CTS is to engage both those considered ‘terrorist’ and their communities, converging under the term ‘terrorism’ may have considerable drawbacks. Yet, if we do not converge under a central concept such as ‘terrorism’, however problematic, much of this critical research will remain fragmented, 17 preventing cross- fertilisation between critical cognate perspectives but also leaving traditional approaches and policy-makers relatively unchallenged. 18 There are two further reasons for retaining ‘terrorism’. One of the key tasks of CTS is to investigate the political usage of this term. For that reason alone, it should be retained as a central marker. The term ‘terrorism’ is furthermore currently so dominant that CTS cannot afford to abandon it. Academia does not exist outside the power structures of its day. However problematic the term, it dominates public discourse and as such needs to be engaged with, deconstructed and challenged, rather than abandoned and left to less critical scholars. Funds earmarked for studying ‘terrorism’ should similarly not be left simply to others.

#### Terror threats aren’t constructed- they’re real and empirically proven

Allison 04

(Graham, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Pgs. 8-9//wyo-mm)

Polls taken in 2003 found that four out of every ten Americans say that they “often worry about the chances of a nuclear attack by terrorists.”11 Are these fears exaggerated? Not in the best judgment of those who have carefully examined the evidence. In 2000, two of the most respected and thoughtful Americans who had no previous responsibility in this arena, Howard BS. Ambassador to Japan, having served previously as President Ronald Reagan’s chief of staff and as majority leader of the Senate. Cutler, a Democrat, has been counsel to the president in both the Carter and the Clinton administrations. The principal finding of the Report Card they presented to the Bush administration in January 2001 states bluntly: “The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction of weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen, sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states and used against American troops abroad o citizens t home.”12 As Baker testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “It really boggles my mind that there could be 40,000 nuclear weapons, or maybe 80,000, in the former Soviet Union, poorly controlled and poorly stored, and that the world isn’t in a near state o hysteria about the danger.”13 The imminence of this threat becomes evident as one considers three points. First, thefts of weapons-usable material and attempts to steal nuclear weapons are not a hypothetical possibility, but a proven and recurring fact.14 Thousands of weapons and tens of thousands of potential weapons (Softball-size lumps of highly enriched uranium and plutonium) remain today in unsecured storage facilities in Russia, vulnerable to theft by determined criminals who could then sell them to terrorists. In the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been hundreds of confirmed cases of successful theft of nuclear materials in which the thieves were captured, sometimes in Russia, on other occasions in the Czech Republic, Germany, and elsewhere. Every month those who follow current events closely will learn of yet another occasion in which nuclear material was stolen or a theft attempted.

#### Preventing extinction is the highest ethical priority – we should take action to prevent the Other from dying FIRST, only THEN can we consider questions of value to life

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online: <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm>

#### All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights

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#### A rejection of America’s future based on a negative past destroys any potential for positive political change.

Rorty, 1999

(Richard, Professor Emeritus of Comparative Literature and, by courtesy, of Philosophy at Stanford University, Achieving Our Country) KH

One does not need to know whether Silko has read Foucault or Heidegger to see her novel as offering a vision of recent history similar to the one which readers of those two philosophers often acquire. In this vision, the two-hundred- year history of the United States—indeed, the history of the European and American peoples since the Enlightenment— has been pervaded by hypocrisy and self-deception. Readers of Foucault often come away believing that no shackles have been broken in the past two hundred years: the harsh old chains have merely been replaced with slightly more comfortable ones. Heidegger describes America’s success in blanketing the world with modern technology as the spread of a wasteland. Those who find Foucault and Heidegger convincing often view the United States of America as Silko does: as something we must hope will be replaced, as soon as possible, by something utterly different.

Such people find pride in American citizenship impossible, and vigorous participation in electoral politics pointless. They associate American patriotism with an endorsement of atrocities: the importation of African slaves, the slaughter of Native Americans, the rape of ancient forests, and the Vietnam War. Many of them think of national pride as appropriate only for chauvinists: for the sort of American who rejoices that America can still orchestrate something like the Gulf War, can still bring deadly force to bear whenever and wherever it chooses. When young intellectuals watch John Wayne war movies after reading Heidegger, Foucault, Stephenson, or Silko, they often become convinced that they live in a violent, inhuman, corrupt country. They begin to think of themselves as a saving remnant—as the happy few who have the insight to see through nationalist rhetoric to the ghastly reality of contemporary America. But this insight does not move them to formulate a legislative program, to join a political movement, or to share in a national hope.

### Experts Good/Critical

**Experts are critical—they have extensive knowledge of primary and secondary works in their field, and the capacity to correctly apply that information to new situations**

**Goldman, 2001**

[Alvin, University of Arizona, “Experts: Which ones should you trust?” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63.1, 85-110, Online, <http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/goldman/SeminarFall2007/October%2031st/Goldman%20-%20Experts%20Which%20Ones%20Should%20You%20Trust.pdf>] /Wyo-MB

Before addressing this question, we should say more about the nature of expertise and the sorts of experts we are concerned with here. Some kinds of experts a r e unusually accomplished at certain skills, including violinists, billiards players, textile designers, and s o forth. These are not the kinds of experts with which epistemology is most naturally concerned. For epistemological purposes we shall mainly focus on **cognitive or intellectual experts**: people who have (or claim to **have) a superior quantity or level of knowledge in s ome domain and an ability to generate new knowledge in answer to questions within the domain.** Admittedly, there are elements of skill or know-how in intellectual matters too, so the boundary between skill expertise and cognitive expertise is not a sharp one. Nonetheless, I shall try to work on only one side of this rough divide, the intellectual side. How shall we define expertise in the cognitive sense? **What distinguishes an expert from a layperson**, in a given cognitive domain? I'll begin by specifying an objective sense of expertise, what it is to be an expert, not what it is to have a reputation for expertise. Once the objective sense is specified, the reputational sense readily follows: a reputational expert is someone widely believed to be an expert (in the objective sense), whether or not he really is one. Turning to objective expertise, then, I first propose that cognitive expertise be defined in "veritistic" (truth-linked) terms. As a first pass, **experts in a given domain** (the E-domain) **have more beliefs** (or high degrees of belief) **in true propositions and/or fewer beliefs in false propositions within that domain than most people do** (or better: than the vast majority of people do). According to this proposal, **expertise is largely a comparative matter.** However, I do not think it is wholly comparative. If the vast majority of people are full of false beliefs in a domain and Jones exceeds them slightly by not succumbing t o a few falsehoods that a r e widely shared, that still d o e s not ma k e him an "expert" (from a God's-eye point of view). **To qualify as a cognitive expert, a person must possess a substantial body of truths in the target domain**. Being an expert is not simply a matter of veritistic superiority to most of the community. Some non-comparative threshold of veritistic attainment must be reached, though there is great vagueness in setting this threshold. **Expertise** is not all a matter of possessing accurate information. It **includes a capacity or disposition to deploy or exploit this fund of information to form beliefs in true answers to new questions that may be posed in the domain.** This arises from some set of skills or techniques that constitute part of what it is to be an expert. **An expert has the (cognitive) know-how, when presented with a new question in the domain, to go to the right sectors of his information-bank and perform appropriate operations on this information; or to deploy some external apparatus or data-banks to disclose relevant material. So expertise features a propensity element** as well as an element of actual attainment. A third possible feature of expertise may require a little modification in what we said earlier. To discuss this feature, let us distinguish the primary and secondary questions in a domain. Primary questions are the principal questions of interest to the researchers or students of the subject-matter. Secondary questions concern the existing evidence or arguments that bear on the primary questions, and the assessments of the evidence made by prominent researchers. In general, **an expert in a field is someone who has** (comparatively) **extensive knowledge** (in the weak sense of knowledge, i.e., true belief) **of the state of the evidence, and knowledge of the opinions and reactions to that evidence by prominent workers in the field**. In the central sense of "expert" (a strong sense), **an expert is someone with an unusually extensive body of knowledge on both primary and secondary questions in the domain**. However, there may also be a weak sense of "expert", in which it includes someone who merely has extensive knowledge on the secondary questions in the domain. Consider two people with strongly divergent views on the primary questions in the domain, so that one of them is largely right and the other is largely wrong. By the original, strong criterion, the one who is largely wrong would not qualify as an expert. People might disagree with this as the final word on the matter. They might hold that anyone with a thorough knowledge of the existing evidence and the differing views held by the workers in the field deserves to be called an expert. I concede this by acknowledging the weak sense of "expert". Applying what has been said above, we can say that **an expert** (in the strong sense) in domain D **is someone who possesses an extensive fund of knowledge (true belief) and a set of skills or methods for apt and successful deployment of this knowledge to new questions in the domain**. Anyone purporting to be a (cognitive) expert in a given domain will claim to have such a fund and set of methods, and will claim to have true answers to the question ( ~ ) under dispute because he has applied his fund and his methods to the question(s). **The task for** the layperson who is **consulting putative experts**, and who hopes thereby to learn a true answer to the target question, **is to decide who has superior expertise, or who has better deployed** his **expertise to the question at hand.** T h e novicet2-experts problem is whether a layperson can justifiably choose one putative expert as more credible or trustworthy than the other with respect to the question at hand, and what might be the epistemic basis for such a choice ?

#### REAL PROBLEMS DEMAND ACTION – IVORY TOWER CRITICISMS CAUSE IMMOBILIZATION

Booth ‘95

[Ken, Prof. of IR, “Human wrongs and international relations,” *International Affaris*, ASP//delizzozzle]

Philosophical sceptics, for whom nothing is certain, and so for whom the bases of action are always problematic, are a familiar feature of academic life Tom Stoppard enjoyable caricatured them in his clever comedy Jumpers, and in particular in the scene in which philosophical sceptics were discussed whether the train for Bristol left yesterday from Paddington station. On what basis could they ever know? Even if they were actually on the train that was supposed to leave for Bristol, might not the happening be explained by Paddington leaving the train? We all know such conundrums, and indeed such people Meanwhile, flesh is being fed or famished, and people are being tortured and killed And even philospohical skeptics have to catch trains Some of them do Unless acadmeics are merely to spread confusion, or snipe from the windows of ivory towers, we must engage with the real. This means having the ‘courage of our confusions’ and thinking and acting without certainty.

In reply to those sensitive to post-colonial critiques of Western imperialism I would argue that just because many Western ideas were spread by commerce and the Gatling gun, it does not follow that every idea originating in the West, or backed by Western opinion, should therefore simply be labelled ‘imperialist’ and rejected. There are some ethnocentric ideas – and individual human rights is one of them – for which we should not apologize. Furthermore, I do not see the dissemination of powerful social and political ideas as necessarily occurring in one direction only. As the economic and political power of Asia grows, for example, so will its cultural power. World politics in the next century will be more Asian than the present one. What matters from a cosmopolitan perspective is not the birthplace of an idea, but the meaning we give it.