# 2ac

## Damage suits

#### Ex post review fails to solve legitimacy or set up a legal framework

Crandall 12 (Carla, Law Clerk – Supreme Court of Missouri, “Ready…Fire…Aim! A Case for Applying American Due Process Principles Before Engaging in Drone Strikes,” Florida Journal of International Law, April, 24 Fla. J. Int'l L. 55, Lexis)

Despite the expanded use of drones, however, the legitimacy of these attacks remains unclear. Most commentators who have addressed the legitimacy of more general targeted killings have examined the issue within the framework of either international humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law (IHRL). n6 Those limited few who have [\*57] analyzed the subject through the lens of American due process have limited their scrutiny to the absence of post-deprivation rights. n7 They suggest, for instance, that the United States should implement some sort of Bivens-type action as a remedy for the survivors of erroneous drone strikes. n8

As this Article explains, however, none of these approaches yield wholly satisfactory answers as to which framework should govern the use of drones within the context of the war on terror. And though the idea that American due process principles ought to be applied ex post represents a significant contribution to the debate, it too ultimately falls flat. Indeed, such an approach unduly narrows the obligation of U.S. officials to the standard of readying, firing, and then aiming- requiring them to perform a detailed review of the strikes only after the fact. Instead, this Article argues that the United States ought to be held to a higher, ex ante standard-that of "aiming" before firing-and posits that such a standard is practically attainable.

In doing so, the Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the capabilities and current employment of drones and explains why resolving the legitimacy of their use is so critical. Specifically, it highlights that, despite the unsettled nature of the law in this area, targeted killings by drone strikes have increased exponentially in recent years-in some instances against arguably questionable targets. Part III examines current attempts to address the legitimacy of drone assaults and explains why they fail to adequately govern the use of these weapons. While this Part explores the applicability of IHRL and IHL, it does not undertake to resolve the debate as to which regime does or ought to apply to these operations. To the contrary, it argues that limitations within each framework have prevented consensus from forming around the applicability of either. Accordingly, U.S. officials [\*58] must arguably look to other sources to find guiding principles to legitimize targeted killings via drones. Though it is admittedly not entirely clear whether constitutional guarantees apply in the foreign locales where these strikes occur-or to the foreign nationals who are often their target-this Part proposes that American due process principles nevertheless ought to be invoked before such strikes occur, because failing to do so allows the executive to act with impunity in a legal void. Part IV argues that, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld n9 and Boumediene v. Bush, n10 the Supreme Court signaled the process that may be due before drones are used to eliminate known terrorist targets. In extending the Hamdi and Boumediene analysis to targeted killings by drones, this Part also begins the inquiry into the procedural protections that due process may demand before U.S. officials engage in such actions. Part V concludes.

#### *They will LOSE THE CASES—turns the counterplan*

Murphy and Radsan – Their Author – 9 (Richard, AT&T Professor of Law – Texas Tech University School of Law, and Afsheen John, Professor – William Mitchell College of Law; Assistant General Counsel – Central Intelligence Agency, “Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists,” Cardozo Law Review, November, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 405, Lexis)

In addition, the doctrine of qualified immunity requires dismissal of actions against officials if a court determines they reasonably believed they were acting within the scope of their legal authority.220 Defendants would satisfy this requirement so long as they reasonably claimed they had authority under the laws of war (assuming their applicability). These standards are hazy, and a court applying them would tend to defer to the executive on matters of military judgment.221

In view of so many practical and legal hurdles, some courts and commentators might be inclined to categorically reject all Bivens-style challenges to targeted killings. In essence, they might view lawsuits related to targeted killing as a political question left to the executive.222 This view parallels Justice Thomas‘s that courts should not second-guess executive judgments as to who is an enemy combatant.223 Contrary to Justice Thomas‘s view, the potency of the government‘s threshold defenses means that targeted-killing cases that make it to the merits would likely involve the most egregious conduct—for example, killing an unarmed Jose Padilla at O‘Hare Airport on a shoot-to-kill order. For these egregious cases, a judicial check on executive authority is most necessary.

#### Counterplan wrecks TK operations and broader military effectiveness

Stuart Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Division, 12/14/12, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MTD-AAA.pdf

First, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly held that where claims directly implicate matters involving national security and particularly war powers, special factors counsel hesitation. See Doe, 683 F.3d at 394-95 (discussing the “strength of the special factors of military and national security” in refusing to infer remedy for citizen detained by military in Iraq); Ali, 649 F.3d at 773 (explaining that “the danger of obstructing U.S. national security policy” is a special factor in refusing to infer remedy for aliens detained in Iraq and Afghanistan (internal quotation and citation omitted)); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (same for aliens detained at Guantánamo Bay). These cases alone should control Plaintiffs’ claims here. Plaintiffs challenge the alleged targeting of and missile strikes against members of AQAP in Yemen. Few cases more clearly present “the danger of obstructing U.S. national security policy” than this one. Ali, 649 F.3d at 773. Accordingly, national security considerations bar inferring a remedy for Plaintiffs’ claims.19 Second, Plaintiffs’ claims implicate the effectiveness of the military. As with national security, the D.C. Circuit has consistently held that claims threatening to undermine the military’s command structure and effectiveness present special factors. See Doe, 683 F.3d at 396; Ali, 649 F.3d at 773. Allowing a damages suit brought by the estate of a leader of AQAP against officials who allegedly targeted and directed the strike against him would fly in the face of explicit circuit precedent. As the court in Ali explained: “It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.” 649 F.3d at 773 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779). Moreover, allowing such suits to proceed “would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals.” Id.; see also Vance, 2012 WL 5416500 at \*5 (“The Supreme Court’s principal point was that civilian courts should not interfere with the military chain of command . . . .”); Lebron, 670 F.3d at 553 (barring on special factors grounds Bivens claims by detained terrorist because suit would “require members of the Armed Services and their civilian superiors to testify in court as to each other’s decisions and actions” (citation and internal quotation omitted)). Creating a new damages remedy in the context of alleged missile strikes against enemy forces in Yemen would have the same, if not greater, negative outcome on the military

 as in the military detention context that is now well-trodden territory in this and other circuits. These suits “would disrupt and hinder the ability of our armed forces to act decisively and without hesitation in defense of our liberty and national interests.” Ali, 649 F.3d at 773 (citation and internal quotation omitted). To infuse such hesitation into the real-time, active-war decision-making of military officers absent authorization to do so from Congress would have profound implications on military effectiveness. This too warrants barring this new species of litigation.

## Prez powers

#### 1st, Pres powers low now—Syria decision undermined Obama’s presidential powers

Nather and Palmer, 9-1-13

[David and Anna, Politico, Bushies fear Obama weakening presidency, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/bushies-fear-obama-weakening-presidency-96143.html] /Wyo-MB

President Barack Obama just turned decades of debate over presidential war powers on its head.¶ Until Saturday, when Obama went to Congress to ask for permission to strike Syria, the power to launch military action had been strongly in the hands of the commander in chief. Even the 1973 War Powers Resolution allows bombs to start falling before the president has to ask Congress for long-term approval.¶ For three decades after Watergate, conservatives like Dick Cheney and those of his ilk sought to increase executive branch power that they felt had been eroded by liberal congressional reformers. George W. Bush’s legal team crafted controversial opinions that emboldened the White House on a wide range of national security areas, from interrogation to surveillance.¶ That makes the move by Obama to hand a piece of the messy situation in Syria to Congress a clear step in the other direction — an abdication of power to Congress at a moment when he has no good solutions.¶ And even if Obama ultimately balks at Congress if they vote down his ask, prominent conservatives who fueled the expansion of presidential power — especially Bush administration alums — are beside themselves, arguing that Obama has weakened the presidency.

#### 2nd, A multitude of other actors hamper presidential flexibility—thumps the disad

Rozell 12

(Mark Rozell, Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University, “From Idealism to Power: The Presidency in the Age of Obama” 2012, <http://www.libertylawsite.org/book-review/from-idealism-to-power-the-presidency-in-the-age-of-obama/>, KB)

A substantial portion of Goldsmith’s book presents in detail his case that various forces outside of government, and some within, are responsible for hamstringing the president in unprecedented fashion: Aggressive, often intrusive, journalism, that at times endangers national security; human rights and other advocacy groups, some domestic and other cross-national, teamed with big resources and talented, aggressive lawyers, using every legal category and technicality possible to complicate executive action; courts thrust into the mix, having to decide critical national security law controversies, even when the judges themselves have little direct knowledge or expertise on the topics brought before them; attorneys within the executive branch itself advising against actions based on often narrow legal interpretations and with little understanding of the broader implications of tying down the president with legalisms.

#### 3rd Link Turn—extend plan bolsters executive action—Obama power is vindicated when he has the backing and support of courts, plan results in more decisive executive actions.

Chebab, 2012

[Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review, 3-30-12, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2031572] /Wyo-MB

Rather, balancing the needs of security against the imperatives of liberty is a traditional¶ role for judges to play as recognized by the founders in the Fourth Amendment.110 Two scholars of national security law have highlighted the value of judicial inclusion in this process:¶ Judicial control of targeted killing could increase the accuracy of target selection, reducing the danger of mistaken or illegal destruction of lives, limbs, and property. Independent judges who double-check targeting decisions could catch errors and cause executive officials to avoid making them in the first place.”111¶ Judges are also both knowledgeable in the vagaries of the law and accustomed to dealing with sensitive security considerations.112 These qualifications make them ideal candidates to ensure that the executive exercises constitutional and international legal restraint when targeting individuals abroad. Reforming the decision-making process to allow for judicial oversight would accomplish numerous other important goals as well. Aside from providing a valuable check on executive power to take away the most fundamental of freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution—the right to life—judicial oversight would reinforce the separation of powers framework of American government and increase democratic legitimacy by placing these determinations on more predictable and accountable legal grounds. For those fearful of judicial encroachment on executive war-making powers, there is a strong argument that this will actually strengthen the President and empower him to take decisive action without worrying about the judicial consequences. As Justice Kennedy put it, “the exercise of [executive] powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the judicial branch.”113 Moreover, though it may be technically legal under international and domestic law, the targeted killing program has become a black spot on American credibility around the globe. The introduction of significant checks on unilateral executive power to target known terrorists can help reform that image and reinstate American moral legitimacy in its use of force against global terrorism.114

#### Political power is not zero sum—no trade off

Read, 3-1-12

[James, College of Saint Benedict/Saint John's University, jread@csbsju.edu, Is Power Zero-Sum or Variable-Sum? Old Arguments and New Beginnings, Political Science Faculty Publications.Paper 4, http://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=polsci\_pubs] /Wyo-MB

The specific question with which this essay is concerned is whether power – and ¶ especially political power – should be regarded as inherently zero-sum, one‟s agent‟s gain ¶ entailing by definition an equivalent loss for another or others; or variable-sum, whereby it is ¶ possible to have mutual gains of power not offset by equivalent losses somewhere else (positivesum), and mutual losses of power not offset by equivalent gains somewhere else (negative-sum). ¶ This essay is part of a larger book-length project that will systematically examine zero-sum and ¶ variable-sum understandings of power; and argue that a variable-sum understanding of power is ¶ at least as fruitful in describing actual power relations – including relations characterized by ¶ significant conflict – as the zero-sum view (see Read 2009a; 2010).

## Security

#### Preventing extinction is the highest ethical priority – we should take action to prevent the Other from dying FIRST, only THEN can we consider questions of value to life

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online: <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm>

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence.

 This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

#### First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan.

#### Second, is reasons to prefer:

#### A. Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 9 minutes of the 1ac

#### B. It is predictable, the resolution demands USFG action

#### C. It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another

#### Engaging the state is critical to the ability of citizens to break into the project of solving global challenges: Engagement relies on an existing internationalist state and refocuses its energies through citizen participation in national institutions that solve for war as well as environmental and social challenges

Sassen 2009

[ColumbiaUniversity, istheauthorof TheGlobalCity (2ndedn, Princeton, 2001), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, 2008) and A Sociology of Globalisation (Norton,2007), among others, 2009, The Potential for a Progressive State?, uwyo//amp]

Using state power for a new global politics These post-1980s trends towards a greater interaction of national andglobal dynamics are not part of some unidirectional historical progres-sion. There have been times in the past when they may have been as strong in certain aspects as they are today (Sassen, 2008a: chapter 3). But the current positioning of national states is distinctive precisely because 270 Saskia Sassen the national state has become the most powerful complex organizational entity in the world, and because it is a resource that citizens, confined largely to the national, can aim at governing and using to develop novel political agendas. It is this mix of the national and the global that is so full of potential. The national state is one particular form of state: at the other end of this variable the state can be conceived of as a technical administrative capability that could escape the historic bounds of narrow nationalisms that have marked the state historically, or colonialism as the only form of internationalism that states have enacted. Stripping the state of the particularity of this historical legacy gives me more analytic freedom in conceptualising these processes and opens up the possibility of the denationalised state.As particular components of national states become the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central to glob-alisation they undergo change that is difficult to register or name. In my own work I have found useful the notion of an incipient denation-alising of specific components of national states, i.e. components that function as such institutional homes. The question for research then becomes what is actually ‘national’ in some of the institutional compo-nents of states linked to the implementation and regulation of economic globalisation. The hypothesis here would be that some components of national institutions, even though formally national, are not national in the sense in which we have constructed the meaning of that term overthe last hundred years.This partial, often highly specialised or at least particularised, dena-tionalisation can also take place in domains other than that of economic globalisation, notably the more recent developments in the humanrights regime which allow national courts to sue foreign firms and dictators, or which grant undocumented immigrants certain rights. Denationalisation is, thus, multivalent: it endogenises global agendas of many different types of actors, not only corporate firms and financial markets, but also human rights and environmental objectives. Those confined to the national can use national state institutions as a bridge into global politics. This is one kind of radical politics, and only one kind, that would use the capacities of hopefully increasingly denationalized states. The existence and the strengthening of global civil society organ-isations becomes strategic in this context. In all of this lie the possibilities of moving towards new types of joint global action by denationalized states–coalitions of the willing focused not on war but on environmental and social justice projects.

#### No link—

#### Security is inevitable—rejecting it causes the state to become more interventionist, flipping the impact

**McCormack 10**

[Tara McCormack, ’10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 59-61)]

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states **a more interventionary role**, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and **ultimately lead to more power for powerful states**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

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### 1AR – Risk Inevitable

#### Risk in the international system is inevitable—the goal should be to weigh the impacts of action vs inaction in the face of a particular threat.

**Harvard Nuclear Study Group 83** (*Living with Nuclear Weapons*, p.16-7)

When President John F. Kennedy was shown irrefutable evidence of the Soviet missile emplacement – U-2 photographs of the missile bases in Cube – he and his advisors discussed the matter for six days before deciding on an American response to the challenge. The decision, to place a naval blockade around the island, was not a risk-free response. This, Kennedy honestly admitted to the nation the night of October 22, 1962: My fellow citizens, let no one doubt this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take… But the great danger of all would be to do nothing. Why did the president believe that “to do nothing” about the missiles in Cuba would be an even greater danger than accepting the “difficult and dangerous” course of the blockade? He accepted some risk of war in the long run, by discouraging future Soviet aggressive behavior. Inaction might have led to an even more dangerous future. This the president also explained that night in his address to the nation: [This] sudden, clandestine decision to station weapons for the first time outside Soviet soil – is a deliberate provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted by either friend or foe. The 1930’s taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. The American government managed the 1962 crisis with skill and restraint – offering a compromise to the Soviets and giving them sufficient time to call back their missile-laden ships, for example – and the missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. The president carefully supervised American military actions to ensure that his orders were not misunderstood. He did not push his success too far or ignore the real risks of war. The point here is not, to make the blockade a model for American action in the future: different circumstances may call for different policies. Rather the point is to underline the persistence of risk in international affairs. Every proposed response to the Soviet action – doing nothing, enforcing the blockade, or invading Cuba – entailed some risk of nuclear war. Kennedy’s task – and we think his success – was to weigh accurately the risks entailed in each course and decide on policy accordingly.

### 1AR – Threat Construction Good

#### Threat construction is good – it allows us to anticipate and prevent danger

Joseph Berke, Found. And Dir. Arbours Crisis Centre, 1998, Even Paranoids Have Enemies, p. 5-6

Internal and external persecution come together in the theoretical model of ‘the paranoid process’ – a set of developmental and defensive mechanisms which serve to delineate the individual’s inner psychic world and his experience of his emerging self, while, at the same time, contributing to the shaping of his sense of significant objects in his experiential world (Meissner 1986). One of this model’s core components, ‘the paranoid construction’ refers to a cognitive reorganization taking place in an attempt to sustain a comfortable sense of self which, however, may be at the expense of reality testing. This process, in its extreme form, leads to the formation of a persecutory bond, where a link is established between, on the one hand, the paranoid individual and, on the other, his persecutors and the terrifying forces that threaten to engulf him. This can become a rigid construction that reinforces the spiral of paranoia-persecution-paranoia. Meissner understands this mechanism as offering a sense of cohesion and durability to a fragile self, though it often involves a high degree of pathology and victimization. Instances of this process abound in individuals, institutions, and groups (including whole nations) where views of internal and external situations are (ab)used to service a brittle sense of identity. Fully recognizing this predicament, and the dangers involved, requires thinking about and tolerating our own conflictual parts. Paradoxically, a certain degree of paranoia is desirable as it is a basis for discrimination (Segal 1994); when we let a new experience touch us, we acknowledge that it may be bad or good, which enables us to anticipate danger. In leaders of an organization, for instance, a certain degree of paranoid potential can be a useful resource, as opposed to a dangerous naivety that would prevent the leader from becoming aware of the situations of activation of aggression in the group, or regression to primitive levels of functioning. Where the leader can be aware of, and apprehend risk and danger, there is the possibility of preparation for the group to face them and cope with them.